ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. HON. CESAR V.
PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of
Customs, respondents.
 
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA)
9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and
BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives,
the law “transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards
and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials
and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not
apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to
the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335
provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall
short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved.
Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It
will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss
BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground
that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
 
Issues:
1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the
President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a
congressional oversight committee.
Discussions:
1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states
that “the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of
the laws upon all citizens of the State.
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
2. To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries
of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
3. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections,  it is clear that
congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes
an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the
over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
 Rulings:
1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22With respect to RA 9335, its expressed
public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the
BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the
said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the
common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the
collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities
through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the
demands of equal protection.
2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue
targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4
of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public
interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and
welfare.”33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in
RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said
IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered
moot and academic.

Garcillano vs. House of Representative
FACTS:
VirgilioGarcillano filed a petition alleging that he is the person alluded in the "Hello Garci" tapes. He
was publicly identified by the members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the
recordings. Thus, Garcillano claimed that he was
directly injured by the House Committee's actions and charged them of electoral fraud.
He prayed to the Court for the petition of prohibition. He filed for the restrain of the House
Representative Committees from using the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in
their committee reports and for any other purpose. Garcillano requested that the said
recordings should be stricken off the records of inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed
to desist from further using the recordings in any of the proceedings.
ISSUE: Does the Constitution require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate?
RULING: According to Sect. 21, Art. VI of the Philippine Constitution, "The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected." Hence, the respondent Committee could not, in violation of the
constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry until the procedures are so published.
But the Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its
members. There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry
were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees. Having been
overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic.
After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not
intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished.
Non-publication of the Rules of Procedure governing legislative investigations is fatal.
Senate vs. Eduardo Ermita
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the
China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing
was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the
alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations to various officials
of the AFP for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28,
2005. The AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga was also invited on that scheduled hearing
but requested for its postponement "due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his utmost
personal attention" while "some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent
operational matters." Likewise, Senate President Drilon received letters from Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita and the President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation requesting for the
postponement or cancellation of the said scheduled hearing.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution, and For
Other Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
During the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter to
Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him "that
per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is
authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval
from the President" and "that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to
appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled
[on] 28 September 2005."
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the
investigation pushed through. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from
testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan, who
were among the officials who attended the hearing, were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. 464 is constitutional.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order
No. 464 are declared void while Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, valid.
Section 1
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior
determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through
the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage
of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads’ possession of
any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3
vis-à-vis 
Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under
Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the
question hour wherein the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on
their part.
Section 1 cannot be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by
the Executive Secretary.
Section 2(a)
Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under the challenged
order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive. The
enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the
phrase "confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by
this executive order."
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information
privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has
determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration
leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That
the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only
makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the
executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested.
Section 2(b) and Section 3
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain
information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the
effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express
pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus
allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
The Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course
authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive
Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he personally
consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest
official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to
exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where
the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence.
Therefore, when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment,
might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or
the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to
provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter
indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the
President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the
failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means
to compel his appearance.
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into
a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing
Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC
tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that
he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate
vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest
and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita
when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the
concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President
or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy
decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic
as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are
presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or
foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under
the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
 Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them
at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more
questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive
privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Akbayan Citizens Action Party vs. Thomas Aquino, Usec. DTI
FACTS:
Petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed by the petitioners, as congresspersons, citizens and
taxpayers, requesting respondents to submit to them the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).
Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates there
right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the
same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social,
political and economic decision making.
Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought involves
a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and
the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA. That diplomatic
negotiation are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the subsequent
event that occurred?
Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered by the
doctrine of executive privilege?
Held:
On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that the principal relief petitioners are praying for is the
disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties,” public
disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its signing by the President, during the pendency of the present
petition, has been largely rendered moot and academic.  officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has become moot
and academic to the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the “full text” thereof.
The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the
JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations. 
Moving on to the second issue, The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are
recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears
emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing
a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances.
Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a
public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its
traditionally privileged status.
The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, Wherein petitioners were seeking
information from the President’s representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the
RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that “secrecy of negotiations
with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the
press nor of the freedom of access to information
B/Gen. Gudani and Lt.Col. Balutan vs. Lt./Gen. Senga
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election
fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry
without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani,
Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However,
the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result,
the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time
honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the
General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing
them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before
it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel
such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to
do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial
order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of
the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on
executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the
Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege
must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military
Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed
forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations
as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s
functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation.  Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to
interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to
unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass
in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is
aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from
members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of
the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier  disagreed with the  notion of
officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply
with the final orders of the courts.
Facts: Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security to shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief
of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said Committee. On the very day
of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of
the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry
without her approval. However, the two testified before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an
order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG)
on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from
military service. After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of
Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2)
the charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their successors-in-interest or persons
acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against them, as a
consequence of their having testified before the Senate.  3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the
Issue:
1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?  complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired
2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the
President desires otherwise?
3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4 October 2005?
Held:  Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000
1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-
chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military
justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek
presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary
rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds
significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of
higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-
chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military
discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual
members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between
obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer
has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s
functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to
interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to
unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass
in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is
aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from
members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of
the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a
modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy
lies with the courts.
The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative
creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so.
There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due
deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this
relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular
mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar
dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power
due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the
branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of
government.
jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the
termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his
case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts
on 4 October 2005
Jean Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, Sgt. At Arms, Senate
FACTS: 
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress
and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second sum
both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as
represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the
original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the
Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of money to
complete his payments. As such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the
Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale in consideration of
the sum of P750,000. The Philippine Government then, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of
the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors
of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the
two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special
committee to investigate the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by
the resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L.
Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was the apparent
unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government’s paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his
alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long
before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited
from the transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him
on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of
Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating
P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000,
which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank,
and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
I t was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000
that gave rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate
then approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail and
is being contested in this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000.
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
3. WON the privilege against self-incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.
HELD:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to
make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent
to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be
within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a
power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question
which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the
subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct
relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and
character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a
result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.
2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of
the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to
punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and
keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court isalways open to those
whose rights might thus be transgressed.
3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name
of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the
bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied
that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to him
unknown. “Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is
punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.” Since according to
the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt
in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain his claim
that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
Facts:
1. The controversy arose out of the Governments purchase of 2 estates. Petitioner was the attorney in-
fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by
the Government of the Philippines. The purchase was effected and the price paid for both estates was
P5,000,000. The Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to determine the
validity of the purchase and whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said Senate
investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered.
Petitioner refused to answer this question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt for
contumacious acts and ordered his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the
Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate or to the Special
Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000 and to answer questions pertinent
thereto.
2.  It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as
it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine Trust Company and by
virtue of the recession of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate. An
intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent irregularity
of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000
in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The
committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the Government.
3. Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him; and
that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred
to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with PNB, and another for P440,000 payable to cash,
which he himself cashed.
4. Hence, this petition on following grounds:
a)        Petitioner contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will
not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not
embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process.
b)   Petitioner contended that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond
its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. 
c)   Also contended that he would incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person
ISSUE: W/N either House of Congress has the power to punish a person not a member for
contempt
YES.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the
investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that
inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within
the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power
in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the
investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of
the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has
no relation to the subject of the inquiry. Note that, the fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the
power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion
in the exercise of that power.  Prof. Randolf David vs. Pres. Arroyo
 It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is
material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the
matter  under inquiry.  Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), Pres. Arroyo committed grave
As to the self-incrimination issue, as against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a
constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a
competent authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of
course with his right under the Constitution.
The resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body
and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of
Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases
where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. That power subsists as long
as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function
involved
Noreco vs. Dumaguete
In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation
in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing
were the heads of NORECO II (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) – Paterio Torres and Arturo
Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and
Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they alleged that  the power to investigate, and to order the
improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the
National Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the
[old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such power. The SP averred
that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters
within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.
HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337)
granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-
members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the
only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for
contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of
delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial
nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere
incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative
agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies,
the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is
devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of
said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Even assuming that
the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of,
such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power)
if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body.
FACTS:
These 7 consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential
abuse of discretion. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the  Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and on the same day, she
issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.On March 3, 2006, the President lifted PP 1017 and issued
PP 1021. On their defense, the respondents stated that the factual basis of the issuances of the PP
1017 and GO No. 5 was the conspiracy among some military officers, NPA and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate Pres. Arroyo as the bombing in Bulacan and
Bataan.
On Feb. 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled “Oplan Hackle I” which
detailed planning and bombing, attacks and plot to assassinate the President.
The Petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1107 and GO No. 5
including the arrest (without warrant) of the Petitioner Randolf S. David. David assailed the issuance of
PP 1107.
In Respondent’s Comment, the Solicitor General countered that the Petition should be
dismissed for being moot, Pres. Arroyo shouldn’t necessarily implead as respondent, PP 1017 has
constitutional and legal basis and it does not violate the people’s right to free expression.
ISSUE:
Procedural:
Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petition moot and academic.
Substantive:
Whether the SC can review the factual basis of PP 1107.
Whether PP 1107 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
RULING:
Petitioners failed to show that Pres. Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1017 totally lacks of factual basis.
The Solicitor General’s consolidated comments and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the
events leading to the issuance of PP 1107.
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. 
The Constitutional foundation of PP 1107 may be divided into three important provisions:
Calling-out Power - In Sec. 18, Art. 7, the President may call out such armed forces to prevent
or supress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Which may be revoke and the SC may review upon
appropriate proceedings filed by any citizen. The petitioners are wrong in stating that PP1107 is a
declaration of Martial Law. It is plain that what the president invoked was her calling-out power. It is
clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s
calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing
lawless violence.
 Take Care Power – In Sec. 17, Art. 7, the President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. However, President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She
cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. This Court
rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate "decrees.”
Power to take Over- in Sec. 17, Art. 7, it states that "the State may, during the emergency
and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not
the President.
FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his
son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of
Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a member of its SanguniangBayan (SB)
representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay
Jowil Red won the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by then
President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the
municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the
municipal council until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his appointment. When Red finally
received his appointment papers, President Aquino was already in power. But still Red was not allowed
to sit as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie
continued to receive his salary for more than a year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment
papers from the Aquino administration after three years and nine months from the date he received his
appointment paper from President Marcos. Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
several criminal complaints against the Mayor and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to
let him assume the position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations for estafa through falsification of
public documents against petitioners, and one (1) information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor alone. The Sandiganbayan rendered
a decision finding the two accused guilty on all counts of estafa. However, with respect to the charge of
violation of RA No. 3019, The Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having
denied their motion for reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen or has
qualified.
Held: YES.
To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the terms of office of KB youth sectoral
representatives to the SB and of the KB Federation Presidents. Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec. 1 of
the KB Constitution respectively provide -
Sec. 7. Term of Office. - Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove
mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of
March 1980.
In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of barangay councils and
the president of the federation of kabataang barangay, their terms of office shall be coterminous with
their tenure is president of their respective association and federation.
xxxx
Sec 1. All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shall continue to hold office until the last
Sunday of November 1985 or such time that the newly elected officers shall have qualified and
assumed office in accordance with this Constitution.
The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative to the SB since he
did not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers; neither did he take a valid oath of
office. Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of the SB although in a
holdover capacity since his term had already expired. The Sandiganbayan however rejected this
postulate declaring that the holdover provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains only to positions in
the KB, clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of B.P. Blg. 51, there can be no
holdover with respect to positions in the SB.
The Supreme Court disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concept of holdover when applied
to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the
succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall
remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where
this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no
successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his
successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to
occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say
that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory
provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen
and has qualified.The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least
implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body
favors the same.
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices,and courts generally indulge in the strong
presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an
executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by one
lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy,
for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering
because of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions
Ernesto Francisco vs. The House of Representatives
Facts:
1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to
the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003
for being insufficient in substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with
the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
 House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court
against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article
XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.”
Issues:
1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
 
1.  This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial
power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which
the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is
the very lis mota or crux  of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of
referendum.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003,
the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
 
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which
were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which
was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of
the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph
5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
Artutor Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the
Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively
originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution.
Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same
did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways &
Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino
averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it
with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes
the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s ironic however to note that  Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco
even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation
was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version
originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the
initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate
passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are
concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of
Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant
difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision dismissing the
petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded
Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several
petitioners.
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the
VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is
averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional”,
citing in support the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand, asserts that
R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt
without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that
Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation”.
Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to adopt a definite
policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on
cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would therefore be to infringe a constitutional policy.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law should be declared unconstitutional. Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section
  55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the
RULING:                                                                         1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she
privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are
is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the
prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power
burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of
matter that the law does not discriminate against the press because "even nondiscriminatory taxation on separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987
constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." The Court was speaking in that case (Murdock Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative
v. Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. The VAT is,
however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.
sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the
press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be
income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution. more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted
by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto
Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though such taxation power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are
may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not
another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another, still the “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be
tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
any existing contract in its true legal sense. It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716
exempts such transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and
veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential. The
sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and
services was already exempt under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of
R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these
transactions, while subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Finally, it is contended that
R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides that "The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation”. Nevertheless,
equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class
be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or
ordinance applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations placed in similar situation.
Furthermore, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the
VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of
taxation." The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes are . . . to
be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." The mandate to Congress
is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system.

As regards the contention of CUP, it is worth noting that its theory amounts to saying that under the
Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation. Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under
which only the following are exempt from taxation: charitable institutions, churches and parsonages, by
reason of Art. VI, §28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit educational institutions by reason of Art. XIV, §4 (3).
With all the foregoing ratiocinations, it is clear that the subject law bears no constitutional infirmities and
is thus upheld.

Neptali Gonzales vs. Hon. Macaraig