DOCTRINE OF FEDERAL PARAMOUNTCY

The principle of federal paramountcy provides that valid provincial legislation will be
rendered inoperative to the extent it conflicts with valid federal legislation where: (1)
there is an operational conflict such that it is impossible to comply with both laws; or (2)
operation of the provincial law frustrates the purpose of the federal law.
ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE
It is the principle whereby the body of water studded with islands or the islands
surrounded with waters is viewed as unity of islands and waters together forming one
integrated unit.
JUDICIAL POWER includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY
Benevolent neutrality protects religious realities, tradition and established
practice with a flexible reading of the principle. Benevolent neutrality gives room for
different kinds of accommodation: those which are constitutionally compelled, i.e.,
required by the Free Exercise Clause; and those which are discretionary or legislative,
i.e., and those not required by the Free Exercise Clause but nonetheless permitted by
the Establishment Clause. (Estrada v. Escritor)

The controversy rests on the so-called "legislative veto", defined by Tribe as "measures
allowing [Congress], or one of its Houses or committees, to review and revoke the
actions of federal agencies and executive departments." 1 Our Constitution specifically
neither prohibits nor allows legislative vetoes, unlike presidential vetoes, which are
formally authorized under Section 27, Article VI. Until today, Court has likewise declined
so far to pass judgment on the constitutionality of a legislative veto.

DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION
It means that the rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no
legislative action is required to make them applicable in a country

Political Question
It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. Hence,
political questions are, ordinarily, outside the pale of Judicial Review.
A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds
recognized by law, as where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits
on the exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the government.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service
and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
Q & A:
1) Can the COMELEC strike out nuisance candidates who could not wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not
supported by a registered political party with a national constituency?

Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, "[t]he State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service[.]" This, however, does not guarantee "a constitutional right to run
for or hold public office[.]"  To run for public office is a mere "privilege subject to limitations
36

imposed by law."  Among these limitations is the prohibition on nuisance candidates. Nuisance
37

candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy "to put the election process in
mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of
the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the
candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy
has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."  In38

Pamatong v. Commission on Elections,  this court explained why nuisance candidates are
39

prohibited from running for public office:

Yes. The Court held in the case of Pamatong v. COMELEC, that the State has a
compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and
orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in
conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and
resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course,
never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same
time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships,
whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a
textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic
institutions.

Police Power:
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary
and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health,
public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.
Power of Eminent Domain:
Eminent domain is defined as the power of the nation or a sovereign state to take, or to
authorize the taking of, private property for a public use without the owner’s consent,
conditioned upon payment of just compensation. It is acknowledged as an inherent
political right, founded on a common necessity and interest of appropriating the property
of individual members of the community to the great necessities of the whole
community.

Power of Taxation
It is the Power to enforce proportional contribution from persons and property levied by
the state by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the government and all public
needs

POWER OF TAXATION
Explain the lifeblood doctrine
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without
unnecessary hindrance. On the other hand, such collection should be made in
accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government
itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the
authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the
promotion of the common good, may be achieved.

Social Justice Society., petitioner

vs.
Dangerous Drug Board, respondents.

The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification,
the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the
democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution, second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved, third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public,
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
BANAT VS. COMELEC
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In
the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties,
Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May
14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others that the total number of
seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to
the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the
canvass of the party-list results.
Unconstitutional. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This
Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list
seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives. We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA
7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the  attainment of
“the  -broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the 
House of Representatives.” 

GOV. EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CORNELIO P. ALDON, and RAYMUNDO T.
ROQUERO, Respondents.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term
and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a
threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption
of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than
voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of office even for
the briefest time. It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can
be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense,
recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a
circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution
expressly disallows as an interruption.

LEGISLATIVE VETO is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative

agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to
Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a “right” or
“power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect.

the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the executive prerogatives. They urge
that any post-enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch should be
limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. (ABAKADA v PURISIMA)

TWO TESTS DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE

POWER

COMPLETENESS TEST
A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate.

SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST

It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s
authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to
be implemented.

What is the power of judicial review? What are its limitations?

ANSWER: The power of judicial review is the power of the Supreme Court to check
whether other departments acted beyond their powers or have exercised grave abuse
of discretion. The courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred
by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.20 Respondents assert that the second requisite is absent in this case.
.What is the meaning of a moot and academic case? Can the Court render a decision
when the case has become moot and academic? What are the exceptions to this rule?
ANSWER: A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of
no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or
dismiss it on ground of mootness. 24 However, as we held in Public Interest Center, Inc.
v. Elma,25 supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court
from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in cases
where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to
resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar, and public.This is also known as the symbolic function of the
Supreme Court. There are exceptions: (a) when the issue is of paramount interest to the
nation, (b) when it is capable of evading judicial review.
5.What is “appointment”? What is “designation”? Distinguish the two by giving at least
two examples.
ANSWER: Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with
the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When
completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for
the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his
office.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional
duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of
Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism
Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are
designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially
executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves
the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common
understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not
appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity
and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of
tenure on the person named.36

In a constitutional government, what must prevail? What is the basic and paramount law
to which all other laws must conform? What is the principle of separation of powers?
What department of our government is considered as the guardian of the constitution?
Answer: It cannot be overstressed that in a constitutional government such as ours, the
rule of law must prevail. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all
other laws must conform and to which all persons including the highest official of this
land must defer. From this cardinal postulate, it follows that the three branches of
government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority
conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither
Congress, the President nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other
branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws,
the executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their interpretation and
application to cases and controversies.  The Constitution expressly confers or
the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it decrees. As the guardian of the
Constitution we cannot shirk the duty of seeing to it that the officers in each branch of
government do not go beyond their constitutionally allocated boundaries and that the
entire Government itself or any of its branches does not violate the basic liberties of the
people (CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE
LEUTERIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs.HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of
Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her
capacity as National Treasurer, respondents. G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992)

7. On June 20, 1953, House Bill No. 16297 was enacted to provide the retirement
pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have
rendered at least twenty (20) years service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch
of the Government or in both, having attained the age of seventy (70) years or who
resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The retired Justice
shall receive during the residue of his natural life the salary which he was receiving at
the time of his retirement or resignation. President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill
No. 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that according to her "it would erode the very
foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce
strictly the policy on standardization of compensation as articulated in Republic Act No.
6758 known as Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." She further said
that "the Government should not grant distinct privileges to select group of officials
whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over
those of the vast majority of our civil service servants." Questions: Is the veto of the
president valid? Explain.
Answer: Invalid. The subject veto is not an item veto; The veto by the Executive is
violative of the doctrine of separation of powers; The veto deprives the retired Justices
of their rights to the pensions due them; The questioned veto impairs the Fiscal
Autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.(Bengzon v. Drilon, supra)

8.  Congressman X is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the

national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. He filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the
first instance of a non-bailable offense.
Question: a)Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules
which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general?
b) The  "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of
Representatives" was filed on the contentions that —
1. His reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any
ruling, giving priority to any right or interest — not even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without
representation.
3. To bar Congressman X from performing his duties amounts to his
suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandates entrusted to him by the people.
4. The House treats Congressman X as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-
equal branch of government to respect its mandate.
5. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of
Congressman X to discharge his mandate.
Rule on the contentions of Congressman X.
Answer(a) NO. One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final
conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an
example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of
justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, it is the injury to the public which State
action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After
conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus
subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.(B) When the voters of his
district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of
the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge
that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may
no longer serve his full term in officeThe performance of legitimate and even essential
duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government.
The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives,
not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the
President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty.
The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother
to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique
skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective
governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and
order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ROMEO G. JALOSJOS,
accused-appellant. EN BANC G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000)
9. Kishu Dalamal, a British subject, was charged, together with other aliens, with having
committed certain irregularities in violation of the Central Bank Rules and Regulations
before the Deportation Board in a complaint filed by a Special Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice.
Acting on the complaint, the Chairman of the Deportation Board issued a warrant of
arrest against Dalamal pursuant to the authority given to said Board by Section 1-(b) of
Executive Order No. 398.  Dalamal was accordingly arrested, but he was subsequently
released upon filing a bond in the amount of P10,000.00.
Question: Is it within the power of the Chairman of the Deportation Board to issue the
warrant of arrest? Explain.

ANSWER: No. The power to issue a warrant of arrest only belongs to the Judicial
Members or judges. Whenever, therefore, the President exercises his power of
deporting an alien upon prior investigation conducted in the manner and form
prescribed in Section 69 of the Administrative Code of 1917, he does so, not only as an
act of state, but also "under the combined powers" of the President and the Legislature.
As an act of state, the President has the inherent power to order the deportation of an
alien and as incident thereof, his arrest, while at the same time that power may be
deemed vested in him thru delegation by the Legislature thru the enactment of an
appropriate statute (Section 69, Revised Administrative Code.) But insofar as his power
to order the arrest of an alien is concerned, either as a measure to insure his
appearance at the investigation proceedings to determine if he is liable to deportation,
or an incident of his inherent power to deport to make effective his deportation order,
assuming only arguendo that he has such incidental power, that power cannot be
delegated either under the principle of delegata potesta non potest delegare, 1or upon
the theory that it is non-delegable because it involves the exercise of judgment or
discretion. (KISHU DALAMAL, petitioner, vs.DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent. EN
BANC G.R. No. L-16812 ,October 31, 1963)

10. The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative

Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates
under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is
"charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those
processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same
character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance)
Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It
has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General
Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is
primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for
pecuniary profit.
Question: Can the Bureau of Printing be sued? Explain.

ANSWER:Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical

personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Any
suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a
suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the
Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection (BUREAU
OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners, vs.THE
BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO
ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO
TOLERAN, respondents. EN BANC  G.R. No. L-15751,January 28, 1961)

11. What are the four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system? Explain
each parameter.

Answer: To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election

system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of
Representatives is the maximum number of seats available to party-list organizations,
such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative
districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a
party-list organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first
round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-list
votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed
seats, shall be distributed to the party-list organizations including those that received
less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional
because this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the
available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a
second round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the
Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature
to prevent any party from dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the
Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality for
the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of
the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution.( BARANGAY
ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),
Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers), Respondent.ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS,
Intervenor.AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor. G.R. No. 179271 ,July 8, 2009)

12.On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4,
Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per
centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign
countries."Question: Is this ordinance constitutional? Explain your answer.

ANSWER: Not constitutional. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the
questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced
and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the
taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only
sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in
terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be
singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the
same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar
company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly
points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.  ORMOC
SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY,
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor
of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-23794 February
17, 1968

13.           The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We
ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically
situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation.
Question: What are the requirements for a reasonable or valid classification?
ANSWER: A classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which
are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to
those who belong to the same class.

14. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present
state of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers
and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Incumbent Elected Official. – Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006
or the Fair Election Act,17 which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code18 and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an
elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to
the positions for which they are running, 19 an elected official is not deemed to have
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any
other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position
without forfeiting his seat.
QUESTION: Are these provisions constitutional? How did the Supreme Court rule on
these provisions? Explain.

Answer: All the provisions are constitutional. There is a substantial distinction between
elected official and appointive officials, hence they are not treated equally. Thus elective
officials are not deemed resigned, while the appointive officials are deemed resigned.
(ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010)

15. . In a speech delivered before the House of Representatives, Congressman X,  said:

“The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your
unpopular administration the free things they used to get from the government are now
for sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless
of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out
forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such
an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration
is dispensing. . . . .”.
  The allies of the President passed a Resolution for Congressman X to
substantiate his charges, and if he cannot do so, he shall be suspended from the
House.
Congressman X did not substantiate the charges against the President of the
Philippines. By a vote of 2/3 of the House, Congressman X was suspended for fifteen
months for reason of “disorderly behavior”.
Arguing that the House has committed grave abuse of discretion, Congressman
X went to the Supreme Court on Certiorari, contending that (1) the Constitution gave
him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought
not to be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behavior for which he
could be punished; and  (3) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to
suspend one of its members.
Rule on the three contentions of Congressman X.

ANSWER (1) it is true that under the constitution he enjoys parliamentary immunity. He
cannot be held liable for his speech in Congress while it is in session. (2) However if he
is declared having a disorderly behavior, this matter belongs to Congress alone based
on its internal rules, which becomes then a political question, and hence beyond the
scope of the power of judicial review of the SC, OTHERWISE, there will be undue
interference, amounting to the violation of the principle of separation of powers.  (3)
Definitely, it is within the power of Congress to discipline or suspend any of its
members.
 SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner, vs.SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO,
JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J.
ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G.
TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA,
ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the
Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59, respondents. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17144 ,October 28, 1960

16. The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of

rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its bid to
acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the
historic Manila Hotel.  Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-
executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement.  Corollarily, they
ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered
by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
Questions: (1) Is said constitutional provision a self-executing one? Explain. (2) Does
the 51% shares therein form part of the patrimony of the nation? Explain.

ANSWER:The Supreme Court ruled that this provision is self-executing. Though late in
Tanada v. Tuvera, it said that this is only an exception to the rule, because the general
rule is that the provision on Declaration of Principles and State Polices are merely
guidelines of the other departments.
 (MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents. EN
BANC[G.R. No. 122156.  February 3, 1997])
17. Given the PROPOSITION:  “DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF
ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO
ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT;
AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?”

Questions: (1) Is this a proposal to amend the constitution?  Or a proposal to

revise the constitution? Explain. (2) In what ways can the constitution be REVISED? (3)
Can the above proposition be “directly proposed by the people through initiative”?
(4) What are the  two essential elements that must be present for such a proposal?

ANSWERL1) In Lambino, the SC ruled that practically the proposal offers a

qualitative overhaul of the government, and thus this would tantamount to a REVISION
of the Constitution, and not merely an amendment. There are only two ways to a
proposal for Revision: constitutional convention and constituent assembly. The people’s
initiative applies only to amendment. Hence, the above proposition cannot therefore be
directly proposed to the people through initiative. (4)First, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal.  No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. 
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
( Lambino v. Comelec G.R. 174153 October 25, 2006)

18. Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Order No. 903,
otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Manila International Airport
Authority ("MIAA Charter"). Executive Order No. 903 was issued on 21 July 1983 by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Subsequently, Executive Order Nos. 909 1 and
2982 amended the MIAA Charter.
As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements
and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA
approximately 600 hectares of land, 3 including the runways and buildings ("Airport
Lands and Buildings") then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. 4 The MIAA Charter
further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of
through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the
Philippines.5
On 21 March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)
issued Opinion No. 061. The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of 1991
withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the
MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of Parañaque to pay the
real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already
due.
Questions: (1) Is the Opinion of the OGCC correct? (2)  What is the nature of the
MIAA? Is it a government owned or controlled corporation?(4) Is it subject to the real
property tax of the City of Paranaque? (5) Is there an exception to its taxability or non-
taxability? Explain your answer.
ANSWER: MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to
perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government
instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.
Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines a
government "instrumentality" as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. –– x x x x
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the
instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality
is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government
instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA
exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, 12 police authority13 and the
levying of fees and charges.14 At the same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers of a
corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Executive Order." 15
Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous,
the instrumentality remains part of the National Government machinery although not
integrated with the department framework. The MIAA Charter expressly states that
transforming MIAA into a "separate and autonomous body" 16 will make its operation
more "financially viable."17
Xxx
Under Section 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code,
which governs the legal relation and status of government units, agencies and offices
within the entire government machinery, MIAA is a government instrumentality and not
a government-owned or controlled corporation. Under Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code, MIAA as a government instrumentality is not a taxable person
because it is not subject to "[t]axes, fees or charges of any kind" by local governments.
The only exception is when MIAA leases its real property to a "taxable person" as
provided in Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, in which case the specific
real property leased becomes subject to real estate tax. Thus, only portions of the
Airport Lands and Buildings leased to taxable persons like private parties are subject to
real estate tax by the City of Parañaque.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, being
devoted to public use, are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or
the Republic of the Philippines. Article 420 specifically mentions "ports x x x constructed
by the State," which includes public airports and seaports, as properties of public
dominion and owned by the Republic. As properties of public dominion owned by the
Republic, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Airport Lands and Buildings are
expressly exempt from real estate tax under Section 234(a) of the Local Government
Code. This Court has also repeatedly ruled that properties of public dominion are not
subject to execution or foreclosure sale.(MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, CITY
MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PARAÑAQUE,
CITY ASSESSOR OF PARAÑAQUE, and CITY TREASURER OF PARAÑAQUE, EN
BANC G.R. No. 155650  July 20, 2006)
19. On January 27, 1985 at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the
Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone,
waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he
managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the
curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and
unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the
rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce
his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to
his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the
Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken
home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered
contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from
an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption
caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital, required further
medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor P14,000.00.
          As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, a complaint — which was, subsequently, amended — for
damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the trial court.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4
of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
          The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property
arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to
enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence
of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions.
          or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
          Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
          Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because
Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas
the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
QUESTIONS: (1) Is the contention of Manila correct? (2) Is the City of Manila liable for
damages? Explain.
ANSWER: (1) Manila’s contention is not correct. (2) It is therefore liable for
damages. As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact
not made in the answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well
as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a
street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the
amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and
have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm
drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned"
who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective
functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect,
admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
          Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was
made, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in
issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less
after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the
reconsideration thereof.
          At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the
liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the
province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision"
over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway,
this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the
City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
          Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following
legislative powers:
xxx          xxx          xxx
          (x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out,
construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys,
sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for
lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the
inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the same for the
laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the building and repair of tunnels, sewers,
and drains, and all structures in and under the same and the erecting of poles and the
stringing of wires therein; to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters
therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other public places; to
provide for the abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners
thereof; to provide for the construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of
bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop
rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons using the streets and public
places, or frighten horses or other animals; to regulate the speed of horses and other
animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits of the city;
to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide for and
change the location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to
raise or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and to require
railroad companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide suitable
protection against injury to persons or property, and to construct and repair ditches,
drains, sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks, so that the natural drainage
of the streets and adjacent property shall not be obstructed.
          This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917
and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act
governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to
provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets
within their respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the
provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of
the highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and
improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and city
roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and
Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways
and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of
the Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, vs.GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents. EN BANCG.R. No. L-23052   January 29, 1968

20. . (a)The general rule is that Courts shy away from deciding cases which have
become moot and academic. State the four exceptions to this rule
(b) For Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators to be accorded standing
to sue, what requirements must be met?

ANSWER:(a)The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution;31 second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved;32 third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 33 and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 34
(b) Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to
sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that
the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election
law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as legislators (PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO
TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN,
ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES,
CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners, vs.GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS
PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents. G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006)
 Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. Explain
this basic principle. What are its dual capacities? What are its twofold functions?

ANSWER: Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold.
In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of
the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and
agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public
functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and
servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private,
proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as
public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in
behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state
or sovereign power." (MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner
vs.HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, IAUREANO BANIÑA,
JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R.
BANIÑA, respondents. FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991)

16. Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Order No. 903,
otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Manila International Airport
Authority ("MIAA Charter"). Executive Order No. 903 was issued on 21 July 1983 by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Subsequently, Executive Order Nos. 9091 and
2982 amended the MIAA Charter.

As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements

and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA
approximately 600 hectares of land,3 including the runways and buildings ("Airport Lands
and Buildings") then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. 4 The MIAA Charter further
provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale
or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.5

On 21 March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued
Opinion No. 061. The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the
exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter.
Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax
imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due.

Questions: (1) Is the Opinion of the OGCC correct? (2)  What is the nature of the
MIAA? Is it a government owned or controlled corporation?(4) Is it subject to the real
property tax of the City of Paranaque? (5) Is there an exception to its taxability or non-
taxability? Explain your answer.

ANSWER: MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform

efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality,
the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. Section 2(10) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines a government
"instrumentality" as follows:

SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. –– x x x x

(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated

within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality
does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not
only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental
powers of eminent domain,12 police authority13 and the levying of fees and charges.14 At the
same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law,
insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order."15

Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous,

the instrumentality remains part of the National Government machinery although not
integrated with the department framework. The MIAA Charter expressly states that
transforming MIAA into a "separate and autonomous body" 16 will make its operation more
"financially viable."17

Xxx

Under Section 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code, which governs the legal relation and status of government units, agencies
and offices within the entire government machinery, MIAA is a government
instrumentality and not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Under
Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code, MIAA as a government
instrumentality is not a taxable person because it is not subject to "[t]axes, fees or
charges of any kind" by local governments. The only exception is when MIAA
leases its real property to a "taxable person" as provided in Section 234(a) of the
Local Government Code, in which case the specific real property leased becomes
subject to real estate tax. Thus, only portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings
leased to taxable persons like private parties are subject to real estate tax by the
City of Parañaque.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA,
being devoted to public use, are properties of public dominion and thus owned by
the State or the Republic of the Philippines. Article 420 specifically mentions
"ports x x x constructed by the State," which includes public airports and seaports,
as properties of public dominion and owned by the Republic. As properties of
public dominion owned by the Republic, there is no doubt whatsoever that the
Airport Lands and Buildings are expressly exempt from real estate tax under
Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code. This Court has also repeatedly ruled
that properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or foreclosure sale.
(MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD
NG PARAÑAQUE, CITY ASSESSOR OF PARAÑAQUE, and CITY TREASURER OF
PARAÑAQUE, EN BANC G.R. No. 155650  July 20, 2006)
 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION IN POLITICAL LAW 2011

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION IN POLITICAL LAW 2011

July 30, 2011  2 p.m. Sci Tech Building

Answer the following questions:

1.       (A)  Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or merely a ceiling? (B) Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? (C) Is the two
percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?(D) How shall
the party-list representative seats be allocated? (E)Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections?(F) If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in
the party-list elections?

ANSWER: (A) the filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory.

Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number of participants in
the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list
election, then, despite the availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible number
of occupied party-list seats would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap. In
such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54
available seats.
(B) The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the
Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list system. There is
no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require
absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that
courts will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative
of the Constitution.
(C) The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the
allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold
mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list
seats.
(D In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
"additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.

(E) Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of
 Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot
be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified
party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating
the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the
procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in  Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue
disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his
separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with
this ponencia.

2.       Senator Pimentel the chairman of the Blue Ribbon Committee in Senate discovered that the Chief of Staff
of the Military committed an anomaly when he bought a piece of land in General Santos City allegedly for
military use. The price was allegedly overpriced to 200%. The seller is a certain Atty. Juan Cruz.
a.       Senator Pimentel issued a subpoena to the Chief of Staff and to Atty. Cruz to appear before the Blue Ribbon Committee to
answer some questions concerning said anomaly. Can the two refuse to appear before said committee?
b.       Meanwhile, the Ombudsman filed a case before the Sandiganbayan concerning the two persons concerned. Atty. Cruz now
refused to appear before the Blue Ribbon Committee. Is he correct?

ANSWER: (A) the two cannot refuse to appear. The power of the Congress in the exercise of its investigation in aid of legislation
carries with it the power to compel witnesses to testify before it, under pain of legislative contempt if not heeded. (B) For the
reason that a case is already filed before the Sandiganbayan, the two may have a reason not to appear anymore, considering
that its constitutional right against self-incrimination may be violated .(AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., Petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE JOSE S. MAJADUCON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 23, Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, respondent. [G.R. No. 138378. July
29, 2003])

3. Congress passed a law prohibiting the importation of rice. The President of the Philippines enters into a treaty with Vietnam to
import rice to the Philippines since there was a shortage of rice due to the recent flood. Mr. X sues the President for violating the
law against rice importation. The President justifies her acts by saying that there is a national emergency. Questions:
(a) Is the suit against the President valid?
(b) In case of the conflict between a law and a treaty which should prevail? State the requisites of Judicial Review. Explain each
(c)What is executive power? Where is it lodged? What is residual power? State at least five powers of the president enumerated
in the Constitution.

ANSWER: (a) The suit against the President of the Philippines is invalid. He is immune from suit.
(b) The law must prevail. This is in consonance with the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Ichong v. Hernandez ;
(c) The requisites of Judicial Review are as follows: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy (2) the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest opportunity (3) it must be determinative of the case (4) It must be raised by the proper
party
© Executive power is not defined under the 1987 constitution. Said powers are merely enumerated. Justice Cortez stated that
executive power is “more than the sum of the enumerated powers” enumerated under the Constitution. Executive power is
lodged in the President of the Philippines. Residual power is one which is not enumerated. Examples of presidential powers
include: (1) treaty making (2) Appointing (3) military powers (4) veto powers (5) pardoning powers( See, Marcos v. Manglapus)
3.      On what principles is international law founded? What does Art. II Sec 2 of the Constitution say
about international law? What is the practical justification of the doctrine of state immunity? What
is its restrictive application? Explain.

ANSWER: International law is founded on the basic principle of PAR IN PAREM NON HABET IMPERIUM, i.e. An
equal cannot have dominion over an equal. Art II Section 2 provides that we “adopt the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The practical justification of state immunity is that
there can be no legal right as against the state which creates the law and for which that right depends. Its
restrictive application however states that a state is only immune with respect to its governmental (jure imperii)
functions, but not to its proprietary (jure gestiones) functions.

4.      The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract  3 on
01 April 1989 for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Save for
the increase in the monthly rate of the guards, the same terms and conditions were also made to apply to
another contract, dated 01 May 1990, between the same parties. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards
were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the petitioner.
On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment
of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay
and overtime pay, as well as for damages, 4 before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro
City, docketed as NLRC Case No. 10-09-00455-90 (or 10-10-00519-90, its original docket number),
against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency.
Questions: (1) Is the Department of Agriculture suable? (2) Will its assets be made liable through a writ of
execution?

ANSWER: (1) IT is suable. The Supreme Court said: “In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not
pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the
questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime
pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083,
aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied, . . . Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by
Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Thus,
in Carabao, Inc., vs. Agricultural Productivity Commission, 20 we ruled:
(C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under Commonwealth Act 327,
stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving the State's immunity from suit, subject to
the general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that "no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered
by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth
Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly observed."
We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. No. 327 and the Labor
Code with respect to money claims against the State. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the
legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in
accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.”
(2) Its assets cannot be made liable however. The Supreme Court said: When the state gives its consent to be
sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution against it. tersely put, when the State
waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the
State has a liability. 21 In Republic vs. Villasor 22 this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution
directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has
explained, thus —
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special
law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution"
and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments , is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated
by law. 23

5.On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID.  On February
15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in a
"Temporary" capacity.  On February 15, 2001, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier renewed again the appointment of
petitioner to the same position in a "Temporary" capacity.
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman,
and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on February 2,
2008.  Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman.  Borra and Tuason
likewise took their oaths of office and assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners.  The Office of the
President submitted to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason for confirmation. However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments.
On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to
the same positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008. They took their oaths of
office for a second time.  The Office of the President transmitted on June 5, 2001 their appointments to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments.  Thus, on June 8,
2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the
same positions. The Office of the President submitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission on
Appointments. They took their oaths of office anew.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April 11, 2001[11] addressed to
petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of
the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department.  COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K.
Sadain objected to petitioner’s reassignment in a Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 addressed to the COMELEC en
banc. Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayos failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the
EID in the reassignment of petitioner.
On April 16, 2001, petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department. Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated
April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during
the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001." Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on
April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, which states in part:
"NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, as an exception to the foregoing prohibitions, has
RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, to appoint, hire new employees or fill new positions and transfer or reassign
its personnel, when necessary in the effective performance of its mandated functions during the prohibited period,
provided that the changes in the assignment of its field personnel within the thirty-day period before election day shall
be effected after due notice and hearing."
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc in a
Memorandum dated April 23, 2001. Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law
Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code,
COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent
administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.   Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of   Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the
prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.  Petitioner also assails
as illegal her removal as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department.    Simultaneously,
petitioner challenges the designation of Cinco as Officer-in-Charge of the EID.   Petitioner, moreover, questions the
legality of the disbursements made by COMELEC Finance Services Department Officer-in-Charge Gideon C. De
Guzman to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason by way of salaries and other emoluments.
In the meantime, on September 6, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed once again the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as Commissioners, respectively, for a
term of seven years expiring on February 2, 2008. They all took their oaths of office anew.
QUESTIONS:
1. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C
of the Constitution;
2. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the
same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution; 
3. Whether or not Benipayo’s removal of petitioner from her position as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment
to the Law Department is illegal and without authority, having been done without the approval of the COMELEC as a
collegial body.

Answer: The appointment ad interim is actually a permanent appointment, subject  to the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. The renewal of the appointment is not violative since it was not yet disapproved by
the CA., they were just bypassed. The Comelec Chair’s administrative action on the matter does not need the
approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body.

6.What is the function of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal? What is the composition of each?

ANSWER: The electoral tribunal serves as the sole judge of all electoral protests filed by each member.
The electoral protests covers “the election, returns and qualification” of said member. Each is composed of
3 justices from the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice and six members from each house
concerned.

7.What are the three principles governing the interpretation of the constitution using the case of Francisco
v. House of Representative? Explain each.

ANSWER: First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed. Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words
of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole. (Francisco v. House of Representatives G.R. No.
160261,November 10, 2003)

8.Atty. Jose CRUZ was the Chairman of the COMELEC.He met an accident and died. Atty. Maria Diaz, one
of the commissioners of the COMELEC was designated by the President of the Philippines as COMELEC
Chair to occupy the vacancy. Is the act of the President valid?
ANSWER: NOT VALID. The SC said: “A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary
and therefore revocable at will.  No cause need be established to justify its revocation.  Assuming its validity, the
designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the
President of the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit.  It is doubtful if the respondent,
having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal.
It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot be removed at will from her permanent
position as Associate Commissioner.  It is no less true, however, that she can be replaced as Acting Chairman,
with or without cause, and thus deprived of the powers and perquisites of that temporary position.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to
fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent.  This is still a government of
laws and not of men.  The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for
presidential action.  The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections
themselves without the participation of the President, however well-meaning.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely have been
guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it.  In any event, that choice and the
basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.
The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was moved only by the best of
motives when she issued the challenged designation.  But while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her
act because it conflicts with the Constitution.  Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the Bautista
case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on Elections, foremost
among which is the security of tenure of its members.  That guaranty is not available to the respondent as Acting
Chairman of the Commissions on Elections by designation of the President of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the designation by the President of the Philippines of respondent Haydee B. Yorac as Acting
Chairman of the Commissions on Elections is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the respondent is
hereby ordered to desist from serving as such.  This is without prejudice to the incumbent Associate
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections restoring her to the same position if they so desire, or choosing
another member in her place, pending the appointment of a permanent Chairman by the President of the
Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.”
(SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner, vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity as ACTING CHAIRPERSON of the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. EN BANC[G.R. No. 93867.  December 18, 1990]

9. What is stare decisis? Is the Supreme Court bound by said principle?

ANSWER: Stare decisis et non quieta movere.  This principle of adherence to

precedents has not lost its luster and continues to guide the bench in keeping
with the need to maintain stability in the law. Courts are bound by prior decisions.
Thus, once a case has been decided one way, courts have no choice but to
resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner. In the
recent decision of the Supreme Court it was said as follows:
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is
controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or
abandoning Valenzuela.[1]

The contention has no basis.

Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta

movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It
simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of
imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and
in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in
question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The
decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts,
because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and
for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down. [2]

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called
upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to
them.[3] In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher
courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind
each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the
innate authority to rule according to its best lights. [4]

The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not
controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new
membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that
it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification .[5] The
adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the
United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. [6] But
ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always
strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may
be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and
justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning
and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is
for the sake of convenience and stability.

For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or

abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the
Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to
conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of
the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in
any decision rendered en banc or in division.[7]

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, PETITIONER, VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)

AND PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, RESPONDENTS. EN
BANC[ G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010 ]

10.What is a political question? Give at least two examples.

Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1067 (1957). In summarizing the
definition of the term, "political question," Justice Concepcion wrote: "In short,
the term ‘political question’ connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of
Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to ‘ those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. ’
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure."