Talanoa Radio Exploring The Interface of

Talanoa Radio: Exploring the Interface of
Development, Culture and Community Radio
in the South Pacific
Linda Susan Austin
Bachelor of Arts in Government/Journalism, California State University at Sacramento, 1980
Master of Science in Journalism, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1990
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at
The University of Queensland in 2013
School of Journalism and Communication

Abstract
Community radio has a proven track record around the world as a tool for community-led
development and social change. Community radio is a new phenomenon in the South Pacific,
arising only in the mid-1990s, and it has yet to emerge with the vibrancy found in other developing
regions of the world. Pacific cultures embody rich oral traditions that revere communal
conversations and islanders are enthusiastic radio listeners. Broadcast radio is a lifeline for
countless rural villagers living on isolated atolls and in rugged mountain hamlets.
This thesis explores why there is not more community radio in the Pacific, to uncover the obstacles
to its emergence, and to explore pathways useful to policy makers and community-media
proponents that would allow the medium to grow.
Community radio lies at the interface of Western-driven development agendas and indigenous
cultural sensibilities. My contention, boldly stated, is that powerful Western development actors
move through the Pacific in a state of geo-political rivalry to advance their own political, economic,
security and ideological interests under the guise of “development,” just as they did during the
colonial era. Since the early 2000s, their interests lie not in broadcast radio but in new information
and communication technologies (ICTs) that are embedded in economic globalisation development
models. Such media are inappropriate technologies for Pacific rural communities.
But alternative Pacific-derived development models do exist. Pacific islanders have adopted a
rentier, or rent-seeking, orientation that maximise their unique cultural attributes to extract
economic and social rents from lucrative foreign aid streams and other sources of exogenous wealth
and redistribute this gain through intricate social networks. In the Pacific, culture impacts directly
on political, economic and social development activities. The patterns of societal organisation and
cultural development that Pacific islanders constructed in response to geography and history are
unique and relevant to discussions about development theory and development communication.
Pacific community radio becomes the interface for the meeting of these two divergent worldviews.
Media, including community radio, have long held privileged positions in Western development
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theories. I will demonstrate that Western-derived development theories have failed in the Pacific
island context. Given this, is there evidence that a Pacific-derived theory around development
communication and community media is emerging that is singularly different from other models
existing in the world?
To investigate this, I look at four actors: the community broadcasters, their civil society
counterparts, their donors, and their governments in their dual roles as regulators and national
broadcasters. My research area encompasses seven sovereign, oceanic South Pacific microstates:
sovereign in that they can set their own broadcasting regulations and development priorities;
oceanic in that their ancient orientation to the sea has given rise to unique cultures and social
structures that affect development and communication; and microstates in that their national
populations of less than one million lend a distinctive flavour to development trajectories. My
research countries are Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. Four
case studies involving five community radio broadcasters will be investigated. They are Buala FM
and its seven sister radio stations in Isabel Province, Solomon Islands, Niuatoputapu FM in far
northern Tonga, Radio BOSCO, a faith-based broadcaster in Guadalcanal Province, Solomon
Islands, and a twin study of women’s activist radio, femTALK FM in Fiji and Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM in
Tonga.
Could there be evidence that Pacific community radio challenges conventional thinking about its
role in development communication? The thesis will argue that Pacific community radio is
emerging as a distinctive form of development communication that is informed by Pacific
indigenous development models. These nascent models are misunderstood and undermined by
dominant orthodox development theories and praxis driven by the international development
community.
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Declaration by author
This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or
written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly
stated the contribution by others to jointly-authored works that I have included in my thesis.
I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statistical
assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional editorial
advice, and any other original research work used or reported in my thesis. The content of my thesis
is the result of work I have carried out since the commencement of my research higher degree
candidature and does not include a substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for
the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have
clearly stated which parts of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award.
I acknowledge that an electronic copy of my thesis must be lodged with the University Library and,
subject to the General Award Rules of The University of Queensland, immediately made available
for research and study in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968.
I acknowledge that copyright of all material contained in my thesis resides with the copyright
holder(s) of that material. Where appropriate I have obtained copyright permission from the
copyright holder to reproduce material in this thesis.
4
Publications during candidature
No publications.
Publications included in this thesis
No publications included.
5
Contributions by others to the thesis
No contributions by others.
Statement of parts of the thesis submitted to qualify for the award of another degree
None.
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Acknowledgments
This work is humbly offered as polopolo, a Tongan word meaning an offering of the first and finest
part of one’s harvest, with deep gratitude to the people and communities of the Pacific island
countries and territories who have accompanied me on a journey to discovery for nearly half of my
life. I carry you forever in my heart. Gratitude is also extended to my advisers, Dr. Kitty van
Vuuren and Dr. Pradip Thomas, and to former adviser Martin Hadlow for their patience and
wisdom. Additionally, my sincere appreciation is extended to The University of Queensland for its
generous financial support. This thesis is dedicated to my late father, who nurtured within me a
deep love for learning and travel, and to my mother, whose courage and exuberance for life has
sustained me in so many ways. I reflect on novelist Indra Sinha’s (2004:25) wise words:
“You can’t just say, “My story starts here.” … It has a thousand beginnings, each of
them in someone else’s life. … Our stories begin before their beginnings and continue
beyond their ends. … Really, there are no individual stories, only the story, coiling
and weaving through all our lives.”
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Keywords
community radio, development communication, south pacific, rentier economics, pacific

development
Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classifications (ANZSRC)
ANZSRC code: 200103 International and Development Communication, 60%
ANZSRC code: 169905 Studies of Pacific Peoples' Societies, 40%
Fields of Research (FoR) Classification
FoR code: 2001 Communication and Media Studies, 60%
FoR code: 1699 Other Studies in Human Society, 40%
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Contents
List of Tables.................................................................................................................... 16
List of Maps and Photos.................................................................................................... 17
List of Appendices............................................................................................................ 17
Acronyms and glossary..................................................................................................... 18
Bibliography..................................................................................................................... 318
Appendices ....................................................................................................................... 362
Chapter 1
Introduction: Development, culture and community radio in the South Pacific
The premise .......................................................................................................... 20
Summary of the argument: development ............................................................... 22
Summary of the argument: culture......................................................................... 25
The research questions .......................................................................................... 29
Research contributions .......................................................................................... 30
The research area................................................................................................... 31
The research methodology..................................................................................... 32
Thesis structure ..................................................................................................... 33
Summary............................................................................................................... 37
Chapter 2
Encounters with Difference: Development and culture in the Pacific context
The other side of heaven ................................................................................................... 38
Islands in orthodox development theory
Introduction........................................................................................................... 41
Islands in the world ............................................................................................... 42
Colonial legacies: early period............................................................................... 42
Colonial legacies: late period................................................................................. 44
The seeding of aid dependency.............................................................................. 47
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Upside-down decolonisation ................................................................................. 48
Pacific development in the mid-20th Century ......................................................... 49
Islands and Rentier development models
Introduction........................................................................................................... 52
The Dependency Model......................................................................................... 54
The Rentier Model................................................................................................. 54
Islanders in the world: aid...................................................................................... 58
Islanders on the Internet ........................................................................................ 63
Islanders in the sky: Tongasat................................................................................ 65
Islanders in the world: remittances......................................................................... 72
Cultural influences affecting economic development ............................................. 73
“The economics of affection” ................................................................................ 75
Remittances critique .............................................................................................. 78
The Pacific talking................................................................................................. 80
Discussion and conclusion ................................................................................................ 82
Chapter 3
Talanoa Radio: Participatory development and media in the Pacific context
Introduction........................................................................................................... 84
Media in development theory
The historical context ............................................................................................ 85
Development communication in context: American Samoa educational television. 86
NWICO and international broadcasters ................................................................. 89
The MacBride Report............................................................................................ 91
Globalisation and ICTs.......................................................................................... 93
Pacific culture and participatory development
Introduction........................................................................................................... 95
Pacific cultural influences on participatory development ....................................... 95
Participatory development theories........................................................................ 100
Pacific radio in participatory development praxis
Introduction........................................................................................................... 104
Island radio ........................................................................................................... 104
Community radio in development communication................................................. 106
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Chapter 4
The missing medium: Community radio in the Pacific regulatory environment
Introduction........................................................................................................... 116
Telecommunication sector reforms and community radio
Introduction........................................................................................................... 117
Radio and the Pacific Plan..................................................................................... 118
Issues of national sovereignty in regulatory reform................................................ 121
Mobile telephony and community radio................................................................. 123
Community radio within national broadcasting regulatory environments
Introduction........................................................................................................... 124
The impact of convergence on regulatory policy ................................................... 124
The state of Pacific regulators ............................................................................... 126
Community radio in national broadcasting regulations .......................................... 129
Fiji’s struggle to enable community media ............................................................ 133
Solomon Islands’ wary support ............................................................................. 136
Vanuatu’s debate over definitions of “local” media ............................................... 137
Chapter 5
Talanoa methodology: Cross-cultural approaches to Pacific research
Introduction........................................................................................................... 141
Theoretical foundations and Pacific approaches
Constructing a culturally appropriate methodology................................................ 143
Case study rationale .............................................................................................. 144
Grounded theory ................................................................................................... 148
The talanoa approach............................................................................................ 150
Scope of data collection......................................................................................... 152
Exploring the insider/outsider dichotomy .............................................................. 155
Matters arising from the field
Logistical challenges ............................................................................................. 156
Gatekeepers........................................................................................................... 158
Cross-cultural dialogue.......................................................................................... 158
Ethical Issues: anonymity and confidentiality ........................................................ 159
Ethical issues: researcher intervention ................................................................... 162
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Chapter 6
When community is a “weasel word:” Buala FM
Introduction........................................................................................................... 166
Station Biography ............................................................................................................. 168
Social Sustainability
Introduction........................................................................................................... 171
Post-conflict environments and participatory development .................................... 172
Connectivity, not community ................................................................................ 175
Post-conflict environments and rentier behavior .................................................... 177
Of kastom and wantok networks ............................................................................ 179
“We are a wantok society”..................................................................................... 182
Organisational Sustainability
Introduction........................................................................................................... 185
COL’s contribution ............................................................................................... 186
A “messy” handover”............................................................................................ 187
Training and community participation ................................................................... 189
Addressing the foundations ................................................................................... 190
Partnerships and potentialities ............................................................................... 192
Financial Sustainability
Introduction........................................................................................................... 194
Failing funding models.......................................................................................... 195
Programming and income generation .................................................................... 196
Lacking the capacity to build capacity ................................................................... 197
Chapter 7
When the radio is “incidental:” Women’s activist radio in the Pacific
Introduction........................................................................................................... 201
Station biographies ........................................................................................................... 202
femTALK FM ........................................................................................................ 203
Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM ............................................................................................... 206
Social sustainability
Introduction........................................................................................................... 209
Voice and accountability ....................................................................................... 210
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Exploring femLINK’s methodology ...................................................................... 212
femLINK critiques ................................................................................................ 214
Voice and action.................................................................................................... 217
Advocacy through media....................................................................................... 219
Working from the inside and the outside ............................................................... 221
Financial sustainability
The risk of co-option ............................................................................................. 222
Strategic positioning: donors ................................................................................. 224
Strategic positioning: femLINK ............................................................................ 226
Staving off co-option............................................................................................. 228
Organisational sustainability
Feminist approaches to capacity building .............................................................. 230
Generation Next .................................................................................................... 231
Operationalising feminist leadership...................................................................... 232
Voluntarism and rentier orientation ....................................................................... 233
Pragmatic motivation ............................................................................................ 235
Leadership dynamics............................................................................................. 236
Chapter 8
“In every village, you see a church:” Radio BOSCO
Introduction........................................................................................................... 242
The background context: religion in development
The forgotten factor............................................................................................... 244
The Pacific historical context ................................................................................ 246
The rise of Pacific Pentecostalism ......................................................................... 248
Pacific churches and modernity ............................................................................. 249
The technology of salvation................................................................................... 251
Station biography.............................................................................................................. 252
Introduction........................................................................................................... 254
Pacific religious broadcasting................................................................................ 254
International linkages ............................................................................................ 258
Technology innovators .......................................................................................... 261
Radio BOSCO’s singularity................................................................................... 262
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Communication theology ...................................................................................... 263
Financial and organisational sustainability
Introduction........................................................................................................... 264
Financial sustainability.......................................................................................... 265
Organisational sustainability ................................................................................. 267
Radio BOSCO ....................................................................................................... 267
Chapter 9
“Radio for all:” Niua FM and Pacific public-service broadcasting
Introduction........................................................................................................... 271
Background context: National broadcasters in theory and Pacific praxis
Introduction........................................................................................................... 273
Public-service broadcasting theory ........................................................................ 273
“The invisible hand of control”.............................................................................. 275
The financial impacts of deregulation .................................................................... 279
VBTC’s challenges ............................................................................................... 281
Positive trends toward reform................................................................................ 282
Station biography.............................................................................................................. 285
Side story: Radio Temotu ...................................................................................... 290
Introduction........................................................................................................... 290
National broadcasters as SOEs .............................................................................. 292
Moving into a multi-player PSB environment........................................................ 293
Flaws in the SOE model ........................................................................................ 295
Introduction........................................................................................................... 297
Unpacking the SOE financial model...................................................................... 297
The SOE model in praxis....................................................................................... 299
Engaging civil society through contestable funding ............................................... 301
Chapter 10 Conclusion and recommendations

Introduction........................................................................................................... 306
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Development and culture....................................................................................... 307
Transmission models of media .............................................................................. 310
The business side of community broadcasting ....................................................... 311
Civil society and development communication...................................................... 312
Recommendations
To advance social sustainability ............................................................................ 312
To advance organisational sustainability................................................................ 314
To advance financial sustainability........................................................................ 316
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List of Tables
Table 2.1 Pacific ODA sources by year and amount.......................................................... 60

Table 2.2 ODA to select PICs, by donor, by year .............................................................. 61
Table 2.3 ODA to select PICs, by donor and sector, 2010 ................................................. 62
Table 2.4 PIC migration demographics ............................................................................. 72
Table 2.5 Remittance flows by select PICs........................................................................ 77
Table 2.6 Permanent migration, by countries of origin and destination, by decade ............ 81
Table 3.1 Socio-economic factors pertaining to media accessibility in the PICs ................ 105
Table 3.2 Non-government, non-commercial secular broadcasters in independent PICs ... 107
Table 4.1 Broadcast legislation in select PICs affecting community radio ......................... 126
Table 4.2 Broadcast-associated regulators in select PICs................................................... 128
Table 4.3 Licensing process for third-sector media in select PICs, 2011............................ 130
Table 4.4 Constitutional freedoms pertaining to expression, information and the press
in select PICs .................................................................................................... 132
Table 5.1 Characteristics of significant interviewees ......................................................... 153
Table 6.1 Station details: Buala FM, Solomon Islands ...................................................... 171
Table 7.1 Station details: femTALK FM............................................................................. 205
Table 7.2 Station details: Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM ................................................................... 208
Table 8.1 Station details: Radio BOSCO ........................................................................... 253
Table 8.2 Faith-based radio broadcasters in select PICs, 2013 ........................................... 256
Table 9.1 Pacific nation broadcasters service details, 2012................................................ 277
Table 9.2 Station details: Niua FM.................................................................................... 287
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List of Maps and Photos
Map 1.1 Research area ...................................................................................................... 31

Map 6.1 Solomon Islands case study locations ................................................................. 168
Map 8.1 Tonga and Niuatoputapu ..................................................................................... 285
Photo 6.1 Buala FM volunteers......................................................................................... 171

Photo 7.1 Sharon Bhagwan Rolls, Betty Blake, volunteers from Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM........ 207
Photo 8.1 Radio BOSCO volunteer .................................................................................. 254
Photo 8.2 Fr Ambrose Pereira, sdb.................................................................................... 254
Photo 9.1 Niua FM facilities ............................................................................................. 288
Photo 9.2 Niua FM studio ................................................................................................. 288
Appendices
Table 5.2 Interviewees, with pseudonyms ......................................................................... 362
Table 5.3 General guideline of interview questions, by category ....................................... 364
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Acronyms and glossary
ABC Australian Broadcasting Corporation

AusAID Australian Government Overseas Aid Program
AMARC World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
CEDAW UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
CEMCA Commonwealth Educational Media Centre For Asia
CETC SPC's Community Education and Training Centre
COL Commonwealth of Learning
Culture of silence A Pacific sultural attribute wherein a person’s expressive space is bound by
age, gender and social status
CSO Civil society organisation
The Digital Strategy A regional ICT initiative adopted in 2005 by Pacific island leaders,
succeeded in 2010 by the Tonga Declaration
EU European Union
FBCL Fiji Broadcasting Corp Ltd, national broadcaster
FBO Faith-based organisation
FAIDP The Framework for Action on ICT for Development in the Pacific, aka
the Tonga Declaration, a regional ICT policy statement adopted in 2010
GDP Gross Domestic Product
ITU International Telecommunication Union
MFF Ma’a Fafine mo e Famili, a Tongan CSO
MDG Millennium Development Goals
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NIEO New International Economic Order
NWICO New World Information and Communication Order
NZAID New Zealand Agency for International Development
ODA Overseas development aid
The Pacific Plan A regional cooperative development plan under the PIFS
PACMAS Pacific Media Assistance Scheme
palangi A common term describing non-Pacific people
PBS Public-service broadcasting/broadcaster
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PFNet The People First Network, an email-communications network in Solomon
Islands
PIC Pacific island country
PIFS Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, a regional inter-governmental trade and
policy organisation
PINA Pacific Islands News Association
PNG Papua New Guinea
RNZI Radio New Zealand International
SIBC Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation, national broadcaster
SIDS Small island developing states
SIDT Solomon Islands Development Trust
SIGNIS World Catholic Association for Communication
SOLMAS Solomon Islands Media Assistance Scheme
SPC Secretariat of the Pacific Community
talanoa Informal group discussions often occurring around a yaqona bowl
TBC Tonga Broadcasting Corporation, national broadcaster
Tonga Declaration aka The Framework for Action on ICT for Development in the Pacific, a
regional ICT policy statement adopted in 2010 by Pacific island leaders
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
US United States of America
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNDP-PC United Nations Development Programme-Pacific Centre
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNESCO-IPDC UNESCO-International Program for the Development of Communication
UNSCR 1325 UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security
VBTC Vanuatu Broadcasting and Television Corporation, national broadcaster
WACC World Association for Christian Communication
YWCA Young Women's Christian Association
yaqona, kava A mildly sedative drink common through the Pacific, usually consumed
within casual group discussions, or talanoa
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Development, culture and community radio in the South Pacific
The premise
This thesis investigates the dynamic interaction of development1 and culture2 through the
phenomenon of community radio in seven independent oceanic South Pacific microstates. Media,
both terrestrial broadcast and newer digital forms, hold privileged positions in development theories
as message disseminators and “drivers of change.” Community radio, or public-service
broadcasting that is neither owned by the state nor driven by market imperatives, has been used
successfully around the world within the field of development communication as a platform to
enable everyday people to share information and discuss development topics pertinent to their lives
and communities (for example, Girard, 2001; Myers, 2011; Siemering, 2007a).
Community radio is a new phenomenon in the South Pacific, arising only in the mid-1990s, and it
has yet to emerge with the vibrancy found in other developing regions of the world. This seems
curious given the pervasive consumption of broadcast radio in everyday island lives, the strength
and resilience of Pacific grassroots communities, and the islanders’ cultural orientation toward oral
and communal communication. Pacific islanders are enthusiastic radio listeners, owning more radio
sets per capita than populations found elsewhere in the developing world (Anashin, 1999:177;
EarthTrends, 2010). Broadcast radio is a lifeline to rural communities living on isolated atolls and
in rugged mountains that remain largely beyond the reach of online digital or satellite-based media.
Pacific cultures embody rich oral traditions that revere communal conversations (such as talanoa,
1
Definitions of development are highly problematic as they frequently reflect the biases of their authors. Conventionally,
development can refer to “improvements in well-being, living standards, and opportunities” (Edelman & Haugerud, 2005:1). It can
also refer to “the process of expanding real freedoms” and human development (Sen, 1999:1). Anti-globalisation advocates attribute
unemployment, rising poverty levels, social unrest and environmental degradation to development models based upon neo-liberal
economic globalisation (Kelsey, 2004b; Rist, 2008).
2
One widely accepted definition of culture is “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and
any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Lindholm, 2007:84). Tongan educator Konai Helu
Thaman (1994:3) defines culture as “the way of life of a discrete group which includes a language, a body of accumulated
knowledge, skills, beliefs and values.” New Zealand anthropologist K.R. Howe (2000:2) defines culture as “the constitution,
practices, and beliefs of human societies.”
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which I will discuss). My initial research interest, then, was to explore why there is not more
community radio in the South Pacific island region, to uncover the obstacles to its emergence, and
to explore pathways useful to policy makers and community-media proponents that would allow the
medium to grow.
My research reveals that community radio in the South Pacific lies at the interface of Western-
driven development agendas and indigenous cultural sensibilities. This is not an original discovery,
but it takes new meaning given the under-researched Pacific island context. I will argue that
Western models of development, which I label orthodox or neo-liberal3 market-led models, are
inappropriate and harmful to small island developing states, thus my contribution expands a rather
substantial body of literature in the fields of development communication, development economics,
international political-economy, and the emerging field of nissology, or island studies.
To boldly state my contention, powerful Western development actors move through the Pacific in a
state of geo-political rivalry to advance their own political, economic, security and ideological
interests under the guise of “development” just as they did during the colonial era, but these
activities are cleverly exploited by “weak” Pacific island-states and their people who maximise
their unique cultural orientations to extract economic rents and social and political remittances from
lucrative aid streams and other sources of wealth and redistribute this gain through intricate social
networks. As I will argue, Pacific island states do seek to achieve economic and social development
through integration with the global system, but they do not do so through commodities trade or
industrialisation as envisaged by classical economists, but through their own culturally informed
development models. These alternative Pacific-centric development models are what I variously
call immanent development (to borrow economist Susan Maiava’s term) or indigenous
development.
Pacific community radio becomes the interface for the meeting of these two divergent worldviews:
Western-conceived development models on one hand and Pacific culture on the other. Orthodox
development theories turn to media, including community media, to advance both orthodox and
participatory development models. But Pacific culture, in all its diversity, structures
3
Neo-liberalism can be described as a free-market economic philosophy that favours the deregulation of markets, trade liberalisation
through the reduction of tariffs and taxes, the privatisation of public services and assets (such as national broadcasters), strong public
sector fiscal discipline, and decreasing the size of the public sector while increasing the role of the private sector (Couldry, 2010:2, 4;
Martinez & García, 2000; Philoguy, 2011).
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communication. Thus the phenomenon of community radio gives expression to Pacific culture,
including its geographically unbounded communities, its extensive social networks, its
communication mores (such as the culture of silence, as will be discussed), and islander
propensities toward rent-seeking behaviour (also to be explained). I argue that the existing
implementation framework around Western development agendas in the Pacific founders because it
fails to recognise, comprehend, or even acknowledge, the profound influences of Pacific culture and
immanent development models. My research into community radio supports this hypothesis and
illuminates pathways useful to growing the community radio sector.
Summary of the argument: development
I argue that the impetus for the Pacific’s contemporary development agendas arose during the
region’s colonial era. Now as then, a proliferation of powerful international development actors
compete for ideological, political and economic influence in and over the islands through trade and
aid. The islanders are not passive observers of the dramatic changes occurring in their lands and
over their seas but are active participants in a dynamic albeit asymmetrical relationship with foreign
powers (Couper, 2009:4; Lansdown, 2006:19; Rainbird, 2000:5; Torrence & Clarke, 2000:5, 22).
Pacific island states present an anomaly to orthodox development theories given their “affluent”
subsistence economies and their “litany” of development challenges that largely derive from
geographical characteristics that are often simply reduced to matters of smallness and remoteness.
They are considered small in terms of land, resources and labour. They are considered remote in
terms of distance from markets and sources of investment capital and from themselves due to
multiple islands linked by expensive transportation and unreliable communication infrastructure.
The Pacific islands are greatly challenged by frequent natural disasters such as cyclones, floods,
droughts, and earthquakes.
Much of the region’s development agenda is set, driven and funded by the international
development community and predicated upon orthodox development theories. Such Western
models are biased toward continental worldviews that assume nation-states possess territorially
bounded resources and sufficient population sizes. Additionally, orthodox development strategies
focus on maximising local resources, thus locking island-states into on a narrow range of export
commodities over which they have no pricing control (Calì & Kennan, 2009:1; Connell, 1991:253;
22
Read, 2010:12). Economist Paul Streeten (1993:199) argues that tying development efforts to
agricultural exports is taking the “slow coach” toward development. Urban-based industries can
provide for more rapid and widespread economic prosperity, but for this to occur, an operational
threshold of between five to 10 million people needs to exist (G. Bertram, 2007:13). For small
countries of only a few thousand of people, it is a misapplied strategy.
I argue that orthodox development models are ill suited, even harmful, when applied to small island
developing states. They are premised on the existence of conditions such land, population density,
and communication, transportation and energy infrastructure that simply don’t exist in island
environments. Applications of orthodox development models, particularly those associated with
neo-liberal economic globalisation, have regressed Pacific economies, led to increasing poverty
rates, and weakened the ability of Pacific governments to provide basic social services, such as
health and education. The Pacific island countries (PICs) will fail to meet the 2015 deadline for
achieving the Millennium Development Goals, the raison d’être of 21st Century Western-defined
development efforts.
Similarly, development theories around participatory or people-led development are challenged in

