Renate Mayntz

Transition to sustainable development: Lessons from governance theory.

1. Governance theory: the approach

The relevance of governance theory to the topic of this workshop rests on the obvious
fact that sustainable development does not evolve spontaneously, but needs deliberate
guidance. However, we do not have at our disposal a single and fully elaborated
theory of governance. The term “governance theory” designates a dynamic field of
research characterized by a succession of different theoretical paradigms. If
governance theory is to be applied to the topic “transition to sustainable
development”, it is therefore necessary to spell out the paradigm that is to be used.
In what follows I shall sketch the development of governance theory, outline an
analytical frame, and try to apply it to the subject of this workshop, pointing out what
governance can teach us about the way toward sustainable development.

The word “governance” has long been familiar in English as a synonym of

“governing”. The first recorded uses of ‘governance’ occur in the fourteenth century
and refer mainly to the action or manner of governing, as distinct from the institutions
of government (Jessop, 2006, 249). Modern governance theory evolved in a
dialectical process that started with the paradigm of political “steering” (Steuerung).
Steering became a political science buzzword when in the late 1960s, governments
were increasingly engaged in middle-range planning. That was the period when
planning theory, organizational design, and procedures such as PPBS flourished. At
the time it was widely believed that the political-administrative sub-system functions
as the control center vis-a-vis the economy and civil society. While planning theory
was (and still is) prescriptive, steering theory was analytical. When the reform
policies of the late 1960s and the 1970s failed to reach their goals, social scientists
trying to explain these failures started to ask for the preconditions of successful
political steering. The steering capability of government, it soon became clear, is
impaired if the target group, the object of steering enjoys a high degree of legal and
practical autonomy, and/or if it resists the intervention. On the side of politics, the
presumed subject of steering, an incorrect problem analysis, the choice of an
ineffective instrument, and implementation deficits were shown to contribute to
reform failure.

In analyzing the reasons leading to reform failure, scientists and policy-makers alike
arrived at the conclusion that the top-down approach of steering was at fault, the
factors that were found to lead to policy failure being inherent in hierarchical forms of
control. Observed reform failures were thus attributed to “state failure”. States reacted
to the problems encountered in hierarchical steering by developing cooperative forms
of policy-making – in neo-corporate decision structures, policy networks, and public-
private partnerships. The implicitly top-down concept of political steering was ill
adapted to this new style of policy-making. Social scientists therefore developed an
alternative paradigm, which came to be known as the paradigm of governance. The
shift from steering to governance was not limited to terminology, but implied also a
shift in analytical perspective. While research in the framework of steering theory is
actor-centered, focusing on corporate actors and their strategic actions, governance
theory is centered on structure, focusing on the institutions that form a governance
structure. The two perspectives emphasize different aspects of a complex reality and

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are complementary to each other. In fact, important insights of steering theory, such
as the identification of factors making for policy failure, are still valid and have
become absorbed into governance theory.

Governance theory shares with steering theory the assumption that policy-making is
about problem-solving and the production of common goods. To focus on problem-
solving is obviously a very selective perspective (Mayntz 2001). A concept that
directs attention selectively to institutions concerned with solving collective problems
and producing common goods is not applicable, for instance, to power relations
characterized by subjugation and exploitation, or to dominance structures in which
rulers are only interested in maintaining and extending their personal power, and the
material profits they derive from it. Even though governance theory does not ignore
power relations, the governance approach is different from approaches that attempt to
grasp existing power structures.

The term governance is currently being used in several distinctly different ways. The
most inclusive meaning of the term can be found in the context of sociological
theorizing, where “governance” designates a summary category of all forms of social
coordination – state (hierarchy), market, clan, network, and solidarity. 1 In the political
science literature , the term is used in a somewhat narrower sense, referring only to
purposive forms of coordination and excluding emergent processes of spontaneous
coordination, as in ideal-typical markets or, more generally, in large populations of
interdependent actors acting independently of each other. Governance in this sense
does, however, include the deliberate use of the market mechanism as a policy
instrument, as in the creation of a market for pollution rights. The core of the political
science concept of “governance” is a cooperative mode of social and political
regulation. Governance in this sense may include hierarchical elements, but is not
purely hierarchical; it involves non-state actors along with state actors in decision-
making and policy implementation (Rhodes 1997). This concept of governance is
applied equally to the national, European, and international levels of policy-making.

The inflationary use of the term governance has been strongly influenced by the
process of internationalization. The World Bank used the term governance in 1989,
admonishing Third World countries to develop a cooperative style of governing that
involves actors from civil society (UNESCO 1998); the Commission on Global
Governance applied the term to regulation at the international level (Commission on
Global Governance 1995). In this context, the term governance was given a normative
twist, clearly expressed in the concept of “good governance”. The assumption is that
the involvement of civil society in policy development and implementation makes
governance “good”, i.e. more democratic and more effective. In this same sense, the
concept has come to be used in efforts of local government reform.

When talking about “new modes of governance”, a still narrower definition of

governance is occasionally used, referring exclusively to the horizontal cooperation of

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A typical example for the explicit identification of “governance” with “social coordination” is given
by Bob Jessop, who continues to specify that “social coordination” refers “…to the ways in which
disparate but interdependent social agencies are coordinated and/or seek to coordinate themselves
through different form of self-organization to achieve specific common objectives in situations of
complex reciprocal interdependence. Among the many techniques and mechanisms deployed here are
exchange, command, networking, and solidarity.” (Jessop 2006, 255)

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state and non-state actors, or even of private actors alone, using the “soft” instruments
of positive incentives, dialogue, and benchmarking. A familiar example is the Open
Method of Coordination (OMC) practiced by the European Union; benchmarking and
OMC are based on learning, supported by the mechanisms of naming and shaming
(Caporaso/ Wittenbrinck 2006; Bruno et al. 2006).

In the following I shall be speaking of governance and governance theory in the

analytical sense of political science. This includes the new forms of governing, but is
not limited to them. Nor is it assumed that governance is “good”. In contrast to
Institutional Economics, which starts from the premise that economic institutions are
efficient solutions of coordination problems, and also in contrast to the functionalist
strand in International Relations theory, which assumes that international institutions
arise in response to problems transcending national boundaries, governance theory in
the analytical political science sense does not make assumptions of functionality.
Governance research is “realistic”; it considers existing governance institutions as
components of situations in which problems exist which they may or may not respond
to; in fact, given governance arrangements can even generate problems that call for
solution.

2. A revised analytical frame

Governance research starts analytically not with a problem, nor a goal state, but with
existing regulatory institutions, asking what functions they are designed to serve, what
coordination problems they are meant to solve, and whether or not they meet such
expectations. Do specific economic institutions contribute to, or rather impede
innovation? Why do German labor market institutions fail to solve the unemployment
problem, channelling redundant labor instead into early retirement? If, however, the
solution of a specific problem is at issue, one should start not with an existing
governance structure but with the problem, and ask how it might be solved. What kind
of governance structure would be capable of directing development to the goal of
sustainability? To deal with this question requires a normative approach, because the
road to a valued future state is sought. But the approach must at the same time be
analytical, because advice must be based on sound knowledge about the effects of
different governance modes. It should not be taken for granted that specific
cooperative forms of decision-making will solve the problem.

The focus of governance theory on the provision of common goods or the solution of
collective problems seems to fit the study of sustainable development very well. But
the fit is not perfect. In the policy perspective, “problems” are challenges; they are
situations in which a positive value that should be achieved is not and will not be
achieved without deliberate efforts. To say that a certain situation is a problem means
that it differs from a state of affairs that is judged desirable or violates a given value;
policy problems, in other words, are always relative to a positive goal state – they are
problems-to-be-solved. Sustainable development is a desirable future goal state that is
presently not realized, and requires deliberate changes in the present situation to be
realized. “Transition to sustainable development” is therefore the description of a
problem to be solved, both theoretically and practically. In order to manage the
transition, it is necessary to know how the present situation must change. Analysis
must therefore start with the given situation and the reasons for its present -
undesirable - condition, and ask how it might be changed.

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What this implies can be spelled out in more detail if one starts with a notion familiar
from the discussion of globalization. One important aspect of the globalization
process is the incongruence between the increasingly global scope of many problems,
ranging from pollution over financial crises and migration to terrorism and organized
crime, and the limited action scope of nation-states. The implied two-dimensional
analytical frame, I have argued previously, should be enlarged to three dimensions:
the genetic structure, consisting of the actors whose behaviour causes a problem, the
impact structure, consisting of the actors who suffer the negative effects, and the
coping structure, consisting of the actors attempting to solve the problem (Mayntz
2002a). Where we deal with problems of the tragedy of the commons type, the scope
of these three structures is identical, they are congruent: Those who produce the
problem suffer the negative effects and are therefore motivated to prevent them, and
their cooperation would be sufficient to do so and thus to solve the problem. For
Mancur Olson (1969), this is the configuration underlying the efficient production of
a public good. But it is an exceptional constellation. More typical is the case where
the problem producers benefit from their actions, while the negative effects are
suffered by others, but where those suffering the negative impacts are unable to do
anything about the problem, while those who could are not motivated. This obviously
is also the situation confronting the search for sustainable development.

The analytical frame just outlined concentrates on actor structures; for many purposes,
this seems too narrow. The genetic structure should be extended to a “causal
structure” that includes, in addition to the behaviour of human beings, causal relations
involving material elements (e.g. resources, atmospheric ozone concentrations) and
immaterial elements (knowledge, accepted norms and values). The impact structure
should be extended to a “problem structure” that specifies the nature of the problem
producing the impacts, and includes effects on system properties, such as the
innovation rate or the welfare production rate. The coping structure finally should be
extended to a “governance structure” that comprises not only actors, but more
generally institutions, i.e. norm systems as well as organizations. This revised
analytical frame, composed of causal structure, problem structure, and governance
structure, can be used both to analyze problematic situations which pose a challenge
to policy-makers, and to devise, theoretically or practically, a way to problem
solution. If one is specifically interested in solving a given problem, one would start
in both cases with an analysis of the problem and not of the governance structure. In
this sense, the scheme “puts governance theory on its feet”. But it would still make
use of everything that governance theory has to offer by way of insights into the
functioning of different governance arrangements.

3. Sustainable development: the problem

In applying the framework just outlined in a problem-solving context, analysis should
start with the problem. Even though the causal structure is logically prior to the
problem following from it, the problem structure is analytically prior; only if a
negative effect, a “bad” is perceived will one ask for its cause and attempt to solve the
problem. It is not my task to analyze in detail what kind of a goal sustainable
development is, and why it is presently not achieved. But since different problems call
for different solutions, at least the kind of problem posed by the transition to
sustainable development must be specified before it is possible to ask what
governance forms might lead the way to such a future state.

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Sustainable development is a system property, but there is no consensus on its
definition. Starting as guiding image of environmental policy, the policy field
sustainable development seems to have resulted from the merger of several distinct
concerns: environmental protection, the socio-economic development of the Third
World, and the opposition to global capitalism. According to Weidner (2004), the
mainstream concept of sustainable development consists of three pillars: an
ecological, an economic, and a social pillar. One postulated core value is equity,
distributive justice both within and between generations. Sustainable development is,
however, not so much a defined goal state as a “regulatory idea” (Knaus/Renn 1998);
it points to a path to be sought. As expressed by the title of this workshop, the
transition to sustainable development is the challenge.

Economics offers several concepts that might help to specify the problem posed by
“transition to sustainable development”. Is the problem a public good that is not
supplied, a common pool resource that erodes, or an insufficient level of public
welfare? Sustainable development would presumably raise public welfare, but the
concept of public welfare, defined in terms of aggregate individual utility, does not
indicate what must be done to increase it. Sustainable development is undoubtedly a
public good. The provision of public goods that are not supplied spontaneously can be
delegated to the state; an alternative would be to change the incentive structure that
presently prevents its spontaneous production. The transition to sustainable
development can evidently not be expected from state action alone. It does indeed
require changing the incentive structure for those whose behaviour stands presently in
its way, but the big question is how to bring this about. In the case of common pool
resources, the problem is over-utilization. Elinor Ostrom has studied how the
sustainable utilization of common pool resources can be achieved (Ostrom 1990).
This is highly relevant for the transition to sustainable development, but it touches
only upon one aspect of it.

