Esherick 1990

Acting Out Democracy: Political Theater in Modern China
Author(s): Joseph W. Esherick and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom

Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Nov., 1990), pp. 835-865
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
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Acting Out Democracy:
PoliticalTheater
in ModernChina
JOSEPH W. ESHERICK and
JEFFREY N. WASSERSTROM
FOR TWO AND A HALF monthsin the springof 1989, China's studentactorsdomi-
nated the world stage of moderntelecommunications. Their massivedemonstra-
tions, the hungerstrikeduringGorbachev'svisit, and the dramaticappearanceof
the Goddess of Democracycapturedthe attentionof an audiencethatspannedthe
globe. As we writein mid-1990, the movementand its bloody suppressionhave
alreadyproducedan enormousbody of literature-fromeyewitnessaccountsby
journalists(Morrison1989; Zhaoqiang, Gejing and Siyuan 1989) and special issues
of scholarlyjournals(Australian
JournalofChineseAffairsNos. 23, 24; The Fletcher
ForumofWorldAffairs14.4), to pictorialhistories(Turnleyand Turnley1989) and
documentary collections
(Han 1990; Wu 1989), and, mostrecently,
textbookchapters
(Spence 1990) and analyticalworks (Feigon 1990; Nathan 1990)-tracing the
developmentof China's crisis.Despite a floodof materialtoo massiveto reviewin
the presentcontext,we still lack a convincinginterpretiveframework that places
theeventswithinthe contextof China'smodernpoliticalevolution,and also provides
a way to compareChina's experienceto that of EasternEurope. Such an interpre-
tationshouldhelp us to understandwhymassivepublic demonstrations spurredan
JosephW. Esherickis Professor of Historyat the Universityof California,San Diego.

JeffreyN. Wasserstromis AssistantProfessor of Historyat the University of Kentucky.
As befitsan essaythatcontinuallycrossesdisciplinarylines betweenhistoryand anthro-
pology,thisarticleis based upon the authors'firsthand observationas well as upon written
and pictorialsources.JosephEsherickwas in Xi'an, Ji'nan and NorthernShaanxi during
the springof 1989, and Jeffrey Wasserstromwas in Shanghaiin December 1986. Where
no additionalcitationis given, informationon these times and places came frompersonal
observationor discussionswith participants.For additionaldetail, see Esherick1990 and
Wasserstrom1991: Epilogue.
The authorswould like to thankthe followingforsharingthoughts,criticisms,recol-
lectionsand/orunpublishedpapers:Jeffrey Cody, Dru Gladney,JamesHevia, David Jordan,
BarryNaughton,Michel Oksenberg,Elizabeth Perry,FrankPieke, HenryRosemont,Jr.,
Clark Sorensen,FredericWakeman,Jr. and two anonymousreaders.Audiencesat the Uni-
versityof Michigan, Universityof Washington,Universityof California,San Diego, and
the Universityof Oregon providedhelpfulcommentson an earlierversionof this article.
Grants fromthe Committeeon ScholarlyCommunicationwith the PRC and Fulbright-
Hayes supportedtheauthors'researchin China, and a grantfromtheUniversity ofKentucky
helped make the writingof this articlepossible.
TheJournal
ofAsianStudies
49, no. 4 (November 1990):835-865.
C) 1990 by the AssociationforAsian Studies, Inc.
835

836 ESHERICK AND WASSERSTROM
evolutiontowarddemocraticgovernancein EasternEurope, but in China led only

to the massacreofJune 3-4 and the presentera of politicalrepression.
None of themostfrequently mentionedcharacterizations of the movementseem
trulyadequate. The Chineseleadership,forexample,has portrayedboth the 1989
movementand its predecessorof 1986-87 as manifestations of "bourgeoisliberal-
ism," or acts of luan (chaos) reminiscentof the Red Guards in the CulturalRevo-
lution,or somecombination of the two (Han 1990:83-103; CQ Chronicle1989:672;
on 1986-7: ChinaNewsAnalysis1328 (1 February1987):8; Renmin ribao,December
25, 1986). But if the 1989 protestswerethe resultof "bourgeois"contamination,
why was the most prominentanthemof the studentdemonstrators "The Interna-
tionale," and why did protesterscarrypicturesof Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai
(Orleans 1989; San Francisco Chronicle,May 19, 1989)?
Officialcharacterizations of recentprotestsas acts of luan and Red Guardism
are even moredeeplyflawed.Protestersunquestionablycommitteddisorderlyacts
in both 1986 and 1989, and therewere certainlycontinuitiesbetweenthe 1960s
and the 1980s in studenttactics(e.g., the use of wall postersand the insistence
upon freetrainpassage to Beijing) in part because some young teachersadvising
the studentswere formerRed Guards. Yet most foreignobserverswere impressed
by the disciplineand orderlinessof the students(Forster1990; Fox 1990; Pieke
1989). The prominentrole of marchmonitors,the securityforcesthat maintained
orderin TiananmenSquare, the student"arrest"of youthsfordefacinga portrait
of Mao-these activitieshardlysuggestan atmosphereof luan. The completelack
of eitheranti-Westernrhetoricor devotionalloyaltyto any living CCP leader by
the studentsof the late eightiesmakesall analogieswiththe Red Guardsextremely
tenuous.
The analysesoffered by Westernsocial scientists,foreignjournalistsand Chinese
dissidents,thoughconsiderably morepersuasivethanthe officialCCP line, are also
problematic.Many, especiallythe professionalPekingologistsof political science,
stressthe role that powerstrugglesbetweenLi Peng and Zhao Ziyang played in
shapingthe 1989 events(Dittmer 1990; Gong 1990; Feigon 1990). There is no
doubt that internaldivisionsparalyzedthe partyleadershipin April and May,
preventing an effective responseto thedemonstrators. But at the startof the move-
ment, one of the protesters'most commonabusive rhymesin Beijing and Tianjin
was "Ziyang,Ziyang,xingebuliang"(Zhao Ziyang,Zhao Ziyang,you are not a good
man; Fox 1990:139) and as late as May 19th(long afterthe Voice of Americaand
BBC broadcastshad been focusingon the Li-Zhao conflict)the protesters'posters
and slogansin Xi'an still had two centraltargets:Deng Xiaopingand Zhao Ziyang.
Corruptionin Zhao's immediatefamilymade him so unpopularthatit is impossible
to see him successfully manipulatingthe movementforhis own ends. Indeed, like
Hu Yaobang beforehim, Zhao Ziyang became a hero only after(and to a large
'Although the officialrhetorichad some effectin alienatingsupportforthe students

in 1986, such CulturalRevolutionimagerywas much less effective in 1989, in partbecause
the studentsconfrontedthe officialline head on. They demandedthatthe leadershipapolo-
gize forlabeling the movementa formof dongluan(turmoil)-a termthat has become a
code wordforthe CulturalRevolution(CQ Chronicle1989:677; Yi and Thompson1989:28).
For a contrastbetweenRed Guard uses of Mao picturesand those of 1989 students,see
Orleans 1989. The Mao honoredin 1989 was the selflesshero of the pre-1949 yearsand
the earlydays of the PRC, not the demigod of the Cultural Revolution. As one worker
fromHubei put it: "At least Mao was honest . . . He even sent his son to the Korean
War. Nowadays, the leaderssend theirsons to America"(San Francisco Chronicle,May 19,
1989:A24).

POLITICAL THEATER IN MODERN CHINA 837
degreebecause) he was ousted frompowerby the alliance of hard-liners and party

eldersaroundDeng.
The Westernpressand Chinesedissidentsabroadusuallycharacterize theevents
of China's springas a "democracymovement."There is no questionthat "minzhu"
was frequently invokedin theprotesters' bannersand slogans,but it would be hasty
to associateminzhu(literally:"rule of the people") with any conventionalWestern
notionof democracy.Consider,forexample,Wuer Kaixi's wordsin the televised
dialogue withLi Peng on May 18th. Earlyin the meeting,Wuer Kaixi explained
what it would take to get studentsto leave TiananmenSquare: "If one fasting
classmaterefusesto leave the square,the otherthousandsof fastingstudentson the
square will not leave." He was explicitabout the principlebehind this decision:
"On the square, it is not a matterof the minorityobeyingthe majority,but of
99.9 percentobeying0.1 percent"(Zhaoqiang et al. 1989:204). This may have
been good politics-and Wuer Kaixi certainlymade powerfultheater-but it was
not democracy.
The hunger-striking studentsin TiananmenSquareadopteda positiondesigned
to preservetheirunityand enhancetheirleveragewith the government.But in
elevatingthe principleof unityabove thatof majorityrule,theywereactingwithin
the traditionof popularrule(minzhu)thinkingin modernChina. When Sun Yatsen
assumedthe presidencyof the Republic of China in January1912, his messageto
the revolutionary paper Minlibaowas a simple slogan (in English): "'Unity' is our
watchword"-not "democracy"or "republicanism,"but "unity" (Sun Zhongshan
xiansheng huace 1986: plate 199). Closer to the present,the dissidentmagazine
Enlightenmentwrotein 1979 of the miraculouseffectsthat the "fire"of democracy
would have on the Chinesepeople:
The firewillenablepeoplecompletely to shakeoffbrutality
andhatred,andthere
will be no quarrelamongthem.Theywill sharethesameviewsand principles
and haveidenticalideals.In loftyand harmoniousunitytheywillproduce,live,
think,pioneer,and exploretogether.Withthesedynamic forces
theywillenrich
theirsociallifeand cultivate
theirbig earth.
(Citedin Nathan1985:6)
While Westerndemocraticnotionsare normallylinked to pluralismand the free

competitionof divergentideas, minzhuin China is herelinkedto a visionin which
people will "sharethe same views" and have "identicalideals." It is thus difficult
to analyzethe eventsof China's 1989 springas a "democraticmovement"in the
pluralistsense of the term.2
Nor do the wordsand deeds of the protestersof either 1986-87 or 1989 fit
easilywithmoreradicalWesternideas ofdirector participatory democracy.In many
cases the studentsseem to have read the minin minzhuin a limitedsense to refer
not to thepopulaceat largebut mainlyor exclusivelyto the educatedelite ofwhich
theyare part. This elitistreadingof minzhuwas clear in the wall postersthatap-
peared in Shanghaiin December 1986, manyof which took theirlead fromthe
2Althoughhis ChineseDemocracy is repletewith usefulexamplesof the sort just cited,

Nathan seems blind to this issue, and concludes with a quite unsupporteddiscussionof
"the West's-and the Chinese democrats'-identificationof democracywith pluralism"
(1985:227). The stressthatChinesedissidentscontinuedto place on a noncompetitive unity
in 1989 is clear fromone of the students'earliestdemands: that the Chinese leadership
affirmthevirtuesof "democracy,freedom,magnanimity and harmony" (CQ Chronicle1989:
668 [emphasisours)).