their application by the Pacific’s immense cultural diversity and its geographical vastness. When
frustrated by field logistics such as travel distances, time constraints, budget limitations, language
competencies, and the lack of electricity, transportation and communication infrastructure in the
rural Pacific, many foreign development agencies simply revert to familiar top-down orthodox
development models and eschew participatory development models.
Conventional development theories fail to be applicable to islands in three ways: they dismiss the
role people play in economic activities by focusing on structural elements such as trade policy
(structuralist); they oversimplify or ignore the complexities of culturally-informed economic
activity (reductionist); and they assume economic structures operate in fixed or pre-set ways not
amenable to tweaking by human interaction (pre-determinist) (Baldacchino, 2011:2). Some island-
centric economists contend that a new development model is needed to articulate island
“futurabilities,” one in which the economy serves the needs of the people instead of forcing people
to adapt to the demands of an exogenous economic structure (Baldacchino & Bertram, 2009; G.
Bertram, 1987, 1999; A. Hooper, 2005; Huffer, 2006; Niles & Baldacchino, 2011).
23
Successful Pacific islands do exploit their comparative advantages but not within conventional
expectations. They do pursue economic development through deeper integration with the global
system but through a reversed-dependency paradigm. They export remittance-earning labour,
exploit geo-political rivalries in return for location, resource and other rents, and set the prices for
these rents through “cooperative politics” and “trans-territorial diplomacy” (Baldacchino, 2011:16;
Katzenstein, 2003:11). The exploitation of non-conventional resources, such as the leasing of
distant atolls for use by foreign militaries, can be advantageously negotiated by astute island leaders
and bound into multi-year contracts that are more stable and profitable than conventional revenue
earned from export commodities or tourism.
Said differently, Pacific island-states pursue a pragmatic development strategy of rent seeking,
which I variously label as rentier behaviour, rentier or rent-seeking orientation, or rentier
economics. Economist Hossein Mahdavy first postulated the rentier theory in 1970 as an
explanatory model to describe the political and economic development of oil-rich Middle East
states (Barker, 2012; Kirkpatrick, 2005; Mahdavy, 1970). In 1985, Geoff Bertram and Ray Watters
(1985) reconceptualised the rentier theory within Pacific realities, arguing that many PICs survive
on migration, remittances, aid, and bureaucracy, hence the widely used acronym MIRAB
(Apostolopoulos & Gayle, 2002; Van Fossen, 2005). The rentier theory has not been rigorously
theorised in political economics and development studies (Barker, 2012; Glasser, 2001:8; Khan, et
al., 2000:39; Qasem, 2010:55).
In classical economics, “rent” commonly refers to revenue received from “the gift of nature,” such
as Fiji’s gold, Nauru’s phosphate, Kiribati’s tuna, and the Pacific’s alluring tourist environment
(Barker, 2012; Khan, et al., 2000; Pasour, 1987; Schwarz, 2007; Yates, 1996). Classical economists
frame rents as revenue derived from non-productive activity or from non-market sources, but I
argue that Pacific rents derived from development aid are forms of “productive capitalism”
generated through the marketing of locational and diplomatic resources (Khan, et al., 2000:39).
Rent-seeking behaviour is a direct affront to classical economic thinking which discredits the
receipt of “unearned” income as “a morally disdainful” behaviour (Baldacchino, 1993; G. Bertram,
1987; Brookfield, 1989; Connell, 1991; T. I. J. Fairbairn, 1987; Watters, 1987). But other
economists contend that far from being “money for nothing,” aid is trade. The PICs have “existence
value” and provide strategic resources to larger countries in exchange for market value (Crocombe,
2009:100; Firth, 1989:76; 2006:2; Hau'ofa, 1987; Katzenstein, 2003:270; Poirine, 1998:88; Salois,
2011:6; Watters, 1987:39-43).
24
The Pacific’s rentier orientation is a lucrative strategy. Pacific islanders receive the highest amounts
of official development aid per capita than any other developing region, as much as 20 times more
than sub-Saharan Africa. Unrecorded “invisible” rents from remittances4 account for more than half
the gross domestic product of several PICs and often exceed the amount of official aid (Centre for
International Economics, 2007:16; Connell & Brown, 2005:10; Gibson, McKenzie, & Rohorua,
2006:17). The rentier model is “short cut” to development that is otherwise out of reach via
conventional “misdirected” trade-led development strategies (G. Bertram, 1999:106; Yates,
1996:15, 31). The PICs are pursuing a policy of “dependency to achieve self-sufficiency,”
exploiting the “importance of being unimportant,” and leveraging their condition of “in-betweenity”
among powerful rich countries entangled in geo-political rivalry within the Pacific region
(Baldacchino, 2008a:221; 2011:8; Connell, 1991:254). International development discourses fail to
acknowledge both the existence of rentier behaviour and the Pacific cultural forces that influence
economic activity.
I argue this rent-seeking orientation is culturally derived and is pervasively applied throughout all
Pacific cultures. It appears at the government level via the extraction of foreign aid, the family level
through the production and exportation of remittance-producing labour, within civil society
organisations (CSOs) that align their missions to coincide with those of rich donors, within Pacific
churches through linkages with mother churches in the Global North and international missionary
organisations, and within Pacific community radio stations. Rentier orientation in the Pacific
context manifests in significantly different ways from that found elsewhere in the world (Movahed,
2013; Pasour, 1987; Qasem, 2010; Tullock, 2005). I argue this difference arises from and is
moderated by Pacific cultural orientation toward “consocial” or relational identities and reciprocal
relationships within extensive social networks.
Summary of the argument: culture
In the Pacific, culture impacts directly on political, economic and social development activities (A.
Hooper, 2005:2; Kavaliku, 2005:23-27; UNESCO-Pacific, 2011:5, 7). The patterns of societal
organisation and cultural development that Pacific islanders constructed in response to geography
4
Economic remittances can be defined as the private transfers of wages and in-kind goods sent by overseas workers to their island
families (Eversole, 2005:138; Rokoduru, 2006:180).
25
and history are unique and relevant to discussions about development theory and development
communication.
Unlike continental states, Pacific communities are defined by the fluidity of the ocean, not the
rigidity of land (Hau'ofa, 1983, 1984, 2005). Tongan anthropologist Epeli Hau’ofa (2005:37-39)
contends that all Pacific island cultures are defined in fundamental ways by the adaptive
interactions between people and the sea. This “oceanic” orientation – one that is expansive,
cyclical, open and fluid – stands in opposition to the bounded, stationary and seemingly changeless
nature of land, which lies at the heart of Western development theories (D'Arcy, 2006:2;
DeLoughrey, 2007:2; P. White, 2007:273). Where Westerners see small islands in a wide sea,
scattered and separated, Hau’ofa (1983) sees the ocean as a nurturing substratum that unifies and
sustains the Pacific peoples in their great diversity.
Islanders have been surviving, if not thriving, in their homelands for nearly three millennia, long
before Euro-Americans arrived with their ideas about development. In pre-colonial times as today,
Pacific islanders travelled widely, established beachheads of kin on many shores, and drew on
distant resources that were redistributed through channels of social obligation and reciprocity. They
have long viewed their communities as geographically unbounded, capable of existing in multiple
locations, and sustained through complex webs of social “bridging and bonding” relationships
based upon reciprocal exchanges (Baldacchino, 2011:19).
The islanders’ oceanic orientation predisposed them to anticipate the introduction of new
technologies and ideas from foreign sources. During colonial times as today, when visitors arrived,
islanders critically assessed what resources or ideas the newcomers might offer that could be
adopted and adapted. Pacific islanders have long appropriated and transformed what the Europeans
brought to them (material goods, Christianity, systems of governance and economics, language)
into “something meaningful” to their own societies, retaining only what met their self-defined
development needs and made them culturally distinctive (Rainbird, 2000:35, 46). Said differently,
Pacific communities have long sought rent-seeking engagement with the outside world to sustain
their village lives and redistributed this wealth through social networks.
Tongan Anglican Bishop Winston Halapua proposes that the roots of Pacific cultural identity
originated within the ancient sea voyages that populated the islands. Around 4000 AD, Pacific
26
islanders began deploying sophisticated sailing craft capable of carrying dozens of people along
with animals, food and materials in extensive open-sea voyages that covered thousands of miles.
Everyone aboard the large outrigger ships, called vaka in Tongan, had assigned hierarchical roles
and responsibilities to ensure a successful journey. The chief might lead the voyage, but expressive
space was given to even the lowliest of crew members who might have seen something that would
be critical to the vaka’s survival (Couper, 2009:13; W. Halapua, 2008b:43-46). Thus, the socially
interdependent world of the vaka was characterised by “communication, close participation and
engagement” but within lines of constructed engagement (W. Halapua, 2008b:45). Vestiges of such
social arrangements are still evident among Pacific peoples, such as within the culture of silence.
Pacific island cultures embody “a deep oceanic sense of interconnectedness” which conjoins the life
on the land with the vast ocean fluidity that surrounds them (W. Halapua, 2008a:4; 2008b:3;
Nainoca, 2011:i). This interconnectedness can be revealed through Pacific social norms, or the
unwritten rules, values and expectations that govern social interaction (Nainoca, 2011:84). Amid
the Pacific’s immense cultural diversity, certain attributes are commonly found: respect, reciprocity,
humility, generosity, compassion, restraint, patience, trust and deference (Nainoca, 2011:9;
Thaman, 2004:8). Respect is the major factor determining islanders’ relationships within social
networks, thus respect is revealed through the dynamics of silence and speech (W. Halapua, 2008b;
Nainoca, 2011:99-104; A. N. Sharma, 1996; Vaioleti, 2006; Vunisea, 2008)
Two socio-cultural characteristics are significant for discussions around Pacific community radio:
talanoa or informal group discussions often occurring around a yaqona5 bowl, and the culture of
silence.
Talanoa, the practice of informal group conversation and storytelling, is found throughout the
oceanic Pacific. The word is comprised of two parts: tala to tell stories and noa to imply emptiness
or space, specifically the creation safe space where all people may talk. Tongan educator Konai
Helu Thaman (2008:463-464) defines this space as vaa or an interval of specific space and time
within which relationships are acknowledged and strengthen. Talanoa can be seen to represent the
interconnectedness of Pacific peoples with their ancestors, environment and community through
acts of deep listening, communication and dialogue. It is “a process of presence” in which there is
5
Yaqona or kava is a mildly sedative drink infused from the dried and pulverised roots of the Piper methysticum plant. In ancient
times, its consumption occurred during religious ceremonies and was associated with communion with ancestral spirits; today it is
widely consumed in leisurely social gatherings.
27
an emphasis on the importance of relationship (W. Halapua, 2008a:8-10, 21; Vaioleti, 2006).
Engaging in talanoa allows for displays of respect which are shown through deep listening to and
consideration of another’s viewpoints (Nainoca, 2011:104).
Tongan theologian Jione Havea (2010:11) suggests that talanoa has three interrelated components:
that of the story, the act of telling the story, and the occasion of conversation arising around the
telling of the story. Thus, it is a process more than a product. I reconceptualise the talanoa
phenomenon and place it within community radio. How might community radio function as the
kava bowl, creating a safe space for dialogue wherein the storyteller, the story and the listeners
interact? And how might community radio protect this space, reserving it for Pacific voices under
pressure from foreign development actors who, in their role as funding agencies, might attempt to
usurp community radio for dissemination their self-defined messages?
The second Pacific cultural attribute relevant to community radio is that of the “culture of silence.”
This vestige of vaka-influenced social structure is clearly revealed in how Pacific islanders use
language and silence. These unarticulated rules about public speech – who can speak, when, how,
and to what purpose – significantly challenge both participatory development praxis and
community radio. Respect is often shown through silence. A Pacific person’s expressive spaces are
bounded by age (youth are often silent in the presence of elders or Westerners), gender (women
often refrain from speaking in mixed gender groups), and social rankings. Because an islander’s
sense of identity derives from his or her “social placement” within “nodes” of relationship with
other people and with land, people know their places in society and seldom step outside of them
(Linnekin & Poyer, 1990:6-9). A wise Tongan knows “what to do and how to do it” and acts to
protect relationships, which includes appropriate behavioural performance within the culture of
silence (Thaman, 2004:8-10). In Pacific communities, decisions are often arrived at through
consensus, but protocols limiting who is allowed to participate in these discussions can silence the
voices of women, youth and the poor (United Nations Population Fund, 2008:1-2; Vunisea,
2008:42).
Questions then raise about the position community radio assumes within the culture of silence given
the latter’s strong respect toward authority and the importance of maintaining social cohesion
through structured silence, the avoidance of voicing direct opinion, and the non-disclosure of vital
information that might cause disharmony. Who is allowed to speak, about what topics and under
28
what conditions? The culture of silence can be softened through the work of CSOs and the media
(Vunisea, 2008:43). Because of their nature as collective entities, CSOs offer individuals relief from
some societal constraints, such as obedience to elders and subservience of women to men (Barr,
2003; Otsuka, 2005). Thus, I consider the theory postulated by Nico Carpentier (2007) and others
that community radio can operate as a “rhizome” or a node that strengthens civil society through the
sharing of the broadcasting facilities and, in the Pacific context, giving voice to grassroots villagers
within the culture of silence (Meadows, Forde, Ewart, & Foxwell, 2009:155).
The research questions
My original premise presumed that orthodox development theories have significantly failed in their
application in the Pacific islands and participatory development theories are similarly challenged
given the Pacific’s immense cultural diversity, thus I sought evidence to support that a Pacific-
derived theory around development communication is emerging that is singularly different from
other models existing in the world. Is there evidence that Pacific model of participatory
development and community radio exists? If so, what are the characteristics of this Pacific model?
How do Pacific community radio stations interact with their communities within the structures of
the culture of silence? How do Pacific social networks reveal themselves within community radio?
How does the Pacific’s rentier orientation reveal itself in the relationships between community
radio stations and their funding agencies, communities and CSO partners? How much influence do
foreign development actors in their role as funding agencies impart on community radio
programming or overall community radio sustainability? Given the cultural orientation toward
chiefly respect, what is the nature of the relationship between community broadcasters and their
formal (government) and informal (chief and church) institutions? Within the Pacific regulatory
environment, what is the nature of the interaction between the international development
community and Pacific media regulators and to what degree does the resulting policy framework
reflect donor interests or islander interests? Indeed, what are the constraints and opportunities
facing Pacific community radio and what strategies might be suggested to further the sector’s
expansion?
29
Research contributions
My research contributes valuable new knowledge to the field of development communication. Very
little research has been done in the Pacific context in the field of development communication and
none has focused on community media and participatory development approaches. Aside from
Helen Molnar’s work (2005, 2008) and the 2013 Pacific Media Assistance Scheme regional media
survey (The Pacific Media and Communication Research Consortium, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d,
2013e, 2013f, 2013g, 2013h), published research in the area of public-service media and
development communication in the Pacific island region is scarce. In the area of Pacific community
radio, only one relevant unpublished thesis was found (that of Hannah Harborow, 2008). Several
scholars have focused on press freedoms within individual Pacific countries. But no one has
investigated Pacific community media, including faith-based broadcasters, nor has anyone sought to
create a comparative study of the Pacific broadcast regulatory environment, or investigated the role
of Pacific national broadcasters in development communication.
My research is interdisciplinary and draws from the fields of development economics, international
relations, anthropology, sociology, religious studies, history, development theory, and
communication theory. It contributes Pacific perspectives into the emerging field of nissology, or
island studies, now predominantly led by Godfrey Baldacchino, and continues the work of Geoff
Bertram, John Connell, Susan Maiava and others in the field of Pacific rentier economics and
related disciplines. Additionally, my research provides a foundational study for future research in
development communication in the Pacific, particularly in the areas of community media, faith-
based media, and the broadcast regulatory environment.
My research reconceptualises rentier economics and culturally informed rent-seeking behaviour

within the South Pacific context. This is unique research contribution expands theoretical
understandings of small island-state sustainability, including that of community media. It is also the
first research in the field of development communication in the South Pacific context that advances
understandings of the dynamic interplay between development and culture.
30
The research area
Greater Oceania encompasses one

third of the earth’s surface, spanning
a width of more than 11,000
kilometres, containing about 25,000
islands ranging in size from thin
crescent atolls to towering volcanic
archipelagos (Rainbird, 2007:167).
My research area encompasses seven
Map 1.1 Research area
sovereign, oceanic South Pacific Source: author
microstates: sovereign in that they
can set their own broadcasting regulations and development priorities; oceanic in that their ancient
orientation to the sea has given rise to unique cultures and social structures that affect development
and communication; and microstates in that their national populations of less than one million lend
a distinctive flavour to development trajectories.6
The case study countries are Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu, as
depicted in Map 1.1. All except Tonga were former British colonies; Tonga, while never colonised,
existed within a 70-year “treaty of friendship” with Britain. All case study countries are members of
the United Nations (UN) and therefore possess coveted “one nation, one vote” status, which
strategically positions their UN votes within lucrative rent-seeking streams. English is commonly
spoken in metropolitan areas of these countries. Fewer than six million people live in my research
area. The most populous of my case study countries is Fiji (estimated 870,000); the least populous
is Nauru (estimated 9,300).
6
Many South Pacific island countries eschewed political independence in the 1970s-1980s, choosing instead to remain as territories
or possessions of larger foreign powers. Examples include the French overseas territories (French Polynesia, New Caledonia, etc),
the United States’ various “freely associated” countries (American Samoa, Guam, etc), and New Zealand’s dependent territories
(Cooks Islands, Niue and Tokelau). Non-sovereign states were excluded from my research area, as was Papua New Guinea because
it is neither oceanic nor a microstate.
31
The research methodology
To investigate the validity of my hypothesis that a Pacific-centric model of community radio might
be emerging from the interface between Western development and Pacific culture, I focused on the
various relationships among four actors: the community broadcasters, their peer-level civil-society
organisations (CSOs), their donors, and their governments, both as telecommunication/broadcast
regulators and national broadcasters.
The small number of existing community radio stations restricted my choice of case study radio
stations. My four chosen case studies, which contain five radio stations, are exemplifications of
their categories. Four of the five radio stations were seeded by the three primary sources of
traditional indigenous development: the community, the chief and the church.7 In other words, the
radio stations arose from within the community (through a CSO), the chief (through the
government), and the church. The fourth case study, a project initiated by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), provides an insightful comparative study. The four cases
studies reflect the Pacific’s cultural diversity: two were located in Polynesian cultures, two in
Melanesian cultures, and one in the hybrid Fijian culture (Melanesian-Polynesian indigenous and
Indo-Fijian).8
My four case studies are:
• Buala FM and its seven sister stations established by the UNDP in rural Isabel Province,
Solomon Islands;
• A twin study of two women’s activist radio stations, femTALK FM in Fiji and Le’o ‘o e
Kakai FM in Tonga;
• Niuatoputapu FM in northern Tonga, the ownership of which was eventually assumed by

the government; and
• Radio BOSCO, a small parish-affiliated radio station located in rural Guadalcanal Province,
Solomon Islands.
7
Christianity was introduced into the islands during the European colonial period in the 18th and 19th centuries when missionaries
worked in tandem with their national governments (British and French, Protestant and Roman Catholic) to “westernise” and
“improve” the islanders. Christianity has been deeply indigenised. The Pacific is often called the Christian continent.
8
The oceanic Pacific can be categorised, although not without controversy, into three cultural areas (Melanesia, Polynesia,
Micronesia), encompassing roughly 250 different cultural groups speaking about 450 distinct languages. The word “océanie” and the
categories of Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia were first applied by Dumont d’Urville in 1831. The categories remain a useful
standard of generalisation even if they ignore the complexities of the Pacific societies within each grouping (Couper, 2009:25).
32
Additionally, I built upon primary documentation and existing literature to investigate the Pacific
broadcast regulatory environment as deficiencies in the regulatory environment are identified in the
literature as one of the two main obstacles to the emergence of community radio worldwide. The
second obstruction to the rise of community radio as identified in the international literature is the
lack of financial sustainability. Here, I applied as an analytical framework Alfonsio Gumucio
Dagron’s (2005a, 2005b) three pillars of community media sustainability – that of social,
organisational and financial sustainability – to facilitate discussions. Thus, my field questions were
designed to investigate how community radio stations, as civil society organisations (CSOs), pursue
these three pillars of sustainability within an environment dominant by wealthy foreign
development actors eager to disseminate their messages around development topics and within the
Pacific cultural context.
My field approach was greatly influenced by talanoa methodology (Nainoca, 2011; Otsuka, 2005;
A. N. Sharma, 1996; Vaioleti, 2006). The talanoa research approach employs various qualitative
instruments with an emphasis on face-to-face interactions through interviews, focus groups and
participant observation. Talanoa research methods also include Pacific cultural practices such as
gift exchanges, respect to elders and authority figures, and sensitivity toward of indigenous
communicative styles (for example, structured silence, uses of time, displays of humility and
restraint, and avoidance of direct speech or confrontational behaviour). By engaging in talanoa as a
research method, a researcher is in essence seeking temporary acceptance into the social group.
This act temporarily bestows on the researcher a thin marker of social status through which other
group members can then assess the researcher’s trustworthiness and acceptability (Robinson &
Robinson, 2005:18).
Thesis structure
This thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 presents an overview of orthodox development theory and alternative Pacific

development models. The small Tongan island of Niuatoputapu provides a concrete example of the
special development challenges facing Pacific islands. I will present evidence to support my view
33
that orthodox development models are built upon colonial models and that both are harmful to
small island developing states. I will discuss the “aid game” dynamics that fuel contemporary
Pacific development agendas and invigorate the Pacific’s rent-seeking orientation. The rentier
economic model will be described through analysis of how PICs apply the model to the leasing of
Internet domain names and geo-synchronous satellite orbital slots and the creation and exportation
of remittance-producing labour. Islanders also extract social and political remittances from
communication technologies, as will be discussed.
Chapter 3 discusses participatory development theories and the role of media, including
community media, within them. Wilbur Schramm’s failed experiment with educational television in
American Samoa will be analysed as an example of how orthodox development models had used
media in an attempt to drive social change in a Pacific context. The Pacific’s cultural attributes, in
particular the culture of silence, often present challenges to applications of participatory
development theories, as I will discuss. The role of Pacific CSOs as collective voices that open the
culture of silence and the challenges they face will be explored.
Chapter 4 investigates the state of the Pacific regional broadcast regulatory environment. Foreign
development actors drove a regional telecommunication sector reform movement in the 2000s that
severely eroded, even erased, broadcast regulations in many PICs. Little effort was made to engage
with grassroots islanders to gain their perspectives on what technologies might be suitable for their
self-defined development needs. Well-funded foreign donors are positioning satellite- and
computer-based information and communication technologies (ICTs) as the appropriate technology
to drive Pacific development. These media platforms meet the donors’ economic and strategic
interests but are overwhelmingly inappropriate for the rural Pacific. However, the sectorial reforms
did spark an explosion of mobile telephony growth that has greatly benefited rural islanders. My
research indicates that the appropriate technology for Pacific development is a hybrid model of
radio and mobile telephony. Among the PICs, only Fiji recognises community media as a distinct
media sub-sector. Fiji’s difficulties in establishing this recognition in the face of strong opposition
from commercial media outlets, many of which were foreign owned, will be discussed, as well as
the Solomon Islands’ wary support of community radio and Vanuatu’s debate about who is entitled
to own radio stations.
34
Chapter 5 outlines my methodology. I applied principles of ethnographic research within a Pacific
culturally appropriate talanoa field methodology in an effort to de-Westernise my research and
open safe spaces for Pacific voices. I also employed grounded theory in my data analysis, which led
to a strong mid-course correction in my research project, as I will discuss. I also explain why I
chose a case study approach, justify the selection of my four case studies, and share some of the
ethical and logistical challenges that arose in the field.
Chapter 6 begins examination of my case studies. The first is Buala FM and its seven sister radio
stations in rural Isabel Province, Solomon Islands. The stations were established by five UN
agencies, led by the UNDP, in a fragile post-conflict environment that allowed for limited
engagement with the receiving villages. The project implementers partnered with a local
intermediary CSO, which applied aggressive rent-seeking behaviour that greatly affected project
sustainability. This case study clearly reveals the complexities arising when orthodox development
models are applied in culturally inappropriate ways and the tremendous influence Pacific social
networks, this case Solomon Islands wantok networks, impart to social sustainability around
community radio.
Chapter 7 discusses a twin case study of women’s activist radio: femLINKPACIFIC’s femTALK
FM in Fiji and Ma’a Fafine mo e Famili’s Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM in Tonga. Both CSOs arose from
within the Pacific women’s social movement, which greatly contributed to Pacific notions that a
self-defined development path to modernisation, but not necessarily Westernisation, was possible.
In this chapter, I explore notions of voice and accountability between CSOs and the communities
they purport to represent, their funding agencies, their CSO counterparts, and their governments.
Throughout the Pacific, CSOs are financially challenged and thus they adopt rent-seeking
behaviours toward donors that leave them open to cooption. femLINKPACIFIC uses femTALK FM
in innovative ways to educate poor rural women about their human security rights and offer them
channels of expression for their voice within the culture of silence. But is “voice” enough to
engender social change? Must voice lead to political action, or is the public performance of voice
around community radio sufficient?
Chapter 8 discusses Pacific faith-based broadcasters, such as Radio BOSCO, a small parish-
affiliated radio station in rural Guadalcanal Province, Solomon Islands. Faith-based broadcasters
represent half of all Pacific community radio stations, but many secular community broadcasters
35
object to their international finances and imported religious programming. In this chapter, I discuss
the role of churches in development theory and in Pacific development specifically. In the Pacific,
the separation of church and state is virtually non-existent, thus many colonial era or mainline
churches have lost their “prophetic” voices on behalf of the poor. Some church practices, such as
tithing, have been directly linked to rising poverty rates in some Pacific countries. Since the 1990s,
islanders have been joining newer religious groups, such as Pentecostal churches, in substantial
numbers. Pentecostalism is characterised by its skilful use of media in evangelism. Many Pacific
faith-based broadcasters have been seeded by international missionary organisations and imported
religious programming can fill the majority of their broadcast schedules. Yet, they are also
innovative and stable broadcasters that create wage employment and produce reasonable amounts
of local radio content. Radio BOSCO, however, was established to provide channels of expression
for youth voices, not to serve as a strictly religious broadcaster. In this view, it advanced a form of
communication theology that is still not widely practiced in the Pacific.
Chapter 9 focuses Niua FM on the Tongan island of Niuatoputapu. Niua FM was the product of
overt rent-seeking behaviour by a local politician who worked his social networks to procure a
radio station to benefit his community and to boost his election campaign. When he was elected to
office, he neglected the station, it eventually collapsed, and the national government stepped
forward to claim ownership. The government offered many compelling reasons why a closer
relationship would benefit Niua FM. But if the government owned Niua FM, would it cease to be a
community radio station? Or would government affiliation lead to a more inclusive community? In
this chapter, I discuss the role of government in public-service programming, the state of Pacific
national broadcasters, and how emerging trends around reform of state-owned enterprises, such as
national broadcasters, could contribute to the strengthening of Pacific community radio.
Chapter 10 summaries my research findings and offers recommendations to assist policy makers
and community media advocates to enable the emergence and sustainability of Pacific community
radio. One resounding research finding is the need to train the villagers interested in community
radio in organisational-management skills, not just media-production skills. Donors simply fail to
do this. Rural villagers have very limited opportunities to learn how to manage a community radio
station. No evidence was found to suggest that any national or regional Pacific media-development
initiative addresses the business side of community media.
36
Summary
In this chapter I have stated my research objectives: to investigate the dynamic interaction of
development and culture through the phenomenon of community radio in seven independent
oceanic South Pacific microstates. I argue that orthodox development models are ill-suited, even
harmful, when applied to small island developing states. Yet these models continue to be advocated
by powerful international development actors in the South Pacific region, often to privilege their
own economic and strategic interests, and that they drive the effort through significant infusions of
development aid. Alternative or immanent development models deeply rooted in Pacific cultural
sensibilities do exist and have proven to be sustainable over time, yet such models are ignored or
dismissed by the dominant international development actors. Pacific island states have adopted a
reversed-dependency strategy or rentier outlook that seeks to extract aid, location and resource
rents, and other forms of non-market revenue from the international community. I argue that such
rent-seeking orientation is innate to Pacific culture given its propensity within oceanic worldviews
to accrue wealth from afar and to adopt and adapt exogenous influences. Kinship-based social
networks existing at the local, regional and transnational levels redistribute this wealth within
reciprocal relationships. Finally, Pacific community radio is well positioned as a unit of analysis
through which to observe the interaction of Western development forces and indigenous culture.
Development theories privilege the use of media to disseminate information and to serve as
facilitators in participatory development models. Similarly, Pacific islanders enthusiastically
consume radio. Pacific community radio, while a new phenomenon, is arising from traditional
indigenous sources of development: the community, the chief and the church. Thus, community
radio holds the potential to open the culture of silence and promote community conversation
(talanoa) around development issues if a balance can be found between competing Western and
Pacific worldviews.
In the next chapter, I investigate the historical roots and contemporary conceptualisations of
orthodox development theories and the place of islands within them. I will also introduce Pacific
rentier economic models and discuss how they are applied through analysis of development aid,
Internet domain names, geo-synchronous satellite orbital slots, and remittance-producing labour
exportation.
37
Chapter 2
Encounters with Difference
Development and culture in the Pacific island context
As my main research interest is to discover evidence that a Pacific-centric model of community

radio is arising from the interface of development and culture, this chapter will discuss and compare
Western orthodox development models with alternative Pacific models to show that the former are
inappropriate for small island developing states and the latter are sustainable and culturally
appropriate. It is ambitious to presume that I can thoroughly discuss 3,000 years of Pacific culture
and 200 years of Western development theory in one chapter, so I will highlight the main themes
and illustrate them with concrete examples. These discussions begin with a malaga, or travelling
visit, to the home of Niua FM in northern Tonga through which the Pacific’s unique development
challenges can be better illustrated.
THE OTHER SIDE OF HEAVEN9
Niuatoputapu exemplifies the “Pacific paradox” where islands with outstanding natural resources
fail to “develop” (Baldacchino, 2006b; Hurley, 2010:42; Prasad, 2007:9; Streeten, 1993:200; Toatu,
2002). Such islands don’t conform to conventional notions of what constitutes “under-
development” nor are conventional remedies relevant or effective (Baldacchino, 1993:32).
Incidences of basic-needs poverty are rarely found in the Pacific. An estimated 75 percent of all
islanders live in dispersed rural villages that are often no larger than 200 people. The presence of
“affluent subsistence” agriculture and cultural “social security nets,” such as food gifting, provide
most islanders with sufficient but cash-poor lifestyles. Islanders instead suffer from the “poverty of
opportunity” or lack of access to health care, education, transportation and communication services,
water and sanitation infrastructure, and limited opportunities for rural income generation (Abbott &
Pollard, 2004:ix-xi; M. Cox, et al., 2007; Taylor, 2010:15). Often the constraints of island
9
The Other Side of Heaven is a 2001 film about the experiences of Mormon missionary John H. Groberg on Niuatoputapu in the
1950s. The multiple and contradictory interpretations that can be deduced from the ambiguous title busied my mind for months.
38
development are simply reduced to matters of smallness and remoteness. Pacific islands are
considered small in terms of land, resources and labour. They are considered remote in terms of
distance from markets and from themselves due to multiple islands linked by expensive
transportation and unreliable communication infrastructure. The Pacific islands are greatly
challenged by frequent natural disasters.10
Niuatoputapu, or Niua, is one such island. For centuries, Pacific islands like Niua were self-
sufficient, even prosperous, despite what modern Western development economists call their
“litanies of hope and despair” (Baldacchino, 2011:2; Campbell, 1992:61; Taylor, 2010:22). Niua
measures four kilometres by eight and is home to 900 people who engage primarily in subsistence
agriculture and fishing. It lies at the northern point of the Tongan archipelago, 520 kilometres from
the national capital, Nuku’alofa.
Tongans gain an immense measure of pride and self-assurance from their history, their king, their
church, and their culture. Today, free primary education and health care (investment in social
capital) place Tongans high on international human-development indices. Literacy rates top 99
percent, but English fluency is not widespread in rural areas. Everyone has enough food to place
Tongans among the world’s most obese people (lifestyle diseases). Niua is an island of remarkable
beauty and natural bounty. Productive gardens are meticulously tended and families routinely dine
on lobster, fish, pork, chicken and indigenous fruit and root crops.
Most homes on Niua are constructed of wood and tin (vulnerable to cyclones); few have improved
toilets. Notably, the village clergy live in simple concrete homes, many of which were built with
overseas funding. Niua has no fewer than 12 churches. Families are large, close-knit and globally
dispersed (transnational kinship groups). Many families send older children to Nuku’alofa for
education (to enable migration); some diaspora families send their children home to Niua during
school holidays to strengthen kinship bonds. Many community leaders had studied overseas
(Westernised elite).
10
During years of natural-disaster occurrence, Samoa’s economic losses have averaged 46 percent of its GDP, Vanuatu 30 percent,
Tonga 14 percent. Damage from Samoa’s 2009 earthquake/tsunami was estimated at US$147 million, or 10.5 percent of annual
GDP. In Fiji, Cyclone Gene caused FJ$45 million (AU$24.3 million) in damage in 2008; flood damage in January 2009 was
estimated at US$60 million (Bettencourt, et al., 2006:2; E. Ferguson, 2009:270; Tonga Ministry of Finance and National Planning,
2010:31).
39
Niua can be reached either by a three- to five-day open-sea ferry ride or via airplane. A supply ship
or inter-island ferry visits every four to eight weeks, however the service is erratic. Villagers in cars
and on bicycles travel up and down the coastal road, calling out the news of a ship’s arrival. Niua
FM, when it was operational, filled this vital communication service. Shipping services ceased for
three months in 2009 due the sinking of an inter-island ferry. Shelves in Niua’s three bush shops
(small private sector) emptied of flour, noodles, sugar, and tinned foods (Westernising food tastes);
fuel for generators and vehicles ran dry.
Air service is also erratic. Planes are scheduled to arrive weekly but service is frequently cancelled
due to inclement weather.11 The grass airstrip strip (undeveloped infrastructure) is vulnerable to
high rainfall. The price of one return-trip air ticket equals the sale of seven traditional mats, or
roughly 42 weeks of one woman’s labour. As there is no paid employment on Niua beyond a few
government jobs (police, teachers, utility services), most cash is accrued from women’s weaving
and by entertaining a small number of “yachties” who visit during summer months (niche tourist
market). The mats were once revered items of cultural wealth and prestige, often incorporating
designs passed down through successive generations of women. Today, a 4x6-foot mat sells for
about AU$150 in the Nuku’alofa tourist markets. Some weavers send mats to overseas relatives in
hope that higher prices can be earned in diaspora communities. Cash to pay for school supplies,
water rates, shop goods, and mobile telephone top-up cards is scarce and thus a persistent source of
worry for islanders, particularly the women.
Communication services are expensive and unreliable. Niua’s solar-powered mobile telephony
system failed for three weeks in January 2012 due to cloudy weather. The aging telephone system is
incompatible with the more modern systems found elsewhere in the country: Niuatoputapuans can
call out but others have difficulty calling in. Mobile telephones are prized possessions and used as a
communal family resources. A satellite-based Internet service at the high school (a disaster-
recovery aid project) had been down for six weeks in January 2012 (skilled islanders travelling).
The reception of Radio Tonga, the national broadcaster located in Nuku’alofa, is still weak even
after the deployment of a new transmitter and tower in 2011 as part of a South Korean bilateral aid
project. Samoa’s national broadcaster, 2AP, can be heard most evenings as it is located only 320
kilometres to the northeast. With the demise of Niua FM in 2011, the only formal source of local
news is each village’s town crier, who walks the coral streets with a bullhorn announcing
11
In March 2013, the only domestic air service, owned by a New Zealand company, closed due to competition from a Chinese-
funded air service introduced as part of a bilateral aid package.
40
government news when the need arises. Niua has no electricity beyond a few solar-power arrays
and private generators (economic remittances). Water pumped from the island’s aquifer is available
about 12 hours a day. In January 2012, there was no nurse, doctor or dentist on island.
In September 2009, a tsunami destroyed half of Niua, killing nine people and causing an estimated
T$18.5 million (AU$10.1 million) in damage (Tonga Ministry of Finance and National Planning,
2010:31; K. Wilson, et al., 2009). International charities, neighbouring countries and Tongan
overseas communities immediately provided disaster-relief aid. In January 2012, Niua was
preparing to accommodate several dozen workers (local labour shortages) who would rebuild one
village and the government administrative centre (a World Bank loan). Incorporated in the designs
of this new village was an office for Niua FM.
ISLANDS IN ORTHODOX DEVELOPMENT THEORY
Introduction
As the story of Niua illustrates, small island developing states (SIDS) face unique development
challenges. While the goals of development – that of improving the daily living conditions of poor
people – have remained constant for much of the past half-century, the methods used to achieve
these goals have changed significantly. This section focuses on three eras of “development” within
the Pacific context: that of the colonial experience, the mid-20th Century orthodox and dependency
models, and the neo-liberal economic globalisation model that arose in the 1980s-1990s and
remains today. I argue that colonial development models seeded aid dependency and led to the
formalisation of the Pacific rentier orientation, which I will discuss. Mid-20th Century development
models continued to focus on colonial development objectives, such as natural-resource extraction,
and continued to emphasis the centrality of the government in driving economic growth. In the age
of globalisation, however, the sovereignty of all nation-states is being undermined through deeper
integration with a world economic system that advances the interests of the wealthy and powerful
despite the recent alluding rhetoric around the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).12 In the
12
The UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight inter-related development targets: 1) eradicating extreme poverty
and hunger; 2) achieving universal primary education; 3) promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women; 4) reducing
child mortality; 5) improving maternal health; 6) combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and similar infectious diseases; 7) ensuring
environmental sustainability; and 8) developing a global partnership for development, which includes in Section 8.3 explicit
reference to the special needs of SIDS.
41
Pacific context, these powerful countries tend to be the former colonial powers or their heirs, such
as Australia, the Pacific’s largest aid partner.
But also in the age of globalisation, Pacific island families and communities are finding their own
self-defined pathways to sustainable development by using their native “governing wits,” as will be
discussed in the third section of this chapter (Baldacchino, 2011).
Islands in the world
For much of the 20th century, the international development community remained sceptical that
island-states were not merely smaller versions of larger continental ones and that orthodox
development theories were thus scalable and universal (Anckar, 2006:43; Baldacchino, 1993:33; A.
Hooper, 2005:11). After all, some islands – Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan – were among the
world’s richest states and successful examples of the orthodox development model. Island
economies outperformed continental ones in nearly every measurement category but gross domestic
product (GDP) (Baldacchino & Bertram, 2009:147; Hein, 2004:14; Katzenstein, 2003:18; Streeten,
1993:200). They attracted more foreign aid per capita, received preferential trade agreements, and
secured international loans on better terms. Some island-states, like Kiribati, possessed vast
economic enterprise zones brimming with valuable fish stocks; others could be fashioned into high-
value “niche” tourist destinations. So why weren’t Pacific island economies growing under what
was presumed to be a proven recipe for success? Many theorists of that era failed to realise island
success stories were not achieved through the application of conventional modernisation
approaches. Instead, islanders had skilfully extracted physical and social resources created and held
by other countries, what Baldacchino (2006b) calls the extra-territorial “hinterlands.”
Colonial legacies: early period
The modern “development project” is often thought to have arisen in the 1940s-1950s, but in the
Pacific, it began in 1521 when Magellan’s starving fleet made landfall on Guam. As a portent of
times to come, the native Chamorros offered provisions; in other words, they gifted food to
encourage the establishment of reciprocal relationships. But when the Chamorros tried to take some
dinghies (reciprocity being a two-way exchange), the Spaniards opened fire, killing seven islanders,
42
and marked the site on their maps “the island of thieves,” an appellation that still rankles modern
Guamanians.
For 400 years, the Pacific islands were occupied, divided, traded and sold among the colonial
powers: Spain, Britain, France, Germany, Imperial Japan and the United States (US). The
Europeans came in two waves: the Spanish in the 16th and 17th centuries, the British and French the
mid-18th and 19th centuries. They came for different reasons, but each sought to impose its own
ideology in terms of governance, commerce and religion. Often the first contact islanders had with
Europeans was through state-sponsored missionaries. Violence, warfare, genocide and disease
ravaged Pacific populations. Within decades, some islands suffered 90 percent population losses;
most islands lost between half to three-quarters of their people (Flynn, Frost, & Latham, 1999:7;
Lansdown, 2006:19). Such near-annihilation decimated their collective storehouse of oral cultural
knowledge (Torrence & Clarke, 2000:24). While David Moorehouse’s phrase “fatal impact,” used
to describe these turbulent times, has fallen out of fashion in Pacific post-colonial literature, it is
nonetheless accurately descriptive.
Captain James Cook’s arrival in Pacific in the mid-18th Century marked a significant historical
turning point. The Seven Years War between Britain and France had ended the year before Cook’s
voyages began in 1768, thus the victorious British controlled a maritime trading empire spanning
much of the known world. Unlike previous European empires, this one was built on capitalist trade,
not military conquest and religious intolerance. This, it was seen, was a distinctly modern way of
organising international affairs.
Cook wrote frequently about the need to “improve” the Pacific people, here the term holding
overlapping meanings of both “generally making better” and “making a profit from” (O’Sullivan,
2008:197). Trade in both material goods and liberating ideas was seen as the principal way for
improvement to occur in the Pacific. The steady march toward “European standards of a good life”
was seen as the only possible path of human progress, a sentiment that would reappear in mid-20th
Century orthodox development thinking (Lansdown, 2006:66). The colonial French agreed, hence,
the race was on to collect Pacific possessions, not as economic colonies but as markers of imperial
prowess (O’Sullivan, 2008:190, 202). This rivalry lives on in the Pacific today: rich countries use
development aid to gain favour with the independent Pacific microstates, all of whom possess
valuable United Nations (UN) votes, but often the objectives behind the aid allocations are designed
43
to serve the donors’ self-interests, not necessarily those of the islanders (Crocombe, 2009:100;
Firth, 1989:76; 2006:2; Hau'ofa, 1987; Katzenstein, 2003:270; Poirine, 1998:88; Salois, 2011:6).
The arrival of new players in the Pacific “aid game,” notably China, ensures that lucrative aid
streams will continue, if not increase, in coming decades and thus further stimulate and reward
Pacific rent-seeking behaviour, as I will explain.
The widespread popularity Cook’s published journals coincided with an intense religious revival in
Britain in the late-1700s (O’Sullivan, 2008:181). In the eyes of these British evangelists, Cook’s
journals depicted a region teeming with sinful heathens awaiting salvation. The London Missionary
Society was specifically established in 1795 to “civilise” and convert Pacific natives (Douaire-
Marsaudon, 2009:164-165; Lansdown, 2006:110-114). For more than 150 years, British Protestant
missionaries and French Catholic priests would abet their governments’ rivalry for dominance in
the Pacific. Today, the Pacific is known as the Christian continent; 95 percent of all islanders are
Christian.
Many islanders initially expressed far more interest in the missionaries’ material goods (nails, metal
fish hooks, cloth, tools, guns) than their religious teachings. The islanders were never merely
passive observers of the dramatic changes occurring in their lands, but were, and remain, active
participants in a dynamic albeit asymmetrical relationship with foreign powers (Couper, 2009:4;
Lansdown, 2006:19; Rainbird, 2000:5; Torrence & Clarke, 2000:5, 22). Pacific islanders
appropriated and transformed what the Europeans brought to them into “something meaningful” to
their own societies, retaining only what suited them and hence made them culturally distinctive
(Rainbird, 2000:35, 46).
Colonial legacies: late period
Oceania’s colonial period from the mid-1850s to World War II was more benign in nature than that
experienced in other areas of the world (Lansdown, 2006:194; Lawson, 2004:136; Torrence &
Clarke, 2000:2). From the beginning, the Pacific islands were dismal prospects for viable colonies:
they had few natural resources, offered little land for plantations, and their populations were
withering to the point of extinction. Profitable items for the lucrative Chinese trade (sandalwood,
bêche-de-mer) were quickly extracted and exhausted (Flynn, et al., 1999:7-8). Later discoveries of
phosphate on some islands, like Nauru, were profitable only when the Australian settler-colonies
44
had grown sufficient in size to become agricultural producers. Whale oil was the Pacific region’s
only “super crop” but the whaling era had peaked by the mid-1850s (Lansdown, 2006:234).
The colonial British, once realising there was little wealth in the islands, were largely disinterested
in their Pacific colonies until another foreign power threatened incursion, such as the US in Fiji and
France in what is today Vanuatu. The small impoverished islands came to be seen more as
nuisances than assets (Aldrich & Connell, 1998; O’Sullivan, 2008:201). One British colonial
administrator cautioned in the 1880s that “hoisting the flag” in Tonga in order to gain trade
advantage over other European rivals did not compensate for “the weakness that a host of half-
bankrupt islands throws upon the Empire” (Lansdown, 2006:319).
Because Britain had claimed the Pacific islands as terra nullius, or land belonging to no one,
international conventions obligated Britain to populate them to fulfil its claiming rights (O’Sullivan,
2008:191-192). Settlers arrived in steady numbers, often via Australia. Colonial Australian
commercial entities spread into the Pacific and grew tremendously wealthy through monopolistic
mercantile trade. Australian traders have dominated Pacific island trade since the early 1800s with
two overt objectives: to expand and control Pacific resources and markets, and to deny entry to
rivals (Babington, 1981:209). Such aims are still clearly be seen today interwoven into regional
trade agreements, such as PACER and PACER-Plus.13
Colonial-settlers in New Zealand and Australia became the most vigorous advocates for continued
British imperial occupation of the region. By the late-1800s, Britain found itself in an awkward
situation: there was little economic reason to stay in the Pacific, yet pressures from its settler-
citizens prevented it from leaving (Lansdown, 2006:321). By the 1880s, Australia began to assume
the authority of a “sub-imperial” power in the South Pacific and claimed the right, if not moral
obligation, to speak on behalf of the region to the wider world (Babington, 1981:208; Fry,
1997a:306; Lovell, 2007:5; O'Lincoln, 1997:3-4, 10; Schultz, 2007:8). Australia cast itself as the
Pacific’s natural leader, occupying a position both within and outside of the region (Jolly,
2007:527). Within contemporary development dynamics, where Australia is the Pacific’s largest aid
donor and often its largest trading partner, a complex relationship exists between Australia and the
13
The Pacific island countries (PICs) are party to various overlapping and colluding trade agreements: with the European Union
(EU) through the Cotonou Agreement and subsequent Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), and with Australia-New Zealand
through SPARTECA (the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement) and PACER and PACER-Plus
(Pacific Agreement for Closer Economic Relations).
45
Pacific island countries (PICs). Islanders often exhibit a “Jekyll and Hyde” attitude toward
Australia, unsure if Australia is positioning itself as one among equals or as a new quasi-colonial
overlord advancing its own commercial and strategic interests at their expense (Campbell, 1992:59;
Fenelon, 2001:25; Fry, 2004:11; Narsey, 2004:3; Saovana-Spriggs & O'Collins, 2003:2-3; Schultz,
2007:11-13). This is often revealed in the dynamics of the region’s main inter-governmental
development-policy organisation, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), which is widely
perceived to be dominated by Australian interests (Huffer, 2006; Naidu, 2003; Pacific Conference
of Churches, 2001; Penjueli & Morgan, 2008; T. Wood & Naidu, 2004).14
The lingering influences of British colonial practices complicate contemporary development efforts
in many PICs. Fiji’s racially divided society resulted from colonial decisions to import some 60,000
indentured workers from India specifically to benefit the Colonial Sugar Refining (CSR) Company,
Australia’s largest company prior to World War II (Lawson, 2004:136-138). The CSR controlled 88
percent of Fiji’s sugar crop, which accounted for two-thirds of the company’s wealth for more than
50 years. While the CSR has long departed from Fiji (in 1973) and the bottom fell out from the
sugar sector due to international trade-liberalisation agreements in the late-1990s, Fiji remains
racially fragemented and prone to coups staged, at least rhetorically, to protect native rights.
Elsewhere, Tonga’s 1875 constitution arose from the influence of British missionary Shirley
Waldemar Baker in the government of King George Tupou I. The constitution enshrined male-only
land-ownership rights, which now lay at the heart of an international controversy around Tonga’s
refusal to ratify CEDAW (the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women). The modern states of Solomon Islands and Vanuatu were artificially created by
colonial powers and now face the onerous task of building both a state and a nation among
disparate clans. Nation-building is the core objective of national broadcasters in both countries,
which are the poorest in the region when measured by conventional economic indicators.15
14
The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (the PIFS or the Forum) was established in 1971 as a trade bureau. Toay it focuses on
regional trade and economic development as defined by its 2005 Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and
Integration (the Pacific Plan). The Forum serves 16 Anglophone Pacific countries and non-sovereign territories: Australia, Cook
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall
Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. It also includes 12 large “dialogue partners,” such as China, the US,
and the EU. Francophone and US-flag PICs can apply for non-voting observer status. However, a second, older and larger regional
development organisation also exists, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC). The SPC, formed in 1947, serves 22 Pacific
nations and non-sovereign territories, both Anglo- and Francophone. For various reasons, the SPC is seen as more indigenously
Pacific than the Forum. In the late-2000s, a noticeable power shift was occurring between the two agencies in favour of the SPC.
15
Vanuatu has been described both as the most vulnerable country in the world and home of the happiest people in the world, thus
development-assessment data must be viewed in context (Parliament of Vanuatu, 2002:3; Winterman, 2006).
46
The seeding of aid dependency
Colonial development model created economic structures not easily “shaken off” after
independence (Barker, 2012; Campbell, 1992:63; Silverman, 2011). Colonial powers drew their
colonies into international trading networks that concentrated on a narrow range of export
agricultural and fisheries commodities destine for colonial home markets. This model would be
replicated in the orthodox and neo-liberal economic development models of the mid- to late-20th
Century.
During the Pacific era of decolonisation (1965-1980), colonial administrations infused large
amounts of “development aid” into the islands to forestall anticipated “economic regression” during
the transition to independence (I. G. Bertram & Watters, 1986). Thus, the Pacific’s present-day
orientation toward “aid entitlement,” or rent received under the guise of development aid, was set in
train by colonial policies. Aid flows into the PICs in the 1980s were twice to three times the amount
of today’s levels (Grynberg, 2005:26-29). In Kiribati in the 1980s, British “grants-in-aid” doubled
in value and the aid-driven government bureaucracy, which provided two-thirds of all wage
employment, grew threefold. Vanuatu had existed as a “condominium” possession between Britain
and France for 74 years prior to independence in 1980, thus economic development had been
characterised by British-French rivalry within which indigenous communities leveraged one power
against the other for the greater gain. French aid to Vanuatu’s Francophone communities increased
from 2 million French Pacific Francs in 1964 to an astounding 36 million in 1968 (M. Cox, et al.,
2007:21). Thus, under the late colonial development model, the PICs were quickly moving “from
subsistence to subsidy” (Baldacchino, 2006b:47). Campbell (1992:66-69) traces this transition in
Tonga where by 1981, all previous aspirations around “paying its own way” toward economic
independence had disappeared from national development plans and Tonga’s fifth development
plan was 90 percent funded by foreign aid.
Colonial-era economists failed to recognise the connection between increased development-aid

flows, which they theorised would propel the islands along the standard development path, and
decreased domestic economic performance. This is a characteristic of rent-based economies where
the abundance of one rent source, such as oil or aid, depresses growth in other economic sectors
47
(Centre for International Economics, 2007:17; Gouy, 2011).16 Consequently, agricultural
production dropped as the islanders opted to buy, not raise, their food. Trade imbalances rose, not
because the nascent PIC governments were incompetent or failed to follow sound fiscal policy but
because the islanders desired the comforts of modern life, increased consumption of imported
consumer goods (now made available through improvements in transportation and communication
services), and paid for them through secure government-sector employment (I. G. Bertram &
Watters, 1986).
Upside-down decolonisation
Decolonisation and independence arrived in Oceania about 20 years after similar movements began
elsewhere in the world, giving the region’s emergence a unique flavour. Aside from the hardship
years during World War II, most Pacific islanders had enjoyed a long era of peace and prosperity
under paternalistic colonial administrators.
Britain seized the opportunity of the mid-20th Century decolonalisation movement to divest itself of
its Pacific possessions. John Connell (1991:253) describes this as “upside-down decolonisation”
wherein sovereignty was “thrust” upon many Pacific countries. Many islanders were reluctant to
relinquish colonial citizenship and its generous economic benefits. They watched with concern as
other newly independent African and Caribbean nations struggled to achieve economic growth
under orthodox development models (MacDonald, 1986:121). Some Pacific countries actively
engaged in forestalling independence while others only “agreed” to be decolonised if financial
“aid” subsidies continued (Aldrich & Connell, 1998:164; Baldacchino, 1993:31; G. Bertram, 1993;
I. G. Bertram & Watters, 1985; Lansdown, 2006:319; MacDonald, 1986:118). As recently as 2007,
voters in the New Zealand territory of Tuvalu rejected an independence referendum despite
pressure from the UN and New Zealand (TVNZ, 2007).
The economic difference between political independence and non-sovereign territorial status is
significant: American Samoa receives five times more in aid than Samoa even though the latter’s
GDP is seven times larger (Poirine, 1999:832). According to Poirine’s (1998:73) analysis of per-
capita aid flows, small independent islands with a population of less than a million received eight
16
The terms “Dutch disease” or “resources curse” are often used to describe this condition. “Dutch disease” refers to the impact a
boom in North Sea natural-gas extraction had upon the Dutch economy in the 1970s.
48
times more than continental developing countries, independent Pacific islands receive 10 times
more, Pacific island territories or associated states 33 times more, French overseas territories 354
times more, and French Polynesia 366 times more. Pacific decolonisation proceeded irrespective of
whether these new independent microstates could be economically self-sustainable.
Pacific development in the mid-20th Century
The emergence of modern development theories is often situated in the post-World War II era of
the 1940s-1950s. This was a time of optimism and idealism. The UN had been established in 1945,
arising in part from the 1941 Atlantic Charter, an economic plan to rebuild post-war Europe.17 In
1949, US President Harry S Truman (1949:4) envisaged a similar model could be applied to newly
independent former colonies, now labelled “developing” countries. It was believed that the transfer
of industrial, agricultural and, later, communication technologies along with targeted financial aid
and Western “expert” advisers would spur economic growth in these poor countries and allow them
to eventually “catch-up” with advanced Western nations (Waisbord, 2001:1).
The orthodox development remedies applied to the Pacific islands were standard repertoire. They
called for the maximum exploitation of what few natural resources were available: Nauru’s
phosphate, Fiji’s gold and sugar, Solomons’ and Vanuatu’s forests, and Kiribati’s tuna. It was held
that the development of primary industries would lead to agriculturally based industrialisation (tuna
canneries, wood-chip mills). In time, these would lead to the growth of more diversified export
sectors (garment factories in Fiji, car-harness assembly plants in Samoa). By exploiting their
“niche” comparative advantages and adjusting their economic policies, PICs would thus “catch-up”
with developed countries (G. Bertram, 2011:21).
Both the late-colonial and early orthodox development models advocated that government play a
central role in industrial development and private sector growth, often through the establishing of
government-owned businesses, tariffs to protect them, and subsidies to grow them. This was easily
applicable to the large bureaucratic structures that colonial governments had left in the islands. In
17
Curiously, “small” countries were initially denied UN membership (Aldrich & Connell, 1998:114; Silverman, 2011). In the 1960s-
1970s, the US and Britain proposed that small states should be given different, but not full, UN membership as it was inconceivable
that a nation of a few thousand people, such as Nauru, would have representation equal to that of the US (Keating, 2008:1). Concerns
were raised that small states would “bloc-vote” and tyrannise the larger UN members-states. When the Maldives joined the UN in
1965, the tacit minimum population size of 100,000 was breached (Bartman, 1998:2). Fiji’s application for UN membership in 1970
reopened the debate about weighted UN membership (Thakur, 1984:274).
49
many small PICs and outer islands, such as Nauru and Niuatoputapu, the government is the private
sector and the only source of wage employment. Government employment is highly valued because
of its higher social status and wages.
Pacific government bureaucracies also performed an allocative function by accruing rents and
redistributing them through social networks. This can lead to perceptions in the international
development community of corruption and “resource” waste, such as the siphoning away of aid
funds. However, Gordon Tullock and others make distinctions between “good” rents that are
beneficial to society and “bad” rents which benefit personal avarice (Alkhater, 2012; Khan, et al.,
2000:78, 90; Pasour, 1987:123; Tullock, 2005:x). One objective in the 21st Century Pacific
development agenda, as defined by international development actors, is the promotion of “good
governance,”18 thus attempts are made to dismantle social networks as they appear within
governmental institutions due to perceptions such allocative networks contribute to corruption and
political instability (Braithwaite, Dinnen, Allen, Braithwaite, & Charlesworth, 2010:104;
Shamseldin, Stephenson, Corterier, Hansen, & Pickering, 2010:16, 21). The implementation of
Western-led “structural-adjustment” policies in the Pacific in the 1990s and early 2000s sought to
minimise the role of government in economic development with devastating results, for example,
the irrecoverable loss of government employment and the removal of protective tariffs such as those
which led to the collapse of Fiji’s garment factories. This development model remains the norm for
most PICs today even though small island states have had considerable difficulties achieving
economic growth through the “mirage” presented by such orthodox development strategies
(Baldacchino, 2008b:35; G. Bertram, 2011:3; Connell, 1991:267; Duncan & Nakagawa, 2006:23;
Firth, 1989:75; Kiloe, 2009:55).
Economic growth has stagnated in the PICs since their independence. Some economists blame this
slow economic growth on Pacific culture, particularly the “unreasonable demands” of kin-group
obligations and land-tenure practices (I. G. Bertram & Watters, 1986:52; Duncan & Nakagawa,
2006:5, 24-25; Read, 2010:22). Orthodox development strategies are premised the accessibility of
land, often to be sold or leased to foreign investors who provide the capital to grow an export-
manufacturing sector (Baldacchino, 1993:30; Schwarz, 2007:1-2). But Pacific cultural beliefs that
view land as a spiritual phenomenon, or that conceive of land as owning people and not otherwise,
18
Good governance has no one definition. Within the UN family of agencies, definitions of good governance contain eight
characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and
inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that
the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making (ESCAP, 2013b).
50
confound Western notions of property rights. As much as 90 percent of land in the Pacific is
thought to be held in traditional communal ownership and most PICs forbid or tightly control land
alienation to foreigners (Duncan & Nakagawa, 2006:5; Wairiu, 2006:412). In Tonga, the king owns
all land and distributes it through a gender-based entitlement system. Upon independence, Vanuatu
placed all land in customary ownership. Even where land is made available through long-term
leases, foreign investors have shown little interest in setting up shop. The high transportation costs
involved in moving Pacific goods to overseas markets severely erode profits. Few PICs have direct
air or sea access to major cities in Asia, Australia or the US.
Orthodox development strategies focus on maximising local resources, thus locking PICs into on a
narrow range of export commodities over which they have no pricing control (Calì & Kennan,
2009:1; Connell, 1991:253; Read, 2010:12).19 Tying economic growth to agricultural exports is
taking the “slow coach” toward development in that it suppresses growth in urban-based industries
(Streeten, 1993:199). But the ability of urban-based industralisation to fuel economic growth
appears to have an operational threshold somewhere between five to 10 million people (G. Bertram,
2007:13). In others words, for small countries of only a few thousand of people, it is a misapplied
strategy. The few manufacturing opportunities that have arisen, such as tuna canneries, offer low-
wage jobs.
The early orthodox development models sought to build upon economic structures established
during colonial times even if these had historically been only marginally successful (Baldacchino,
1993:29; G. Bertram, 1987:26; Connell, 1991:253, 267, 280; Fraenkel, 2006:26). Small island
states do not behave like large states, nor can they follow the “mechanical” application of
conventional modernisation models with any hope of success (Baldacchino, 2011:19; G. Bertram,
1993:257; Katzenstein, 2003:12). What trade goods the Pacific had to offer were largely
“internationally insignificant” (Baldacchino, 1993:35). Foreign interests controlled the true sources
of island wealth (gold, phosphate, fisheries, tourist resorts), with profits correspondingly
expatriated. For example, the rapacious global desire for tuna has decimated Kiribati’s rich fishing
grounds (Connell, 1991:259-260; E. Ferguson, 2009:281; Teaiwa, Tarte, Maclellan, & Penjueli,
2002). Kiribati’s small navy is woefully incapable of protecting its 3,000-mile-wide economic zone
from invaders, thus resource pirates have driven the tuna stocks to near-extinction levels. Of the
19
For example, during six months in 2011 the price per metric ton of copra rose to its highest level in more than 20 years
(AU$1,1490 per ton), then immediately plummeted to one of its lowest prices over the same period (AU$793 per ton) (IndexMundi,
2012; World Bank Development Prospects Group, 2012).
51
tuna legally harvested within its borders, Kiribati receives about 5 percent of its market value from
fishing licenses; revenue from fishing licenses fell by 22 percent from 2005-2007.
Clearly, orthodox development economists had not fundamentally theoreticised island microstates.
The orthodox modernisation paradigm is both inappropriate for and harmful to small island states
(Abbott & Pollard, 2004:xi; Bartman, 1998; Centre for International Economics, 2007:19; T. I. J.
Fairbairn, 2007; Fraenkel, 2006:16-17; Gibson, 2006; Read, 2010:27; Streeten, 1993:197-198;
Tidrick & Yale, 2006; T. Wood & Naidu, 2004:40; World Bank Pacific Department, 2011:3-4, 19).
A new development model is needed to articulate island “futurabilities,” one in which the economy
serves the needs of the people instead of forcing people to adapt to the demands of an exogenous
economic structure (Baldacchino & Bertram, 2009; G. Bertram, 1987, 1999; A. Hooper, 2005;
Huffer, 2006; Niles & Baldacchino, 2011). In this way, the Pacific contributes yet another
alternative development model to challenge orthodox development theories.
ISLANDS AND RENTIER DEVELOPMENT MODELS
Introduction
By the 1970s, alternative perspectives about “development” – who defined it, how were its goals
established, and what were the implementation strategies applied to achieve the goals – arose to
challenge the orthodox model.
As early as the late-1960s, theorists who had earlier supported the orthodox modernisation model –
Everett Rogers (1976), Wilbur Schramm (1979) and Erskine Childers (Colle, 2008), in particular –
began to ask why the quality of life for the average person in the developing world was not
improving, at times even worsening, despite decades of effort and millions of aid dollars. Some
theorists suggested that one of the most significant deficiencies within modernisation “tool kit” was
its failure to account for social, cultural and political influences existing within countries that might
obstruct “development” efforts, at least as far as these efforts were defined by Western viewpoints
(Dagron, 2009:458; de Cuéllar, 1996:9; Sparks, 2007:11; Stiglitz, 2002:164).
52
The orthodox model had never been ideologically neutral. It carried an element of economic
determinism – the “unquestionable merit of free-market capitalism” – along with a parallel drive to
expand democratic concepts and practices as defined primarily by the US (McPhail, 2009:8; K. G.
Wilkins & Mody, 2001:390). Under the orthodox model, economic growth gained paramount
importance over all other facets of society, including indigenous culture, which was often seen as
an impediment (Lerner, 1969).
By contrast, the emerging alternative models, with their obvious Marxist orientation and led by
non-Western theorists, described the orthodox model as “neo-colonialist” in that it created and
exploited “structural inequalities” in the global economic system that kept developing countries in a
state of perpetual weakness and under-development (Manyozo, 2007:33; Servaes & Malikhao,
2008:160-163).
The clash of these competing ideologies occurred throughout the 1970s-1980s, primarily in
international conferences convened by the UN, in particular UNESCO, and came to be known as
the New International Economic Order (NIEO) debates. These debates found expression through
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a coalition of developing countries that sought a middle
course through the Cold War rivalry between the capitalist US and its allies and the Soviet-led
socialist bloc. The NAM’s membership comprised nearly two-thirds of all UN member-states, thus
its calls for more equitable distribution of the world’s resources resounded with some strength
(Schwarz, 2007:3). Among the Pacific countries, Vanuatu joined the NAM in 1983 and Fiji in
2011.
Often sitting in the front-row seats as witnesses to these invigorating NIEO debates around
development, power and culture were the Pacific islanders. The Pacific women’s social movement
gained tremendous momentum throughout the 1970s-1980s, often conjoined with the exuberance
surrounding their countries’ independence and politicised around two central issues, the
denuclearisation and decolonisation of Pacific island countries (George, 2012). While the women
were often frustrated because their voices around their issues were shouted down by the bellicosity
of the NIEO debates, as they were at the World Conference for Women in Mexico City in 1975,
they emerged with new understandings that “development” models and ideologies were not
universally applicable (George, 2012:110). For example, Western “feminists” often derided the
importance of marriage and family, while Pacific women rejected this thinking (George, 2012:113,
53
119; Griffen, 1989:110-111). Thus, islanders began reason that it was conceivable that they could
devise their own development models that honoured their cultures and histories.
The Dependency Model
The first significant theoretical challenges to orthodox development theories drew from neo-
Marxist viewpoints and have been variously labelled the dependency, imperialist or world-systems
models. Theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, Herbert Schiller and others
argued that the persistent “under-development” experienced by some countries was part and parcel
of Western development subterfuge (Melkote & Steves, 2001:171; Sparks, 2007:85-100). Western
development activities perpetuated the economic subordination of “under-developed” or
“peripheral” countries to the stronger developed or “core” countries by exploiting “structural
inequalities” in the global economic system (Manyozo, 2007:33; Servaes & Malikhao, 2008:160-
163). The motives and outcomes of aid projects undertaken by Western nations and their
institutions – the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, UN agencies, and later the World
Trade Organisation – began to be questioned (McPhail, 2009:46).
In this theoretical view, the only alternative was for a country to disengage from the world market
and seek its own development on its own terms from within its own self-sufficiency (Inayatullah,
1967:101-102; Servaes & Malikhao, 2008:163). This model of radical self-reliance was not
attractive to islanders long accustomed to the generous largesse of benign colonialism. More
importantly, it was by deeply engaging in the world labour market that islanders were able to
extract remittances that allowed them to enjoy standards of living that far exceeded the economic
carrying capacity of their countries (Baldacchino, 1993:34-35; 2006b:47; G. Bertram, 2007:3, 16).
If “modernisation” was just another word for “westernisation,” as these theorists suggested, Pacific
women agreed: Pacific people wanted to modernise but not necessarily westernise, and they have
been following this course of action for centuries (George, 2012:77; Maiava, 2002:1).
The Rentier Model
The Pacific’s orientation toward “aid entitlement” as set in train by colonial policies was clearly
informed by oceanic cultural orientations toward “adopting and adapting” exogenous influences.
54
The economic question then was not if economic dependence on former colonial administrators was
a good or bad policy, but whether it was a rational strategy that met the needs of the newly
independent island-states (Baldacchino, 1993:36-42; G. Bertram, 1993:257). The PICs innovatively
inverse Herbert Schiller’s theory of core-periphery dependence, seeking instead closer bonds with
former colonial powers to further draw transfers of wealth (or rents) from larger rich states to
smaller ones in a reversed imperialist relationship (Maxwell, 2003). Indeed, a poor island is one that
has failed to establish a sufficiently intimate relationship with a prosperous patron, just like an
educated Tongan is “a useful person who knows his/her relationships with everyone and
everything” (Aldrich & Connell, 1998:247; Thaman, 2004:7).
Economist Hossein Mahdavy first postulated the rentier theory in 1970 as an explanatory model to
describe the political and economic development of oil-rich Middle East states. In 1985, Geoff
Bertram and Ray Watters (1985) reconceptualised the rentier theory within Pacific realities, arguing
that many PICs survive on migration, remittances, aid, and bureaucracy, hence the widely used
acronym MIRAB (Apostolopoulos & Gayle, 2002; Van Fossen, 2005). The rentier theory has not
been rigorously theorised in political economics and development studies although its existence can
be inferred from the economic, social and political structures found in many developing countries
(Barker, 2012; Glasser, 2001:8; Khan, et al., 2000:39; Qasem, 2010:55). Roberto Blum and Alberto
Díaz Cayeros (2002) suggest that geographic conditions, such as remoteness and strategic location,
can pre-determine the emergence of rentier orientation.
Rents can be variously defined to include such diversity of phenomena as farm subsidies, political
lobbying and technology patents. In classical economics, “rent” commonly refers to revenue
received from “the gift of nature,” such as Fiji’s gold, Nauru’s phosphate, Kiribati’s tuna, and the
Pacific’s alluring tourist environment (Barker, 2012; Khan, et al., 2000; Pasour, 1987; Schwarz,
2007; Yates, 1996). Classical economists frame rents as revenue derived from non-productive
activity or from non-market sources, but as will be argued, Pacific rents derived from development
aid are forms of “productive capitalism” generated through the marketing of locational and
diplomatic resources (Khan, et al., 2000:39).
Classical economists such as John Locke, David Ricardo and Adam Smith dismissed rent-seeking
behaviour, or the receipt of “unearned” income, as “parasitic,” “shameful” and “morally disdainful”
behaviour (Baldacchino, 1993; G. Bertram, 1987; Brookfield, 1989; Connell, 1991; T. I. J.
55
Fairbairn, 1987; Watters, 1987). Marxist economists viewed rent-seeking behaviour as a social
relationship influenced by a commodity’s “use value” and “exchange value” wherein a
commodity’s use value remains fairly constant over time, but its exchange or market value will
fluctuate in times of glut or scarcity. For example, the value of rents accrued from “geo-political
services” during the Cold War (funding given by Western powers to the PICs to exclude the Soviets
from the region or to gain access to island areas for military uses) declined in value in the 1990s as
the Cold War ended but still remains more stable and profitable than conventional revenue earned
from export commodities or tourism (Poirine, 1998:83).
Modern economists remain divided on whether the “growth implications” of rent-seeking behaviour
are positive (growth inducing) or negative (growth retarding) (Khan, et al., 2000:36-39). Indeed,
much seems to depend on the motives for the rent-seeking behaviour and the processes used to
create and distribute rent-derived wealth (Alkhater, 2012:55; Pasour, 1987:136-137). Pacific
cultural tendencies to rely on traditional sources of wealth creation – the community through
extensive kinship-based social networks, the chief or national government, and to lesser extent the
church – are expressed through the rentier development model, as I will explain.20
The Pacific rentier model differs from similar models found elsewhere in the world, such as the
Middle East and Africa (Movahed, 2013:1-2). Firstly, the Pacific islands are democracies with the
exceptions of Fiji and Tonga. Coup-troubled Fiji has largely resisted sliding into the autocratic rule
found in Middle Eastern countries; democratic elections are expected to resume in 2014 under a
new non-racial electoral system and new constitution. Tonga, one of the world’s last monarchies,
evolved into a constitutional monarchy in 2006-2008, although the royal family and the hereditary
noble class still hold disproportionate political and economic power. Secondly, the sources of
Pacific rent are diverse and renewable, unlike the Middle East’s dependency on one resource, oil.
The Pacific’s burgeoning “youth bubble” – one in two Pacific islanders is younger than 30 years old
– ensures that a steady stream of new remittance-producing workers can be strategically trained and
exported to meet growing international labour demands in key vocations such as nursing,
accountancy and teaching (Jayaweera & Morioka, 2008:10; Secretariat of the Pacific Community,
2011).21 The tourism sector continues to exploit the seductive lure of the South Seas paradise,
20
The church’s role in Pacific development in the 21st Century presents a mixed picture, as will be discussed in Chapter 8.
21
The Pacific is one of the fastest growing regions in the world with an average regional growth rate of 2.5 percent per annum. The
need to create waged jobs for Pacific’s youth is urgent given the current stagnant employment climate (Browne & Mineshima,
2007:8; Luthria, 2006:23; Mares & Maclellan, 2006:101).
56
although risks inherently exist in the “plasticising” of culture to appease tourist tastes (DeLoughrey,
2007:13; Jolly & Tcherkézoff, 2009:13; Lansdown, 2006:8; Trask, 1987:161-162).
Most significantly, all PICs have a UN vote and a history of aligning their votes to suit the needs of
rich donor countries, an activity that Baldacchino (1993:42) describes as tokens of sovereignty that
are “for sale or for rent.” The so-called “chequebook diplomacy” between China and Taiwan is one
example (Callick, 2009; Crocombe, 2009; McElroy & Bai, 2008). Islanders set the prices for such
capitalist transfers of rents through “cooperative politics” and “trans-territorial diplomacy”
(Baldacchino, 2011:16; Katzenstein, 2003:11).
The islanders have been creative in diversifying rent sources: the leasing of remote islands for use
as weapons-testing facilities, passport sales (Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga), offshore financial havens
sometimes linked organised crime (Nauru, Vanuatu), the registration of foreign ships including
some affiliated with Islamic militant groups (Kiribati, Tonga), philatelic and currency sales, the
leasing of Internet domain addresses that sometimes promote pirated materials or pornography
(Samoa, Tonga), the selling of ambassadorships, leasing of their international telephone codes for
live sex-chat lines, the hosting of real and virtual casinos, to name but a few.22 The PICs will also
leverage the seductive “myth of paradise” to garner aid in times of crises (Baldacchino, 1993:43;
Brookfield, 1989:14), but so far they have resisted overtures from developed countries that sought
to create toxic-waste dump sites on some islands (Green Left Weekly, 1993; Greenpeace Pacific
Campaign, 1989). The Pacific rentier orientation can also frustrate the international development
community because the islanders are reluctant to work collectively within “pooled” aid or regional
projects, synchronise donor activities, or reduce dependence on favoured donor countries. More can
be gained by going solo.
The rentier model provides a “short cut” to development that is otherwise out of reach via
conventional “misdirected” trade-led development strategies (G. Bertram, 1999:106; Yates,
1996:15, 31). The PICs are pursuing a policy of “dependency to achieve self-sufficiency,”
exploiting the “importance of being unimportant,” and converting their condition of “in-
22
In Tonga, the sale of passports (priced as high as US$37,000 each) earned nearly US$50 million from 1983-1991 but mostly to
the benefit of the royal family, not the national treasury. An estimated US$20 million was believed to have been lost in dubious
investment schemes (Brandon, 2002; Dutter, 2001; K. R. Lewis, 2011:51-52). In 2013, the Kiribati Government acknowledged it had
sold passports to suspected North Korean arms dealers (PACNEWS, 2013). Until 2000, Tuvalu was offering single-person passports
for US$11,000 and four-person family passports for US$22,000 (Stanley, 2009).
57
betweenity” among powerful rival countries into economic “harbours of opportunity” (Baldacchino,
1993:38; 2006b; 2008a:221; Connell, 1991:254). To clarify how this rentier orientation manifests in
Pacific development models, illustrations will be drawn from two areas: firstly, what Baldacchino
(2011) calls the “power of jurisdiction” wherein the PICs maximise their geography and
sovereignty, and secondly, within what Bertram and Watters’ (1985) call the “transnational
corporation of kin.”
Islanders in the world: aid
Pacific islanders receive the highest level of official development aid (ODA) per capita in the
world, estimated at US$850 million in 2008, or US$201 per person compared to US$12 per person
for all other developing countries (Tidrick & Yale, 2006:2). Aid is one of the four areas identified
in Bertram and Watters’ (1985) MIRAB model (migration, remittances, aid, and bureaucracy).
Different PICs accentuate different components of the MIRAB model and they can “change horses”
as circumstances dictate, as did Nauru in the 2000s.23 Within the MIRAB model, Polynesian
countries tend to focus on remittance-producing labour migration, while Melanesian countries
generally concentrate on natural-resource rents.
Poirine (1998) and others reject the views held by classical economists who disparage non-market
rent-seeking activities as “money for nothing” (Baldacchino, 2006b:51; Firth, 1989:75-76; Prasad,
2007:12; Sevele, 1987; Tidrick & Yale, 2006:37). Instead, they argue, aid is trade. The island-states
have “existence value” and provide strategic resources to larger countries in exchange for market
23
The classic example of a MIRAB state changing colours but not characteristics is Nauru (Connell, 2006b; Kirkpatrick, 2005).
Phosphate-mining rents once placed the Nauruans among the wealthiest people in the world with per capita income estimated at
US$31,000 in the 1970s. Correspondingly, the agricultural sector had vanished by the 1980s. Food and water were imported, cars
outnumbered people, and the airline and chain of international hotels were sources of national pride. Nauruans shun private-sector
work, saw little need for higher education, and grew to become the most obese people in the world, with nearly half the population
suffering from diabetes by the 1990s. Historically, Nauru had received no foreign aid. When primary phosphate reserves expired in
the early-2000s, the Nauruans were woefully unprepared. There were no national development plans, remittance-earning labour
migration was non-existent, and the people sank into a collective state of depression as their leaders pleaded for aid to stave off
starvation (Connell, 2006b:59). In 2001, Australia’s Howard Government enacted the “Pacific Solution,” wherein illegal asylum
seekers entering Australia were sent to detention centres on Nauru. This initiative injected AU$52 million into Nauru’s economy in
2003-2004. Other countries provided Nauru with US$181.5 million in the mid-2000s (Connell, 2006b:55-60). Russia provided
US$50 million in “aid” in 2010 in exchange for Nauru’s diplomatic recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Sasako, 2010). In
August 2012, the Australian Government reactivated the Pacific Solution at an estimated monthly cost of AU$8 million (M. Franklin
& Maley, 2012). The Australian Parliament voted to revive the program two days before the Australian prime minister officially
contacted Nauruan officials to request their “partnership.” Predictably, Nauruan officials said they were “happy to help out” (Vasek
& Packham, 2012). While Nauru is frequently described as a failed state, it continues to extract substantial rents from the world
system and its 9,300 residents live comfortable lifestyles that would be the envy of most developing countries.
58
value.24 Aid forestalls the emergence of “slums in (the donor’s) own backyard,” ensuring political
stability in the region (Watters, 1987:39-43). Aid protects the donor-country’s sphere of influence
by insuring its Pacific neighbours “keep the right company” (Watters, 1987:43). For example, in the
mid-1980s, Vanuatu and Kiribati issued commercial fishing licenses to Soviet fishing fleets, thus
they were exercising their comparative market niche and maximising the profitability of their
natural resources. But the licenses were withdrawn a year later due to strong pressure from the US
and Australia (Firth, 1989:83-84; Hau'ofa, 1987:8). In August 2012, the US threatened Tuvalu with
sanctions if it reflagged 12 Iranian oil tankers (Reuters, 2012).
Aid is not given based on “recipient need” where logically the poorest countries would receive the
most aid, but instead is driven by donor interests (Crocombe, 2009:100; Firth, 1989:76; 2006:2;
Hau'ofa, 1987; Katzenstein, 2003:270; Poirine, 1998:88; Salois, 2011:6). Large donors are often
also significant trading partners and thus “unavoidably acquire disproportionate weight” in a
receiving country’s decision-making processes (De Herdt & Bastiaensen, 2004:876).
Australia remains, by far, the powerhouse aid donor in the region, providing on average more than
50 percent of all aid flows, about US$977 million in 2010. Australia provides 85 percent of all aid
to Solomon Islands, 70 percent to Vanuatu, and together with New Zealand, 75 percent to Kiribati
(Grynberg, 2005:26-29). As mentioned, islanders often are conflicted in their views about
Australia’s intentions in the Pacific. Pacific ODA data categorised by source and year are listed in
Table 2.1.
In the 1980s-1990s, the focus of international aid shifted from “untied” subsidies to governments
for welfare assistance (health, education) to “technical assistance” and project-tied funding (A.
Hooper, 2005:10). In the 2000s, aid focus shifted again to promote “good governance” and security
concerns, often defined by the donor countries and international development agencies (Shibuya,
2006). This had several implications. Projects were now clearly defined and subjected to time-
bound performance criteria. A substantial portion of the received aid “boomeranged” back to the
donor-country through the hiring of foreign consultants, the mandated purchase of donor-country
supplies and equipment, and the contracting of services to well-resourced foreign businesses that
outbid local contractors. This is particularly true for China’s aid projects (HIPC-CBP, 2010). In
24
The more remote and less inhabitable an island is, the more value it holds as a strategic location for world superpowers (Aldrich &
Connell, 1998; Firth, 1989:75). The more strategically important island-states’ locations are to world powers, the less likely that they
will be granted full sovereignty but will instead earn tremendous amounts of aid as compensation.
59
others words, aid flows benefit the donor countries and create limited economic activity, such as job
creation, in the recipient countries. This was especially true in the 2000s during the deregulation of
the Pacific telecommunication sector, to be discussed in Chapter 4.
Table 2.1 Pacific ODA sources by year and amount*

