Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District

Daniel P. Potter Daniel P. Potter

Electronically RECEIVED on 3/3/2021 at 4:24:52 PM Electronically FILED on 3/3/2021 by Maria Perez, Deputy Clerk

B310559

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
______________

CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC BIXLER-

ZAVALA; JANE DOE #1; AND JANE DOE #2,
Plaintiffs and Petitioners

v.

SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Respondent.

DANIEL MASTERSON, CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY

INTERNATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY
CENTER,

Defendants and Real Parties in Interest.

_____________

APPEAL FROM LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

HON. STEVEN J. KLEIFIELD, DEPT. 57, CASE NO.
19STCV29458
________________

LAW AND RELIGION PROFESSORS’ AMICUS BRIEF FOR

PLAINTIFFS
_______________
LESLIE C. GRIFFIN (BAR NO. 174017)
UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, LAS VEGAS
WILLIAM S. BOYD SCHOOL OF LAW
4505 S. MARYLAND PKWY., BOX 451003
LAS VEGAS, NV 89154-1003
(713) 301-3105
leslie.griffin@unlv.edu
Amicus Counsel
1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................... 3

INTERESTS OF AMICI ................................................................ 5

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF ............................................................. 8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ....................................................... 8

ARGUMENT ................................................................................ 10

I. Petitioners’ Claims Must Be Protected by

the Courts ............................................................... 10

II. Petitioners’ Right to Leave a Religion is

Protected by the First Amendment ................. 15

III. The Ministerial Exception Does Not Block

This Suit ................................................................. 18

CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 21

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT ........................................... 23

PROOF OF SERVICE ................................................................. 24

2
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases
Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus (9th Cir.1999),
196 F.3d 940..................................................................................... 19

Clement v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Erie (W.D. Pa. June 16, 2017),
No. CV 16-117 ERIE, 2017 WL 2619134 ........................................ 20

Doe v. First Presbyterian Church U.S.A. of Tulsa (2017),

421 P.3d 284..................................................................................... 17

Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery (D. Kan. 2004),

342 F. Supp. 2d 996 ......................................................................... 19

Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church (9th Cir. 2004),

375 F.3d 951..................................................................................... 19

Employment Division, Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith

(1990), 494 U.S. 872 ........................................................................... 14

Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville (Okla. 1989),

775 P.2d 766..................................................................................... 17

Hadnot v. Shaw (Okla. 1992),

826 P.2d 978..................................................................................... 17

Hope Internat. Univ. v. Superior Court (2004),

119 Cal.App.4th 719 ........................................................................ 19

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C.

(2012), 565 U.S. 171 .......................................................................... 18

Hutchinson v. Luddy (Pa. 1992),

606 A.2d 905 ...................................................................................... 8

Malicki v. Doe (Fla.2002),

814 So.2d 347 ................................................................................... 19

McKelvey v. Pierce (N.J. 2002)

800 A.2d 840 .................................................................................... 20

3
 Page

Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru (2020),

140 S. Ct. 2049 ............................................................................. 9, 18

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005),

131 Cal. App. 4th 417 ...................................................................... 13

Savin v. City & Cty. of San Francisco (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2017),
No. 16-CV-05627-JST, 2017 WL 2686546 ..................................... 19

Sherbert v. Verner (1963),

374 U.S. 398 ..................................................................................... 15

Other Authorities
40th Statewide Investigating Grand Jury [Pa.] Dec. 16, 2019,
Report 1, Redacted .......................................................................... 13

Angela C. Carmella, The Protection of Children and Young People:

Catholic and Constitutional Visions of Responsible Freedom (2003),
44 B.C. L. REV. 1031, 1032–33 ........................................................ 21

Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits

of Hosanna-Tabor (2014), 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1183......................... 13

Clerical Abusers and the First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES,

Mar. 14, 2012....................................................................................... 12

Dominic Patten, Danny Masterson Pleads Not Guilty to Rape Charges,

Faced 45 Years if Convicted, DEADLINE, Jan. 20, 2021 ..................... 12

Larry McShane, Timothy Cardinal Dolan’s lawyer viewed church

program to compensate sexual abuse victims as a hedge against
legislation: report, Jan. 14, 2021,
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS ................................................................... 15

Marianne Grano, Divine Disputes: Why and How Michigan Courts

Should Revisit Church Property Law, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 269 (2018)
............................................................................................................. 16

Rules
California Rules of Court, Rule 8.204(c)(1) ........................................... 23

California Rules of Court, Rule 8.520(f)(4) ............................................. 5

4
 INTERESTS OF AMICI1

Amici are professors of law and religion who understand that

some members and former members of religions are subjected to

tort harm and suffer serious damages from it, just as other people

do. We believe that tort victims will receive due process of law to

resolve their injuries in civil courts, and not in arbitration run by

the tortfeasors themselves. The tortfeasors’ arbitration hearing

would not give justice to the injured plaintiffs in this case. We ask

this Court to recognize the rights of plaintiffs to have their tort

cases heard in court. Religious freedom does not require tort

injuries to be resolved by the church itself. Instead, we ask this

court to give these plaintiffs a legal chance at receiving justice.

The amici are:

Seth J. Chandler
Foundation Professor of Law
University of Houston Law Center

Katya Dow
Professor of Practice
University of Houston Law Center

1
Amici certify that no person or entity other than Amici and its
counsel authored this proposed brief in whole or in part and that
no person or entity other than its counsel made any monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the
proposed brief. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.520(f)(4).)

5
Meredith J. Duncan
George Butler Research Professor of Law, Assistant Dean
for Diversity, Inclusion & Metropolitan Programs
University of Houston Law Center

Benjamin Edwards
Associate Professor, Director of the Public Policy Clinic
University of Nevada, Las Vegas Boyd School of Law

Margaret A. Farley
Gilbert L. Stark Professor Emerita of Christian Ethics
Yale Divinity School

Thomas B. McAffee
Emeritus Professor of Law
University of Nevada, Las Vegas Boyd School of Law

M. Isabel Medina
Ferris Family Distinguished Professor of Law
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law

Michael A. Olivas
William B. Bates Distinguished Chair in Law Emeritus
University of Houston Law Center

Laura Oren
Professor Emerita
University of Houston Law Center

Jordan Paust
Professor Emeritus
University of Houston Law Center

Jean Porter
John A. O’Brien Professor of Theology
University of Notre Dame

Mark A. Rothstein, J.D.

Herbert F. Boehl Chair of Law and Medicine
University of Louisville School of Medicine

6
Jim Starzynski
Guardian ad Litem and Youth Attorney
Corrales, NM

March 2, 2021 Leslie C. Griffin

By: ____Leslie C. Griffin________

Leslie C. Griffin
Attorney for Amici Curiae

7
 AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case gives this court an excellent opportunity to state

that religious freedom protects the right of individuals to be free

from abuse. Religions have long stood for that freedom, but

sometimes they have blocked it.

Religious freedom is not the freedom to harm. Too many

people, too often, think it is. For example, courts originally

concluded that all the churches’ choices to sexually abuse children,

and then to bury the abuse in order to protect the abusers instead

of the abused, were decisions protected from court review by the

First Amendment. Gradually the courts learned that when

religions remain outside the law, their members are harmed. See,

e.g., Hutchison v. Luddy, 606 A.2d 905, 908 (Pa. 1992) (“Here, it is

the Pennsylvania rules of discovery which are controlling. Merely

because Canon 489 is controlling in the internal operation of the

affairs of the Church does not mean that it permits evidence

pertaining to sexual molestation of children by priests to be

secreted and shielded from discovery which is otherwise proper.”);

Pennsylvania v. Stewart, 690 A.2d 195 (Pa. 1997) (rejecting claims

that records placed in “secret archives” were banned from

8
disclosure or discovery pursuant to First Amendment). Instead,

the First Amendment is protected through enforcement of the laws

that safeguard everyone, especially victims of abuse.

The courts have been much clearer that the First

Amendment protects an individual’s religious freedom right to

leave a church as well as to join one. Without such freedom,

individuals would be enslaved to their churches in a way that both

the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause prohibit.

The courts have given great protection to the ministerial

exception in order to protect religious freedom. However, the

ministerial exception “does not mean that religious institutions

enjoy a general immunity from secular laws[.]” Our Lady of

Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060 (2020).

Churches do not possess absolute religious freedom to harm their

ministers, as the court in question here has suggested. The courts

need to be clear that there is no religious freedom to abuse

ministers, members, or former members.

In this case, Petitioners Chrissie Carnell Bixler, Cedric

Bixler-Zavala, Jane Doe #1, and Jane Doe #2 ask the court to allow

a balanced court procedure that will listen to both Petitioners’ and

Respondents’ claims. This would be in stark contrast to sending

9
the church’s illegal conduct back to its own members for review

instead of letting legal misconduct be reviewed by the courts.

Petitioners ask that the court allow the Respondents’ terrible

wrongs—including sexual assaults, harassment, stalking, and

destruction of property—to be considered as civil wrongs instead

of as acts protected by religious freedom. This court must stand

with the courts that learned the lesson that churches should be

punished, not rewarded, for their abuse, and rewarded only when

they do the wonderful and supportive things that they often do.

ARGUMENT

I. Petitioners’ Claims Must Be Protected by the

Courts

Petitioners have been subjected to terrible and repeated

abuse by the Scientology defendants, as summarized by the judge

in the superior court:

According to the first amended complaint, Defendants

stalked, harassed, invaded the privacy of Plaintiffs and
Plaintiffs’ families, and intentionally inflicted emotional
distress on Plaintiffs, who are four women sexually
assaulted by Defendant Daniel Masterson, a “field staff
member” or recruiter for Church of Scientology and
Religious Technology, which organizations are allegedly
lead by Defendant David Miscavige (collectively
“Defendants”). Defendants’ conduct was allegedly to
retaliate against Plaintiffs for reporting the alleged
sexual assaults to the police.

10
Plaintiffs allege Defendant Masterson, a high-ranking
member of Church of Scientology and Religious
Technology, sexually assaulted Plaintiff Chrissie Bixler
at various times between 1996 and 2002 while the two
were dating and cohabitating. Plaintiffs allege David
Miscavige, Church of Scientology, and Religious
Technology and their agents coerced, by threats of
violence and ostracization, Plaintiff Bixler not to report
the sexual assaults to law enforcement. In 2016, Bixler
reported the assaults by Masterson to the Los Angeles
Police Department (“LAPD”). Following Bixler’s 2016
report to the present, Plaintiffs Bixler and Bixler-Zavala
suffered various trespasses, invasive surveillance,
stalking, threats of violence, defamation, sexual
harassment, destruction of property – particularly pets,
identity theft, assaults using automobiles, harassing
phone calls, text messages, and social media messages,
and wire taping; all purportedly from agents of the
Defendants. Plaintiffs allege this conduct is designed to
dissuade Bixler from, and punish Bixler for, cooperating
with law enforcement.

Plaintiffs allege that: in September 2002 Masterson

drugged and sexually assaulted Plaintiff Jane Doe #1;
and in April 2003 Masterson drugged and sexually
assaulted Jane Doe #1 while strangling her and
threatening her with a firearm. Agents for Defendants
attempted to coerce, with threats of violence and
ostracization, Jane Doe #1 to not report the sexual
assaults to law enforcement. In June 2004, Jane Doe #1
reported the sexual assaults to the LAPD. Agents of
Defendants coerced Jane Doe #1 to sign a non-disclosure
agreement regarding the sexual assaults. In 2016, Jane
Doe #1 asked the LAPD to reopen the investigation into
Masterson’s sexual assaults against her. Following Jane
Doe #1’s 2016 request to the present, Jane Doe #1
suffered harassing phone calls, text messages, and social
media messages, stalking, witness tampering, invasive
surveillance, defamation, various trespasses, larceny,
property damage, identity theft, threats of violence,

11
 assaults, sexual harassment, and wire taping; all
purportedly from agents of the Defendants. Plaintiffs
allege this conduct is designed to dissuade Jane Doe #1
from, and punish Jane Doe #1 for, cooperating with law
enforcement.

Chrissie Carnell Bixler, et al. v. Church of Scientology

International, et al., Superior Court of California, Dec. 30, 2020, at

1 (emphasis added). One of the defendants in this case, Danny

Masterson, is currently under arrest and charged with rape.

Dominic Patten, Danny Masterson Pleads Not Guilty to Rape

Charges, Faced 45 Years if Convicted, DEADLINE, Jan. 20, 2021, at

https://deadline.com/2021/01/danny-masterson-rape-case-moving-

forward-la-da-thomas-mesereau-and-sharon-appelbaum-

1234599732/.

Respondents claim that the terrible treatment in this case

must be reviewed by the church itself, in an arbitration, in which

“all arbitrators are Scientologists in good standing with the Mother

Church.” 1 ER 177. This argument is reminiscent of the churches’

early claims “that the First Amendment shields them from civil

lawsuits for negligent supervision and retention of employees who

sexually abuse children.” Editorial, Clerical Abusers and the First

Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012. Across the country, courts

have learned that both the abusers and their protectors should be

12
held liable for their wrongdoing. See, e.g., 40th Statewide

Investigating Grand Jury [Pa.], Report 1, Redacted, Dec. 16, 2019,

http://www.pacourts.us/news-and-statistics/cases-of-public-

interest/fortieth-statewide-investigating-grand-jury (exposing

extensive injury to individuals by the church’s hierarchy).

The First Amendment usually blocks individuals from suing

their churches “over matters of significant religious concern.”

Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and

Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1183, 1203 (2014).

The courts learned from the child abuse cases that such abuse is

not a matter of religious concern. No Respondent in this case

claims that the right to sexually assault and abuse the Petitioners

is a religious duty that Scientology must undertake. As California

has held, “internal church dispute[s]” are not subject to judicial

review, but a “criminal investigation into suspected child

molestation allegedly committed by Catholic priest” is. Roman

Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 131 Cal.

App. 4th 417, 432 (2005), as modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 16,

2005). This case, like Roman Catholic Archbishop, involves

investigation of illegal conduct by Respondents, and should be

reviewed in court, not dismissed as an internal church matter. The

13
plaintiffs in this case have suffered great damage and want justice

to heal those harms.

This case reminds us that the “Free Exercise Clause is

implicated only when the government interferes with religious

beliefs or conduct. This is also true for church autonomy. This is

why the regular tort rules apply to someone hit by the church

bus or by a falling gargoyle. Those suits threaten no religious

practice.” Lund, supra, at 1204. This case was much worse than

being hit by a church bus or by a falling gargoyle; it involves rape,

sexual assault, harassment, and property damage, among other

harms. The terrible torts in this case do not threaten any

Scientology religious practice. Therefore they should be reviewed

by the courts, not by the churches’ own members.

Plaintiffs ask this Court to remember that everyone,

religious and non-religious, must obey “neutral laws of general

applicability.” Employment Division, Dep’t of Human Resources of

Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). A religious arbitration by

individuals of required loyalty to Scientology would not protect

those laws as neutrally as the courts would. Such an arbitration

would not be impartial, as it is expected to be. A recent New York

story reminds us that abuse harms should not be handled

14
exclusively by the churches. “An attorney with the Archdiocese of

New York suggested the church’s program to compensate

childhood sexual abuse victims was intended to blunt the passage

of the state’s Child Victims Act,” i.e., to keep children from the

courts’ protection. Larry McShane, Timothy Cardinal Dolan’s

lawyer viewed church program to compensate sexual abuse victims

as a hedge against legislation: report, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Jan.

14, 2021.

If this court applied strict scrutiny, the government’s

“compelling state interest” in protecting individuals from physical

and mental harm would outweigh the need to support

Respondents’ claim to self-centered arbitration. Sherbert v. Verner,

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

We ask this Court to make sure that these terrible tort

claims are heard in court, where Plaintiffs can receive full due

process of law.

II. Petitioners’ Right to Leave a Religion is Protected

by the First Amendment

“An important free exercise right is

the right to exit a religion.” Marianne Grano, Divine Disputes:

15
Why and How Michigan Courts Should Revisit Church Property

Law, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 269, 284 (2018). Plaintiffs are church

outsiders, not insiders; outsiders “have constitutional rights to be

free from the power of other peoples’ churches.” Lund, supra at

1204. If Plaintiffs’ case went to arbitration, it would be subject to

other peoples’ churches’ power. “An important aspect of church

autonomy is how every insider has the right to leave, the right to

become an outsider. Maybe this is part of the church autonomy

principle itself; maybe it describes the limits of church autonomy.

But either way, church autonomy implies a constitutional right of

exit from religious organizations.” Id. at 1203.

States have long recognized the difference between a church

outsider and a church insider. In Oklahoma, for example, Marian

Guinn left the Church of Christ after they subjected her to

discipline. Although Guinn had abandoned her church

membership, the church nonetheless read its disparaging remarks

about Guinn to church members. Church Elders believed one can

never withdraw from church membership.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed, and upheld the

jury’s verdict for actual and punitive damages for the torts of

outrage and invasion of privacy.

16
Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 768

(Okla. 1989). The “shield from liability evaporates for claims that

arise after a member has separated from the church and is no

longer a church member.” Id. Three years later, the court repeated

its recognition that “the church has no power over those who live

outside of the spiritual community.” Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d

978, 988 (Okla. 1992).

In a 2017 case citing Guinn, the court noted “we were

unequivocal, ‘[j]ust as freedom to worship is protected by the First

Amendment, so also is the liberty to recede from one’s religious

allegiance.’ … We went further: ‘The First Amendment clearly

safeguards the freedom to worship as well as the freedom not to

worship.’” Doe v. First Presbyterian Church U.S.A. of Tulsa, 421

P.3d 284, 290 (2017) (citing Guinn, 775 P.2d at 776) (emphasis

added). All courts should be unequivocal that the right to exit a

church is constitutionally protected, as it must be for the Plaintiffs

here.

This court should recognize Plaintiffs’ constitutionally

protected exit by allowing their lawsuit to proceed in court. Just

like Guinn’s church, Scientology cannot take away its members’

17
freedom by asserting their view that membership continues even

after the members make numerous efforts to leave them.

III. The Ministerial Exception Does Not Block This

Suit

The First Amendment protects many religions against

employment lawsuits by their ministers. The Supreme Court has

recognized this ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor

Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171

(2012) and Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.

Ct. 2049 (2020). However, churches are not absolutely free to abuse

their ministers. As the Supreme Court explained in Hosanna-

Tabor, “We express no view on whether the exception bars other

types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of

contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers. There

will be time enough to address the applicability of the exception to

other circumstances if and when they arise.” Hosanna-Tabor

Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171,

196 (2012).

The time is now for this Court to reiterate that there is no

First Amendment right to sexually abuse, assault, or harass a

minister, member, or nonmember. Many courts, especially

18
California courts, have recognized that there is never a religious

duty to sexually assault or harass people, and that inflicting tort

abuse does not automatically enjoy First Amendment protection.

See, e.g., Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th

Cir. 2004) (allowing claim that minister was subjected to sexual

harassment suit in a hostile work environment, and also a

retaliation lawsuit, to proceed); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y

of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that the ministerial

exception did not bar seminarian’s sexual harassment

claim); Savin v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, No. 16-CV-05627-

JST, 2017 WL 2686546, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2017) (stating

sexual harassment claims are not barred by the ministerial

exception); Hope Internat. Univ. v. Superior Court, 119

Cal.App.4th 719, 736, footnote 8) (2004) (stating that the

ministerial exception does not protect a church from assault and

battery claims); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347 (Fla.2002) (refusing

to apply the ministerial exception to negligent hiring and

supervision claims related to alleged sexual assault by clergy);

Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 342 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Kan.

2004) (holding that complaints for sexual harassment and

retaliatory harassment could proceed without being barred by the

19
ministerial exception); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840 (N.J.

2002) (stating that the ministerial exception did not bar

seminarian’s sexual harassment claim); Clement v. Roman

Catholic Diocese of Erie, No. CV 16-117 ERIE, 2017 WL 2619134,

at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 16, 2017) (allowing offensively sexual hostile

work environment lawsuit to proceed).

Unlike the suits in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran

Church and Our Lady of Guadalupe, this is not an employment-

related lawsuit. Courts have allowed civil suits against churches

for sexual misconduct and harassment, which are at the heart of

Plaintiffs’ claims in this case. The actions taken by the Defendants

did not further or implicate any religious duties as “ministers,” as

Defendants have not claimed that they believe sexual assault or

rape to be a part of their religious tradition. Moreover, Plaintiffs

are not ministers, but are church-outsiders. Lund, supra at 1204.

Now is the time for this Court to make clear, and to reiterate,

that the First Amendment does not protect Scientology’s right to

sexually assault Petitioners, to commit all kinds of torts on them

in pursuit of that abuse, and then to allow their own agencies to

review the facts in place of the courts. We ask this Court to grant

20
this petition so it can state clearly that Petitioners’ lawsuit can

proceed in court, not in religious arbitration.

CONCLUSION

Professor Carmella has summarized the long list of changes

that happened to litigation involving the First Amendment once

courts understood the terrible horror of child sexual abuse:

In light of a growing consensus that the Church has failed in

the past to protect children from abusive priests, states have
begun to rush in to fill the void by imposing external
accountability. In the process, they are making sure the
Church now knows that the matter of child sexual abuse is
rightfully in the states’ jurisdiction, both civil and
criminal. In state legislatures, there are moves to add
“clergy” to the list of professionals obligated to report
suspected child abuse. Statutes of limitations have been
extended in some states, and bills are pending in many
others, to allow for criminal prosecution of abusive priests
and for the filing of new tort lawsuits against dioceses.
Prosecutors have become more aggressive. Grand juries
have been convened and have issued reports filled with
scathing criticisms of church conduct. Courts have shown
little regard for constitutional claims or claims of document
privilege made by dioceses. Bishops have been called to
testify in court and before grand juries. And criminal
liability for a diocese—once unimaginable—is now on the
table.

Angela C. Carmella, The Protection of Children and Young People:

Catholic and Constitutional Visions of Responsible Freedom, 44

B.C. L. REV. 1031, 1032–33 (2003).

21
 The same rules must apply to adults who sexually harass

and assault their church members. We ask the Court to join the

protection of sexual assault victims by allowing them their day in

court.

Respectfully submitted,

_/s/ Leslie C. Griffin ______________

LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, ESQ.

22
 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(c)(1).)

The text of this brief consists of 3,273 words as counted by

the Microsoft Word version 2019 word processing program used

to generate the brief.

Dated: March 2, 2021

_/s/ Leslie C. Griffin ______________

Leslie C. Griffin

23
 PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a

party to this action. I am employed in. My business address is.

On March 3, 2021, I served true copies of the following

document(s) described as LAW AND RELIGION
PROFESSORS’ AMICUS BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS on the
interested parties in this action as follows:

SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

BY MAIL: I enclosed the document(s) in a sealed envelope or

package addressed to the persons at the addresses listed in the
Service List and placed the envelope for collection and mailing,
following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar
with X’s practice for collecting and processing correspondence for
mailing. On the same day that the correspondence is placed for
collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of
business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed
envelope with postage fully prepaid.

BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: Based on

a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by e-
mail or electronic transmission via Court’s Electronic Filing
System (EFS) operated by ImageSoft TrueFiling (TrueFiling) as
indicated on the attached service list.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State

of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on
March 3, 2021, at Los Angeles, California .

___/s/ Fernando Mercado__________

Name

24
 SERVICE LIST
Bixler et al. v. Church of Scientology et al
Case Number

Plaintiffs’ Counsel

Robert W. Thompson, Esq.

Casey A. Gee, Esq.
THOMPSON LAW OFFICES, P.C.
700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160
Burlingame, CA 94010
Telephone: 650-513-6111
Email: bobby@tlopc.com
Email: casey@tlopc.com
Email: alicia@tlopc.com

Brian D. Kent, Esq.

Gaetano D’Andrea, Esq.
M. Stewart Ryan, Esq.
LAFFEY, BUCCI, & KENT, LLP
1435 Walnut Street, Suite 700
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Telephone: 215-399-9255
Email: bkent@lbk-law.com
Email: gdandrea@laffeybuccikent.com
Email: sryan@laffeybuccikent.com
Email: vzeoli@laffeybuccikent.com
Email: jkerr@laffeybuccikent.com

Jeffrey P. Fritz, Esq.

SOLOFF & ZERVANOS, P. C.
1525 Locust Street, 8th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Telephone: 215-732-2260
Email: jfritz@lawsz.com
Email: lgoodfellow@lawsz.com
Email: jgilbert@lawsz.com

25
Marci Hamilton, Esq.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA Fox-Fels Building
3814 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
Telephone: 215-353-8984
Email: hamilton.marci@gmail.com

Graham E. Berry (SBN: 128503)

Law Office of Graham E. Berry
3384 McLaughlin Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90066
Email: grahambe1Tyesq@gmail.com

Defendants’ Counsel

William H. Forman, Esq.

David C. Scheper, Esq.
Margaret E. Dayton, Esq.
SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP
800 W. Sixth Street, 18th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90017
Telephone: 213-613-4682
Email: wforman@scheperkim.com
Email: dscheper@scheperkim.com
Email: pdayton@scheperkim.com
Attorneys for Church of Scientology International & Celebrity
Centre International

Robert W. Mangels, Esq.

Matthew D. Hinks, Esq.
JEFFER, MANGELS, BUTLER & MITCHELL, LLP
1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067-4308
Telephone: 310-203-8080
Email: rmangels@jmbm.com
Email: mhinks@jmbm.com
Attorneys for Religious Technology Center

26
Jeffrey K. Riffer, Esq.
ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN GARTSIDE, LLP
10345 West Olympic Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90064
Telephone: 310-746-4400
Email: jriffer@elkinskalt.com
Attorney for Defendant David Miscavige

Andrew B. Brettler
LAVELY & SINGER, P.C.
2049 Century Park E., Suite 2400
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: 310-556-3501
Email: abrettler@lavelysinger.com
Attorney for Daniel Masterson

Superior Court of Los Angeles County

Frederick Bennett
111 N. Hill Street, Rm 546
Los Angeles, CA 90012
(by mail)

27
 Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District
Daniel P. Potter
Electronically FILED on 3/3/2021 by Maria Perez, Deputy Clerk

PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
California Court of Appeal, Second
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Appellate District
California Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District
Case Name: Chrissie Carnell Bixler et al. v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles County et al.
Case Number: B310559
Lower Court Case Number: 19STCV29458

At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this legal
1.
action.

2. My email address used to e-serve: leslie.griffin@unlv.edu

3. I served by email a copy of the following document(s) indicated below:

Title(s) of papers e-served:

Filing Type Document Title
BRIEF - AMICUS CURIAE Law And Religion Professors Amicus Brief For
BRIEF Plaintiffs
Service Recipients:
Date /
Person Served Email Address Type
Time
Marci Hamilton hamilton.marci@gmail.com e- 3/3/2021
Court Added Serve 4:24:52
PM
Margaret Dayton pdayton@scheperkim.com e- 3/3/2021
Scheper Kim and Harris Serve 4:24:52
274353 PM
William Forman wforman@scheperkim.com e- 3/3/2021
Scheper Kim & Harris LLP Serve 4:24:52
150477 PM
Robert Thompson bobby@tlopc.com e- 3/3/2021
Thompson Law Offices, P.C. Serve 4:24:52
250038 PM
David Scheper dscheper@scheperkim.com e- 3/3/2021
Scheper Kim & Harris, LLP Serve 4:24:52
120174 PM
Andrew Brettler abrettler@lavelysinger.com e- 3/3/2021
Lavely & Singer Serve 4:24:52
262928 PM
Matthew Hinks mhinks@jmbm.com e- 3/3/2021
Jeffer Mangels Butler Mitchell LLP Serve 4:24:52
200750 PM
Casey A. Gee, Esq. casey@tlopc.com e- 3/3/2021
Serve 4:24:52
PM
Alicia alicia@tlopc.com e- 3/3/2021
Serve 4:24:52
PM
Brian D. Kent, Esq. bkent@lbk-law.com e- 3/3/2021
Serve 4:24:52
PM
Gaetano DAndrea, Esq. gdandrea@laffeybuccikent.com e- 3/3/2021
Serve 4:24:52
PM
M. Stewart Ryan, Esq. sryan@laffeybuccikent.com e- 3/3/2021
Serve 4:24:52
PM
V. Zeoli vzeoli@laffeybuccikent.com e- 3/3/2021
Serve 4:24:52
PM
J. Kerr jkerr@laffeybuccikent.com e- 3/3/2021
Serve 4:24:52
PM
Jeffrey P. Fritz, Esq. jfritz@lawsz.com e- 3/3/2021
Serve 4:24:52
PM
L. Goodfellow lgoodfellow@lawsz.com e- 3/3/2021
Serve 4:24:52
PM
J. Gilbert jgilbert@lawsz.com e- 3/3/2021
Serve 4:24:52
PM
Graham E. Berry grahambe1Tyesq@gmail.com e- 3/3/2021
Serve 4:24:52
PM
Robert W. Mangels, Esq. rmangels@jmbm.com e- 3/3/2021
Serve 4:24:52
PM
Jeffrey K. Riffer, Esq. jriffer@elkinskalt.com e- 3/3/2021
Serve 4:24:52
87016 PM

This proof of service was automatically created, submitted and signed on my behalf
through my agreements with TrueFiling and its contents are true to the best of my
information, knowledge, and belief.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.

3/3/2021
Date

/s/Fernando Mercado
Signature

Griffin, Leslie (174017)

Last Name, First Name (PNum)

Law Firm