MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B.

death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited

DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER
GR No. 161434, March 3 2004
FACTS:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of
candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth
to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be
Manila.
Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition
to disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of
candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the
son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s
citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan—
respondent’s father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s
son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a
Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as
evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The
1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a
distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child,
thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the
allegation that respondent was born only before the
assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s
citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation
evidenced by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had
jurisdiction.

Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of

discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on
questions regarding “qualification of a candidate” for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections
are held.

“Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal” in

connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the “President” or
“Vice-President”, of the Philippines which the Supreme
Court may take cognizance, and not of “candidates” for
President or Vice-President before the elections.

2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in

holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing

fundamental law on respondent’s birth, provided that
among the citizens of the Philippines are “those whose
fathers are citizens of the Philippines.”

Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather

Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s death certificate
was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was
also drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born
in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence,
Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954
was presumed to be the place of residence prior his
POE-LLAMANZARES V. COMELEC
MARCH 8, 2016; G.R. NO. 221697
Perez, J.:
FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections,
Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines and that her residence up to day
before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months
counted from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968, found as newborn infant
in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE
(SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US
in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares
who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then
became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due
to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who
then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then
quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother
and finally went home for good to the Philippines on
MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition
declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter
and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes
Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225
requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship.
From then on, she stopped using her American
passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or
cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among
others, that she cannot be considered a natural born
Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that
her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos.
The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the
ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements and that she committed
misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed
the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified
as candidate for Presidency.
ISSUES:
1. With regard to: a) being a foundling, and b) her
repatriation, is the petitioner a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines? YES TO BOTH.
2. Did the petitioner meet the 10-year residency
requirement for running as president? YES.
Did the petitioner commit material misrepresentation in
her Certificate of Candidacy? NO.
RATIONALE:
1. Is petitioner a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?
ON BEING A FOUNDLING:
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-
born citizens.
The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole
chapter on Paternity and Filiation. That said, there is
more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has
Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner
are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such
parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sec. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must
have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on
collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it
tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private
respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino
citizen. The private respondents should have shown
that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her
admission that she is a foundling did not shift the
burden to her because such status did not exclude the
possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as
in this case where there is a high probability, if not
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the
Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) that from 1965 to
1975, the total number of foreigners born in the
Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of
Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The
statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was
99.83%.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle
that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not
provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the
adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the
first place to be adopted.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of
petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in
Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features:
height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond-
shaped eyes and an oval face.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international
law.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR")
has been interpreted by this Court as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and
binding on the State.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 15:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality
nor denied the
right to change his nationality.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article
24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to
acquire a nationality:"
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and
render them stateless just because there may be a
theoretical chance that one among the thousands of
these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but
two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational,
and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the
statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision
denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of
their birthright. There is no reason to sacrifice the
fundamental political rights of an entire class of human
beings.
While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as
to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either.
ON PETITIONER’S REPATRIATION
The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's repatriation in
July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did
not result in the reacquisition of natural-born
citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the
applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is
not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine
citizenship."
According to the Supreme Court, the COMELEC's
ruling disregarded consistent jurisprudence on the
matter of repatriation.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET,
repatriation was explained as follows:
…Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-bom Filipino.
Also, COMELEC's position that natural-born status
must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson
vs. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was clarified
to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time
of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof."
2. Did the petitioner meet the 10-year residency
requirement for running as president?
ON RESIDENCE
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to
have 10 years residence in the Philippines before the
day of the elections.
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing
that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile
and relocated to the Philippines for good. These
evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport
showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to
the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail
correspondences starting in March 2005 to September
2006 with a freight company to arrange for the
shipment of their household items weighing about
28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the
Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to
ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her
children showing enrollment in Philippine schools
starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax
identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005;
titles for condominium and parking slot issued in
February 2006 and their corresponding tax
declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23
February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S.
acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's
family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service
confirming request for change of address; final
statement from the First American Title Insurance
Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April
2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to
the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she
had been a Philippine resident since May 2005;
affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the
return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and
her family stayed with affiant until the condominium
was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's
husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided
to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he
stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and
to
sell the family home).
The evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and
coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her family's actual
continuous stay taken together, lead to no other
conclusion that when she came here on May 24 2005,
her intention was to permanently abandon the United
States. Petitioner also actually re-established her
residence here on 24 May 2005.
ON MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION
The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of
residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by
9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she
put six ( 6) years and six (6) months as "period of
residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for
Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she
started being a Philippine resident only in November
2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically
assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and
the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings,
she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC
as the period of residence as of the day she submitted
that COC in 2012.