US$ million, August 2012
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
All donors 1,160.56 1,199.15 1,308.88 1,533.83 1,560.03 2,018.20
Australia 483.38 550.31 649.53 723.5 703.64 976.90
New Zealand 103.81 113.32 133.19 156.3 135.87 171.14
Japan 93.69 76.16 70.29 72.93 111.89 176.30
EU Institutions 85.01 78.15 71.27 94.12 82.25 120.97
UNDP 4.91 5.71 5.77 6.36 9.22 8.41
* Includes PNG, Francophone and US affiliates. PNG receives 25 percent of Australia’s Pacific aid.
Source: (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012b).
The provision of aid has become a vigorous point of competition among rival countries. Donor
countries use aid allocation to project their own political and economic interests under the rubric of
“development assistance” (Firth, 1989:88-89; Katzenstein, 2003:270). Data on Pacific ODA
allocations categorised by donor and recipient countries are presented in Table 2.2.
Donor activities are not well coordinated across the region. Donors can become competitive,
unwilling to work with each other, and engage in “perennial efforts to outmanoeuvre each other for
international recognition” (M. Cox, et al., 2007; Dawson, et al., 2009:3-5; Fenelon, 2001:25; Gouy,
2011:335; Hayward-Jones, 2009:8; Hill, 1994:13; Teaiwa, et al., 2002:6; Tidrick & Yale, 2006:12-
13). Thus today’s development environment is reminiscent of 19th Century colonial rivalry. For
example, Japan’s amount of Pacific ODA rose substantially in 2006, one year after China infused
an estimated US$600 million in the region (Wesley-Smith, 2007:5).25 Similarly, when Australia
curtailed bilateral aid to Fiji’s Bainimarama military government in 2006, Fiji adopted a “look
north” policy toward China and immediately received an US$5 million cash infusion (M. Fifita &
Hanson, 2011:4). Similarly, the EU punitively withheld 94 percent of a pledged US$81 million
25
The amount of China’s aid to the PICs is difficult to quantify (Lum, Fischer, Gomez-Granger, & Leland, 2009). China’s Pacific
aid program was estimated at US$229.82 million in 2009; it increased an astounding 780 percent between 2002-2005 (M. Fifita &
Hanson, 2011:3; Hanson, 2008). Since the late-2000s, China has been reducing its allocation of aid grants and increasing the amount
of “soft loans,” which are offered interest-free for five to 20 years. The shift to soft loans has increased PIC public debt; for example,
Tonga’s debt-to-GDP ratio is now 40 percent (Brissenden, 2013). If grants and soft-loans are combined, China ranks as the third
largest PIC aid donor, still greatly dwarfed by Australia but almost equal to the US and double that of Japan, New Zealand and the
EU (Callick, 2009; M. Fifita & Hanson, 2011:3; Hanson, 2008; Young, 2011).
60
Table 2.2 ODA to select PICs, by donor, by year
US$ million, August 2012
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Australia
Fiji 15.77 20.46 21.87 18.61 18.31 20.07 33.72
Kiribati 5.43 7.01 6.71 5.77 8.12 10.07 14.53
Nauru 13.32 7.26 16.57 21.64 26.76 18.31 23.33
Samoa 12.73 12.05 13.33 12.89 12.43 17.81 42.76
Solomons 102.16 143.02 146.42 201.82 185.84 168.78 254.00
Tonga 7.93 8.79 7.65 10.51 11.72 14.42 20.91
Vanuatu 19.05 19.09 21.51 22.1 26.81 40.04 55.96
New Zealand
Fiji 2.75 3.47 5.97 3.54 3.85 3.33 3.63
Kiribati 2.05 1.68 2.08 2.41 3.63 5.33 2.88
Nauru 0 0.35 0.2 1.33 0.77 1.11 1.70
Samoa 5.9 4.29 7.34 6.29 7.62 10.34 17.76
Solomons 11.62 10.42 17.65 17.59 22.06 26.83 25.48
Tonga 3.87 4.82 6.08 11.89 6.37 7.18 11.42
Vanuatu 4.67 4.99 7 7.39 10.53 15.5 12.86
Japan
Fiji 14.15 12.59 7.98 5.75 6.31 23.23 19.02
Kiribati 1.18 11.69 9.88 13.05 7.68 6.79 3.47
Nauru 0.27 1.24 0.48 1.51 1.49 2.47 1.64
Samoa 4.62 12.52 16.81 8.46 4.8 15.97 27.02
Solomons 2.86 14.16 14.3 15.41 9.48 5.98 16.33
Tonga 2.98 11.24 4.41 4.55 3.75 11.72 23.77
Vanuatu 3.61 3.2 3.91 8.63 13.91 13.07 15.61
EU Institutions
Fiji 21.88 19.77 8.96 10.74 6.03 12.8 6.23
Kiribati 3.76 4.2 4.9 3.65 6.22 1.94 0.79
Nauru 0 0 0.02 0.24 1.52 0.91 1.09
Samoa 1.89 2.83 3.27 2.24 10.22 8.97 11.42
Solomons 3.19 22.76 20.11 3.13 7.19 3.87 24.97
Tonga 3.68 2.77 0.68 0.27 0.81 0.76 1.62
Vanuatu 2.77 5.56 7.42 4.53 4.1 2.78 2.05
Source: (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012b).
sugar-industry grant after Fiji’s 2006 military coup (E. Ferguson, 2009:269). Even within the Buala
FM case study, when local project implementers approached the British High Commission for
funding, the Japanese consulate immediately offered to match the British contribution.
Bilateral aid donors focus on different priorities. Australia and New Zealand consistently fund
education, health and civil society but not infrastructure projects. Asian donors appear fond of one-
off, high-profile infrastructure projects, such as Japan’s US$15 million Japan-Pacific Regional ICT
61
Centre at the University of the South Pacific in Fiji, and Taiwan’s and South Korea’s equipment
donations to national broadcasters in Kiribati, Solomons and Tonga. Donor aid levels by country
and sector are reflected in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 ODA to select PICs, by donor and sector, 2010

(As % of total bilateral commitments, US$ million, 2010 exchange rate)
Australia Japan NZ EU
Social Sector 73% 64.10% 41.70% 25
Education 14.8 4.4 18.7 14.2
Health 8.4 13 3.3 7.2
Government/CSOs 40.5 1.2 11 26.3
Water/Sanitation -- 44.5 -- --
Economic Sector 7.8 6.8 17.5 7
Transportation / 5.7 2.2 14.6 --
Communication
Energy 0 4.3 0.8 --
Production Sector 3.9 10.9 12.7 5.8
(fisheries, agriculture,
mining)
Multi-sector 9.6 8.2 3.9 16.2
Humanitarian 1 24.9 9.6 0.6
Other 2.7 -- 8.1 --
Source: (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012:10).
Pacific islanders might receive the most ODA per capita of anyone in the world, but this is not
because they receive impressive amounts of aid, only that there are so few islanders. Oceania
receives about 2 percent of all global aid allocations, a rate that has not changed in 25 years. Even
international agreements to fund climate-change initiatives, such as the UN’s 2009 Copenhagen
Accord, are likely to be targeted at African developing countries. The international community has
pledged to provide US$30 billion annually by 2020 for climate-change initiatives, but aid pledges
are quite different from aid disbursements (Hurley, 2010:39). Ironically, aid to island-states began
declining worldwide in 1994, the ratification year of the UN’s Barbados Plan of Action (Hurley,
2010:4). The Barbados Programme of Action on Sustainable Development emerged from the first
Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and it
remains the international centrepiece of development theory for small island developing states. It
explicitly linked environment sustainability to economic growth but it did so through the lens of
orthodox development theory wherein successful island-states would maximise their natural
resources, discover and exploit areas of comparative advantage, and develop “overseas market
potentialities” (United Nations Environmental Programme, 1994).
62
In the Pacific, aid for primary industries (agriculture, fisheries, mining), the exploitation of which
was theoreticised as driving economic growth, has fallen from 28 percent in 1990 to about 8 percent
in 2010. Donors that fund primary industries often have fisheries or mining interests. Aid to
economic sectors such as transportation, communication, energy, business growth, and banking has
steadily declined since 1995, from 32 percent to about 11 percent in 2012. This indicates that aid
flows are not aligning with the theoreticised development model.
As I will discuss in Chapter 4, donor activity within the Pacific’s telecommunication sector is lively
but often donors view telecommunication from only two vantage points: either as markets to be
deregulated to encourage private sector growth (often privileging foreign-owned service providers),
or as messaging channels to be used to deliver donor-directed content. Islanders, however, often
view their telecommunication resources as points of rent extraction, such as through the leasing of
Internet domain names.
Islanders on the Internet
The PICs have among the lowest rates of Internet penetration in the world (The World Bank, 2013;
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2008:1). The lack of
telecommunications infrastructure has been identified as an impediment to regional economic
growth (Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2010b:1). All PICs have some Internet access but
this tends to be confined to urban areas and shared facilities, such as public Internet cafés, schools
and work places. Connectivity speeds can often be too slow to process much beyond e-mail. Only a
handful of larger PICs (Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu) are served by submarine fibre-optic cables,
such as the Southern Cross Cable (launched in 2000), thus for outer islanders nearly all Internet
service, such as it is, is delivered via satellite.
But the lack of Internet service and domestic consumption has not stopped many smaller PICs from
marketing their country-code Internet domain name. Several PICs have domain names that are
considered “domain hacks,” or short, simple endings that often resemble English words, such as
Tonga’s .to, Vanuatu’s .vu, Samoa’s .ws (for “web site”) and, of course, the most successful of
them all, Tuvalu’s .tv. Kiribati’s .ki, which is popular in Germany (de.ki), can fetch up to US$1,500
63
in annual registration fees per name, as compared to US$19 annual fee for a .ws (Samoa) domain
name (101domain.com, 2013). Buying a .ws domain name through the Samoan government
increases the annual fee to US$35, which is comparable to US rates. Other PICs, such as Fiji,
Tonga and Vanuatu, charge around US$100 for account establishment and US$50 annual
maintenance.
Tuvalu, a New Zealand territory of about 11,000 people living on nine islands and atolls, earns
US$4 million a year in rent from its country code top-level Internet domain name, .tv. These
royalties are greater that its annual subsidy from New Zealand (NZ$3.5 million or AU$2.77 million
in 2011-2012) and twice the annual remittance earnings generated by its merchant sailors (15
percent of its male labour force) (BBC, 2000; Cave, 2000; Maynard, 2010; New Zealand Aid
Programme, 2013; Stanley, 2009; Ward, 2000). When Tuvalu first leased its domain name to the
US-based company, Idealab, in 1999, it received an upfront payment of US$50 million, a sum that
was more than half of its annual GDP. Tuvalu used some of the proceeds to pay the annual UN
membership fee of US$20,000, allowing the country to join the UN in 2000 (Ward, 2000). The
domain-name rents also allowed the Tuvalu government to retire contracts worth US$2 million
annually that it had been receiving by leasing its international telephone code to foreign companies
for live sex-chat services (Ward, 2000).
Today, the .tv domain name is administered by the US-based VeriSign, which charges US$100 a
year for a standard web address. However, China’s second largest Internet service provider rents the
“China.tv” domain name for US$100,000 a year. Globally, more than 170,000 organisations have
registered to use the .tv domain name (Ward, 2000). The clientele list is impressive and includes
media enterprises (Reuters, the Economist, Bloomberg, Home Box Office, CNBC Asia, Korea
Broadcasting Telecom, Telemundo, MTV, Columbia TriStar International Television, and others),
banks (Barclays), electronics companies (Motorola), real estate companies, pharmaceutical
companies, and even American Major League Baseball (DomainRegister.com, 2013). About 60
percent of Tuvalu’s domain-name revenue is derived from US sources, 5 percent from mainland
Chinese sources, and 35 percent from European and Asia sources; South Korea is the second largest
client-country after the US (Cave, 2000). The government has been using the rent proceeds to build
schools and roads, improve educational and welfare services, and expand rural electrification (BBC,
2000; Cave, 2000).
64
Another New Zealand territory, Tokelau (population 1,500), has also successfully extracted rents
from its country code top-level Internet domain, .tk. Proceeds have boosted its annual GDP by
about 10 percent and enabled the government to provide wireless Internet access in urban areas and
public-use computers in hospitals, schools and Internet cafés (BBC, 2007; Beaumont, 2007;
Fickling, 2004). More significantly, the islanders are using the Internet resources to strengthen
social networks with the estimated 8,000 Tokelauans who live overseas. Telephone revenues have
dropped by 40 percent as islanders are switching to Skype (a free voice-over-Internet application)
and social media platforms (Beaumont, 2007).
Islanders in the sky: Tongasat
In 1988, Tonga created a furore in the international telecommunication sector by laying claim to 16
geostationary earth orbit (GEO) satellite slots, thus leading to the breakdown in the international
space regulatory regime. The story of Tongasat, Tonga’s licensing agent of its satellite services, has
been well documented, particularly so by Anthony van Fossen (Andrews, 1990, 1993; Collis, 2012;
Day, 2011; Delzeit & Beal, 1986; Ezor, 1993; Fairfax NZ News, 2008; Mendosa, 1996; L. Parks &
Schwoch, 2012; Price, 2002; Riddick, 1994; Roberts, 2000; Stein, 1993; Tronchetti, 2009:184-186;
Van Fossen, 1999). This discussion will focus on the obstacles Tonga faced in implementing its
development strategy in the face of Western opposition and how Tongan cultural attributes
interacted with this development initiative.
The GEO orbit is the most valuable location in space. This arc, located 35,790 kilometres (22,300
miles) above the equator, is the only position in which satellites move at the same speed as the
earth’s rotation, thus remaining in constant contact with a single tracking station. It is from within
the GEO orbit that the world’s global communication systems function, delivering weather
information, mobile telephony, international broadcasting, military surveillance, and numerous
other services. One GEO satellite can “see” about 40 percent of the earth’s surface; a network of
three GEO satellites can provide instantaneous global coverage. Due to radio interference, GEO
satellites must be spaced 2 degrees, or 900 miles, apart, thus the GEO orbit is thought to be limited
to 180 satellite slots. The satellite-telecommunication sector is hugely profitable with global
revenues in excess of US$158 billion in 2010 (Collis, 2012:63). Traffic along the trans-Pacific
Asia-US route was growing at 40 percent per annum in 1988 when Tonga applied to the world’s
radio-spectrum regulatory authority, the UN International Telecommunication Union (ITU), for the
65
last 16 GEO positions available in the world, or about 10 percent of a scarce but vital natural
resource.
Technically, the ITU is not a frequency-allocation body. It receives applications from sovereign
nations requesting satellite positions, publishes these applications and, if no nation protests,
registers the requested orbital positions in the name of the applying country. This is often called the
“first come, first served” allocation system. Private sector is not allowed to apply for orbital slots
except through the auspices of sovereign nations, as Tongasat exemplifies.
When the Soviets launched Sputnik in 1957, the Cold War Space race began in what was essentially
a lawless environment. In 1961 and 1963, the UN General Assembly passed the first two
resolutions on Space, the latter of which declared that Space was a global commons. By the late-
1960s, it was clearly apparent that the US and the Soviet Union were gradually capturing all the
orbital slots and they were doing so legally under international law. The Soviets then owned 60
percent of all orbiting satellites but the US, with its more efficient technology, controlled more than
half of the world’s satellite traffic and reaped the resulting profits. Many developing countries,
informed by the New International Economic Order ideology, feared that they would be locked out
of their future share of the global commons because they presently lacked the technical and
financial resources to claim and occupy the satellite orbital slots.
In 1967, the UN General Assembly adopted what is commonly referred to as the Outer Space
Treaty, which reaffirmed that Space was a common heritage of all humankind and was freely
available to all countries “irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development” (Ezor,
1993:928). But shifting the definition of Space from res nullius, belonging to no one, to res
communis, belonging to all, did little to slow the rapidity with which powerful space-faring
countries swept up the orbital slots for their own political, economic and ideological advantage
(Collis, 2012:67-68).
In 1976, eight newly independent equatorial countries signed the Bogotá Declaration, which
declared that the orbital slots existing above their territorial boundaries belonged to them and were
not part of the global commons. The Bogotá Declaration failed to achieve its aims, but it did place
the interests of developing countries on the global agenda. In 1985, developing countries pressured
the ITU, during a World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC), to amend the orbital-
66
allocation system; the US had opposed the convening of this WARC meeting, the first in 20 years.
In 1988, the WARC proposed three significant changes to the orbital-allocation system: every
sovereign nation was entitled to at least one slot (ideally the one closest to its terrestrial
boundaries), there would be no permanent space allocation (orbital assignments would last 20
years), and that the “special needs” of developing countries needed to be taken into account (Collis,
2012:73-74; Riddick, 1994:18-19).
In 1988, Tonga defined its “special needs” as economic, not technical, and applied for 16 GEO
orbital slots with the intention of quickly leasing these slots to the highest bidder. In other words,
Tonga turned Space into a form of rentable property similar to that of an outer island. Tongasat
continues to market itself to commercial satellite companies who remain barred from making direct
application to ITU for orbital allocations (Tongasat, n.d.). In essence, Tonga is offering to bestow
“flags of convenience” on satellites.
Tonga’s business plan was rational. The dissolution of the Soviet Union had released an abundance
of inexpensive Gorizont satellites for international sale; Tongasat bought at least one. The Asia-
Pacific region had a pent-up demand for satellite services, thus Tongasat found a market eager to
pay the US$2 million annual lease it requested per satellite.26 If all 16 orbital slots had been
allocated and leased, Tonga sought to gain US$32 million in annual rents, an amount equal to 20
percent of its GDP. Tongan officials argued that the satellites would benefit national and Pacific
regional development, such as through distance education, tele-medicine, emergency weather
information, and improved rural communication facilities (Ezor, 1993:917; Mendosa, 1996; Tupou
& Kupu, 2000). Furthermore, Tonga had acted legally, following the letter of the law through a
loophole in the law, to secure the orbital slots.
The international community reacted furiously to Tonga’s action, in particular the US-led
consortium of national telecommunication agencies called INTELSAT (the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization).27 The over-confident US and INTELSAT had been
26
Tongasat’s rental rates are also considerably lower than those of its competitors. In the late-1990s, Australia protested against
Tongasat’s rate structure, which was about 18 percent of that charged by Australia’s Optus network (Van Fossen, 1999:9).
27
INTELSAT was founded by the US within an anti-communist agenda in 1964. It functioned as an intergovernmental consortium
with upwards of 120 members until 2001 when it was corportised and renamed Intelsat Inc. In 2008, BC Partners, a European-
dominated private equity firm, acquired Intelsat Inc. for US$16.6 billion (BC Partners, 2008). In 2011, Intelsat’s fleet of 52
commercial communication satellites was the largest in the world. Of its five GEO satellites in position over the South Pacific, only
one serves the entirety of the Pacific island region, IS-18 located over Tuvalu (Intelsat, 2013). Ironically, from 1978 to the late-
1990s, Tonga’s only earth station had been operated by INTELSAT (Van Fossen, 1999:18).
67
blindsided by Tonga’s ITU application. (Tonga had not been a member of INTELSAT.) The larger
space-faring nations could no longer be assured of their easy access to Space because smaller
countries could “set up shop” by laying claim to orbital slots not for telecommunication purposes
but for economic gain (Ezor, 1993:917). The INTELSAT rhetoric resembled that of earlier classical
economists toward rentier behaviour: Tonga was accused of “a space grab,” of shamelessly
“seizing” the common heritage of humankind for economic self-interests, and of destabilising the
international framework that had been built upon “gentlemen’s agreements” to use Space (via
INTELSAT) to spread the benefits of technology to all of the world’s peoples (Andrews, 1990;
Delzeit & Beal, 1986). The US and five other INTELSAT member-countries pressured the ITU to
block Tonga’s applications and restructure its satellite-application policies to prevent future similar
occurrences; in other words, the powerful countries were protecting their strategic interests.
The ITU was caught in a bind. It holds no enforcement powers and has limited conflict-resolution
processes. Historically, when disputes arose over orbital allocations or radio-frequency interference
caused when two countries placed satellites in the same orbit (which Tonga accused the US of
doing and which China did in 1992 and Indonesia in 1993, effectively blocking Tonga from using
its own GEO slots), the ITU would back the first applicant, in this case Tonga. But to do so would
anger the same powerful countries that were funding the ITU, namely the US through its dominance
in the UN system (Roberts, 2000:20). If ITU backed the US position, its legitimacy would be
eroded because it would be seen as a puppet of INTELSAT and the US hegemony, thus countries
would be less inclined to coordinate their space activities under the ITU umbrella.
Tonga diplomatically reduced its number of satellite applications to six; these were awarded in
1991. Three more slots were eventually added, giving Tonga a total of nine slots. Other developing
countries quickly followed in Tonga’s footsteps and made application for “paper satellites” which
could be leased for economic rent. In the early 2000s, 92 percent of all ITU satellite applications
were for “paper satellites” (Collis, 2012:76). Ironically, when Tonga’s neighbour, Niue, made plans
to organise funding to launch a satellite into orbit above its territory, Tonga blocked the move,
saying it owned the satellite orbital slot (Radio Australia, 2001). Thus, Tonga’s bold attempt to
secure lucrative and sustainable rents from the development of new natural resources had
resounding international significance. However, Tongans themselves began to view this move as
another example of its royal family exploiting national assets for private gain.
68
Tongasat had been organised as a private company, not a government department or even a state-
owned enterprise. By 1994, Princess Salote Mafile'o Pilolevu Tuita (Princess Pilolevu), the only
daughter of the then-sitting king, held 80 percent of Tongasat shares; consequently, her net worth
rose to an estimated US$25 million (Van Fossen, 1999:9). Tongasat deposited the satellite rents in a
US bank account under the name of the royal family and beyond the reach of Tonga governmental
scrutiny. Despite mounting pressure, the princess refused to disclose details of this fund (Field,
2001a). The situation was further complicated when the princess established a marketing office for
Tongasat in Hong Kong in 1995 and placed her daughter as manager. In parallel activities, the
princess’ brother, now King Tupou VI, used his royal authority in 1997 to create a private
company, Tonic or Tonga Network Information Centre, to sell Tonga’s country code top-level
Internet domain name. Proceeds flowed directly into the prince’s hands (Eisenhart, 1999). In 1998,
the prince challenged Tongasat’s exclusive licence by attempting to create a competing satellite
agency. When the prince suggested that Tonic and Tongasat be merged, a very public rift arose
between the prince and the princess. From within the royal family, accusations arose that Tongan
national assets were being used to enrich the royal family (Field, 1998). Tongasat’s domestic
controversies are well documented (Fairfax NZ News, 2008; Field, 1998, 2001b, 2002, 2005;
Mendosa, 1996; Van Fossen, 1999), so my discussions will focus on how Tongans used ICTs to
advance political and social change around the Tongasat debate.
Tongasat and Tonic were the latest in a string of questionable business enterprises undertaken by
the Tupou royal family in the 1980s-1990s which had exploited national assets for personal gain
and often in direct competition to government services (Field, 2001b). Dissatisfaction mounted
against the royal family throughout the 1990s, both within the government and Tonga’s diaspora
community.
With roughly half of all Tongan voters living outside of the country, diaspora Tongans possess a
significant critical mass through which they can advocate for democratic reform via online forums
(Moala, 2008; Small & Dixon, 2004:4-5; Spoonley, 2003:11). Internet-based communication is one
of the main conduits for the transmission of what Peggy Levitt and others call social and political
remittances, or new ideas, values and beliefs that migrants gain from immersion in overseas
societies and then retransmit to island families and communities (Levitt, 1998; Markley, 2011).
Pacific online “virtual communities” are important in a number of ways: they allow participants to
freely discuss sensitive issues (such as reproductive health and political reform) outside of normal
societal and cultural constraints; they transmit cultural knowledge and indigenous language; and
69
they strengthen social networks (M. I. Franklin, 2005; Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2011; Papoutsaki &
Strickland, 2008; Spoonley, 2003). Planet Tonga, TNews Talanoa, and Matangi Tonga Online are
the most active Tongan online communities (TNEWS Talanoa, 2011c).
As early as 2001, Tongans began raising questions in online forums about “illegal diversions” of
profits derived Tongasat and similar royal holdings into private offshore banking accounts (Kapa,
2001). Some blog commentators accused the royal family of abusing their positions for blatant
personal financial gain to the detriment of Tonga’s economic health (Latu, 2013; Masa, 2002;
Matangi Tonga Magazine, 2006; TNEWS Talanoa, 2008, 2008b, 2008c, 2011). Others commented
on the “damaging attitude” of Tongan culture wherein deeply engrained respect (faka’apa’apa) for
the royal family had created a situation where “the royals do what ever they want to” with impunity
(Planet Tonga, 2006).
Such remarks would be inconceivable in a non-mediated environment within the Pacific culture of
silence. Online pseudonyms cloak commentator identity characteristics, thus weakening cultural
protocols. Commentators within the Tongan diaspora community were also insulated from potential
retribution; some writers noted that in-country Tongans were too afraid of the royal family to speak
out (Field, 2005). While many of the online comments could be considered “grumbling of the
land,” in Fijian kudru ni vanua or expressive space for innocuous gripes and complaints, the fact
that Tongans were crossing a cultural boundary to point a finger at power indicated growing
pressure for political reform. A pro-democracy movement emerged in 2006; in 2008, the king was
forced to curtail his royal powers within a constitutional monarchy.
The online dialogues revealed that the bloggers were using the Internet to find and exchange
information not available in the Tongan media, thus expanding Tonga’s public sphere. Online
discussions were often thoughtful, such as several commentators exchanging views about
Tongasat’s estimated profits and unpaid royalties, which they shared and collectively refined.
Rumours circulated that Tongasat earned on average T$25 million (US$14 million) annually,
meaning by 2005, some commentators suggested, anywhere between T$175-T$210 million
(US$98-$118 million) was unaccounted for (Planet Tonga, 2006). These claims are likely to be
wildly unrealistic but the government did little to deflate them when it confirmed in 2008 that
Tongasat had paid its debt (which the prime minister refused to quantify) and that it was “nowhere
near” the rumoured T$50 million (US$25 million) (Sevele, 2008).
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In late 2012, the Tongasat accountability issue re-emerged around allegations raised in Parliament
that the government had illegally transferred a US$75 million grant from China directly to Tongasat
to pay for orbital leases in 2008 (Fonua, 2012). The government was forced to issue a clarifying
statement stating that Tongasat received only US$25.45 million of the Chinese grant (Government
of Tonga, 2012).
Tongasat has been instrumental in the warming of diplomatic relations between China and Tonga.
In the early 1990s, the Chinese owners of Apstar 1 shifted into one of Tongasat’s orbital slots
(Langa'oi, 2010:167-168; Van Fossen, 1999:12). Apstar 1 carried broadcast programming from
such clientele as CNN, MTV, ESPN, and Australia’s ABC. In 1995, Tongasat established a
marketing office in Hong Kong. In 1998, Tonga dropped its 26-year friendship with Taiwan and
diplomatically recognised China. Today China is one of Tonga’s largest aid donors. Princess
Pilolevu would credit this change to “divine intervention,” explaining that Tongasat had been God’s
vehicle to bring the Tongans and Chinese closer together (Fairfax NZ News, 2008; Radio Australia,
1998). China’s increasing influence in Tonga, particularly through the allocation of “soft” loans
often held by land collateral, has also been discussed in the Tongan blog sphere, with some
commentators voicing fears that the Chinese were slowly taking control of Tonga through the
business machinations of the royal family (TNEWS Talanoa, 2008).
In Fiji, similar online communities also arose in reaction to the 2006 Bainimarama military coup.
As with the Tongan online communities, most blogs and chat rooms appeared to attract equal
numbers of island-based and transnational readers. Analyses of Fijian political blogs indicate that
political remittances are not as influential as the theories of Levitt and others might suggest
(Harborow, 2008; Walsh, 2010). Since the 2006 coup, all but seven of the 72 blogs to appear have
been based overseas. Similarly, Tonga’s most active blogging sites were based in New Zealand and
the US. Despite high readership levels, the Fijian blogs have failed to contribute to the emergence
of constructive democratic debate; some have perpetuated hate speech (Walsh, 2010). In 2009,
Fiji’s military government unsuccessfully attempted to block some of the more vitriolic blog sites
(Walsh, 2010:170). In the Tonga situation, while the blogsphere of the early-2000s contributed to
the rise of pro-democracy movement, there is little evidence it has contributed to structural reforms
that would more equitably distribute Tongasat’s profits, which remain in the hands of the royal
family.
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Islanders in the world: remittances
As the Tongasat story reveals, Pacific diaspora communities are powerful development actors who
generate economic, social and political remittances that lead to indigenously defined social change.
Economic remittances can be defined as the private transfers of wages and in-kind goods sent by
overseas workers to their island families (Eversole, 2005:138; Rokoduru, 2006:180). Definitions
can also be expanded to include social and political remittances (Levitt, 1998).
In small societies, such as those found in the PICs, change often comes through choices made by
individual social actors (I. G. Bertram & Watters, 1986:48). Nowhere is this more clearly expressed
than in the Pacific labour-migration phenomenon. Pacific migration data are presented in Table 2.4.
Among islanders, there is a near universal acceptance of the need to migrate to overcome limited
domestic opportunities. Migration is a rational economic strategy, both in the movement of labour
toward overseas jobs and the investment in targeted education to prepare the next generation.
Migration is seen as a “collective survival” strategy, thus it reflects Pacific cultural sensibilities.
Some commentators describe remittance-producing migration as a substitute for development, or
“even development itself” (R. Brown, Connell, Jimenez, & Leeves, 2006:50; Connell & Brown,
2005:6, 12; Luthria, 2006:9; Spoonley, 2003:8). Susan Maiava (2002) calls it “development that is
not ‘development.’” Such people-led initiatives are often discredited or made invisible by advocates
of orthodox development models (Eversole, 2005:10-11; Maiava, 2001, 2002; Maiava & King,
2007).
Table 2.4 PIC migration demographics