speechesFang Lizhi gave at the city'sTongji University earlierthatyear.The main

themein theseposters,as in Fang's lecturesand writings(Kraus 1989), was not
thatthe CCP should be moreresponsiveto the ideas of China's masses,but rather
thatit shouldallow the intelligentsiaa greatervoice in nationalaffairs.This elitist
straincarriedoverintostudenttacticsin 1986: at one point,whenShanghaiworkers
came out to supporttheirprotesting"youngerbrothers,"the studentstold them
just to go home.
The situationin 1989 was somewhatdifferent,sinceat timesthestudentsactively
sought(and received)the supportof nonintelligentsia groups. Nonetheless,some
educatedyouthscontinuedto see democraticreforms in elitistterms.For example,
two foreignobserversfoundFujian students"horrified at the suggestionthat truly
popularelectionswould have to includepeasants,who would certainlyoutvoteedu-
cated people like themselves"(Erbaughand Kraus 1990:153). Otherreports(e.g.,
Forster1990:98) highlightstudentdistrustof the laobaixingor untutoredmasses
(a distrustsymbolizedby groupsofstudentswho ropedthemselves offfrombystand-
ers duringsome marches),and the intelligentsia's lack of concernforthe needs of
workersand peasants(Chan and Unger 1990). Westerncriticsand Chinesedissi-
dentsalike have takenleadersof the movementto task forbehavingin nondemo-
craticand elitistways, both at the time of the occupationof TiananmenSquare
and duringthe formation of new protestleagues in exile.3
The precedingcommentsdo not mean that therewas nothing"democratic"
about the movement.Clearly,therewas a greatdeal about the protests-the calls
forfreedomof speech,the demandsformorepopularinput into the way China is
governed-that Westernersassociatewith the term"democracy."We do not wish
to implythatChinesearesomehowincapableofunderstanding or actinguponWestern
conceptsof democracy.Nor do we wish to implythat a Chinese movementmust
meeta stringent set of contemporaryWesternstandardsbeforeit can earnthe acco-
lade "DemocracyMovement."Afterall, as Donald Price (1989) has observed,we
considermanyWesternstatesto have been "democratic"long beforetheyreached
the stageof universalsuffrage. The pointwe do wish to stressis simplythat,given
thevariouscontoursof meaningthe termminzhuhad in 1989, labelingthe protests
a "DemocracyMovement"does not take us veryfarin our effortto make senseof
the movement.In some cases, in fact,it obfuscatesmorethan it clarifies.
China's Springas PoliticalTheater
It would seem thata moreproductiveway to understandthe eventsof April-

June, 1989, is to view themas an exercisein politicaltheater.Scholarsas diverse
as E. P. Thompson(1974, 1978) and CliffordGeertz(1980), workingon political
systemsas dissimilaras eighteenth-centuryEngland and nineteenth-century Bali,
have demonstratedthe value of interpreting politics in theatricalterms,i.e., as
3Note this May 1989 exchangebetweena youth, barredfromboardinga bus where

Wuer Kaixi was resting,and a studentsecurityguard. " 'What kind of democracyis this?'
[the youth]fumed. 'What kind of freedom?You are just like the country'sleaders.' Re-
spondedthe guard: 'You are right.But you are harmingour unity.Don't say such things'"
(Newsweek, May 29, 1989, 21; cf. Lubman 1989). Criticismsof the new exile leaguesappear
in Chan and Kwong 1990; and Chan and Unger 1990. Rosemont(1990) notesthe influence
that the "new authoritarianism"has had in Chinese dissidentcircles.

symbol-ladenperformances whose efficacylies largelyin theirpowerto move spe-

cificaudiences.This approachwould seem ideallysuitedforanalysisof the Chinese
protestsof 1989. As essentiallynonviolentdemonstrations thatposed no directeco-
nomicor physicalthreatto China's rulers,the powerof the protestsderivedalmost
exclusivelyfromtheirpotencyas performances whichcould symbolically undermine
the regime'slegitimacyand move membersof largerand economicallymorevital
classesto take sympathetic action.
A numberof the moreinsightfulanalystsof the Chineseprotestsof 1989 have
alreadyhighlightedthe importanceof symbolismand role playing. Frank Pieke
(1989, 1990) analyzesthe "ritualized"qualityof theprotestactionsand the signifi-
cance of audienceparticipationin the Chinese marches.PerryLink has compared
the petitioningat TiananmenSquare to "morallychargedBeijing opera" (cited in
Strand1990:30-31). In a relatedvein, Dru Gladney(1990) and Lucien Pye (1990)
have interpreted the symbolicimplicationsof a varietyof studentactionsand texts,
and David Strand(1990) uses theatricalmetaphorsto capturethe mood and explain
the impactof studentdemonstrations in Beijing since 1919. Our goal is to expand
on thesethemesand to place theeventsof 1989 in a largerhistoricaland theoretical
context.In particular, it seemsimportant to examinetherelationship betweenpolitical
theaterand ritual-a more tightlyprescribedformof culturalperformance which
was so vital to the governanceof imperialChina.
What, then,was thepoliticaltheaterof 1989? Firstof all, it was streettheater:
untitled,improvisational, with constantlychangingcasts. Though fluid in form,
it nevertheless followedwhat Charles Tilly (1978) calls a historicallyestablished
"repertoire"ofcollectiveaction.This meansthat,evenwhenimprovising, protesters
workedfromfamiliar"scripts"whichgave a commonsenseofhow to behaveduring
a given action, whereand when to march,how to expresstheirdemands,and so
forth.Some ofthesescriptsoriginatedin thedistantpast, emergingout oftraditions
of remonstrance and petition stretchingback for millennia. More were derived
(consciouslyand unconsciously)fromthe steadystreamof student-ledmass move-
mentsthat have takenplace since 1919. Thus, forexample,when youthsparaded
fromschoolto schoolin 1989, carryingbannersemblazonedwiththe nameof their
alma maters,and called on studentsat otherinstitutions to join theirfighttojiuguo
(save the nation),theywerefollowingcloselyin the footstepsof theMay 4th Move-
ment'sparticipantsand otherRepublican-eraprotesters (Strand1990; Wasserstrom
1990a).
State ritualsand officialceremoniessupplied otherpotentialscripts(cf. Tilly
1986:116-17). The April 22nd funeralmarchin memoryof Hu Yaobang was a
classic example of studentsusurpinga state ritual, improvisingupon an official
scriptto make it servesubversive ends. Chinesefunerals-especially thoseof wealthy
and/or politicallyimportantfigures-have always been key momentsforpublic
ritual(Pye 1990:333-37). As newspaperaccountsofearlytwentieth-century funeral
processionsshow, theseceremonieswerean importantopportunity forelite families
to displaytheirstatus,withmusiciansand hiredmourners joiningfamilyand friends
carefullyorderedby age, gender,and social statusin a symbolicrepresentation of
the proper social order (NCH, November 19, 1902:1076-77; November 24,
1917:467-68). In the PRC, memorialservicesforimportantpoliticalleadersare a
criticalpolitical moment,and the compositionof funeralcommitteesis carefully
scrutinizedforclues to changingpoliticalalignments(Watson and Rawski 1988).
Here is politicalritualwith all the liminalitythat VictorTurner'sconceptionre-
quires: transitionbetweentwo preferably stable political states, and thus highly
dangerous(Turner1969).

The particulardangerin the case ofpoliticalfuneralsarisesfromthe possibility

that unauthorizedpeople will usurpthe ritualand rewritethe scriptinto political
theaterof theirown. The most famouspreviousexampleof this was, in fact,not
quite a funeral,but the Qingmingremembrance thatfollowedsoon afterthe death
of Zhou Enlai in 1976 (Yan and Gao 1986:586-640). It producedthe first"Tian-
anmenIncident"in which thousandsof Beijing residentsused the opportunity to
pay theirrespectsto Zhou and, in the process,level a varietyof directand indirect
attackson theGang ofFour. Criticalto thenatureofsuch ceremoniesis theauthori-
ties' inabilityto prohibitthem: theyare politicallyrequiredritualsof respectfor
revolutionary heroes. But when studentsusurp the ritual, they can turn it into
political theater.Thus the funeralmarchbecomesa demonstration. Though they
marchbehindmemorialwreathsto the deceasedand carrytheirofficialschoolban-
ners,theyalso chantslogansand hoist signs with theirown politicalmessages.
Marchesof thissortinevitablylead to thecentralsquareofthecity.That square
normallyfacestheseat ofgovernment authority, whichis also likelyto be thevenue
foran officialmemorialservice.At thispoint,thedemonstration becomesa petition
movement.The mostdramaticwas thepetitionof 1989 presentedby threestudents
kneelingon the stepsof the GreatHall of the People. The symbolismof thispeti-
tion was important,forit demandedan explanationof the backgroundto Hu Yao-
bang's resignationas GeneralSecretary of the Partyin 1987. This demandfocused
on the factthat the partyleaderswho were orchestrating the officialceremonies
insidethe Great Hall werepreciselythe men who had removedHu Yaobang from
power. Thus the streettheaterunmaskedthe hypocrisyof the officialritual,and
revealedthestudentson thestreetsto be thetrueheirsofthelegacyofHu Yaobang.
In the end, the officiallyrequiredritual,once capturedby the studentactors,be-
comes the mechanismforattackingthe authorities.4
Once the public stage has been captured,the streetactorsare all the morefree
to writetheirown script. In Beijing, theyprovedextraordinarily creative.They
successfully upstagedtwo more state rituals:on the seventiethanniversary of the
May 4th Movement,the party'sformalcommemorations paled beforethe students'
protestmarches;and in mid-May, the welcomingrally studentsheld for Gor-
bachev-complete with signs bearingslogans in Russian and Chinese-stole the
thunderfromthe officialceremoniesof the summit.One reasonforthe successof
these protests,and forthe relativeweaknessof the officialritualstheymocked,
came fromtheirrespectivesettings.Throughoutmuch of May, studentswere in
full controlof Beijing's symboliccenter,TiananmenSquare. The government was
forcedto hold its gatheringsin less public and/orless powerfulvenues-the Great
Hall of the People forMay 4th, the airportto welcomeGorbachev.
The grouphungerstrikelaunchedin Beijing in mid-May,whichwas replicated
in severalothercitieswithindays, was anotherstrokeof creativegenius. Although
dissidentofficialsin imperialtimesoccasionallyrefusedfoodto show theirdisplea-
surewith a ruler(Watson 1989; Pye 1990:341-42), and at least one Republican-
4This patternis hardlyunique to China. Comparethis accountof a demonstration by

tensof thousandsof youthson November17, 1989, in Prague. It was one of the keyevents
leadingto the fallof the Communistgovernment in Czechoslovakia."The memorialforJan
Opletal, the studentkilled by the Nazis, was sponsoredby the officialstudentorganization
but was transformed into a demonstration forfreedom,political change and the dismissal
of the CommunistPartyleader,Milos Jakes"(New YorkTimes[nationaledition]November
18, 1989). Needless to say,Czechoslovakia-wherethe theatersweretransformed intohead-
quartersof the democraticopposition,and a playwright,Vaclav Havel, was elected Presi-
dent-is an excellentplace to look forexamplesof political theater.

era labor dispute involveda hungerstrike(Elizabeth Perry,personalcommunica-

tion), this kind of group fastwas not a centralelementin the Chinese student
protestrepertoireuntil the influentialone performedin Hunan in 1980 (Yi and
Thompson 1989:42-44). Its use in 1989, by studentswho comparedtheirstrike
to thoseof dissidentsin othernations(Yi and Thompson:172; Newsweek, May 29,
1989:21) showedhow internationalized modelsfordissenthad become. This hun-
ger strikeproveda potentpiece of politicaltheaterand earnedthe protesters enor-
mous public sympathy.
The placementof the Goddess of Democracyin TiananmenSquare-directly
betweentwo sacredsymbolsof the Communistregime,a giantportraitof Mao and
theMonumentto thePeople'sHeroes-was anotherpowerful pieceoftheater.Though
Westernjournalistsoftentreatedthis twenty-eight footicon as a simple copy of
the Statue of Liberty,and the Chinese governmentinsistedthat this was so, the
goddess was in realitya more complex symbolcombiningWesternand Chinese
motifs,some employedreverently, othersironically(Yi and Thompson 1989:72;
Han 1990:342-48). Some featuresof the goddessdid resemblethe Statueof Liber-
ty-an exactreplicaof whichwas carriedthroughShanghaiin mid-May(New York
TimesMagazine,June4, 1989:28), but otherscalled to mindtraditional Bodhisattva,
and even the socialist-realist
sculpturesof revolutionaryheroesfoundin Tiananmen
Square. It was also, as Dru Gladney(1990) notes,reminiscent of the giant statues
of Mao thatwerecarriedthroughthe squareduringsome National Day paradesof
the sixties(ChinaReconstructs,December 1966, 3; BeijingReview,October3, 1969,
7). A potentpasticheof importedand nativesymbolism,the goddessappearedin
the square just as the movementwas flagging,bringingnew crowdsof supporters
and onlookersto the area.
Streettheaterof this sortalso is dangerousbecause it is impossibleto control
the cast. As noted above, studentstriedat times to keep the laobaixingat arm's
length,but this was not alwayspossible,and in manycases organizersanxiousto
swell the numberof protesters encouragedbystanders fromall walksof lifeto join
the crowd. Inevitably,this attractedmembersof the floatingpopulationof youths
who had been in and out of troublewith the stateapparatus.Mistreatedby public
securitymen in the past, manyboregrudgestheywereanxiousto settle.It appears
that theseyoungmen were responsibleforsome of the violencethat brokeout as
earlyas April 22nd in Xi'an and Changsha,and on June 3rd in Beijing.
Once one recognizesthe movementas an instanceof political theater,it be-
comestemptingto ratethe performances. One of the best acts was put on by Wuer
Kaixi in the May 18th dialogue with Li Peng. The costumingwas important:he
appearedin his hospitalpajamas. So, too, was the timing:he upstagedthe Premier
by interrupting him at the verystart.And props: laterin the session,he dramati-
callypulled out a tube insertedintohis nose(foroxygen?)in orderto makea point.
Especiallyforthe young people in the nationwidetelevisionaudience, it was an
extraordinarily powerfulperformance.
For older viewers,perhapsthe most rivetingact was performed on May 20th
when the CCTV news announcerXue Fei read the officialmartiallaw announce-
ment.Again, costumingwas important:he woreall black, the suit apparentlybor-
rowedforthe occasion. He read the announcement frombeginningto end without
liftinghis eyesfromthepage, in a perfectimitationof the tonereservedforfuneral
eulogies. Xue Fei's performance was witnessed,understood,and rememberedby
televisionviewersthroughoutthe country.
In anyperformance, the audienceis critical.In streettheater,audiencepartici-
pation alwaysbecomespart of the drama, and this was certainlytrue in Beijing

and othercitiesin 1989 (Niming 1990; Pieke 1989). First,citizenslinedtheparade

routeto applaud the studentdemonstrators. Then, therewerebannersannouncing
support,and standsset up to providefoodand drink.By the end, the nonstudent
crowdshad been fullydrawninto the act, as the citizensof Beijing came out in
forceto block the army'sentranceto the cityafterthe declarationof martiallaw.
Televisionprovideda powerfulnew dimensionto the movement'saudienceap-
peal. Most obviously,with the world pressgatheredforthe Gorbachevvisit, the
demonstrators gained a global audience. That audience certainlyhelped dissuade
the regimefroman earlyuse of forceagainstits critics,but the domestictelevision
audiencewas at least as important.Throughit, by mid-May,Chinese acrossthe
countrydirectlywitnessedthe scale of the massivedemonstrations in Beijing, and
that knowledgeemboldenedyoungpeople to launch theirown protestmarchesin
cities acrossChina. Furthermore, the Beijing demonstrators were keenlyaware of
the power of this new medium as theyshowed throughtheirdemand fora live
broadcastof theirdialogue with the government.As a political mode, theateris
onlyas powerfulas theaudiencethatit can move;and thistheatercertainlyinspired
and energizedhundredsof millionsof people in China and acrossthe world.
As ritualand theater,the actionsof demonstrators naturallycall forthcertain
responsesfromthe authorities,and the efficacyof officialperformance is substan-
tiallydependenton how well theyplay these roles. The partyleadership'sfailure
to acknowledgein any way the petitionof the studentskneelingon the steps of
the GreatHall was a majorviolationof ritual,and it significantly increasedpublic
angeragainstofficialarrogance.5 This is importantbecauserituallycorrectresponses
to earlierstudentpetitions-such as thosesubmittedin 1918 (the yearbeforeMay
4th) and 1931 (whenJapaninvadedManchuria)by youthsangeredby the Chinese
authorities'handlingofrelationswithJapan-had helpedto defusepotentiallyvola-
tile situations(NCH, June8, 1918, 571-572; Minguoribao,June 1 and 2, 1918;
Israel 1966:60-61 and passim).
The refusalto acknowledgethe studentpetitionin April was but the firstof
a seriesof unskillfulofficialperformances. When Li Peng was forcedto join the
televiseddialoguewiththe studentleaders,he was clearlyunsuitedforthe roleand
veryuncomfortable in it-and, predictably,he playedit verybadly. Later,thevisit
of Li, Zhao Ziyang and otherpartyleadersto the hospitalizedhungerstrikerswas
a rituallyrequiredact ofcompassion,thisone performed moreadroitly.The loyalist
ralliesthe partyorganizedin the Beijing suburbsduringthe week beforethe mas-
sacrewereremarkable, but farless effective,
acts of officialtheater:participantstold
Westernjournaliststhat officialshad instructedthem to take part, and televised
coverageof the eventsshoweda mixtureof bored,unhappy,and embarrassed faces
(San FranciscoChronicle, June 1, 1989, A21-25). Even the tanksofJune4th were
a kind of theater.One does not choose tanksfortheirefficacy in crowdcontrol-
this was a performance designed to show irresistiblepower. It was a bad act, but
the videotapeswere skillfullyedited and played over and over for the domestic
televisionaudience.
Forofficialtheater,however,nothingwas moreimportantthantheritualbiaotai
thatfollowedthe movement'ssuppression.These public statements ofposition(and
here the only permissibleposition was one in favorof the regime) began with
5Among thestudents,therewassignificant
criticism
ofthekneeling petitioners'
servile
posture.But it appearsthatbyadoptingthistraditional
ritual,thepetitioners
gainedsub-
stantialsympathy fromthegeneralpopulace.(See Lianhebao1989:60-61.)

provincialleaders, regionalmilitarycommands,and functionalministriesof the

nationalgovernment.Rebroadcaston nationaltelevisionand reportedin the press,
theyannouncedthe speed with which the constituentpartsof the state apparatus
fell in behindthe new partyleadership.These biaotaiof partyand militaryelites
werefollowedby similarperformances in schools,factories,researchinstitutes,and
administrative bodies acrossthe nationas virtuallyeveryurbancitizenwas required
to accountforhis or her actionssince April and publiclyannouncesolidaritywith
the new hard-linepolicies. Biaotai is a special formof performance (biaoyan).the
participantswere clearlyacting-most were not sincere-and everyoneknew it.
They recitedmemorizedscripts,withkeyphrasesliftedfromarticlesand editorials
in People'sDaily. Because fewbelievedthe wordstheywereuttering,mostof these
biaotaiwere poorlyperformedand bad theater.But the regime'sunremittent in-
sistenceon thesebiaotaiperformances testifiesto the importanceof such theaterin
the Chinesepoliticalsystem.
It should be noted that politicallysensitivemembersof the Chinese public
recognizethe practicesdescribedabove as a formof theater.In theirview, politics
is a performance; and public politicalacts are ofteninterpreted in thatway. Thus,
forexample,a typicalreactionto Li Peng's speechannouncingmartiallaw was to
evaluateit as a performance, and the reviewswereuniformly bad: wordsweremis-
pronounced,the tone was too shrill,etc. As one Beijing intellectualput it: "He
should have been wearinga patch of whiteabove his nose'-the standardmakeup
of the buffoonin Beijing opera. Similarly,protesters at timesrepresentedLi as the
clownor villainin propagandaskitsbasedon traditional theatrical
forms.One Beijing
streetperformance (describedforus by HenryRosemont,Jr.) combinedcomiccross
talk with operaticmotifsto portraythe attemptsof a courtesan(representing Li
Peng) to flatter,appease, and therebygain the protectionof an old man (repre-
sentingDeng Xiaoping).
Metaphorsfromthe worldof the theaterare so much a partof the languageof
politics in modernChina (as elsewhere)that protestersand observerscontinually
adopted theatricalturnsof speech. When protestersattackedLi Peng and Deng
Xiaoping, theirslogansincluded"Li Peng xiatai!" (Li Peng, get offthe stage) and
"Xiaoping, Xiaoping, kuaixieXiatai!" (Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping, hurry
and get offthestage;Wu 1989:262, 267). Wheneverpreviouslylittle-known actors
assume a major political role, thereis discussionof who theirhoutai(backstage
managers)mightbe. And aftertheTiananmenincident,therewas significant debate
as to whetheror not it should be termeda "tragedy."6But the sense in whichthe
Chinesepeople see all thisas performance was mostpowerfully suggestedby a wise
old peasantfromnorthernShaanxiwho, when asked the difference betweenMao
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, simplylaughed and said, "They were just singing
opposingoperas(changduitaixi)!"
6MichelOksenberg provoked ourthinking on thispoint.It becameclearduringNixon's

November 1989visittoChinathatChineseandWestern connotationsoftheterm"tragedy"
werequitedifferent.Western notions,derivedfrom Greekdrama,link"tragedy" tounalter-
able fateand to some"tragicflaw"in thevictimof thetragedy. Thus,froma Western
perspective,callingtheeventsofJune3-4 a "tragedy" tendsto objectifythem,and even
to remove forthebloodshed
responsibility fromthehandsoftheChineseleadership. In this
sense,"tragedy" was an attemptto softentheimplications oftheterm"massacre"; and it
is perhapssignificantthatyearsearlier,Nixonhadhadno difficulty in termingthestudent
deathsat KentStatea "tragedy" (Sale 1973:638).But Chinese"tragedy" is closerto our
senseof "melodrama" and impliesa clearvillain-whichtheChineseleadership correctly
understood to be themselves.

Ritual and Theater
Our discussionto this point has used two termsto describepublic political
performances: "ritual" and "political theater."These termsreferto two distinct
genresofaction,thoughthe line demarkingthe two is not alwaysclear,sincemany
acts involvebothritualisticand theatricalelements(Schechner1976). Beforeexplor-
ing the grayarea whereritualand theateroverlap,we must distinguishthe two
ideal types,becausethe differing degreesto whicha politydependsupon and leaves
legitimatespace forone or theothergenrehaveprofoundimplicationsforthenature
of politics in that system.Thus the ritual-infused politics of imperialChina was
qualitativelydifferent fromChina's twentieth-century politics with its distinctive
politicaltheater.
Thereare almostas manydefinitions of ritualas thereare anthropologists. De-
finedmost loosely,the termincludesvirtuallyany "rule-governed" or "commu-
nicative"activity,in which case everythingfromstrictlyorderedcoronationsto
highlyimprovisational demonstrations would qualifyas politicalrituals(Lukes 1975;
Wasserstrom1989: Conclusion).We will use the termin a narrowersense here.
BorrowingheavilyfromCliffordGeertz (1973:87-125), we will defineritualsas
traditionally prescribedculturalperformances thatserveas modelsofand modelsfor
what people believe.
Such a definitionconformswell with the Confuciansense of "li," a termthat
is frequently translatedas "ritual."Li serveto supportand reinforce the statusquo,
bringingorderto a communityby reaffirming the distinctionsbetweenand bonds
connectingits individualmembers(Schwartz1985:67-68 and passim). Taking our
lead fromConfuciusand his followers,we will highlightthis system-maintenance
functionof ritual,a functionalso stressedby Durkheim(1915) and his followers.
We mustalso, however,take accountof criticsof the functionalist approachto
rituals,whichin the wordsof one writertreatsritualacts as "a sortof all-purpose
social glue" (Robin Horton, cited in Turner 1982:82). Again building upon the
workof Geertz(1975, 1980b), we will highlightthe symbolicnatureof ritualsas
acts with hiddenmeaningsthat need to be decoded. And followingVictorTurner
(1969, 1976, 1982), we will stressthe processualand dynamicnatureof rituals.
Accordingto Turner,while ritualsserveto confirmexistinghierarchicalrelations,
theserelationshipsare frequently suspendedor temporarily overturnedduringthe
ritualprocess.This createsa volatile and potentiallydangeroussituation:thereis
alwaysthe chance(as with Hu Yaobang's funeral)thatpeople will capitalizeupon
the instabilityor liminalityof the processand subvertit to otherends.
To put Turner'spoint anotherway, thereis alwaysthe chancethatpeople will
turna ritualperformance into an act of political theater.Centralto the notionof
ritual is the idea that only carefuladherenceto a traditionally prescribedformat
will ensurethe efficacy of the performance.7 With anydeparturefroma traditional
script,a ritualceases to be ritual. Ritual thus gives relativelylimitedplay to the
creativepowersof scriptwriters or actors,and as soon as participantsbreak away
fromtraditionalstructurestheiractionsbecome theatrical.Theater,by nature,is
71f,forexample,a priestat masswerejustto pourwineintoa chalice,dumpwafers

intoa bowl,and pass themaroundwithouttheproperwordsand gestures, transsubstan-
tiationwouldnotoccurand thecommunicants wouldnotpartakein thebodyand blood
of Christ.Schechner
uses the believedefficaciousness
of ritualsas the maincriterion
for
themfromtheatrical
differentiating performancesin hisessay,"FromRitualto Theaterand
Back."

