ENI

ENI
US Operations
Risk Analysis, Risk Management and Process

Safety Management
Technical Proposal
Add Energy Ref. No.

AE.AIM.ENI.RARM.TECH_001
Technical Proposal
Risk Analysis, Risk Management and Process Safety Management
Date: Revision/Reference No: Pages:
20.05.2019 AE.AIM.ENI.RARM.TECH_001 TBD
Client:
ENI Petroleum
Client Contact:
Chelsea Lynch
Contract Specialist
E-Mail: chelsea.lynch@external.eni.com
Add Energy Contact:
Sonia Zelaya
Technical Manager
E-Mail: sonia.zelaya@addenergy.no
Role: Names: Signature:
Author Sonia Zelaya Text
Technical Focal Point Daniel McGowan
Reviewer Susan Steyn
Abstract:
Add Energy have been invited to submit a technical proposal for the provision of Risk
Analysis, Risk Management and Process Safety Management.
Keywords:
Risk, Analysis, Process, Safety, Management
Reproduction:
This proposal is created by Add Energy, Houston, USA. The document may not be altered
or edited in any way or otherwise copied for public or private use without written
permission from Add Energy.
Contents
1 Introduction...........................................................................................................- 4 -
2 Company Profile.....................................................................................................- 5 -
3 Why Add Energy.....................................................................................................- 7 -
4 Scope of Work........................................................................................................- 8 -
5 Project Execution and Methodology.......................................................................- 9 -
5.1 Heading Two..............................................................................................................- 10 -
5.2 Heading Two..............................................................................................................- 11 -
5.3 Heading Two..............................................................................................................- 12 -
6 Deliverables..........................................................................................................- 13 -
7 Cost, Time and Resources.....................................................................................- 14 -
8 Project Meetings and Reporting............................................................................- 15 -
9 Terms and Conditions...........................................................................................- 16 -
Execution Summary
Provision of Risk Analysis, Risk Management and Process Safety
Management
This proposal and content within, demonstrate how Add Energy will listen to and understand the
core requirements for the provision Risk Analysis, Risk Management and Process Safety
Management for all ENI US Operations. We endeavour to seamlessly transition from the
requirements in the Invitation to Tender, and not only meet but exceed ENI’s requirements. How
will we achieve it? We will listen, advise and execute based on the parameters of the project
requirements.
The personnel that will be allocated to this project are essential TO ITS SUCCESS. Therefore, rest
assure that we have taken great consideration in selecting personnel who will be the right fit for
this work scope. The working culture that Add Energy promotes ensures integrity, accountability
and excellent workmanship. Thus, the high calibre of personnel that we meticulously select be
part of our team, not only carry forward their stringent work ethic to our company, but also
yours.
We look forward to your review of our proposal as we are confident that upon review, you will be
convinced that we can not only deliver what we say we will, but we will go above and beyond to
exceed your expectations. You have the opportunity now to make a change for the better.
Better results, better relations, better reliance.
Company Profile
(GRAPHICS TO USE STANDARD TEMPLATE)
Add Energy Asset and Integrity Management, part of the Add Energy
Group, is a maintenance, integrity and reliability specialist, focused on
increasing plant uptime, achieving maximum design potenti al,
opti mizati on and sustainable safety integrity. Add Energy off ers a wide
suite of products and services to enable management of universally
recognized business scorecards and key performance indicators. Add
Energy are able to enhance the performance, reputati on and business
positi on of plant operators and owners.
Utilizing our unique understanding of equipment availability, integrity (reliability on demand),

planning and optimization, we can establish safety integrity frameworks and systems, applied to
complex engineering systems consistently and robustly, resulting in the creation of a
performance benchmark against which safety integrity indicators can be dynamically measured.
From analysis of the relationships between these indicators and industry developed benchmarks
we establish, and justify, the business case for management of any highlighted performance
deficits. Add Energy’s aim is to enable operators and owners to prolong asset life well into the
decline of their design performance, whilst still maintaining an optimum balanced relationship of
investment and return.
Our service provision:

Track Record
Add Energy have a global footprint and success track record with Oil Majors, Drilling Contractors
and Power Generation Facilities.
Below is snapshot of the companies that Add Energy work with:
Add Energy Software

Add Energy have developed a suite of propriety software solutions aimed at optimizing processes
and procedures to enable greater asset efficiency and integrity. Add Energy’s software uses
industry data and norms and our own internal global reliability and maintenance database which
has been developed using operator best practice data.
Please see below a short description of each software:

Why Add Energy
Subti tle
Text
Add Energy Capability and Capacity
Add Energy has over 15 years’ experience of delivering operati onal
excellence soluti ons to the energy industry. Our soluti ons are delivered
through subject matt er expert knowledge and analysis and have provided
proven results in cost rati onalizati on, improved safety and equipment
upti me.
(NEEDS TO INCLUDE RISK CAPABILITIES) - Australia
Project Execution Plan

Subti tle
(DANNY TO REVIEW AND EDIT)
To fulfil the US Operations support requirement of ENI, Add Energy would analyse and manage
any risk and process safety facilities currently operated by the incumbent. Add Energy would
utilize bespoke software, corporate knowledge and subject matter experts to further improve
Risk Analysis and Risk Management Safety Processes.
Add Energy endeavours to place the right individuals for this role and we are open to
collaborating with ENI to place such individuals on this project. The consultants placed on this
project will demonstrate an understanding and competency level within Risk and Safety
Management Processes, to which they can be subject matter experts and can therefore provide
face to face, phone or email support to ENI personnel who require assistance within project
specific scope of work for these processes.
In addition to being able to provide office-based support, these consultants would make a
number of field visits per year to each of the sites. The purpose of these visits would be to
interact with the field-based staff, discussing and revolving any identified issues, as well as
providing any necessary new or refreshing training.
Scope of Work
Subti tle
RISK DEFINITION AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
DEFINITION OF HAZARD AND RISK

Hazard: The potential to cause harm. Harm includes ill health and injury; damage to property,
equipment, plant or products, damage to the environment, production losses, or
increased liabilities.
Risk: The likelihood of a (loss) event occurring; the likelihood that a specified undesired
event will occur due to the realization of a hazard by, or during, work activities, or by
the products and services created by work activities.
RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk management can be defined as the eradication of minimization of adverse effects of risk to
which an organization is exposed to. Stages involve identifying the risk, identifying who can be
harmed and how, evaluating the associated controls and identifying if further controls are
required, controlling the risk and monitoring the risk
Figure 1: Taken from HSE leaflet INDG 163 (Rev 3), revised 06/11
MAIN RISK ASSESSMENT TYPES
Risk Assessment can be of three main types:
a) Qualitative
b) Semi Quantitative, and
c) Quantitative.
The main method of risk assessment conducted on the ENI Platform will be by utilisation of
the semi-quantitative Risk Assessment format. In the onshore office environment,
qualitative and semi- quantitative Risk Assessment shall be used.
QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