Decision theory points to a number of formal problem properties that are relevant for
coping. Problems can be either well-structured, consisting of single, clearly defined,
and isolated effects, or ill-structured, consisting of many interrelated components;
they can be quantitative (level problems) or qualitative (structure problems), and they
can call for distributive or for redistributive measures. On all of these dimensions,
“transition to sustainable development” is on the side of maximum complexity. While
simple problems may not be easy to diagnose and solve, they meet the crucial
precondition of all deliberate problem-solving: The unequivocal definition of that
which should be changed. For complex problems, this does not hold. The absence of
sustainable development is an ill-structured problem with highly diffuse and unevenly
distributed negative impacts. Most importantly, it is a composite problem, consisting
of several distinct components that require separate solutions which are not always
compatible with each other. Moreover, sustainable development is a problem not of
local or regional, but of global scope. The term “global problem” is not used
uniformly; it may mean problems caused by globalization, problems that manifest
themselves worldwide, or problems that can only be solved by global cooperation;
this last is the sense in which sustainable development is a global problem.

Problem structure and causal structure can be separated only analytically. A typology
familiar from policy studies serves to show how both are related. This typology is
based on two dichotomous variables, the diffuse or concentrated distribution of costs,

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and of benefits in a given population (Wilson 1980). The combination of these two
dichotomous variables produces a fourfold table. In policy research, each combination
is related to a specific type of regulatory policy-making, but the scheme can also be
applied to the distribution of costs and benefits in situations in which a problem is
generated. The underlying assumption is that all actors want to maximize benefits and
minimize costs. Problems can be characterized by the profile of negative impacts
caused by the behaviour of those who profit from the activity producing these
impacts. Set in the framework of a common goods analysis, rational actors who
pursue their individual interests by maximizing profits or using as much of a free
resource as possible cause the problem: Scarce resources erode, valued goods are not
produced. The impact of the problem creates a new interest structure, defined by the
perceived need of those suffering the negative impact to arrive at a problem solution –
to stay the erosion of a valued resource, to provide the lacking good. A comparison of
the two profiles indicates who might be interested in solving a problem. Coping
becomes more difficult the more causal structure and impact structure diverge; if the
problem producers enjoy only the benefits while the negative impact is suffered by
others, it is most difficult to motivate the problem producers to change their
behaviour. With respect to the ability to provoke coping responses, there is moreover
a big difference between problems that have clear and direct impacts on defined
groups of actors, and problems whose negative impacts are widely diffused, difficult
to identify by the individuals affected, and only very indirect. The lack of sustainable
development causes highly diffuse costs, while the benefits derived from the
behaviour producing the problem are concentrated, causing strong resistance to any
regulation cancelling these benefits.

To provoke a coping response, a problem must be perceived as such. Perception of a

problem comes most easily from intensely felt negative impacts, but often negative
impacts are of low intensity and not immediately felt, as in the case of unsound food,
or they concern system properties that have only indirect and long-run effects. In such
cases, and sustainable development is a case in point, it is of crucial importance to
create the perception that an existing state of affairs is indeed a problem. This requires
both knowledge of complex causal relations, and policy entrepreneurs to put it on the
political agenda (Grundmann 1999). The crucial role that science plays in this
connection is not limited to proving that there is a long-run damage or risk of damage
(i.e. more extreme weather conditions, rising ocean level etc.); it must also prove how
that effect is caused, and if human behaviour contributes to it. This obviously calls for
social science knowledge as well as natural science knowledge. The history of
emission control illustrates how difficult it is to unravel a complex causal structure;
the task is even more demanding in the case of sustainable development.