In-country Emigration rate
Population Population Net Migration Stock of Emigrants % of of tertiary-
(July 2012 Growth per per 1,000 emigrants as % of emigrants skilled
est.)* annum* population* (2010)** population** female** population**
Fiji 890,057 0.77 -7.11 182,200 21.3 47.8 62.2
Kiribati 101,998 1.23 -2.85 6,400 6.5 48.8 23.1
Nauru 9,378 0.61 -15.04 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Samoa 194,320 0.6 -10.8 120,400 67.3 44.7 76.4
Solomons 584,578 2.17 -1.86 5,400 1 43.9 6.4
Tonga 106,146 0.2 -17.9 47,400 45.4 48.7 75.2
Vanuatu 227,574 1.32 0 3,900 1.6 46.8 8.2
* Source: (US Central Intelligence Agency, 2013).
** Source: (Ratha, Mohapatra, & Silwal, 2011).
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Cultural influences affecting development
As revealed in the Tongasat example, Pacific culture impacts directly on political, economic and
social development (Gegeo, 2001a:492; Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2001:61; A. Hooper, 2005:2;
Kavaliku, 2005:23-27; Lilomaiava-Doktor, 2009:14; UNESCO-Pacific, 2011). To understand
contemporary Pacific development, one must realise that its living cultures are based on “legacies
of the past” that project those ideals into the future (Kavaliku, 2005:23).
According to Tongan theologian Winston Halapua, the structures of Pacific cultures originated
during the ancient sea voyages that populated the Pacific islands (W. Halapua, 2008b). By 4000
BC, islanders had devised sophisticated sailing craft capable of carrying dozens of people along
with animals, plants, food, and materials in open-sea voyages estimated to last 40 days or more and
covering thousands of miles.28 The islanders were eager and highly accomplished navigators
(DeLoughrey, 2007:99; Douaire-Marsaudon, 2009:167; Rainbird, 2007:98). Ancient navigational
tools (celestial markers, ocean currents, prevailing winds, sea chants, stick charts) provided landfall
coordinates as accurate as those of 19th Century European explorers (Couper, 2009:24-36;
Ellsworth, 1987:45-64). The patterning of Pacific languages suggests a long history of intensive
inter-island contact (Jolly & Tcherkézoff, 2009:1). The Pacific islands are the most diverse
linguistic region in the world yet their languages often revealing a conjoined linguistic heritage
(Couper, 2009:25). Islanders spread family beachheads on far shores, through which they extracted
wealth and enhanced their social status. Extended family groups were also sources of refuge in
times of natural disaster. Thus, Pacific societies developed ways to collectively survive, if not
thrive, often in challenging environments; the exportation of remittance-producing labour is a
continuation of this orientation.
According to Halapua, everyone aboard the large outrigger ships, called vaka in Tongan, had
assigned hierarchical roles and responsibilities to ensure a successful journey. The chief might lead
the voyage, but expressive space was given to even the lowliest of crew members who might have
seen something that would be critical to the vaka’s survival (Couper, 2009:13; W. Halapua,
28
The Solomon Islands and Vanuatu were settled around 3500 BC, Fiji, Samoa, and Tonga by 1000 BC, and the remainder of north
and central Oceania and New Zealand by 1000 AD. A different series of migrations originating from today’s Taiwan and the
Philippines populated Kiribati, Nauru and Micronesian islands starting around 1500 BC (Couper, 2009:23-25; Jolly, 2007:514; Jolly
& Tcherkézoff, 2009:1-2; Lansdown, 2006:2-4; A. Smith & Jones, 2008:24). Archaeologist Paddy Nunn suggests Pacific navigators
briefly settled the Panama isthmus around 1514 AD, which if accurate could account for the introduction of yams, one of the
Pacific’s most pervasive food crops (Couper, 2009:23; Nunn, 2001:126; Rainbird, 2007:98).
73
2008b:43-46). The socially interdependent world of the vaka was characterised by “communication,
close participation and engagement” but within lines of constructed engagement (W. Halapua,
2008b:45). Vaka-influenced social-organisational patterns variously manifested on land. Among
Polynesians (those who sailed the farthest), stratified social hierarchies emerged. In Melanesian
cultures, more egalitarian social structures allow commoners to gain chiefly or “bigman” status
through displays of customary knowledge, acquisition and redistribution of wealth, and the
management of social (or wantok) networks (Kabutaulaka, 2002; Nanau, 2011).
Pacific patterns of social organisation and identity formation contrast with Western notions about
individuality and self-expression (A. Howard, 1990:260-262, 274-276; Linnekin, 1990:170;
Linnekin & Poyer, 1990:6-7). Western notions of identity can be more fixed around an individual’s
agency, whereas island identities are viewed as more collective and shifting (Ho, Holmes, &
Cooper, 2004:10). A Pacific islander has been described as one identified through “social
placement” within “nodes” of relationship in kinship groups, social hierarchies, and land origination
(Linnekin & Poyer, 1990:6-9) or as “the locus of shared biographies” (A. Howard, 1990:262).
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz coined the term “consocial” to describe such relational personhood
(A. Howard, 1990:261-267; Linnekin & Poyer, 1990:3-4).
Pacific identities are adaptable and permeable, constructed and reconstructed as social, political and
environmental conditions change (Caughey & Marshall, 1989:15; A. Howard, 1990:266; Linnekin,
1990:165-169). This fluidity instils Pacific societies with “an openness toward outside influences”
and allows for cultural change (D'Arcy, 2006:1). Such flexibility enables a person to voluntarily
shift his or her identity by changing networks of committed relationships (such as through
marriage), by accepting multiple “nested” identities, and by adopting various “identity markers”
such as dress, language, attachment to locality, and participation in cultural exchanges. Pacific
islanders can, and do, voluntarily shift their social identities and maintain more than one identity
simultaneously (Thaman, 1994:4). Pacific identity is continually demonstrated through behaviour
and performance; even blood relations need to be validated by social action in order to be
recognised (Linnekin & Poyer, 1990:8). A person who is not blood-related can achieve kinship
status through behavioural performance. It is by this route that countless palangis, or foreigners,
have been permanently or temporarily incorporated into Pacific communities. Transnational kinship
groups, or extended families living both on the island of origin and overseas, engage in such
identity (re)formation as the norm.
74
Participation in the production, preparation and sharing of both food and koloa (a Tongan word for
cultural wealth such as mats and tapa or bark cloth) are important pathways for non-local persons to
be incorporated into communities. The sharing of food harvested from a certain locality creates
bonds to the land and among the people the land possesses. Social networks were, and still are,
created and affirmed through feasting and food gifting. The quantity and quality of food and koloa
amassed and distributed allow for both the display and judging of a family’s wealth and social
status, as is frequently observed at Pacific weddings. The corpulence of village chiefs was an open
display of communal wealth and power.
Language is also a powerful identity marker (Gray, 2001:4; Makihara & Schieffelin, 2007:8-10;
Thaman, 1994:17; Van Heekeren, 2008:16). Language is used to define social status and placement,
thus Pacific social relationships are created and maintained through talk (Makihara & Schieffelin,
2007:8). As ethnographer Greg Dening (2007:300) wrote, “culture is talk.” The skilful use of
language is highly valued in the Pacific, as adduced by the pervasiveness of songs, poetry, village
theatre, public speeches, storytelling, and oral genealogies. About 75 percent of Pacific islanders
live in rural villages where their mother language is an indigenous vernacular. Most Pacific
islanders are impressively multi-lingual, reflecting their multiple nested identities. For these
reasons, community radio is ideally suited to Pacific applications; it is both oral and vernacular
specific.
“The economics of affection”29
One of the clearest expressions of Pacific culture in development is the calculated exportation of
remittance-producing labour. No region in the world highlights the impact of remittances on
development than the Pacific, which has one the highest migration rates in the world (Mohanty,
2006:110). Pacific remittance receipts were estimated at US$470 million in 2008, generated by
islanders working primarily in the US, Australia, New Zealand and Canada (Hay & Howes,
2012:4). In some PICs, remittance levels are three times greater than export-trade receipts and equal
or surpass foreign aid streams (Centre for International Economics, 2007:16; Connell & Brown,
2005:10; Gibson, et al., 2006:17). An estimated 90 percent of all Tongan families receive
remittances. Formal (bank transferred) remittances constitute about 28 percent of Tonga’s GDP; if
estimated unrecorded remittances are added (such as those carried by hand), the remittance-to-GDP
29
(Connell & Brown, 2005:16)
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ratio rises to 40 percent (Browne & Mineshima, 2007:40). Samoa similarly has a high remittance-
to-GDP ratio (about 23 percent), placing these two countries second and seventh in the world
overall (Ratha, et al., 2011; Seth, 2011:129).
Islands worldwide are characterised by high migration rates: the poorer the country, the greater the
migration orientation (R. Brown, et al., 2006:49; R. P. C. Brown & Connell, 2005:17; Mohanty,
2006:126). But the Pacific differs from other regions in two respects: the decision to migrate is
made by families, not individuals, and Pacific remittances appear not to “decay” over time but are
sustained by strong cultural values and renewable generations of migrants dispersed through
resilient kinship networks (R. P. C. Brown & Connell, 2005:22; Connell & Brown, 2005:viii;
Muliaina, 2005; Spoonley, 2003). This “transnational corporation of kin,” a phrase coined by
Bertram and Watters (1985), influences family decisions on who migrates to which destination
country and into what occupation for the greatest material gain. Pacific families maintain strong
multi-generational ties with their home village through two-way remittances, frequent family visits,
and the use of communication technology, especially mobile telephony.
Polynesian countries, such as Samoa and Tonga, have been exporting remittance-producing labour
since the 1950s. Most Melanesian countries, such as Solomons and Vanuatu, suffer from acute
shortages of internationally desirable skilled workers, thus remittances are produced by internal
rural-to-urban migration, often facilitated by social wantok networks (Connell & Brown, 2005:1).
Islanders often face a push-pull situation. For example, following the 2000 coup, Fijian labour
migration rates rose 218 percent between 1999-2004, generating US$204 million in remittances
(Mohanty, 2006:115). Fijians were “pushed” to migrate as local economic conditions deteriorated
following the coups and the implosion of the garment and sugar industries under international free-
trade agreements in the late-1990s and early-2000s, but they were also “pulled” as overseas
opportunities expanded for contract security personnel (due to the US-led war in Iraq) and the
global demand for nurses (R. Brown, et al., 2006:51; Mohanty, 2006). Some PICs train specifically
to “push” labour migration, for example, Kiribati’s maritime training school. In Kiribati, seafarer
remittances contribute between 15-20 percent to the national economy annually, about AU$12-13
million (Borovnik, 2009:146-147; Browne & Mineshima, 2007:11; Mares & Maclellan, 2006:128).
Seafarer remittance amounts are negotiated by the family and sealed in contracts with the employer;
levels can reach 70-80 percent of wages (Browne & Mineshima, 2007:3; Connell & Brown,
2005:21).
76
The Pacific remittance phenomenon presents an intriguing picture. Skilled workers easily earn four
times their domestic salaries by working overseas (Rokoduru, 2006:177). A study of female Fijian
nurses and teachers working in the Marshall Islands found 92 percent of them remitted more than
half of their monthly wages (Rokoduru, 2006). Similarly findings were noted in studies of
Auckland-based Samoans (Muliaina, 2005). Intra-regional migration also stimulates economic
growth: for every one foreign worker employed in the PICs, an average of 10 local jobs are created
(Luthria, 2006:13). Table 2.5 presents data on Pacific remittance revenues.
Table 2.5 Remittance Flows by Select PIC

GDP growth Per Capita Remittances (US$ million)**
annual ave. Income
2009-2011* (US$, 2012)* 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010e
Fiji 0.17 4,900 185 185 160 123 113 128
Kiribati 0.26 6,100 7 7 7 9 8 9
Nauru n/a 5,000 (2005) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Samoa 1.03 6,300 110 108 120 135 124 142
Solomons 3.86 3,400 7 20 20 20 2 3
Tonga 1.3 7,700 69 79 101 94 87 99
Vanuatu 3 5,000 5 5 6 7 6 7
* Source: (US Central Intelligence Agency, 2013).
** Source: (Ratha, et al., 2011).
Unskilled workers face stubborn migration barriers. If granted entry into metropole countries, such
as through temporary farm worker schemes, such labourers can earn a month’s salary within a
matter of days. For example, the daily wage for a Fijian farm worker is around AU$9, compared
with the hourly wage of an Australian-based farm worker of about AU$15.50. In Vanuatu, the
monthly minimum wage is equivalent to AU$149, or roughly 10 hours of work in an Australian
orchard (Mares & Maclellan, 2006:124). A study of Fijians and ni-Kiribati working on Australian
farms found they remitted 42 percent of their net seasonal earnings; Tongan workers on New
Zealand farms remitted around 72 percent (Gibson & McKenzie, 2011).
Thus, it makes far better economic sense for islanders to migrate for superior wages than to toil on
the family farm or struggle to find a low-wage domestic job. Reducing barriers to labour migration,
particularly for unskilled workers, would do far more to reduce poverty in the Pacific than current
aid efforts do, but opening the doors to greater numbers of unskilled workers has long been a
contentious issue in developed countries. Connell, among others, argues that greater unskilled-
labour mobility would provide an “interesting alternative to the prospect of endlessly propping up
77
micro-economies through aid in perpetuity” (Connell, 2006a:87; Dobell, 2012; W. Morgan, 2012b).
Both aid and remittances are forms of rent-derived wealth.
Allowing for the movement of Pacific workers within trade-liberalisation agreements is a

complicated and sensitive issue. The easing of restrictions that barred entry of unskilled Pacific
workers into European markets was a “red line, non-negotiable” area during the EU-Pacific
Economic Partnership Agreement talks in the late-2000s (Penjueli & Morgan, 2008:33; United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development Secretariat, 1996:10). In comparison, New Zealand
opened its economy to Pacific (mostly Polynesian) workers in the 1950s, well before the US
(1966), Canada (1976) and Australia (1977) (Castles & Miller, 2009). The success of New
Zealand’s labour-migration policy with Samoa and Tonga can serve as a template for Australia’s
relationship with the Solomons and Vanuatu. World Bank economists and others suggest that the
most effective and humane strategy Australia could implement to assist Pacific “failing states” is to
increase unskilled labour mobility (Hay & Howes, 2012:7; Luthria, 2006:22-23; Mares &
Maclellan, 2006; World Bank, 2010). Studies indicate that foreign temporary workers boost local
host economies: they fill jobs that are not attractive to host-country residences and they stimulate
and sustain small town economies (Mares & Maclellan, 2006:17). The largest obstacle to the
creation of a viable agricultural guest-worker scheme for Pacific islanders in Australia is Australia’s
heavily reliance on itinerant tourists, or backpackers, who now constitute 85 percent of the
country’s agricultural labour force (Mares & Maclellan, 2006:103). Pacific islanders, however, are
not eligible for such “working holiday maker” or WHM visas (Hay & Howes, 2012:11, 39).
Australia’s 2008 Pacific Seasonal Workers Scheme has produced disappointing outcomes compared
with New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme and Canada’s highly successful
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (Gibson & McKenzie, 2011; Hay & Howes, 2012; Mares
& Maclellan, 2006).
Remittances critique
Clearly remittances have a powerful positive development impact. Because remittances are person-
to-person transfers, they directly target the needs of receiving families (Seth, 2011:124).
Remittances significantly reduce poverty and enormously lift the standard of living by funding
basic necessities, such as food, housing, and schooling fees, as well as providing funds for markers
of social status, such as church contributions and community donations (Browne & Mineshima,
78
2007:10; Seth, 2011:124). Numerous studies link migration with higher health and educational
outcomes, even among family members who do not migrate (R. P. C. Brown & Connell, 2005:20;
Connell & Brown, 2005:36). Remittances also flow out through cultural reciprocity networks to
assist families without migrant workers (R. Brown, et al., 2006:93). Economic remittances take
many forms. Frequently they are cash transfers, but sometimes they are goods such as outboard
motors, electrical generators or home electronics. Remittances consisting of second-hand clothing
were instrumental in the creation of the Nuku’alofa flea market in Tonga in the 1980s.
The cost of sending monetary remittances to PICs is among the highest in the world, averaging
between 15-20 percent of the value of remittances sent. Because Pacific workers tend to remit
smaller amounts more often, the associated transaction costs mount substantially. Only a third of all
remittances are sent through official banking channels (R. Brown, et al., 2006:93). Unrecorded
remittance transfers are estimated to be 50 to 60 percent higher than official flows (Gibson, et al.,
2006; Seth, 2011:124). Remittances bound for rural outer-island families, who do not have easy
access to formal banking services, are frequently hand-carried by returning visitors or workers
(Gibson, et al., 2006; Muliaina, 2005). Telephone-based banking services are slowly making
inroads into rural Fiji, Solomons, Samoa and Vanuatu; such “SMS” banking services are
widespread in sub-Saharan Africa (Seth, 2011:134-135). A reduction in bank-transfer costs would
significantly increase the amount of spendable dollars in the hands of the Pacific poor, but such
banking reforms do not appear on regional development agendas. Interestingly, Pacific churches,
such as the Tongan-affiliated Melie mei Langi, have become involved in remittance-transfer
activities, reducing the transaction costs by as much as 75 percent (Gibson, et al., 2006; Luthria,
2006:13).
But remittances bring downsides, too (Connell & Brown, 2005:4, 8; Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2011;
Seth, 2011:131). Connell (2006a:88) argues that remittances ease poverty but do little to resolve the
root causes of it. Reliance on remittances is so pervasive that any decline in transfer amounts, such
as experienced during the 2009 global economic recession, causes widespread “hardship” (Browne
& Mineshima, 2007:5; Seth, 2011:138). Remittance-receiving families often reduce the size of their
gardens (subsistence agriculture) for two reasons: labour has been lost through migration and rising
income allows for food purchases. An estimated 70 percent of Tongan remittances are spent on
store-bought food, which in turn leads to diet-related illnesses (Kelsey, 2004b:18). International
preferences toward skilled labour potentially increase domestic economic inequality as the rural
poor have limited access to higher education. Additionally, PICs lose valuable skilled workers who
79
simply cannot be replaced (Lal, 2003). An estimated 80 percent of Fijian nurses and almost 50
percent of Fijian-trained doctors migrate. Fiji, the site of a regional medical school, ranks fifth in
the world for percentage of doctors as emigrants per capita (Ratha, et al., 2011). Nearly all PICs
suffer from chronic shortages of medical personnel, thus further eroding efforts to meet the MDGs
pertaining to maternal and child health. The flight of upper-wage skilled workers deprives PIC
governments of their taxes. Remittances that flow to families do not offset government expenses to
provide health and other welfare services, although some costs are recouped for educational
services. Additionally, migration separates parents from children; it is not uncommon to find rural
villages populated with only the young and the elderly.
The Pacific talking
The use of communication technology is an essential component in this migration-remittance

nexus. Communication technology as a means to transmit social remittances or enhance
transnational migrant identities is not widely researched (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2010; Papoutsaki
& Strickland, 2008:2; Patrick, Koster, & Rakuita, 2005:12).
In the Pacific context, mobile telephony is the preferred communications tool between “home and
away,” although the use of email is quickly gaining (Connell & Brown, 2005:54; Hopkins,
2009:239, 241, 244; Patrick, et al., 2005:30). Since 2009, the growth in mobile telephony in the
PICs has moved at a breathtaking pace due largely to market deregulation. Diaspora islanders have
rapidly adopted mobile telephony to maintain contact with their island families. Ni-Kiribati
fieldworkers in New Zealand spend as much as 15 percent of their weekly wages on telephone calls
to their island families (Gibson & McKenzie, 2011). Field observations noted deep rural islanders
frequently used pre-paid mobile telephones to contact overseas relatives.
Traditional forms of diaspora media are also widely consumed. Pacific diaspora media serve two
functions, that of unifying migrant communities in their new home lands and connecting these
communities with their island homes (Hopkins, 2009:232, 234; Papoutsaki & Strickland, 2008:5).
New Zealand’s large pan-Pacific population enjoys a diversity of print and broadcasting media in
island vernaculars (for example, the Pacific Radio Network and Pasifika Broadcasting). One study
of Fijian migrants in Brisbane noted their hording of Fijian newspapers, brought in by the boxfuls
by visitors and carefully circulated and discussed during talanoa sessions (Patrick, et al., 2005:31).
80
Migrant islanders regularly listen to Pacific-ethnic shows on Australian community radio stations
(Lee, 2006:128; Patrick, et al., 2005). Pacific island radio stations are increasingly providing online
“streaming” content accessible by overseas audiences. Church officials serving Pacific diaspora
congregations circulate home news through newsletters and after-sermon chats. Some churches
organise computer training classes to help migrants send email to families back home (Patrick, et
al., 2005:34) Thus, transnational islanders are using ICTs to “reaffirm and reconstruct” Pacific
identities within a globalised kinship network (Mohanty, 2006:108; Papoutsaki & Strickland,
2008:13). As noted in the Tongasat example, diaspora islanders confidently use email, chat rooms
and discussion boards. They use these tools to maintain contact with family members living in other
metropolitan communities, but infrastructure bottlenecks in the Pacific islands usually limit these
options for their island-based families. As mentioned, on-island Tokelauans are rapidly adopting
Skype and other voice-over-Internet services to talk with family living overseas.
Hence, migration is as much about the people left behind as the people who move away.
Remittance-producing migrants function as development agents in their own right, existing in an
advantageous liminal space between two cultures. Returning migrants bring back new ideas about
how governments and communities could be improved, and new skills and technologies to affect
social changes. These social remittances have powerful potential impacts on socio-economic
development, particularly in the areas of women’s equality and political participation (Levitt,
1998). But two critical elements emerge: migrants must return (many skilled workers/settlers do
not, even upon retirement), and that greater numbers of temporary, thus returning, migrants diffuse
greater amounts of socio-economic remittances and more deeply into rural areas where the majority
of Pacific islanders live. However, regional labour-migration policies are structured to prevent such
movement (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2010; W. Morgan, 2012b). Data pertaining to Pacific
permanent migration are presented in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6 Permanent migration, by countries of origin and destination, by decade

1980s 1990s 2000s
Aust. NZ US Aust. NZ US Can. Aust. NZ US Can.
Fiji 9,485 6,705 9,367 29,315 8,328 17,183 14,187 43,695 25,402 31,505 22
Kiribati 4 216 228 414 9 1,001 404 402 496 6,471 39
Nauru 425 95 7 447 4 85 46 460 219 548 10
Samoa 137 25,391 15,272 5,517 37,611 12,995 115 13,084 46,795 17,467 73
Solomons 14 216 2 1,018 9 56 12 1,307 497 360 34
Tonga 2,602 5,300 7,489 5,955 8,167 11,374 156 7,596 17,817 16,694 102
Vanuatu 660 118 3 833 5 76 35 888 272 492 19
No statistics were provided for Canada for the 1980s.
Source: (Ratha, et al., 2011).
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have explored a number of points of contact between Western development models
and Pacific culture. I have argued that orthodox development models have built on colonial-era
development models and that both are inappropriate, even harmful, to Pacific microstates. Orthodox
and neo-liberal economic development models presume the existence of land availability,
population densities, and transportation and communication infrastructure. These simply don’t exist
in island microstates. Small island developing states face unique development challenges, as
exemplified by Niuatoputapu, that still are not full theoreticised in orthodox development models.
Pacific microstates have instead created alternative and culturally derived development models,
ones that seek a reversed-dependency relationship with powerful development benefactors. These
models arise from the Pacific’s oceanic propensity toward adopting and adapting exogenous
influences and from consocial identity formation wherein extensive kinship-based social networks
provide pathways for wealth creation and redistribution. I demonstrated the soundness of these
models through discussions around the dynamics of development aid, the exploitation of unusual
natural resources such as country-level Internet domain names and GEO satellite positions, and the
calculated exportation of remittance-producing labour. I also discussed how Pacific cultural
attributes can both advance development (remittances) and retard development (Tongasat).
Alternative development models often meet strong resistance from Western hegemonic economic
powers that seek to structure the world system to privilege their political, strategic, commercial and
ideological objectives. The US vigorously protested Tonga’s bid for GEO satellite positions, just as
international immigration policies continue to negatively discriminate against unskilled Pacific
workers. Similarly, aid is given to win the allegiance of Pacific microstates but when they stray
from the donor-chosen path, sanctions are often threatened or imposed. China’s entry into the
Pacific aid game has ramifications for the Pacific development agenda, but China declines to fund
civil society initiatives, thus it appears an unlikely supporter for Pacific community radio.
Strong evidence exists to support my argument that Pacific immanent development models are
sustainable pathways to self-defined development. Given the importance that orthodox
82
development models have historically attached to the use of media in advancing development
objectives, attention now turns to exploring the role of media in Pacific development to investigate
if evidence exists to suggest that immanent models of development communication are also
emerging.
83
Chapter 3
Talanoa Radio
Participatory development and media in the Pacific context
Introduction
Media have long held privileged positions within development theories. Orthodox development
models viewed them as messaging channels for the delivery of media content around development
goals; participatory development models viewed them as pathways for community expression
around development issues. But culture informs communication, particularly within the Pacific’s
culture of silence. Radio pervades daily island life and Pacific islanders are eager radio listeners.
Radio is the Pacific’s only mass medium and it serves as an essential lifeline for countless remote
island communities.
Given that orthodox development theories have foundered in the Pacific context, how relevant are
participatory development theories around community radio when applied in this vast geographical
region so diverse in its cultures, histories, economies and political structures? I will argue that
Western-defined participatory development models as implemented by international development
actors fail in the Pacific context. As cultural outsiders, foreign development actors are often
ignorant of culturally appropriate strategies through which to engage with communities within
participatory development models.
However, islanders are creating alternative participatory development models and within them
refined definitions of community radio that offer a collective voice within culturally appropriate
pathways. Community radio is a new phenomenon in the Pacific, emerging only in the mid-1990s.
The nascent models reflect Pacific cultural propensities to rely on traditional sources of wealth
creation and distribution – the community, the chief and the church – and they do so through within
a rentier orientation, thus giving rise to Pacific immanent models of participatory development.
84
This chapter discusses the theoretical underpinnings of media within orthodox development theory
and participatory development models and investigates how Pacific cultures interact with these
models to advance more refined understandings of community radio within development
communication.
MEDIA IN DEVELOPMENT THEORY
The historical context
Radio was first introduced into the Pacific during the colonial era, providing the foundation upon
which development communication within orthodox development theories would be built in later
decades. Colonial-era radio was used to deliver information from the government to the public in a
top-down fashion with little, if any, feedback (P. Lewis, 1993:17; Molnar, 2005:283; Wessberg,
1999:87). Islanders were often excluded even as listeners given that the broadcasts were in colonial
languages (Bolton, 1999). Islanders would not gain employment within national broadcasters until
the late-1950s (Fiji Broadcast Corporation Ltd, 2012). Curiously, broadcasting regulations were
enacted before the first radio station began broadcasting. Colonial Samoa passed the region’s first
regulations in 1929, followed by Tonga in 1930, while Fiji launched the region’s first radio station
in 1935. The colonial model, that of a mechanical transmission model where information is
imparted in a one-way “sender-message-receiver” delivery mode, was incorporated into early
theories emerging in the 1950s around the role of media in development communication (Carey,
1985; Chandler, 1994; Servaes & Malikhao, 2008:166).
Theorists such as Daniel Lerner (1963, 1969), Wilbur Schramm (1967, 1979) and Everett Rogers
(1976) and others proposed that mass media could function as “multipliers” or “magic bullets” that
would efficiently persuade people in developing countries to give up their traditional ways, adopt
“modern” personalities, and individually and collectively move themselves and their countries out
of a state of “under-development” (Dube, 1967; Oshima, 1967). Lerner suggested that mass media
and the dissemination of skilfully produced “behaviour change” messages could create “a culture of
acceptance” toward modernisation efforts. Such media applications would work in conjunction with
the transfer of industrial and agricultural technologies, targeted financial aid and Western “expert”
advisers to spur economic growth and allow poor countries to eventually “catch-up” with advanced
Western nations (Waisbord, 2001:1).
85
Competing perspectives emerged on how to best to use media to advance development goals.
Lucian Pye suggested that a centralised nation-state would drive modernisation efforts and that
mass media, such as state-owned national broadcasters, were critical components in the act of
nation-building (Beam, 1992:113). Everett Rogers’ (1974) significant contribution was to
rearticulate both Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld’s theories about “two-step” information flows and
Harold Lasswell’s ideas about the importance of local opinion leaders, thus joining the
hypothesised effects of media exposure with the importance of interpersonal communication in the
diffusion and adoption of new ideas and technologies. Media could be used to create “an appetite
for change.”
Development communication in context: American Samoa educational television
Wilbur Schramm’s “bold experiment” with educational television in American Samoa exemplifies
the misplaced enthusiasm and heedless application of the modernisation model in the early 1960s
(Barney, 1982; Bronson, 1966; K. G. Cox, 2011; Hall, 1961, 1965; McAnany, 2012:53-54; Newton,
2011; Saettler, 2004; Schramm, Nelson, & Betham, 1981). By the late-1950s, the US-territory of
American Samoa had degraded into a “national disgrace” characterised by rotting buildings, rutted
roads, widespread malnutrition, limited electrification, ill-equipped medical and educational
facilities, and raw sewage being dumped in one of the Pacific’s finest harbours (Hall, 1961). The
idealistic Kennedy administration, which came to power in 1961 amid growing Cold War tensions,
considered that American Samoa’s under-development was a blot on the US’s international
prestige. After all, the US was spending millions of dollars to “develop” poor countries around the
world while its own strategic South Pacific possession lay neglected.
In 1961, American Samoa’s new US-appointed governor, H. Rex Lee, deduced that the way
forward for American Samoa was a radical transformation of its educational system. He faced two
choices: the importation of nearly 400 US-mainland teachers with associated housing and other
costs, or the creation of a television-based educational system that could deliver new targeted
curricula at a greater cost savings. The resulting educational-television project (ETV) was the first
of its kind anywhere in the world and was touted as a showcase model for other developing
countries to follow. Unlike other applications of educational media, television broadcasts here
would serve as the core of the educational system; classroom teachers were pushed into secondary
86
roles. The US began what was essentially a total social re-engineering of traditional Samoan society
using the public education system as “the tidal force … driving all else ahead of it” and through
which Samoans, under US mentorship, would achieve the “development of the society which (they)
deserve” (Bronson, 1966; K. G. Cox, 2011).
Project documents belie the arrogance of the US strategy. Samoan culture was described as “old
and relatively changeless” and unable to adapt to the needs of the modernising world, a view which
embodied Lerner’s notion that traditional cultures are impediments to development (Lerner, 1963,
1967a; Schramm, et al., 1981:32; Taylor, 2010:31). The project’s intention was “not to destroy
Samoan culture,” just “modify” it and “preserve its more meaningful characteristics” (Bronson,
1966; K. G. Cox, 2011). Tellingly, among ETV’s six main objectives, the development of a
“responsible citizenship for effective encounter with continuing social change” was listed as
number 2, while “retention of the high values of Samoan culture” ranked as number six (K. G. Cox,
2011). The project began by closing more than half of the existing village schools, thus weakening
village social organisation, and consolidating them into new schools made of concrete and glass
which can become uncomfortable in tropical heat and humidity. The project aggressively imposed
English language acquisition, targeted pre-schoolers through American-biased socialisation
programs, implemented school lunch programs that acclimated students to Western food tastes and
created a market for surplus US mainland agricultural commodities, and offered televised adult
night school that delivered “the principles of government and democracy” along with more standard
development information around farming, sanitation and home economics (Hall, 1965). From 1961-
1967, the project was wholly driven by imported US “experts,” such as educational theorists,
television producers, broadcast engineers, school principals, and classroom “instructional
supervisors.” About half of American Samoa’s existing teachers, some of whom were US educated,
were deemed to be “unsalvageable” and were replaced with imported US teachers. Complementary
development projects began as well. A new airport, 30 schools, a hospital and a library were built.
Electricity, water and sewer infrastructure was introduced. Roads were sealed. Tax codes were
restructured to encourage private sector investment. Birth control was introduced to curb
burgeoning population growth. An expanded agricultural extension program offered, at cost,
seedlings, fertilizer and even new breeds of pigs, a staple in Polynesian diets. A separate school was
established for the children of the imported US workers.
The ETV project itself was radically ambitious. By 1964, four modern television studios were built
and equipped with the latest technology, and they buzzed with activity. During the peak years of
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1964-1967, about 60 lessons a day were broadcast via six television channels into local schools.
Most of the programming was targeted at Classes 1-4 as these young children were seen as the
drivers of American Samoa’s future. Many lessons were videotaped for later replay, but some 182
live shows were produced weekly. Each teacher was expected to produce 20 television lessons a
week. Technology was placed centre stage, not classroom teachers. Schramm later admitted that the
pace was “frenetic,” consequently little attention had been given to monitoring and evaluating the
program, thus limiting opportunities for mid-project adjustments (Schramm, et al., 1981:72). When
Schramm finally evaluated the program 18 years later, he and others acknowledged that their “bold
experiment” had been a failure: student academic-achievement scores had not significantly
improved between 1964-1980 (McAnany, 2012:53-54; Saettler, 2004:370; Schramm, et al.,
1981:32).
The project documents indicate that Schramm and Governor Lee were cognisant of the Pacific
culture of silence. Lee had met at least twice with Samoan chiefs (or matai) in token shows of
participation. Records indicate the chiefs were “quietly respectful,” indicating they refrained from
voicing what could be critical comments (Schramm, et al., 1981:4). When “soft whispers” of
dissatisfaction first arose from Samoan teachers, project implementers dismissed these as evidence
of “human failure” or the Samoans’ obstinacy toward adapting to modernity (Bronson, 1966).
However by the late-1960s, Samoan teachers, students and families were openly complaining to
their chiefs, who in turn performed their cultural duties by bringing these views to the project
implementers (Schramm, et al., 1981:74). By the early 1970s, US geo-political interests had shifted
elsewhere given the domestic Watergate Scandal, the loss of the Viet Nam War, and the Middle
Eastern oil-embargo of 1974. By 1976, the ETV project had devolved into a government-controlled
local television service, KVZK-TV, which began to broadcast primarily programming from US
commercial television networks interspersed with local Samoan content. Television was now
ensconced in 96 percent of American Samoan homes despite occasional complaints about negative
social change attributed to the “cultural imperialism” of the programming offered (McAnany,
2012:54). One project participant, Emile McAnany (2012:53), reduced the ETV project’s failings to
too great haste, too many foreign staff and too little local consultation. The US government had
invested US$30 million into the project between 1961-1964 and roughly US$2 million each year
throughout the 1960s (Hall, 1965). Governor Lee’s dreams of creating an economically self-
sufficient American Samoa by 1975 were far from realised. The development gains experienced in
the late-1960s, such as improved agricultural output, had arisen solely upon the infusion of massive
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amounts of US development aid; they faded as soon as aid flows ceased. American Samoa remains
the poorest US overseas possession.
The ETV project pushed Schramm (1979) and similar other theorists who had supported the early
modernisation model, such as Rogers (1976) and Childers (Colle, 2008), to begin to question their
theoretical assumptions. Schramm and Childers suggested that development projects were failing
because the project “beneficiaries” were not sufficiently involved. Schramm began to view media
as just one of several variables, such as literacy, income and urbanisation, that would work in
unison to propel a poor country into economic development (Beam, 1992:111-113). The use of
broadcast programming imbued with Western cultural and political biases as a vehicle to advance
Western-defined modernity began to face resistance in American Samoa and throughout the
developing world.
NWICO and international broadcasters
In 1961, as Cold War tensions deepen between the US and the Soviet Union, a coalition of
developing countries formed with the intention of seeking a middle course between these two
superpowers and their competing development agendas. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),
composed largely of newly independent “developing” countries, began to agitate for more equitable
distribution of the world’s resources within more balanced terms of trade. Demands included lower
tariffs and higher prices for raw commodities and increased control over the activities of
transnational corporations, such as international broadcasters, operating within their countries. The
NAM’s membership comprised nearly two-thirds of all UN member states, thus its call in 1974 for
a New International Economic Order (NIEO) resounded with some strength (Schwarz, 2007:3).
The NIEO contained a proposal for a New World Information and Communication Order
(NWICO). The “free flow of information” – deemed so central to Western democratic notions of a
people’s abilities to govern themselves – grew to be seen as just another ploy by the capitalist West
to conceal neo-imperialist manoeuvrers on par with the alleged universal benefits of “free trade”
and “free markets” (Fore, 1982:2). The ownership and uses of mass media entered into international
discourses and placed the issues of identity, power and communication at the heart of the NWICO
(M. Ferguson, 2005:32; Padovani, 2005:31; Pickard, 2007:122).
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The NWICO debates, occurring within UNESCO in the late-1970s and 1980s, were a watershed
moment for development communication. They focused on a number of interrelated media and
sovereignty issues that fall into two general categories: those dealing with international
communication (“free flow” of information, media ownership, journalistic standards, imbalances in
media content) and those concerning development communication (participatory communication,
community media) (Mody, 2003a:125-128; A. Rogers, 2005:5).30 Many of the NWICO concerns,
such as Western ownership of media technology, limited access to communication media for most
of the world’s people, and top-down communication methods from policy-makers (national and
international) to the common people, remain unresolved in many parts of the world today, including
the Pacific (Sparks, 2007). Pacific examples of the affects of NWICO included the establishment in
1987 of the regional PACNEWS news service, which added Pacific voices to international news
flows, and the creation of several media-development schemes designed to improve journalistic
skills and strengthen national broadcasters (Molnar & Meadows, 2001:88; Wessberg, 1999:88).
The Pacific presents another view on the role of international broadcasters in global geo-political
rivalry. Pacific broadcasters, both commercial and national, face significant human-resource and
financial challenges: their small populations produce few trained media professionals and their
small economies provide limited revenue to sustain media outlets (R. A. Hooper, 1998). For
example, Kiribati closed its national television broadcaster in March 2013 due to unpayable debts
and lack of qualified personnel (Kiribati Independent, 2013a). As much as 80 percent of the
television content broadcast in the Pacific is derived from international sources, both Western and
non-Western, such as South Korea and the Philippines (Bentley, 2002:6). There simply would be
little content otherwise.
While Pacific radio content reflects higher levels of indigenous programming, many commercial
broadcasters rely heavily on Anglo-American music (and in the case of multi-cultural Fiji, South
Asian pop music). The major international radio services in the Pacific are the Australian
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Radio New Zealand International (RNZI), the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and to a lesser extent Radio France Internationale. All these
30
Adam Rogers (2005:5) proposes two classifications: the Diffusionist/Mechanistic group characterised by the works of Lerner
(1963, 1967a, 1967b, 1969), Schramm (1967, 1979), Everett Rogers (1976), Lasswell (1969) and similar others, and the
Participatory/Organic group led by the writings of Freire (2005), Servaes (1996, 2008a, 2008b), Melkote and Steeves (2001),
Childers (Colle, 2008), and similar others.
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broadcasters have political undertones. The BBC’s charter includes a mandate to represent Britain
to the world (Moe, 2011:60). Both ABC and RNZI are mandated to transmit into neighbouring
Pacific countries, thus they assume foreign policy roles (Australian Broadcasting Corporation,
2011:2). In the late-2000s, disagreements between Fiji’s Bainimarama military government and
Australian news producers over Fiji’s perception of biases in Australian news product led to the
expulsion of foreign journalists and a three-year closure of ABC’s transmission services in Fiji
(ABC News, 2009; Media Spy, 2012). These confrontations reflect the competing viewpoints found
in the NWICO debates: the first that the free flow of information was an individual human right
which was protected from government control, and the second that governments could limit
individual rights in the interest of benefiting the nation by balancing the flow of information to
protect its culture and social order (Raube-Wilson, 1986:112-114). New Zealand’s national
broadcaster also pursues foreign policy objectives in its Pacific regional service. In 2010, RNZI was
providing about 16 hours of free programming daily to broadcasters in 17 Pacific island-states
(Sennitt, 2005c). In 2012, TVNZ, New Zealand’s state-owned television broadcaster, withheld its
programming from Fiji’s state-owned television station, FBCTV, as a punitive measure against
Fiji’s military government. In response, FBCTV turned to Qatar-based Al Jazeera for news content
(R. Lal, 2012). The state-owned China Central Television (CCTV) is also widely received in the
Pacific region, with broadcasting-relay facilities existing in Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu. A Chinese
bid to establish a television network in Fiji was controversially denied in 2005 (Sennitt, 2005).
The reliance on international broadcasters is even more clearly revealed within Pacific community
radio. About 75 percent of Pacific faith-based broadcasters have been established through funding
from mother churches or international missionary organisations located primarily in the US. For
example, Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN) has provided several Pacific radio stations with
start-up funds and staff training but then requires them to fill about half of their broadcast schedule
with TBN programming (Doulos Broadcasting Network, 2012; The Supreme Court of Samoa,
2011:2).
The MacBride Report
From the onset, the US and its allies were threatened by the emergence of NIEO and NWICO.
NWICO was seen as a front for Soviet subterfuge or, at the very least, an obstacle to American
corporate interests. The emergence of conservative-right governments in US (under President
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Ronald Reagan) and UK (Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher) posited that free trade and market
deregulation, often called neo-liberal economic globalisation, would provide “universal” solutions
to the world’s problems. The two governments had little sympathy for NAM members’ insistence
on their rights to political self-determination and the importance of their cultural identities
(Tremblay, 2005:1). US officials argued that media products, such as television shows and films,
should be considered no differently from any other trade good.
At the height of the tensions in 1976, UNESCO, at the bidding of the US, organised an international
group of scholars, journalists, media owners and others to study “the totality of communication
problems in modern society” (International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems,
1980:xvii; Whitlam, 1989:3). The resulting study, entitled Many Voices, One World or more
commonly the MacBride Report, became the essential reference point for subsequent theories and
applications of development communication (Pasquali, 2005:27). The MacBride Report contributed
to thinking around the use of media in development in five areas: communication policy,
technology, cultural identity, human rights, and international cooperation (Tupper, 2005:1). The
report stated that people had a “right to communicate” inseparable from other human rights.
Communication was more than just the one-way information dissemination, more than just the
transference and forced-fit of Western communication models and technology into non-Western
societies, and more than just the imposition of behaviour-change objectives from exogenous
development agents onto native people, all of which were encapsulated in the American Samoa
ETV project.
Communication, according to the MacBride viewpoint, should not be conceived of as a product but
more of a dialogic “process” involving a plurality of voices, including those of development
“beneficiaries” (Berrigan, 1981:11; International Commission for the Study of Communication
Problems, 1980:254; Servaes, 1996:75; UNESCO, 2007a:41; Waisbord, 2001:18; World Congress
on Communication for Development, 2006:2). In this view, the “process” of dialogue arising
around development issues resembles the Pacific talanoa, or informal group discussions that
involve respectful listening and egalitarian sharing, as I will explain. The MacBride Report further
stated that people must have the technical means to both speak and be heard if they are to
meaningfully engage in the process of self-governance and self-defined development, thus they
must be afforded access to media facilities and allowed to participate in the creation of media
content (Fore, 1982:9; International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems,
1980:172-173). The use of appropriate technology, such as “small” media like community radio,
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was deemed indispensable to “participatory” development practices and thought to be so important
that “no community can afford to do without them,” especially when the media were adapted to suit
local contexts (de Cuéllar, 1996:7; International Commission for the Study of Communication
Problems, 1980:26-27, 55-57).
Theoretically at least, development came to be seen as a process of dialogue and participation.

There was no one model best suited to achieve “development” nor one definition of what
constituted appropriate development. The form and pace of development would vary from
community to community based upon local influences and interests. MacBride commissioners
called for a fairer and more balanced system of communication between development actors and
development beneficiaries based on issues of human rights, not political-economic ideology
(Tremblay, 2005:1). In this way, the MacBride Report presented a third development paradigm, the
participatory model, and gave global legitimacy to the use of community media to enable people to
engage in dialogue around development issues affecting their lives and communities (Carlsson,
2005:60).
Globalisation and ICTs
In the 1990s, a “new world information and communication order” did indeed arise, but not as
envisaged by NWICO and the MacBride Report. The neo-liberal economic globalisation model
proposed that economic development would arise from impersonal market-driven forces governed
by values of trade, profits and efficiency, not the idealistic notions contained in the MacBride report
pertaining to dialogue and participation (Mansell & Nordenstreng, 2006:24; Tupper, 2005:3-4). In
the 1990s, free-trade market-liberalisation ideology became the hallmark of various international
trade agreements and “structural adjustment” programs advocated by international development
agencies, such as the World Bank and World Trade Organisation. In the Pacific, this meant the
“right-sizing” of government bureaucracies, the privatisation of government-owned national
broadcasters and similar public-service providers, and the removal of trade tariffs that had protected
the manufacturing sector, such as Fiji’s garment factories, which erased some 15,000 jobs when it
collapsed in the early-2000s (Kelsey, 2004b; Narsey, 2004). But it also meant the dismantling of
monopolistic structures in the telecommunication and media sectors, leading to explosive positive
growth in mobile telephony and the blossoming of commercial broadcasters. Today, the Pacific’s
radio environment can be described as a mixed system of national broadcasters, profit-oriented
93
commercial broadcasters, and a limited number of “third sector” or non-commercial, non-
government media, such as faith-based or student radio stations (Buckley, et al., 2008:55). Samoa
was the first PIC to deregulate its media sector in 1988. The deregulation of the Pacific
telecommunication sector in the late-1990s and 2000s updated broadcasting regulations that had
lingered unchanged since the colonial era.
The globalisation age needed new “magic bullets” to drive development, not “old-fashioned” radio
but the newer computer- and Internet-based information and communication technologies (ICTs)
(Davison, 2009:2; Pasquali, 2005:27). This change in focus was readily apparent in the UN World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) conferences in 2003-2005 (Deane, 2007a:46; Sparks,
2007:14). The WSIS reflected concerns with technological standardisation and deregulation of the
telecommunication sector. The NWICO “soft” issues – those of social inclusion, human
development, and the democratisation of media – fell off the WSIS agenda and were instead
replaced by discourses on technological solutions to human development issues, market solutions to
development challenges, and the elevation of private sector interests over those of both nation-states
and civil society (Leye, 2007; Ó Siochrú, 2004; Padovani, 2005; Pickard, 2007). The WSIS
conferences were largely a debate between two philosophical camps: advocates of free-market
globalisation driven by private sector interests versus advocates of communication rights, drawn
largely from civil society and developing countries (Pickard, 2007:119).
One significant outcome from the WSIS conferences was the coalescing of civil-society
organisations (CSOs), that part of the society distinguishable from either the state or private sector,
around issues of development and “information rights,” as opposed to “communication” rights as
espoused during the MacBride/NWICO era. Theoretically, it was argued, a stronger and more
active civil society would lead to deeper citizen participation at all levels of policy-making (de
Cuéllar, 1996:19; End Poverty 2015 Millennium Campaign, 2010; Hayward-Jones, 2009:8; Stiglitz,
2002:164-166). One of the most promising vehicles to allow for this deeper engagement was
community radio. But operationalising these theories around participatory or people-led
development and the role of media within them would be significantly problematic in the Pacific
context.
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PACIFIC CULTURE AND PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
Oceania is a region of striking human diversity, one of such immensity and complexity that it
routinely confounds the efforts of well-intentioned international development agencies to engage in
participatory development praxis (Howe, 2000:70; Teaiwa, 2005a:1; Thaman, 1994:3).
Development actors wishing to apply participatory development techniques need to understand how
Pacific communities organise themselves and how local customs – known variously as kastom,
fa’asamoa, anga fakatonga, bula vakavanua or similar descriptors of the Pacific Way – are used in
intra- and inter-group relationships in order to converse with villagers (Cole, 2005:483; Gegeo &
Watson-Gegeo, 2001:503-504; Nanau, 2011:36). With an estimated 5,000 villages and 70
languages in the Solomons alone, the task of engaging in community-based dialogue within
culturally appropriate methodologies can be particularly challenging. The reasons many donor-led
development projects fail in the Pacific is due to “the lack of appreciation of the diversity, vastness
and multi-layered richness of indigenous society” (Kaua & Sore, 2005:1-2). Once frustrated, many
foreign development agencies fall back onto familiar top-down modernisation models to achieve
their own self-defined development goals. Given these complexities, how does Pacific culture
influence participatory development praxis? This section discusses the theoretical moorings of
participatory development and investigates the interaction between the theories and the praxis in the
Pacific context.
Pacific cultural influences on participatory development
Pacific island cultures embody “a deep oceanic sense of interconnectedness” which conjoins the life
on the land with the vast ocean fluidity that surrounds them (W. Halapua, 2008a:4; 2008b:3;
Nainoca, 2011:i). This interconnectedness can be revealed through Pacific social norms, or the
unwritten rules, values and expectations that govern social interaction (Gegeo, 2001a:492-497;
Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2001:59; Nainoca, 2011:84). Amid the Pacific’s immense cultural
diversity, certain attributes are commonly found: respect, reciprocity, humility, generosity,
compassion, restraint, patience, trust and deference (Nainoca, 2011:9; Thaman, 2004:8). For
example, the Fijian and Samoan notions of vanua encompasses the physical, social and cultural
dimensions of the island worldview: physical in that one has a sense of belonging to a locality and
95
within a social hierarchy; social in that one is interwoven into extended families and social
networks; and cultural in that one knows the skills, beliefs and values necessary to perpetuate the
Fijian way of life (Lilomaiava-Doktor, 2009; Nainoca, 2011:85-87). Such norms are articulated
through behavioural performance, in particular through the culture of silence.
The culture of silence with its unarticulated rules about public speech – who can speak, when, how,
and about what – poses significant challenges to participatory development praxis and the role of
community radio within it. Respect is the major factor determining islanders’ relationships within
social networks, thus respect is revealed through the dynamics of silence and speech (W. Halapua,
2008b; Nainoca, 2011:99-104; A. N. Sharma, 1996; Vaioleti, 2006; Vunisea, 2008). Youth often
refrain from speaking in the presence of elders or foreigners. Women often remain silent in mixed
gender groups and whisper their comments, if any, to male relatives who will speak publicly on
their behalf. Commoners will silently defer to a chief’s decision even if they don’t agree with it in
order to bestow respect. Pacific societies are “polite;” public confrontation is avoided but contrary
opinions might be expressed during informal talanoa sessions, often sweetened with bantering
(Nainoca, 2011:52, 107; P. M. Swain, 1999:151). Other attributes of the culture of silence include
strategic inaction and the non-disclosure of vital information (Baldacchino, 2008b:43). Islander
tendencies not the share “bad news” in order to maintain social harmony can leave foreign
consultants with inaccurate perceptions about how well a development project is progressing.
In both Polynesian and Melanesian societies, village decisions are often worked out in highly
participatory ways through informal group discussions (talanoa), formal village meetings and
public gatherings such as feasts where emphasis is placed on consensus-building through small
scale, horizontal, personal conversation (Vikilani, 2010;7; Vunisea, 2008:42; White, 2004:10;
2004b:16; G. M. White, 2007:3, 12). Things are said and done in public spaces so that others may
see and hear, thus embedding the events in the community’s memory (White, 2004b:3). Geoffrey
White (2007:14) contends that these characteristics of community involvement, public discussion,
and collective decision-making constitute a Melanesian-style public sphere. Winifereti Nainoca
(2011:98), writing from within the Fijian context, notes the importance of “the social channels of
communication” wherein everyone in the village is kept abreast of news and information. Similar
communicative contexts have been documented elsewhere in the Pacific (Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo,
2001:62; The Pacific Media and Communication Research Consortium, 2013a:10). Social
sustainability is built upon such relationships (Ballantyne, 2003:5-6; Dagron, 2003:4).
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Foreign development actors can easily misinterpret the culture of silence. Silence can carry multiple
meanings, ranging from full agreement to total disagreement with what is being said, or it may be
simply expressions of shyness and respect (Nainoca, 2011:106). For example, Australian officials
negotiating a regional trade agreement misunderstood the silences of Pacific leaders as implicit
acceptance of the plan, instead of a more culturally sensitive understanding that the island leaders
were too respectful to publicly voice disapproval (Kelsey, 2004b:22; Slatter, 2003:5). Similar cross-
cultural misunderstandings were noted in the American Samoa ETV project. Islanders find it
“socially difficult to pose uncomfortable questions to those in authority,” including Western
development actors (Narsey, 1997).
Well-intentioned development agencies that are unaware of the culture of silence can aggravate the
conditions of poverty through their projects. In Pacific communities, decisions are often arrived at
through consensus, but protocols limiting who is allowed to participate in these discussions can
silence the voices of women, youth and the poor (United Nations Population Fund, 2008:1-2;
Vunisea, 2008:42). Aliti Vunisea (2008:43) cites examples of fishery-management projects that
created no-fishing zones near villages because no one objected to the locations during public
consultations, even though the proximity of these no-take zones increased the daily burden on poor
women to secure enough food for their families. Esther Williams (1999) contends that some rural
women live their entire lives in silence, although she predicts that ICTs will help soften the culture
of silence due to the anonymous and impersonal nature of computer-based communication.
Within the Melanesian context, two concepts gain importance: kastom and wantok. Kastom is a
social framework around oral codes of behaviour that cements group relationships around
fundamental notions of reciprocity, support, caring, and respect (Nanau, 2011). Wantokism is an
affective, moral relationship that binds members of a kinship group, often identified by language,
into expanding concentric circles of reciprocity that is expressed within a specific kastom
framework (Braithwaite, et al., 2010:104; Nanau, 2011). International development actors often
assume they are adopting culturally appropriate approaches when they limit their community
engagement to discussions with chiefs and government officials, as was seen in the American
Samoa ETV project. But in doing so, they repeat the mistakes of colonial administrators who
assumed the chiefs were all-powerful rulers, similar to European monarchs, and were thus
incognisant of the fact that chiefs attained their authority only through the maintenance of
relationships expressed through kastom and wantok networks (Keesing, 1946:153; White, 2004:4).
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Wantok networks are extremely powerful and extend far beyond a community’s physical
boundaries, but as yet have been “insufficiently mobilised” or even recognised as positive
contributors to social sustainability around development activities (Braithwaite, et al., 2010:103).
Chiefs draw their strength from wantok networks.31 A chief’s retention of his position depends on
how well he nurtures reciprocal relationships, thus he strives to win his community’s support
through skilfully organising the community around wealth-producing activities. In this way, a chief
resembles a community manager, or organiser, and serves as its spokesman (White, 2004b:17). The
difficulties in understanding kastom and the functionality of wantok systems means many foreign
development actors simply consult with village chiefs, then claim that this sufficient community
participation (Higgins, 2008:7).
The orality of island culture also influences development communication: the preference is clearly
to engage in face-to-face interactions in small group settings, or talanoa. Peter Maynard Lewis’
(2008) research into development-communication methodologies among Tongan development-
oriented CSOs found they produced “distinctly Tongan expressions of participation” by using
interpersonal social networks such as women’s weaving groups, men’s kava-drinking sessions,
town officials, and family meetings to diffuse behavioural-change messages around domestic
violence and HIV/AIDS. Such sensitive, or taboo, subjects could not be easily discussed in more
public mixed-gender settings, such as the media (Guttenbeil-Likiliki, 2006:161-162). Lewis’
(2008:89) research noted that interpersonal communications had greater influence on behavioural
change than media campaigns, although media were often used as “a necessary precursor.” Similar
findings appeared in studies in Samoa (Tonkin, 2008) and the Solomons (P. M. Swain, 1999).
Another expression of island orality is found in community theatre, which is widely used in Pacific
development communication (Aoki, 1993; Gaskell & Taylor, 2002; Hou, 1999:88-89; Mariano,
Kintanar, & Mendoza, 2007:325-328; Moore, 2009; Roughan, 1997:157; P. M. Swain, 1999:135-
137). A Solomon Islands survey found 93 percent of respondents preferred community “theatre for
development” over radio, which was seen as “not a traditional way” to disseminate information
(Hou, 1999:102). Pacific “theatre for development” has been adapted from indigenous performance
art, is highly audience-participatory, and very popular. Post-performance discussions around the
issues raised in a play can last for several hours; such discussions are often gender segregated to
31
The term “chief” can have complex meanings. I use it here to encompass both hereditary chiefs and bigmen. In both categories of
Melanesian indigenous leadership, people, usually men, can gain authority through their knowledge of kastom and history, skills as a
manager and orator, personal qualities and achievements, and demonstrated service to the community over extended periods of time
(Hogbin, 1958:157-159; Kabutaulaka, 2002:82-83; White, 2004:2; 2004b:16-17).
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open the culture of silence (P. M. Swain, 1999:136). While development theatre can be expensive
to implement in terms of transportation costs and other logistics, it compares favourably to the cost
of establishing and maintaining a community radio station. A community radio station also
presumes listeners can afford radio receivers and batteries. I suggest that community theatre might
be the most culturally appropriate medium for Pacific development communication.
Stepping out of the culture of silence can be an emotional experience for islanders. Field data
revealed that islanders can be “too ashamed” to speak on the radio for fear they will be seen as
“proud.” In Fijian society, person who talks too much, such as a radio announcer, is considered
arrogant and risks bringing shame onto his or her family (Nainoca, 2011:49). Rowan Mary Jeffrey’s
(2004:109, 182) research of expatriate Pacific island radio announcers at a New Zealand
community radio station found even “Westernised” islanders were reluctant to speak on air due to
what Jeffrey’s called the “obstacles to participation” arising from the islanders’ perception of their
socio-cultural position within their communities. Personal pride, the desire to maintain the family’s
good name through appropriate behaviour, and community umbrage tend to inhibit villagers from
speaking out (Pacific Islanders' Educational Resource Centre, 1982:5-8). Fijian villagers who
violate the culture of silence risk having sanctions, such as extra work duties in the village, imposed
upon them by chiefly authority (Nainoca, 2011:100-101). A wise Tongan knows “what to do and
how to do it” and acts to protect relationships, which implies appropriate behaviour performance
within the culture of silence (Thaman, 2004:8-10).
The culture of silence can be softened through the work of CSOs and the media (Vunisea, 2008:43).
Because of their nature as collective entities, CSOs offer individuals relief from some societal
constraints, thus they become the collective “voice of the people” (Barr, 2003; Otsuka, 2005). CSOs
are natural allies with community radio, which has been described as the voice of civil society
(Buckley, 2006a; Fraser & Restrepo-Estrada, 2001, 2002; Girard, 2001; Haughton, 2011:6; Joseph,
2005:23; Skuse, 2006).
But throughout the region, Pacific CSOs are “chronically starved” for funding and constantly “on
the look out” for new funding partners, which is a recipe for the implementation of aggressive rent-
seeking behaviour (Bautista, 2012a:26; 2012b:37; Tonkin, 2008:58). As a result, CSOs will
frequently align their organisational objectives to match those of their donors, leading to “voice and
accountability” issues with the communities the CSOs purport to represent (Bautista, 2012a:11;
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Brodhead, 1987:2; DAC Network on Gender Equality, 2008:8; T. Parks, 2008:218; Rice & Austria,
2007:68; Tonkin, 2008:34-35). Pacific CSOs also suffer from numerous “internal organisational
capacity deficiencies” which constrain their ability to secure funding and fulfill their mission
objectives (AusAID, 2008:12; Bautista, 2012a:ii; 2012b:27; Bird, 2007:2, 13; Chapman, Linhart, &
Roughan, 1998:53; Hauck, Mandie-Filer, & Bolger, 2005:9, 23; Ortega, 2006:2, 10; P. M. Swain,
1999:148; Warner, et al., 2007:xii, 10). International development agencies often seek out
appropriate local CSOs (such as those that are urban based, English speaking, and have Westernised
organisational structures) as bridging partners to provide entry into the local social context and
sometimes to advance donor-defined development goals by bypassing recalcitrant Pacific
governments (Hill, 1994:125-126; Smillie, 1998:3-4; Tonkin, 2008:33; K. G. Wilkins & Mody,
2001:393). Due to the significant amounts of international aid flowing to many political and
human-rights CSOs, Pacific governments often view the motivations and activities of such CSOs
with suspicion (Bautista, 2012a:1, 35; 2012b:29; Kabutaulaka, 1998:49).
Many international development actors realise that working within the Pacific socio-cultural
context is the key to any successful development project, but as cultural outsiders, they are often
ignorant of entry points into it (Foresti, Sharma, Neil, & Evans, 2007:6; George, 2011:3; K. R.
Lewis, 2011:58; Menocal & Sharma, 2009:2-3; O’Neil, Foresti, & Hudson, 2007:vii; Tembo,
2012:1; Yabusaki, 2007:58, 61). Given this, how relevant are Western-derived participatory
development theories in the Pacific context and how does island culture contribute to a more
refined theoretical understanding?
Participatory development theories
Theories about participatory development draw from two philosophical approaches: those of
Brazilian educationalist Paulo Freire’s (2005) theology-based concepts about dialogic
communication and conscientisation, or the political awakening that arises from self-reflection on
the causes and conditions of suffering, and the MacBride Report’s advocacy for wider and deeper
levels of access and participation in development planning and development-oriented
communication (Servaes, 1996:78). These, in turn, draw from Western socio-political concepts
pertaining to issues of self-sovereignty, social contracts and representational governance (Adams &
Dyson, 2007:58-64, 135-140; Berrigan, 1981:8; Fuller, 2007a:3; Jankowski, 2002:9). These are
largely alien concepts in the Pacific with its notions of consocial identity and respect for chiefly
100
authority. However, Cass (2004:103) contends that Pacific media models are informed by Freirean
notions of social justice because missionary churches established many of the Pacific’s first
newspapers to achieve similar aims.
Freire placed his faith in the common person’s ability to reason and discern the best strategy to
achieve a self-defined “liberation” (Freire, 2005:55, 64, 90; Servaes, 1996:75). Central to his
philosophy were notions of dialogue and respect. Development actors who seek to work on behalf
of the poor without engaging in meaningful dialogue with them will only perpetuate the structures
of “oppression” that impede the people’s development or “liberation.” Without faith in the inherent
rationality of common people, development actors will seek to “deposit” their ideas to be
“consumed” by the villagers and the resulting dialogue becomes a “farce which eventually
degenerates into paternalistic manipulation” (Freire, 2005:89-91). The American Samoa ETV
project resembled such paternalistic manipulation as it sought to implant American ideas around
development and had little inclination to include islanders as equal partners in the project.
Foreshadowing discussions around the case study radio stations, this tendency toward top-down
development will reappear in the Buala FM case study wherein the UNDP (United Nations
Development Programme) was stymied by the cultural, linguistic and geographical complexities of
the Solomon Islands and reverted to a classical application of top-down non-consultative
development work. In contrast, Radio BOSCO was designed to give expressive space to the voices
of youth. Likewise, femLINKPACIFIC bases its work around conscientisation wherein rural
women are informed about their human rights, then offered opportunities to share their experiences
and opinions on femLINK’s community radio station.
The MacBride Report amplified Freirian notions about the importance of dialogue and community
involvement in decision-making processes around development issues. The report made explicit the
right to communicate, or the right to seek, receive and impart information, as a fundamental human
right (International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, 1980:253). This right
was posited to be both at the individual level and collectively at the community level and could be
amplified through the “democratisation of communication,” particularly through the use of
appropriate media such as community radio.
Definitions of participatory development abound. Many involve terms such as empowerment,

partnership, inclusion, people-centred, context-led, community-owned, and the decentralisation of
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decision-making processes (Kasongo, 1998:35; Manyozo, 2007:34-42; McPhail, 2009:28; Quarry,
2008:2-4; Quebral, 2006:1; A. Rogers, 2005:19; Servaes, 1996:75; UNESCO, 2007a:44; United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 2005:2; Waisbord, 2001:5). A positive correlation has
been seen between deeper levels of community involvement and “better development outcomes”
(Rush, 2009:1). If a community believed it owned a beneficial “home-grown” project, people would
voluntarily work to support and sustain it based on “a moral … obligation to work for the well-
being of the community” (Kasongo, 1998:37). If orthodox development models were “about talking
and teaching,” the new participatory models were about “listening and dialogue” (Sparks, 2007:58).
In this way, Pacific immanent development models embody the participatory ethos.
The warmth and humanness of the participatory model has wide appeal but its attractive rhetoric
also conceals “elastic” meanings about the word “participation” (Huesca, 2006:570; Sparks,
2007:71). True to Freire’s warnings about paternalist manipulation, development actors began
putting “a rosy face on business as usual” by wrapping development projects in the new “mantra”
of partnership and stakeholder participation with little evidenced change in praxis (Dagron,
2007b:1; Rush, 2009:8; Servaes, 1996:84; Sparks, 2007:59; Whiteman & Mamen, 2002:52; K.
Wilkins, 2009:2-3). For example, Buala FM’s donor-led production of radio shows around health
messages was touted as “participatory” when in fact only a handful of donor-selected young men
were involved; they were hardly representative of the greater community. Too often development
agencies use the rhetoric of “partnership” and “community engagement” to “manufacture
compliance” and to provide legitimacy to a project whose goals and outcomes are already pre-
determined, as will be seen in the Buala FM story (Rush, 2009:8). Participation is only meaningful
to the extent that villagers have the power to actually affect the outcomes of development projects,
to give their consent before projects begin, and to even refuse them altogether (Dagron, 2007a:198;
Kasongo, 1998:36; Rush, 2009:1, 6; K. G. Wilkins & Mody, 2001:389). Sherry Arnstein’s (1969)
influential eight-step “ladder of citizen participation” remains useful in the Pacific context. It ranks
community informational meetings as “manipulation” or non-participation; community
consultations where villagers’ comments are expressed but not incorporated into the project design
or implementation are ranked as “tokenism.”
Many development projects fail because project implementers lack the will to “start off together”
with the community and rarely are there discussions about “life after the project” to ensure there are
no misunderstandings and messy handovers, as was the case with Buala FM (Dagron, 2009:262;
Engberg, 2005:13-14; Saovana-Spriggs & O'Collins, 2003). Without this sense of community
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engagement, development projects were vulnerable to the end-of-plan collapse when donor funding
ends, as so frequently occurs in the Pacific. When communities are not involved in the early
planning around development projects, such projects will simply be viewed as imposed from the
outside, owned by the donor and not the community, and they will subsequently fail at the project’s
end (Pavarala & Malik, 2007:157; Tavhiso, 2009:75; Wissenbach, 2007:12).
Alfonso Gumucio Dagron (2009:456-458) suggests that some donors never truly intend to
relinquish power over a project to the local community despite “lip service” around participatory
development. This could truly be the case within Pacific community radio. Donor funding is often
available for media-production workshops leading to the creation of radio content around donor-
friendly development objectives. On one hand, this implies that CSOs and others involved in
community media are positioning themselves within aid streams around fashionable development
themes as a way to secure funding. On the other hand, no evidence has been found that donors are
willing to train in organisational and managerial skills that would allow community broadcasters to
survive as public-service businesses.
Maria Eriksson Baaz contributes an insightful post-colonial commentary on the “paternalism of

partnership” and the role of identity formation within relationships operating at the “coal face” of
development activities (Baaz, 2005, 2007; Goodhand, 2007:419). Partnership is thought to create a
more equal relationship between development agencies and project “partners,” enabling the latter to
assume leadership in project design, implementation and post-project sustainability. But Baaz
suggests that that relationship is often constructed within the “post-colonial condition.” In other
words, foreign aid workers self-identify themselves as reliable, organised, committed, open and
trustworthy while their indigenous “partners” are perceived as disorganised, passive, uncommitted,
lacking initiatives, and largely unfit to assume leadership and responsibility. The existence of such
views has been observed in some Australian-led development projects in the Pacific (Higgins,
2008; Hollway, Howes, Reid, Farmer, & Denton, 2011:9, 107). Frequently, such power
relationships are constructed and exercised through the management of communication processes,
such as those involving community radio (Castells, 2009:3; Dagron, 2009:456-457).
Development agencies themselves were unclear about the nature of participatory development and
the role of communication within it (Deane, 2006:3; Fraser, Restrepo-Estrada, & Mazzei, 2007:1).
Many larger development organisations find participatory development approaches a “nuisance”
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and a hindrance to rapid attainment of their project objectives (Dagron, 2009:453). Communication
is often seen as an end to itself through the dissemination of media products designed “to get the
message across” (Dagron, 2007b:2; Deane, 2006:3; Quarry, 2008:2). As found elsewhere in the
world, Australia’s aid program in the Pacific lacks development-communication specialists who are
trained in facilitating dialogue and community engagement as opposed to writing press releases or
conducting ad-hoc media-skills workshops (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2011; Quarry,
2008:11)
PACIFIC RADIO IN PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT PRAXIS
Introduction
Given the emphasis the MacBride commissioners and others placed on the centrality of
communication to society and development, questions of who “owns” the media, who is allowed
opportunities to speak via the media, and on behalf of whom become important issues (M.
Ferguson, 2005:24; Saeed, 2009:466). This section explores the role of radio in Pacific societies,
discusses how community radio is positioned within participatory development theories. and
investigates both the relevancy and implementation of these theories in the Pacific context.
Island radio
Radio is deeply embedded in daily life in the Pacific islands. It pulsates from open windows on city
buses, blares from shop front in busy markets, cascades out of houses in informal settlements, and
choruses through the night as companions for the ubiquitous urban nightwatchmen. Farmers take it
into the fields with them, taxi drivers sing along with it, villagers gather around communal sets to
hear the rugby game, and primary students tune into broadcast school lessons. Outer islanders listen
to shortwave weather bulletins, rural women do their chores while listening to talkback shows, and
the homebound elderly find companionship in its cheerful music and deejay banter. The airwaves
are jammed with “service” announcements about deaths, births, marriages, funerals, school
reunions, community funding-raising events, sporting matches, church activities, arrivals of ships
into port, and even quite personal information such as medical-test results (Korauaba, 2012:91;
Sofield, 2002:14). Indeed, radio connects Pacific people.
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Pacific islanders have among the highest rates of radio set ownership in the developing world. The
Pacific Plan, the regional blueprint for cooperative development, aims to have at least one AM
radio receiver in 90 percent of Pacific households by 2015 (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat,
2007:23). The ratios of radio receivers per 100 people range from a low of nine radio sets per 100
people in Kiribati to high of 102:100 in Samoa. By comparison, ownership rates in sub-Saharan
Africa are 15 radio receivers for every 100 people (Patel, 2011:5). Socio-economic data pertaining
to media accessibility in the Pacific are displayed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Socio-economic factors pertaining to media accessibility in the PICs

Internet Mobile phone
1 GDP per Urban Radio
Population 1 1 users/100 subscribers/
Country capita (US$) pop. 2 receivers/ 2
(July 2013) people 4 100 people
(2012) (2010) 100 people
(2010-11) (2011)
Fiji 896,758 $4,900 52% 28 68 (2004) 84
Kiribati 103,248 $6,100 44% 10 8.9 (2003) 14
Nauru 9,434 $5,000 (2005) 100% 6 62 (1997) 65
Samoa 195,476 $6,300 20% 7 102 (2003) 91 (2010)
Solomons 597,248 $3,400 19% 6 13.2 (2003) 50
Tonga 106,322 $7,700 23% 25 67 (2003) 53
Vanuatu 261,565 $5,000 26% 8 33 (1997) 56
1
source: (US Central Intelligence Agency, 2013).
2
source: (ESCAP, 2013).
3
source: (Woodruff, 2007:14).
4
source: (EarthTrends, 2010).
For many people, mobile phones are replacing the traditional radio receiver. The cost of a basic
mobile phone with a built-in FM receiver can be as low as AU$25 in Fiji and the Solomons. This
technology shift has implications for national broadcasters, which transmit on the AM band due to
its larger transmission footprint. The popularity of radio among everyday people remains strong
despite growing challenges of accessibility and affordability, such as the lack of rural electricity and
deepening rural poverty rates that impinge on people’s ability to purchase radio sets and batteries.
The advantages of using radio to foster development are well known (Berrigan, 1977; Bourges, et
al., 1997; Dagron, 2001; Girard, 2001; Hallett, 2009; P. Lewis, et al., 1993). As found elsewhere,
radio in the Pacific context helps to overcome the multiplicity of languages and vast geographic
distances; it reinforces oral traditions and communal lifestyles; it is affordable to establish and
maintain, and its presence is pervasive. The Pacific’s physical characteristics – hundreds of widely
dispersed islands with small populations or isolated villages nestled in rugged mountains – help to
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explain the continued importance of radio as a lifeline for remote communities. Radio is often
described as the Pacific medium and its only true mass media (Lal & Fortune, 2000:468; Molnar &
Meadows, 2001:76). Radio broadcasting on all bands – shortwave or high-frequency, AM and FM
– is extensively used in development communication. Most Pacific islanders, when asked, will
identify radio as the national broadcaster, a popular FM commercial station, or, more rarely, a
church-based radio station. Low-power FM community radio is virtually unknown. Known secular
community radio stations in the Pacific are listed in Table 3.2. Known faith-based broadcasters, 17
in number, are listed in Table 8.2 on page 256. Only one PIC, Fiji, recognises community radio
within its broadcast regulatory framework. The lack of regulatory recognition presents a barrier to
the emergence of community radio around the world (Buckley, 2006a; Fraser & Restrepo-Estrada,
2001, 2002; McCormack, 2006; Skuse, 2006).
Community radio in development communication
Community radio is sometimes described as “third-sector” media, positioned between government-

