Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
Manila

NINTH DIVISION
VICENTE S. PEREZ acting in his CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
own right and as Attorney-in-Fact
of GEOFFREY PEREZ, Members:
Petitioner,
YBAÑEZ, E. A.,
Chairperson
- versus -
SANTOS, R. A. M., &
v
PASCUA, B. S., JJ.
RUDIE VALORIA, NORA
ALCANTARA, VILLA MIOLETA,
NELIA CORTEZ, LILIA QUIAPO, Promulgated:
TESIE VALORIA and TEOFILO
VALORIA, JR., ___________________
Respondents.
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YBAÑEZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 43 of the Rules of

Court, seeking to reverse the Decision2 rendered on 11 January 2019
by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(“DARAB”) in DARAB Case No. 19053 and its Resolution 3 dated 18
July 2019. The assailed Decision granted the appeal 4 of respondents
Rudie Valoria (“Rudie”), Nora Alcantara (“Nora”), Villa Mioleta
(“Villa”), Nelia Cortez (“Nelia”), Lilia Quiapo (“Lilia”), Tesie Valoria
v Acting Third Member for fifteen (15) working days, as per Office Order No. 58-21-RSF dated 22
February 2021
1 Rollo, pp. 26-66.
2 Ibid., pp. 11-20.
3 Ibid., pp. 23-25.
4 Ibid., p. 91, Annex “C”.
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
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(“Tesie”), and Teofilo Valoria, Jr. (“Teofilo”) and respondent Belinda

Valoria (“Belinda”) to the 16 June 2015 Decision 5 of Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (“PARAD”). The assailed Resolution,
on the other hand, denied the Motion for Reconsideration 6 filed by
petitioner Vicente S. Perez (“Vicente”).

THE FACTS

Petitioner Vicente Perez together with Geoffrey Perez

(“Geoffrey”) are the lawful co-owners of an agricultural land with an
area of Thirteen Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-Five square meters
(13,955 sq.m.) located at Barangay San Vicente, Alaminos City,
Pangasinan.7

On 12 December 2006, petitioner entered into an agricultural

leasehold contract8 with Severina Valoria (“Severina”) covering the
subject land, whereby the latter agreed to pay an annual lease rental
equivalent to Nine Hundred Twenty-One (921) kilograms of palay.
Severina died on 25 May 2013 but petitioner only learned of such fact
in July 2013.9

On 12 September 2014, petitioner filed a complaint10 for the

extinguishment of his tenancy relationship with the late Severina, as
she had no qualified heirs to succeed the tenancy. Petitioner alleged
that respondents, who are supposedly the successor-tenants of the
late Severina, are either working or residing outside Alaminos City
rendering them incapable of personally cultivating the subject land.
Thus, respondents are not qualified to succeed the tenancy.11

5 Ibid., pp. 251-259, Annex “K”.

6 Ibid., pp. 97-115.
7 Ibid., p. 31, Petition for Review.
8 Ibid., pp. 271-272, Annex “D”.
9 Ibid., p. 31, Petition for Review.
10 Ibid., pp. 291-296, Annex “O”.
11 Ibid., p. 31, Petition for Review.
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
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Upon the failure of parties to enter into an amicable settlement,

Provincial Adjudicator Annabelle O. Madayag-Oandasan
(“Provincial Adjudicator”) directed them to submit their respective
position papers within thirty (30) days. Petitioner filed his Position
Paper12 but respondents failed to comply with the directives.13

Meanwhile, on 14 April 2015, the Provincial Adjudicator upon

motion of petitioner, issued an Order14 directing the DARAB
Provincial Sheriff to supervise the harvest and to deliver fifty percent
(50%) of the proceeds thereof to the petitioner during the pendency of
the case.15

On 16 June 2015, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a

Decision16 in favor of petitioner, declaring the termination of his
tenancy relationship with the late Severina and ordering respondents
to peacefully vacate the property and surrender its possession to
petitioner. There being no appeal, said Decision became final and
executory on 15 July 2015. Consequently, a Certificate of Finality 17
was issued on 11 August 2015.18

On 07 September 2015, petitioner filed a Motion for the

Issuance of a Writ of Execution to the 16 June 2015 Decision. Finding
the motion meritorious, the Provincial Adjudicator granted the
motion and ordered that a Writ of Execution be issued immediately. 19
However, as of date, no Writ of Execution has ever been issued.20