Qualitative Risk Assessment is mainly used for lower risk workplaces such as office
environments. They are qualitative as they measure risk subjectively in a scale of low,
medium or high. Risk classifications will vary from person to person in such a Risk
Assessment process, depending on the person’s risk appetite/aversion.
Figure 2: Qualitative Risk Matrix
SEMI QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

Semi Quantitative Risk Assessment is a slightly more precise way of measuring risk and is
used for medium to higher risk workplaces. Mostly the risk will be measured in a more
detailed 5 x 5 matrix with severity measured on the one side of the scale and likelihood
measured on the other. The ENI Permit to Work system utilizes such a system for offshore
tasks. As with quantitative, risk classifications will vary from person to person in such a Risk
Assessment process, depending on the person’s (group’s) risk appetite/aversion.
.1 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) studies are the foundation for process safety and risk management
programs. They help companies identify hazard scenarios for a process that could adversely affect
people, property, or the environment. PHA techniques such as Hazard and Operability Studies
ENI
Risk Analysis, Risk Management and Process Safety Management Date: 03/03/21
(HAZOP), What-If Studies, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Major Hazard Analysis
(MHA) are used.
A team leader, or facilitator, works with a group of people who know the process to conduct the
PHA. The team leader prepares for the study, advises on the selection of team members and
methodology and the definition of study scope, and oversees the team's brainstorming of causes
and consequences of possible accidents and the formulation of recommendations for appropriate
corrective actions.
Hazard scenarios caused by equipment failures, human errors and external events must be
considered. Safeguards, facility siting and human factors issues should be identified and their impact
on safety identified.
Considering the complexity of today's chemical processes, the challenges involved in facilitating a
PHA study, and the potential liabilities from an incident, your best option for completing PHAs may
be to seek the assistance of expert specialists.
PHA is required by OSHA's PSM and EPA's RMP regulations in the US and process safety and risk
management regulations around the world. It is good engineering practice. Companies that handle
or process highly hazardous chemicals have a responsibility to protect employees, the public and the
environment from exposure to accidental releases.
PHA also helps to protect against process downtime, property damage, product quality issues, and
adverse publicity from accidents. The financial cost of catastrophic accidents is exceptionally high
and PHA can be considered an inexpensive form of insurance.
AE has conducted PHAs for a wide variety of facilities, and has facilitated many thousands of studies
using such techniques as HAZOP, What-If, MHA, FMEA, Fault Tree Analysis, etc. AE provides a variety
of PHA services including, PHA for Leaders
AE has pioneered and continues to develop new and improved approaches for performing and
conducting PHA studies over a period of 30 years. These approaches allow studies to be performed
efficiently and effectively and also help to ensure study quality. Protecting lives, assets, and the
environment depends on the quality of PHA studies and studies must be performed properly. The
effort required is warranted given the potential consequences of process safety incidents.
AE uses software enhances the team leader's ability to conduct the analysis efficiently. It is designed
to allow the team leader to function as both facilitator and scribe, thereby eliminating the need for a
separate scribe and reducing the cost of the study.
AE provides facilitators for all types of PHA studies, including:
Performance of design-stage PHAs.
Studies are performed at the design stage to improve safety before a process is built.
Initial PHAs are the first PHAs performed for an operating facility. They may be an update to a
design-stage PHA.
Performance of revalidation PHAs.
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PHAs must be updated and revalidated periodically to account for changes that may have been
made to the process. Commonly a period of 5 years is used.
AE also offers these PHA services:
Mentoring and coaching your personnel in PHA facilitation.
An experienced AE facilitator assists your new facilitators in learning the ropes and gaining
confidence in facilitating studies.
Reviewing PHAs.
AE can review your completed PHAs and provide suggestions for improvements that will provide
information useful in revalidating PHAs and improving the quality of your PHAs.
PHA Scribing.
PHA team leaders are trained to simultaneously facilitate and document a PHA study. However, if
required, AE can provide both a PHA team leader to lead a PHA study and a separate PHA scribe to
handle the PHA documentation tasks.
Technical Safety and Risk
.1.1 HAZID
General Task Description / Work Breakdown
The Hazard Identification (HAZID) study technique is one of a range of techniques selected
when appropriate in the process of hazard identification followed during the lifecycle
of an operating site from conception to abandonment. The diagram in Addendum 3
records other systems and activities which contribute to hazard identification.
The principal use at present of the HAZID study is to act as the starting point in carrying out
an FSA for an offshore Installation’s Safety Case. Equally, it may be used for other purposes
at both onshore and offshore sites. Some of these are discussed in Paragraphs 2.2 and 3.6
below.
Hazard identification uses checklists of hazards to pinpoint material, system, process, and
facility characteristics that could produce undesirable consequences through the
occurrence of an incident. Possible means of eliminating the hazards or controlling the risk
are usually identified. HAZID (HAZard IDentification) is a high-level, systematic study of
process hazards. It is used for early identification of hazards and is typically applied at the
conceptual or detailed design stage.
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Early identification and assessment of hazards provides critical input for project decisions at
a time when design changes have the minimum cost penalty.
Also, a HAZID study provides the basis for a Hazard Register that summarizes the hazards
present in a process together with their sources, locations, significance, and controls. The
Hazard Register provides a starting point for hazards management and is a regulatory
requirement in some jurisdictions.
AE has extensive experience in hazard analysis. Different software can be used to guide and
document HAZID studies.
Performance of HAZID studies.
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Our facilitators will lead your HAZID team in conducting a study. We provide a written
report of the results.
Development of a Hazard Register.
We utilize the results of HAZID studies to prepare a Hazard Register that meets your
requirements.
Inputs, Assumptions, and Generic Deliverables
HAZID (Hazard Identification) is a qualitative technique for the early identification of

potential hazards and threats effecting people, the environment, assets or reputation. The
major benefit of a HAZID study is to provide essential input to project development
decisions. It is a means of identifying and describing HSE hazards and threats at the earliest
practicable stage of a development or venture.
Objective of the study:
To identify the potential hazards and to reduce the probability and consequences of an
incident in site that would have a detrimental impact to the personnel plant, properties and
environment. Scope of study will depend on the particular project.
Methodology
The study method is a combination of identification, analysis and brainstorming by the