Her explanation that she misunderstood the query in

2012 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as
inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted
the COC, is strengthened by the change which the
COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is
now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the
day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not
have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that
the first version was vague.

Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion for the

COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and
conclusive admission against petitioner.

CONCLUSION:
The procedure and the conclusions from which the
questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED
CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National
Elections.
Gregorio Nuval v. Norberto Guray | GR No L-30241
| Dec. 29, 1928
Facts:
On May 11, 1928, within the period fixed by Sec. 437
of the Administrative Code, Nuval filed in Civil Case
1442 in CFI-La Union, in his dual capacity as a
registered voter and a registered candidate for the
office of municipal president, a petition filed against
Guray, asking for the exclusion of the latter’s name
from the election list since he has not fulfilled the
residency requirement. - The Judge dismissed the
petition, opining that Guray was a bona fide resident of
the municipality from Jan. 1, 1927; since the order was
not appealable, Guray’s name remained in the election
list. - Guray was elected as municipal president, with
Nuval obtaining second place. - Nuval filed the present
quo warranto action, based on Sec. 408 of the
Administrative Code, asking that Guray be declared
ineligible due to non-fulfillment of the residency
requirement which is required to be eligible in an
elective office.
Issues:
1. Whether the judgment rendered by the CFI in
cancelling Guray’s name on the election list constitutes
res judicata;
In Sec. 437 of the Administrative Code, the procedure
prescribed is summary in character, thus the judgment
rendered therein is unappealable, EXCEPT when the
petition is tried before a justice of peace, in which case
it may be appealed to a CFI judge.
However, it is not enough to constitute res judicata.
There is no substantial identity of parties, which is a
requisite in res judicata. The petition for execution was
presented by Nuval in his capacity as a qualified voter
and as a duly registered candidate. The quo warranto
proceeding, however, was in Nuval’s capacity as a
registered candidate for the office.
Furthermore, the subject matters are not substantially
identical. In the petition for exclusion, the object of the
litigation was the conclusion of Guray as a voter from
the election list, while in the present quo warranto
proceeding, the object is the expulsion from office.
There is no identity in the causes of action. In the
petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that
Guray had not fulfilled the 6 -month required
residency. In the quo warranto proceeding, the cause
of action was that Guray has not the one year legal
residence required for the eligibility of the office of the
municipal president.
2. Whether Guray, at the time of his election, was
ineligible for office of the residence in the municipality;
On June 27, 1922, Guray was appointed municipal
treasurer of Balaoan, La Union. A requirement of the
post is that he live continuously in the municipality
where he performs such official duties. Due to this,
Guray asked for the cancellation of his name in the
election list of Luna (where he has lived since forever).
In 1926, Guray and his family went back to live in Luna
at his in-law’s house due to high costs of living in
Balaoan.
In 1927, he began construction of a house which
remained incomplete. On February 1928, he applied
for and obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna,
and filed his resignation on the same month. Despite
having a cedula declaring him a resident of Balaoan,
he obtained another cedula from the municipality of
Luna on Feb. 20, 1928, which was dated January 15,
1928. He then applied for registration as a voter of
Luna, alleging that he had been residing in the
municipality for 30 years.
In view of the facts just related, the question arises
whether or not Norberto Guray had the legal residence
of one year immediately prior to the general elections
of June 5, 1928, in order to be eligible to the office of
municipal president of Luna, Province of La Union.
It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons
his residence in a state and acquires one in another
state, he cannot again vote in the state of his former
residence until he has qualified by a new period of
residence". "The term 'residence' as so used is
synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention." Since Norberto Guray abandoned
his first residence in the municipality of Luna and
acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote and be a
candidate in the municipality of Luna, he needed to
reacquire residence in the latter municipality for the
length of time prescribed by the law, and for such
purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so, but
his personal presence in said municipality.
For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion
and so hold in fact and in law Norberto Guray only
abandoned his legal residence in the Municipality of
Balaoan, and began to acquire another in the
municipality of Luna from Febraury 16, 1928, when he
filed his resignation from the office of municipal
treasurer of Balaoan which he had been holding, and
which resignation was accepted; and on being elected
municipal president of Luna in the general elections of
June 5, 1928, he had not reacquired the legal
residence necessary to be validly elected to said
office.
Caasi vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan in the local elections of January 18, 1988.
His disqualification, however, was sought by Mateo
Caasi on the ground that under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code Miguel was not qualified
because he is a green card holder, hence, a
permanent resident of the USA and not of Bolinao.
Sec. 48 provides:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications - Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective
office under this Code, unless said person has waived
his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.
Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he
denied that he is a permanent resident of the United
States. He argued that he obtained the green card for
convenience in order that he may freely enter the
United States for his periodic medical examination and
to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a
permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and that
he voted in all previous elections, including the
plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the
1987 Constitution and the congressional elections on
May 18, 1987.
After hearing, the Comelec dismissed the petition. It
held that the possession of a green card by the
respondent Miguel does not sufficiently establish that
he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.
Issue:
1. Whether a green card is proof that the holder
thereof is a permanent resident of the United States
such that it would disqualify him to run for any elective
local position.
Held:
Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and
permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of
a green card attesting to such status are conclusive
proof that he is a permanent resident of the United
States. In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own
handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in
Manila before his departure for the United States in
1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein
regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently,
so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its
face, the green card that was subsequently issued by
the US Department of Justice and Immigration and
Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear
bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the
card, the upper portion, the following information is
printed: “Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person
identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently
and work in the United States.”
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration
to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. He did not go to the United States merely
to visit his children or his doctor there. He entered the
US with the intention to live there permanently as
evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a
visitor's or tourist's) visa.
Issue:
2. Whether Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in
November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate
for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988 local
elections, waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of the United States
Held:
No. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the
Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is
a green card holder must have "waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country."
Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver
of his green card should be manifested by some act or
acts independent of and done prior to filing his
candidacy for elective office in this country. Without
such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any
elective office."
Miguel's application for immigrant status and
permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of
a green card attesting to such status are conclusive
proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S.
despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The
waiver of such immigrant status should be as
indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear
evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that
status or that he surrendered his green card to the
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of
Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, the
conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said
public office.
Issue:
3. Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.
Held:
Yes. Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which
proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it
of the United States, but the records of this case are
starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as
such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of
Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that
he was disqualified to become a candidate for that
office. Hence, his election was null and void.
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run
for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of
filing his certificate of candidacy is one of the
qualifications that a candidate for elective public office
must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification
because he was a permanent resident of the United
States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only
three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the
Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for
mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.