12 Ibid., pp. 263-269, Annex “M”.

13 Ibid., pp. 31-32, Petition for Review.
14 Ibid., pp. 260-261, Annex “L”.
15 Ibid., pp. 32-33, Petition for Review.
16 Ibid., pp. 251-259, Annex “K”.
17 Ibid., pp. 250, Annex “J”.
18 Ibid., pp. 33-34, Petition for Review.
19 Ibid., p. 249, Annex “I”.
20 Ibid., p. 35, Petition for Review.
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
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On 26 October 2015, respondents filed a Petition for Relief from

Judgment21 ratiocinating the excusable negligence of their counsel as
the reason for their failure to file an appeal within the period
mandated by the rules. Their counsel Atty. Honorato Mataban
(“Atty. Mataban”) claimed that he had only learned of the 16 June
2015 Decision on 24 August 2015, through respondent Rudie. He
further claimed that his copy of the 16 June 2015 Decision was
misplaced and he obtained an actual copy of such Decision from the
respondents only on 03 September 2015.22

In his Answer,23 petitioner argued that respondents' Petition for

Relief from Judgment must not be given due course, it being
insufficient in form and substance. Even on the merits, respondents
are still not qualified to succeed the tenancy especially since they
hired laborers to till the subject land in their stead. Then on 25 July
2016, the Provincial Adjudicator issued a Resolution 24 dismissing
respondents' petition for lack of merit. Hence, respondents filed an
appeal25 before the DARAB.26

Sometime in January 2016, while the case is pending, petitioner

received an information that respondent Rudie ordered his men to
enter and cultivate the subject land without the former's consent, in
clear violation of the directives in the 16 June 2015 Decision to
peacefully vacate the subject land and to surrender its possession to
petitioner. This information was corroborated by Zenaida Saringan
(“Saringan”), the secretary of Barangay San Vicente Council in
Alaminos City, who declared in her Affidavit 27 that a certain
Bladymir Llego (“Bladymir”) openly admitted to her that he was

21 Ibid., pp. 187-203, Annex “H”.

22 Ibid., p. 35, Petition for Review.
23 Ibid., pp. 166-186, Annex “G”.
24 Ibid., pp. 138-139, Annex “E”.
25 Supra note 4.
26 Rollo, pp. 35-36, Petition for Review.
27 Ibid., pp. 136-137, Annex “A”.
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
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instructed by respondent Rudie to cultivate the subject land and to

harvest the crop for 2015.28

To further support the foregoing information, the Barangay

Agrarian Reform Committee (“BARC”) Chairman, Herminigildo
Gines, issued a Certification and affirmed that a group of men was
ordered by respondent Rudie to enter and cultivate the subject land.29

Ruling of the DARAB

On 11 January 2019, the DARAB rendered its Decision30

granting respondents' appeal to the 16 June 2015 Decision of PARAD.
The decretal portion of the same reads:

“WHEREFORE, the APPEAL is hereby

GRANTED. The DECISION dated June 16, 2015 is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A NEW JUDGMENT
is rendered as follows:

1. DISMISSING the complaint for lack of

merit;

2. DIRECTING the parties, with the assistance

of the MARPO, Alaminos City, Pangasinan to execute
an agricultural leasehold contract in accordance with
RA 3844 and its implementing rules and regulations;
and

3. DIRECTING the complainants-appellees to

maintain and respect the peaceful possession and
cultivation of respondent-appellant Rudie Valoria.

SO ORDERED.”31

28 Ibid., p. 36, Petition for Review.

29 Ibid.
30 Supra note 2.
31 Rollo, pp. 84-85, DARAB Decision dated 11 January 2019.
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
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In finding the Petition for Relief from Judgment meritorious,

the DARAB opined that the Supreme Court, in certain instances,
afforded the litigants another opportunity to vindicate their rights
when the mistake of their counsel is so palpable amounting to gross
negligence. In this case, the DARAB viewed that although the failure
of respondents to appeal the PARAD Decision is utterly attributable
to the gross negligence of their counsel, the outright dismissal of the
instant petition would defeat the interest of justice.

It propounded that the purpose of social justice and agrarian

reform would be crippled if it will uphold strict compliance to the
technical requirements of the law. The successor heirs of the lawful
tenant, the late Severina, will be deprived of their right to security of
tenure over the subject agricultural land, whose status are very well
protected by Section 7, Republic Act (“R.A.”) No. 3844. Said act
provides that the agricultural leasehold relation shall not be
extinguished by sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of
the landholding. It will not terminate the rights of the agricultural
lessee who is given protection by the law by making such rights
enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's successor-in-
interest. The same act also enunciates the principle of security of
tenure of the tenant, such that it prescribes that the relationship of
landholder and tenant can only be terminated for causes provided by
law.