HAZID team members. Guidewords are used in order to identify possible potential and
hazardous effects as well as threats. Furthermore, the team analyses the appropriate
controls that should put in place in order to prevent or control each identified threat.
The analysis of HAZID will be conducted on a session basis, grouping the processes with the
PFD (Process Flow Diagram) and plant layout into a series of sections where the various
sources will have similar characteristics and hence consequences.
HAZID Team:
In addition to the Chairman and scribe, the HAZID team comprises of the following
personnel:
 Design consultant / Project Manager

 Production Manager
 Chemical engineer / Chemist
 Maintenance Manager
 Electrical Engineer
 Instrument Engineer
 Quality Control Engineer
Role of AE in the HAZID study:
 Facilitate/lead the team to carry out highly structured and systematic examination
sessions
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 Use of standard guide words and suitable simulation tool

 Control the discussion so that meaningful results are obtained
 Record the discussions and submit the report to the management
Benefits of Carrying out HAZID:
 Identify opportunities for inherent safety

 Identify Fire, explosion, toxic release scenarios and measure to prevent it.
 Any special preparations required to be taken to handle these can be pre – planned.
 Any specific process modifications if required can be established at an early stage.
 Prepares the system & team, ready and confident to go ahead for commissioning.
Avoids major surprises.
 Hazards involved in operating each equipment can be enlisted at the beginning,
leading to better process mapping & better control in future to getting OSHAS / ISO
approvals.
 The major benefit of HAZID is early identification and assessment of the critical
health, safety and environmental hazards provides essential input to the project
development decisions.
.1.1 HAZOP
HAZOP study is to carefully review a process or operation in a systematic manner to

determine whether deviations from the design or operational intent can lead to undesirable
consequences. This technique can be used for continuous or batch processes and can be
adopted to evaluate written procedures. The HAZOP team lists potential causes and
consequences of the deviation as well as existing safeguards protecting against the
deviation [ViewFlowchart]. When the team determines that inadequate safeguards exist for
a credible deviation, it usually recommends the action be taken to reduce the risk.
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HAZOP
Objective of carrying out a HAZOP study:

• To check a design
• To decide whether and where to build
• To decide whether to buy a piece of equipment
• To obtain a list of questions to put to a supplier
• To check running instructions
• To improve the safety of existing facilities
HAZOP Team:
• In addition to the Chairman and scribe, the HAZOP team comprises of the following
personnel:
• Design consultant / Project Manager
• Production Manager
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• Chemical engineer / Chemist

• Maintenance Manager
• Electrical Engineer
• Instrument Engineer
• Quality Control Engineer
Role of AE in the HAZOP study:

• Facilitate/lead the team to carry out highly structured and systematic examination
sessions
• Use of standard guide words and suitable simulation tool
• Control the discussion so that meaningful results are obtained
• Record the discussions and submit the report to the management
• Download Power Point Presentation on
.1.1 What-if & What-if/Checklist
The What-If Analysis technique is a brainstorming approach in which a group of experienced

people familiar with the subject process ask questions or voice concerns about possible
undesired events.
The purpose of a What-If Analysis is to identify hazards, hazardous situations, or specific

event sequences that could produce undesirable consequences. An experienced group of
people identifies possible abnormal situations, their consequences, and existing safeguards,
and then suggests alternatives for risk reduction where obvious improvement opportunities
are identified or where Safeguards are judged to be inadequate. The method can involve
examination of possible deviations from the design, construction, modification, or operating
intent. It requires a basic understanding of the process intention, along with the ability to
mentally combine possible deviations from the design intent that could result in an incident.
This is a powerful technique if the staff is experienced; otherwise, the results are likely to be
incomplete.
The PHA team brainstorms questions in a WI study. The team starts with a prepared list of
questions in a WIC study, although almost always additional questions are added as a study
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proceeds. Sometimes PHA teams develop questions based on the HAZOP thought process
by thinking through what questions would arise if a HAZOP study were being performed.
WI methods are well-suited to examining the impacts of proposed changes in Management
of Change (MOC) PHA studies because the questions can be tailored to the change and the
areas affected by it. They can be used to study virtually any aspect of a process such as
equipment, procedures, control systems, management practices, etc.
Team leaders should be experienced with the technique since it is providing less structure
than other PHA methods:
Baseline Data Development
 Establish Requirements
 Develop Activity Definition
 Characterize systems and facilities
Process Hazard Screening
 Use Comprehensive checklists

 Apply to each Operation/System/Facility
 Identify Applicable Hazards
Perform Hazard Analysis
 Develop Hazard Analysis Tables

 Identify important controls
 Perform Preliminary Ranking of Controls
 Select Accidents for Further Analysis
Perform Design Basis Accident Analysis
 Performance Probabilistic and Deterministic Analysis of Selected Accidents

 Quantify Frequency and Accidents
 Identification of Most Significant Controls
Develop Controls and Complete Document
6.1.1 LOPA Study
LOPA is a simplified risk assessment method. It provides an objective, rational and

reproducible method of evaluating the risk of hazard scenarios and comparing it with risk
tolerance criteria to decide if existing safeguards are adequate, or if additional safeguards
are needed.
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LOPA is performed as part of PHA, or after PHA has been completed, and can be viewed as
an extension of it. Typically, high risk scenarios are first identified for consideration. LOPA
addresses safeguards that are Independent Protection Layers (IPLs), defined as those whose
failure is independent of any other failures involved in the scenario. Qualifying safeguards as
IPLs and assigning their probabilities of failure is a key part of LOPA. These probabilities are
combined with the frequency of the scenario initiating event and the probabilities of other
scenario elements to estimate the scenario risk. Fig 1. The flowchart of LOPA
[Insert Flowchart]
LOPA is used to determine the Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) required for Safety Instrumented
Functions (SIFs) in Safety Instrumented Systems (SISs) to comply with the ISA S84 / IEC
61511 standard.
LOPA is also used to provide a more rational and objective approach than the subjective
engineering judgment used in PHA to decide if additional safeguards are needed to protect
against accident scenarios. The subjective approach used in PHA can lead to disagreements
and possibly inappropriate measures to reduce risk which is of particular concern when
considering risk remediation measures for high risk scenarios, or those that are expensive to
implement.
AE has performed a variety of LOPA studies and projects for clients. AE also developed
extensions of LOPA to address human factors and process security.
Development of a LOPA Program.
AE develop LOPA programs tailored to the needs of an individual company. Programs cover
issues such as the LOPA approach to be used, risk criteria to be used, screening PHA
scenarios, guidance on when to use LOPA, etc. Program documentation is provided.
Development of LOPA Guidelines.
AE develop technical guidelines for performing LOPA tailored to the needs of an individual
company. Guidelines address topics such as failure data to be used, standardizing IPL PFDs,
guidelines for qualifying IPLs, etc. A set of written guidelines is provided.
Facilitation of LOPA studies:
• AE facilitate LOPA studies as part of PHA studies or as separate studies. AE provide a

report documenting the results of the study.
• Development of Risk Tolerance Criteria.
AE assist your organization in the development of individual and group risk tolerance criteria
suitable for your facilities.
6.2 SIL and Reliability
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6.2.1 SIL Assessment/Allocation
Process industry is exposed to risks like fire, explosion, injuries and accidents etc causing
fatalities and monetary losses. Safety Instrument System (SIS) is one of the most important
layers of protection against accidents & hazards, in a chemical process industry.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, USA warrants that the design and
implementation of safety system meet good engineering practice. Safety Performance
criteria for SIS should be defined by Safety Integrity Levels (SIL). The determination of Safety
Integrity Level required for the SIS will help verification of configuration of SIS to meet or
exceed the required SIL and in turn the reliability of the system.
Methodology:
During the design stage of the project or modification or revamp, the safeguarding systems
or emergency shut down systems (mechanical or instrumented) are identified. The
requirement for an Instrumented Protective Functions (instrumented systems) is decided
based on the design practices which are checked by technical disk HSE review or the HAZOP
study. Consequence of failure in terms of safety, environment and economical losses are
assessed along
with the probability of occurrence. This risk graph generated helps to assess the risk levels.
The SIL assessment can be qualitative and quantitative.
The appropriate SIL is simply selected from the matrix once the demand rate and highest
consequence class of all consequence categories have been determined.
Standards adopted for the study:

• IEC 61508
• IEC 61511
• ANSIISA 84.01
Documents required for the study:

• Process flow schemes
• P & ID diagrams
• Standards adopted for the instrument selection
• Process safety study reports
• Cause and effect matrices
Role of AE:
SIS study will be team exercise and competent personnel responsible for the areas of
process technology, process safety, operations and process control should be part of the
team. The AE expert will carry out the role of facilitator. The main task of the facilitator is to
guide the team through the classification steps and to ensure that every step is recorded to
achieve the objective.
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Benefits:
Helps improve overall safety of the facility. Prevents (or) mitigates consequences which can
result in – loss of life, personnel injury, equipment damage, loss of production.
Helps in complying with present (or) future government directives on Health, Safety and
Environment. Provides a better corporate image and helps in boosting employee morale.
6.2.2 FMEA
FMEA is a hazard evaluation procedure in which failure modes of system components,

typically, process equipment, are considered to determine whether existing safeguards are
adequate. Failure modes describe how components fail (e.g., open, closed, on, off, leaks,
etc.). The effects of each failure mode are the process responses or incident resulting from
the component failures, i.e., hazard scenario consequences. A FMEA becomes a FMECA
(Failure Modes and Effects and Criticality Analysis) when a criticality ranking is included for
each failure mode and effect. A criticality ranking is the same as a risk ranking.
FMEA is used extensively in the aerospace, nuclear, and defence industries. Typically, it is
used in the process industries for special applications such as Reliability Centered
Maintenance (RCM) programs and the analysis of control systems.
FMEA can be conducted at different levels of resolution. For PHA purposes, usually it is
conducted at the equipment level, e.g., valves, pumps, lines, etc. For RCM purposes, usually
it is conducted at the equipment component level, e.g., motor, shaft, impeller, casing, seal,
bearings, etc. for a pump.
6.2.3 Cause and Effects Diagrams
A Cause-and-Effect Diagram is a tool that helps identify, sort, and display possible
causes of a specific problem or quality characteristic (Viewgraph 1). It graphically
illustrates the relationship between a given outcome and all the factors that influence
the outcome. This type of diagram is sometimes called an "Ishikawa diagram"
because it was invented by Kaoru Ishikawa, or a "fishbone diagram" because of the
way it looks.
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When should team use Cause-And-Effect Diagram
• Constructing a Cause-and-Effect Diagram can help your team when you need to
• Identify the possible root causes, the basic reasons, for a specific effect,
• problem, or condition.
• Sort out and relate some of the interactions among the factors affecting a
• particular process or effect.
• Analyze existing problems so that corrective action can be taken.
Why should use a Cause-and-Effect Diagram
A Cause-and-Effect Diagram is a tool that is useful for identifying and organizing the
known or possible causes of quality, or the lack of it. The structure provided by the
diagram helps team members think in a very systematic way. Some of the benefits
of constructing a Cause-and-Effect Diagram are that it
• Helps determine the root causes of a problem or quality characteristic