4. Governance of the transition to sustainable development

Confronted with the kind of problem described in the last section, what can
governance theory tell us about the way to approach it? Governance theory was
developed in the context of domestic policy-making in the modern nation-state.
Different from steering theory it paid special attention to governance forms involving
non-state actors. There has apparently been a parallel development in dealing with
sustainable development. At first the advocates of environmental protection and
subsequently also the advocates of sustainable development approached the state.
When the ineffectiveness of national policy in this as in several other policy fields
became evident, while non-state actors seemed to gain power in the course of

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globalization, cooperation of the various “stakeholders” appeared to be a more
effective approach. The “cooperative state” thus became the guiding image in the
policy field of sustainable development, and negotiation, consensual conflict
resolution, and self-binding commitments were considered promising instruments.

The relative advantages of horizontal versus hierarchical coordination in the

production of common goods have been repeatedly discussed in governance theory. In
complex environments, non-hierarchical forms of decision-making can produce more
effective solutions than even a ‘benevolent dictatorship’ or paternalistic domination.
They permit processing of more information and take a greater variety of values
(interests) into account, and they make for higher flexibility and adaptability (Scharpf
1993). On the other hand horizontal cooperation is beset by the dangers of a decision
blockade, of bargaining in which those without resources to offer in exchange loose
out, and of resulting in compromise solutions at the level of the lowest common
denominator, or that externalize costs to third parties. These findings are relevant for
the transition to sustainable development, but they remain at a highly abstract, general
level. What is needed is a closer look at different forms of governance involving non-
state actors. In fact, the development, mode of operation, and effectiveness of a large
variety of cooperative forms of policy-making have been studied empirically; the
findings of these studies are the substantive core of governance theory.

Networks in which public and private actors cooperate in the formulation and
implementation of public policy are probably the best studied governance forms. The
exact composition of policy networks differs between countries and between policy
fields. In European countries the corporatist triad of state, organized business and
organized labor negotiating macro-economic policy, and sectoral policy networks
found in such fields as technology policy or telecommunications policy have attracted
much interest (Streeck/Kenworthy 2005, Marin/Mayntz 1991). In the USA, the “iron
triangles” link a parliamentary committee, a private interest organization, and a
government department all working in the same policy field (Heclo 1978). A second
important type of governance involving this time only private actors are negotiating
systems that serve functions of self-regulation; these systems are composed of private
organizations representing opposed interests, as in wage bargaining or in the German
health system. They differ in the extent to which affected third (or fourth etc.) parties
do in fact participate. Consumers, for instance, though obviously affected by the
impact wages have on prices, are not represented in the German wage bargaining
system. Still another function is served by private governments, i.e. organizations that
impose rules on the behaviour of their members, rules that do not only serve to
contain ruinous intra-group competition, but also the production of negative
externalities that would eventually backfire (Streeck/ Schmitter 1985). In this way,
private interest organizations, both business associations and professional
associations, contribute to the production of collective goods. This is also true of
public welfare organizations who have become important actors in modern
governance. They advocate specific public welfare goals, acting as pressure groups
and participating in policy networks.

The constitutional distribution of powers and the structure of interest organization in a

given nation-state set the stage for the development of different forms of governance.
Some forms are so closely linked to the territorially bounded and constitutionally
organized nation-state that it is difficult or impossible to carry them to a trans-national

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level, be it the level of the European Union or what has come to be called “global
governance”. From the literature on European policy-making one gets the impression
that in the EU, bilateral contacts and ad hoc issue-centered negotiations are more
prominent than some of the governance forms familiar from the nation-state. Due to
the limited powers of the European Parliament there is, for instance, apparently no
European counterpart to “iron triangles”. Since there exist no full-scale European
political parties, we also do not find stable networks linking political parties, interest
groups, and government agencies. Likewise absent are European versions of the
relatively clear-cut macro-corporatist arrangements linking state, employers, and
organized labor. For Streeck and Schmitter (1991), ‘transnational pluralism’ rather
than neo-corporatism therefore characterizes European policy-making. Finally we do
not find institutionalized negotiating systems of opposed private interests organized
on the European scale.

