ANTONIO A. MECANO vs.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992

Facts:

 On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S. Lim, he requested
reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under
Section 6991 of the RAC that in case of sickness caused by or connected directly with
the performance of some act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his
discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees.

 Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably

recommended the payment of petitioner's claim.

 The Undersecretary of Justice returned petitioner's claim to Director Lim, having

considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA that the RAC being relied upon
was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

 Justice Franklin M. Drilon stating that "the issuance of the Administrative Code did not
operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including
the particular Section 699 of the latter".

 COA, however, denied petitioner's claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had
been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same
section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He
commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees' Compensation
Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity
of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Issue:

Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC,

Ruling:

No, the Administrative Code of 1987 did not repeal or abrogate Section 699 of the RAC,

There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts
on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the
conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the
whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal
the earlier law.10

Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same
subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they
cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law
cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.11
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover
the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code
which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law,
the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699,
and still others. The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of
an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the
new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. 12 What is necessary is a
manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal.
 PRIMITIVO LEVERIZA, FE LEVERIZA, PARUNGAO & ANTONIO C. VASCO
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES & CIVIL AERONAUTICS
ADMINISTRATION

G.R. No. L-66614 January 25, 1988

Description: Power of the Administrator to enter into a contract under its administration.

Facts:

 Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant case. These three
contracts are as follows:
Contract A. This is a "CONTRACT OF LEASE", executed between the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Defendant CIVIL
AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION (CAA), as lessor, and ROSARIO C.
LEVERIZA, as lessee

Contract B. This is a "LEASE AGREEMENT", executed between ROSARIO C.

LEVERIZA, as lessor, and Plaintiff MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES, INC., as lessee

Contract C. This is a "LEASE AGREEMENT", executed between Defendant

CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION, as lessor, and plaintiff MOBIL OIL
PHILIPPINES, INC., as lessee
 It appears that defendant Civil Aeronautics Administration as LESSOR, leased the same
parcel of land, for durations of time that overlapped to two lessees, to wit: (1) Defendant
Rosario C. Leveriza, and that plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., as LESSEE, leased the
same parcel of land from two lessors, to wit: (1) defendant Rosario C. Leveriza and (2)
defendant Civil Aeronautics Administration, Inc., for durations of time that also
overlapped.
 It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a contract of sublease
(Contract "B") with Mobil Oil Philippines without the consent of CAA (lessor). The
cancellation of the contract was made in a letter dated June 28, 1966 of Guillermo P.
Jurado, Airport General Manager of CAA addressed to Rosario Leveriza,
 Plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., in this case seeks the rescission or cancellation of
Contract A and Contract B on the ground that Contract A from which Contract B is
derived and depends has already been cancelled by the defendant Civil Aeronautics
Administration and maintains that Contract C with the defendant CAA is the only valid
and subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is
concerned
 On the other hand, defendants Leverizas' claim that Contract A which is their contract
with CAA has never been legally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is
Contract C between plaintiff and defendant CAA which should be declared void.
 Defendant CAA asserts that Exhibit "A" is still valid and subsisting because its
cancellation by Guillermo Jurado was ineffective and asks the court to annul Contract A
because of the violation committed by defendant Leveriza in leasing the parcel of land to
 plaintiff by virtue of Contract B without the consent of defendant CAA. Defendant CAA
further asserts that Contract C not having been approved by the Director of Public Works
and Communications is not valid.
 The lower court render judgment declaring that contract A and B have been validly
cancelled and contract C as valid.
 Leveriza filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the case and lack of evidentiary support of the decision
which was denied. CAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration was however denied. On
appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision, finding no reversible error
in the decision of the lower court.
 Petitioners contend that Contract "A" is still subsisting because Contract "B" is a valid
sublease and does not constitute a ground for the cancellation of Contract "A", while
Contract "C", a subsequent lease agreement between CAA and Mobil Oil Philippines is
null and void, for lack of approval by the Department Secretary. Petitioners anchor their
position on Sections 567 and 568 of the Revised Administrative Code which require
among others, that subject contracts should be executed by the President of the
Philippines or by an officer duly designated by him, unless authority to execute the same
is by law vested in some other office
 Mobil Oil Philippines asserts that Contract "A" was validly cancelled on June 28, 1966
and so was Contract "B" which was derived therefrom. Accordingly, it maintains that
Contract "C" is the only valid contract insofar as the parcel of land in question is
concerned and that approval of the Department Head is not necessary
 Civil Aeronautics Administration took the middle ground with its view that Contract "A" is
still subsisting as its cancellation is ineffective without the approval of the Department
Head but said contract is not enforceable because of petitioners' violation of its terms
and conditions by entering into Contract "B" of sublease without the consent of CAA.
The CAA further asserts that Contract "C" not having been approved by the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, is not valid