• using a structured approach.
• Encourages group participation and utilizes group knowledge of the
• process.
• Uses an orderly, easy-to-read format to diagram cause-and-effect
• relationships.
• Indicates possible causes of variation in a process.
• Increases knowledge of the process by helping everyone to learn more
• about the factors at work and how they relate.
• Identifies areas where data should be collected for further study.
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6.2.4 Fault Tree Modelling
FTA is not comparable to standard PHA methods. It does not identify a full set of hazard
scenarios for a process. Rather, it is used to identify the causes of a particular incident
(called a top event) using deductive reasoning. Often, it is used when other PHA techniques
indicate that a particular type of accident is of special concern and a more thorough
understanding of its causes is needed. Thus, it is a useful supplement to other PHA
techniques. Sometimes FTA is used in the investigation of incidents to deconstruct what
happened. FTA is also used to quantify the likelihood of the top event. It is best suited for
the analysis of highly redundant systems.
FTA identifies and graphically displays the combinations of equipment failures, human
failures and external events that can result in an incident. Computer programs are used to
provide graphical representations of fault trees and to calculate top event likelihoods. FTA is
not a technique that lends itself to a team-based study. Typically, one or two people
construct a fault tree. It requires different training and resources than other PHA
techniques.
6.3 Fire and Explosion Strategy
6.3.4 Fire Hazard Management
AE can offer services in managing the all the fire risks in facility. The process includes risk
assessment, consequence analysis, evaluation and design of risk reduction/mitigation
measures, cost benefit analysis and support in implementation of risk reduction measures.
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6.3.5 Fire Safety Audit
Objective:
To carry out a systematic, critical appraisal of all potential Fire hazards involving personnel,
premises, services & operation method
To ensure that occupational Safety & Health System fully satisfy the legal requirements and
those of company’s written safety policies, objectives & progress
Scope of Work:
Fire Hazard Identification
 Identifying potential fire / explosion hazards / risks in the Premises and suggesting
appropriate preventive measures
 Evaluate the Fire risk in each operation / area.
Firefighting system
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 Evaluate the location of the Fire pump house and water storage tank to meet the
Statute and standard requirements and the availability of nearby hazards.
 Adequacy of the underground and above ground fire water tank and pumping
capacity, Availability of Overhead tank and its interconnection with Fire water
network, and backup supply
 Configuration of the pumps and valves for the hydrant and sprinkler system
 Checking the Adequacy of the sprinkler system, detection system, operating
temperature/other parameter
Fire detection and alarm system
 Adequacy of the Fire detection and alarm (FDA) system with respect to relevant
standards, positioning of the detectors with respect to ventilation system, beam
depth, obstructions, etc.
 Checking the availability and adequacy of the backup power supply to FDA panel and
other electrically operated emergency equipment
 Type of cables used for emergency service.
Gas suppression system
 Assess the requirement of Gas suppression system based on fire risk and criticality of
the equipment /operations as per relevant standards.
 Assessing the location of the Gas suppression cylinders, routing of pipeline, location
of manual release and abort switches and panel, Standby power supply, etc.
Fire extinguisher
 Checking the adequacy and deployment of the portable Fire extinguisher as per
relevant standards.
 Accessibility to extinguishers as per relevant standards and availability of refills,
mounting practice, etc.
Passive fire protection
 Segregation of the facilities and utilities, requirement of fire partition walls and its
fire rating
 Segregation of power cables and data cables and utilities lines
 Addressing the fire spread through vertical and horizontal openings meant for cable
passes, utility lines, etc.
 Fire rating of the emergency exit doors, Fire lifts, etc.
 Fire rating of building construction, internal partitions and false ceilings.
Emergency Management & Life Safety System
 Availability of Emergency preparedness plan
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 Adequacy of emergency exit based on occupant load / type of occupancy / type of

exit
 Adequacy and availability of emergency lights and ventilation
 Segregation of the emergency exit from the remaining facility.
 Communication of emergency, Mutual Aid, etc.
 Approach road width and clearance.
 Access and egress to the building.
 Open space around the building.
 Adequacy of signage.
 Assess the requirement of passive fire protection system like cable pass sealants, etc.
 Assessment of fire safety training level of security staff, and facility management
staff.
 Assessment of emergency plan, fire mock-up drill records, evacuation plan and its
adequacy.
Reporting & Recommendations:
At the end of field study, a Fire Safety Audit report will be provided on the findings of the
study and recommendations for next course of action. The recommendations suggested for
risk improvement would be categorized as Category A, B and C. The criterion for
categorization is presented as follows:
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6.3.6 Design of Fire Protection Systems
Fire protection systems are meant to provide a reasonable degree of protection for life and
property from fire. The fire protection systems include manual and automatic systems
which uses water, foam or inert gases as the extinguishing medium. For an adequate and
efficient fire protection system the design and installation of the system should be based on
sound engineering principles, test data, and field experience.
AE can provide expertise and experienced in providing design solution for all kinds of
hazards.
Methodology:
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6.3.7 Fire and Gas Detection Mapping
Hydrocarbon detector mapping using Dispersion Modelling Software is a scientific way of

locating the detectors adopted by Major Oil Companies.
It helps in identifying the leakage at an early stage, and acts as an optimization tool to fix up
the quantity of the detector.
With the installation of Hydrocarbon Gas Detection System, the risk is considerably reduced
to As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) level.
Design of Fire Detection and Alarm System
Automatic Fire detection and alarm system is primarily a life safety system meant for
detecting the fire at the early stages and alarm the occupants. The fire detection system are
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also used for automatic activation of fire extinguishing systems such as spray systems, water
mist systems and gas suppression systems. The control relay modules in the advanced
addressable detection systems enable the integration and operation of ancillary services
such as electrical systems, fire dampers, access control systems, video surveillance,
emergency lighting systems, emergency communication systems etc. to activate/deactivate
in case of emergencies.
Types of Detectors
Spot type detector
 Photo electric smoke detector

 Ionisation type smoke detector
 Heat detectors
o Fixed temperature type
o Rate of Rise type
 Multi sensor detectors
Projected Beam type detector
 Infra-Red Detectors
 UV/IR type detectors
Flame type detector
 UV flame detector
 IR flame detector
Spark/Ember detector
Air Sampling type detector
Linear Heat sensing Cable
Video Image Fire Detector
The efficiency of a fire detection and alarm system depends on various factors such as
selection of suitable type of detector, spacing between detectors, mounting locations, rate
of air flow, room temperature, humidity level, presence of dust particles, type of ceiling etc.
30
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AE can provide experience in design and review of all fire detection and alarm systems
example shown above.
6.3.8 Quantitative Risk Assessments
Quantitative Risk Analysis is proven as a valuable management tool in assessing the overall
safety performance of a Chemical Process Industry.
Objective of QRA:
 To identify, quantify and assess the risk from the facility from the storage and
handling of chemical products
 To identify, quantify and assess the risk to nearby facilities / installations.
 To suggest recommendations in order to reduce the risk to human life, assets,
environment and business interruptions to as low as reasonably practicable.
Risk Analysis techniques provide advanced quantitative means to supplement other hazard
identification, analysis, assessment, control and management methods to identify the
potential for such incidents and to evaluate control strategies.
QRA is widely used in assessing the risk in Oil & Gas Installations especially refineries, tank
farms, cross country pipelines, bottling plants, terminals etc.
Risk Assessment procedure:
Hazard Identification is a critical step in Risk Analysis. Many aids are available, including
What-if Analysis, Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Studies, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), and Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) etc.,
Assessment of risks is based on the consequences and likelihood
Consequence Estimation is the methodology used to determine the potential for damage or
injury from specific incidents. E.g.: Jet fire distances, BLEVE etc.,
Likelihood assessment is the methodology used to estimate the frequency or probability of

occurrence of an incident.
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AE analysis Assessment of risks is based on the consequences and likelihood
 Consequence Estimation is the methodology used to determine the potential for