Once we move to the global scale, the level at which sustainable development must be
pursued, the institutional and structural preconditions for the development of many
governance forms characteristic of modern nation-states are largely absent. There is
nothing close to a world government or legislature, there are no world-wide political
parties, and the system of organized interests is highly fragmented. There are no
international peak associations with a sectoral representation monopoly and that
amount of binding power down to the lowest level required of a private actor
participating in a corporatist structure or in a system of sectoral self-regulation. 2
Different sectoral and different socio-economic interests are even more selectively
organized on the international than on the European level, and where private
international organizations do exist, they are mainly involved in bilateral attempts of
exerting influence and in sectoral self-regulation (Greenwood/Jacek 2000). Therefore
we find no international counterparts to the classic tripartite (state, capital, and labor)
neo-corporatist arrangement and other familiar sectoral policy networks. Similarly
absent are institutionalized negotiating systems of opposed interests. At the national
level, these are typically compulsory negotiating systems installed by the state, and
the participating interest organizations share the same geographical basis. At the
global level, these preconditions of successful delegated self-regulation are lacking.

As Grundmann (1999) has pointed out in his instructive case study of fluorocarbon
control, to cope with a problem of transnational or even global scope requires, among
other things, the existence of powerful corporate actors that could be involved and
who offer a forum for its discussion. The existing supra-, inter- and transnational
corporate actors are characterized by great diversity in their territorial scope, their
functional content, and their institutional basis (Rosenau 1992). The UN is composed,
aside from the General Assembly and Security Council, of a host of programmes,
funds, and special agencies that serve a variety of different functions – among many
others the International Labor Office ILO, the World Bank, and the Food and
Agricultural Organization FAO. These international governmental organizations
(IGO) are practically autonomous; the World Trade Organization WTO is so even
formally. Other, geographically more limited organizations as the OECD exist
entirely outside the UN framework. These international governmental organizations

2
One reason for this organization deficit is the absence of a powerful public negotiating partner. Only
in the field of human rights and environmental protection, the creation of the UN and its subsidiary
organizations seems to have contributed to the development of international public interest
organizations (Bornschier 1999).

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are hybrids between institutionalized intergovernmental negotiating systems and
corporate actors able to impose decisions on their own members (Mayntz 2002b).
They are surrounded by a host of private, non-governmental international
organizations (NGOs). Already in 1995, their number was 5000 according to a
conservative estimate (Wessels 2000, 155), comprising both international business
organizations and public welfare organizations. The latter may have become more
important on the international than they were on the national level (Hall/ Biersteker
2002). But measured by their power to extract resources, to command compliance and
to apply sanctions, most of them have only a very restricted capacity to act as
corporate actors. International business associations and certain types of public
welfare associations in the fields of environmental protection and human rights appear
to be the relatively most powerful NGOs.

The achievement of sustainable development cannot be expected from any one of

these inter- and transnational organizations. The organizations and agencies operating
in the framework of the UN may appear to tackle additively several of the
components of sustainable development, but they are not bound together in pursuit of
this goal. Governance of sustainable development must involve all relevant actors.
Though there are no international counterparts to the clearly bounded and relatively
stable policy networks of public and private actors that we know from some West-
European states, we do find a variety of loosely joined sets of public and private
corporate actors, possibly located at different levels, who cooperate in the interest of
solving some specific problem. International regimes, considered as informal or even
institutionalized systems of negotiation (Ruggie 2004, 501), join national and
international political actors, private corporate actors both of the economic and public
welfare type, and scientific experts, to agree on a set of norms, standards, or ways of
acting in a specified policy field. Many of these regimes are in the field of
environmental policy, e.g. climate control and the protection of natural resources;
others have been in the area of human rights. Another type of network involved in
global public policy-making are the trisectoral networks analyzed by Reinicke and
Witte (1999). Trisectoral networks are composed of a private international
organization (often a NGO of the public welfare type), representatives of some public
authority (a UN agency or some other intergovernmental organization), and actors
from the economy (international business associations or multinational corporations). 3
One example of such networks is the Roll Back Malaria Initiative, where the WHO,
the World Bank, UNICEF, several big firms, and several NGO work together. Still
another form of global network has been studied under the title “private governance”
(Cutler 2002). Here transnational corporations (TNC) and global business
associations, often in interaction with public welfare NGOs, institute not only new
accounting standards, but also eco-labelling and other forms of certification to prove
the social responsibility of participating firms. A famous example of such an
agreement of firms, many of them TNC, to comply with socially responsible
principles is the Global Social Compact, entered into by several hundred firms,
several UN agencies, and several large NGOs (Ruggie 2004, 514-516).

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“These actors who in the global context often remain separate and opposed to each other realize that
they depend on each other to reach their respective goals and agree to collaborate in a loose, informal
network structure….The trisectoral networks we witness today emerged in the shadow of traditional
multilateralism. Each network arose out of a special constellation of interests and actors making use of
a ‘window of opportunity’. There is no master plan of formal coordination. (Reinicke/Witte 1999, 13-
14).

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All of these different networks belong to the category of global public policy
networks (GPP) analyzed by Reinicke and Deng (2000). GPP vary in composition and
function. Transnational advocacy networks pressure states and international
organizations to address specific policy issues; their main function is agenda setting.
Negotiating a policy decision or standard is a second major function; advocacy
networks may, but do not necessarily evolve into such policy-making networks. A
third major function of GPP can be the implementation of decisions taken. The core
feature of global public policy networks is the collaboration between individual states,
international organizations, civil society, and the private economic sector. This might
serve as template for a governance structure to manage the transition to sustainable
development – provided the conditions of effective operation pointed out by
governance theory can be met.

To begin with, policy networks do not evolve spontaneously, they must be formed;
diffuse interests in particular must first be organized. That may need a policy
entrepreneur. In the case of sustainable development, public welfare NGOs may
appear the most likely candidate for the role of entrepreneur forming a public policy
network; after all, public welfare NGOs do represent global public interests and
promote attitudinal changes favourable to public welfare goals (Price 2003). As again
Grundmann (1999) has shown, the task of a public welfare entrepreneur is easier if
there is a valid general norm that can be appealed to. But sustainable development is
not a globally shared priority value. Nor are NGOs the born advocates of global
welfare simply because they do not represent the particularistic interest of a specific
group. They are not necessarily representative of widely shared interests, having a
biased “Western” view of sustainable development. Hence their legitimacy as well as
their capacity to assure compliance is limited.

Turning to the composition of a “sustainability network”, NGOs would obviously

have to be included, even if for the reasons just mentioned the positive effect of NGO-
participation in policy networks is easily overestimated (Weidner 2004). Obviously
state authorities and international organizations would have to participate, though the
role they would play in a “sustainability network” is ambivalent. Political actors are
essential because they must implement any new norms, they must regulate, monitor,
provide incentives, and control compliance. Effective regulation requires that
international agreements worked out by (predominantly Western) states and some
NGOs are translated all the way down to the local level, where the perspective is
much narrower. This is exceedingly difficult. It can, moreover, not even be expected
that state representatives, acting independently or within international organizations,
spontaneously advocate global welfare goals. States seek primarily to promote their
own national interest in international negotiations, whether this is defined by the
power considerations of their political elite or shaped by domestic demands, for
instance by a major national industry.

To bring state actors around to support sustainable development is therefore no lesser

challenge than to convince potent economic actors, firms and particularly
transnational corporation (TNC). Yet the inclusion of corporate economic actors in a
global public policy network is crucial if they are important problem producers.
Successful governance requires that those who would loose the benefits they derive
from the present situation must be part of the governance structure, forcing them to

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face directly the advocates of those who presently bear the negative impacts, and
negotiate with them. But it should be difficult to bring economic and political actors
who currently derive benefits from violating sustainability to participate in a policy
network aiming at sustainable development. Participation in a policy network means
to accept the interests of all other participants as legitimate, and to orient oneself at
the solution of a collective problem, even if that means to forego individual benefits.
This is the basic condition if problem-solving is to supersede mere bargaining
(Mayntz 1993).