Issue:

Whether or not the administrator of CAA cannot execute without approval of the Department
Secretary or Director of Public Works and Communications, a valid contract of lease over real
property owned by the Republic of the Philippines

Ruling:

No, CAA can execute without approval of the Department Secretary, a valid contract of lease
over real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines.

CAA Administrator has the authority to lease real property belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines under its administration even without the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, which authority is expressly vested in it by law, more particularly Section
32 (24) of Republic Act 776, which reads:

Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. — Subject to the general

control and supervision of the Department Head, the Administrator shall have,
among others, the following powers and duties:

xxx xxx xxx

 (24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila
International Airport and all government aerodromes except those controlled or
operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines including such power and duties
as: ... (b) to enter into, make and execute contracts of any kind with any person,
firm, or public or private corporation or entity; (c) to acquire, hold, purchase, or
lease any personal or real property; right of ways, and easements which may be
proper or necessary: Provided, that no real property thus acquired and any other
real property of the Civil Aeronautics Administration shall be sold without the
approval of the President of the Philippines. ...

Under 567 of the Revised Administrative Code, such contract of lease must be executed: (1) by
the President of the Philippines, or (2) by an officer duly designated by him or (3) by an officer
expressly vested by law. It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration has the authority to enter into Contracts of Lease for the government under the
third category. Thus, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration has the power to execute the deed or contract involving leases of real properties
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not because it is an entity duly designated by the
President but because the said authority to execute the same is, by law expressly vested in it.
 IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION

 G.R. No. 102976 October 25, 1995

Facts:

 Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA") was created by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
272 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the
Philippines
 P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of five (5) years counting from 9
August 1973.1 When ISA's original term expired on 10 October 1978, its term was
extended for another ten (10) years by Executive Order No. 555
 The National Steel Corporation ("NSC") then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National
Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National
Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the
construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City
 Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on 16 November
1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public located in Iligan City,
and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC.
 Certain portions of the public land subject matter Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied
by respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation ("MCFC").
 Letter of Instruction (LOI), was issued directing the NSC to "negotiate with the owners of
MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC's present
occupancy rights on the subject land." LOI also directed that should NSC and private
respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period of sixty (60) days from the
date of LOI No. 1277, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under
P.D. No. 272 to initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of
private respondent MCFC relating to the subject public land.
 Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail. ISA commenced
eminent domain proceedings against private respondent MCFC. A writ of possession
was issued by the trial court in favor of ISA. While the trial was ongoing, however, the
statutory existence of petitioner ISA expired
 MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid judgment could be
rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a juridical person. The trial court granted
MCFC's motion to dismiss and did dismiss the case. The dismissal was anchored on the
provision of the Rules of Court stating that "only natural or juridical persons or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil case."3 The trial court also referred to non-
compliance by petitioner ISA with the requirements of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court Petitioner ISA filed its opposition to this motion and trial court granted MCFC's
motion to dismiss and did dismiss the case.
  Petitioner went on appeal to the Court of Appeals., the Court of Appeals affirmed the
order of dismissal of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner ISA, "a
government regulatory agency exercising sovereign functions," did not have the same
rights as an ordinary corporation and that the ISA, unlike corporations organized under
the Corporation Code, was not entitled to a period for winding up its affairs after
expiration of its legally mandated term, with the result that upon expiration of its term on
11 August 1987, ISA was "abolished and [had] no more legal authority to perform
governmental functions.
 In this Petition for Review, the Solicitor General argues that since ISA initiated and
prosecuted the action for expropriation in its capacity as agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, the Republic, as principal of ISA, is entitled to be substituted and to be made
a party-plaintiff after the agent ISA's term had expired.
 Private respondent MCFC, upon the other hand, argues that the failure of Congress to
enact a law further extending the term of ISA evinced a "clear legislative intent to
terminate the juridical existence of ISA,