damage or injury from specific incidents. E.g.: Jet fire distances, BLEVE etc.,
 Likelihood assessment is the methodology used to estimate the frequency or
probability of occurrence of an incident.
Software such as PHAST RISK MICRO 6.7, WHAZANv2.0, EFFECTS v2.0 are used to carry out
the modelling of probable outcomes such as fire, explosion, vapour cloud explosion, BLEVE
etc.
Risks are quantified using this study and ranked accordingly based on their severity and
probability. Acceptability of the estimated risk must then be judged based upon criteria
appropriate to the particular situation. Study report is used to understand the significance
of existing control measures and to follow the measures continuously. Wherever possible,
additional risk control measures are to be adopted to reduce the risk levels.
6.3.9 Consequence Modelling
Consequence modelling involves the determination of the impacts of process accidents

involving hazardous materials on people, the environment and the process. The amount and
form of hazardous material released is determined for toxic materials, flammables, and
explosives (called the source term). The dispersion of the released material through and
beyond the facility is studied. The distance travelled and area covered are determined. For
toxic materials, their effects on people and the environment are evaluated. For flammables,
the impact of the heat radiation from a fire on people and equipment is calculated. For
explosive materials, the impact of blast overpEERAressures on people, equipment and
structures are calculated.
Models tailored to each particular situation are used to evaluate consequences. Gas, two-
phase, and liquid releases are modelled and their discharge rates are calculated. Dispersion
is modelled for buoyant or heavy gases, as appropriate, taking account of the range of
atmospheric conditions possible at the time of release. Toxicity data and dose-response
models are used to model toxic effects. Various types of fires are modelled including pool,
jet, flash, fireball, and warehouse fires. Types of explosions modelled include confined,
unconfined, and dust explosions as well as BLEVEs (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor
Explosion), thermal decompositions, and runaway reactions.
Companies employ dispersion and consequence modelling for various purposes including
determining impact distances for EPA's Risk Management Program (RMP) regulation,
assessing the significance of hazard scenarios identified during PHA, and providing input to
risk analysis. Reliance on purely qualitative analysis is insufficient where high consequence,
low probability accidents are concerned since qualitative consequence estimates are
subjective. Quantitative analysis provides a sounder basis for decision making when
considering the tolerability of catastrophic accident consequences.
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AE is experienced in performing consequence modelling for a variety of facilities. We use

models that cover a wide variety of situations.
Source term determination:
AE calculate the amount of hazardous material released in an accident and we provide a

report that documents the results of the calculations.
Dispersion analysis:
AE calculates distances to various concentration endpoints for a released material and the
area covered by the plume. We provide a report that documents the results of the
calculations.
Consequence modelling:
AE determine the impacts of toxic material releases on people on-site and off-site and the
environment, and the impacts of fires and explosions on people and property. We provide a
report that documents the results of the calculations.
Sensitivity, importance and uncertainty analysis:
AE determine the input variables to which the results of consequence modeling are most
sensitive and we determine which variables play the most important role in contributing to
the results of the analysis. We also propagate uncertainties in the input variables through
the analyses to determine the uncertainties in the calculated results. We provide a report
that documents the calculations.
6.3.10 Major Accident Hazards Identification
MHA was developed specifically to support process safety studies [A1, A2]. It is used to
identify major hazard scenarios involving fires, explosions, toxic releases and reactivity
excursions. MHA employs a structured approach to identify loss of containment scenarios.
Causes of loss of containment can be direct, e.g., valves left open or ruptures in lines or
vessels, or indirect, e.g., runaway reactions resulting in releases through pressure relief
devices or vessel and piping rupture. MHA constrains brainstorming to such scenarios within
a structured framework to guide the identification of initiating events using standard
checklists. Brainstorming focuses on specific categories of initiating events to focus the
team’s brainstorming without narrowing their vision. The checklists provide guidance to the
team and help assure completeness.
AE can build customized checklist for specific facilities or types of processes. The method
prompts consideration of items not already in the checklists. MHA will use a process
subdivision similar to other PHA methods.
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6.3.11 Performance Standards
Text
Text
6.3.12 Facility Risk Based Inspections
Text
Text
6.3.13 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA)
Scope of the study involves the
Development of an onsite Emergency Preparedness Plan to control and avert any disaster
scenario that could be anticipated at the facility and the consequence of human and
property damage.
Identification of major hazards and Emergency Categorization – Inputs from existing QRA
report will be taken.
Development of Emergency Management Structure (covering following key areas)
 Resources Management (Emergency facilities) – Emergency Control Centre,

Assembly Points, Emergency Escape routes, Emergency Communication, Medical
facilities, etc.
 incident Management System – Emergency notification, Emergency Declaration,
Control of Emergency, Role of key personnel, etc.
 Roles of Site Controller, Incident Controller, Team leader, Team Members, etc.
 Procedure to handle specialized emergencies such as Bomb threat, Confined space
rescue, Chemical spill handling, Specific first-aid measures
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EEERAs) are an essential element of process safety
and risk management programs. Most facilities have EERAs in place, although they may not
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be up to date. For example, they may not address accident scenarios identified by process
hazard analyses. EERAs developed by AE address the following:
 On-site and off-site notification procedures.

 Emergency evacuation procedures.
 Personnel roles, lines of authority, and communication.
 Rescue and medical duties for those employees who are to perform them.
 Emergency response training requirements.
 Site decontamination procedures.
 Provisions for critique of response and follow-up.
 Personal protective and emergency equipment.
AE compare response plans with release scenarios to help ensure the emergency planning
zones, egress routes, locations of PPE for emergency responders, and specified assembly
areas are appropriate. It is good practice to conduct emergency response drills to test the
efficacy of the EERA and help ensure the program works for actual events.
Addressing Emergency Response
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis are required by government regulations and good
engineering practices.
AE has developed numerous Emergency Response Programs for various clients in a variety
of industries. We regularly audit programs against regulatory and industry requirements.
Our understanding of OSHA and EPA regulatory requirements helps to ensure that programs
comply with the regulations.
Services Offered
Development of a comprehensive Emergency Response Program for your facility.
AE provide a documented program and can assist in its implementation.
Assistance in improving your existing Emergency Response Program.
We review your current program, make recommendations for improvements, and, if

requested, assist with implementing the improvements.
Assistance in developing and implementing appropriate drills to test and improve existing
programs.
AE plan drills based on credible release scenarios and observe emergency personnel as they
respond. These can be classroom of actual field exercises. We provide feedback to the
responders and a written report with observations and recommendations for
improvements.
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Determination of credible release scenarios.
AE help you determine credible release scenarios that should be used as the basis for the
development of your EERA and assist in developing procedures to address them.
Development of an EERA management system to provide a structured framework for the

