Human Rights Impact Statement CP - SDI 2018 BGHT

Human Rights Impact Statement
Counterplan
Notes
General
This counterplan does a Human Rights Impact Statement/Assessment over the area of the plan. We say it
must be consistent with the ratified Rights in the United States.
There are several examples of ratified rights.
ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – ratified by the U.S. in 1992)
 Prohibition of slavery
 Right to freedom of movement
 Rights to fair and public hearing by impartial tribunal
 Right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
 Right to privacy
 Right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion
 Right to freedom of expression
 Non-discrimination and equality under the law
CERD (International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination – ratified
1994)
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Human rights impact statement is modelled after the Environmental impact statement in NEPA. That
process is described in the next header.
FYI How NEPA Statements Work
Wexler, 2008 (Lesley, Assistant Professor @ Florida State University College of Law, “ARTICLE:
HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT STATEMENTS: AN IMMIGRATION CASE STUDY” Georgetown
Immigration Law Journal Lexis)
Under the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969, federal agencies [*297] must undertake an
environmental assessment to identify the potential environmental consequences of any "major federal
action." Most proposed major federal actions require an agency to conduct an environmental assessment
87 at an early planning stage. 88 If the environmental assessment results in a "finding of a significant
impact," which means that the action has the potential to significantly affect the environment, the relevant
federal agency must produce an environmental impact statement ("EIS"). 89 These EISs include detailed
information on the environmental impacts of the proposed action, the alternatives to the proposed action,
and any available mitigation measures. In addition, in analyzing project alternatives, agencies must
consider the purpose of the project and then what might constitute reasonable alternatives given the
project's purpose. 90 The NEPA urges agencies to "use all practicable means" to "restore and enhance"
the environment and "avoid or minimize any possible adverse effects of their actions upon the quality of
the human environment." 91
In addition to generating environmental review for agency actions, the NEPA also includes a dictate for
legislative environmental impact statements. 92 Not all legislation is subject to this requirement; only
those bills or legislative proposals "developed by or with the significant cooperation and support of a
Federal agency" must comply. 93 Otherwise, Congress, the judiciary, and the president are exempted
from the NEPA's requirements. 94
The NEPA's purpose is to yield better agency decisions. 95 The drafters intended the NEPA to be an
action-forcing statute--agencies must justify any deviations to the public. 96 In order to accomplish its
purpose, the Council on Environmental Quality directs agencies to focus "on the issues that are truly
significant to the action in question, rather than amass[] needless detail." 97 Thus, the NEPA seeks to
provide high-quality information that includes "accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and
public scrutiny." 98 In order to achieve this mission, the NEPA directs agencies to: write in plain
language, 99 follow a clear format for EISs, 100 and emphasize the [*298] portions useful to decision-
makers and the public. 101 Draft EISs must discuss "all major points of view on the environmental
impacts of the alternatives including the proposed action," including those alternatives "not within the
jurisdiction of the lead agency" and "the alternative of no action." 102 The discussion of environmental
impacts must include both direct and indirect effects as well as means to mitigate adverse environmental
impacts. 103 Most importantly, agencies must issue a record of decision before taking any action that has
an adverse environmental impact or that would limit the choice of reasonable alternatives. 104
Congress created the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") to oversee the NEPA's implementation.
While each existing federal agency conducts individual assessments, the CEQ developed over-arching
guidelines to help individual agencies implement the NEPA. 105 The existence of the CEQ allowed for
mid-stream corrections as agencies experimented with the NEPA mandates. In addition to looking at
federal experiences under the NEPA, the CEQ also used state experiences under state statutes to help
develop federal regulations. The CEQ also fostered harmonization between state and federal reporting
requirements. 106
Congress recognized the limitations of information-gathering and assessment. Agencies must identify any
incomplete or unavailable evidence and discuss its relevance. 107 Agencies must also make clear when
they are using a cost-benefit analysis and include a statement of other considerations likely to be relevant
to the decision. 108 They also need to identify any scientific methodologies used in preparing the report.
109 An agency generally prepares an EIS itself, but it may also permit an applicant or a contractor
selected by the agency to prepare an environmental assessment. 110 Even when others submit
information, the agency must independently evaluate the information and is responsible for its accuracy.
111
External participation is an important part of the NEPA review process. The NEPA directs agencies to
circulate draft and final EISs, 112 as well as to provide notice of NEPA-related hearings. 113 The
agency solicits comments from appropriate state and local agencies, other agencies with special [*299]
expertise, and the public. 114 The agency must then respond to the comments by: modifying alternatives,
evaluating new alternatives, supplementing or modifying its analyses, making factual corrections, or
explaining why the comments do not warrant further agency response. 115 After the comment period, the
agency must then prepare a public record of its decision that states "whether all practicable means to
avoid or minimize environmental harm from the alternative selected have been adopted, and if not, why
they were not." 116
Over the last thirty-eight years, the Council on Environmental Quality 117 and the courts have fleshed
out many of the contours of the environmental review process, although much litigation remains. For
instance, after initial confusion, the determination whether a proposed activity constitutes a "major federal
action" necessary to trigger the initial environmental assessment is usually rather simple. 118 Most of the
current controversies involve those cases when groups contest the "finding of no significant impact,"
because such a finding determines whether the agency must undertake a environmental impact statement.
Both environmental and industry groups have grown increasingly sophisticated, often bringing their own
experts and evidence to bear on the agency's review.
Shells
1nc
Text: The United States federal government should initiate a binding impact
assessment regarding the consequences of _____ and adopt such measure only if it
can be made consistent with human rights ratified by the United States.
The CP establishes Humans Rights review – Immigration is a key test

To develop a sense of how human rights review would operate in practice, this paper uses immigrants'
human rights as a starting point from which to identify issues raised by particular design choices. As
immigrants suffer a wide variety of human rights abuses and possess an extensive array of international
human rights protections, t hey provide a helpful test case for the [*304] development of a human
rights review process . Immigrants are subject to various and often overlapping government authorities
and policies, so designers can compare different federal, state, and local approaches to human rights
review. Moreover, such a model tests the limits of human rights review as immigrants are a relatively
unpopular, politically powerless social group.
Trump is collapsing human rights credibility which triggers authoritarian

backsliding – action is key to signal strong support for international rights
Nossel, 6/19/2017 (Suzanne, executive director of the Pen American Center and was formerly deputy
assistant secretary of state for international organizations at the U.S. State Department. "It’s OK That
Trump Doesn’t Care About Human Rights, America Still Does" Foreign Policy,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/19/its-ok-that-trump-doesnt-care-about-human-rights/)
Amid the endless post-mortem of Donald Trump’s first overseas trip, human rights advocates have
focused more fire on what the president didn’t say than what he did: His failure to call out rights abuses in
Saudi Arabia or anywhere else left activists aghast. Yet, nearly five months into Trump’s administration,
his attitude toward human rights can come as no surprise. The president doesn’t go much for strictures of
any kind, much less international legal standards and softer norms developed by humanitarians, activists,
and lawyers. He has little regard for precepts and edicts enshrined in treaties and overseen by U.N.
institutions. He isn’t moved by the invocation of universal values, principles, or truths. He isn’t even
moved by the courage of the powerless citizen who challenges the strongman; between authoritarian
rulers and the dissidents who challenge them, he chooses the former almost every time.
In light of this, it is time for human rights advocates to pivot from voicing outrage at the president’s
failure to press for rights in his global pronouncements and appearances and instead double down on
making sure the rest of the world understands he does not speak for all Americans. The idea that the
current White House will press Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to release his country’s jailed
journalists and academics, urge China’s Xi Jinping to loosen restrictions on anti-government speech, or
persuade Arab leaders to usher in democratic reforms is fantasy. Moreover, coming from this president,
speeches and statements on human rights would ring hollow, compounding the global propensity to read
hypocrisy and cynicism into American articulations of values. Rights advocates would be better off
working to temper the worst in Trump’s domestic policies and finding other vehicles and voices to
uphold, and ultimately restore, the credibility of the United States as a global human rights
standard-bearer. Advocates may find there is a silver lining of sorts in Trump’s silence on rights: It
creates an opportunity for more credible actors — from members of Congress to intellectuals and
activists — to remind the world that despite Trump’s election, liberal values and support for dissidents
remain strong across the United States.
Consider Trump’s speech in Saudi Arabia, which aimed to rally Sunni Muslim nations to redouble the
fight against terrorism. Trump promised Arab allies, “We are not here to lecture — we are not here to tell
other people how to live, what to do, who to be, or how to worship.” Trump’s sojourn in Saudi Arabia
made no mention of the country’s imprisoned and brutalized political dissidents, no comment on its
repressive policies toward women, gays and lesbians, or minority groups. Foregoing critique of any kind,
he pronounced the kingdom “magnificent.” And just weeks before, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson gave
a tour d’horizon speech to diplomats that stressed national security and economic interests and slighted
human rights and democratic values.
Make no mistake: Trump and Tillerson’s silence on human rights issues is a betrayal to rights advocates
and those they defend. There is every reason to voice alarm that the U.S. president is surrendering
American credibility as a force for human rights, betraying rights defenders and dissidents who have long
looked to Washington as an ally, and even undercutting years of rights-oriented policy by demonstrating
that America’s commitment to its professed values is politically contingent and expendable. The damage
caused by Trump’s reversals will be real and lasting. However fraught and uneven, the U.S. commitment
to human rights has long imbued its foreign policy with a sense of moral conviction and uplift, tempered
some of Washington’s most bellicose and self-serving instincts, and made international affairs into
something more purposeful than a grinding, cyclical power game.
But the real blow to U.S. global human rights leadership is, of course, a function of beliefs, policies, and
actions — not simply the rhetoric that reflects them. Trump was quick to remake the Obama
administration’s standoffish relationship with Egyptian military ruler Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, ending the cold
shoulder with the warm embrace of a high-profile visit to Washington and praise for the autocrat’s
“fantastic job” as president. Neither Trump nor anyone in the administration has spoken about Egypt’s
killing of protesters and arrests of tens of thousands of political dissidents. Trump’s affection has given
Sisi license to issue a draconian new law regulating nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), never mind
that such laws have previously been used to target and even jail American NGO workers. In late March,
Tillerson greenlighted large-scale arms shipments including F-16 airplanes to Bahrain, lifting human
rights conditions that the Obama administration imposed after a harsh crackdown on protesters. The most
heavily touted “deliverable” of Trump’s Middle East junket was a $110 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia.
No amount of homage to jailed activists or pleas for women’s rights could ever have made up for that.
Earlier, Tillerson had skipped the public release of the State Department’s annual global human rights
report, an event traditionally attended by his predecessors regardless of party. In his initial weeks in
office, Trump made clear that he favored reintroducing torture as an interrogation technique and only
demurred because Defense Secretary James Mattis talked him out of it. Top human rights posts in the
administration either sit empty or have been filled with officials who lack any human rights background
or expertise — meaning that when key decisions are made, no one will be at the table to advocate that
rights be considered. Trump’s one grand “humanitarian” gesture since taking office, ordering cruise
missile strikes on a Syrian air base that was used to launch a chemical weapons attack, was, by his own
account, an act of intuition and impulse, driven by outrage and possibly by compassion but not by fealty
to an international norm under assault.
The Trump administration has also pursued domestic policies that call into question America’s claim to
international leadership in areas including press freedom, tolerance for political dissent, women’s rights,
and the protection of religious minorities, refugees, and immigrants. Trump’s attacks on the press and
false cries of fake news make it impossible for him to act as a champion for the rights of journalists or
independent media globally. His indignation at criticism and propensity to lash out against opponents
make him an uneasy ally for dissidents worldwide. His slashing of funding for women’s health care and
reproductive rights would hollow out any pronouncements he might offer on women’s rights. His
restrictive approach to refugees, plans for a wall to block migrants from Mexico, and indifference toward
immigrant workers render him unfit to extoll the virtues of a humane approach to global migration.
Beyond that, Trump’s refusal to respect the integrity and independence of federal law enforcement
institutions, his cronyism, nepotism, lack of transparency, and proclivity toward self-dealing make him an
impossible exponent for the values of good governance, accountability, transparency, and rule of law that
underpin the defense of human rights.
Given all this, human rights advocates need to do more than decry each and every missed opportunity for
the president to articulate a set of values that he manifestly does not share. Even those U.S. presidents
most passionate about the spread of rights and freedoms — Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and Barack
Obama — walked a tightrope in trying to maintain America’s credibility on human rights while seeking
to advance a breadth of foreign-policy interests, many of which directly contradicted rights-respecting
policies. For as long as the United States has had an articulated human rights policy Washington has been
dogged by charges of selectivity, hypocrisy, and empty rhetoric. Against this backdrop, Trumpian
pronouncements on human rights seem liable to hurt more than they help, making it easier to impugn
other American leaders and future presidents as equally insincere.
This is not to suggest that advocates should give up on the role of the United States as a defender of
human rights. Now, with authoritarianism on the rise in China , Russia, Turkey, the Philippines,
and Hungary and intact in much of the Middle East and Africa — and ba cksliding likely to
accelerate amid an absence of leadership from the White House — brave rights defenders and
dissidents in those countries need more international support , not less. Left to their own interests ,
governments like Russia and China that wish to weaken international human rights institutions and
instruments will seize opportunities to expand their influence. Progress made in advancing norms of
international accountability, LGBT rights, and the protection of journalists and human rights defenders
will almost certainly atrophy.
But crocodile tears from President Trump, should they even be offered, will address none of that. Much
more important are efforts to show the world that the current administration is neither the only face of
America’s role in the world nor the sole vessel for U.S. values. Most foreign governments and informed
citizens know that most of Washington regards his leadership with skepticism and that his public approval
ratings are at historic lows. Members of Congress, civil society organizations, and other institutions work
to defend human rights globally and can speak out and step up where the current administration won’t.
The role of these actors in showing solidarity with dissidents, calling out repressive policies, supporting
rights defenders, and advocating for the role of institutions and norms should redouble as the White
House retreats. That Trump won’t — and can’t credibly — speak out doesn’t mean that American society
or even the American government must go quiet. Members of Congress can hold hearings, send letters,
take meetings with visiting advocates, take part in delegations, and otherwise demonstrate that the U.S.
government as a whole takes seriously its role as a human rights standard-bearer , even if the current
administration amounts to an egregious lapse.
Funders should step up to help alleviate the strain that civil society organizations face in trying to address
the challenges posed by the president’s domestic policies while simultaneously trying to fill the vacuum
created by the administration’s retreat from America’s traditional role as a rights defender globally. These
groups should not be forced to choose now that the agenda at home has grown so imperative as well. In
recent years, private funders of human rights campaigns have been shifting their support away from U.S.-
and European-based groups in favor of direct help to advocates working in hotspots around the world.
The logic is simple: The solution to human rights abuses in Turkey, Russia, or China won’t be found in
Washington. The Obama administration reinforced these efforts through its own campaign to buttress
local civil society organizations around the world, offer them financial support, and elevate their
participation in international diplomacy. Importantly, this assistance in funding and organizational
development came backed with the moral leadership of the U.S. government voiced at the highest levels
and through its diplomatic missions.
But with President Trump’s budget dramatically scaling back such support, foundations should reinvest
additional resources in organizations and partners who can keep faith with international counterparts,
raise the global media profile of rights violations and crises, and apply pressure through international
mechanisms and forums. Such efforts will help blunt the impact of the Trump administration’s
indifference, catalyze the engagement of Capitol Hill on human rights issues, and sustain and strengthen
connections internationally. Trump’s retreat from leadership on human rights can be mitigated if
nongovernmental groups lean in. Just as civil society organizations and the media are tempering some of
the president’s most constitutionally and morally dubious domestic policies, so they should also help to
bridge shortfalls in funding, speak out for those who counted on the United States for support, and fortify
civil society groups that the Trump administration is abandoning.
The best way to preserve America’s global human rights leadership is not to put words in Trump’s mouth
but to demonstrate that the U.S. system of government, strong independent civil society, and claim to
global leadership are strong enough to withstand his term of office.
The CP Reverses the perception of hypocrisy and restores US Human Rights

Leadership
Human rights impact statements and other review mechanisms might also be used as evidence of good
faith domestic treaty compliance. To the extent that the United States already implicitly complies with
reporting requirements under the human rights treaties it has ratified and implemented, foreign countries
find America's disinclination to use human rights language problematic. 52 Thus, instead of using a
constitutional metric to determine violations when collecting information on police brutality, for example,
U.S. states could do so instead by documenting the issue in terms of human rights. By adding treaty
language to the assessment process, transmitting our efforts at compliance across the globe becomes
easier.
Enhancing our reputation for human rights compliance is especially important given current political
realities. Many countries hold a declining opinion of t he United States. 53 The international community
would welcome America's affirmation of the continuing importance of human rights in the wake of many
post-September 11th actions such as torture, extraordinary rendition, increased domestic surveillance, and
harsher and more frequent detention of immigrants. Moreover, the international community would benefit
from the assurance that the concept of "human rights" means more than a justification for regime change.
54 American exceptionalism to human rights law angers our allies and complicates efforts to secure their
cooperation. 55 Not surprisingly, many countries view the United States' silence about its own human
rights failings as hypocritical. 56 In particular, the international community strongly criticizes the State
Department's annual human rights reports for omitting an assessment of domestic performance as well as
omitting "actions by governments taken at the request of the United States or with the expressed support
of the United States . . . ." 57 Human rights advocates suggest that U.S. leadership on human rights faces
a severe [*293] credibility gap--for instance, other countries perceive the United States as a laggard on
human rights treaty compliance in regards to migrants 58 --but that repudiation of past abuses and
momentum for policy changes could restore its leadership . 59
As many have suggested, good international relations are vital to winning the War on Terror. 60
Moreover, international cooperation is essential to address immigration related issues such as human
trafficking. A visible commitment to migrants' human rights might bolster the United States' credibility
when it seeks better treatment for the approximately 2 million American emigres. 61 Other international
problems, such as climate change and related environmental issues, also require cooperation and
leadership. An increased willingness to participate in global human rights discourse and demonstrate
adherence to human rights treaties might enhance our ability to lead and participate in other arenas.
Global backsliding unravels international problem-solving on multiple existential

threats and causes wars
Kendall-Taylor, 7/15/2016 (Andrea, deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at
the National Intelligence Council and a nonresident senior associate in the Human Rights Initiative at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. “How Democracy’s Decline Would
Undermine the International Order,” Center for Strategic & International Studies,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-
order)
It is rare that policymakers, analysts, and academics agree. But there is an emerging consensus in the
world of foreign policy: threats to the stability of the current international order are rising. The norms,
values, laws, and institutions that have undergirded the international system and governed relationships
between nations are being gradually dismantled. The most discussed sources of this pressure are the
ascent of China and other non-Western countries, Russia’s assertive foreign policy, and the diffusion of
power from traditional nation-states to nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations,
multinational corporations, and technology-empowered individuals. Largely missing from these
discussions, however, is the specter of widespread democratic decline. Rising challenges to democratic
governance across the globe are a major strain on the international system , but they receive far less
attention in discussions of the shifting world order.
In the 70 years since the end of World War II, the United States has fostered a global order dominated by
states that are liberal, capitalist, and democratic. The United States has promoted the spread of democracy
to strengthen global norms and rules that constitute the foundation of our current international system.
However, despite the steady rise of democracy since the end of the Cold War, over the last 10 years we
have seen dramatic reversals in respect for democratic principles across the globe. A 2015 Freedom
House report stated that the “acceptance of democracy as the world’s dominant form of government—and
of an international system built on democratic ideals—is under greater threat than at any point in the last
25 years.”
Although the number of democracies in the world is at an all-time high, there are a number of key trends
that are working to undermine democracy. The rollback of democracy in a few influential states or even
in a number of less consequential ones would almost certainly accelerate meaningful changes in today’s
global order.
Democratic decline would weaken U.S. partnerships and erode an important foundation for U.S.
cooperation abroad. Research demonstrates that domestic politics are a key determinant of the
international behavior of states. In particular, democracies are more likely to form alliances and cooperate
more fully with other democracies than with autocracies. Similarly, authoritarian countries have
established mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of “worst practices.” An increase in authoritarian
countries, then, would provide a broader platform for coordination that could enable these countries to
overcome their divergent histories, values, and interests—factors that are frequently cited as obstacles to
the formation of a cohesive challenge to the U.S.-led international system.
Recent examples support the empirical data. Democratic backsliding in Hungary and the hardening of
Egypt’s autocracy under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have led to enhanced relations between these countries and
Russia. Likewise, democratic decline in Bangladesh has led Sheikh Hasina Wazed and her ruling Awami
League to seek closer relations with China and Russia, in part to mitigate Western pressure and bolster
the regime’s domestic standing.
Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership,
democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously
exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners on specific
issues, the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited. Consequently, further democratic decline
could seriously compromise the United States’ ability to form the kinds of deep partnerships that
will be required to confront today’s increasingly complex challenges . Global issues such as climate
change , migration, and violent extremism demand the coordination and cooperation that democratic
backsliding would put in peril. Put simply, the United States is a less effective and influential actor if it
loses its ability to rely on its partnerships with other democratic nations.
A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the current global order by diluting U.S. influence in
critical international institutions, including the United Nations , the World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would weaken Western efforts within these institutions to
advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to protect. In the case of Internet
governance, for example, Western democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet.
Autocracies, in contrast, promote state control over the Internet, including laws and other mechanisms
that facilitate their ability to censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including
Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the “Likeminded Group of Developing Countries”
within the United Nations to advocate their interests.
Within the IMF and World Bank, autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down
conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in exchange for financial support. If successful,
diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance reforms. In a more
extreme scenario, the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries to bypass the IMF and
World Bank all together. For example, the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and
the BRICS Bank—which includes Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—
provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial institutions when it suits their
interests. Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global economic governance will become
fragmented and less effective.
Violence and instability would also likely increase if more democracies give way to autocracy .
International relations literature tells us that democracies are less likely to fight wars against other
democracies, suggesting that interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies declines .
Moreover, within countries that are already autocratic, additional movement away from democracy, or an
“authoritarian hardening,” would increase global instability. Highly repressive autocracies are the most
likely to experience state failure , as was the case in the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, Syria,
and Yemen. In this way, democratic decline would significantly strain the international order because
rising levels of instability would exceed the West’s ability to respond to the tremendous costs of
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and refugee flows.
Finally, widespread democratic decline would contribute to rising anti-U.S. sentiment that could fuel a
global order that is increasingly antagonistic to the United States and its values. Most autocracies are
highly suspicious of U.S. intentions and view the creation of an external enemy as an effective means for
boosting their own public support. Russian president Vladimir Putin, Venezuelan president Nicolas
Maduro, and Bolivian president Evo Morales regularly accuse the United States of fomenting instability
and supporting regime change. This vilification of the United States is a convenient way of distracting
their publics from regime shortcomings and fostering public support for strongman tactics.
Counterplan
2nc Say Yes
The counterplan solves 100% of the case –
The plan will be approved – Obviously, Humans Rights frameworks supports
increasing legal immigration and decreasing restrictions on immigration.
While there is support there will likely be modifications that improve solvency
including blocking access for bad people in various contexts.
Human rights review will approve the plan – overcomes obstacles to advancing Ilaw
generally
Cole, 2006 (David, Professor @ Georgetown University Law Center, “Article: THE IDEA OF
HUMANITY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS” Columbia Human Rights Law
Review Lexis)
Are international human rights arguments likely to be effective in advancing immigrants' rights in the
United States? There are many reasons to be pessimistic. Despite its history as a nation of immigrants and
the ever-increasing diversity of its populace, the United States remains a deeply parochial and nationalist
culture, and the law shares that parochialism. International human rights arguments are often seen as the
advocates' last refuge, pulled out only when there is no other authority to cite. In the absence of an
international forum with the power to hold the United States accountable, and in the face of
Congressional directives that the international human rights treaties it has ratified are not "self- [*629]
executing," international human rights feel aspirational, without the force of law. It is not surprising, then,
that international human rights arguments are rarely advanced in domestic U.S. courts - in immigration
cases or elsewhere. Nor should it be surprising that in those few instances where such arguments are
broached, they are as often as not ignored or summarily dismissed.
Yet despite these substantial obstacles, there are also reasons to be optimistic about the potential for
advancing immigrants' rights through international human rights. As Hermann Cohen's quotation implies,
human rights are just that - human rights - and therefore generally do not acknowledge distinctions
between citizens and noncitizens. The rights identified and protected in international human rights treaties
derive from human dignity, and dignity does not turn on the type of passport or visa a person holds .
Accordingly, human rights discourse offers tremendous normative power and potential for advancing
social justice on behalf of foreign nationals in the United States. In some sense, it would be irresponsible
not to explore that potential. And for a variety of reasons, now is an especially propitious time for such
exploration.
There will only be small modifications – those are easy, and will be accepted.
Hunt and Mac Naughton, 2006 (Paul, Law at the Human Rights Centre, University of Essex and
Special Rapportuer on the right to the highest attainable standard of health, and Gillian, Senior Research
Officer Human Rights Center @ University of Essex, “Impact Assessments, Poverty and Human Rights:
A Case Study Using The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health” 5/31/2006
http://www.who.int/hhr/Series_6_Impact%20Assessments_Hunt_MacNaughton1.pdf)
The purpose of this report is to contribute to discussions on human rights and impact assessments. In
recent years, there have been increasing calls for governments to perform human rights impact
assessments prior to adopting and implementing policies, programs and projects. Yet to date, there has
been little published on methodologies or tools to aid governments in undertaking human rights impact
assessments. This report examines some recent developments on human rights impact assessment and,
using the right to health as a case study, proposes a methodology for incorporating human rights into
other forms of impact assessment.
The aim of human rights impact assessment in this study is to aid governments in complying with their
international and national human rights obligations. In general, impact assessment is a process used to
predict the future consequences of proposed policies , programs and projects and thereby to provide
governments with opportunities to improve them before they are adopted or implemented. In the context
of human rights impact assessment, the process aids governments in choosing between alternatives,
making modifications , and providing for mitigating measures in order to respect, protect and fulfill
human rights. Thus, human rights impact assessment helps governments to adopt and implement policies ,
programs and projects that will best meet their obligations to take deliberate and concrete steps toward
progressive realization of human rights.
HRIA’s will be accepted – the process is self-reflexive.

Maassarani et al, 2007 (Tarek F., Juris Doctorate from Georgetown University Law Center and a
Master's in International Affairs from Columbia University, Margo Tatgenhorst Drakos, candidate for a
Master's in Human Rights from Columbia University, and Joanna Pajkowska, “Extracting Corporate
Responsibility: Towards a Human Rights Impact Assessment” Cornell International Law Journal Lexis)
[*152] In summary, HRIA's directive to assess systematically and openly a project's impact on human
rights, to propose feasible alternatives, and to consider feedback from the impacted communities will
improve decision-making by the corporation by assuring informed participation and empowering
stakeholders. Furthermore, by recognizing positive contributions towards the fulfillment of human rights,
the HRIA promotes and rewards the beneficial effects of corporate activity. As a broader social
innovation, the HRIA will play a critical role in raising awareness about human rights, identifying
business practices and policies that further human rights and sustainable economic development,
translating general human rights objectives into specific priorities and concrete measures, and
illuminating the causal links between specific economic activities or policies and human rights. 104
Finally, through constant iteration, evaluation, and adaptation, the HRIA will have a self-reflexive and
evolutionary quality, allowing it to improve through use.
Impact statements are good – create better decisions and accountability.

In theory, review processes such as impact assessments and impact statements serve several important
functions. Most obviously, these review processes generate information to educate both the public and
policymakers. Supporters of the NEPA suggest that its combination of "information, transparency, and
political accountability creates powerful pressures on agency decision-makers to avoid the most
environmentally damaging courses of action , and to mitigate environmental harms when it is cost
effective to do so." 65 The information created by review processes encourages decision-makers to reject
or modify some proposed actions either because (a) these decision-makers' rational, technocratic values
allow them to use the new information to come to a better decision or (b) these decision-makers' desire to
avoid the ensuing public and interest group pressure encourages them to mitigate potential impacts. 66
The administrative or political burden of the review process may also deter the consideration or alter the
contents of proposals likely to be subject to an extensive, contested impact statement . Outside of its
influence on a particular government action, the cumulative effect of a review process helps inform the
larger policy and public debate about an issue area by providing clear goals and creating easily
identifiable and objective metrics to measure the attainment of those goals. 67 The information generated
and decisions made can also guide the behavior of outside actors such as corporations and other
governments. 68
Optimism about the theorized outcome of review processes should be tempered by the serious criticisms
lodged by scholars and advocates. 69 In their worst incarnations, review processes produce low-value
information at a high cost. Information overload can degrade the quality of action or cause paralysis by
analysis. Similarly, some review processes emphasize procedure over substance, creating a mere hoop
jumping exercise rather than a reasoned decision-making endeavor. In addition, rather than encouraging
transparency, technocrats and other experts may quietly infuse their values into the [*295] assessments
without disclosing such bias to the public. Finally, the prospective nature of most review processes tends
toward massive one-shot information gathering exercises and thus fails to account for changes in dynamic
environments.
Despite such potential shortcomings, empirical and anecdotal evidence from the environmental context
supports the value of impact statements. 70 While some of the value of review processes depends on
optimal implementation, the lack of robust litigation and legislative options in the human rights arena
warrants experimentation with new approaches. In fact, one of the lesser-noted benefits of a review
process is its ability to generate information that improves decision-making outside of its immediate
context.
Solves Public Attitude.
The counterplan gives immigrants a voice even if the outcome is not in their favor.
In addition, the human rights review process could serve an educational function by raising consciousness
about the importance and substance of human rights and the potential effect of legislation and agency
action on immigrants. For example, during an environmental impact statement, the public can enhance
agency decision making by providing expert statements on the nature of the risk posed, its long term
effects, and the harms posed by alternative decisions. Similarly, interest groups like the American Civil
Liberties Union or Human Rights First might be able to provide legal analysis and data that the agency
itself lacks. Individual migrants might also welcome the opportunity to participate through public
comments that provide a more personal perspective on the proposed action. Human rights review might
provide them with a voice to express discontent, an experience with value regardless of the outcome of
the process .
Solves Trafficking
Only a prior and binding HRIA can solve the root cause of problems cause by
trafficking.
Bakker, 2007 (Saskia, Program Manger for Human Rights for Women – Humanist Committee on
Human Rights, “Human Rights Impact of Anti-trafficking Interventions: Developing an Assessment
Tool” July http://www.bayswan.org/traffick/HOM_Summary.pdf)
In recent years, non-governmental organisations, specialists and advocates in the field of trafficking in
human beings, migrants’ rights and sex workers’ rights and related fields have observed with growing
concern various negative consequences of anti-trafficking interventions . Examples are:
1. Existing measures to protect and assist individuals who are identified as victims of trafficking are
inadequate and ineffective, and in many instances actually further harm the rights of those they are
intended to benefit.
2. Many anti-trafficking laws, policies and practices contribute to the stigmatisation and criminalisation of
women working in nonformal, unregulated and unprotected labour sectors, most prominently sex workers
and domestic workers, both local and migrant. Thus making them more vulnerable for abusive practices .
3. In the long run, indiscriminate and repressive anti-trafficking laws, policies and campaigns, negatively
impact on women’s rights in general.
To be able to minimise negative impacts and maximise positive impacts of anti-trafficking interventions,
it is important to analyse the precise relation between those interventions and the human rights of the
people affected by those interventions. It is with this in mind that HOM, represented by Saskia Bakker,
together with Lin Chew and Marjan Wijers - two long-standing advocates of the necessity to adhere to
human rights principles in anti-trafficking measures – took the initiative to develop a human rights impact
assessment tool, which can help stakeholders in such a process.
As a first step in a proposed project to develop a human rights impact instrument for the documentation
and assessment of anti-trafficking laws, policies and measures (henceforth, the tool), an international
consultation was held 11-13 June in Utrecht. Aim of the consultation was to assess the need for such a
tool and to discuss possible objectives, functions, scope, content and process to develop the tool.
2. The consultation
The consultation brought together twenty persons, including the organisers. Participants were
representatives of NGOs, independent specialists and researchers, working in the related fields of anti-
trafficking and forced labour, human rights, labour rights, sex workers’ rights and migrants’ rights (see
participants list). Basis of the discussion was the preliminary project proposal written in October 2006
and a discussion paper formulating dilemmas and questions (note and ref. – we should set up a web-site
soon).
During the first two days intensive working sessions were held to table and discuss all the issues and
aspects which have to be taken into consideration in making the tool.
On the morning of the third day -13th June – the participants presented examples of the human rights
impact of anti trafficking interventions as well as the main outcomes of the discussions regarding the tool
in a public forum. In the afternoon they discussed their views with a number of donors, who responded
with great interest to the project, and expressed their willingness to support its further development.
3. Results of the consultation (preliminary, to be validated by participants)
This summary report presents the main results of the two days’ discussions, organised along four main
aspects, each of which encompasses multiple related issues discussed.
a) Need for the tool
There is a great need for a human rights impact assessment tool to analyse and assess anti-trafficking
laws, policies and measures
Participants unanimously affirmed that there is a need for an assessment tool, and that the initiative is a
welcome and timely one. A tool will help NGOs to bring human rights principles into practice in relation
to anti-trafficking measures. Contrary to the situation some years ago, experience now exists on the
development and use of such tools. The tool is needed for a variety of reasons:
- There is a lack of (technical) ability to analyse, make impact assessments and find solutions, especially
in situations where the needs and interests of various sectors and communities; intersect each other and
human rights issues are more complicated than what meets the eye;
- There is an urgent need for correct and reliable information as a basis for human rights advocacy in the
field of anti-trafficking policies and measures ;
- The groups affected by anti-trafficking policies (next to trafficked persons), in particular local sex
workers and migrant workers (including migrant sex workers and domestic workers), need to be
recognised as part of the solution and their participation needs to be guaranteed in decision-making
processes on anti-trafficking measures;
- It is necessary to document and analyse the extent of negative impacts of anti-trafficking laws, policies,
measures, as well as negative impacts caused by the application of non-traffickingspecific laws in an anti-
trafficking context;
- Causes and consequences of trafficking are not effectively addressed by current anti-trafficking policies
and interventions;
- Governments need to be held accountable for the harm resulting from their anti-trafficking and related
laws and policies, and for the protection and promotion of rights of those affected by those measures;
- A tool can help to show how globalisation and interdependence of countries within the scope of the
human trafficking issue sometimes ‘hide’ root causes, such as impoverishment and unequally distributed
wealth, as well as how corruption and impunity influence the implementation of measures.
Process Good
Process is still good even if it doesn’t stop HR abuses.
A human rights review process is not a panacea --violations will continue even with the implementation of
this proposal. A human rights review process does, however, force agencies and legislatures to at least
acknowledge immigrants' human rights, something they rarely do now. Such recognition may educate and
influence both the government and the public. It may also provide valuable evidence to the international
community of the United States' renewed commitment to human rights. Given the pervasiveness of
ongoing violations and the limitations on human rights treaty ratification and implementation, a new
strategy is warranted. This article begins exploring some of the design issues inherent in a review process,
but hopes that other academics and advocates will take up the call and further the investigation.
A2: Goals Are Static
Goals of impact statements can evolve – Family Impact Statements prove.
In the late 1970s, Senate hearings sparked the idea of family impact statements for the development and
assessment of public policies. 119 The suggestion languished until 1987, when President Reagan issued
Executive Order 12606 requiring executive departments and agencies to "identify proposed regulatory
and statutory provisions that may have significant potential negative impact on the family's well-being
and provide adequate rationale on why such a proposal should be submitted." 120 The executive order
was not intended to create any substantive or procedural rights. 121 Rather, for proposals falling under its
mandate, department and agency heads merely had to respond to particular questions about how the
proposal would [*300] affect the family in direct and symbolic ways. Coterminous with Executive Order
12606, a coalition of family organizations conducted and published several family impact statements of
new federal legislation. 122 This coalition also developed a set of family impact questions and guiding
principles to help other institutions frame their studies. 123
Some states, such as Illinois, 124 also chose to undertake family impact statements. Illinois required
eight human services departments to include information about how their programs promoted family
stability. 125 A handful of other states implemented or proposed such legislation. 126 Those state
government actors who did undertake the family impact statements were not specially trained and the
forms were rather superficial, but empirical evidence suggests that these family impact statements
"rais[ed] awareness of several issues." 127
One of the interesting aspects of the family policy review process is its transformation from a potential
tool to implement a progressive, liberal family policy to an executive order meant to regain political
ground for a more conservative approach to family policy . 128 This evolution demonstrates that while
the concept of impact statements may be value-neutral, the ultimate determination of the relevant
benchmarks and definitions of purposes and concepts can radically change the orientation of the review
process. For instance, the Reagan Administration viewed the primary goal of its family impact statements
executive order not to provide "specific policy decisions so much as general guidance to agencies to
consider 'the family' as [agencies] make decisions and, perhaps even more importantly, as they publicly
justify those decisions." 129
A2: Too Many Things Get Reviewed
Review will be limited.
As a considerable number of legislative and administrative policies implicate immigrants' human rights,
designers should first determine which policies to subject to human rights assessments and impact
statements. A very ambitious review process might simply cover any proposed government action.
Taking a cue from the NEPA, drafters could however limit the human rights review process to "major
government actions significantly affecting the human rights of migrants." Under the NEPA, the relevant
agency undertakes an initial environmental assessment for any proposed major government action. If the
environmental assessment yields a "finding of significant impact," then the agency continues the review
process with an EIS. This section tries to flesh out these terms in the human rights context. For instance,
what types of proposals should constitute a "major government action?" When does such an action
"significantly affect" immigrants' human rights? Which human rights should count for the review
process? Which governments and which actors should be subject to the requirement?
1. Activities Subject to Human Rights Review
Because of the vast scope of their actions, subjecting all of the activities of federal, state, and local
governments to environmental or human rights review would constitute a massive undertaking
demanding substantial resources. Yet it is not impossible. For instance, New York's SEQRA covers any
proposed action that comes before an agency. 154 By way of comparison, the Council of Environmental
Quality, which devises NEPA regulations, limits review to "major government actions" which include:
issuing government permits; establishing government policies and regulations; undertaking or authorizing
government projects; initiating activities subject to government control and responsibilities such as the
dispensation of government funds; 155 and failing to act when such government omission is otherwise
reviewable by a court. 156 This definition prioritizes particular types of policies, but state
experimentation suggests more expansive review is possible.
Under either a narrow or broad review process , however, certain substantive policy areas should be
subject to human rights impact statements. For example, relevant policies in the immigration context
include regulations governing: admission determinations; family reunification standards; and detention
policies for refugees, asylum seekers, and undocumented migrants. [*306] Other potentially relevant
policies include: projects to build border control structures; the use of government funds by private actors
to enhance border security; and government limitations on educational loans, housing, social services, and
employment for undocumented migrants.
In addition to executive agency action, the human rights review process might govern the legislative
branch as well. 157 As written, the NEPA only governs legislation initiated by agency action. However,
human rights violations often stem from the underlying legislation itself rather than the implementing
regulations or particular policies allowed under a legislative regime. Thus, some pieces of legislation
should be reviewed before they require agency action . For instance, efforts to revive Executive Order
13107, which sought to "vet proposed legislation for conformity with [human rights] treaty
requirements," are already underway. 158 By conducting reviews at both the legislative and the agency
level, those interested in protecting human rights get two bites at the apple. Legislative review would
focus on the law's overall purpose and any facial human rights violations, while agency review would
facilitate close attention to any human rights violations in implementing regulations or individual agency
decisions under the statute.
A2: No Capacity/Resources
State Department already has the capacity and expertise for human rights
reporting.
Although domestic actors have never conducted a human rights review following a NEPA framework, the
federal government and non-governmental organizations have already experimented with informational
tools in the human rights context. This subsection looks at other informational strategies, such as the State
Department's human rights reports, which suggest both the United States' capacity to conduct human
rights impact statements and the corrective role that non-governmental organizations can serve in
monitoring and improving government performance. These reports also warn of the potential
politicization of human rights information tools.
a. State Department
The United States possesses significant expertise in preparing reports on government compliance with
human rights obligations. Since 1975, the State Department has completed detailed reviews of every other
country's human rights performance. These reports influence congressional debates and public discourse,
134 corporations in choosing where to invest, judges adjudicating asylum status, government agencies in
distributing military and economic assistance packages, 135 and academics analyzing human rights
violations. 136 These reports provide extensive information on a variety of topics including: "political
and extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest, denial of fair trial, the state of freedom
of speech and press, freedom of religion, the right of citizens to change their government, and
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, disability, and social status. Children's and [*302] workers'
rights are also included." 137
The steady improvement of the quality and acceptance of these reports is worth noting. The State
Department initially undertook these reports to facilitate the linkage of human rights criteria to foreign
policy. The Nixon administration suggested that the previous lack of recorded and assessed human rights
violations made it impossible to objectively distinguish between countries for foreign policy purposes.
138 By conducting such reports, the government could use identifiable criteria and information in order
to provide foreign assistance to compliant countries.
Despite such aspirations, however, early reports suffered from inconsistent coverage and disagreements
over what constituted a "consistent pattern of gross violations." 139 Other countries and NGOs criticized
early reports for promoting Cold War ideology at the expense of objectivity by unfairly praising allies and
castigating enemies. 140 Partisan fights erupted over particular information in specific reports as well as
a more general disagreement over the potential inclusion of social, economic, and cultural rights
alongside political and civil rights. 141
Over time, the State Department enhanced the credibility of their reports, considered now by most
objective readers to be unbiased . 142 The State Department employed various strategies to improve
the quality of the reports. 143 The staff preparing the reports, for example, began to view themselves as
independent of any individual administration's politics, thus allowing them to resist pressure to slant the
reports. 144 Similarly, some scholars suggest that as "accurate and unbiased human rights reporting has
become an intrinsically important goal for many key actors within the [State] Department," the reports
have improved. 145 Intense congressional debate and outside scrutiny provide an additional quality
check.
A2: Doesn’t Solve Long Term
Review is ongoing and adaptable to changes.
Although agencies currently undertake environmental assessments prior to their decisions to pursue a
particular action, agencies and legislators can also conduct human rights reviews at later stages of policy
development. The NEPA includes a provision that allows agencies to monitor the implementation of their
decisions and permits them to condition funding on such implementation. 179 This monitoring function
does not, however, include the ability to review EIS findings or grant the authority to conduct a new
assessment or impact statement under changed circumstances. Although a purely prospective review
process ideally prevents the adoption of policies that infringe on immigrants' human rights, designers may
need to provide for ongoing review for several reasons. First, policies often have unintended
consequences; foresight is not perfect and non-discriminatory legislation and agency regulations may
inadvertently result in human rights violations in practice. Second, given changed circumstances, a policy
that once posed no significant impact on immigrants' human rights might do so over time. Moreover, an
agency might propose mitigation measures in order to avoid a full-blown human rights impact statement,
but then fail to implement those measures. 180 The formation of an ongoing duty to update human rights
assessments or review "findings of no significant impact" would help account for changed circumstances
and keep agencies and legislative bodies honest. 181 Further work will need to be done to determine
what will trigger an ongoing, as opposed to prospective, review.
A2: US Reports Bias
NGO’s will criticize bias US reports.
In addition to shadow reports responding to flaws in the State Department reports, some NGOs conduct
independent annual reviews of global human rights practices. 150 For instance, Human Rights Watch
surveys about seventy countries with a particular emphasis on "the freedom of local human rights
defenders to conduct their work" and the responses of key international actors to significant human rights
issues. 151 The latest report included a lengthy discussion of U.S. policies and criticized the executive
branch as particularly disrespectful of immigrants' human rights. 152
A2: Government’s Will Distort Data
Human rights experts in agencies and NGOs will ensure the HRIS is being followed.
Ideally, government agencies and legislative aides should conduct human rights reviews. 194 They often
possess the best information about the nature of the proposed action as well as a sense of who will be
most affected by such [*314] action. In order to undertake human rights review, agencies will need to
train or hire experts with the skills necessary to conduct such analysis. This inclusion of human rights
experts within the agency or legislative decision making process may diversify existing staffs and subtly
influence the agency's orientation. 195 Therefore, even an agency initially hostile to the inclusion of
human rights considerations may, like the State Department, grow to see such a review as an important
part of its institutional mission.
Even if government entities resist such accountability measures, NGOs may voluntarily undertake this
function as a second-best alternative. NGOs cannot formally bind governments and sometimes lack the
authority to demand information from an agency or legislative supporters. Even so, the many NGOs
skilled in information generation, acquisition, and dissemination , 196 may, with enough resources and
savvy, create assessments and reports similar to those produced by a government. Voluntary review can
also serve as an impetus to, or corrective for, government review because agencies are often sensitive to
external criticism and may prefer to control the flow of information. 197 At the very least, NGO
statements can serve a sorting function to assist immigrants and encourage sympathetic government
bodies to consider human rights they might have otherwise overlooked or ignored. 198
A2: Review Procedure Fails
Procedural Review alone solves – empirical evidence from NEPA proves.
In theory, a substantive statute seems more likely to deter undesirable environmental consequences than a
procedural one. A substantive statute imposes a particular outcome and directs behavior. SEQRA's
substantive reach has blocked many proposals 203 as well as encouraged mitigation in cases where the
agency wanted to avoid a full-blown EIS or litigation. 204 A strong substantive mandate, however, may
encourage agencies to narrowly interpret the mandate in order to circumvent its reach. Moreover, given
existing resistance to human rights, a strong substantive requirement may not be politically feasible. That
said, evidence from the NEPA suggests that even a purely procedural statute can effectively change
institutional behavior and, over time, agencies may internalize the values the review process seeks to
promote. Indeed, although the empirical evidence is hardly systematic, a large body of both anecdotal and
more scientific data indicates that the NEPA has had a significant effect on substantive outcomes and has
made an important contribution to environmental protection. 205 This conclusion makes [*316] sense
as courts have extensive experience enforcing procedural obligations and seem quite willing to make sure
that agencies take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of their actions. 206
In the human rights context, some have expressed apprehension that an agency or legislator would refuse
to make a "finding of significant impact" because such a finding would acknowledge and seemingly
sanction a human rights violation. While this concern is a serious one, human rights review need not turn
into a paper tiger in practice. First, governments often do acknowledge human rights violations so long as
they do not raise substantive litigation issues. For instance, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
allows the government to abridge rights so long as such action is "demonstrably justified." 207 The
Canadian government has repeatedly made such findings. Moreover, as United States courts rarely allow
most litigants to raise private rights of action under human rights treaties, 208 this should alleviate some
of the government's concern. Second, even the purely procedural right of review provides some check on
government action. An agency cannot make a "finding of no significant impact" without responding to
public comments and other evidence. Under human rights review, rather than merely refusing to
acknowledge the violation, the government has to at least make a colorable argument as to why no
violation occurred. Third, even if the government construes human rights narrowly and makes frequent
"findings of no significant impact," NGO shadow reports and other pressure can respond to such ill-
founded conclusions. Finally, the evidence under the NEPA and SEQRA indicates that agencies often
make "findings of significant impact" even though they know that such a determination will be the end of
the proposed action. 209
A2: Certainty Key
The process of the counterplan solves – HRIA ensure international obligations are
met, increase the coherence and effectiveness of policy.
Hunt and Mac Naughton, 2006 (Paul, Law at the Human Rights Centre, University of Essex and
Special Rapportuer on the right to the highest attainable standard of health, and Gillian, Senior Research
Officer Human Rights Center @ University of Essex, “Impact Assessments, Poverty and Human Rights:
A Case Study Using The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health” 5/31/2006
http://www.who.int/hhr/Series_6_Impact%20Assessments_Hunt_MacNaughton1.pdf)
With this myriad of impact assessment methodologies already in use, is there any purpose in developing a
methodology for human rights impact assessment? Human rights impact assessment offers added value
for several inter-related reasons. First, human rights impact assessment is based on a framework of
international legal obligations to which governments have agreed. Second, human rights impact
assessment provides an opportunity to make government policy-making more coherent across
departments as the framework applies to all divisions of the government. Third, human rights impact
assessment will result in more effective policies because the policies will be more coherent , they will be
backed up by legal obligations and they will be adopted through human-rights respecting processes.
1. Legal Obligations
International human rights legal obligations arise when a State voluntarily endorses a human rights treaty.
Every State is a party to at least one international human rights treaty; thus they all have some binding
international legal obligations for human rights.29 Almost every State is a party to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which recognizes along with civil and political rights, a broad range of economic,
social and cultural rights, including the right to the highest attainable standard of health.30 Most States
are party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well, which also
guarantees the right to health.31 The rights enumerated in these treaties derive from the dignity and worth
of the human person, lending them considerable moral authority.
To comply with its international human rights obligations, a State must ensure, before it adopts any
proposed law, policy, program or project, that it is consistent with its human rights, as well as other, legal
obligations.32 The Committee on the Rights of the Child, for example, has stated that a continuous
process of child impact assessment is required to ensure that all provisions of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child are respected in legislation and in policy development and delivery at all levels of the
government.33
In response to reports submitted by States, the treaty bodies have also urged individual States to perform
impact assessments. For example, the Committee on the Rights of the Child urged the Government of the
Netherlands “to develop ways to establish a systematic assessment of the impact of budgetary allocations
and macroeconomic policies on the implementation of children’s rights and to collect and disseminate
information in this regard.”34 Similarly, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, has
recommended to States that human rights impact assessments “be made an integral part of every proposed
piece of legislation or policy initiative on a basis analogous to environmental impact assessments or
statements.”35
Thus, human rights impact assessments are highly recommended , perhaps even legally required , for
States to comply with the international human rights obligations that they have undertaken. Further, the
human rights legal framework for impact assessments adds legitimacy to demands for policy changes
that are based on these assessments.36 The legal obligations also bring both monitoring and
accountability to bear on policy-making. Policy-makers will be subject to scrutiny by human rights
institutions, including the international treaty bodies, and people can hold their governments accountable
for the adverse human rights impacts of policies, programs and projects.
In sum, the international legal obligations underlying the human rights framework for impact assessments
gives States a strong incentive to do the impact assessments, a legitimate rationale for modifying
proposals based on the assessments and a system to hold policy makers to account for the impact of their
decisions on human rights.
2. Coherence
The human rights framework for impact assessment also offers States the opportunity to enhance
coherence in policy-making processes. Governmental departments are often disconnected and do not
necessarily know what other departments are doing or have agreed to do.37 Thus, for example, one
department may adopt a policy or program that adversely affects the people that another policy or
program in another department is designed to help. However, a State’s national and international human
rights obligations apply to all divisions of the government, and thus human rights must be consistently
and coherently applied across all national policy-making processes.38 In this manner, the human rights
framework can bring coherence to policy making, helping to ensure that the same factors are considered
in policy-making in all departments of the government.
3. Effectiveness
The underlying legal obligations and the increased coherence offered by a human rights framework for
impact assessment will both contribute to rigorous policy-making as well as to adoption of policies,
programs and projects that are more effective in improving the well-being of people, especially those who
are marginalized. The human rights approach also brings a number of factors to the assessment process
that generally will improve effectiveness in policy making such as disaggregation, participation,
transparency and accountability.39
For example, a human rights approach to impact assessment requires assessing the decision-making
process to determine whether it encourages the people who are likely to be affected by the policy,
program or project to participate in a meaningful manner. It asks: does the government consult the people
likely to be affected in determining the likely consequences of a proposal, in generating ideas for
modifications and alternatives to a proposal, in weighing priorities and in making final trade-offs and
decisions? Participation by the people affected is more likely to result in a decision that will be better for
them, a decision that they will accept and a decision that they can own. In this way, the human rights
requirement of participation will enhance effectiveness of the policy, program or project.40
Similarly, the human rights approach to impact assessment requires consideration of the distributional
impact of reforms on the well-being of various groups, especially people living in poverty and other
marginalized groups.41 Disaggregated information allows for the impact analysis to identify mitigating
measures or alternatives that may not have been evident without this information and that will result in a
more effective policy, especially in terms of its impact on the most vulnerable people.
Overall, the human rights framework for impact assessment adds value because human rights (1) are
based on legal obligations to which governments have agreed to abide, (2) apply to all parts of the
government encouraging coherence to policy-making and ensuring that policies reinforce each other; (3)
require participation in policy making by the people affected, enhancing legitimacy and ownership of
policy choices; (4) enhance effectiveness through factors such as disaggregation, participation and
transparency; and (5) demand mechanisms through which policy makers can be held accountable.
A2: Delay
Human Rights review is fast – No delay
Maassarani 2007 (Tarek F., JD – Georgetown University Law Center and MA in International Affairs
– Columbia University, et al., “Extracting Corporate Responsibility: Towards a Human Rights Impact
Assessment”, Cornell International Law Journal, 40 Cornell Int'l L.J. 135, Lexis)
The additional outlays in time and money required by an HRIA are among the main sources of resistance
to be anticipated from the business community. Indeed, the costs of an HRIA both in terms of extra
investment and preparation time are likely to be significant. However, corporations already take years to
finalize large-scale business decisions: negotiating contracts, running in-depth economic analyses, and
conducting feasibility studies take time. Incorporating an HRIA into this preliminary stage may not
significantly strain the timeline. Furthermore, when dealing with major investments such as a $ 1 billion
pipeline, a proper HRIA would be just a drop in the barrel. However significant the expenses associated
with an HRIA, as our case study has illustrated, corporations still focus too narrowly on short-term costs
rather than on the long-term benefits of sound decision-making.
Plan takes forever too.

Malkin 2002 (Michelle, Nationally Syndicated Columnist and Fox News Commentator, “The
Deportation Abyss "It Ain't Over 'Til the Alien Wins"”, September,
http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/back1002.html)
One Justice Department employee who runs an independent web site on the deportation morass observes:
Between the incompetence of the INS, the complete lack of alien detention center space, and the
bureaucracy of the EOIR, our system for deporting known illegal aliens and criminal alien residents is a
sad joke. But no one is laughing. If all of the illegal aliens and deportable resident alien criminals were
rounded up tomorrow, the system would not be capable of handling them. It would be an absolute
disaster. The INS and the EOIR wouldn't have the foggiest idea of what to do with them! The aliens
would all be released back out on the street on immigration bonds and go back right where they were as if
nothing happened, while their cases would grind on through the system of Immigration Court hearings
and endless appeals.15 EOIR director Kevin Rooney summarized the plethora of appeal options available
to all aliens even criminal aliens in his February 2002 testimony to Congress: "Even if an alien is
removable, he or she may file an application for relief from removal, such as asylum, voluntary departure,
suspension of deportation, cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, registry or a waiver of
inadmissibility."16 What does all this bureaucratic jargon spell? Delay, delay, delay . Each of the
loopholes enumerated by Rooney is written into the Immigration and Nationality Act. If an alien loses a
BIA judgment, he can then seek relief in the federal circuit courts of appeal.
International Law Good
International Human Rights Law is better than domestic – multiple reasons
Another potential benefit of using a human rights approach is that international human rights law may be
more expansive than domestic protections. First, international human rights law tends to be broader than
even robustly interpreted domestic protections. As human rights are based in an individual's inherent
dignity rather than her status under the law, they tend to provide more protections to immigrants than a
domestic system. For instance, statutory anti-discrimination provisions often fail to protect immigrants as
they prohibit national origin discrimination but permit discrimination based on alienage. 62 Moreover,
the executive and the courts continue to narrow their interpretation of constitutional rights in the wake of
September 11th. 63 For example, human rights law as enshrined by international treaties probably
dictates more protections regarding conditions and length of detention than the prevailing interpretation of
the Constitution. 64 Even if the Constitution could have provided adequate protection, undoing existin g
[*294] narrow jurisprudence can prove quite difficult. Human rights law, on the other hand, provides a
less developed canvas for domestic actors to flesh out.
Perms/Theory
2nc Perm Do Both
The perm severs – Impact assessments are an alternative strategy that rejects
immediacy.
Processes are key – only prior review can solve.
Review Lexis)
A third way to pursue international justice in the domestic arena might be more institutional or process-
oriented. Instead of using traditional forums such as the media, public relations, and the courts to advance
human rights concerns, advocates might think about building human rights consciousness into the
processes of political decision making . In a recent article in American Prospect, Elisa Massimino
describes a Clinton Administration innovation designed to do just this. Executive Order 13107, issued in
1998, sought to integrate human rights considerations into the domestic policymaking agencies, so that
rather than an afterthought raised by human rights groups through reports, letters, or lawsuits, these
concerns became the everyday concern of the executive branch. 95 As [*656] Massimino details, the
Order created an Interagency Working Group with a mandate to:
Prepare treaty compliance reports to the United Nations; respond to complaints about human-rights
violations; vet proposed legislation for conformity with treaty requirements; monitor and analyze state
law and practice on human rights; educate the public about human rights; and conduct a yearly review of
all U.S. reservations, understandings, and declarations to see whether they can be withdrawn or whether
U.S. law should be altered to make them unnecessary. 96
The Working Group apparently died under the Bush Administration (ironically, just when it was most
needed). But such efforts to "incorporate" international human rights thinking into domestic lawmaking
and administration should be pursued wherever possible. Perhaps the central challenge for international
human rights advocates focused on the United States is to get domestic actors to take human rights
seriously. As noted above, globalization has set in motion a series of incentives that are likely to make
international law increasingly more familiar, and increasingly more critical to domestic decision
making. But it is also important to work on this relationship from the inside out, by creating mechanisms
and actors within executive institutions whose role is precisely to promote early consideration of
human rights. Crises like Abu Ghraib - and memos like the Office of Legal Counsel's August 2002
torture memo 97 - illustrate the critical importance of infusing policymaking at the outset with
greater sensitivity to international law concerns. Initiatives like Executive Order 13107 offer that hope. 98
Severence is a voter makes going negative impossible because there is no stable

ground.
The perm is intrinsic – adds non-binding review – that is not neither the plan or
counterplan – it’s a voting issue because it allows the affirmative to get out of all
offense.
The perm is Non-Binding review that fails.
The current scope of what might be loosely called the international human rights law duties of TNCs is
wide, but spread thinly and unevenly. It encompasses examples of supposed customary international law,
treaty obligations, and so-called "soft law" codes of conduct, guidelines, and compacts. The actual legal
cover these initiatives provide is meager or non-existent. [*142] The legal (or quasi-legal) duties
imposed on corporations have some potential authority, but as yet they remain ill-defined and ineffective.
In short, the rudiments of an international legal framework may be discernable, but the legal content of
the law is almost wholly absent. 36
As a result, corporations in the developing world operate within a legal lacuna, leading to the kind of
unchecked abuses described above.
Under pressure to be more accountable, many corporations have taken up the banner of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR), adopting various voluntary initiatives, including those described above by Kinley
and Tadaki, as well as private codes of conduct, both internal and industry-wide. 37 In doing so,
businesses do not fill the role of government but rather help promote human rights in their own sphere of
competence. As corporations like Unocal have learned the hard way, neglecting to act responsibly can
ultimately put their reputation and bottom line at risk. 38 While this should be reason enough for
corporations to care about human rights, some corporations have nonetheless resisted specific and
compulsory measures. 39 Many corporations continue to be magnanimous in their charity towards
society; however, it is exactly this voluntary character of philanthropy that corporations likely prefer, as it
allows them to gain in reputation without being bound to their commitments. This resistance to
compulsory measures has resulted in a variety of vague and unenforceable multilateral initiatives, from
the Global Compact to the U.N. Human Rights Business Norms, 40 which are perceived, at best, as
toothless paper tigers and, at worst, as public relations "whitewashing." 41 In any case, corporate
human rights abuses persist. Ultimately, the ideal legal framework for effectively guaranteeing corporate
compliance with fundamental human rights will be an integrated two-track regime, centered on the state's
responsibility to safeguard its own populace yet supplemented by international mechanisms defining
minimum standards applicable to a corporation's "sphere of influence" when the state is unwilling or
unable to do so. 42 However, long before such international legal structures can be [*143] erected to
fill the void, corporate human rights norms must mature beyond their present thin and uneven infancy.
While states are reluctant to share the international legal stage and develop well-defined and compulsory
norms of corporate conduct, 43 these norms may still emerge from the bottom up. 44
Doesn’t solve the net benefit – only implementing the process of a Human Rights
Impact Assessment can reverse US Hypocrisy that’s the 1nc Wexler evidence.
Only prior and binding process can solve.
A human rights review process is not a panacea --violations will continue even with the implementation of
Ext. Doesn’t Solve Net Benefit
Genuine Human Rights Impact Statements are key to set a precedent.
Campbell 9/2/2009 (Tom, Professor and Convenor – Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics,
University of Melbourne, “A Democratic Bill of Rights for Australia” Accessed 6/18/2018
http://lib.znate.ru/docs/index-49394.html?page=2)
Human rights impact statements are one of the key ways the model will foster a strong rights-culture in
the executive branch of government (see Evans 2005). When a bill is introduced to Parliament, the MP
who introduces it (who will in most cases be a Cabinet minister) must explain its human rights
implications. This encourages the government to take human rights issues into account when formulating
legislation. It is also a way of freeing human rights discourse from the narrow confines of the judicial
approach. The idea of human rights impact statements is that the executive can develop and articulate its
own understanding of human rights, leading to a broader moral and political human rights discourse.
One of the problems with the British model is that governments do not properly engage in this process
(see section 2.1). Although governments must state whether bills are consistent with the bill/charter of
rights, they simply rely on legal advice to second-guess the courts, trying at all costs to avoid a
declaration of incompatibility. They rarely develop and defend their own approach to human rights and as
a result, there is no genuine inter-governmental dialogue. Instead of a diversity of view points, we end up
with the dominance of a narrow judicial approach. This leads to an impoverished understanding of human
rights and hinders the development of a robust rights culture within government.
The democratic model avoids this problem because courts will not be empowered to issue declarations of
incompatibility. This prevents impact statements from becoming an exercise in court-avoidance, and
encourages governments to engage genuinely with human rights issues . Impact statements also provide an
opportunity for the Opposition, the media, and human rights organisations to focus more closely on the
human rights implications of legislation, engendering a stronger human rights culture within government
and in civil society.
Review must happen BEFORE policy enactment – delay causes abuse

Bakker et al, 2009 (Saskia, Program Manger for Human Rights for Women – Humanist Committee
on Human Rights, MARIEKE VAN DEN BERG, DENIZ DU¨ ZENLI, AND MARIKE RADSTAAKE
“Human Rights Impact Assessment in Practice: The Case of the Health Rights of Women Assessment
Instrument (HeRWAI)” Journal of Human Rights Practice, 1(3), November
https://academic.oup.com/jhrp/article-pdf/1/3/436/6458194/hup017.pdf)
Human rights impact assessment (HRIA) is a relatively new tool in the toolbox of human rights
practitioners. In short, it is a systematic process to investigate and measure the impact of policies,
programmes, projects, and interventions on human rights. HRIA is ‘based on the normative framework of
international human rights law, laid down in such documents as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, [and] the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights’ (Lenzen and d’Engelbronner, 2009: 9).
Activities to assess human rights impact serve a variety of important and inter-related functions across the
academic and non-academic sectors of the human rights community (Landman, 2006: 127–130). HRIA
tools assist documentation and contextual description and monitor to what extent states or other actors
comply with human rights treaties. They can be used for mapping human rights violations or serve as
advocacy tools by assisting in the formulation of concrete, rights-based recommendations for change in
policy. Impact assessments can be carried out before an activity takes place (ex ante) or after an activity
has taken place (ex post). Ex ante HRIAs aim to measure the potential impact of activities on human
rights. The objective here is to prevent human rights violations and/or to maximize potential positive
effects. It is important to carry out ex ante HRIAs at the earliest stage possible in order for the
outcome to be incorporated into the decisionmaking process (Lenzen and d’Engelbronner, 2007: 19–
20). Ex post HRIAs on the other hand, aim to measure the actual impact of activities on human rights and
therefore can take place after an activity. The forward looking aspects of impact assessments can enhance
policy development and prepare arguments for policy choices. The backward looking aspects facilitate
measuring whether the applied policy did achieve the objectives, as well as looking at the process itself –
asking ‘whether we have done what we agreed to do?’ (Radstaake and Bronkhorst, 2002: 43).
A2: Lie Perm
Trump’s government leaks, people will find out. The Incentive for leaking is
inevitable.
Bort, 5/15/2018 (Ryan, “Trump Keeps Trying (and Failing) to Stop These White House Leaks” Rolling
Stone https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/trump-white-house-leaks-w520308)
Throughout the 2016 campaign, Donald Trump assured Americans that if he were to become president,
he would only hire "the best people." Trump's ability to follow through on this promise has been
undermined by a growing number of administration officials who have either resigned, been fired, been
indicted or found themselves at the center of corruption allegations. To the president's dismay, present
White House staffers have also developed a keen taste for leaking information to the media at an
unprecedented clip, most recently divulging that White House aide Kelly Sadler said that John
McCain's vote to confirm prospective CIA director Gina Haspel doesn't matter because McCain "is dying
anyway."
As pressure builds for the White House to apologize publicly, which at this point is unlikely, Trump on
Monday took aim not at Sadler, but at the staffer who leaked her comments.
Leaking has been a fixture of life in the White House since Trump took office , and the news of Sadler's
comments have once again brought the issue into the spotlight. In a remarkable bit of meta-leaking, the
details of a meeting held by Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders about the leak were quickly leaked
– by five separate leakers – to Axios. Sanders even acknowledged during the meeting that her comments
would probably soon find their way to the media. "I am sure this conversation is going to leak, too," she
reportedly said. "And that’s just disgusting."
A day later, Axios published another report, this one about why the leakers leak. Reasons ranged from
personal vendettas, to making sure the press has the story straight, to attempting to kill policy positions
opposed by the leaker, to the feeling that everyone in the White House is engaged in a "Mexican
Standoff" and that "you might as well shoot first." One leaker told Axios that they choose their language
carefully while leaking to avoid being implicated. "To cover my tracks, I usually pay attention to other
staffers' idioms and use that in my background quotes," the leaker said. "That throws the scent off me."
Lying kills the signal of the HRIA – doesn’t solve the net benefit.
Master's i4n International Affairs from Columbia University, Margo Tatgenhorst Drakos, candidate for a
A Human Rights Impact Assessment incorporates the human rights rubric into the decision-making
process attendant under-regulated operations of corporations in the developing world. It focuses on
human rights impacts occurring within a corporation's sphere of influence. The effects may either
contribute to or detract from the fulfillment and progressive realization of international human rights
standards. Unlike domestic regulation, HRIA considers human rights "indivisible and interdependent" 95
and integrates positive and negative effects into a dynamic whole. Alongside the increasing legal and
normative authority of human rights standards, a growing body of scholarship and jurisprudence is
bringing to bear a more sophisticated and salutary understanding of their substance.
A. The Nuts and Bolts of HRIA
Despite its human rights frame of reference, an HRIA regime extends many of the main principles and
methodologies animating SIA. 96 Adapted to address corporate impacts on human rights in the
developing world, the guiding principles should be:
1. Involve the Public: Identify all potentially affected and under-represented stakeholders, especially
workers and members of the local community. This is especially difficult, but essential, when the state
politically marginalizes its minorities or lacks accountable, democratic governance. [*150] In the latter
case, a large-revenue hydrocarbon project calls for public consultation throughout the country.
2. Analyze Impact Equity: Recognize and address the uneven distribution of positive and negative effects.
This is consonant with the spirit of non-discrimination underlying all human rights. By minimizing the
perception of preferrential treatment of particular ethnic groups or economic clases, this also avoids
communal strife.
3. Identify Relevant Definitions, Methods, and Assumptions in Advance (Set Parameters): Reflect ahead
of time on what constitutes significance, reversibility, and mitigation potential, as well as the methods and
underlying assumptions. This will concretize and legitimize the impact assessment and promote
transparency.
4. Internalize the HRIA in Decision-Making: It is understood that an HRIA, and the critical insights
derived from it (however unappealing to some), should not be treated as a mere formality but rather as an
integral source of feedback informing the central decision-making process. Moreover, the HRIA and its
lessons should be institutionalized into corporate practice through internal codes of conduct and explicit
policies addressing discrimination, labor, security, and indigenous peoples that include mechanisms for
monitoring, non-retaliation, appeals, staff training, and enforcement with contractors. 97
5. Use Competent HRIA Practitioners: HRIA auditors should exhibit independence and familiarity in
their dealings with the HRIA process and corporate decision makers. Financial and institutional
independence is imperative to avoid actual and perceived conflicts of interest. Familiarity and faithful
exception require employing and consulting with qualified and cooperative social scientists and human
rights practitioners.
6. Employ Data with Integrity: For reliable and current information, HRIA auditors should use rigorous
fieldwork along with credible sources of data from published social science literature and human rights
reports. They should plan for data gaps wisely.
7. Transparency: Honestly disclose both the process and results of a project's HRIA, to the extent
consistent with the protection of vital trade secrets. This strengthens the legitimacy of corporate decision-
making and public participation. 98
Lying is immoral – reject it.

Murphy 96 (Mark C., American Journal Juris., 41 Am. J. Juris. 81, Lexis)
Bok’s remarks capture the insight that what disturbs people about lying is not fundamentally that lies are
contrary to the good of knowledge, though lies certainly are contrary to that good. What is most troubling
about being lied to is that lies infect the decisionmaking process, undermining the good of practical
reasonableness. Thus, the account of the moral absolute against lying defended here does justice to what
bothers reflective people about being the victim of lies. I have argued that although Finnis is right to think
that the lie is an act directed against the intrinsic good of knowledge, the wrongfulness of lying is most
adequately explained by reference to the good of practical reasonableness. Lying is absolutely morally
forbidden, in last analysis, because refraining from lying is necessary to show adequate respect for the
status of other agents as practical reasoners. On this matter, at the very least, natural law theory should
affirm its agreement with Kant. 40
2nc Perm Do the Counterplan
1. The CP is Mutually exclusive – the plan is distinct from reducing restrictions
on legal immigration that require prior and legally binding review – that is a
competing approach that requires rejection of immediate change. That’s the
Wexler and Cole evidence.
Defer to field experts – they’re the most knowledgeable, precise, and define
the literature base that should determine competition. Its critical to topic
education.
2. The CP Severs Certainty and Immediacy
a. Resolved
OED 89 (Oxford English Dictionary, “Resolved,” Volume 13, p. 725)
Of the mind, etc.: Freed from doubt or uncertainty , fixed, settled. Obs.
b. should
Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of
Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?
CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)
The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in
praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal
professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the
same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in
praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 13 "Should" not
only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy
to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation
infra note 15. Certain
contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating
preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in
proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v.
California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should
devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the
requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must"
when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In praesenti means literally "at the
present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is
presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future
[in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).
c. “Substantial” requires legal effect

Words and Phrases 64 (40W&P 759)
The words" outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive," in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the
same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full
existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential , apparent, constructive, and imaginary;
veritable; genuine; certain : absolute : real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually
existing; true; not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.
3. Fiat should be certain and unconditional:
A) Neg ground – key to every disad – politics, relations, etc. rely on implementation
– allowing conditionality means the Aff can shift to avoid our best case arguments –
makes them a moving target
B) Aff ground – guarantees durability and makes debates about “should”, not
“would” – otherwise the Aff would always lose on rollback
4. Severs normal means
Immigration reforms don’t factor in human rights
Wexler 7 (Lesley, Professor of Law – Florida State University and Former Debater – University of
Michigan, “The Non-Legal Role of International Human Rights Law in Addressing Immigration”, The
University of Chicago Legal Forum, 2007 U Chi Legal F 359, Lexis)
Current domestic and international law relating to immigration, particularly that favored by countries that
draw large number of migrants, 1 tends to favor law enforcement over human rights approaches. 2 The
response to September 11th has exacerbated this tendency to promote law enforcement and security
paradigms at the expense of human rights frameworks both at home and abroad. 3 In effect, this
heightened attention to security means that many states focus on the control of movement across borders
through measures such as enhanced penalties for trafficking and unlawful entry, as well as increased
funding for border patrols, 4 while they devote relatively few resources to the promotion and defense of
migrants' human rights. 5
Normal means should govern competition: its based in literature, predictable for
both sides, and fair because they only have to defend one process of action
A2: Textual competition Good
A) Bad Standards – doesn’t allow “ban the plan”, allows scramble perms and
functional “plan plus” counterplans
B) Not logical – actions compete based on function – re-wording shouldn’t matter.
Distorts real world decision-making – biggest impact
No offense – bad counterplans can be beaten on theory – text comp isn’t necessary
to eliminate them
2nc Multiple Worlds Perm (CP + Do Plan Anyway)
There aren’t multiple worlds --- only one: the initiation of the process. Saying “yes”
or “no” is an outcome, not a mandate. Fiating in one instance of another delays the
decision of the plan, severing immediacy and is intrinsic because it adds temporal
specification --- voting issue because it allows the Aff to dodge all offense.
Do the plan no matter what isn’t genuine, kills the process which doesn’t solve.
The current scope of what might be loosely called the international human rights law duties of TNCs is
wide, but spread thinly and unevenly. It encompasses examples of supposed customary international law,
treaty obligations, and so-called "soft law" codes of conduct, guidelines, and compacts. The actual legal
cover these initiatives provide is meager or non-existent. [*142] The legal (or quasi-legal) duties
imposed on corporations have some potential authority, but as yet they remain ill-defined and ineffective.
In short, the rudiments of an international legal framework may be discernable, but the legal content of
the law is almost wholly absent. 36
As a result, corporations in the developing world operate within a legal lacuna, leading to the kind of
unchecked abuses described above.
Under pressure to be more accountable, many corporations have taken up the banner of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR), adopting various voluntary initiatives, including those described above by Kinley
and Tadaki, as well as private codes of conduct, both internal and industry-wide. 37 In doing so,
businesses do not fill the role of government but rather help promote human rights in their own sphere of
competence. As corporations like Unocal have learned the hard way, neglecting to act responsibly can
ultimately put their reputation and bottom line at risk. 38 While this should be reason enough for
corporations to care about human rights, some corporations have nonetheless resisted specific and
compulsory measures. 39 Many corporations continue to be magnanimous in their charity towards
society; however, it is exactly this voluntary character of philanthropy that corporations likely prefer, as it
allows them to gain in reputation without being bound to their commitments. This resistance to
compulsory measures has resulted in a variety of vague and unenforceable multilateral initiatives, from
the Global Compact to the U.N. Human Rights Business Norms, 40 which are perceived, at best, as
toothless paper tigers and, at worst, as public relations "whitewashing." 41 In any case, corporate
human rights abuses persist. Ultimately, the ideal legal framework for effectively guaranteeing corporate
compliance with fundamental human rights will be an integrated two-track regime, centered on the state's
responsibility to safeguard its own populace yet supplemented by international mechanisms defining
minimum standards applicable to a corporation's "sphere of influence" when the state is unwilling or
unable to do so. 42 However, long before such international legal structures can be [*143] erected to
fill the void, corporate human rights norms must mature beyond their present thin and uneven infancy.
While states are reluctant to share the international legal stage and develop well-defined and compulsory
norms of corporate conduct, 43 these norms may still emerge from the bottom up. 44
The perm is intrinsic – adds non-binding review – that is not neither the plan or
counterplan – it’s a voting issue because it allows the affirmative to get out of all
offense.
2nc General Theory
Counter-interpretation: Neg can condition the plan on things if they have a
solvency advocate. We meet that its our 1nc Wexler ev. It says we should condition
immigration reform on Human rights impact assessments.
Solves aff ground – limits counterplans to a predictable number based on the
literature. Guarantees they can have answers.
Key to topic education – Human rights review is an important discussion on the
immigration topic.
A human rights review process is not a panacea--violations will continue even with the implementation of
Conditional fiat increases Aff ground – guarantees delay and potential non-adoption
of the plan – structurally ensures ground based on immediacy or critical advantages
Tons of ground exists
Bakker et al, 2009 (Saskia, Program Manger for Human Rights for Women – Humanist Committee
on Human Rights, MARIEKE VAN DEN BERG, DENIZ DU¨ ZENLI, AND MARIKE RADSTAAKE
“Human Rights Impact Assessment in Practice: The Case of the Health Rights of Women Assessment
Instrument (HeRWAI)” Journal of Human Rights Practice, 1(3), November
https://academic.oup.com/jhrp/article-pdf/1/3/436/6458194/hup017.pdf)
This article examines Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) as a methodological approach to
investigate and measure human rights impacts and compliance. It recognizes that there is a vast body of
relevant theoretical material, but notes that practical examples of its use and case studies are thus far
limited. To analyse the potential contributions of HRIAs for human rights practitioners, a concrete tool is
discussed: Aim for human rights ‘Health Rights of Women Assessment Instrument’, produced by Aim for
human rights. The article considers lessons that can be drawn from practical experiences with this tool. In
the discussion of the case studies, examples of results and outcomes of its use are provided. The authors
then extrapolate from the concrete tool to discuss to what extent HRIA as a methodology can contribute
to measuring and promoting the realization of human rights. They highlight benefits as well as challenges
that still have to be overcome. Finally, a call is made for more intensive sharing of practical experiences
with HRIA tools in order to move the methodology forward.
Policy analysis: CP constructs better immigration policy – rational decision-making

is the best education debate provides – we’ll use it for the rest of our lives.
Net Benefit
2nc US Not Committed Now
Trump is not committed to Ilaw or Human rights now
Wuerth 11/14/2016 (Ingrid, Helen Strong Curry Professor of International Law at Vanderbilt Law
School 11/14/16, “A Global Downturn in Human Rights: Implications for International Law,”
https://www.lawfareblog.com/international-law-age-trump-post-human-rights-agenda, )
The Trump presidency will have a significant impact on international law , including a potential withdrawal from or re-
negotiation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the Iran nuclear deal. Although those two examples would pit the United States
against much of the rest of the world, in other respects Trump’s election is consistent with ongoing global changes. To take a well-known
example, Trump’s opposition to NAFTA appears to align with world-wide populism and hostility to trade agreements, as illustrated by Brexit.
Trump’s election is also consistent with other trends in international law. As I argued before the election, we are in the midst of a
world-wide decline in international human rights and a related rise in power by China and Russia over the content of
international law, a theme discussed last week by Anne Peters here. Liberal intervention on behalf of human rights—opposed by China and
Russia—would almost certainly have received a boost from a Hillary Clinton administration. Although it is difficult to predict what direction the
new administration will take, it
is likely that the U.S. will expend little energy on promoting the international
legal protection of human rights (putting aside here international humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict, and other related
areas of international law).
We are, in other words, probably already in the “ post-human rights era ” of international law, meaning that the
enforcement and expansion of human rights through binding international law will decline . Fortunately,
thanks in part to the historic successes of the human rights movement, there are many other ways to advance the cause of human rights, including
regional human rights institutions, soft international norms (such as the historic Helsinki Accords), and domestic or transnational political reform
and activism. Promoting
civil liberties and human rights at home and abroad should be an important objective
in the coming years, all the more so with Trump as President, but perhaps not through the enforcement
of binding international law .
Specifically true in the context of immigration – US falls short on International

Immigrants’ rights now.
Johns, 2013 (J. Brian, LL.M. candidate in the International Legal Studies Program at the American
University Washington College of Law and earned a J.D. from Rutgers University School of Law,
“FILLING THE VOID: INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS
INTO UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION POLICY” Rutgers Law Journal Vol. 43 Lexis)
Intemational human rights law has developed covenants and declarations to recognize a set of rights due
to all individuals, including immigrants. As immigration concems grow, attention must be paid to the
protections against discrimination, the right to fair judicial proceedings, and the guarantee of liberty
distilled from treaty and customary intemational law. In this regard, Argentina is a pioneer, incorporating
such rights into its domestic structure. The Argentine model should be viewed by other states in future
revisions of immigration policies.
United States immigration policy falls well short of meeting the standards set by intemational law . A
succession of laws motivated by tragedies and domestic hostilities reflects a disdain toward the domestic
influence of immigration rights. Despite its current failings, the United States has the potential to move
beyond its xenophobic outlook and to adopt an immigration system that promotes the rights of the
individual while maintaining national integrity. Any change to the American system must be predicated
on a sincere effort to change domestic opinion. Until public apprehension toward immigration is quelled,
implementation of an Argentina-like model will be unsuccessful.
US not committed to International Human rights regime now.
Wexler, 2010 (Lesley, Assistant professor of Law @ Florida State College of Law, “THE PROMISE
AND LIMITS OF LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNATIONALISM” Fordham Urban Law Journal
Lexis)
Since the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"), the United States has
developed an uneasy relationship with the international human rights project. Neither Democratic nor
Republican [*605] presidents have embraced the full panoply of strategies to recognize and implement
human rights domestically. The U.S. government has long resisted signing and ratifying many major
human rights treaties such as the CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC"). 10
Even ratification of major human rights treaties leads to few federal legislative changes or initiatives. 11
Unlike its European counterparts, 12 the U.S. federal government has created no national human rights
institution, utilizes no human rights ombudspersons, lacks a human rights commission, and fails to
conduct human rights impact statements on proposed initiatives. Yet, at various times over the last sixty
years, the United States proudly carried the mantle of a human rights leader. American diplomats
aggressively drafted and promoted various human rights treaties including the UDHR, 13 the CRC, 14
and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 15 American
presidents on both sides of the aisle have cited human rights as justifications for supporting particular
foreign leaders, limiting military and economic aid for various regimes, and even using military force. 16
Although America's relationship with international human rights law is a long and complicated one, this
section identifies several political positions that help explain why, despite varying and often high levels of
national support for human rights, the federal government is generally unlikely to be a first mover on
domestic integration of international human rights. 17
2nc Perception Key
Only institutionalizing human rights concern can ensure legitimacy necessary for
cooperation.
Review Lexis)
But there are also reasons for hope. The attacks of September 11 and their aftermath have made it clearer
than ever that we are dependent upon the good will of the rest of the world, and fidelity to international
human rights is critical to maintaining the legitimacy of our security efforts . The skepticism of
lawyers and judges is giving way to the realities of a globalized world, in which transnational exchange
makes transnational norms more and more necessary. And because immigration law's "plenary power"
finds its source in international law conceptions of sovereignty, it is especially well-suited to the
limitations that international law is beginning to impose on sovereignty, in particular through the last half-
century's development of human rights.
In exploiting these opportunities, it seems best to take a three-pronged approach: (1) argue narrowly in
court, using international human rights law principally as a guide to statutory and constitutional
interpretation rather than as an independent and freestanding source of rights of action; (2) turn the human
rights activist's more traditional tactics of "shaming" on the United States itself, attempting to mobilize
international opinion by invoking internationally based claims; and (3) seek out ways to
" institutionalize" human rights concerns into the domestic lawmaking and law enforcement policy
process.
US use of HRIA boosts HR cred.

The development of a human rights strategy to protect migrants yields several benefits that a purely
constitutional framework lacks. First, the use of human rights treaties and discourse creates links to the
international movement to protect human rights. These links can strengthen protections at home in two
ways: by drawing international attention and pressure to bear on domestic efforts 46 and providing a
shared language and understanding for domestic advocates to interact with, and learn from, international
experiences. 47 As many countries face similar immigration issues, the shared wisdom of an
international approach may be particularly useful in this area.
Such international interactions might also facilitate the transmission of human rights assessments
and impact statements throughout the world . Human rights review might complement U.N. efforts to
mainstream human rights and integrate them at an operational level. 48 The visibility and leadership
capabilities of the United States make it particularly able to promote the use of human rights
assessments . 49 Just as the United States' development and implementation of environmental impact
statements has shaped environmental policy in a significant number of countries , 50 the United States
could also reinvigorate its human rights policy through its leadership and assist other countries in
developing a stronger commitment to human rights. 51 Impact assessment provides other countries with
an opportunity [*292] to embrace the importance of human rights without making a strong commitment
to a treaty regime they might be unwilling to or be incapable of enforcing.
Perception of American Exceptionalism prevents cooperation and increases anti-

American sentiment. Only the CP Solves.
Review Lexis)
Once the photos from Abu Ghraib were released worldwide, politicians in and out of the Administration
almost immediately realized that this instance of pushing the bounds of international law had backfired.
Reactions in and around Washington sometimes expressed concern for the injuries suffered by the Iraqi
detainees, but nearly always reserved their deepest concern for the disastrous impact these pictures would
have on American foreign policy. 35 That expression of concern illustrated what the 9/11 Commission
later noted in its report - that success in fighting terrorism turns in large measure on perceptions of the
United States held around the world. 36 If we are seen as pursuing illegitimate means in the effort to
keep ourselves secure, we will suffer serious consequences, as we will find it more difficult to obtain
the cooperation we need in order to find and incapacitate terrorist threats, and Al Qaeda and other
terrorist groups will find it easier to find willing recruits to the fight against us .
The Defense Department itself has recognized that we must take seriously the battle for "hearts and
minds." 37 That reality [*638] creates an opportunity for advocates concerned about the treatment of
foreign nationals in the war on terrorism. The way we treat other countries' nationals is covered
extensively in the foreign media, and arguably much of the anti-American resentment so prevalent around
the world today can be attributed to the perception that the United States is not willing to accord to
"them" the dignity and respect that international human rights demand , and is not willing to play by the
rules that international law sets out. 38 Moreover, the very fact that foreign nationals are so often the first
targets of our security initiatives makes foreign nations and foreign media potential partners in calling
attention to violations of international human rights here at home.
Ext. Backsliding Impact
Backsliding causes global nuclear war
Corr ’17 (Anders Corr – PhD in Government and International Relations @ Harvard, Principal at Corr
Analytics, Political Risk Analysis, “The New Cold War: Democracy Vs. Autocracy,” 21 May 2017,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/05/21/the-new-cold-war-democracy-vs-autocracy/2/#)
Over the past 8 days, North

Korea successfully tested two nuclear-capable missiles , making a mockery of
President Trump’s tough approach on North Korea. He has meanwhile opened his arms of friendship to Russia and China, the
biggest global threats to democracy. His public excuse is the need to work with Russia on terrorism, and with China on North Korea. That help
has not materialized, which will be a test of Trump’s mettle. If he fails to take action against North Korea, and leaves his many concessions to
China in place, he got played.
The North Korean launches are the latest in decades of events that show an animosity of authoritarian
rulers toward democracies. Shortly after the Soviet Union disintegrated in the 1990s, many U.S. analysts saw democracy
and liberalism as triumphant over autocracy, and even presaged the “end of history.” Russia and China were proceeding toward
market liberalization and democratization. The democratic peace would soon take hold and the world would evolve
in a utopic manner, they thought.
But that dream now seems far-flung, with low-grade Russian and Chinese offensives in Eastern Europe
and Asia respectively. These offensives are calibrated in such a manner as to make territorial gains ,
while not provoking a military response. They utilize alliances with Iran and North Korea to encourage
rogue state action that distracts global public attention from Chinese and Russian territorial offenses.
Conversely, the
United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the European Union and others are in a
relatively loose alliance based on the common values of democracy , human rights, and freedom of speech. But the
alliance is divided by the strong democratic desire for peace, and domestic elites with individual incentives to value trade and investment over the
defense of values like democracy. It is subject to free riding, which President Trump has successfully pushed, including at an upcoming meeting
in Brussels on May 25.
an autocratic bloc is provoking, through territorial expansion and destabilizing nuclear

What could be called
development , an interrelated set of conflicts developing in the direction of a New Cold War between
autocracies on one side, and democracies on the other. As with the old Cold War, the locus of the conflict is
everywhere, including the South China Sea , East China Sea , North Korean and Iranian nuclear and
ballistic missile development, the Russian occupation of Crimea in Ukraine, Russia’s attempt to reclaim
influence in the former Soviet Union, including through occupation of part of Georgia, China’s attempt to
push the U.S. out of Asia and claim it as a sphere of influence, the Arctic , space , undersea exploration,
and Russian and Chinese attempts to influence politicians and even voting outcomes in democratic countries.
To institutionalize its growing power and leadership of autocratic countries, and many democratic hangers-on, China attempts to reform global
governance not through democratization that might help countries like Japan, India, Brazil and Germany to positions of greater influence in
places like the U.N. Security Council, but to uniquely reflect and accommodate China’s own growing economic and military power.
Democracies are being challenged worldwide by this autocratic bloc. If democracies do not have a
clear-eyed understanding of the threat, and a grand strategy to defeat or at least deflect the challenge,
democracies will be weakened in such a way as to make future challenges even more difficult to
overcome. The outcomes of the challenges that democracies face today will determine future outcomes , in
a process that is increasingly path dependent .
Nowhere are the challenges and path dependence greater than in defending democratic voting processes from autocratic influence, and in
defending front-line democratic territory in places like Eastern Europe, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Himalayas, and Taiwan.
Decisions on defensive actions or inactions by allied democracies on these fields of economic,
diplomatic, and military battle will profoundly affect the future of democracy, peace, and stability for
decades, if not centuries, to come. Positive outcomes will require not just grand strategies by major powers ,
but comprehensive citizen involvement by people of many nations who care about a future that is
democratic and at peace .
2nc International Use Impact
Countries are on the brink of adopting HRIA now
The idea of human rights impact statements is not a wholly new concept. In 1979, the United Nations
Secretary General proposed human rights statements for new development projects. Endorsed by the
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Secretary General
recommended that:
Every effort should be made, at each phase of a development project, to ensure that the rights contained in
the Covenants are duly taken into account. This would apply, for example, in the initial assessment of the
priority needs of a particular country, in the identification of particular projects, in project design, in the
implementation of the project, and in its final evaluation. 71
Although few countries systematically heed this call, 72 many scholars have called for the use of human
rights impact statements in various contexts including general government action, 73 treaties, 74
international organizations, 75 and U.S. governmental 76 or corporate action abroad. 77 The Global
Commission for International Migration has made a similar suggestion for [*296] human rights review.
78 Unfortunately these scholars tend toward cursory mentions of such proposals and fail to flesh out the
relevant details. 79
Several countries are either implementing or considering human rights review processes. For example, in
Britain, an NGO works with the government to conduct a democratic audit which "monitor[s] and
evaluate[s] acts, domestic laws, administrative acts, and judicial decisions by reference to international
human rights standards." 80 Numerous other countries have adopted this democratic audit approach as
well. 81 Meanwhile, Australia is considering a version of human rights review that would require first
that "executive agencies prepare human rights impact statements . . . in relation to all significant policy
proposals, and second, that an independent executive agency review the quality of these statements." 82
US use of Human Rights Impact Statements spillover to international use.

The development of a human rights strategy to protect migrants yields several benefits that a purely
constitutional framework lacks. First, the use of human rights treaties and discourse creates links to the
international movement to protect human rights. These links can strengthen protections at home in two
ways: by drawing international attention and pressure to bear on domestic efforts 46 and providing a
shared language and understanding for domestic advocates to interact with, and learn from, international
experiences. 47 As many countries face similar immigration issues, the shared wisdom of an
international approach may be particularly useful in this area.
Such international interactions might also facilitate the transmission of human rights assessments
and impact statements throughout the world . Human rights review might complement U.N. efforts to
mainstream human rights and integrate them at an operational level. 48 The visibility and leadership
capabilities of the United States make it particularly able to promote the use of human rights
assessments . 49 Just as the United States' development and implementation of environmental impact
statements has shaped environmental policy in a significant number of countries , 50 the United States
could also reinvigorate its human rights policy through its leadership and assist other countries in
developing a stronger commitment to human rights. 51 Impact assessment provides other countries with
an opportunity [*292] to embrace the importance of human rights without making a strong commitment
to a treaty regime they might be unwilling to or be incapable of enforcing.
Adherence to Global Humans Rights Prevents WMD Conflicts

Burke-White, 2004 (William W., Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special
Assistant to the Dean at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton
University and Ph.D. at Cambridge, “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation”,
The Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring, 17 Harvard Human Rights. Journal. 249, Lexis)
This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion of human rights should be
given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human
rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national
security are acts of aggression by other states . Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the
Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from
the post-Cold War period [*250] indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens' human rights are also
those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human
rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can
significantly enhance U.S. and global security . Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to
be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international aggression . A central element of U.S.
foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. 2 If the correlation discussed herein is
accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic
linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization
of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such
states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records.
Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the
institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining
weapons of mass destruction ( WMD ). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.
US HR Impact
Counterplan prevents worst abuses of the US.
Review, Lexis)
Phrasing rights claims in the language of international human rights may facilitate international
pressure. When one charges that the United States government has violated the First or [*639] Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution, foreign observers are likely to defer to Americans on the issue. What
basis does a Swiss or Saudi citizen have to judge whether given actions violate American constitutional
norms? Where, by contrast, the charges are framed in terms of international human rights, they speak a
transnational language, one with which citizens and lawyers from any number of countries will feel more
comfortable. There is no need to defer to the United States, for example, on what the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the Geneva Conventions say. Thus, international human rights
language facilitates international moral and legal pressure on troubling U.S. practices .
A2: Trump Prevents Solvency
Action now is key – even under trump.
Brannen, 4/7/2018 (Kate, he deputy managing editor of Just Security and a nonresident senior fellow
at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council., “UNDER TRUMP, U.S.
IS NO LONGER A CHAMPION OF HUMAN RIGHTS” Newsweek http://www.newsweek.com/under-
trump-us-no-longer-champion-human-rights-579028)
Tyler Giannini, co-director of Harvard Law School’s Human Rights Program and its International Human
Rights Clinic
Human rights and advocating for their protection is all the more important right now when the U.S.
government will not be a leader on this front.
Human rights groups know very well what it is like to work without a government that is friendly to
human rights. That is too often the norm and usually at the heart of their work.
It should not be a time to panic, but instead a time when human rights work is going to be even more
relevant and needed.
James Silk, director of Orville H. Schell Jr. Center for International Human Rights at Yale Law School
It would be dangerously negligent not to see this as an uncertain time for human rights and not to be
especially vigilant. The Administration has not only shown no commitment to international law,
international human rights or international cooperation, but its acts and rhetoric have shown a
determination to neglect and even to affirmatively damage the most vulnerable, whether racial minorities,
people of diverse religious beliefs, children, the disabled, or refugees.
Human rights remains a powerful tool, especially as a language for principled resistance to tyranny and
barbarism and for building solidarity around seemingly disparate issues, as we saw so vividly in the
Women’s March and have continued to see in many forms since.
I believe that we in human rights will stay the course, not turning our backs on the atrocities and poverty
that already plagued the world and that will persist, but turning some of our attention toward using human
rights to hold this government accountable, to build support for efforts to block its most egregious acts, to
create pressure on it to live up to our legal and moral obligations.
A2: Backsliding Inevitable
Backsliding is occurring because of a lack of human rights considerations the CP
solves
Kendall-Taylor, 7/15/2016 (Andrea, deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at
the National Intelligence Council and a nonresident senior associate in the Human Rights Initiative at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. “How Democracy’s Decline Would
Undermine the International Order,” Center for Strategic & International Studies,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-
order)
Since 9/11, and particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring, Western enthusiasm for democracy support
has waned. Rising levels of instability, including in Ukraine and the Middle East, fragile governance in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and sustained threats from terrorist groups such as ISIL have increased Western
focus on security and stability. U.S. preoccupation with intelligence sharing, basing and overflight rights,
along with the perception that autocracy equates with stability, are trumping democracy and human
rights considerations .
While rising levels of global instability explain part of Washington’s shift from an historical commitment
to democracy, the nature of the policy process itself is a less appreciated factor . Policy discussions
tend to occur on a country-by-country basis—leading to choices that weigh the costs and benefits of
democracy support within the confines of a single country. From this perspective, the benefits of
counterterrorism cooperation or access to natural resources are regularly judged to outweigh the perceived
costs of supporting human rights. A serious problem arises, however, when this process is replicated
across countries. The bilateral focus rarely incorporates the risks to the U.S.-led global order that arise
from widespread democratic decline across multiple countries.
Many of the threats to the current global order, such as China’s rise or the diffusion of power, are driven
by factors that the United States and West more generally have little leverage to influence or control.
Democracy, however, is an area where Western actions can affect outcomes. Factoring in the risks that
arise from a global democratic decline into policy discussions is a vital step to building a comprehensive
approach to democracy support. Bringing this perspective to the table may not lead to dramatic shifts in
foreign policy, but it would ensure that we are having the right conversation.
Affirmative
Aff – Perms
Perm – Do both. Solves all their signal arguments. Their authors say it doesn’t
have to be prior.
Although agencies currently undertake environmental assessments prior to their decisions to pursue a
particular action, agencies and legislators can also conduct human rights reviews at later stages of
policy development. The NEPA includes a provision that allows agencies to monitor the implementation
of their decisions and permits them to condition funding on such implementation. n179 This monitoring
function does not, however, include the ability to review EIS findings or grant the authority to conduct a
new assessment or impact statement under changed circumstances. Although a purely prospective review
process ideally prevents the adoption of policies that infringe on immigrants' human rights, designers may
need to provide for ongoing review for several reasons. First, policies often have unintended
consequences; foresight is not perfect and non-discriminatory legislation and agency regulations may
inadvertently result in human rights violations in practice. Second, given changed circumstances, a policy
that once posed no significant impact on immigrants' human rights might do so over time. Moreover, an
agency might propose mitigation measures in order to avoid a full-blown human rights impact statement,
but then fail to implement those measures. n180 The formation of an ongoing duty to update human rights
assessments or review "findings of no significant impact" would help account for changed circumstances
and keep agencies and legislative bodies honest. n181 Further work will need to be done to determine
what will trigger an ongoing, as opposed to prospective, review.
Perm – Do the counterplan. Not functionally or textually competitive.

Perm – Do the counterplan’s impact assessment and do the plan no matter what.
Non-binding solves better – gets implemented and spurs further action on human
rights.
Baue, 3/19/2007 (Bill, cofounder of Sea Change Media who, has researched and written articles,
reports, and chapters for organizations and publications, “Ruggie Report Says Voluntary Human Rights
Initiatives Set Stage for Binding Global Standards,” citing Harvard Professor John Ruggie,
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/2253.html)
Prof. Ruggie suggests that voluntary initiatives are drawing a blueprint of the architecture for binding
standards.
"As they strengthen their accountability mechanisms, they also begin to blur the lines between the strictly
voluntary and mandatory spheres for participants," Prof. Ruggie writes. " Once in, exiting can be costly ."
Just as participation can be self-reinforcing, so too can accountability be self-imposed. Prof. Ruggie cites
the efficacy of human rights impact assessments.
"Several SRI funds strongly promote human rights impact assessments coupled with community
engagement and dialogue," Prof. Ruggie writes, referring to a letter submitted to him by faith-based
institutional investors and SRI members of the Interfaith Coalition on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR.)
"However, relatively few firms conduct these assessments routinely--and only a handful seem
ever to have done a fully fledged human rights impact assessment (HRIA), in contrast to including
selected human rights criteria in broader social/environmental assessments."
"And apparently only one company--BP--has ever made public even a summary of an HRIA," writes
Prof. Ruggie, referring to a document co-authored by Mr. Bennett assessing the Tangguh LNG Project for
BP Indonesia. "No single measure would yield more immediate results in the human rights performance
of firms than conducting such assessments where appropriate."
If HRIAs are so effective, why are they so rare?
"There aren't more HRIA's happening because not enough of a fire has been lit under companies in
industries where they are particularly necessary," Mr. Freeman told SocialFunds.com. "I would like to
think HRIAs will become standard operating procedure over the next decade not only for extractive
industries but even in beverage industries, for example."
Voluntary initiatives exhibit four additional blind spots, according to Prof. Ruggie: they currently do not
apply to small and medium-sized enterprises, or to developing country firms, or to state-owned
enterprises in emerging economies, and determined laggards find ways to avoid scrutiny. Despite these
problems with voluntary initiatives, he still sees his mandate as pushing society toward the tipping point
where voluntary initiatives blur into becoming standard practice.
"His comment about getting to the tipping point I think reveals his thinking about the strategic question,
How do we secure better compliance with global human rights standards affecting business?" states Mort
Winston, chair of the department of philosophy and religion and director of the Center for the Study of
Social Justice at The College of New Jersey, and former chair of Amnesty International USA. "His view,
which I share, is that it is necessary to get to a critical mass of companies that have adopted and are
practicing voluntary CSR before one has any hope of generating the political will among nation states to
enact global legal obligations that are directly binding on corporations."
Perm: Do the plan and have states perform an HRIS while implementing it.
Perm solves
Even if the federal government initially lacks the political will, some states and localities may be
interested in adopting such a human rights approach. In contrast to the federal government's expertise
with immigration policy, many states are confronting immigration related issues for the first time in their
recent histories. 184 Furthermore, despite the popular perception that the federal government controls all
immigration related legislation, 185 states, counties, and cities are active in this area . 186 Some states
have been hostile to immigrants, proposing measures such as ". . . prohibiting landlords from leasing to
illegal immigrants, penalizing businesses that employ undocumented workers, [] training local police to
enforce immigration laws," 187 limiting in-state college tuition to documented migrants, and
discouraging the employment of undocumented workers. Meanwhile, other cities and states are leading
efforts to welcome and assimilate immigrants by sponsoring ESL classes, providing cultural awareness
training, teaching financial literacy, 188 developing police outreach programs, 189 and providing ID
cards. 190
In addition to their increasing familiarity with immigration policy, many [*313] states possess
substantial experience conducting environmental impact statements. In fact, by mandating the inclusion
of "health, economic, social, and cultural impacts" in EISs, some states conduct more expansive reviews
than the federal government. 191 By having multiple states and localities undertake human rights review
processes, they can experiment with different design choices and learn from one another as well as
influence any potential federal process.
Aff – Delay
CP causes massive delays – it’s modeled off of EIS – and they take three years.
Straub, 3/24/2009 (Noelle, “NEPA reviews shouldn't delay stimulus projects, experts say” Greenwire
http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2009/03/24/2)
If the economy flounders despite the massive stimulus package, don't blame the federal law that forces
government agencies to review their projects' environmental impacts. So say National Environmental
Policy Act experts like Nicholas Yost, who led the drafting of NEPA regulations during the Carter
administration. The preparation of environmental impact statements under NEPA takes almost three-and-
a-half years -- much longer than Yost and others say is needed. The process, they say, can be sped up with
strict deadlines, strong leadership from agency chiefs and increased resources and personnel to do
reviews.
Aff – CP Fails
Human rights impact assessments fail – massive confusion over what and how to
measure.
Ergas, 2010 (Yasmine, Associate Director, Institute for the Study of Human Rights “Human Rights
Impact: General Issues and Sectoral Perspectives,” May
http://www.humanrightscolumbia.org/sites/default/files/2011_05_02_human_rights_impact.pdf)
Moreover, as the April workshop and other debates have highlighted, both sectoral issues and general
themes relating to evaluation and impact assessment often appear differently to differently situated actors.
The cost-benefit analysis of conducting an evaluation when resources for interventions are perceived to
be urgently needed, the time-frames within which results are to be expected, the "thickness" of the
descriptions gathered, the recourse to narratives and testimonies, the attention to the singularity of a
particular case in a given context in contrast to the isolation of measurable traits across a sample that
allows comparability, the evidentiary value of any datum and, indeed, the definition of what does or does
not constitute data may vary depending on whether one is an advocate or a policy-maker , a donor or an
academic researcher. Even the identification of the results of one intervention may vary: where advocacy
generally aims to change policies or conditions on the ground, in the first instance it often proceeds by
drawing attention to a particular situation. The salience gained — in the eyes of opinion leaders, policy
makers, political gatekeepers, media, and public opinion generally — constitutes an objective of an
intervention and not simply an incidental result. Analogously, gains in legislative and policy frameworks
— the signature and ratification of a treaty, the decision to establish a tribunal — often inform the
emergence of constituencies which press for implementation and alter the political landscapes in which
human rights issues are negotiated. But if policy-makers, donors or scholars focus evaluations on
immediate results then the extent to which opinion change has been effected or the bases for social
mobilizations have been strengthened may not be registered. The challenge is to establish fruitful
dialogue among interlocutors while respecting divergent points of view. In short, one must ask whether
and how scholars' analyses can help inform advocates' choices; how advocacy can lead to a reconstruction
of theoretical frameworks; how the lessons policy-makers derive may be of use to advocates, donors or
scholars. To help nurture this conversation, the symposium convenes advocates and academics, policy-
makers and donors.
But underlying all sectoral inquiries remain several general questions, which require collective, multi-
perspectival, consideration. The symposium will focus on two such questions: how can human rights be
measured, and appropriate indicators established; and, what are the ethical issues that impact assessments
must confront and how can they be addressed. The measurement of human rights, and hence any
assessment of change, is naturally dependent on the interpretation given to such rights and the
identification and weighting of factors related to these interpretations . Consensus in these areas appears
provisional at best. But alongside definitional matters, practical considerations also limit approaches to
measurement and the development of indicators. As has long been recognized, data collection is shaped
by numerous factors, including governmentally (or inter-governmentally) generated knowledge demands,
prevailing scientific paradigms and strategic choices regarding data collection techniques. Ultimately,
research "on the ground" requires local negotiations over meanings which, inter alia, bring into play
respondents' perceived obligation to supply (or data-gatherers' perceived right to demand) information.
Furthermore, if the experience gained in the course of an intervention changes the advocates', or the
policy-makers', own understandings of the problems to be dealt with, the methods to be utilized, and even
the meanings of the intervention as initially defined, how is such change factored into an evaluation? Is
this change itself — perhaps best posited as the result of a functioning feed-back loop, however
informally structured — not an objective of any intervention? But if objectives and methods change, how
can evaluations be effectively conducted? How, then, do such definitional variations and fluctuations and
implementation constraints affect the measurement of human rights?
Aff – Leadership is not Key
US doesn’t have to lead.
Wexler, 2010 (Lesley, Assistant professor of Law @ Florida State College of Law, “THE PROMISE
AND LIMITS OF LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNATIONALISM” Fordham Urban Law Journal
Lexis)
Given the federal government's exclusive authority to conduct treaties with foreign powers 7 and the limitation on sub-federal actors' abilities to
conduct agreements and compacts with those same actors, the
federal government seems at first blush to be the first best
actor in bringing human rights home. Regardless of this statement's accuracy, it does not necessarily
follow that the U.S. federal government will or must be the first mover in this arena . This section details the
various reasons why the U.S. federal government is often, and perhaps systemically, reluctant to prioritize the [*604] ratification and domestic
enforcement of international human rights as embodied in treaty law.
Aff – CP Doesn’t Solve Net Benefit
Doesn’t Solve Net Benefit – Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, no support from courts, and
won’t spill over.
Review Lexis)
American law and culture pose at least three considerable impediments to a legal or political strategy
aimed at furthering immigrants' rights through international human rights . The first is specific to this
historical moment. The attacks of September 11 [*630] succeeded in terrorizing the American psyche
and have led to a new wave of anti-immigration sentiment. That sentiment may make resort to
international human rights claims in this area especially risky. The anti-immigrant feeling is in part due to
the fact that all nineteen suicide bombers were noncitizens, backed by an international terrorist
organization comprised almost entirely of foreign nationals. But discrimination against immigrants is also
founded on the fact that, as in every other serious national security crisis in our past, government officials
have found it easier to sacrifice the rights of non-voting foreign nationals for the purported security of the
nation than to ask voting Americans to sacrifice their own rights and liberties in the name of promises of
greater security. 8 Louis Post's description of the Palmer Raids of 1919-1920, which rounded up
thousands of foreign nationals after a series of terrorist bombings, is equally applicable to the
government's post-9/11 response: "the delirium caused by the bombings turned in the direction of a
deportation crusade with the spontaneity of water seeking out the course of least resistance." 9 In such
situations, deportation of foreign nationals is "the course of least resistance," 10 especially when they are
viewed as "them" in the us-them dichotomy that so often dominates public discourse and consciousness in
a time of war.
The targeting of foreign nationals has taken many forms, from incommunicado detention and torture
abroad to preventive detention, systemic surveillance, and ethnic profiling at home. Many of the most
troubling initiatives have been undertaken through immigration law. Bent and twisted to serve purposes it
was never designed to achieve, immigration law has led to widespread secret arrests without charges,
secret trials, denials of access to counsel, detention without probable cause, and even the rendering of
foreign nationals to other countries for torture. 11 Early in the aftermath of 9/11, Attorney General John
Ashcroft discovered that the immigration laws afforded him wide-ranging discretion - a discretion he
expanded far beyond its already capacious boundaries - to target foreign nationals as "suspected
terrorists" on little or no evidence of [*631] involvement in anything remotely close to terrorist activity.
12 Just as traffic regulations have enabled narcotics officers to engage in pretextual stops and searches,
so immigration law has given federal agents the pretext they need to stop, search, monitor, and interrogate
foreign nationals in the search for terrorists.
The utility of immigration law and immigrant targeting to law enforcement officials and politicians means
that invoking international human rights in this realm presents considerable risk. If immigration law is
driven by the politics of fear and the course of least resistance, the invocation of international human
rights in this setting may do more to harm international human rights than to help immigration law. The
incentives to target foreign nationals may prove too powerful, and may lead courts, Congress, the
executive, and the public at large to take a rather dim view of the legal limitations posed by international
instruments. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the Administration's detention and interrogation
of foreign nationals abroad. The international laws of armed conflict recognize the power of a state in
wartime to hold those fighting for the other side for the duration of the conflict, but impose basic limits on
that power, including guarantees of fair process and prohibitions on torture and inhumane treatment. 13
Claiming that this is a new kind of war, the Administration has sought to employ the extraordinary
powers of war while evading the international law limits on those powers, refusing until suffering defeat
in the Supreme Court to provide Guantanamo detainees with any sort of hearing to assess their status 14
and maintaining in secret Justice Department and Pentagon memos that the international law prohibition
on torture cannot constrain the President in wartime. 15 It [*632] has long been said that civil liberties
are some of the first casualties of war, but international human rights may be even earlier to go.
The second reason to be pessimistic about the effectiveness of international human rights claims lies in
the skeptical reception such claims have long been given in the United States. Until recently, a lawyer
litigating for social change in the United States would use international human rights arguments only after
all statutory and constitutional law arguments had failed, and even then without much hope of actually
prevailing. American legal culture has long viewed international human rights as "mere surplusage" when
it comes to domestic law. Many assume that international human rights norms are not likely to provide
greater guarantees than does the Constitution. Congress has often made this a self-fulfilling prophecy by
adopting reservations in ratifying international human rights conventions providing that the treaties not be
read as mandating anything more than what American constitutional law guarantees. 16 There is a dearth
of lawyers trained to employ international human rights arguments, and judges are unaccustomed to
hearing such arguments, much less to taking them seriously. A variety of legal doctrines erect barriers to
private enforcement of international human rights in domestic courts, and there is no effective
international legal forum for enforcement against the United States. 17 All of these circumstances
combine to make [*633] international human rights appear illusory and utopian, not real constraints to
be taken seriously by the political or legal branches of government.
The skepticism is evident in Supreme Court opinions. In 2004, the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted
the Alien Tort Statute, which had for twenty years been the principal avenue for development of
international human rights law in U.S. courts. 18 The Court limited the Alien Tort Statute to enforcement
of those international human rights norms that already have the specificity and uniform consensus that
characterized the three international law violations recognized as affording private individuals a cause of
action at the time of the Alien Tort Statute's enactment in 1798 - injuries against ambassadors, denial of
safe conduct, and piracy. 19 While the Court significantly left "the door ajar" to U.S. courts' enforcement
of such widely established international human rights claims, 20 its limitation on the types of claims that
are cognizable is likely to make U.S. courts inhospitable for the development of international human
rights claims in Alien Tort Statute lawsuits.
As I will suggest later, the Sosa decision is by no means a fatal bar to international human rights
advocates in domestic courts, particularly where they invoke international law as a guide to the
interpretation of statutory or constitutional questions rather than as an independent source of relief. But
perhaps more significantly, the Court's reasoning for its narrow construction of the Alien Tort Statute
reflects substantial judicial discomfort with playing an active role in the development of international
human rights law. The Court listed several reasons for construing the judicial role narrowly, and all are
likely to be cited by defendants in international human rights cases as reasons for judicial restraint in this
domain generally. The Court noted that while it has long been recognized that the law of nations is a part
of federal common law, modern conceptions of both common law and the role of federal courts
contemplate a much more limited role for courts than was assumed at the time of the Framers, when it
was thought that common law was found, not made, by courts. 21 The Court also reasoned that modern
jurisprudence disfavors judicially created private rights of action and that the interpretation of
international human rights will often [*634] implicate matters of foreign relations best left to the
political branches. 22 Moreover, the Court saw "no Congressional mandate to seek out and define new
and debatable violations of the law of nations." 23
Finally, even apart from the specific challenges posed by the post-9/11 era, immigration law is an
especially difficult arena for advancing individual rights claims of any kind, much less those based on
international law. The Supreme Court has long characterized the immigration power as "plenary," and
government lawyers inevitably open their briefs in immigrants' rights cases by quoting decisions
suggesting that the principal limits on that "plenary power" are political, not legal, in nature. 24 The
Supreme Court has only rarely declared an immigration law unconstitutional, and the casebooks are
replete with examples of injustices that would plainly not be tolerated (legally or politically) had the
victims been U.S. citizens. 25 As the Supreme Court reiterated in 2002, upholding a statute imposing
mandatory preventive detention on foreign nationals, a practice that would never pass constitutional
muster if applied to citizens, "Congress regularly makes rules [for aliens] that [*635] would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens." 26
These concerns make clear that international human rights arguments are no magic sword in the stone for
immigrants' rights advocates. In their own respective spheres, advancing immigrants' rights and
international human rights have been uphill battles. Combining the two might well be dismissed as "naive
and dangerous" idealism, as President Bush might put it. 27 But as I will show in the next section, each
of the obstacles identified above simultaneously provides an opportunity. With the right emphasis and
tactics, international human rights arguments may well prove a critical tool in the arsenal of those who
seek to advance immigrants' rights.
Aff – Alt Causes
Way too many alt causes the counterplan doesn’t overcome.
Sarah Knuckey, director of the Human Rights Clinic, and the faculty co-director of the Human Rights
Institute at Columbia Law School
The Trump administration’s actions demonstrate disdain for human rights across the civil, political, social
and economic rights spectrum. In just two months, Trump’s administration has already taken numerous
actions that violate, undermine, or seriously risk harming human rights around the world.
His administration undermined women’s rights by reinstating the “global gag” rule, which blocks funding
for international NGOs providing abortion services overseas. His administration undermined indigenous
rights and risked the right to water by advancing the construction of the Dakota Access and Keystone
pipelines.
Privacy rights were harmed when he took action to exclude non-US citizens from agency privacy
policies. The Muslim Bans violated the right to non-discrimination.
A wide range of other actions–related to transgender students, voter ID laws, migrants without
documentation, transparency requirements for mining companies, as well as arms sales to Bahrain,
undoing efforts to fight climate change, inviting an anti-LGBT hate group to the U.N., failing to show up
at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights—all harm the protection and advancement of
human rights.
Alt Causes outweigh.

Trump officials have clearly given verbal support to international human rights, but is that commitment
anything more than lip service? If words spoke louder than actions, Trump’s record might be viewed
more favorably.
For those keeping score, the list of things the Trump administration has done in its first few months in
office to threaten human rights at home and abroad is a long one. Check out Columbia Law School’s
Trump Human Rights tracker for more.
Taking all of this into account, what are we to make of the Trump administration’s attitude toward
international human rights? Is all of this concern exaggerated or is it time to panic? To find out, I asked
some of the top human rights lawyers, experts and advocates in the field today. Here’s what they had to
say:
Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch
So far we’ve seen no principled commitment to promoting human rights. We’ve heard broad pledges of
support, but they have been applied only for traditional adversaries or when ignoring a problem would be
too damaging even for the Trump administration’s credibility.
Most of the time, when any competing interest has been at stake, human rights have been jettisoned.
David Kaye, U.N. special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion
and expression
I don’t know if the sky is falling, but in specific areas, I believe there is the potential for real regression in
the U.S. commitment to rights and to the institutions that support the victims of abuse worldwide.
Of course, the administration is seeking to intimidate the press (so far unsuccessfully, by and large) and is
taking specific steps to undermine access to information, as we see with the limited press availabilities at
State and the imminent arrival of a Fox journalist as spokesperson.
Nikki Haley’s swipe at the Human Rights Council shows a total lack of awareness of the range of things
that happen in that forum, even if it could genuinely use some reform. And then at the state level, we see
draconian proposals to undermine the right to protest. Does this mean the sky is falling?
I don’t know, but it certainly reflects and implements a posture of disdain for the rules that govern
democratic societies.
Aff – Backsliding Inevitable
Global backsliding now – the impact is non-unique.
Kagan, 1/26/2015 (Robert, Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow with the Project on
International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, “Is Democracy in Decline?
The Weight of Geopolitics” Brookings https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-democracy-in-decline-the-
weight-of-geopolitics/)
These are relevant questions again. We live in a time when democratic nations are in retreat in the realm
of geopolitics, and when democracy itself is also in retreat. The latter phenomenon has been well
documented by Freedom House, which has recorded declines in freedom in the world for nine straight
years. At the level of geopolitics, the shifting tectonic plates have yet to produce a seismic rearrangement
of power, but rumblings are audible. The United States has been in a state of retrenchment since President
Barack Obama took office in 2009. The democratic nations of Europe, which some might have expected
to pick up the slack, have instead turned inward and all but abandoned earlier dreams of reshaping the
international system in their image. As for such rising democracies as Brazil, India, Turkey, and South
Africa, they are neither rising as fast as once anticipated nor yet behaving as democracies in world affairs.
Their focus remains narrow and regional. Their national identities remain shaped by postcolonial and
nonaligned sensibilities—by old but carefully nursed resentments—which lead them, for instance, to
shield rather than condemn autocratic Russia’s invasion of democratic Ukraine, or, in the case of Brazil,
to prefer the company of Venezuelan dictators to that of North American democratic presidents.
Meanwhile, insofar as there is energy in the international system, it comes from the great-power
autocracies, China and Russia, and from would-be theocrats pursuing their dream of a new caliphate in
the Middle East. For all their many problems and weaknesses, it is still these autocracies and these
aspiring religious totalitarians that push forward while the democracies draw back, that act while the
democracies react, and that seem increasingly unleashed while the democracies feel increasingly
constrained.
It should not be surprising that one of the side effects of these circumstances has been the weakening and
in some cases collapse of democracy in those places where it was newest and weakest. Geopolitical shifts
among the reigning great powers, often but not always the result of wars, can have significant effects on
the domestic politics of the smaller and weaker nations of the world. Global democratizing trends have
been stopped and reversed before.
Only a total change in US geopolitical beliefs can solve, that’s not happening.
Kagan, 1/26/2015 (Robert, Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow with the Project on
International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, “Is Democracy in Decline?
The Weight of Geopolitics” Brookings https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-democracy-in-decline-the-
weight-of-geopolitics/)
What about today? With the democratic superpower curtailing its global influence, regional powers are
setting the tone in their respective regions. Not surprisingly, dictatorships are more common in the
environs of Russia, along the borders of China (North Korea, Burma, and Thailand), and in the Middle
East, where long dictatorial traditions have so far mostly withstood the challenge of popular uprisings.
But even in regions where democracies remain strong, authoritarians have been able to make a
determined stand while their democratic neighbors passively stand by. Thus Hungary’s leaders, in the
heart of an indifferent Europe, proclaim their love of illiberalism and crack down on press and political
freedoms while the rest of the European Union, supposedly a club for democracies only, looks away. In
South America, democracy is engaged in a contest with dictatorship, but an indifferent Brazil looks on,
thinking only of trade and of North American imperialism. Meanwhile in Central America, next door to
an indifferent Mexico, democracy collapses under the weight of drugs and crime and the resurgence of
the caudillos. Yet it may be unfair to blame regional powers for not doing what they have never done.
Insofar as the shift in the geopolitical equation has affected the fate of democracies worldwide, it is
probably the change in the democratic superpower’s behavior that bears most of the responsibility.
If that superpower does not change its course, we are likely to see democracy around the world rolled
back further. There is nothing inevitable about democracy. The liberal world order we have been living in
these past decades was not bequeathed by “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.” It is not the
endpoint of human progress.

Human Rights Impact Statement CP - SDI 2018 BGHT

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Human Rights Impact Statement

The CP establishes Humans Rights review – Immigration is a key test

Trump is collapsing human rights credibility which triggers authoritarian

The CP Reverses the perception of hypocrisy and restores US Human Rights

Global backsliding unravels international problem-solving on multiple existential

HRIA’s will be accepted – the process is self-reflexive.

Impact statements are good – create better decisions and accountability.

Plan takes forever too.

Severence is a voter makes going negative impossible because there is no stable

Review must happen BEFORE policy enactment – delay causes abuse

Lying is immoral – reject it.

c. “Substantial” requires legal effect

Policy analysis: CP constructs better immigration policy – rational decision-making

Specifically true in the context of immigration – US falls short on International

US use of HRIA boosts HR cred.

Perception of American Exceptionalism prevents cooperation and increases anti-

Over the past 8 days, North

an autocratic bloc is provoking, through territorial expansion and destabilizing nuclear

US use of Human Rights Impact Statements spillover to international use.

Adherence to Global Humans Rights Prevents WMD Conflicts

Perm – Do the counterplan. Not functionally or textually competitive.

Alt Causes outweigh.

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