● In banning from elective public office Philippine

citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of
a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid
down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold
elective public office those Philippine citizens who
possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has
reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast
their lot with our country "without mental reservations
or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those
who are resident aliens of a foreign country are
incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and
welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their
public duties here, they must keep another eye on their
duties under the laws of the foreign country of their
choice in order to preserve their status as permanent
residents thereof.

● Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which

provides that "any public officer or employee who
seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of
an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall
be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel
for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the
United States before he was elected to public office,
not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan. (G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990)
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995 IMELDA
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY
MONTEJO, respondents.
FACTS:
On March 8, 1995, Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-
Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte
with the Provincial Election Supervisor, stating that she
is 7- months resident in the said district. On March 23,
1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo,
incumbent Representative and a candidate for the
same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), alleging that Imelda did not meet the
constitutional oneyear residency requirement. Imelda
thus amended her COC, changing “seven” months to
“since childhood.” The provincial election supervisor
refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that
it was filed out of time. Imelda, thus, filed her amended
COC with COMELEC's head office in Manila.
On April 24, 1995, the COMELEC Second Division
declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the
amended and the original COCs. The COMELEC in
division found that when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos
and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to
stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly
declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is
deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she
spent her childhood and school days, as her place of
domicile. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this ruling.
During the pendency of the disqualification case,
Imelda won in the election. But the COMELEC
suspended her proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to
the Supreme Court. Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P.
881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15
days before the election. Since the COMELEC
rendered the resolution on April 24, 1995, fourteen
(14) days before the election, COMELEC already lose
jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it is the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not
the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election
of members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election
purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of
one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
HELD:
For purposes of election laws, residence is
synonymous with domicile. Hence, petitioner was a
resident of the First District of Leyte and therefore
possessed the necessary residence qualifications to
run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of
Representatives for the following reasons:
 Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As
domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is
gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's
being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her
domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile
was established when her father brought his family
back to Leyte.
 Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully
effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1.) An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2.) A bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3.) Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on
these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing
concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for
a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two
legal residences at the same time. Petitioner held
various residences for different purposes during the
last four decades. None of these purposes
unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her
domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in
1952. A wife does not automatically gain the
husband’s domicile. What petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her
domicile of origin. The term residence may mean one
thing in civil law and quite another thing in political law.
What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is
concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of
husband and wife, the term residence should only be
interpreted to mean "actual residence." The
inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous
civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner
married the former President in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not
a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner
gained a new domicile after her marriage and only
acquired a right to choose a new one after her
husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to
the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly
but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming
this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This
choice was unequivocally expressed in her letters to
the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the
PCGG's permission to rehabilitate their ancestral
house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte.
Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in
her brother's house, an act which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to
the PCGG Chairman.
Joel Jimenez vs Remedios Cañizares
Facts:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a petition for the annulment
of his marriage with Remedios Cañizares on the
ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too
small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis
for copulation. He alleged that the condition of her
genitals as described above existed at the time of
marriage and continues to exist and that for that
reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one
day after they had been married.
Defendant however failed to submit her answer within
the required period. The Court ordered the defendant
to submit to a physical examination by a competent
lady physician to determine her physical capacity for
copulation. Defendant, however, did not follow the
order and did not appear during the scheduled
hearings. The judge, thus, rendered judgment
annulling the marriage of the parties.
1. Issue:
May the marriage in question be annulled on the
strength only of the lone testimony of the husband-
plaintiff?
Held:
No. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds
that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence,
to annul a marriage. Whether the wife is really
impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established, because from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein. Although her
refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court
show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude
the presumption arising out of the suppression of
evidence could not arise or be inferred because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and
shy and would not submit to a physical examination
unless compelled to by competent authority.
refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court
show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude
the presumption arising out of the suppression of