more liberatedfromthe rigid constraintsof tradition,and providesautonomous

space forthe creativityof playwrights,directors,and actors. This gives theatera
criticalpowerneverpossessedby ritual:it can exposethe folliesof tradition(or the
folliesof abandoningtradition),mock social elites,or revealthe pain and suffering
of everydaylife(Turner 1982:52-55; Agnew 1986:103-112).
Althoughhe is talkingabout aesthetic theater(the formaldramasof the stage),
Turner(1982) makes additionaldistinctionsbetweentheaterand ritualwhichare
relevantto our moremetaphoricaluse of the term.8One such distinction,particu-
larlyimportantin the Chinesecontext,has to do with role playingand the audi-
ence. Role playingis centralto all ritual; and Chinese ritual is particularly con-
cernedto fix each individualin his or her propersocial role. Participationis by
invitationonly, and each participanthas a specifiedrole. Rituals separatepeople
into superiorand inferior,elder and younger,male and female.Accordingto the
Liji (Classic of Ritual), "without[rituals]. . . therewould be no meansof distin-
guishingthe positionsof rulerand subject,superiorand inferior, old and young."
But pairedwith thisrole forritualis the role thatConfuciansgive to music: music
unites.Thus theLiji notesthat1i "makefordifference and distinction,"but "(m)usic
makesforcommonunion" (ChapterI, 27:63 and 28:97-99; trans.in Fung 1952,
1:339, 343). It does so because it createsan undifferentiated audience,and that is
what theaterdoes as well. As a leading dramatictheoristwrites,"Theatercomes
intoexistencewhena separationoccursbetweenaudienceand performers" (Schech-
ner 1976:211). The homogeneityof the audience should not be overstressed, be-
cause different membersof the audiencemightidentify withdifferent characters or
respondto different themes.But in general,the relativelyundifferentiated audience
in theater(as opposed to the carefully stratified in ritual)enjoya shared
participants
experienceand may be drawn towarda commonidentity.At the veryleast, the
audience,in itsanonymity, is freedto interpretthedramaand identify withparticu-
lar roles as it wishes. This is quite different fromritual,which, by involvingall
the "audience"forceseach participantinto a prescribedrole and a particularplace
in the socio-politicalstructure.
Theater,then, is culturalperformance beforea mass audience. Politicaltheater
is theaterwhich expressesbeliefsabout the properdistributionand dispositionof
power and otherscarce resources.Unlike political rituals,which in our limited
definition alwaysperform a hegemonicfunction ofconfirming powerrelations, political
theateroftenchallengesor subvertsthe authority(in E. P. Thompson'sphrase,
"twiststhe tail") of rulingelites.9
While political theatercan be (and oftenis) counter-hegemonic, it is by no
meansalwaysso. Groupswithinthe rulingelite can use politicaltheaterto defend
theirpositionagainstattacksfrombelow or to maximizetheirpowervis-'a-visother
elite groups.The rowdyLondonstreetparadesby eighteenth-century supportersof
8Here, Geertz is less helpful.Althoughhe has writtenat lengthabout the "theater

state" of Bali (1980a), his language (he writesof "the ritual extravaganzasof the theater
state"[p. 1021) bothfailsto distinguishbetweenritualand theaterand tendsto treattheater
as a mass ritualto whichall respondedwith the same uniformbelief.
9Thompson(1974, 1978) analyzesthe "countertheater" of "threatand sedition"through
which English commonerschallenged the gentry's"theaterof hegemony."While these
insightfularticlesforcefully illustratethe subversivepotentialof theater,we have avoided
Thompson's"theater/countertheater" terminology because the term"theaterof hegemony"
blurs the importantdistinctionbetweenregularlyrepeated"rituals"(such as coronations)
and otherkindsof improvised,theatricaldisplaysof forceor majestythatsupportthe status
quo.

thenew Hanoverianregime,whichwerestagedto offset Jacobinmockeries ofGeorgeI

(Rogers 1978); the gatheringsheld by Americanpoliticalpartiesto show support
forpresidentialcandidates,or the paradesfornationalholidays(Davis 1986); and
the patrioticmass rallyGermanstudentsorganizedforBismarckin 1895 to honor
theIronChancellor's80th birthday(Jarausch1982:3-6)-these are but a fewexam-
ples of politicaltheaterthatupheld ratherthanchallengedthe hegemonyof ruling
institutions or elites.
Having distinguishedritualand theater,we mustnow notewhatthe two forms
have in common. Perhapsthe most fundamentalsimilarityis that both ritualand
theaterare performed forsocial effect.Languageand symbolsare used not primarily
to conveytruths,but to produceeffects-on the participants,the audience, the
gods. This is "pragmaticspeech," whose functionis to move,not to inform.Lin-
guistically,one sees this most clearlyin whatJ. L. Austinhas called the "perfor-
mativeutterances"of ritual.In a marriageceremony,the "I do" is not a reporton
one's mental act of acceptance;the words in themselves completethe act (Austin
1979:233-52). As such, it is not meaningfulto debate the truthvalue of such
utterances:all that co stsis that utteringthe wordshad the prescribedeffectof
completingthe marriageceremony.Similarly,in the Chineseritualdiscoursecodi-
fiedin such textsas the Yili (Steele 1917), it would be quite inappropriate to take
literallythe polite refusalof a gift,or the confessionof unworthiness when offered
a position.These politephrasesare not spokento expressone's trueintentions,and
a literalreadingof the words could cause a major breachof etiquette. It is the
symbolic of the words,in the contextof the total verbaland nonverbalperfor-
effect
mance,thatcounts:the wordsand actionsconveya postureof humility,of thanks,
and of respectforthe otherpartyin the social transaction. 10
These simplepointsare importantin interpreting eventsin China, forwe will
understandtheprotesters' actionsbetterifwe focuson theirsymbolicmeaningsand
intendedeffects thanifwe scrutinizetheirwordsin searchofsomecoherentpolitical
program.The slogans,big-character posters,pamphlets,open letters,and speeches
of the protesters wererepletewithemotivestatements of commitment and dissent.
They were proclamationsof personalpositions,moral statementsof resolve.They
announcedthe role one was committedto play in the emergingpolitical drama,
but theyrarelyanalyzedthe failingsof the Chinesepoliticalsystemor proposeda
concreteprogramforpoliticalchange.But thiswas natural,fortheirswas a perfor-
mancedesignedto impressand movean audience,not a lecturedesignedto inform.
To saythisis certainlynot to suggestthatthemovementwas merely play-acting.
In the post-Reaganera, thereare graverisksin writingof politicsas performance.
One can easilybe misunderstood as suggestingthatit is all fakery:artificialprops,
carefullystaged events, all medium and no substantivemessage. That is not our
intent.Our point is ratherthat it makes a good deal more sense to analyzeper-
formedactsand utterances notfortheirtruthvalue, but fortheirsymbolicmeaning.
For example, on April 21st and again on April 27th, many studentsat Beijing
universitieswroteout lasttestaments (yiyanoryishu).Theyproclaimed theirwillingness
to die fordemocracy,freedom,the motherland;theysaid good-byeto theirparents
l?lndivinationritualswhichmimicthesesocialtransactions,
an undesirable resultmay
comefromchoosingthewrongpolitewords.Therefore, according to one informant,
"You
keepthrowing theblocksuntila yescomesup, eachtimeslightly changing whatyousay.
This is becauseyoumighthavemadea mistakein givingyouraddress,or youmightnot
havebeenpolite(kheq-khi [keqil)enoughin speakingto thegod" (Ahern1981:32).

and begged their forgivenessand understanding(Lianhebao 1989:69-71; Han

1990:126-27; Pye 1990:341). It makes little sense to ask whetherthesestudents
reallyknew what "freedom"and "democracy"meant, and still less sense to ask
whethertheyweretrulypreparedto die. These last testaments werepowerfulpublic
statements ofgreatsymbolicmeaning.Theyrevealeda fundamental alienationfrom
the regimeand a willingnessto make great(perhapsthe ultimate)sacrificeforan
alternativepoliticalfuture.
Ritual and theaterhave more in commonthan symbolicaction. There is also
a greatdeal of borrowingof scriptsbetweenritualand theatricalperformances, in
part because the rootsof the two culturalformsare so closelyintertwined.Most
aesthetictheatergrew directlyout of ritualperformance: Greek tragedyfromthe
dithyrambsung aroundthe altar of Dionysus, nedieval European"passionplays"
fromtheCatholicmass,acrobatics and magicactsfromshamanistic practices(Burdick
1974:7-41; Kirby 1976). The earliestformsof Chinese drama likewisehad their
rootsin sacrificialrites(Mackerras1975:13). The bond betweenChineseoperaand
ritual performance is evident in everythingfromthe use of "Mulian" plays in
conjunctionwith funeralrites" to the traditionof stagingtheatricalperformances
to entertainthe gods (Naquin 1988:60; Esherick1987:67-68).
Politicaltheateralso borrowsheavilyfromritualscripts,thoughofteninverting
the meaningof thosescripts.In sixteenth-century France,religiousriotersmocked
theiropponents'most sacred ritesin acts of political theater:Protestantparaders
wouldforcea priestto burnhis vestments; Catholicswould parodyProtestant prayers
by transposingthe words"Devil" and "God" (Davis 1975:152-88). The decisions
of Americanantiwarprotestersto hold demonstrations on Veterans'or Memorial
Day are anotherexampleof Westernprotesterstransforming a ritualoccasioninto
a theatricalone (Lukes 1975:294, 299).
The transmission of textsbetweenritualand political theateris by no means
unidirectional:someritualperformances havetheirrootsin whatTurnercalls "social
dramas." This is not surprising,since one functionof ritualsis to heal wounds
betweengroupsby symbolicallyreenactingsocial conflicts(rangingfromwarsand
feuds to shoutingmatchesand bitterlycontestedelections)and then concluding
witha symbolicreintegration ofthecommunity (Schechner1976:196-202 and pas-
sim; Turner1982:68-87). Thus somepoliticalritualssimultaneously commemorate
and deradicalizesubversiveacts of political theater.Recent work on the French
Revolutionby Mona Ozouf and otherssuggeststhat theJacobinsand otherswere
interestedin creatingnew festivalspreciselyin orderto "representradicalaspira-
tions, while at the same time curbingthem" (Hunt 1984:99; Ozouf 1988). As
LynnHunt argues(1984:60), Frenchfestivalsof the decade after1789, combining
symbolicreenactments of attackson the ancien regimewith ritualizedpledges of
loyaltyto the new order, both "recognized"and "partiallydefused"the revolu-
tionarypotentialof the populace.
The mutualborrowingof scriptsbetweenpoliticaltheaterand ritualgives the
relationshipbetweenthe two formswhat one theoristcalls a "braided"quality:the
two strandscontinuallyoverlapand reemerge,alternatelytakingprecedenceover
each other(Schechner1976:211). One of the best illustrations of this relationship
has directrelevanceto the eventsof 1989: the transformations of the May 4th
Movementfromtheaterto ritualand back. When studentstook to the streetsin
"1These playsdeal withthesearchoftheBuddha'sdisciple,Mulian,through

various
hellsto findhis mother and releaseherfromsuffering.