Issue:

Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the
expiration of ISA's term

Ruling:

Yes, the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration
of ISA's term.

The 1917 Revised Administrative Code, which was in effect at the time of the commencement of
the present expropriation proceedings before the Iligan Regional Trial Court, provided that:

Sec. 64. Particular powers and duties of the President of the Philippines. — In

addition to his general supervisory authority, the President of the Philippines shall
have such other specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed
on him by law, and also, in particular, the powers and duties set forth in this
Chapter.

Among such special powers and duties shall be:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) To determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of

eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the Philippines; and to direct the
Secretary of Justice, where such act is deemed advisable, to cause the
condemnation proceedings to be begun in the court having proper jurisdiction.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 currently in force has substantially reproduced
the foregoing provision in the following terms:

Sec. 12. Power of eminent domain. — The President shall determine when it is

necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of
 the National Government, and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems the
action advisable, to institute expopriation proceedings in the proper court.

In the present case, the President, exercising the power duly delegated under both the 1917
and 1987 Revised Administrative Codes in effect made a determination that it was necessary
and advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the
Republic and accordingly directed the Solicitor General to proceed with the suit

CRISOSTOMO vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 106296 July 5, 1996

Facts:

 Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine College of Commerce

(PCC) During his incumbency as president of the PCC in 1974., two administrative
cases were filed against petitioner for illegal use of government vehicles,
misappropriation of construction materials belonging to the college, oppression and
harassment, grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty.

 1976, petitioner was preventively suspended from office pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, §13,
as amended. In his place Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer-in-charge

 P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, CONVERTING THE
PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY,
DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS,
AND EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS.

 Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment acquitting petitioner of the charges
against him. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for execution of the
judgment, particularly the part ordering his reinstatement to the position of president of
the PUP and the payment of his salaries and other benefits during the period of
suspension which was granted. However, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Dr.
Jaime Gellor as acting president of the PUP following the expiration of the term of office
of Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who had succeeded Dr. Mateo.

 People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the two
orders and the writs of execution issued by the trial court. It also asked for a temporary
restraining order. Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining
petitioner to cease and desist from acting as president of the PUP pursuant to the
reinstatement orders of the trial court. Said decision set aside the orders and writ of
reinstatement issued by the trial court. The payment of salaries and benefits to petitioner
accruing after the conversion of the PCC to the PUP was disallowed. Recovery of
salaries and benefits was limited to those accruing from the time of petitioner's
suspension until the conversion of the PCC to the PUP
  Petitioner argues that P.D. No. 1341, which converted the PCC into the PUP, did not
abolish the PCC. He contends that if the law had intended the PCC to lose its existence,
it would have specified that the PCC was being "abolished" rather than "converted" and
that if the PUP was intended to be a new institution, the law would have said it was
being "created." Petitioner claims that the PUP is merely a continuation of the existence
of the PCC, and, hence, he could be reinstated to his former position as president. A
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals

Issue:

W/n the conversion of PCC to PUP abolished the former institution

Ruling:

No, P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former Philippine College of
Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic University of the Philippines. What took place was a
change in academic status of the educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the
change in its name, the expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and
organization.

When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to replace it

with another one, the lawmaking authority says so. In contrast, P.D. No. 1341, provides:

§1. The present Philippine College of Commerce is hereby converted into a university to
be known as the "Polytechnic University of the Philippines," hereinafter referred to in this
Decree as the University.

But the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of president of the PUP could not be ordered
by the trial court because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had been promulgated fixing the
term of office of presidents of state universities and colleges at six (6) years, renewable for
another term of six (6) years, and authorizing the President of the Philippines to terminate the
terms of incumbents who were not reappointed. Petitioner became entitled only to retirement
benefits or the payment of separation pay.
 VIOLA vs. HON. RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III
G.R. No. 115844 August 15, 1997

Facts:

 This is a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of Art. III, 1-2 of the Revised
Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga
Barangay Officers so far as they provide for the election of first, second and third vice
presidents and for auditors for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters.
Petitioner Cesar G. Viola brought this action as barangay chairman of Bgy. 167, Zone
15, District II, Manila against then Secretary of Interior and Local Government Rafael M.
Alunan III, Alex L. David, president/secretary general of the National Liga ng mga
Barangay, and Leonardo L. Angat, president of the City of Manila Liga ng mga
Barangay, to restrain them from carrying out the elections for the questioned positions
on July 3, 1994.
 Petitioners contention is that the positions in question are in excess of those provided in
the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), 493 of which mentions as elective
positions only those of president, vice president, and five members of the board of
directors in each chapter at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political
subdivision, and national levels. Petitioner argues that, in providing for the positions of
first, second and third vice presidents and auditor for each chapter, 1-2 of the
Implementing Rules expand the number of positions authorized in 493 of the Local
Government Code in violation of the principle that implementing rules and regulations
cannot add or detract from the provisions of the law they are designed to implement.

Issue:

Whether or not the additional positions in question have been created without authority of law

Ruling:

No. Petitioner’s contention that the additional positions in question have been created without
authority of law is untenable. To begin with, the creation of these positions was actually made in
the Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng Mga Barangay, which was adopted by the First
Barangay National Assembly on January 11, 1994.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the creation of the additional positions is authorized by the
LGC which provides as follows:

493. Organization. The liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political
subdivision, and national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5)
members of the board of directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer
and create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the
chapter. A secretary-general shall be elected from among the members of the national
liga and shall be charged with the overall operation of the liga on the national level. The
board shall coordinate the activities of the chapters of the liga.

That Congress can delegate the power to create positions such as these has been settled by
our decisions upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the
Philippines to create, abolish or merge offices in the executive department. We hold that 493 of
the Local Government Code, in directing the board of directors of the liga to create such other
positions as may be deemed necessary for the management of the chapters, embodies a fairly
intelligible standard. There is no undue delegation of power by Congress.
 BIRAOGO, vs.THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

Facts:

 Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010." . Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the
legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution6 as it usurps
the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate
funds therefor.
 Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President
with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
 Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following
characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse
committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary
bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and
recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by
the State.10 "Commission’s members are usually empowered to conduct research,
support victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes.
Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about
past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for
prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms.
 Petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the province of
Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They maintain that the
delegated authority of the President to reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a public office, much
less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the reorganization of the administrative structure
of the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of
the Office of the President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and 4)
only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.36 Such continuing authority of the
President to reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the
President overstepped the limits of this delegated authority.
 OSG contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct fact-
finding investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public
officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of his authority to assume
directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the
 discretion of his officials.40 The power of the President to investigate is not limited to the
exercise of his power of control over his subordinates in the executive branch, but
extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his power to discipline
subordinates,41 his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes 42 and in
order to be informed on matters which he is entitled to know

Issue:

Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code

Ruling:

No, Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional and

structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper
by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another;
(2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency
or vice versa; or
(3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or
vice versa.

Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition

thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a
body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected.
The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.

However, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed. Section 17 reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be
doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to
which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials
and employees faithfully comply with the law
 ANAK MINDANAO PARTY-LIST GROUP vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE HON.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA

Facts:

 Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants

Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 364
and 379

 E.O. No. 364, which President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo TRANSFORMING THE

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND
REFORM

 E.O. No. 379, which amended E.O. No. 364, The National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) shall be an attached agency of the Department of Land Reform."AMIN’s
position.
 AMIN charges the Executive Department with transgression of the principle of
separation of powers. AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were
created by statutes, they can only be transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not
by mere executive orders. While AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in
the President21 who, as Chief Executive, holds the power of control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices,22 it posits that this broad power of control including
the power to reorganize is qualified and limited, for it cannot be exercised in a manner
contrary to law, citing the constitutional duty 23 of the President to ensure that the laws,
including those creating the agencies, be faithfully executed.
 AMIN cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidential commission to be clearly an
extension of the President, and the creation of the NCIP as an "independent agency
under the Office of the President."24 It thus argues that since the legislature had seen fit
to create these agencies at separate times and with distinct mandates, the President
should respect that legislative disposition.


Issue:
 Whether or not any reorganization of these administrative agencies should be the
subject of a statute.

Ruling:

No, The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law:

SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office.– The

President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President.

(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or
agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
departments or agencies.

The Administrative Code of 1987 categorizes administrative relationships into (1) supervision
and control, (2) administrative supervision, and (3) attachment.41 With respect to the third
category, it has been held that an attached agency has a larger measure of independence from
the Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and
control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the
Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for "policy and program
coordination."42 Indeed, the essential autonomous character of a board is not negated by its
attachment to a commission
 BAGAOISAN vs. NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. 152845, August 5, 2003

Facts:

 President Joseph Estrada issued on 30 September 1998 Executive Order No. 29,
entitled "Mandating the Streamlining of the National Tobacco Administration (NTA)," a
government agency under the Department of Agriculture. The order was followed by
another issuance, on 27 October 1998, by President Estrada of Executive Order No. 36,
amending Executive Order No. 29, insofar as the new staffing pattern was concerned, by
increasing from four hundred (400) to not exceeding seven hundred fifty (750) the
positions affected thereby. In compliance therewith, the NTA prepared and adopted a
new Organization Structure and Staffing Pattern (OSSP)

 NTA created a placement committee to assist the appointing authority in the selection
and placement of permanent personnel in the revised OSSP. petitioners, all occupying
different positions at the NTA office in Batac, Ilocos Norte, received individual notices of
termination of their employment with the NTA effective thirty (30) days from receipt
thereof. Finding themselves without any immediate relief from their dismissal from the
service, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order, with the
Regional Trial Court.

 The RTC, ordered the NTA to appoint petitioners in the new OSSP to positions similar or
comparable to their respective former assignments. A motion for reconsideration filed by
the NTA was denied by the trial court. Thereupon, the NTA filed an appeal with the Court
of Appeals.

 Appellate court rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the assailed orders of
the trial court. Petitioners went to this Court to assail the decision of the Court of
Appeals, contending that Court of Appeals erred in upholding Executive Order Nos. 29
and 36 of the Office of the President which are mere administrative issuances which do
 not have the force and effect of a law to warrant abolition of positions and/or effecting
total reorganization

Issue:

whether or not the reorganization is valid

Ruling:

Yes, reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith.
Reorganization is carried out in `good faith’ if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 provides for the circumstances
which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees
made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number
of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an
office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where
incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance
and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned
and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices,
and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation."8

The Court of Appeals, in its now assailed decision, has found no evidence of bad faith on the
part of the NTA; thus -

"In the case at bar, we find no evidence that the respondents committed bad faith in issuing the
notices of non-appointment to the petitioners.

"Firstly, the number of positions in the new staffing pattern did not increase. Rather, it
decreased from 1,125 positions to 750. It is thus natural that one’s position may be lost
through the removal or abolition of an office.

"Secondly, the petitioners failed to specifically show which offices were abolished and
the new ones that were created performing substantially the same functions.

"Thirdly, the petitioners likewise failed to prove that less qualified employees were
appointed to the positions to which they applied.

"x x x           x x x          x x x

"Fourthly, the preference stated in Section 4 of R.A. 6656, only means that old employees
should be considered first, but it does not necessarily follow that they should then automatically
be appointed. This is because the law does not preclude the infusion of new blood, younger
dynamism, or necessary talents into the government service, provided that the acts of the
appointing power are bonafide for the best interest of the public service and the person chosen
has the needed qualifications."
KAPISANAN NG MGA KAWANI NG ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD vs. COMMISSIONER
FE B. BARIN
G.R. No. 150974, June 29, 2007

Facts:

 RA 9136, popularly known as EPIRA (for Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001),
was enacted on 8 June 2001 and took effect on 26 June 2001. Section 38 of RA 9136
provides for the abolition of the ERB and the creation of the ERC. The pertinent portions
of Section 38 read:
Creation of the Energy Regulatory Commission. — There is hereby created an
independent, quasi-judicial regulatory board to be named the Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC). For this purpose, the existing Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)
created under Executive Order No. 172, as amended, is hereby abolished.

 Commissioners issued the guidelines for the selection and hiring of ERC employees. A
portion of the guidelines reflects the Commissioners’ view on the selection and hiring of
the ERC employees vis-a-vis Civil Service rules, thus:
Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, however, will have suppletory application to the
extent possible in regard to the selection and placement of employees in the ERC

 KERB sent a letter to the Commissioners stating the KERB members’ objection to the
Commissioners’ stand that Civil Service laws, rules and regulations have suppletory
application in the selection and placement of the ERC employees. KERB asserted that
RA 9136 did not abolish the ERB or change the ERB’s character as an economic
regulator of the electric power industry. KERB insisted that RA 9136 merely changed the
ERB’s name to the ERC and expanded the ERB’s functions and objectives.
  KERB made a number of requests: (1) the issuance of a formal letter related to the date
of filing of job applications, including the use of Civil Service application form no. 212; (2)
the creation of a placement/recruitment committee and setting guidelines relative to its
functions, without prejudice to existing Civil Service rules and regulations; and (3) copies
of the plantilla positions and their corresponding qualification standards duly approved
by either the President of the Philippines or the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

 Barin replied to KERB’s letter. She stated that Civil Service application form no. 212 and
the ERC-prescribed application format are substantially the same. Furthermore, the
creation of a placement/recruitment committee is no longer necessary because there is
already a prescribed set of guidelines for the recruitment of personnel

 KERB, fearful of the uncertainty of the employment status of its members, filed the
present petition. KERB later filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Enjoin Termination of
Petitioner ERB Employees. However, before the ERC received KERB’s pleadings, the
Selection Committee already presented its list of proposed appointees to the
Commissioners

 Two hundred twelve (212) ERB employees, one hundred thirty eighty [sic] (138) were
rehired and appointed to ERC plantilla positions and sixty six (66) opted to retire or be
separated from the service. Those who were rehired and those who opted to retire or be
separated constituted about ninety six (96%) percent of the entire ERB employees

 KERB asserts that there was no valid abolition of the ERB but there was merely a
reorganization done in bad faith

Issue:

Whether Section 38 of RA 9136 abolishing the ERB is constitutional

Ruling:

Yes, Section 38 of RA 9136 explicitly abolished the ERB. A valid order of abolition must not only
come from a legitimate body, it must also be made in good faith. An abolition is made in good
faith when it is not made for political or personal reasons, or when it does not circumvent the
constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. 9 Abolition of an office may be brought
about by reasons of economy, or to remove redundancy of functions, or a clear and explicit
constitutional mandate for such termination of employment. 10 Where one office is abolished and
replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. 11 When
there is a void abolition, the incumbent is deemed to have never ceased holding office.

[I]f the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional functions, duties or
powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office different from the one abolished, even
though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be considered as an abolition
of one office and the creation of a new or different one. The same is true if one office is
abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing officer or office

After comparing the functions of the ERB and the ERC, we find that the ERC indeed assumed
the functions of the ERB. However, the overlap in the functions of the ERB and of the ERC does
not mean that there is no valid abolition of the ERB. The ERC has new and expanded
functions which are intended to meet the specific needs of a deregulated power industry

NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION vs. CIVIL

SERVICE COMMISSION and VIOLETA L. GARCIA
G.R. No. 84301. April 7, 1993

Facts:

 "The records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a
first grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under
permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III
pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was also appointed under permanent
status up to September 1984. She was for two years, more or less, designated as Acting
Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. By virtue of Executive Order No.
649 (which took effect on February 9, 1981) which authorized the restructuring of the
Land Registration Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein, petitioner Garcia
was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under
temporary status, for not being a member of the Philippine Bar and which later on

 notified petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds
II on the ground that she was "receiving bribe money. Said Memorandum of Termination,
 was the subject of an appeal to the Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn
referred the appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).

 MSPB dropped the appeal of petitioner Garcia on the ground that since the termination
of her services was due to the expiration of her temporary appointment, her separation is
in order. Her motion for reconsideration was denied

 Civil Service Commission directed that private respondent Garcia be restored to her
position as Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the NALTDRA. It held that
"under the vested right theory the new requirement of BAR membership to qualify for
permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II or higher as mandated under
said Executive Order, would not apply to her (private respondent Garcia) but only to the
filling up of vacant lawyer positions.

 Petitioner NALTDRA filed the present petition to assail the validity of the above
Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. It contends that Sections 8 and 10 of
Executive Order No. 649 abolished all existing positions in the LRC and transferred their
functions to the appropriate new offices created by said Executive Order, which newly
created offices required the issuance of new appointments to qualified office holders.
Verily, Executive Order No. 649 applies to private respondent Garcia, and not being a
member of the Bar, she cannot be reinstated to her former position as Deputy Register
of Deeds II.

Issue:

(1) was the abolition carried out by a legitimate body?; and

(2) was it done in good faith

Ruling:

Yes, The power to reorganize is, however; not absolute. We have held in Dario vs. Mison 7 that
reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. This court has pronounced 8 that if the newly created office has substantially new,
different or additional functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an
office different from the one abolished, even though it embraces all or some of the duties of
the old office it will be considered as an abolition of one office and the creation of a new
or different one. The same is true if one office is abolished and its duties, for reasons of
economy are given to an existing officer or office.

Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the
operation of the Land Registration Commission. 9 A reorganization is carried out in good faith if
it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. 10 To this end, the
requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key positions in the NALTDRA was
imposed to meet the changing circumstances and new development of the times. 11
Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not
have such qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the NALTDRA,
The additional qualification was not intended to remove her from office. Rather, it was a criterion
imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.
 EUGENIO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995

Facts:
  Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2,
1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended
to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. However,
respondent Civil Service Commission2 passed Resolution stating that Civil Service
Commission hereby resolves to streamline reorganize and effect changes in its
organizational structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall
now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service
Commission.
 The above resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of petitioner as Civil
Service Officer, Rank IV. Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the
Career Executive Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been
abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul the resolution stating, that such
resolution is IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT COMMISSION
USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ABOLISHED
THE CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY LAW

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid reorganization

Ruling:

No, CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an
unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a
legislative function. Commission's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as
enumerated in Section 16 of 1987 Admin Code. The essential autonomous character of the CESB is
not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made
to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain "policy
and program coordination