evidence could not arise or be inferred, because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful, and
shy and would not submit to a physical examination
unless compelled to by competent authority.
Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The
lone testimony of Joel that his wife is physically
incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear
asunder the ties that have bound them together as
husband and wife.
3. ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only
the testimony of the husband.
HELD:
The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her
husband did not avail of the opportunity to defend
herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be
concluded. It is a well-known fact that women in this
country are shy and bashful and would not readily and
unhesitatingly submit to a physical examination unless
compelled by competent authority. Such physical
examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She
is not charged with any offense and likewise is not
compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence
being an abnormal condition should not be presumed.
The case was remanded to trial court.

"Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be

presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency."
The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is
physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound
them together as husband and wife.

2. ISSUE:
Whether or not Remedios’ impotency has been
established.

HELD:
No. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage
in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of
Joel who was expected to give testimony tending or
aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he
sought and seeks. Whether Remedios is really
impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established, because from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein. Although her
G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913 CONSTANZA
YAÑEZ DE BARNUEVO, plaintiff and appellant, vs.
GABRIEL FUSTER, defendant and appellant.
FACTS:
On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and
Constanza Yañez were joined in a Catholic or
canonical marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain. In
February of 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the
Philippine Islands, settled, and acquired real and
personal property. Toward the middle of 1896,
Constanza Yañez came to Manila, where her husband
was residing, and here lived with him in conjugal
relations until the month of April, 1899. On the 4th day
of that month and year they made an agreement, in a
public document, by which they "resolved to separate
and live apart, both consenting to such separation, and
by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to
move to Spain, there to reside in such place as the
said lady pleases." In the same document, the
husband undertook to send his wife the sum of 300
pesetas monthly for her support, payable in Madrid,
Spain, from the month of June of the said year 1899.
The husband complied with this obligation until August,
1899, after which time he ceased to make further
payments.
In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to
the Philippines, but the husband had absented himself
therefrom in the early days of February of the same
year. On the 11th of March, 1909, the wife
commenced divorce proceedings against her husband,
alleging as cause of action the adultery committed by
him in or about the year 1899 with a certain woman
that she named in the complaint and with whom he
had lived and cohabited and by whom he had had two
children. She prayed that she be granted a decree of
divorce; that the court order the separation of the
properties of the plaintiff and the defendant, to date
from the date of the said decree; that the conjugal
society be therefore liquidated, and after the amount of
the conjugal property had been determined, that one-
half thereof be adjudicated to her; furthermore, as to
the amount of pension owing for her support but not
paid to her, that the defendant be ordered to pay her
the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220
Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency
at the rate of exchange on the date of the complaint,
amounted to P12,959.90.
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila held itself to have jurisdiction, decreed
the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff
and defendant, ordered the latter to pay the former
P5,010.17, directed that the communal property be
divided between the parties, with costs against the
defendant, and in event that the parties could not
agree to the division, it was to be effected by
commissioners according to law.
Both parties appealed from this judgment, but
notwithstanding the appeal, the partition of the
property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded
with. These latter, after various vicissitudes, rendered
their report and account of the partition to the court,
who then rendered final judgment, from which, also,
both parties appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance over the
case and partition of property as decided by the court
should be affirmed.
HELD:
The partition of property decreed in the judgment
appealed from of the 9th of September, 1911, should
be and is hereby confirmed. The two judgments
appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special
pronouncement of costs in this instance.
The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree
a divorce is not comprised within the personal status of
the husband and wife, simply because the whole
theory of the statutes and of the rights which belong to
everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private
law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are
not a matter of the private law of persons, but of the
public or political law of the nation. “The jurisdiction of
courts and other questions relating to procedure are
considered to be of a public nature and consequently
are generally submitted to the territorial principle. . . .
All persons that have to demand justice in a case in
which foreigners intervene, since they can gain nothing
by a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to
the tribunals of the state which have coercive means
(property situated in the territory) to enforce any
decision they may render. Otherwise, one would
expose himself in the suit to making useless
expenditures which, although he won his case, would
not contribute to secure his rights because of the
court’s lack of means to enforce them.” “Justice,” says
the same professor, “is a principle superior to that of
nations, and it should therefore be administered
without taking into any account whatsoever the state to
which the litigants belong. . . . In order to foster their
relations and develop their commerce, all civilized
nations are interested in doing justice, not alone to
their own people, but to those foreigners who contract
within the country or outside of it juridical ties which in
some manner effect their sovereignty. Might its courts,
in some cases, in suits between foreigners residing in
its territory, apply the personal law of the parties, but
abdicate their jurisdiction, refrain from administering
justice because the personal law of the foreigner gave
the jurisdiction of the given case to some court that is
not the territorial one of the nation? This has never yet
been claimed in any of the theories regarding the
conflict of laws arising out of questions of nationality
and domicile; it would be equivalent to recognizing
extraterritorial law in favor of private persons.
The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is
only binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not
accompany the persons of the Spanish subject
wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke
it if he resided in Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in
any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain.
Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the
ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to
the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege
lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their
personal statute, a law of their nation which gives
jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a
certain court within or without the territory of their
nation. It is a question that has already been settled in
two decisions of the Supreme Court.

In the present action for divorce the Court of First

Instance of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction
over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish
Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city and
had their domicile herein.
Quita vs. Court of Appeals Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998 spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship.
FACTS:
Fe Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were The case was remanded to the trial court.
married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941 and were
not blessed with children. Their relationship soured
and eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in U.S.A and
in July 1954, she obtained a final judgment of divorce.
Three weeks after, she married a certain Felix Tupaz
in the same locality but their relationship also ended in
a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third
time, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died and left no will. In August

1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of
letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo
in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent
BlandinaDandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse
of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed
Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan,
opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment
instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved
in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors
themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by
Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors
submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950
private writing and the final judgment of divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T.
Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.

Petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs

of the decedent and the distribution of his estate. At a
scheduled hearing, the trial court required the
submission of the records of birth of the Padlan
children within ten days from receipt thereof, after
which, with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for
resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the
required documents being submitted.

ISSUE:
Who between petitioner and private respondent may
validly claim as the spouse of the decedent

RULING:
The right of petitioner to inherit as Arturo’s spouse
must still be determined by the trial court. The trial
court failed to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship when she obtained the divorce abroad. The
purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the
matters in issue with the aid of documentary and
testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the
parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.

On the other hand, private respondent’s claim to

heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She
and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the
prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting
thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered
void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000 PAULA T. in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his
LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our
and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents. laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and
legal capacity." Whether the will is intrinsically valid
FACTS: and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and
serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance
1927 to September 30, 1957. On February 22, 1937, with the formalities required is answered by referring to
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish
priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines
Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to
United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by
the United States District Court, Southern District of
New York. He discovered that his wife Paula was
pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on
November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior
Court of the State of California in and for the County of
San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John
Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On
November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of
California, for the County of San Diego found all
factual allegations to be true and issued an
interlocutory judgment of divorce. On January 16,
1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.
Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as
Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or
cohabitation. From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia
lived together as husband and wife. Their twenty-five
(25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. On March 13, 1981,
Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will
was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano,
duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano.
In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to
Alicia and their three children.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was valid?

HELD:
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an
American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his
divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3)
execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established,
admitted and undisputed. Thus, as a rule, issues
arising from these incidents are necessarily governed
by foreign law. The Civil Code clearly provides:

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to

the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.”

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is

subject to the law of the country where it is situated.”

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to

his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown