JOURNAL OF BATTLEFIELD TECHNOLOGY VOL 6, NO 2, JULY 2003 1

CENTRALISATION AND DECENTRALISATION IN NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE

Anthony H. Dekker1
Abstract. In this paper, we examine the spectrum of choices between organisational centralisation and decentralisation
in the presence of emerging trends in communications, information-processing, and sensor technologies. These
technologies are important drivers in the current move towards Network Centric Warfare (NCW), and raise the
question: should the new networks being developed be used to enable greater centralisation, or greater
decentralisation? We reduce the choice to six basic questions (covering issues such as facilities, information availability,
communications, and time constraints), and examine how the answers to these questions are impacted by technological
change. Our analysis suggests that most new technologies can support both centralisation and decentralisation. As a
result, over coming decades, the choice will be increasingly determined by a purely theoretical question, namely the
possibility of a "global optimum." This in turn is based on characteristics of the air, maritime, and land environments,
with a global optimum more likely in the air and maritime environments, and less likely in the land environment.

INTRODUCTION SIX KEY QUESTIONS

Within the military sphere, as in business, a consensus has In order to select a balance between centralised and
developed over many decades regarding the relative benefits decentralised decision-making for a particular task in an
of centralisation and decentralisation [1]. Some decisions NCW environment, we pose six key questions (Table 1).
have proven best handled by a senior general in a central These questions cover the practical and theoretical reasons
headquarters. These decisions are typically those where a for making centralised or decentralised decisions, and the
global optimum is required, that is a “best possible” solution constraints on communicating those decisions to the tactical
based on the entire “big picture.” Making high-level units executing them.
centralised decisions is usually called “planning.” Other We now consider these (inter-related) questions in detail.
decisions have proven best handled by tactical warfighters:
pilots, soldiers, and naval personnel. These have generally
(I) Where are the Facilities for Decision-Making?
been short-term urgent decisions. Yet other decisions are
handled somewhere in between these extremes. However, A central headquarters is often well-equipped with facilities
this consensus must be re-evaluated in the light of the for decision-making. Located in a relatively safe rear
emerging trend towards Network Centric Warfare. position, staff are free from the distractions of ordnance
flying past their heads. Increased space allows more staff to
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is the military equivalent of
deal with complex decisions, and allows better information
e-business. It involves taking advantage of a network linking
management, with maps on walls, TV screens, and computers
information sources (sensors), information users (shooters),
readily available.
and information transformers/planners (command-and-
control nodes). In the words of Alberts et al [2]: As an example, an AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control
System) aircraft is currently the best place to make decisions
“We define NCW as an information superiority-enabled
about overall deployment of a team of fighter aircraft (Figure
concept of operations that generates increased combat
1). Flying to the rear of the main battle, and protected by a
power by networking sensors, decision makers, and
fighter escort, the AWACS staff are free from the tactical
shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed
distractions suffered by fighter pilots. An AWACS aircraft
of command, higher tempo of operations, greater
such as the Boeing E-3C has room for 17 surveillance and
lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-
control staff, and a large number of computer displays. In
synchronization. In essence, NCW translates
contrast, an individual fighter pilot does not have the time or
information superiority into combat power by effectively
the facilities to deal with the “big picture” of air combat
linking knowledgeable entities in the battlespace.”
(there are additional reasons for using AWACS aircraft, and
we touch on these later in relation to questions II to VI).
I Where are the facilities for decision-making located? Threat Threat
II Is a global optimum necessary? AWACS
III Is a global optimum possible?
IV Where is the necessary information for decision-
making available?
V Within what timeframe must decisions being made?
Threat
VI What communications infrastructure is available? Threat
Table 1. Six key questions for choosing between
centralisation and decentralisation.

Figure 1. AWACS concept of operations.

1
Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) Fern Hill, Department of Defence, Canberra ACT 2600, Australia.
2 DEKKER: CENTRALISATION AND DECENTRALISATION IN NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE
However, computer technology is slowly changing this
situation. Computers deployed in tactical units can manage
large amounts of information. In the future, intelligent
software will automate many headquarters functions
traditionally performed by human personnel, such as
updating information on maps, handling messages, checking
availability of resources, and so on. This will permit more
decentralised decision-making, since the smaller the number
of staff required, the closer to the tactical level we can move
decisions.
Using computers to improve the management of information
at the tactical level is partly dependent on improved user
interfaces. Staff at the tactical level often have both their
hands and their eyes occupied with critical activities. This
means that improvements in voice recognition, speech
synthesis, and natural language processing may be necessary
for the effective use of computers at the tactical level. On the
other hand, requiring people to process both visual and audio
information may risk information overload, unless computers
become more effective at automatically prioritising
information.
The availability of well-trained staff able to make decisions
in centralised or decentralised locations is also an important
factor. For this reason, special-forces personnel, who are
required to make important decentralised decisions, receive
extremely high levels of training [8].
(II) Is a Global Optimum Necessary?
Some problems can be solved by allowing multiple tactical
units to individually optimise their “piece of the puzzle.”
Other problems require a centralised decision that takes into
account the entire “big picture.” Experience with computer
algorithms for difficult problems [6] indicates that solutions
calculated in a distributed fashion, such as by genetic
algorithms or neural networks, can be quite good, but not as
good as a centrally calculated global optimum. For example,
air defence of a naval task group requires the best possible
assignment of threats to weapons systems, and this must take
into account the “big picture” of all target priorities and all
weapons systems capabilities. Failure to do so may result in
serious loss of life. Similarly, centralised control of air
engagements with an AWACS aircraft offers significantly
better performance than individual action, and an AWACS
aircraft is recognised as a “force multiplier” for this reason.
However, it should be emphasised that to speak about a
global optimum implies the existence of a clearly formulated
problem, with extensive and accurate information about the
elements of the problem. This can sometimes be achieved in
the air and maritime environments, but is more difficult in the
chaotic land environment. As Moltke once wrote [17]:
“In war with its enormous friction, even the mediocre is
quite an achievement.”
The ability of platforms to continue functioning in the air and
maritime environments is also largely determined by the laws
of physics. In contrast, the ability of an army unit to continue
functioning is much more heavily influenced by moral
factors, which are more difficult to measure [17].
(III) Is a Global Optimum Possible?
Notwithstanding the desirability of a global optimum in many
cases, it may not always be possible. In some cases, a
centralised decision is no better than the local optimum
obtained by decentralised decision-making. In other cases,
the problem is too complex for a global optimum to be
calculated.
To illustrate this, consider a collection of targets where the
global optimum requires selecting and prioritising the top ten
threats, and the degree of threat depends on synergistic
effects, such as multiple threats to the same friendly platform.
In this case, the global optimum requires evaluation of each
combination of possible targets to engage. If each possible
combination takes one nanosecond to evaluate (a blindingly
fast speed), the total decision times will be as per Table 2.
Number of Targets Decision Time
1 1 nanosecond
2 2 nanoseconds
5 0.1 microseconds
10 4 milliseconds
20 11 minutes
50 14 months
100 2 000 years
Table 2. Decision times for varying target numbers.
The exponential growth illustrated in Table 2 indicates that,
even with much faster computers or more sophisticated
search strategies, a global optimum will always be impossible
for more than 100 or so targets. The land environment, with
many targets, will therefore always require a substantial
amount of decentralised decision-making about which targets
to engage. The clutter of obstacles and terrain in the land
environment further restricts the possibility of a global
optimum, and reinforces the need for decentralised decision-
making.
(IV) Where is the Necessary Information Available?
In many situations, the best place to make a rapid high-
quality decision is the place where sensor information is
collected. For example, an AWACS aircraft has a powerful
radar on the same platform as the command-and-control staff,
and bandwidth constraints would make it difficult to transfer
the detailed real-time radar data to any other location.
Consequently, decisions are best made on the AWACS
aircraft.
In a strict hierarchy, where information is passed “up the
chain,” the first place that a fully integrated situation
awareness picture appears is the central headquarters, and this
supports centralised decision-making. However, a networked
(peer-to-peer) organisational architecture makes it possible to
build an integrated situation awareness picture in each
tactical unit before the central headquarters has the
information, and this supports decentralised decision-
making. This is because it is usually preferable to make a
decision in the place where the integrated situation awareness
picture first appears.
In other cases, information is only available at the tactical
level, and decentralised decision-making is the only option.
Units operating under radio silence, and special forces [8]
deployed in hostile territory are two examples.
Information about staff morale is one category of information
that is available at the tactical level, but is difficult to pass on
JOURNAL OF BATTLEFIELD TECHNOLOGY VOL 6, NO 2, JULY 2003
to a central headquarters. Morale and other human issues can
often not be understood unless the commander “looks in the
eyes” of his troops, and for this reason the best commanders
have made great efforts to gain such information at first hand.
General Fred Franks, the highly successful US VII Corps
commander in the Gulf War, puts it this way [5]:
“The main thing was that I wanted to get my subordinate
commanders’ sense of what was happening, and then give
them my own sense and tell them what I wanted them to
do in the next twelve to twenty-four hours. When I was
there with them, I could look them in the eye and see if
they understood what I wanted. That way, there could be
no ambiguity in orders… By being up front, you gain
immediacy. But you also gain something else: Soldiers
are getting hurt, wounded, killed in action. Commanders
shouldn’t be staying in their command post. They should
be out and around the soldiers, where they can be feeling
the pain and the pride, and where they can understand the
whole human dimension of the battle. That way of
operating has practical, tactical consequences. It will
better inform commanders’ intuition about what to do; it
will suggest alternate courses of action that will
accomplish their mission at least cost of their troops.”
In contrast, Adolf Hitler in his bunker at Vinnitsa, guided
mostly by his memories of World War I trench warfare, was
completely unable to make appropriate decisions about the
conduct of his Russian campaign, approximately 1 000 km
away. In the words of historian John Keegan [9]:
“Radio did not bring to the Führer’s headquarters all the
other information of an immaterial but much more
important kind—the look of the battlefield, the degree of
heat and cold, the variation in intensity of enemy
pressure, the level of noise, the flow of wounded
backward, the flow of supply forward, the mood of the
soldiers, to be judged by the expression of their faces and
the tone of their answers to questions—which only a man
on the spot would gather.”
The improvement of communications technology permits
some of this information to reach a central location, and one-
on-one videoconferencing with the troops may substitute for
the physical presence of the commander, but even with these
tools it is difficult for a commander in the rear to get a true
feel for what is happening at the front.
Another historical example is German air defence in World
War II after Allied radar countermeasures became effective
[12]. Where information on the target of Allied bombings
was available, a centralised form of ground control
codenamed Wilde Sau was moderately effective, even when
using single-seat fighters, since they could engage visually
over the target, aided by searchlights. In the absence of such
information, a decentralised strategy called Zahme Sau was
more effective. This combined loose ground control with
two-seat fighters visually searching the night sky, and calling
in reinforcements when Allied bombers were found. In both
cases, decisions were best made at the location where
information was available.
(V) Time Constraints
In some circumstances, centralised decisions are ruled out by
time constraints. The time taken to pass a centralised decision
to the tactical units that will carry it out can sometimes be
3
prohibitive. This time delay is often due to a combination of
bandwidth limitations (discussed in the next question) and
human processes for verifying, collating, and otherwise
manipulating information. Because it reduces such delays,
decentralisation is often appropriate for rapidly-changing
situations. For example, when Heinz Guderian introduced the
military doctrine later known as Blitzkrieg (for its fast-
moving combination of motorised ground forces and Stuka
strike aircraft), he was forced to combine this with
Auftragstaktik (directive control), a policy of designating an
objective and point of main effort [7,10,11], while
decentralising other decisions. Directive control, or mission-
oriented command, has become an important aspect of
doctrine for many military forces.
In contrast, the serious casualties suffered by US forces in
Mogadishu on 3 October 1993 [13] were partly due to
centralised decisions on the route the US convoy should take
through the city. These decisions were made on the basis of
high-quality overhead imagery, but the time delay in
communicating instructions led to disaster.
In general, the time constraint is derived from the sensor
range divided by speed of target engagement—that is, the
time between seeing a target and being killed by it. This time
constraint is therefore likely to be most stringent in
environments with poor visibility: forested, mountainous, and
urban terrain. These environments are therefore likely to
require a substantial degree of decentralisation.
(VI) Communications Infrastructure
We have already mentioned communications infrastructure in
relation to previous questions. Communications infrastructure
affects the availability of information in centralised or
decentralised locations (question IV). It also affects the
distribution of decisions to the tactical units which will
execute them. Orders are generally more compact than the
information on which they are based [15], and so generally
require less bandwidth. However, when communications
links are absent or unusable (e.g. with operations under radio
silence), decentralisation is necessary. For much of history,
naval forces have operated in a highly decentralised fashion
for this reason, with each captain having considerable
autonomy.
Where communication permits, a greater degree of control
can be vested in a fleet or carrier group commander.
However, without appropriate communications, centralised
control of a fleet is impossible. This was demonstrated by
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto at the battle of Midway, where
centralised control of the 88-vessel Japanese fleet proved
ineffective, due to a combination of geographical separation
and an attempt to maintain radio silence [14].
Improved communications technology can eliminate
decentralisation where this has been forced by the inability to
disseminate orders in time. However, by making information
available in a wide variety of locations (question IV),
improving communications infrastructure can support both
centralisation and decentralisation.
A SIMULATION EXPERIMENT
We investigated some of these issues in a simulation
experiment (partially based on the SCUDHunt game of [4]).
4 DEKKER: CENTRALISATION AND DECENTRALISATION IN NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE

The experiment involved a 4×4 grid containing four equally poor quality, and therefore decentralisation was
randomly-located missile launchers (see Figure 2). preferable because of its speed advantage. When tempo was
high, time constraints did not permit centralised decision-
making at all (question V).

Int Plan
HQ HQ

HQ 1 HQ 2 HQ 3 HQ 4
Figure 2. SCUD-hunting experiment—centralised
architecture.
Figure 3. SCUD-hunting experiment—decentralised
architecture.
Four surveillance aircraft fly along the columns of the grid, in
an attempt to locate the missile launchers. When the missile
The experimental data confirmed this analysis (see Table 3,
launchers are located, four strike aircraft are dispatched to
or for a more detailed discussion, see [3]). The centralised
destroy them (each strike aircraft can destroy only one
architecture out-performed the distributed architectures only
launcher).
when tempo was slow, and sensor quality was fair to good.
The experiment varied sensor quality (so that the surveillance
aircraft may provide more or less accurate information), and Sensor Quality
tempo (so that the launchers may avoid strike by moving Poor Fair Good
either rapidly or slowly to safe locations after detection). The Slow Centralised Arch. Best
experiment is described in more detail in [3]. Tempo Moderate
Decentralised Architectures Best
A variety of organisational architectures were examined. In Fast
the centralised architecture (Figure 2), information from the
surveillance aircraft was integrated in an intelligence Table 3. SCUD-hunting experiment—best-performing
headquarters, and then passed to a planning headquarters architectures under varying circumstances.
which assigned the strike aircraft to targets. This was
contrasted with several variations of decentralised THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
architectures, where four independent headquarters each
“owned” a column, with control of one surveillance aircraft If we consider the impact of new technology in the light of
and one strike aircraft dedicated to that column. our six key questions, some interesting patterns emerge.
Limited communication was possible between the Table 4 shows how improvements in communications,
independent headquarters (Figure 3). The performance of information-processing, and sensor technology can either
each architecture was examined under varying combinations support centralisation (C), or decentralisation (D), or both.
of sensor quality (ranging from poor to good) and tempo The numbers 1 to 5 in the table refer to the points below.
(ranging from fast to slow).
Question Comms IT Sensors
The decentralised architectures were assumed to respond I Facilities? D (1)
more quickly. However, where multiple targets occurred in
II Global Optimum Necessary?
the same column, the decentralised architectures left some
strike aircraft unused, and hence some targets untouched. In III Global Optimum Possible? C (2)
other words, the global optimum of using all four strike IV Information Availability? C, D (3) C, D (4)
aircraft effectively was only obtained with the centralised V Time Constraints? C (5) C (2)
architecture. VI Comms Infrastructure? C (5)
This experiment was thus designed so that a global optimum
was necessary (question II). However, where sensor quality Table 4. Impacts on the six key questions of Table 1 of
was poor, a global optimum was not possible (question III), improvements in communications, information-
because centralised and decentralised decisions were of processing, and sensor technologies.
JOURNAL OF BATTLEFIELD TECHNOLOGY VOL 6, NO 2, JULY 2003
1. As indicated in our discussion of question I above,
intelligent software can automate many decisions, as well
as improving information management, and this supports
decentralised decision-making. Better cockpit avionics,
laptop computers in tanks, and fully automated precision
guided weapons or unmanned combat air vehicles
(UCAVs) are possible examples.
2. Improvements in hardware speed and software
intelligence can rapidly find global optima for more
difficult problems. For example, improved computer
technology will eventually make it possible to “fight” a
fleet as a unit in the way that a Combat Information
Centre (CIC) currently “fights” an individual ship. In the
ultimate development of what is known as cooperative
engagement [18], targets can be prioritised and assigned
to the weapons systems best capable of destroying them,
in a way that globally optimises fleet protection (see
Figure 4). This may mean that two ships each engage
missiles aimed at the other, because the character of their
weapons systems makes that the optimal choice.
3. Improved communications technology can make
information available in both central and decentralised
locations. Technology such as global broadcast satellite
systems can pass centrally collected information (such as
imagery) to tactical units, supporting decentralisation. On
the other hand, videoconferencing may allow National
Command Authority or senior generals to talk directly to
tactical personnel, even going so far as to personally
authorise a private or corporal to fire the first bullet in
politically-charged circumstances.
4. Similarly, improved sensor technologies can make
information available in a way that supports either
centralisation or decentralisation. This includes sensors
themselves, such as improved infrared devices; sensor
platforms, such as uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs);
and sensor data analysis, such as multi-spectral image
processing.
5. Improved communications technology facilitates fast
transfer of centrally produced orders to tactical units, and
allows execution to be monitored using e.g.
videoconferencing and handheld digital cameras. This can
make centralisation possible where time constraints
(question V) or the absence of communications links
(question VI) have previously ruled it out.
Figure 4. Future cooperative-engagement concept of
operations.
5
Notice that all these technologies can support both
centralisation and decentralisation, and that question II
(regarding the necessity of a global optimum) is the only
question not impacted by technological change. This is
because question II is essentially theoretical in nature.
As technology improves, we would expect the technology-
related constraints to become less binding, while the
theoretical constraints remain equally important. This means
that over several decades, as technology improves, the
theoretical constraints will increasingly dominate the issue of
centralisation and decentralisation. These theoretical
constraints are question II (regarding the necessity of a global
optimum) and the theoretical component of question III
(regarding the possibility of a global optimum), and these
depend on the nature of the tactical situation.
In the air and maritime environments (in contrast to land),
global optima are often feasible and necessary for survival.
More complete information is available, especially with
improved sensors, there are generally fewer targets (less than
100 or so), and there is no terrain for targets to hide behind.
Consequently, improvements to technology will increasingly
drive a tendency toward centralisation in these environments.
On the other hand, global optima are not feasible in the land
environment. To quote Storr [15]:
“Conceptually, the number of possible outcomes resulting
from enemy contact is huge, and probably beyond our
capacity to comprehend. Every single interaction—of
infantryman, tank and gun—could have several results.
The possible permutations of all such interactions are
innumerable.”
Forested, mountainous, or urban terrain restricts the ability of
sensors to acquire information [16], and creates tactical
situations where rapid response is necessary, even if the
response is not perfect [15]. Together with the infeasibility of
global optima, this suggests that a high degree of
decentralisation (i.e. directive control, or mission-oriented
command) will continue to be appropriate for the land
environment, in spite of technological change.
CONCLUSIONS
We have posed six key questions (Table 1) for selecting a
balance between centralised and decentralised decision-
making, and discussed several examples where one or the
other is preferable. We have also looked at the impact of
advances in communications, information-processing, and
sensor technologies, and showed that these can support both
centralisation and decentralisation, depending on the
circumstances.
However, as technology improves, we can expect that the
choice will be increasingly dominated by our question II
(necessity of a global optimum) and by the theoretical
component of question III (possibility of a global optimum).
For optimal engagement of less than 100 or so targets in the
relatively uncluttered air and maritime environments,
centralisation will increasingly give the “knowledge edge,”
and improvements in technology will increasingly facilitate
centralisation. This trend includes improvements in air
battlespace management, and cooperative engagement of
threats in the maritime environment.
6 DEKKER: CENTRALISATION AND DECENTRALISATION IN NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE

On the other hand, in the more complex and cluttered land
environment, where global optima are not (and never will be)
possible, technological change will support better and faster
decentralised decisions. The degree of decentralisation will
depend on the details of terrain, with flat open desert terrain
permitting some centralisation, and forested, mountainous, or
urban terrain forcing more decentralisation. Equipped with
improved sensors, laptop and palmtop computers, and
sophisticated software, future ground troops will engage in a
dramatic improvement on Blitzkrieg. Fast, high-quality
decentralised decisions will give a speed advantage over
opposing forces, defeating them before they are able to plan a
response.
As improvements in technology gradually eliminate
technological constraints, the choice between centralisation
and decentralisation will therefore eventually be determined
by the nature of tactical problems in the air, maritime, and
land environments themselves.
[16] D. Bowley and S. Brewer, “Australia’s Regional Environment
Blunting the Knowledge Edge?” Australian Defence Force
Journal, 150, September/October 2001.
[17] M. van Creveld, Command in War, Harvard University Press,
1985.
[18] W. Perry, R. Button, J. Bracken, T. Sullivan, and J. Mitchell,
Measures of Effectiveness for the Information-Age Navy: The
Effects of Network-Centric Operations on Combat Outcomes,
RAND, 2002.
Anthony Dekker obtained his PhD from the University of Tasmania
in 1991. Following a number of years as a lecturer in Computer
Science at Griffith University and the National University of
Singapore, he joined the Defence Science and Technology
Organisation (DSTO) in Canberra. He can be contacted by email at
dekker@ACM.org.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author is indebted to Ed Kruzins and Elizabeth Newton
Smith for discussions on NCW; to Julia Loughran and Marcy
Stahl for discussions on SCUDHunt; and to Carlo Kopp for
bringing Wilde Sau / Zahme Sau to the author’s attention.
Carlo Kopp, Clive Walmsley, Bernard Colbert, Martine
Dekker, Jon Bell, John O’Neill, Bill Blair, the editor-in-chief,
and an anonymous referee also provided helpful comments
on the paper.

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