1919 to protestimperialistthreatsfromabroad and warlordcorruptionat home,

theyestablishedthe classic scriptforstudentpolitical theater.Subsequently,both
the Guomindangand the CCP have triedto use the political theaterof the May
4th Movementas the basis fornew ritualsof conciliation.Though the two parties
commemorated May 4th differently, both soughtto turnthe May 4th anniversary
into a saferevolutionary festival(Schwarcz1986:240-82). The scriptbegins with
a replayof the conflictof 1919, usually throughspeechespraisingthe actionsof
formerstudentprotesters.The ritual then moves into a healing phase, in which
officialspeakersemphasizethat thereis no longera divisionbetweenthe nation's
rulersand its youth,since the presentregimeis carryingon in the May 4th tradi-
tion. These speakersclaim thatthe dutyof contemporary studentsis to provetheir
patriotismby workinghard to help the partybuild a new China, ratherthan by
protesting,and the membersof the audience(oftenstudents)show theiracceptance
of thisinterpretationby clapping,shoutingloyalistslogans,and singingpartysongs.
These officialattemptsto "recognize"and "defuse"the revolutionary potential
of studentshave neverbeen whollysuccessful,as educatedyouthshave repeatedly
managed to transform May 4th ritualsback into May 4th theater(Wasserstrom
1990b). They have done this by emphasizingthe reenactment aspectof the official
ritual, while denyingthe reconciliatory phase. In 1947 under the Guomindang,
some Shanghaistudentschose to engage in anti-GMD propagandaratherthanat-
tend officialcommemoration activities.But the most dramaticcase of subversion
occurredin 1989, when Beijing studentsupstagedthe CommunistParty'sfestival
to literallyretracethe stepsoftheirpredecessorsof seventyyearsbefore.What made
this piece of streettheaterso subversivewas its implication(clearlyspelled out in
bannersand slogans) that the ideals of the May 4th Movement(which the CCP
claimedto represent) remainedunfulfilled and neededto be foughtforagain on the
streets.
Despite thesesymboliclinks betweenritualand theater,it remainsimportant
to distinguishthetwo formsand to notewhenone or theotherpredominates within
a specificpoliticalsystem.It is particularlyimportantforour purposes,becausethe
impactof streettheateris in partdeterminedby the degreeto whichpoliticalthea-
ter is seen to have a legitimateconnectionto governance.To illustratethis point,
we must brieflyreviewthe rolesof ritualand theaterin Chinesepolitics,past and
present.
PoliticalRitual in ImperialChina
Few cultureshave given ritualas crucial a role in governanceas did China.

Confuciushad arguedthat"If [a ruler]could forone day 'himselfsubmitto ritual,'
everyoneunderHeaven would respondto his goodness"(Lunyu12:1, as trans.in
Waley n.d.:162). As Confucianismemergedas a distinctschool of thoughtin an-
cient China, this notionof rule throughritualbecame centralto its teaching.In
the imperialera, the administrative weaknessof the state and the comparatively
small size of its formalbureaucracy combinedwith the Confuciandisdain forrule
by regulationand coercivepunishmentto make ritualindispensableforthe main-
tenanceof social order(Hucker 1961:67-68; Naquin and Rawski 1987:88; Zito
1989). Confucianritualwas primarily a secularritual;but forConfucius,as Herbert
Fingarette(1972) has put it, the secularwas sacred.Elaborateceremoniesgoverned
and guaranteedthathumansocietywould operatein harmony
all social relationships
with the cosmic order. A centralconcernof political philosopherswas defining,

categorizingand describingthe correctpracticeof ritual(li) associatedwith rela-

tionshipsbetweenHeaven, the emperor,officials,and membersof the populace at
large.
Imperialritual, the highestgenre of li, was overwhelmingly confinedto the
palace and the special templesforimperialsacrifices near the capital. Within the
walls oftheForbiddenCity,theritualswereextraordinarily elaborate(one can recall
the openingscene of the movie, "The Last Emperor").The places, costumes,ges-
tures,and wordsof the participantswereall carefully choreographed to displaythe
orderedhierarchy of the courtand bureaucracy, and the emperor'sunique role con-
nectinghumansocietyto the greatercosmos. But high walls and imperialguards
excluded the generalpublic fromany participation,and the carefullyprescribed
roles of the participantsexcluded all possibilityforpolitical theater(Zito 1989;
Gugong bowuguanyuan 1983).
The most notableexceptionsto the patternof imperialconfinement were the
huntsand southern tours of the Kangxi and Qianlong emperors of the Qing. The
emperorsweregreetedby vast crowdsas forerunners assembled all as
officials, well
as local gentryand commoners,to kneel and greetthe imperialarrivaland depar-
ture. But the emperortraveledin an enclosedsedan chairor barge, beforewhich
thepeoplewereto prostrate themselves,so thatevenon tour,thepatternofimperial
seclusionwas not entirelyabandoned. The Kangxi emperoroccasionallyused his
toursand huntsto meetordinarypeasantsand inquireof theircropsand especially
of any oppressionby local officials(Spence 1966:125-36). But the extraordinary
natureof these contactsis suggestedin a Jesuitaccountaccordingto which the
peasants"wereall eager to see his Majesty,who insteadof concealinghimselfgave
everyonethelibertyofcomingnearhim" (Du Halde 1736:349). SuchJesuitsources
are importantbecause the officialrecordis silenton contactsof this sortbetween
the Emperorand the people (Spence 1966:131)-a factwhich itselfsuggeststhe
rituallyproblematicnatureof such contact.
Officialritual tended to imitate the imperial. Officialswere, to paraphrase
AlexanderWoodside (1989), "spiritualmicro-monarchs." They replicatedthe im-
perial sacrificeto the Altar of Soil and Grain and led worshipat the Confucian
temple. Day-to-dayofficialritualwas largelyconfinedto the tribunal,or to the
privateritualof visits with local notablesor otherbureaucrats.Officialson tour
wereprecededby criersand bannersorderingsilenceand reverence,and the public
bowed beforethem. The arrivaland departureof officialsdid at least providethe
ritual (at these liminal moments)of a procession,which allowed the public an
opportunity to expressits regretover the departureof a popularofficial(or oppo-
sitionto the arrivalof an unpopularone [Hsiao 1967:449-501). But, in general,
politicalrituals,of the sortmost easily transformed
participatory into politicalthe-
ater, were absentfromthe officialvision of how politicsshould operate.Instead,
therewere rigidlystratifiedhierarchicformsin which the ritualleader (emperor,
official,or kin group patriarch)confronted a mute audiencewhich in manycases
(because prostrate)nevereven saw the ceremonialhead.12
The contrastto Europeanroyaland civic ritualis striking.Fromthe fourteenth
century,the royalentryto a city was one of the most importantformsof ritual
procession.But on enteringa city,the monarchwould be met (confronted?) by the
12Especiallywhencompared to Chinesetheateraudiences,thesilenceof ritual"audi-

ences"is notable.In thisregard,the"profoundsilence"thatJesuitobserversrecordedin
thevastcrowdsgreeting theKangxiemperor suggeststhathis imperialtourswerecloser
to ritualthantheatrical
performances(Spence1966:136).

city'sarmedmilitia,handedthe keysto the city(an act of fealty,but also a gesture

to a guest), and welcomedwith streetpageantssymbolically portraying the virtues
whichthecitizenry expectedof its ruler(Strong1984:7- 11). In someGermancities
jealous of theircivic autonomy,the burghers'welcome of theirprinceor bishop
could turninto an armedshow of forcein whichtownsmenconfronted theirsover-
eign as a rival(Brady 1989). But everywhere theseceremoniesprovidedan oppor-
tunityforthe corporatebodies of urbanlife(universities, guilds,parlements or Sen-
ates, clergy,militia, lawyers,merchantsand tradesmen)to organizeand publicly
announcetheirplace in thepublic order.As a consequence,evenmonarchicalrituals
"tendedto describethe essenceof nationalkingshipin such a way as to exalt civic
virtuesand encouragethepreservation of urbanliberties"(Bryant1986:22). All the
morewas this trueof civic ritualson such feastdays as CorpusChristi,wherethe
autonomousstrengthof the corporategroupsthat made up Europeancivil society
was regularly givenrituallegitimacy and publicdisplay(Muir 1981; Bergeron1971).
One notable featureof Chinese political ritualsis the generalabsence of any
public speaking. There were, of course, the xiangyue,the public lectureson the
SacredEdict. But all accountsagree thatthis formquicklyatrophiedin the Qing,
and nevercaughton in Chineseculture(Hsiao 1967:194-201; Mair 1985). China
lacked the rhetoricaltraditionof Greek and Roman forumsor of many illiterate
societies.Confuciuswas suspiciousof menwith"cleverwords"(Lunyu1:3, as trans.
in Chan 1985:325-59), and Confucianbureaucratspreferred the authorityof the
brush.Even in the academies,Qing evidentialscholarsreactedagainstthe lecturing
stylesof the Song Neo-Confucians,preferring the moresolitaryscholarshipof tex-
tual criticism(Elman 1984:48). Religiousritualprovidedno rhetorical models:China
lackeda congregational religionwithweeklysermons.Consequently,in the limited
civil societyof guilds and huiguanthatgrew up in late imperialChina, therewere
neitherthe ecclesiasticnor the Roman Republicanmodels forpublic meetingsand
speechesthatone findsin merchants'and artisans'guilds in Europe.
The one legitimatepoliticalactivitythatprovidedan openingforpoliticalthea-
terwas the rightto petitionofficialsforredressof grievances.In ancientChina, a
"complaintdrum" (dengwen gu) was supposedlyplaced beforea ruler'spalace to
summonattendantsto hear a grievance.The drum continuedin use in imperial
times,and the Qing placed it just southwestof Tiananmen.Nonetheless,the Qing
code was interpreted in such a way as to discouragestronglysuch directappeals to
Beijing, and most petitionswerepresentedto local authorities(Bodde and Morris
1973:464-66). Naturally,the rightto petitionled frequently to a politicaltheater
of mass demonstrations, which mightdevelop into riotsor even rebellions(Perry
1985). A late nineteenth-century accountof such a petitionmovementevokesim-
ages of modernprotestrepertoires:
I oncesawa procession
ofcountry peoplevisittheyamensofthecitymandarins.
. . .Shops wereshutandperfectstillness as twenty
reigned thousandstrong,
they
wendedtheirwaythrough thestreets,withbanners eachat theheadofa
flying,
company andeachinscribedwiththenameofthetemplewherethatcompany held
itsmeetings."Whatis themeaningofthisdemonstration?" I inquired."We are
goingto reducethetaxes,"was thelaconicanswer.
(Martin1900:91-92, citedin Hsiao 1967:434)
Such mass petitionmovementswere surelyunusual, but the scriptwas well

enoughknownto be replicatedwhen necessary.Furthermore, a significantfeature
of the Chinesecase was the replicationof the bureaucratichierarchyin the world
of thegods. Consequently,gods werealso petitioned-and farmorefrequently than

officials.Thus religiousritualcould serve,in EmilyAhern'swords(1981:92), as a

"learninggame," teachingordinaryChinese "how to analyze(and so manipulate)
the politicalsystemthat governedthem."
Petitionsprovidedone small avenueof public access into the otherwiseclosed
realmof legitimatepoliticsin imperialChina. But the statedealt harshlywithany
attemptto use petitionsformorethanpersonalgrievances.They werenot to be an
excuse forpublic debate on mattersof policy. As Confuciussaid, "He who holds
no rank in a state does not discuss its politics" (Lunyu8.14, as trans. in Waley
n.d.: 135). Evenas China begantheslowprocessofreform in thewakeoftheOpium
War, movementtowarda public politicsoutsidethe statewas exceptionallyslow.
When Lin Zexu, in disgraceafterthe outbreakof the Opium War, revealedhis
supportforthe acquisitionof ships and guns in a letterto a friend,he closed by
urging,"I only beg that you keep [theseideas] confidential.By all means, please
do not tell otherpersons"(cited in Teng and Fairbank1979:28). Even the famous
reformessaysof Feng Guifen,writtenaround 1860, werenot publisheduntil they
were broughtto the attentionof the Emperorin 1898 (ibid.:50). But afterthe
Sino-Japanese War, and especiallyin the courseof the twentiethcentury,Chinese
politicschangedfundamentally, and centralto thatchangewas the emergenceof a
new space for,and new kinds of, politicaltheater.
China
PoliticalTheaterin Twentieth-Century
In the finalyearsof the Qing dynasty,the New Policy reformsusheredin a

newera ofChinesepolitics.Firsttherewerethenew schools,whichbroughttogeth-
er a politicallyengaged studentclass in urban centersacross China. Soon these
studentswere organizingprotestsagainst foreign-financed railways,boycottsof
Americangoods because of U.S. restrictions on Chinese immigration,and broad
movementsforpoliticalreform.Theywrotebig-character posters,spokefromstreet
cornersand stagedmassdemonstrations, includingcostumedcharacters to dramatize
theirconcerns(Rhoads 1975:86, 95-96). Some of thesedemonstrations built upon
classicritualforms-as in a 1906 funeralprocessionby Changshastudentsto bury
the ashesof two revolutionaries who had committedsuicide(Esherick1977:56; cf.
Rhoads 1975:88). As MaryRankin(1985) and William Rowe (1989) have shown,
an increasinglyassertivecivil societygrewout ofearliernetworksofgentryactivists,
local managers,merchantguilds, and charitableorganizations.Chambersof Com-
merceand EducationalAssociations soughtto setagendasforlocalpolitical
aggressively
affairs.As constitutionalreforms began in 1909-10, China had herfirstexperience
withelectoralpolitics. ProvincialAssemblieselectedin 1909 providedthe basis for
politicalparties,as like-mindedindividualsgroupedtogetherin a varietyof refor-
mistassociations.But reformers also reliedupon establishedpoliticalformsto press
theirviews-most notablythe petitionspresentedto the court in favorof rapid
transitionto fullconstitutional government. The new local, provincial,and national
assembliesbecame forumsforspeechmaking.Political rhetoricbecame important
to the political process;and especiallyamong studentsand dissidentintellectuals
abroad,some(like Wang Jingwei)establishedtheirpoliticalreputations as eloquent
public speakers.
Chambersof Commerceand the ProvincialAssemblieswere two of the most
prominentinstitutionsin this new civil society. It is significantthat all of the
ProvincialAssembliesand manyoftheChambersofCommercewerelocatedin new,

speciallyconstructed buildings.The architecture of thesestructuressymbolizedthe

breakwith the past. Chinese-style walled compoundsand enclosedcourtyards were
generallyeschewed. Instead, the chambersand assemblieswere located in large
Western-style buildingsof brickor stone, opening directlyonto the streetsand
includingspacious auditoria(huitang)fora modernpoliticsof meetings.The new
schoolsalso built auditoria,especiallyin the Republicanperiod, and the function
ofthenewarchitecture was explicitlyacknowledged.One commentator on theaudi-
toriumat Qinghua Universityin Beijing notedthatsincetheartofpublic speaking
was so undevelopedin China, the school'snew auditorium"may well be regarded
as the ForumRomanumwherebudding Ciceroswill delivertheirorations"(Chao
Hsueh-hai,cited in Cody 1990). Sportsstadiumsattachedto missionaryschools,
anotherimportedformof architecture, also providedvenues forthe new politics
(Zhou 1985:154-56).
This politicsof public meetings,speeches,and demonstrations was so new to
China that its formsand models had to be borrowedfromothertypesof perfor-
mance. Foreignmodels were one naturalsource,especiallysince so manyspeakers
and protestershad eitherstudiedabroad or been trainedin missionaryschools in
China (wherepreachers'sermonsprovidedregularremindersof the power of ora-
tory).A NorthChina Heraldaccountof a 1903 meetingto condemnRussianimpe-
rialismnotes that one of the firstthingsthat happenedwas that "a set of rules,
translatedfrom the English [Robert'sRules of Order?],for the governanceof
public speakersand meetingswere . . . read, printedcopies of which were also
distributedto the audience"(May 7, 1903, 885). Two yearslater,in an articleon
theanti-American boycottof 1905, thesameShanghainewspapernotedthatAmeri-
cans shouldat least be heartenedby the factthatthe movementwas being carried
Americanmanner,"completewithpublic assembliesand
out in a "characteristically
the electionof delegatesto representative bodies (NCH, August 11, 1905, 322).
Manyof the mostardentprotesters in 1905 had been trainedby Americanmission-
aries, and these missionaries'conferences and assembliesmay well have servedas
influential"object lessons"in governanceforradicalChineseyouths.It is no mere
coincidencethatone ofthe mosteffective public speakersat Shanghaiboycottmeet-
ings was Ma Xiangpo, an educatorand formerpriestwho had studiedunderthose
most skillfulof rhetoricians: the Jesuits(Hayhoe 1983:323-341; BritishForeign
Officerecords228/2155).
Alongsideforeignmodels fororatoryand rallies,activistsin the new politics
also borrowedmetaphorsand techniquesfromChinesetheater.When the firstpub-
lic organizingwent on in the late nineteenthand earlytwentiethcenturies,before
the new architecture was in place, the most commonmeetingplaces were guild
halls (huiguan)and temples,whichwere equipped with stages foroperaticperfor-
mances. There politiciansmountedplatforms(stages:tai) to addressthe audience.
Meetingsbegan with a kaimushi,a curtain-raising. Speechmakingwas a kind of
performance: yanjiang,or yanshuo.
Given the influenceof importedpolitical models and theatricalvenues and
metaphors,it should come as no surprisethat both operasand xinju (new theater)
plays-dramatic performances thatmixedChineseand Westerndramaticgenres-
became"importantvehiclesofpropaganda"forrevolutionaries (Mackerras1975:48).
Shanghai'sChunliuShe (SpringWillow Society)performed xinju workswithnames
suchas "Blood of Patriotism"that"advocatedrevolutionand satirizedand laid bare
the corruptionof the ruling government."The troupe'sfounder,Wang Zhong-
sheng,was executedforhis activitiesin 1911-a sign thattheManchusunderstood
the persuasivepoweroftheatrics(Zhou 1985:32; Mackerras1975:49).

The new Republic inauguratedin 1912 broughtfortha politicaltheaterappro-

priateto China'snew democraticforms.We see thisin magazinesand photoalbums
about thisperiod(Sun Zhongshan xianshenghuace1986; Guomingeming huashi1965).
Politiciansarraythemselvesat railwaystationsor in frontof meetinghalls forcere-
monialphotographs.Naturally,theymountstagesto deliverspeeches.Theyparade
into cities in open limousines,with flag-wavingcrowdslining the streets.Now,
forthe firsttime, political leadersare broughtface to facewith the people: gone
is the bowingand the taboo on visual contact.The people see, hear,evaluate,and
reactto the politiciansof the earlyRepublic. The purpose,of course,is to make
thenew politicspublic and open.Indeed, the termforholdinga meetingsymbolizes
this new politics:kaihui,to open an assembly.
The Guomindang'sexperiments withpatrioticmassmobilizationwerethemost
consciousefforts to use political theaterto fosterpoliticalcommitmentand legit-
imacyforthenew regime.Theirmostdramaticefforts would beginwithan incident
thatthreatened China'snationalsovereignty. Guomindang(GMD) leadersat nation-
al and local levels would sponsormass ralliesagainstthe aggressor,usuallyJapan.
Yellow tradeunions,pro-QMD youthgroups,and otherloyalistorganizations would
mobilizepeople to attendtheserallies,at whichofficialspeakerswould praisethe
GMD as the nation'sleadingpatrioticand revolutionary force,and thecrowdwould
be encouragedto mix criesof "Long Live the Republic"and "Long Live theNation-
alist Party"with sloganscriticizingthe foreignfoe. Later, local partybranchesor
governmentbureausmight arrangeforpetitionersor carefullyscreenedrepresen-
tativesof "legitimate"groups to travelto Nanjing to presenttheirviews to top
GMD figures,or urge civic groupsto launchpatrioticfundraising drives(Wasser-
strom1991: chapters6, 7, 9).
Whateverthe specifictechniques,the intentwas the same: to mobilizepopular
outrageto reinforce ratherthan subvertthe statusquo. Sometimes,as duringthe
New LifeMovement,thismobilizationmergedwithattemptsto foster JiangJieshi's
personality cult. Even whennotdirectlyassociatedwithculticpractices,GMD mass
mobilizationdrivesalwaysreliedheavilyon ritualforms-bows to partyand nation-
al flags,recitationsof Sun's last will at the startof meetings,orchestrated visitsto
the National Father'stomb by petitionerswho visitedthe capital.
Most of thesedriveslefta great deal of room formore spontaneouspolitical
theater.As such, theymight have servedas the basis fora new formof politics,
in whichmassexpressions ofpopularopinion,albeitcarefully stage-managed, would
play a role in determining and legitimizingpublic policy. But thesenew formsof
publicperformance neverseemedto catchon in China. The foreignrhetorical models
were alien, and the analogyto theaterlinked politics to an occupationviewed as
morallysuspectin China (Mackerras1975:78-79, 95-96).
Concretely,political theaterencounteredtwo problems. First, China's rulers
neverdevelopeda mechanismto connectthis new open politics of speechesand
meetingsto the "real" politicsof governing.As studiesby AndrewNathan (1976)
and LloydEastman(1974) have shown,the governanceof China remaineda matter
of factionalalliances and patronagenetworks,of personalconnectionsand secret
deals. Electoralpolitics,the mostcommonWesternformconnectingpoliticalthea-
ter to the businessof governing,neverappealed to the Chinese. Liang Qichao ob-
servedit in the United States and found it fraughtwith fraud,ignorance,and
corruption (Chang 1971:239). When Yuan Shikaidisbandedthe electiveassemblies
in 1914, therewas minimal protestfromthe disenfranchised citizenry(Young
1977:148-55). In the yearsafter1927, the Guomindangtriedsporadicallyto reim-
plementelectoralpolitics. But campaignsat the local level were so fraughtwith

corruptionthat theyconvincedneitherforeignobserversnor the Chineseelectorate

that castingvotes had any real impact on governance(See China WeeklyReview,
issuesof March-April 1946; ShanghaiEveningPost,April 30, 1946:8).
Secondly,experimentsat mass mobilizationwere consistently underminedby
the tendencyof patrioticpopular movementsto get out of hand and end up as
attackson thosein power. Thus the Nationalistera witnessedperiodicswingsbe-
tween officialencouragement and violent repressionof popular mobilization,the
complexdynamicsof which are explicatedin recentworksby ChristianHenriot
(1983) and Wang Ke-wen (1985). The firstmajor swing took place in the spring
of 1928, when partyleadersfirstsupported,then suppressedpopularoutrageover
theJi'nanIncident(Israel 1966:10-46; Cavendish1969); one of the last important
swings came in the springof 1946, when partyleadersencouragedurbanitesto
attendralliesagainst"SovietImperialism"in February,thenquickly,as theUnited
States replacedthe USSR as the targetof popularpatrioticindignation,began to
arguethatall mass gatheringsweresubversiveacts (Wasserstrom1991: chapter9).
When officialsfailedto turnthe massmovementsintocontrolledperformances,
theyturnedto a set of repressive tacticsthatobserversof last year'seventswill find
all too familiar.The regimewould declareall collectivegatheringsillegal, close
newspapers(except for foreignones protectedby extraterritoriality) that printed
favorableaccountsofpopularprotests,arrestactivists,and, ifnecessary, use violence
againstthosewho continuedto take to the streets.This kind of repression reflected
a continuationof the traditionaldichotomyof 1i (ritual) and fa (law or coercive
control[Schwartz1985:102-4, 321-491). Thoughimperialrulerscalledsuchcollective
action"heterodox"and the GMD brandedit "counter-revolutionary," bothregimes
ultimatelysaw forceas the only responseleftwhen ritualor "ritualized"political
theaterfailed.
The Guomindang'sfailureto make eitherelectionsor mass mobilizationan
integralpartof governancemeantthatthe open politicsof politicaltheaterbecame
increasingly associatedwith repertoires of protest.The traditionalformsformass
petitionsprovided,forprotestmovements, a well-establishedChineserepertoire that
was lacking forhegemonicpolitical theater.May 4th establishedthe Republican
modelforpetition-based mass action:studentsfromthe leadinguniversities marched
to the centralsquare, Tiananmen,and attemptedto presenttheirpetitions-in
1919, calling forthe rejectionsof the termsof the VersaillesTreatythat would
cede Germanrightsin Shandongto Japan ratherthan returningthem to China.
Furtherdemonstrations followedin Beijing in the early 1920s, but the May 30th
Movementwas the nextepisode of trulynationalsignificance.These were, in the
wordsof Mao Zedong, the yearsin which"the Chineseproletariatand the Chinese
CommunistPartymountedthe politicalstage" (Mao 1940, 2:690). A new wave of
studentactivismfollowedtheJapaneseinvasionof Manchuria,culminatingin the
December9th Movementof 1935.
Thesedates-May 4th, May 30th,December9th-were watersheds in thehistory
of RepublicanChina. They form the markers for conventional periodization,the
topicsofclassroomlectures.Theyalso becameanniversaries callingforthcelebratory
ritualsmodeledon the originalevents.Most importantly, theydefinedthe reper-
toiresfora new street
political theater.Students a
alwaysplayed leadingrole,marching
fromtheircampusesbehindbannersproclaiming theirschoolaffiliations.
Theyshouted
slogans, waved flags,cheered onlookers,petitioned theauthorities, and clashedwith
police. On their campusesthey wrote big-characterposters; outside they set up
platformsto speak to the citizenry.Althoughthe authoritiescriticizedthem for

neglectingtheir studies, suppressedtheir illegal marchesand condemnedtheir

disruptionof law and order,the pressbroadcastnewsof theiractivitiesthroughout
the country,and the power of theaterwas undeniable. From the December 9th
Movementof 1935, and increasingly in the late '40s, the Communistsrecognized
the power of this theaterand its capacityto delegitimizeGuomindangrule, and
theyworkeddiligentlybehindthe scenesto encouragefurther demonstrations.
After1949, theCommunistPartysoughtto ritualizethistheater:to incorporate
and domesticateits repertoiresinto campaigns.The partywas well aware of the
dangerof uncontrolled politicaltheater:manyof its keyleadershad risento promi-
nencethroughstudentand workerdemonstrations. They understoodthe powerof
independentstudentunions,whichwerecalled, underthe Guomindangas in 1989,
xueshengzizhibui(studentself-government societies[Israel 1966:241). Accordingly,
the Communistsbanned all autonomousassociations.But they did not wish to
abandon the theater-only to monopolizethe capacityto organizeit, to succeed
here(as elsewhere)wherethe Guomindanghad failed. Thus it became one of the
importantfunctionsof work units and the party-sponsored mass organizations(of
youth,women,workers,peasants,etc.) to mobilizeconstituencies formass demon-
strations.
The resultwas the "campaignstyle"of Maoist politics- a stylethatprevailed
thataccompanied
untilthe late 1970s (Cell 1977). In the ritualizeddemonstrations
everymajorcampaignand markedkey dates on the revolutionary calendar,people
would marchforthbehindtheirunit's or mass organization'sbanners,with lots of
red flags, drums,and cymbals,and head for the centralsquare. In the nation's
capital, nationalminoritieswould join in nativecostumewhile the partyleaders
lookeddownfromtheelevatedplatformofTiananmenitself.The same ritualwould
be repeatedin cities acrossthe country,with local leaderson theirown elevated
reviewingstands.
During the CulturalRevolution,Mao loosenedthe controlson thesepolitical
rituals,and the studentsquicklydevisedtheirown innovativerepertoires of street
theater."Ghostsand monsters"wereparadedthroughcities in dunce caps; offend-
ing teachersand cadreswere put on stage in the "airplaneposition"; books were
burned,art destroyed.But CulturalRevolutionstreettheaterquicklydegenerated
intosomethingtoo disorderly evenforMao, as rivalRed Guardgangsfoughtphysi-
cal battlesin schools,factories,and on the streets.
By the late '60s, this revivedtheaterhad to be suppressed;and by 1980, the
partyrevisedthe constitutionto prohibitall big-character posters,leaflets,and
demonstrations. In fact,underDeng Xiaoping, the partytriedto abandonboththe
campaignritualof the pre-CulturalRevolutionperiod and the political theaterof
the "ten yearsof chaos," and rule purelyby administrative routine.But the 1976
Tiananmendemonstrations in honorof Zhou Enlai and againstthe Gang of Four,
the DemocracyWall movementof 1978-79, the Hunan protestsof 1980, the stu-
dent demonstrations in Beijing in 1985 and in Shanghaiand othercitiesin 1986-
87, and finallyChina'sspringof 1989 provedthatpoliticaltheatercannotbe totally
suppressed.Some public ritualsare alwaysnecessary,and in those ritualsthereis
alwaysthe dangerthat studentsor otheractorswill usurp the stage and turnthe
officialritualinto theirown politicaltheater.13
ofboth1985 and 1986-

13Inadditionto examplesgivenearlier,thestudentprotests
87 beganon anniversarydates-September 18thandDecember9th-forofficial commem-
orations.

the PoliticalTheater
Interpreting
As performance, thetruth-valueofthewordsand actionsin thispoliticaltheater
is notterribly important.But thatdoes not implythatthistheateris meaningless
onlythatwe haveto pay moreattentionto its symbolismthanto theliteralmeaning
of its utterances.Let us considerthe symbolismof 1989. The firstfunctionof
politicaltheateris quite simplyto be heard,to gain attention.Initially,the audi-
ence is a dual one: thegeneralpopulation(bothurbanresidentswho directlywitness
the demonstrationand those who can be reached throughthe media) and the
authorities.But the authoritiesare the real audience; the value of the people is
largelyinstrumental. The moresupportthe demonstrators can gain fromthe citi-
zenry-the largerthe applaudingcrowdsliningthe demonstration route,the more
concretecontributions of food and drink, the more symbolicaid in the formof
bannersor citizens'supportgroups, the greaterthe monetarycontributions from
citizensand small business-the more leveragethe demonstrators will gain with
the authorities.
That the authoritiesare the real audienceis demonstrated by the petitionfor-
mat. But a petitionalso acknowledgesthe fundamentallegitimacyof the govern-
mentto which one appeals. Later, the petitionis replacedby the appeal fordia-
logue-also a demandto be heard.But underlying thisdemand-even moreclearly
in dialoguethanin petition-is a claim to entranceintothepolity(cf. Tilly 1978).
Groupspreviouslyexcludedfromthe politicalprocessseek throughdemonstration,
petition,and dialogueto be takenseriouslyby the authoritiesas participantsin the
politicaldecision-making process.Even some of theviolenceof the demonstrations,
the rock-throwing and arson,can be interpreted as efforts
to gain attention,to be
heard-effortsby thoseless skillfulwithand less trustingofwordsthanintellectuals
and university students.
The publicnatureofpoliticaltheateris its secondmostimportantcharacteristic.
Open to all, streettheaterinvitesall citizensto join. Once TiananmenSquare was
occupied, the studentsoftendebated strategyand made decisionsin public, there
forall to see. They demandeda live broadcastof theirdialogue with government
leaders. Symbolically,such theaterstandsin directcontrastto the secrecyof the
party-state. Significantly,the modelforsuchdemonstrations in China, theMay 4th
demonstration of 1919, protestedagainst the secretdiplomacythat had preceded
the Versaillesconference. Streettheaterinvariablysymbolizesa call to open up the
politicalprocess,and the verysecrecy(and lack of accountability) of the party-state
naturallycalls forththis sortof dialecticalopposite.
Thirdly,studentstrikesand, evenmoredramatically, thehungerstrike,present
imagesofselflessness-akeyvaluein contemporary China,withmodelsfromNorman
Bethuneto Lei Feng. These acts wereextraordinarily effective.The most common
praiseof the studentmovementwas thattheirmotiveswereentirelypatriotic-for
love of country(aiguo). They soughtnothingforthemselves-unlikeworkerswho
mightstrikeforhigherpay. These studentsasked nothing,acceptednot evenfood,
and wishedonly the good of the nation. Their acts of self-denialstood in obvious
contrastto the self-serving and corruptleadershiptheyattacked.No privilegeof
the partyleadershipwas morevisible than the enormousbanquetstheyconsumed
at public expense.Now herewere studentsrefusingto eat anythingat all.
Finally,the last testamentsthatthe studentswroteout, plus the hungerstrike
and relatedgestures,located the studentssymbolicallywithina rich traditionof
political martyrs.These activities,as Dru Gladney (1990) has noted, linked the
studentsto Qu Yuan, the loyal ministerof the thirdcenturyB.C. who showedhis

willingnessto "die forthe affairsof the nation" by committingsuicide afterhis

rulerrefusedto heed his advice. Such actions also recalledearliergenerationsof
studentmartyrs, fromChen Dong (a Song Dynastyprotesterexecutedforhis criti-
cismsofgovernment corruption,who servedas a modelforsomeMay 4th protesters
[Lee 1985:190-92; Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan1979, 1:4731), to Yao Hongye
and Chen Tianhua (two frustrated Hunanese activistswho committedsuicide in
1906), and the hundredsof youthfuldemonstrators killed by foreignand native
authoritiesduringthe Republicanera. When studentsat TiananmenSquare swore
collectiveoaths to sacrificetheirlives-the last, and mostprophetic,of whichwas
taken on June 3rd (Yi and Thompson 1989:266)-they were reenactinga scene
fromthe May 4th Movement(ShenBao, 27 May 1919, 10). Similarly,when Chai
Ling bit herfingerand wroteout a protestsloganwithherown blood, she stepped
intoa rolethatstudentprotesters of 1915 and 1919 had played(ShanghaiMunicipal
Police Files, reel 65, I.D. 6691). With all this theater,the studentsappealed to
a traditionof principleddissentand revolutionary action that the partyitselfhad
legitimizedand mythologizedin the attemptto claim it as its own.
If we are to understandthe enormousappeal of the studentdemonstrations in
Beijing and acrossChina, we must begin by appreciatingthesesymbolicmeanings
of theirprotest.The slogans-attacking the corruptionof officialprofiteers (guan-
dao), callingfora freerpress,mockingChina's highestleaders,advocatinga never-
defined"freedom"and "democracy" -were certainlyimportant.But theygained
theirpowerbecausethe veryrepertoire of the movementsymbolizeda demandfor
a voice in government, fora moreopen politicalprocess,and foran end to leader-
ship by a self-serving elite.
A Comparative Perspective
The 1989 demonstrations in China wereclearlypartofa larger,worldwidecrisis

of state-socialist
systems.In EasternEurope,CommunistPartieshave been toppled
frompower,one afterthe other.In the SovietUnion, the Partyis in the processof
renouncingits monopolyon power,and variousethnicgroups-led by Lithuania,
but includingall the Baltic statesand the peoples of the Caucasus region-have
been movingsteadilytowardsome formofgreaterautonomyfromMoscow. Increas-
ingly,China (along withNorthKorea, Vietnam,and Cuba) is lookinglike the last
refugeof socialism.As a currentChinesejoke has it-playing on the officialcant
that "Only socialismcan save China"-now "Only China can save socialism."
In each of the Europeantransitions, streetdemonstrationsplayeda criticalrole.
This was, of course, most obvious in the dramaticeventsof East Germanyand
Czechoslovakia.There, utterlypeacefulpolitical transformations-a"velvetrevo-
lution,"to use theCzech phrase-were broughtabout by unarmedciviliansprotest-
ing in the streets.Since exactlythe same sort of political theaterbroughtforth
troopsand tanksand unprecedentedbloodshedin China, it is necessaryto tryto
explainthe contrasting result.
Clearly,partof the answerlies in factorsquite beyondthe scope of this essay.
The CommunistPartyof China (like the partiesof Vietnam,Cuba, and, to a lesser
degree,Korea) made its own revolution.Each of thesecountriesthus differsfrom
the state-socialistregimesof EasternEurope, which were, in varyingdegrees,all
broughtinto beingand proppedup by the Soviets'Red Army.Consequently,when
Gorbachevmade it clearthatthe BrezhnevDoctrinewas dead and the SovietUnion