Could a “sustainability network” including such diverse actors agree on a mission and
move from advocacy to negotiation? Negotiation between opposed interests can be
successful if it is possible to change interest perceptions and normative beliefs, so that
a collective goal is finally accepted by all participants. Here the “new modes” of
governance, i.e. arguing, persuasion, naming and shaming may be important, but they
do not suffice. In the case of fluorocarbon control, the pro-regulation coalition won
out when the major opponent of regulation, DuPont, changed sides. Trusting that it
could not be proven scientifically that fluorocarbons cause appreciable damage,
DuPont had committed itself publicly to stop fluorocarbon production should their
damage be scientifically established. When this was finally the case, the fear of image
loss and the fear of being involved in costly indemnity suits brought against the firm
from skin cancer victims let DuPont turn into an advocate of regulation. In addition to
identity considerations, it was the perceived material interest that brought DuPont to
change its mind. (Grundmann 1999, 312-314)

Science can obviously play a crucial role in changing perceptions. Certainty in the
diagnosis of a “bad”, and belief in the effectiveness of costly coping measures can
contribute importantly to attitudinal change. In the case of fluorocarbon control, the
active participation of scientists in the developing policy network has been decisive.
To affect actor orientations, science must credibly show that the continuation of a
given practice will cause deleterious effects for all in the long run. This may be more
difficult for sustainable development than it has been in the case of fluorocarbon
control, where the visibly growing “ozone hole” gave credibility to scientific analysis.
More importantly even, the fluorocarbon case also suggests that without a change in
their perceived material interests, those who presently stand in the way of sustainable
development will not change their behaviour voluntarily. Inability to change the
interests of powerful problem producers thus poses a strict limit to the problem-
solving potential of negotiation in networks characterized by opposed interests, and
by an asymmetric power structure that privileges the opponents of change.

The biggest obstacle to the formation of a global public policy network dealing with
the issue of sustainable development is, however, not the existence of massive
conflicts of interest between unequal partners, but the composite nature of the
problem. All of the GPP mentioned in the survey by Reinicke and Deng (2000)
address narrowly defined problems. Sustainable development, in contrast, is a
composite problem, cutting across a number of different policy fields. Of course there
are other composite problems such as “social responsibility” or “clean air”, but these
are cognitively decomposable and involve mainly one, more or less clearly
circumscribed, target group of regulation. The impairment of sustainable development
is the joint effect of several different causal structures that can hardly be attacked by
the actors in only one policy network. Different problem components involve

11
different industries, different public authorities and intergovernmental organizations,
and different NGOs – and they require knowledge from different scientific
disciplines. There is abundant evidence that individual problem components of
sustainable development can be attacked, even if success is limited; the Global Water
Partnership mentioned by Reinicke and Witte (1999), the Global Compact analyzed
by Ruggie (2004), the Forest Stewardship Council (Cashore/Auld/Newsom 2004),
and the Global Mining Initiative, according to Weidner (2004, 390) the most exacting
dialogue about sustainable development ever held in an industrial sector, are just a
few examples. But for a comprehensive approach to sustainable development, these
different initiatives would have to be combined.

The only governance structure adapted to such a problem might be a network of

networks - tying in various specialized regimes, linked to existing international
organizations, and with firm roots in the more powerful states. But such a macro-
network would suffer, if it could ever be formed, from strong centrifugal tendencies.
The lack of a global institutional framework in which actors are positioned constrains
international actors, especially private organizations, to build variable coalitions. The
structurally fragmented context puts a premium on adaptability, on flexibility ex post
rather than on trust that is given ex ante. The general climate of fluidity, volatility,
uncertainty, and multiple opportunities impedes the formation of stable links. While
Reinicke and Deng (2000, 65-89) discuss network management, they have no
promising strategies to offer for holding a network of networks together since this
type of GPP is never considered in their survey. It is, in fact, difficult to conceive of a
network manager who could coordinate and hold a sustainability network-of-networks
together in the absence of a widely shared, firm belief in the necessity of a transition
to sustainable development. To create this belief may be the challenge to be
confronted first of all. At this point, however, governance theory could offer no help,
and a different body of theory would have to be consulted.

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