In view of the aforementioned provision, the DARAB noted the

willingness of respondents to succeed their mother Severina as tenant
of the subject land and to personally cultivate said property. Their
appeal to the DARAB demonstrates such willingness.

On the other hand, petitioner did not refute the answer of

respondents that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (“MARO”)
of Alaminos City actually told him (petitioner) during the conference
that Severina has qualified heirs, particularly respondent Rudie, from
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
DECISION
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among whom he could choose to succeed in the tenancy relationship

left by Severina, in accordance with Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844. This
notwithstanding, petitioner failed or even deliberately refused to
exercise his right to choose a successor among the qualified heirs of
Severina as the new tenant on the subject land. In view of this failure,
the same provision enumerated the persons who will succeed the
agricultural lessee in case of death or incapacity. Thus, being the
eldest surviving descendant, respondent Rudie is the rightful
successor-tenant of the late Severina.

Dismayed, petitioner, through counsel, filed the instant petition

before this Court interposing the following errors purportedly
committed by the DARAB, viz:

“I.
THE HONORABLE BOARD GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN GRANTING THE RESPONDENTS'
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
CONSIDERING THAT:

A. The Honorable Board unceremoniously

granted respondents' Petition for Relief despite its
glaring procedural infirmities. A simple perusal
of the Petition for Relief easily reveals that it lacks
the requisite affidavits and other supporting
documents showing the excusable negligence
relied upon.

B. The Honorable Board erred in granting the

Petition for Relief on the ground of excusable
negligence, as the respondents miserably failed to
prove the merits of the same.

C. Even assuming that there was excusable

negligence, the Honorable Board callously
brushed aside the fact that the Petition for Relief
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
DECISION
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was filed beyond the reglementary sixty-day

period provided under the rules.

D. The Honorable Board unduly disregarded the

well-settled rule that the negligence of the counsel
binds the client and thus, respondents are bound
by the acts and omissions of their counsel.

E. The respondents utterly failed to prove that

they were deprived of their day in court and
divested of their alleged tillage without due
process of law, through the negligence of their
counsel.

II.
EVEN CONSIDERING THE MERITS, THE
HONORABLE BOARD SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE
QUALIFIED TO SUCCEED THE TENANCY, IN
THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF PERSONAL
CULTIVATION.

III.
EVEN ASSUMING, WITHOUT ADMITTING,
THAT RESPONDENTS MAY SUCCEED THE
TENANCY, THEY ARE NEVERTHELESS
DISQUALIFIED TO BE TENANTS, AS THEY
DELIBERATELY FAILED TO PAY THE LEASE
RENTAL REQUIRED BY THE RULES.”32

Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner avers in general that a petition for relief from

judgment is an equitable remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances and upon presentation of affidavits and supporting

32 Ibid., pp. 37-38, Petition for Review.

CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
DECISION
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documents showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable

negligence relied upon. However, in this case, respondents' petition
for relief was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit showing the
excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting
respondents' good and substantial defense as required by law. For
petitioner, such defect calls for the outright dismissal of the petition
and strict adherence of the technical rules.33

Petitioner went on to assail the ground for which respondents'

petition for relief is predicated upon i.e., excusable negligence, and
argued that Atty. Mataban's negligence during the proceedings
before the PARAD could hardly be characterized as excusable, much
less avoidable. To support his claim, petitioner recalled the Order
issued by the Provincial Adjudicator on 12 March 2015, directing the
parties to file their respective position papers within thirty (30) days
from the receipt thereof. Yet, respondents' counsel Atty. Mataban
failed to file any position paper despite proof that all parties were
served with copies of the aforesaid order.34

Further, petitioner averred that Atty. Mataban should have

taken the initiative to inquire from the DARAB Office as to the status
of the case after an unreasonable length of time without receiving a
decision from the Provincial Adjudicator, more so when he admitted
that his copy of the Decision was allegedly “lost”. However, Atty.
Mataban decided to sleep on his obligation, that even after he learned
the 16 June 2015 Decision from respondent Rudie on 24 August 2015,
he only obtained another copy on 03 September 2015. As such,
petitioner strongly believes that respondents' Petition for Relief was a
mere afterthought and a feeble attempt to justify their failure to
appeal the 16 June 2015 PARAD Decision.35

33 Ibid., pp. 39-42, Petition for Review.

34 Ibid., pp. 42-43, Petition for Review.
35 Ibid., pp. 43-44, Petition for Review.
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
DECISION
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Petitioner likewise contends that respondents' Petition for

Relief was filed beyond the reglementary sixty (60)-day period
provided under the rules. Even assuming that Atty. Mataban only
learned of the 16 June 2015 Decision on 24 August 2015, respondents
can only file such petition sixty (60) days therefrom or until 24
October 2015. However, it was only on 26 October 2015 that
respondents filed their Petition for Relief in utter disregard of the
rules. Thus, as a general rule, the foregoing acts and omissions of
Atty. Mataban should bind respondents.36

Neither were respondents deprived of their day in court

because according to petitioner, there were at least three (3)
hearings/conferences conducted by the Provincial Adjudicator
where the former should have ventilated their claims. Instead,
respondents, through Atty. Mataban, simply chose to defy the
directives of the Provincial Adjudicator regarding the submission of
position papers.37

Even on the merits, petitioner asseverates that respondents may

only have leasehold rights if they can personally cultivate the subject
land. Records however show that respondents have no tenancy rights
over the subject land as it was proven that respondent Rudie merely
hired workers to cultivate the same. Evidence also revealed that none
of the respondents, including Rudie, are residents of Alaminos City.
Since, the law requires the leasehold tenants to personally attend to,
and cultivate the agricultural land, then neither respondent Rudie
nor his siblings are qualified to succeed as substitute tenant of their
mother Severina over the subject land.38

Assuming that respondents may succeed the tenancy,

petitioner maintains that they are nevertheless disqualified to be
tenants for their deliberate failure to pay the lease rental required by
36 Ibid., pp. 45-48, Petition for Review.
37 Ibid., p. 49, Petition for Review.
38 Ibid., pp. 50-61, Petition for Review.
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
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the rules. Petitioner pointed out that respondents have not shared
with him their yearly harvests since 2015, an essential element to
consider them as “de jure tenant”. Respondent Rudie cannot also
neglect his obligation of paying the lease rentals based on his belief
that petitioner has denied to recognize his tenancy rights. If he
believes in good faith that he is qualified to be a tenant, then he
would assume and fulfill the obligations of a tenant. Thus, under
Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844, a landowner, such as petitioner in this
case, may dispossess a tenant of his landholding if the tenant does
not pay the lease rental when it falls due.39

Respondents' Arguments

Respondents, for their part, avers that Rudie's succession as

tenant of the subject landholding is in accordance with existing laws
since all evidence established that the lease rentals were duly
delivered and accepted by petitioner, except for the lease rentals after
the filing of complaint.40

Further, respondents raised that respondent Rudie has already

assumed cultivation of the subject property as well as delivered the
produce therein for a considerable length of time until petitioner filed
a complaint against them. By allowing Rudie to cultivate the subject
landholding and by receiving the produce of the harvest therein,
petitioner is deemed to have impliedly consented to a tenancy
relationship with the former, who possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualification as provided by law. After all, it is settled
that there must be a concrete evidence to justify tenant's eviction
from his tillage. In case of doubt, it must always be resolved in favor
of the tenant/lessee.41

39 Ibid., pp. 61-64, Petition for Review.

40 Ibid., p. 338, Comments.
41 Ibid., p. 339, Comments.
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
DECISION
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Respondents, in sum, suggest that their ejectment would

contravene the objectives of agrarian laws. Moreover, it will set aside
all the efforts and hard work, which their parents had invested on the
subject land for a considerable length of time. As a bona fide tenant
over the land in question, respondents are then entitled to the
protective mantle of the provision of security of tenure and can only
be ousted from the tenanted landholding for lawful cause.42

THE ISSUES

The primordial issues presented for Our resolution are

whether: (1) the DARAB correctly granted the Petition for Relief from
Judgment filed by respondents; and (2) respondent Rudie is qualified
from succeeding his mother Severina as tenant over the disputed
landholding.

OUR RULING

The petition has no merit.