would no longer come to the rescue of unpopularEast European regimes,those

regimesfell veryquickly.
In addition,China and the remainingstate-socialist regimesare all poor Third
World countries.They have large, impoverished,and still poorlyeducated rural
populations.At least in China, thereis unquestionablysubstantialpeasantdiscon-
tentovera varietyof issues-the paymentforgrainrequisitionsin IOUs and scrip
insteadof money,and the failureto deliverpromisedsuppliesof chemicalfertilizer.
But, in general,peasantsdisplayedlittlesympathyforthe demandsof the student
demonstrators. Only the attackon corruptionstrucka responsivechord. When the
crackdowncame, ruralresidentstendedto believe the governmentcontentionthat
the peasant soldiersof the People's LiberationArmywould not fireon unarmed
civiliansunlesstherewas a genuinethreatto law and order.In short,China's huge
peasant populationremainedlargelypreoccupiedwith its own materialinterests,
and it viewed those interestsas dependenton continuedpolitical stability.Conse-
quently, China's peasantryprovideda reservoirof supportfor the hard-linersin
Beijing that was missingin any East Europeanregime(Zweig 1989).
More germaneto our discussion,however,is the roleplayedby the institutions
of civil societyin EasternEurope (Tismaneanu 1990). These long-neglectedinsti-
tutionsproved to have sufficientlife to structurethe oppositionmovementand
sustainit to victory.The most obvious example is the Catholic Churchin Poland
(Machcewicz1989). As a gatheringplace and refugefordissidentsin the Solidarity
movement,the Catholic opposition(with a Polish Pope) was fundamentalto the
breakthrough in Poland-which was, afterall, the firstdomino to fall. Hungary
was the nextcountryto make seriousmovesin the directionof pluralism,and here
the old democraticpartiesplayed a crucial role. In Czechoslovakia,the dissident
groupsamong the intellectualswereclearlybetterorganizedthananyonepreviously
believed. In East Germany,the Evangelical (Lutheran)Church helped to shelter
dissidentintellectualsand a small independentpeace movement.Bulgariawitnessed
a nascentenvironmental movement,whichplayeda criticalrole. In Lithuania,there
was again the CatholicChurch,plus the role of nationalmovementsand linguistic
solidarity.
Virtuallyall of the institutionsof civil societyin Europe are imbued, to one
degreeor another,with aspectsof democraticculture.We sometimesforget,as we
focuson the hierarchicstructuresand statelyritualsof the Catholic Church, that
the Pope is elected and councilsof bishopsand othermore local institutionshave
oftenoperatedon democraticprinciples.On a more mundanelevel, artisanguilds
would, on theirfeastdays, constitutethemselvesas a "republic"to manage their
affairsand disciplinetheirmembers(Darnton 1985:85-89). When, therefore, civil
societyhas been allowed to prosper,it has broughtwithit, in theWest, a discourse
and a cultureimbued with electoralformsand at least a minimaltoleranceof dis-
sent.
In EasternEurope, such institutionsof civil societyplayed a criticalrole of
translatingthesymbolicmeaningofstreettheaterintosystematic programs forpolitical
change. When the party-states of EasternEurope were forcedto sit down to nego-
tiate with the streetprotesters,therewere people with organizationalexperience
and programmaticideas who could manage the delicate transitionto democracy.
The glamour-seeking media has hardlyfocusedon this process,sometimesleaving
the impressionthatdramaticdemonstrations led to government collapseand a natu-
ral evolutionto electoralforms.But that is hardlya plausible scenario,and when
the full storyis told we will surelyfinda criticalrole of the institutionsof civil
societyin presidingover thatperilouspoliticalprocess.

It is notenough,however,to focuson institutions alone. The smalland vulner-

able groupsof dissidentintellectualsand workersin EasternEuropecould certainly
not match the organizationalmight of the party-statein these countries.But if
thereis one thingthat the rapid collapse of communistpartiesin EasternEurope
and Russia has taughtus, it is that social scientistshave misled us into accepting
an excessivelyreifiednotionof what "institutions"are. We have been led to think
of the party-state almostas a physicalstructure,of unshakablesize and weightand
power. Now we are in a positionto focuson the factthat such "structures"are,
in fact, made up of peoplewho are bound togetherby certainrules and habits,
interestsand aspirations,ritualsand sharedidentities.The people who make up
theseinstitutionsare not mindlesspartsof a party"machine,"acting alwaysand
unfailinglyin the interestof that machine. (Gorbachevand his supportersin the
Soviet Union obviouslycannotbe understoodif we identifythem only as leaders
and servantsof the CommunistPartymachine.)
Once we escapean excessivelyinstitutional approachto politicsin state-socialist
systems,we are in a betterpositionto appreciatethe impactof the cultureof civil
society,thehabitus (Bourdieu1977:72-87) thatreemerged fromthecollectivememory
to give life to the East Europeanmovementsof dissent. One participant/observer
of the Polish experiencehas noted "the explosionof nationalmemory. . . the
massiveturnoutforanniversary celebrations"thatfollowedthefirstSolidaritystrug-
gles of 1980-81 (Machcewicz1989:19). In small ritualsand mass celebrations,the
habitusof democraticgovernancewas revivedfroma culturerichin civic ritualsand
the theaterof popularrule.
As we notedabove, China'simperialstateallowedminimaldevelopmentofcivil
society.The late Qing and the Republicanera witnesseda brieffloweringof civil
society,but its rootswerenotdeep. In addition,as David Strandhas shown(1989:98-
120; 1990), this new civil societyfoundit difficultto escape the old politics of
personalnetworks,and the leadersof the new civic institutionstendedto look for
patronswithin the state system.The habitusof autonomousassociationwas still
weaklydeveloped. In addition,civil societyin China neverprovidedan adequate
foundationforpluralistpolitics. To a largedegree,it revealedthisweaknessin its
rhetoric.The Chinesepress(both a componentand a mouthpieceof China's nascent
civil society)tendedto speak of the "people" as an undifferentiated whole-usually
standingagainst an opposingsymbolic category, "officials,"i.e., the state(Rankin
1986:166). Thus, when Chinese began to speak of "rule by the people" (minzhu),
the "people" werea unifiedmass. The separate"republics"of civil societywerenot
sufficiently legitimizedto bring,with the idea of democracy,the pluralismbred
in the corporaterootsof Europeancivil society.
Under the PRC, the budding sproutsof republicancivil societywere cut off
altogether.The rhetoricof the undifferentiated people was usurpedby the stateto
establisha "people's democraticdictatorship."Dissidentswere safelyexcluded as
"enemiesof the people." Pluralismexistedneitherin the organizationof society
nor in the rhetoricof politics. Both the party-stateand its opponentsappealed to
the virtueof "unity." But only the partyexistedas a functioningpolitical orga-
nization.The tragicresultof thiscombinationof circumstances is thatthe Chinese
CommunistPartycan justlyclaim that thereis no politicalforceoutsidethe party
capable of rulingChina. Many of the hunger-strikers concededthis point in May
1989, and theyprobablyreflectedthe consensusof mostprotesters.In the wake of
June 4th, the party'sclaim to legitimacyrestson little more than this fact:there
is no alternativeto the CCP. The reagson thereis no alternativeis simple enough:
the partywill not permitone to exist. To preservetheirfragilelegitimacy,the

partyleadersmustrigorously suppressanyhintofpluralism:no autonomousstudent

or workers'unions, no publicationswhich might providean alternativevoice, no
civil society.Then theycan presentthe Chinesepeople with a bleak choice: either
continuedCommunistrule or chaos.
Withouta civil society,onlystreettheaterremainsas a mode ofpoliticalexpres-
sion. No Chinese regimehas ever been able to suppressit altogether.The smooth
functioningof Chinesepoliticsrequirespublic ritualsto celebratethe ideals of the
revolutionand the party-statewhichemergedfromit. In time, studentswill again
findan opportunityto usurp those ritualsto performtheirown political theater.
Then the question will again arise: can they(and the state) find a mechanismto
link this theaterto the complextask of governing1.1 billion Chinese?
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Acting Out Democracy: Political Theater in Modern China

Author(s): Joseph W. Esherick and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom

This content downloaded from 188.72.126.25 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 20:56:57 PM

JosephW. Esherickis Professor of Historyat the Universityof California,San Diego.

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evolutiontowarddemocraticgovernancein EasternEurope, but in China led only

'Although the officialrhetorichad some effectin alienatingsupportforthe students

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degreebecause) he was ousted frompowerby the alliance of hard-liners and party

While Westerndemocraticnotionsare normallylinked to pluralismand the free

2Althoughhis ChineseDemocracy is repletewith usefulexamplesof the sort just cited,

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speechesFang Lizhi gave at the city'sTongji University earlierthatyear.The main

China's Springas PoliticalTheater

It would seem thata moreproductiveway to understandthe eventsof April-

3Note this May 1989 exchangebetweena youth, barredfromboardinga bus where

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symbol-ladenperformances whose efficacylies largelyin theirpowerto move spe-

This content downloaded from 188.72.126.25 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 20:56:57 PM

The particulardangerin the case ofpoliticalfuneralsarisesfromthe possibility

4This patternis hardlyunique to China. Comparethis accountof a demonstration by

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era labor dispute involveda hungerstrike(Elizabeth Perry,personalcommunica-

This content downloaded from 188.72.126.25 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 20:56:57 PM

and othercitiesin 1989 (Niming 1990; Pieke 1989). First,citizenslinedtheparade

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provincialleaders, regionalmilitarycommands,and functionalministriesof the

6MichelOksenberg provoked ourthinking on thispoint.It becameclearduringNixon's

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Ritual and Theater

71f,forexample,a priestat masswerejustto pourwineintoa chalice,dumpwafers

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more liberatedfromthe rigid constraintsof tradition,and providesautonomous

8Here, Geertz is less helpful.Althoughhe has writtenat lengthabout the "theater

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thenew Hanoverianregime,whichwerestagedto offset Jacobinmockeries ofGeorgeI

This content downloaded from 188.72.126.25 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 20:56:57 PM

and begged their forgivenessand understanding(Lianhebao 1989:69-71; Han

"1These playsdeal withthesearchoftheBuddha'sdisciple,Mulian,through

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1919 to protestimperialistthreatsfromabroad and warlordcorruptionat home,

Few cultureshave given ritualas crucial a role in governanceas did China.

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categorizingand describingthe correctpracticeof ritual(li) associatedwith rela-

12Especiallywhencompared to Chinesetheateraudiences,thesilenceof ritual"audi-

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city'sarmedmilitia,handedthe keysto the city(an act of fealty,but also a gesture

Such mass petitionmovementswere surelyunusual, but the scriptwas well

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officials.Thus religiousritualcould serve,in EmilyAhern'swords(1981:92), as a

In the finalyearsof the Qing dynasty,the New Policy reformsusheredin a

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speciallyconstructed buildings.The architecture of thesestructuressymbolizedthe

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The new Republic inauguratedin 1912 broughtfortha politicaltheaterappro-

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corruptionthat theyconvincedneitherforeignobserversnor the Chineseelectorate

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neglectingtheir studies, suppressedtheir illegal marchesand condemnedtheir

ofboth1985 and 1986-

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willingnessto "die forthe affairsof the nation" by committingsuicide afterhis