proper implementation of the program.
AE provide assistance in developing a management system that allows EERAs to function

successfully and help to interface the system with those for other programs to avoid
conflicts and ensure needed interactions occur.
Assistance in integrating multiple programs into a single, Integrated Contingency Plan (ICP)
for a site.
Some sites have multiple regulatory requirements for EERAs. These requirements can be
met by the preparation of a single program. We provide assistance in the development of
such an integrated plan.
Text
Text
6.4 Barrier and Integrity Management
6.4.4 Barrier Analysis
Text
6.4.5 Bow-Tie Analysis and Development
Bow tie analysis is a hazard analysis technique which is combination of fault tree analysis
(FTA) and event tree analysis (ETA). Fault tree analysis (FTA) is identifying basic events that
can lead to an accident event, whereas Event tree analysis (ETA) is identifying the event
sequences from initiating events to accident scenarios.
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6.4.6 Safety & Environmental Critical Elements
Text
6.4.7 Risk Registers
Text
6.4.8 Facility Siting & Consequence Modelling
OSHA's PSM regulations require that facility siting be addressed in Process Hazard Analysis
(PHA). Facility siting involves the assessment of the possible impacts of fire and explosion on
life safety, structures, and equipment as well as the effects of releases of toxic substances
and their ingress into buildings.
Traditionally, facility siting has a broad interperpretation. OSHA's

interpretationinterpretation of facility siting includes the spatial relationship between the
hazards of a process and the location(s) of people in the facility, particularly in occupied
buildings such as control rooms. The importance of this aspect of facility siting largely was
not recognized prior to the promulgation of the PSM standard. Issues that should be
addressed in a facility siting study include:
 Identifying hazard scenarios that could have significant effects on occupied buildings.
 Identifying vulnerable locations of control rooms, and other buildings that may be
occupied by people.
 Spacing between the hazards in a process and the locations of employees in
occupied buildings.
 Spacing of process units and equipment.
 Spacing between potential sources of flammable releases and ignition sources.
 Domino effects, i.e.: the potential for an incident to propagate from one process
area to another separate area.
 Emergency response issues, e.g.
37
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o Availability of emergency equipment

o Location of fire suppression systems
o Accessibility for fire trucks
o Accessibility of fire hydrants / monitors
o Locations of emergency refuges and muster points
o Ability of an occupied building to provide sheltering-in-place
o Suitability of evacuation routes
o Adequacy of hazardous area classifications
Numerous accidents have involved impacts on people because of their proximity to hazards,
The Flixborough accident in the UK is classic example; 28 workers were killed and a further
36 suffered injuries. The entire plant was destroyed including the control room and the
administration building. More recently, the BP Texas City accident in 2005 resulted in 18
fatalities. Temporary trailers were destroyed and in the control room the windows
shattered, and the roof collapsed. This accident focused a spotlight on facility siting. Every
company operating hazardous facilities is expected to be aware of and must address facility
siting.
OSHA expects that impacts of accidents on people present in structures such as control
rooms, trailers, offices, and motor control centers be considered. A common way of
complying with OSHA's regulatory requirement is to use a checklist of questions to identify,
evaluate and control hazards associated with facility siting. More detailed Facility Siting
Analysis (FSA) studies examine the ability of occupied buildings to withstand fires,
explosions and the ingress of toxic materials.
AE has developed methods to incorporate facility siting into PHA studies and has performed
FSA studies to investigate facility siting issues in depth. We have audited the facility siting
programs of many companies. AE's FSA approach integrates established industry
approaches including API RP 752 / 753 and CCPS guidelines. AE consultants select the best
consequence analysis software modeling tools to meet the unique requirements of each FSA
project. They understand how to meet applicable good engineering practices, such as API RP
752, and comply with applicable regulatory requirements.
Development of a Facility Siting program for your company:
AE can provide advice and guidance on the content of a facility siting program tailored to
your specific needs. We provide a written plan that integrates with your current systems
and programs, and, if requested, provide assistance with its implementation.
Performance of PHA studies that incorporate Facility Siting:
AE can help ensure your PHAs address facility siting to meet OSHA's expectations and
requirements. The PHA report documents the approach used and the PHA worksheets
contain entries showing the impact of Facility Siting on hazard scenarios.
38
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Performance of Facility Siting studies to identify issues and evaluate the ability of occupied
buildings to withstand fires, explosions and toxic material ingress:
AE can conduct studies on your entire facility or individual process areas. Toxic release, blast
over-pressure and thermal radiation footprints are overlaid on the facility plot plan and an
occupied building analysis performed. A report is prepared that documents the issues
identified and provides an assessment of building integrity. Results of a FSA study can be
referenced during a subsequent PHA study.
Auditing your current facility siting practices against regulatory requirements and/or
industry best practices:
AE provide an audit report that identifies findings and presents recommendations for
corrective actions. If needed, we can help you implement the corrective actions.
AE can perform studies for new or existing facilities. However, facility siting studies are best
performed at the design stage when changes are more easily made.
6.4.9 Explosion/Blast Analysis and other catastrophe modelling techniques
Text
6.4.10 HSE Management Systems support
Objectives of Gap Analysis are:
To study and evaluate the effectiveness of implementation of existing HSE management

systems and find the gaps with respect to recommendations of OSHA standards and best
international practices in HSE management System
Report the findings in terms of Strength and opportunities for improvement with
recommended improvement framework.
Prepare a roadmap through a systematic approach to overcome the gaps as observed in

Gap Analysis phase Text
 HSE Leadership and Commitment  Work permit system

 Employees Participation  Operation & Maintenance System
 Facility Design, Construction &  Inspection & Maintenance
Pre-Startup Safety Review  Management of Change
 Process Safety information  Training
 Risk Analysis and Management  Incident Investigation and Analysis
 Third Party Services  Occupational Health
 Personnel Safety  Environment Management
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 Control of Defeat and reliability of  Emergency Planning and Response

critical system and devices  Compliance Audit
Standards / Rules to be adopted:
 OHSAS 18001 Standard

 OSHA guidelines on Process Safety Management
 Good engineering practices followed in Similar Industries
6.4.11 HSE procedure/program development
Scope of the activity is to prepare HSE procedure/programs that provides clarity on the
fundamentals of Safety and act as a reference document on issues pertaining to Health and
Safety.
Methodology for the Preparation of Safety Manual
Detailed site study to understand the operations with an objective to include any site-
specific elements in the corporate safety manual
 Preparation of Draft HSE procedure/programs

 Review by an expert consultant of AE
Incorporating Comments from the client
 Submission of Final HSE procedure/programs Text
6.4.12 Training, including: Process Safety, Root Cause Analysis, Accident Investigation and
other related HSE topics
Accident investigations determine how and why the accident occurred. Accident
investigation should be done to avoid similar future incidents. Emphasis of investigation is
concentrated on finding the root cause of the accident.
Root cause analysis is adopted to determine the cause of accident.
A detailed analysis of an accident will normally reveal three cause levels: basic, indirect, and
direct. Most accidents are preventable by eliminating one or more causes.
Objective of Accident investigation are:
 Recognize the need of an investigation

 Investigate the scene of the accident
 Interview victims & witnesses
 Distinguish fact from fiction
 Determine root causes
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 Compile data and prepare reports

 Make recommendations
Outcome of Accident investigation:
 Final Report of Accident investigation detailing the loss situation

 Background of the loss in accident
 Listing of the possible causative factors
 Inference on the most probable reason of loss
 Guidelines on Loss minimization measures
Tools used:
 Fault Tree analysis

 Event Tree analysis
 5M method and etc
(Tools as per client requirement can be adopted) Text
6.4.13 3rd party HSE inspections and audits
Scope of the comprehensive safety audit is to

 Carry out a systematic, critical appraisal of all potential hazards involving personnel,
plant, services and operation method
 Ensure that Occupational Safety and Health system fully satisfy the legal
requirements and those of the company’s written safety policies, objectives and
progress.
Methodology adopted in carrying out the Safety Audit:
 Pre-Audit Data Request

 Opening Meeting to explain the objective, scope & methodology of the study
 Plant Walkthrough
 Site Study
 Discussions
 with Plant Personnel
 Study of Records
 Presentation of Salient Findings at site.
 Submission of Report
Safety Audits are carried out in reference to the relevant statutory regulations, applicable
codes/ standards/ guidelines and good engineering practices. Elements addressed as a part
of the safety audit are:
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Safety in Operations &

Safety Management System Maintanence Elecrical Installations
 Identification of
Electrical
hazards(shock,fi
re,overloading)
 Review of SCP  Review of
 Changes control Hazardous Area
Procedures classification
 Design Deviations  Review of
 Work Permit earthing and
System bonding
 Safety & Healthy Policy  Review of practices;statis
 Accident Reporting & Maintenence electricity
Investigation Practices of  Review of
 Occupational Health Critical electrical
Monitoring Equipment maintenance
 Statutory Compliance  Work Injury system and
 Employee Safety Prevention – practices;LOTO
Training Manual &  Review of
 First-Aid Centre Mechanical Lightning
 Safety Communication Material Handling protection
& Motivation / Guarding, etc system
Safety Audits are normally conducted with following objectives:
To carry out a systematic, critical appraisal of all potential hazards involving personnel,
plant, services and operation method; and to ensure that Safety and Health system fully
satisfy the legal requirement and those of the company’s written safety policies, objectives
and progress.
Depending on the requirements of the organisations, the audit can focus attention on the
following aspects of a safety system:
1. Safety Management systems
2. Fire and Explosion prevention, protection and emergency management
3. Work injury prevention
4. Health hazards control
5. Evaluating emergency plan if already available
After the objectives of the study are accepted next step would be collection of information.
A detailed description of type of data that need to be collected is sent on acceptance of this
proposal.<br>
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After analysing the information by the audit team members, a schedule is prepared after
discussing with the factory management. Site study will be undertaken on mutual
convenience and during the audit an attempt will be made by the audit team members to
identify the activities that can lead to major fires, explosions and toxic releases which will
have both onsite and offsite consequences.
After the site study a preliminary report is prepared and submitted with in 2 weeks and a
final report is submitted within the agreed time frame
Benefits of Safety Audit are:
1. Identifies loss producing events

2. Assess the potential losses associated with the risk
3. Identifies measures to minimise the losses
4. 4.Identifies system deficiencies Text
6.4.14 Blast Overperpressure Analysis
Text
43
ENI
7 Cost, Time and Resources

Subti tle
(DANNY TO BUILD CTR)
44
ENI
8 Previous Work Experience

Subti tle (NEED TO BE RISK RELATED WORK EXPERIENCE) - Australia
9 Appendix
Client Testi monials
10 Appendix
All previous work experiences
45

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Risk Analysis, Risk Management and Process

Add Energy Ref. No.

Technical Focal Point Daniel McGowan

Reviewer Susan Steyn

Utilizing our unique understanding of equipment availability, integrity (reliability on demand),

Our service provision:

Below is snapshot of the companies that Add Energy work with:

Add Energy Software

Please see below a short description of each software:

Project Execution Plan

DEFINITION OF HAZARD AND RISK

QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

Figure 2: Qualitative Risk Matrix

SEMI QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

.1 PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS

AE provides facilitators for all types of PHA studies, including:

Performance of design-stage PHAs.

Performance of revalidation PHAs.

Technical Safety and Risk

General Task Description / Work Breakdown

Performance of HAZID studies.

Inputs, Assumptions, and Generic Deliverables

HAZID (Hazard Identification) is a qualitative technique for the early identification of

Objective of the study:

The study method is a combination of identification, analysis and brainstorming by the

 Design consultant / Project Manager

Role of AE in the HAZID study:

 Use of standard guide words and suitable simulation tool

Benefits of Carrying out HAZID:

 Identify opportunities for inherent safety

General Task Description / Work Breakdown

HAZOP study is to carefully review a process or operation in a systematic manner to

Objective of carrying out a HAZOP study:

• Chemical engineer / Chemist

Role of AE in the HAZOP study:

.1.1 What-if & What-if/Checklist

General Task Description / Work Breakdown

The What-If Analysis technique is a brainstorming approach in which a group of experienced

The purpose of a What-If Analysis is to identify hazards, hazardous situations, or specific

Baseline Data Development

Process Hazard Screening

 Use Comprehensive checklists

Perform Hazard Analysis

 Develop Hazard Analysis Tables

Perform Design Basis Accident Analysis

 Performance Probabilistic and Deterministic Analysis of Selected Accidents

Develop Controls and Complete Document

6.1.1 LOPA Study

General Task Description / Work Breakdown

LOPA is a simplified risk assessment method. It provides an objective, rational and

Inputs, Assumptions, and Generic Deliverables

Development of LOPA Guidelines.

Facilitation of LOPA studies:

• AE facilitate LOPA studies as part of PHA studies or as separate studies. AE provide a

6.2 SIL and Reliability

6.2.1 SIL Assessment/Allocation