It is a time-honored principle that findings of fact of

administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers,
are entitled to respect if supported by substantial evidence, as they
are deemed experts on matters within their specific and specialized
jurisdiction.43 Consequently, the judicial determination of the
DARAB, which is vested with primary jurisdiction and has acquired
expertise on matters relating to tenancy relationship, have the same
binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body.44

42 Ibid.
43 Victoria P. Cabral v. Gregoria Adolfo, Gregorio Lazaro and Heirs of Elias Policarpio, G.R. No. 198160,
31 August 2016.
44 Monico Ligtas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200751, 17 August 2015.
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
DECISION
Page 13 of 24

The DARAB correctly granted the Petition for Relief

from Judgment filed by respondents

To seek relief from a decision, resolution, or final order of a

Provincial Adjudicator, Section 1, Rule XVI of the 2009 DARAB Rules
of Procedure provides:

“SECTION 1. Petition for Relief from

Decision/Resolution/Final Order. —When a
decision/resolution/final order is rendered by the
Adjudicator against any party, through fraud,
accident, mistake and excusable negligence and such
party has no other adequate remedy available to him
in the ordinary course of law, he may file a petition
for relief with said Adjudicator, praying that the
decision/resolution/final order be set aside.”

Under Section 2 thereof, a petition for relief must also be

accompanied by affidavits and supporting documents showing the
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon,
whichever is applicable. Otherwise, the petition may be dismissed
outright.

Anchoring his arguments on these rules, petitioner faulted the

DARAB for granting respondents' petition for relief on appeal, even
without a separate affidavit of merit demonstrating respondents'
good and substantial cause of action or defense or the excusable
negligence of their counsel in particular.

The argument deserves scant consideration.

Jurisprudence holds that an affidavit of merit serves as the

jurisdictional basis for the court to entertain a petition for relief. It is
essential because a new trial would be a waste of time if the
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
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Page 14 of 24

complaint turned out to be groundless or the defense ineffective. 45

Through the same affidavit, a court may validly consider the equities
of a case in order to determine whether there is a compelling reason
for setting aside the decision.46

Despite the importance of an affidavit of merit, its absence is

not a fatal defect to warrant denial of the petition, so long as the facts
required to be set out also appear in the verified petition.
Furthermore, a petition for relief without a separate affidavit of merit
is sufficient where facts constituting petitioner's substantial cause of
action or defense, as the case may be, are alleged. The reason being is
that oath elevates the petition to the same category as a separate
affidavit.47 Thus, this alone, contemplates substantial compliance with
the rules.

In the present case, the questioned Petition for Relief was

verified by respondent Rudie himself. Moreover, the petition
contains a complete recital of facts under oath, where respondents
admitted in detail how their counsel's gross negligence deterred them
from appealing the 16 June 2015 PARAD Decision on time. Certainly,
the verified petition is more than sufficient to ascertain the grounds
relied upon by respondents. To require respondents to append an
affidavit of merits to their verified petition is to compel them to do
the unnecessary. Therefore, the defect pointed by petitioner is not
fatal to the claim of respondents and at most, negligible.

The contention that respondents' Petition for Relief was filed

beyond the reglementary period cannot also prosper. Section 3, Rule
38 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for relief from
judgment must be filed within: (1) sixty (60) days from knowledge of

45 Evangelista Garcia v. Court of Appeals and Spouses Miguel and Adelia Lazaro, G.R. No. 96141, 02
October 1991, 202 SCRA 228, 233, 238.
46 Eugenio Tenebro v. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Davao Farms Corporation, G.R. No. 107193,
07 July 1997, 341 Phil. 83.
47 Romeo Samonte v. S.F. Naguiat, Inc., G.R. No. 165544, 02 October 2009, 602 SCRA 231, 237.
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
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the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and (2) six (6)
months from the entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding.
These two periods must concur and could not be extended or
interrupted.48 Correlatively, Section 1, Rule 22 of the same rule
provides that when the due date of the filing of pleadings in courts
falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where
the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. In
which case, the filing of the said pleading on the next working day is
deemed on time.49

At bar, respondents must comply with the twin-period

requirement in order to seek relief from the 16 June 2015 Decision of
the PARAD. First, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days
from when Atty. Mataban learned of such Decision on 25 August
2015, or until 24 October 2015. Second, the petition must be filed not
later than 16 December 2015 or six (6) months from the entry of said
Decision. However, it must be noted that 24 October 2015 falls on a
Saturday. As such, Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, effectively
extended the last day of the filing of petition for relief until the next
working day, or on 26 October 2015, which falls on Monday.
Therefore, respondents' Petition for Relief, which was filed on 26
October 2015, complied with the reglementary period set forth in
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner further asserts that relief from judgment should not

be granted since the gross and inexcusable failure of respondents'
counsel to appeal the 16 June 2015 PARAD Decision binds the
respondents. Neither can a petition for relief be used to revive
respondents' right to appeal which had been lost through the Atty.
Mataban’s inexcusable negligence.

48 Dr. Fe. Lasam v. Philippine National Bank and Hon. Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch
66 of San Fernando City, La Union, G.R. No. 207433, 05 December 2018.
49 Reinier Pacific International Shipping, Inc. and Neptune Shipping Management SVCS., PTE., LTD., v.
Captain Francisco B. Guevarra, G.R. No. 157020, 19 June 2013, 699 SCRA 1, 7.
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
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We are mindful of the general rule that relief will not be

granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to the
negligence of his counsel. This proceeds from the well-accepted
principle that clients are bound by the mistakes and negligence of
their counsel.50

However, in highly meritorious cases, the Supreme Court has

departed from the general rule due to the following circumstances:
(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client
of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright
deprivation of the client's liberty or property; or (3) where the
interests of justice so require.51

Here, the manner with which Atty. Mataban handled the case
of respondents reflects his gross negligence and utter incompetence.
In respondents' Petition for Relief, Atty. Mataban narrated that he
only learned of the 16 June 2015 Decision on 24 August 2015 when
respondent Rudie relayed it to him through a phone call. Atty.
Mataban immediately searched for the copy of said Decision and
until September 2015, he was not able to find the same. He then
realized that someone could have deliberately or mistakenly took it
from his office, where he also renders his notarial service. As a result
thereof, the 16 June 2015 Decision of the PARAD lapsed into finality.
Thus, through the gross and inexcusable negligence of Atty.
Mataban, respondents lost their opportunity to appeal and to seek
relief from the impugned Decision of the PARAD.

Nevertheless, the first exception is wanting. As correctly raised

by petitioner, respondents' right to due process was not violated with
their counsel's negligence as they were afforded the opportunity to be

50 Cagayan Economic Zone Authority v. Meridien Vista Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 194962, 27
January 2016.
51 Dionisio B. Azucena v. Foreign Manpower Services, K.S. Kasmito and Fortune Life & General
Assurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 147955, 25 October 2004, 441 SCRA 346, 354-355.
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
DECISION
Page 17 of 24

heard and to submit any evidence they have to support their claim or
defense. Neither were they deprived of their day in court as in
actuality, they were afforded every opportunity to be heard during
the proceedings before the PARAD. It is only when the PARAD
issued the 16 June 2015 Decision that respondents were stripped of
the opportunity to appeal said Decision and ultimately to file a
petition for relief. However, it is settled that the right to appeal is
neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a
mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law. 52 Thus, the first
exception, where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives
the client of due process of law, is unavailing in this case.

Be that as it may, the case falls under the second and third
exceptions. It cannot be overemphasized that the denial of
respondents' petition for relief would result to an outright
deprivation of their right to property particularly their tenurial rights
over the subject landholding, as will be discussed below. A denial of
said relief would definitely defeat the purpose of agrarian reform
program and ultimately, social justice. Hence, the DARAB was
correct in giving merit to the Petition of Relief from Judgment of
respondents against the 16 June 2015 of the PARAD.

At any rate, where a rigid application of the rules will result in

a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, then such rule may be
relaxed, especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged
defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent
on its face or from the recitals contained therein. Technicalities may
thus be disregarded in order to resolve the case. After all, no party
can even claim a vested right in technicalities. Litigations should, as
much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.53

52 Spouses Edmond Lee and Helen Huang v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 218867, 17 February
2016.
53 B.E. San Diego, Inc. v. Manuel A.S. Bernardo, G.R. No. 233135, 05 December 2018.
CA-G.R. SP No. 162105
DECISION
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Based on these premises, We found no error on the part of

DARAB in giving due course to the Petition for Relief filed by
respondents against the 16 June 2015 Decision of PARAD.

Respondent Rudie is qualified to be a successor-tenant

over the subject landholding

At the outset, tenancy relationship exists when the following

essential requisites are present: (1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant, (2) the subject matter is agricultural land, (3) there is
consent between the parties, (4) the purpose is agricultural
production, (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant, and (6)
there is sharing of the harvests between the parties. All the requisites
must concur in order to establish the existence of tenancy
relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal.54

Here, petitioner seeks the termination of the tenancy agreement

it entered with the late Severina and the dispossession of respondents
from the disputed landholding on the ground that respondents
cannot fulfill their obligation to personally cultivate the said property
since all of them were no longer residents of Alaminos City.

Petitioner, however, conveniently ignored that respondent

Rudie has already retired from service, giving him more time and
opportunity to fulfill his obligations as an agricultural tenant. Even if
Rudie resides in Quezon City, such fact alone cannot prevent him
from becoming a successor-tenant because the distance between
Alaminos City and Quezon City is not significant enough that it will
be physically impossible for him to assume his tenurial
responsibilities over the subject landholding. Besides, the law does
not require a tenant to have an actual residence at the place where
his/her landholding is situated. It merely obligates the leasehold

54 Vicente Adriano v. Alice Tanco, Geraldine Tanco, Ronald Tanco, and Patrick Tanco, G.R. No. 168164,
05 July 2010, 623 SCRA 218, 229.
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tenant to personally attend to and cultivate the agricultural land. 55

Hence, respondents cannot be dispossessed of the landholding in
question on this ground alone.

Neither can the hiring of farm laborers and workers serve as a

basis for petitioner to terminate its tenancy agreement with
respondents.

It is settled that a person, in order to be considered a tenant,

must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm
household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually
work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others
whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold,
and is considered as having abandoned the land as tenant and ceases
to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.56

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that employment of

farm laborers to perform some aspects of farm work does not
preclude the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship,
provided that an agricultural lessee does not leave the entire process
of cultivation in the hands of hired helpers. Indeed, while the law
explicitly requires the agricultural lessee and his immediate family to
work on the land, the hiring of farm laborers by the tenant on a
temporary, occasional, or emergency basis does not negate the
existence of the element of personal cultivation essential in a tenancy
or agricultural leasehold relationship.57

In his Petition for Relief, respondent Rudie established that he

merely hired workers on an occasional basis to carry out some phases
of farm labor such as transplanting and harvesting. For the most part,
55 Manuel Jusayan, Alfredo Jusayan, and Michael Jusayan v. Jorge Sombilla, G.R. No. 163928, 21
January 2015, 746 SCRA 437, 445-446.
56 Purificacion Perez-Rosario, et.al., v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140796, 30 June 2006, 494
SCRA 66, 82.
57 Juan Galope v. Cresencia Bugarin, Represented by Celso Rabang, G.R. No. 185669, 01 February 2012,
664 SCRA 733, 740.
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Rudie assumes the vital phases of farm work during his regular visits
to the subject landholding, that usually lasts no less than a week for
each visit, six (6) times a year. Surely then, these periods are more
than sufficient for respondent Rudie to personally perform all the
phases of farm work which, according to the International Rice
Research Institute (“IRRI”) Manual, does not last more than three (3)
days for each phase.

At this juncture, the pronouncement in Manuel Jusayan, Alfredo

Jusayan, and Michael Jusayan v. Jorge Sombilla58 is instructive, viz:

“Cultivation is not limited to the plowing and

harrowing of the land, but includes the various
phases of farm labor such as the maintenance, repair
and weeding of dikes, paddies and irrigation canals
in the landholding. Moreover, it covers attending to
the care of the growing plants, and grown plants like
fruit trees that require watering, fertilizing, uprooting
weeds, turning the soil, fumigating to eliminate plant
pests and all other activities designed to promote the
growth and care of the plants or trees and
husbanding the earth, by general industry, so that it
may bring forth more products or fruits. In Tarona v.
Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that a tenant is
not required to be physically present in the land at
all hours of the day and night provided that he lives
close enough to the land to be cultivated to make it
physically possible for him to cultivate it with some
degree of constancy.”

Evidently, the fact that respondent Rudie lives from a distance

where it can be physically possible for him to visit and perform his
tenurial obligations over the subject landholding with some degree of
constancy is sufficient for this Court to establish the element of
personal cultivation.

58 G.R. No. 163928, 21 January 2015 citing Leonardo Tarona, et. al. v. Court of Appeals (Ninth Division),
G.R. No. 170182, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 474.
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Assuming that respondents may succeed the tenancy,

petitioner still insisted that they are disqualified to be successor-
tenants for their deliberate failure to pay the lease rentals over the
subject landholding since 2015.

We are not convinced.

To eject the agricultural lessee for failure to pay the leasehold

rentals under Section 36 (6) of R.A. No. 3844, jurisprudence instructs
that the non-payment must be willful and deliberate in order to
warrant the agricultural lessee’s dispossession of the land that he
tills. The term "willful" means voluntary and intentional, but not
necessarily malicious, while the term "deliberate" means that the act
or omission is intentional, premeditated or fully considered.59

Most of all, for non-payment of the lease rental to be a valid

ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding, the
amount of the lease rental must first be lawful. If the amount of lease
rental claimed exceeds the limit allowed by law, non-payment of
lease rental cannot be a ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee
of the landholding.60

Section 34 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, mandates that not

more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the average normal harvest
shall constitute the just and fair rental for leasehold. In this case,
although the initial annual lease rental was equivalent to Nine
Hundred Twenty-One (921) kilograms of palay, the lease was
effectively modified through the Order61 of the Provincial
Adjudicator dated 14 April 2015, which in effect, demanded

59 Eufrocina Nieves, as represented by her attorney-in-fact, Lazaro Villarosa, Jr. v. Ernesto Duldulao and
Felipe Pajarillo, G.R. No. 190276, 02 April 2014, 731 Phil. 189.
60 Heirs of Enrique Tan, Sr. v. Reynalda Pollescas, G.R. No. 145568, 17 November 2005, 475
SCRA 203, 213-215.
61 Supra note 14.
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respondents to deliver fifty percent (50%) of their net harvest as lease

rental.

However, this concept of share tenancy, has long been

outlawed with the passing of R.A. No. 3844. At present, the law
mandates that not more than twenty-five (25%) of the average normal
harvest shall constitute the just and fair rental rate for leasehold. 62
Thus, petitioner cannot validly dispossess respondents of the
landholding for the non-payment of rental precisely because the lease
rental the former claimed is unlawful.

In instances when the lease rental is unlawful, the case of Heirs

of Enrique Tan, Sr. v. Reynalda Pollescas,63 teaches Us that the
Department of Agriculture (“DAR”) must first fix the provisional
lease rental payable by the lessee to the landowner/lessor pursuant
to the second paragraph of Section 34 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended. 64
Until the DAR has fixed the provisional lease rental, the lessee cannot
be in default in the payment of lease rental since such amount is not
yet determined. There can be no delay in the payment of an
undetermined lease rental because it is impossible to pay an
undetermined amount. That the lessee is not yet in default in the
payment of the lease rental is a basic reason why he/she cannot be
lawfully ejected from the land for non-payment of rental.

Accordingly, before it can be determined if respondents' non-

payment of lease rental is willful and deliberate, and before they may
62 Henry L. Mon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118292, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 165, 171-172.
63 G.R. No. 145568, 17 November 2005, 475 SCRA 203, 213.
64 Section 34. Consideration for the Lease of Riceland and Lands Devoted to Other Crops - xxx In
the absence of any agreement between the parties as to the rental, the Court of Agrarian
Relations shall summarily determine a provisional rental in pursuance of existing laws, rules
and regulations and production records available in the different field units of the
department, taking into account the extent of the development of the land at the time of the
conversion into leasehold and the participation of the lessee in the development thereof. This
provisional rental shall continue in force and effect until a fixed rental is finally determined.
The court shall determine the fixed rental within thirty days after the petition is submitted for
decision.
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be declared in default, it is the duty of DAR to first fix the provisional

lease rental entitled to petitioner. Hence, at the risk of repetition,
respondents cannot be dispossessed of their landholding for the non-
payment of an undetermined lease rental.

Finally, Section 7 of R.A. No. 384465 provides that once there is

an agricultural tenancy, the agricultural tenant’s right to security of
tenure is recognized and protected. The landowner cannot eject the
agricultural tenant from the land unless authorized by the proper
court for causes provided by law. Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844, as
amended by R.A. No. 6389, enumerated several grounds for the valid
dispossession of the tenant.66 Lamentably, as discussed above, none of
such grounds for valid dispossession of landholding was attendant in
respondents' case. Thus, the assailed Decision of DARAB conforms
with the law and jurisprudence.

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is DENIED. The assailed

Decision67 rendered on 11 January 2019 by the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 19053 and

65 Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation- The agricultural leasehold relation once
established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding
until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of
tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes
herein provided.
66 “xxx(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National
Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes:
Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five
times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years;
(as amended by RA 6389) (2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the
terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by
fortuitous event or force majeure; (3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a
purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon; (4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt
proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;(5) The land or other
substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably
deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee; (6) The agricultural lessee does
not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to
crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment
shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop
is not thereby extinguished; or (7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of
the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.”
67 Supra note 2.
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its Resolution68 dated 18 July 2019 are AFFIRMED. This Court

REMANDS the instant case to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board for the determination of the provisional lease
rental.

SO ORDERED.

ELIHU A. YBAÑEZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RAFAEL ANTONIO M. SANTOS

Associate Justice

BONIFACIO S. PASCUA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

ELIHU A. YBAÑEZ
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Ninth Division

68 Supra note 3.