affiliated national broadcasters and commercial private broadcasters (Buckley, 2006a:4; P. M.
Lewis, 2008:5-20). Commercial broadcasters tend to focus on profitable urban markets that can be
satisfied with inexpensive entertainment formats delivered by low-cost FM transmission (M.
Armstrong, 2005:281; Asian Media Information and Communication Centre, 2005:11; Mendel,
2011:3; Steemers, 2002:3-4). Unless regulated to do so, they rarely carry public-service
programming and are largely uninterested in serving unprofitable rural areas.
The Pacific commercial radio sector varies greatly, reflecting each PIC’s unique geographical and
socio-cultural contexts. Larger PICs, such as Fiji, Samoa and Tonga, have diverse and vibrant
commercial media sectors, while smaller PICs, such as Nauru and Kiribati, struggle for economic
viability in small markets and widely dispersed populations (The Pacific Media and
Communication Research Consortium, 2013a:15-16). Fiji has the largest private radio sector (10
broadcasters), followed by Samoa and Tonga, each with five (The Pacific Media and
Communication Research Consortium, 2013a:12-13). Some commercial radio broadcasters carry
variable amounts of development-oriented content around issues of gender, youth, health,
environment, and emergency-weather information. However, rural voices are seldom reflected in
such programming due to the high cost and limited availability of transportation to rural areas (The
Pacific Media and Communication Research Consortium, 2013c:14; 2013f:11; 2013h:10).
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Table 3.2 Non-government, non-commercial secular broadcasters in independent PICs, 1998-2013
Radio station Year Owner/Description
Fiji Radio Pasifik 89.4 FM 1996 University of the South Pacific. Off-air 2009. Restarted
December 2011. Based in Suva.
FemTALK 89.2 FM 2004 femLINKPACIFIC, a women’s CSO. Three roving suitcase
radio units located in Suva (Human Capital Ltd), Nadi (west
end of Viti Levu) and Labasa (on northern island of Vanua
Levu).
FNU FM 88.6 July 2012 Fiji National University student station. Based in Suva.
SPC 95.2 FM -- Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Station is operational
about 4 months a year as a training station within a women’s
community development training program. Based in Suva.
Kiribati Kiritimati Radio 93.5 1998 A component of an AusAID-funded water and sanitation
FM project on Christmas Island. Still operational 2013.
Nauru Radio Pasifik-Nauru 2005-2007 University of the South Pacific trial project. Educational
99.9 FM support.
Samoa National University of October Student radio station.
Samoa 105.0 FM 2012
Solomons Buala FM and seven 2007 2007-2010. A cluster of eight radio stations established by
other stations UNDP, later transferred to Isabel Provincial government. On
and off throughout 2012-2013.
Gold FM 88.8 FM May 2011 Self-identified as a community radio station owned by gold
mine. Format is commercial music. Initially was to partner
with Radio BOSCO. Based near Honiara.
One Voice 97.4 FM Pending Solomon Islands Development Trust, a CSO. Proposed
launch in 2011. Still pending May 2013. Based in Honiara.
Radio Temotu March A self-described temporary (six-month) community radio
2013 station established by SIBC, World Vision New Zealand and
NZAID to assist in earthquake recovery. Based in Lata,
Temotu Province.
Tonga Niuatoputapu Radio FM May 2010 Operated 11 months from mid-2010, funded by SPC. Based
88 on island of Niuatoputapu.
Le’o ‘o e Kakai (Voice March Ma’afafine moe Famili. a women’s CSO affiliated with
of the People) 98 FM 2012 femLINKPACIFIC. Based in Nuku’alofa.
Vanuatu CReST FM/Tafea i 2004 Established as a partnership between Vanuatu Education
Toktok Haus FM 104 Dept. and UNICEF. Station operations have been unstable
for technical and human resource reasons. Still operational
2012. Based on Tanna Island.
Talk-back radio is the main form of engagement with rural audiences (The Pacific Media and
Communication Research Consortium, 2013a:36).
Similarly, Pacific governments are “loath” to relinquish control of their national broadcasters, often
reducing them to mouthpieces for the government and denying access to disfavoured community
groups (Fraser & Restrepo-Estrada, 2001:4; Mendel, 2011:3; Price & Raboy, 2001:2; Sorariba,
1994:40-46). National broadcasters are not necessarily public-service broadcasters, or broadcasters
created, financed and controlled by the public (Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting
Development, 2009; Asian Media Information and Communication Centre, 2005:14; Cowling &
Tambini, 2002:4; Joseph, 2005:19, 28; Price & Raboy, 2001:1; E. Smith, 2012:4, 10). Pacific
national broadcasters lack well-designed policies to protect them from pervasive government
107
interference or even to clearly define their service objectives (Samuon, 2004:105; Sorariba,
1994:39-40). Their financial situation everywhere, except perhaps in Fiji, is precarious. Five of the
national broadcasters within my seven study countries exist as “state-owned enterprises” fully
owned and controlled by their governments; two remain as government departments.
National broadcasters play an essential role in nation-building throughout the Pacific; many are
mandated to “assist” their governments to achieve specified national goals (Sorariba, 1994:39).
They seek to create a national dialogue, or public sphere, among widely dispersed islanders to
engage them as “citizens” in discussions around national issues and they often do this in close
partnership with CSOs. Such nation-building efforts are fundamentally important in countries such
as Solomons and Vanuatu that were artificially created during the colonial era and remain
fragmented by geography, culture and language. Lissant Bolton (1999) describes how in colonial
Vanuatu (then known as the New Hebrides) indigenous islanders and sympathetic priests co-opted
the colonial broadcasting service to create a sense of indigenous identity through the airing of
recorded kastom stories and songs, often requested through tenacious letter-writing campaigns.
National broadcasters play essential development roles through the broadcasting of parliamentary
sessions, standardised school-based curricula, agricultural and health information, and emergency-
weather information. For isolated islanders who lack access to health clinics or counselling services
and who live in village settings that offer limited personal privacy, the ability to request and receive
reliable information anonymously through the combination of mobile telephony and radio
broadcasting is quite valuable. However, the views of rural populations are seldom reflected in
national broadcasts except through brief talkback radio interactions. The corporatisation of Pacific
national broadcasters in the 1990s under media-deregulation initiatives have left most deprived of
funding for rural-outreach activities.
In the PICs, more emphasis appears to be placed on building a sense of national identity through
radio broadcasting and less important is community expression through community-based media,
which can be viewed as undesirable or even dangerous. For example, to forecast discussions in
future chapters, broadcast regulators in Solomons are wary of issuing licenses for community radio
stations, fearing that in the wrong hands such little radio stations could re-ignite the internecine civil
unrest, or “tensions,” that nearly destroyed the country from 1998-2003. Additionally, some PICs
are geographically compact, meaning a national broadcaster on Nauru or Niue behaves similar to a
community broadcaster (Molnar, 2007:4).
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But national broadcasters cannot possibly address all of the development priorities of the many
communities that comprise the country and, as urban-based entities, they can exist at a “physical
and mental distance” from rural listeners (Fraser & Restrepo-Estrada, 2001:8; Molnar, 2007:7).
National broadcasters in Solomons and Vanuatu broadcast in island pidgin as part of their nation-
building mandate. Given the limitations of rural school curricula, many villagers lack fluency in
these hybrid languages, thus vernacular community radio fills an important gap. Rural Pacific
communities are information deprived (Molnar, 2005:11). As mentioned, after Niua FM failed,
Niuatoputapuans had no sources of local news other than three town criers equipped with bullhorns
and “the coconut wireless,” or casual conversation.32 Information deprivation is a cause of poverty
(Siemering, 2007a; A. Singer, 2008:149; Slater & Tacchi, 2004:58). The MacBride Report
acknowledged this diversity of contexts when it stated that large media, such as national
broadcasters, and small media, such as community radio, each had its rightful place in development
work: “for different purposes, different means” (International Commission for the Study of
Communication Problems, 1980:57).
Definitions of community media can be “notorious vague” and highly elusive (Carpentier, et al.,
2007:221; Fraser & Restrepo-Estrada, 2001:4; Howley, 2002:4). Proffered definitions frequently
include references to community ownership and management, non-profit status, volunteer-based,
participatory content-making, programming that reflects community needs and interests, small
broadcast range, simple and affordable equipment that is easily operated by non-professional
broadcasters, and “mission driven” as opposed to profit-driven (Fuller, 2007a:3; Girard, 2001:2;
Jankowski, 2002:7; Jayaprakash & Shoesmith, 2007:44; Skuse, 2006:9; UNESCO, 1979:104).
Some definitions of community radio eschew any close association with influences originating
outside of a community’s immediate resource base (Center for International Media Assistance,
2007:5; Fraser & Restrepo-Estrada, 2001:4; Siemering, 2007b:3).
Again, the Pacific socio-cultural attributes add nuanced perspectives. Notions of “formal”
voluntarism, or unpaid work for an organisation or social cause, are foreign concepts, although
Pacific cultures embody rich traditions of informal voluntary service performed on behalf of
families, communities and churches (Low & Davenport, 2002:376; Office for the Community and
Voluntary Sector, 2002; Tamasese, Parsons, Sullivan, & Waldegrave, 2010; Webster, 2007:9-11).
32
On Nauru, the “coconut wireless” was found to be more effective in spreading news and information than the media (Secretariat of
the Pacific Community & Nauru Bureau of Statistics, 2006:6). A 2007 survey found only 50 percent of Nauruan men and 26 percent
of woman listened to radio or TV news weekly; 19 percent of women had no media access at all (Nauru Bureau of Statistics, the
Secretariat of the Pacific Community, & Macro International Inc., 2009:29-32).
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Within the Pacific’s cultural orientation toward pragmatic rent-seeking behaviour and the dearth of
wage employment opportunities, CSOs, such as community radio stations, frequently need to offer
financial incentives to attract and retain volunteers.
Similarly, community radio has been described as “expressions of a community, not for it” or a
platform for community dialogue (Berrigan, 1981:8; Buckley, 2006a:1; Fraser & Restrepo-Estrada,
2002:70; Fuller, 2007a:5; Hollon, 2006; Howley, 2002:13). Communities are often defined as either
geographically bounded areas or “communities of interest,” such as church congregations,
university students or women (Hollander, Stappers, & Jankowski, 2002:26; Jankowski, 2002:5).
But how does one define the “community” in the Pacific context, where communities extend
beyond their physical boundaries, linked by intricate social networks spread over multiple
countries? And within the Pacific culture of silence, who speaks for the community?
Community media are often described as tools of empowerment that offer marginalised
disadvantaged people a “voice” in policy decisions affecting their communities by providing both
vertical (upward to decision-makers) and horizontal (through the community) communication
channels (Buckley, 2006a; Fraser & Restrepo-Estrada, 2001, 2002; Girard, 2001; Skuse, 2006). But
Pacific governments are highly centralised and located in capital cities, thus it is questionable if
national decision-makers listen to community radio. They do, however, listen intently to national
broadcasters and will act swiftly to drive opposition voices from the airwaves (Dorney, 2013;
Korauaba, 2007b:31; P. M. Swain, 1999:154). Buala FM and its seven sister radio stations were
established by UNDP as a means for rural villagers living in Isabel Province to hear and respond to
local government planning initiatives, but the island’s mountainous terrain and intermittent
electricity services meant radio broadcasts were not received in the provincial capital. femLINK’s
roving community radio station was likewise not regularly heard in Fiji’s capital city, but the
content of the rural broadcasts was “transformed” into print advocacy documents that were
disseminated to national policy-makers and others. In this way, femLINK’s radio service functions
as an “organic intellectual,” to use Antonio Gramsci’s term, who “helps to articulate the ideas and
aspirations” of marginalised groups but who also risk distorting the group’s true voice in the rush
toward advocacy and activism around particular causes, in this case women’s security issues
(Howley, 2002:3). Many media-starved rural Pacific islanders are overjoyed to receive a donor-
gifted community radio station that fills their lives with happy music, village announcements in
their local language, and little else, much to the dismay of foreign project implementers who had
envisioned a more substantial programming menu, as was the case in both Niua FM and Buala FM.
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Many Pacific CSOs lack awareness about community radio. Larger CSOs seek partnerships with
national broadcasters to take advantage of the latter’s national broadcast coverage. Some don’t see
the need for village-based media as villagers constantly interact as they do their daily chores, thus
engaging in horizontal community-level dialogue. Villagers frequently travel to nearby villages to
attend weddings and similar social functions and keep in contact via mobile telephony with family
living in provincial and national capital cities, thus sharing and gathering news. Many CSOs have
limited funds for media work and thus prefer printed materials, such as posters, that can lasts for
months on a public bulletin board. Newsletters are eagerly consumed and passed from hand-to-hand
in more literate societies such as Fiji and Tonga. Videos and DVDs are making significant inroads
into rural village life. After-show discussions occur with viewers similar to those employed around
community theatre. Some CSOs are using affordable text-messaging via mobile telephony to spread
information in urban informal settlements. Donor interests around media in Pacific development
work are strongly shifting toward ICT-based applications, such as Internet-connected community
telecentres.
But the greatest challenge to Pacific community radio is sustainability, here defined within Alfonso
Gumucio Dagron’s “three pillars” of social, organisational and financial sustainability (Dagron,
2003, 2005a, 2005b; Dagron & Dlamini, 2004). The three pillars of sustainability include: 1) social
sustainability as expressed through community ownership of the station (either legal or perceived),
community participation in all levels of operations and decision-making, including creation of
relevant programming delivered in local languages; 2) institutional, or organisational, sustainability
such as the internal structures of the station pertaining to its governing board, administrative
systems, human resource management, and related functionality; and 3) financial sustainability,
such as the generation of sufficient revenue from mixed funding sources and through transparent
financial-accountability processes. The three dimensions interact. For example, funds will flow if
communities and donors trust the organisational integrity of the station, its capability to produce
and deliver locally relevant programming, and to operate in transparent, participatory ways. The
lack of organisational sustainability impacts on technical performance (equipment failure), financial
viability (insufficient income generation), and human resources (lack of training and retention of
staff and volunteers). Social sustainability in the Pacific is heavily influenced by culture, which in
turn influences organisational and financial sustainability.
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Community radio stations around the world struggle to achieve these sustainability ideals (Lush &
Urgoiti, 2012:10). Sustainability has become the “holy grail” of the community media movement:
many talk about it but few know how to achieve it (Krüger, 2012:10). Very few community radio
stations in developing countries survive without support from international donors (Carpentier, et
al., 2007; da Costa, 2012:139; Dagron, 2003:1; Hamelink, 2007; Jallov, 2001; 2003:119; Krüger,
2012; Lush & Urgoiti, 2012:26; McFeatters, 2007b:4; Myers, 2011; Saeed, 2009; Tavhiso, 2009:6;
Wissenbach, 2007). Some commentators question if it is even reasonable to expect that community
radio stations in poor communities in developing countries can achieve any level of financial
sustainability (Bautista, 2012a:27; Dagron, 2003:3; McFeatters, 2007b:8; Myers, 2011:18-25).
Donors are often reluctant to provide funding for core administrative services, or organisational
sustainability, for fear of engendering aid dependency (Dagron, 2003:20; Lush & Urgoiti, 2012:26;
Siemering & Fairbairn, 2006:5).
Given the limitations of Pacific economies, the challenges of financially sustaining a community
radio station are enormous. Villagers are cash-poor and most don’t understand the need to support,
financially and otherwise, a community radio station because other broadcasters come to them free
of charge. The rural private sector, as a potential advertising base, is virtually non-existent. Thus
international development agencies are essential partners (Siemering, 2007b:11). But such
sponsorships are not without peril, as mentioned earlier within discussions around Pacific CSOs
(Patel, 2011:4). To paraphrase Godfrey Baldachhino (1993:36-42), economic dependence on
foreign donors to sustain community radio is a rational strategy for Pacific community radio; the
question is how skilfully broadcasters can negotiate within these asymmetrical power relations
without being subsumed by them. Foreign donors eagerly gift suitcase radio stations, which cost as
little as US$8,000, and provide funding for the production of media product around fashionable
development issues, such as the Millennium Development Goals, but they systematically fail to
provide training in organisational sustainability that would allow these broadcasters to grow into a
vibrant self-sustaining entity capable of articulating their community’s voice.
Given the challenges of achieving financial sustainability from within the resources of poor rural
villages and within asymmetrical relationships with foreign donors, many Pacific community radio
stations are turning to other traditional sources of wealth: the church and the government. In this
way, Pacific community radio is responding to its unique social, political and cultural conditions (P.
Lewis, 1993:12-14).
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The role of faith-based broadcasters in Pacific development is surprisingly contentious given the
region’s deep indigenisation of Christianity. Half of all Pacific community radio stations are faith-
based broadcasters. Many secular community radio practitioners contend that Pacific faith-based
radio is not “true” community expression as nearly all programming and funding are derived from
foreign sources. However, Joys Eggins’ (2005, 2007) research into faith-based radio in Papua New
Guinea found that such radio stations do provide valuable development-related programming
interspersed amid thick amounts of religious content. More than 90 percent of her surveyed
villagers listened to both the Protestant Pentecostal and Roman Catholic radio stations and that the
stations’ “moralistic” overtones were acceptable as most listeners were churchgoers themselves.
Additionally, the faith-based stations were the only media providing “vital messages pertaining to
their basic living needs” as both national and commercial broadcasters neglected rural audiences
(Eggins, 2005:48). Some media theorists downplay the importance of community ownership of
community media, citing the significant contribution the Catholic Church has had in creating stable,
sustainable and committed community radio stations around the world. What is important is not
name on the broadcasting license but the levels of benefit the community gains from the station
(Dagron, 2007a:203-204; Jankowski, 2002:9).
Likewise, government partnerships with Pacific community radio provide many advantages, such
as funding, training, technical support, facilities, and electricity. Such direct partnerships, either
with national or provincial governments or via state-owned national broadcasters, exist in Tonga
and the Solomons.
Given the lack of regulatory recognition of community broadcasting in all PICs except Fiji,
community broadcasters receive commercial licenses allowing them to accept advertising. One
often-noted model of financial sustainability is New Dawn FM, in Bougainville, Papua New
Guinea, which is a commercial radio station committed to providing community-participatory
public-service programming (Laukai, 2010). However, a similar private sector model failed in
Solomon Islands. Gold FM in Solomon Islands is owned by an Australian mining interest that
originally desired to partner with Radio BOSCO to help the latter overcome technical difficulties.
However, the local radio staff hired to manage Gold FM had little exposure to the principles of
community radio, thus the station delivers a commercial radio format to the displeasure of its
Australian owners.
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Partnerships between Pacific island and Pacific diaspora community media providers, particularly
those located in New Zealand’s vibrant pan-Pacific media scene, could provide the means for
islanders to enhance their stations’ organisational sustainability, such as through personnel
exchanges that provide opportunities for self-directed learning. These have not yet been explored.
Pacific community radio practitioners themselves acknowledge that deficits in managerial,
leadership and business competencies are major obstacles to the medium’s growth.
In this chapter, I have discussed the historical and theoretical origins of participatory development
models and the role of media within them. The tendency within orthodox modernisation models to
view media as one-way information-dissemination channels is still prevalent in the contemporary
Pacific within donors, governments, CSOs, and churches. One early application of media-driven
modernisation was the American Samoa educational television project in the 1960s which led to
neither sustainable economic development nor improved educational outcomes, although it did
introduced foreign media content delivering American socio-political biases deeply into American
Samoa’s traditional culture. Many of the international broadcasters serving the South Pacific, such
as Australia’s ABC and New Zealand’s RNZI, advance the foreign-policy objectives of their
governments.
Participatory development models arose from within the NIEO and NWICO debates in the 1960s-
1980s and were envisaged as providing community residents with greater influence upon, if not
control over, the social, economic and political changes occurring in their lives. Community radio
was seen as providing accessible channels through which people could have greater voice and
demand greater accountability. I have shown how the Pacific’s unique cultural attributes, such as
the culture of silence, and its geographical and economic conditions have challenged some of these
theories, revealing a gap between community media promise and performance. Pacific community
radio is adopting and adapting models of participatory development and development
communication to suit its unique circumstances.
Pacific community radio faces many challenges. Rural villagers are cash-poor and because they
have limited exposure to community radio, many fail to understand the need to support these
broadcasters, either financially or with volunteer labour. The rural private sector, which could
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provide advertising revenue, is virtually non-existent. Rural community broadcasters are heavily
dependent upon foreign donors for funding and equipment. Foreign donors seek to implant
community radio stations to facilitate the dissemination of their chosen development messages,
often within the rhetoric of participatory development models and frequently with good intentions.
Pacific CSOs are chronically cash poor and they struggle to maintain their integrity within
asymmetrical power relationships with donors. Additionally, international development actors are
shifting focus away from broadcast media toward ICTs as the new “magic bullets” to drive
economic growth and development in the globalised world.
Pacific governments still hold colonial views around the role of national broadcasters in national
development. National broadcasters are subjected to crippling levels of political interference
throughout the region. Most PICs are welcoming toward community media initiatives even though
most fail to recognise community media in broadcast regulations and policies. Some countries,
however, are suspicious about the perceived potential of community radio stations to undermine
nation-building objectives and stir political unrest. Some national broadcasters view community
media as rivals in a small media markets.
Another source of traditional wealth, the church, has an overwhelming presence in the Pacific
community media sector. However, nearly all are dependent on foreign funding and imported
religious programming.
Despite these challenges, the existing community radio practitioners in the region remain optimistic
that the medium will grow once the proper sustainability formula is found. I argue that the
emerging model will reflect Pacific rent-seeking orientation but what remains unresolved is the
fulcrum around which donor interests and islander needs meet. I argue, and the following case
study discussions will show, that islanders are pursuing culturally appropriate models of community
radio, some of which are more successful at accruing rents than others. I will demonstrate that the
greatest obstacle preventing the emergence of Pacific community is its lack of organisational
sustainability. So far, donors have shown no interest in transferring managerial, leadership or
business skills that might allow community radio stations to become independent entities capable of
fulfilling their missions as authentic voices of grassroots islanders.
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Chapter 4
The Missing Medium
Community Radio in the Pacific Broadcast Regulatory Environment
Introduction
Community radio has a proven track record around the world for helping rural communities engage
in dialogue around development issues. In the Pacific, community radio is a new phenomenon,
emerging in the mid-1990s. Many media commentators argue that one reason why community radio
fails to emerge in some countries is the non-existence of policies and regulations that recognise it as
a distinct broadcasting sub-sector (Buckley, 2006a; Fraser & Restrepo-Estrada, 2001, 2002;
McCormack, 2006; Skuse, 2006).
Since the 2000s, the Pacific’s broadcasting regulations have been subsumed or erased off the books
altogether in the rush to deregulate the telecommunication sector in alignment with free-market
economic ideologies. What remains is a broadcasting regulatory environment largely in shambles.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first describes the political dimensions of the regional
telecommunication sector reform movement in the 2000s and its impact upon community media.
The second section discusses how individual Pacific island countries (PICs) have addressed
community media within their broadcast regulatory structure. I will argue that a more nuanced
definition of information and communication technology (ICT) by Pacific governments and their
development partners could better position community radio as the appropriate technology for
development the PICs, especially through hybrid applications of FM radio and mobile telephony.
Expanding definitions of “universal access” provisions in telecommunication regulations would
provide a funding source for community media, as does Fiji’s controversial 2010 Media Industry
Development Decree.
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TELECOMMUNICATION SECTOR REFORMS AND COMMUNITY RADIO
Introduction
The greatest impact on the Pacific broadcasting environment has come from the tidal surge of
regulatory reform in the telecommunication sector occurring in the last 15 years. In the lingering
heat from the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) debates of the 1970s-
1980s, international development agencies have been reluctant to advocate reforming the
broadcasting sector. Broadcast media are seen to be too closely associated with notions of cultural
identity, national sovereignty and expressive “content industries” (Eltzroth, 2006:19; Wessberg,
1999:83, 86). In contrast, the ICTs – telephony, satellite services and Internet – are viewed more as
utilities and therefore are more amenable to market-liberalisation efforts (Eltzroth, 2006:19-22).
Regional development agencies and island leaders within the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
(PIFS) widely agree that ICTs could be powerful tools for development but only if open and
competitive markets and stable regulatory regimes exist (Guild, 2003:7; Network Strategies,
2010b:1; Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2010b:1; Soakai, 2005:6-8).33 The reforms would
follow the free-market, orthodox development model complete with new national regulatory
agencies established, foreign consultants to write new regulatory policies, and aid streams sufficient
to ensure the process flowed in the direction desired by the powerful donor agencies. Nearly two
dozen regional and international development actors are actively involved in telecommunication
reform in the region, making this area a dynamic representation of the asymmetrical relationships
existing between PICs and powerful international development actors.
33
The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (the PIFS) is a regional inter-governmental trade and economic development agency
consisting of Australia and 15 other Anglophone Pacific countries and non-sovereign territories and 12 foreign “dialogue partners,”
such as China and the US. The PIFS is widely perceived to be dominated by Australian interests (Huffer, 2006; Naidu, 2003; Pacific
Conference of Churches, 2001; Penjueli & Morgan, 2008; T. Wood & Naidu, 2004). As mentioned previously, a complex
relationship exists between the PICs and Australia that has its roots in the colonial era when Australia was positioning itself as the
dominant political, economic and military power in the region. Islanders are often unsure if Australia is situating itself as one among
equals or as a new regional power advancing its own commercial and strategic interests at their expense (Campbell, 1992:59;
Fenelon, 2001:25; Fry, 2004:11; Narsey, 2004:3; Saovana-Spriggs & O'Collins, 2003:2-3; Schultz, 2007:11-13).
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Radio and the Pacific Plan
The PICs rely heavily on foreign aid to fund telecommunication-infrastructure development, thus
donor agencies can freely impose their definitions on what would be the “appropriate” ICTs to
drive development in the age of globalisation. Radio is seldom included in these definitions. For
example, the Asian Development Bank restricts its definition of ICTs to telephony and Internet-
based services (Accascina & Gruet, 2003:5). Even within the PIFS, radio is treated like yesterday’s
news. The downgrading of radio as an appropriate ICT for development in the Pacific can be seen
in the evolution of PIFS’ Pacific Plan, the regional blueprint for cooperative development.34
In 2005, the PIFS issued the Pacific Plan and its accompanying Digital Strategy. The Digital
Strategy stated that broadcasting had been a largely neglected area of ICT development in the
region (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2005b:2). Community FM broadcasting was included on
its list of “new” ICTs that could play a transformative role in regional development (Pacific Islands
Applied Geoscience Commission, 2009:10). The Digital Strategy called for a “re-examination” of
the state of broadcasting in the region to both “upgrade” its content and ensure its delivery was “in
line with community needs and technologies” (Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience Commission,
2009:14). This review never occurred nor has the oversight been explained. Instead the drumbeat of
“ICTs for every islander” began to resound through the islands (Guild, 2003).
In 2010, the Digital Strategy was reviewed and renamed the Framework for Action on ICT for
Development in the Pacific (FAIDP). Within the new policy, all mention of community radio had
been excised and replaced with scattered references about the need to strengthen national
broadcasters and improve journalism training (Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2010b:10-12).
Instead of calling for the establishment of community broadcasting, as the earlier Digital Strategy
had suggested, the FAIDP advocated the establishment of computer-outfitted telecentres as the
“appropriate” technology for isolated rural communities (Guild, 2003b:10; Pacific Islands Applied
Geoscience Commission, 2001:3; Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2010b:20, 25; Secretariat of
the Pacific Community, 2001:12-13; 2010:22; 2010b:9).
34
The Pacific Plan emerged from an external review of the PIFS designed to reform the agency after several years of bitter tension
in the PIFS between various PICs and Australia. Despite its respectful language and advocacy for strengthening Pacific cultures and
values, the Pacific Plan presents a “business as usual” approach to trade-led development (T. Wood & Naidu, 2004:4).
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The FAIDP itself is internally confused about the role of radio in Pacific development. It
acknowledges that because of the relative high cost of the new ICTs, radio is still the predominant
means of communication in the Pacific “even though it provides only one-way communication”
(Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience Commission, 2009:4). Such statements reflect a lack of
understanding about the participatory nature of community media and their potential to create both
vertical and horizontal communication channels. The FAIDP further states that because there are
limited available resources in the region, the Pacific needs “cost-effective, technically proven and
appropriate ICT solutions” and that it should avoid “risky and unproven” ones (Secretariat of the
Pacific Community, 2010b:5). So I question why the conjoining of ICTs with time-tested, reliable
and community-based FM radio is not identified.
It is not surprising that the “form” of the ICT intervention chosen to be implemented has overridden
the communicative “function” of media technology: those making the decisions at the national and
regional levels are technicians and engineers, not communication professionals. One community
radio broadcaster spoke of her frustration in trying to discuss on several occasions community
radio’s potentialities with ICT-infatuated officials at the PIFS, the Secretariat of the Pacific
Community (SPC), and UNESCO’s Pacific office.35 “Maybe the boys like their toys,” she said
(“Vanessa,” radio staff, personal communication, 11 Feb. 2011). A broadcast engineer agreed:
“Alas, the UN and others are not into this type of communication any more, if they ever were in an
earnest sense” (“John,” radio partner, personal communication, 17 March 2011).36
Policies such as the FAIDP that focus only on the technical aspects of the “digital divide” address
only part of the problem: they fail to recognise the economic, social and political factors that affect
technology diffusion and adoption. This approach is further muddled by applying “market-driven
international patterns of ICT diffusion” in developing countries (P. N. Howard & Mazaheri,
2009:1160).
The Pacific Plan and its numerous advocacy documents brim with comments about the need to
introduce appropriate technology to the PICs so that islanders might “take advantage of the
opportunities offered by convergence” in the areas of economic growth, good governance, health
35
As mentioned, the SPC serves 22 Pacific nations and non-sovereign territories, both Anglo- and Francophone. For various
reasons, the SPC is seen as more indigenously Pacific than the PIFS. In the late-2000s, a noticeable power shift was occurring
between the two agencies in favour of the SPC and around which agency would be best suited to implement the FAIDP.
36
As part of my research design, interviewees were offered both confidentiality and anonymity, thus pseudonyms were assigned.
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and education (Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience Commission, 2009:16; Pacific Islands Forum
Secretariat, 2010b:8; Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2001:19; 2010b:9).37 Such technologies
must “maximise benefits to communities,” offer equal access to women and rural populations, carry
locally created content preferably in vernacular, and offer access to public information concerning
markets and services, health and education. Ideally, telecentres and other “shared resource centres”
should be established “for village conversations, discussions and activities” centred around the ICT
access points (Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2010b:11).
All of these development objectives have been fulfilled by community radio and/or hybrid radio-
ICT projects elsewhere in the world, yet references to these achievements are missing from Pacific
ICT-development documents (Dagron, 2001; Girard, 2001). Interestingly, in a 2008 survey, rural
ni-Vanuatu villagers said that the Internet was “not applicable” to their lives; they said their
preferred methods for gathering information and communicating were, in order of preference,
mobile telephones, face-to-face conversations with family members, face-to-face conversations
with village leaders, village information centres, the radio, and finally newspapers (Sijapati-Basnett,
2008:73, 86). Given all of this, I ask for who is the Pacific Plan’s “appropriate” technology
appropriate and whose economic sectors are being developed through such development projects?
A 2010 review of the Pacific Plan found that ICT-targeted foreign aid focused in three areas:
technical advice, capacity building and training, and financial support for specific projects. Such
activities tend to “boomerang” the aid back to the donor countries. The report’s authors noted that
ITC-related foreign assistance is driven by the donor country’s “commercial and political interests
and the desire to further business opportunities” (Network Strategies, 2010a:73). Thus not only are
ICT-for-development projects such as the FAIDP embedded within free-market orthodox
development models, they are reflect die-hard colonial orientations to gain political and economic
advantage in and over the islands.
37
Convergence has multiple definitions, such as the coming together of computing, telecommunications, and media in a digital
environment (Pavlik & McIntosh, 2004:19), or a situation in which multiple media systems coexist and media content flows fluidly
across them (Jenkins, 2008:282).
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Issues of national sovereignty in regulatory reform
At the onset of the 2005 Pacific Plan, PIFS officials assured Pacific leaders that their national
sovereignty would not be threatened by regional initiatives such as the Digital Strategy and later
FAIDP. The Pacific Plan would complement national ICT development plans, it was said, and it
would be guided by international standards (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2007:3-5; Secretariat
of the Pacific Community, 2010b:7).
However, as the Pacific Plan evolved through the years, its documents began to reflect a growing
frustration within the international development community around the slower than expected pace
of telecommunication reform. A 2005 report stated that the Digital Strategy needed to be presented
in such a way that “the countries would be willing to ‘buy in’ and implement the advice,” implying
that the Plan was being pushed top-down by the PIFS rather than arising bottom-up from the PICs
themselves (Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific Information and Communications
Technology Working Group, 2005:3).
To hasten the pace of reform and to address a perceived shortage of skilled indigenous
telecommunication professionals, regional development agencies began in 2001 to draft model ICT
legislation to serve as a template. Fijian government officials, however, raised a warning flag and
cautioned the PIFS and affiliated development agencies to “avoid the imposition – or appearance
thereof – of one-size-fits-all prescriptions or identical policy frameworks” (International
Telecommunication Union, 2002:3; Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2001:17). Thus,
telecommunication reform can be just as sensitive with respect indigenous identity and national
sovereignty as reform of the broadcasting sector is thought to be in the post-NWICO world
(Wessberg, 1999:83, 86). Yet, the new telecommunication regulations in some PICs such as
Kiribati and Vanuatu carry similar, if not identical, wording.
Despite assurances that PIC national sovereignty would not be compromised by the
telecommunication reforms, by 2007 Pacific Plan documents were saying that “real sacrifices of
sovereignty” were needed if the PICs are to survive in the globalised ICT-driven economy (Budden,
2007:7). As late as 2010, Pacific Plan documents still called for a model regulatory framework to
implemented in the region; these were to be designed by the PIFS and implemented by the new
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telecommunication regulatory agencies established in many countries (Pacific Islands Forum
Secretariat, 2010b:64).
The language used in various policy papers and strategic plans reveals the pressures placed on PICs
to align themselves with these reforms or risk losing donor aid (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat,
2007:9-10, 38). Many of these documents praised the potential of ICTs to drive Pacific
development within unrealistic scenarios given the realities of life in rural villages where 75 percent
of islanders live. Numerous examples appear in documents that strongly suggest that the authors, all
foreign development consultants, did not make any effort to engage with rural islanders within
participatory development approaches (Accascina & Gruet, 2003:29; ESCAP, 2008; Purbo, Yoon,
Haque, & Keis, 2005:3; Soakai, 2005:7). Some community radio practitioners also questioned why
such consultations did not occur (Rolls, 2007b:19).
Even providing the basic foundations for a successful ICT project in the Pacific can be enormously
challenging: the lack of reliable electricity, affordable bandwidth connectivity, reasonably priced
computers, ICT-skilled professionals and computer-repair technicians, not to mention the non-
existent computer skills and limited English language skills among rural islanders. A 2010 survey
found that 84 percent of rural Solomon Islanders did not have access to a computer and 77 percent
said they didn’t know how to use one (ANU Enterprise, 2011b:11). A different nationwide
Solomon Islands survey found that less than one-third of rural households had electricity but 70
percent had a household radio and 57 percent had a shared mobile phone (Tebbutt Research,
2010:65-67). Of these mobile phones, 40 percent were capable of receiving FM radio. Such
statistics clearly illustrate two points: broadcast radio and radio-enable mobile telephones currently
exist in rural Pacific communities and are being employed by the islanders as culturally appropriate
technologies, while applications of computer-based ICTs fail given the infrastructure deficiencies
and the lack of computer literacy among villagers.
Even PIFS technical staff noted that satellite-based ICTs, such as telecentres, would be “clearly
unaffordable to a majority of the (island) people” (Guild, 2003:3). Most PICs rely on satellites to
provide broadband connectivity as only a handful of larger countries (Fiji, Samoa, Tonga and
Vanuatu) are connected to submarine fibre-optic cables, such as the Southern Cross Cable. The cost
of such satellite services is between five to 20 times higher than in other similar Asia-Pacific
countries such as New Zealand and amounts to one-quarter to one-half of the average annual per
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capita income in many PICs (Guild, 2003:3). Even the FAIDP commented on this paradox of
positioning ICTs to drive development, noting “it will be a long time before all communities in the
Pacific enjoy the benefits of access to ICT and the Internet” (Secretariat of the Pacific Community,
2010b:3). Existing satellite transmission footprints, such as those provided by PACRICS and
PEACESAT, fail to cover the PICs inclusively.
Pacific CSOs have lobbied the PIFS and other development actors to consider community radio
more seriously in their “ITC toolbox,” but current development trends indicate that computer- and
Internet-based ICT projects will remain the predominant focus of donor interests for some time to
come (Hilyard, 2010:5; Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2010a:42-44; 2010b:62-63; Rolls,
2005:5).
Mobile telephony and community radio
Since 2009, the growth of mobile telephony in the PICs has moved at a breathtaking pace due
largely to market deregulation and increased competition among service providers. In Vanuatu,
mobile telephone networks now cover 85 percent of the country, up from 20 percent in 2007; this is
thought to be a greater coverage area than that of the national broadcaster. Similar astounding
growth patterns are seen in other PICs. In 2003, 1.5 percent of Samoans and 3.4 percent of Tongans
used a mobile phone; by 2007 those rates had increased to 48 and 30 percent of the population,
respectively (Sijapati-Basnett, 2008:1).
Islanders use their mobile phones to supplement, but not replace, indigenous communication
patterns, such as consulting with village chiefs and affirming relationships with diaspora family
members (Sijapati-Basnett, 2008:44; Tebbutt Research, 2010:55-57). Such patterns support Susan
Maiava’s (2002) contention that sustainable Pacific development occurs naturally as islanders adopt
and adapt exogenous technology to suit their cultural and economic needs.
The costs associated with mobile telephony usage and the impact these costs have on the limited
incomes of many islanders is not without controversy (Kumar, 2009; Rolls, 2007b:23). However,
since the mid-2000s, rates have been steadily dropping. If one uses as a base standard a monthly
usage pattern of 33 local calls and five national calls, the cost for such a service represents 16
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percent of the average ni-Kiribati’s monthly income but only 2.5 percent for the average Tongan.
Rates in other PICs, based on a percentage of average monthly income, range from around 4
percent in Samoa, 4.5 percent in Fiji, 7 percent in Vanuatu, 9 percent in Nauru, and 13 percent in
Solomon Islands (Network Strategies, 2010a:47-49). However, in many PICs, “imperfect market
conditions” exist where duopolies reap significant profits but consumers suffer erratic service and
lack complaints mechanisms (Kumar, 2009:2-4).
Despite this, the evidence still suggests that community radio especially when conjoined with
mobile telephony holds great potential to be the appropriate technology for development
communication in the region (Tacchi, 2005:346, 351).
COMMUNITY RADIO WITHIN NATIONAL BROADCASTING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENTS
Introduction
One noticeable trend arising from Pacific telecommunication reform is the tendency to repeal or
supersede existing broadcasting regulations with newer telecommunication regulations. However,
these new regulations do not carry-over or address the broadcasting issues of the older regulations.
This section discusses how community radio is positioned within national broadcast regulatory
environments in the seven case study countries. Fiji, through its controversial 2010 Media Industry
Development Decree, is the only PIC to recognise community radio as a distinct sub-sector and it
provides a funding model for other PICs to consider. Solomon Islands, which has more community
radio stations than any other PICs, is a post-conflict environment where community radio is viewed
with some suspicion due to fears it could re-ignite civil unrest. In Vanuatu, debates have been raised
concerning definitions of who is a “local” and should non-indigenous people be allowed to operate
radio stations.
The impact of convergence on regulatory policy
The technical argument that broadcasters need to be regulated because they use scarce public
resources (radio spectrum) is losing value in today’s “converged” ICT environment. International
case law and many international treaties, such as the International Telecommunication Union
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(ITU)’s International Radio Regulations, acknowledge the right of sovereign states to manage the
radio spectrum assigned to their countries. Some PIC media regulations acknowledge that the ITU
policy underlies their country’s framework (Republic of Kiribati, 2004:4).
In the early years of broadcasting, regulations were required for technical reasons to prevent
interference in a congested spectrum environment. Broadcasting regulations and policies are
intended to share the radio spectrum equitably and impartially among the various users, including
community media, to ensure the public goods are not monopolised by richer countries, or even the
richer areas within one country “even for the most profitable services” (Chaduc & Pogorel,
2008:69).
Since the late-1990s, digital- and computer-based technologies have allowed for the “convergence”
or melding of various media formats into one common platform (Eltzroth, 2006:28; Secretariat of
the Pacific Community, 2010b:6). For example, many islanders now listen to FM radio on mobile
phones. In rural Solomon Islands, “third-generation” mobile handsets can access the Internet at
connection speeds often faster than those offered by conventional dial-up modems. The
revolutionary changes occurring in compression and digitisation technologies are “blurring the
bright line distinction” between the telecommunication and broadcasting sectors (Eltzroth,
2006:22). So-called “stovepipe” regulations which cover only one part of the ICT sector, such as
broadcasting or telephony, are no longer feasible in this era of “spectrum spread” (Buckley, et al.,
2008:243; Eltzroth, 2006:15). Convergence suggests that the radio spectrum is no longer a finite
natural resources that needs government oversight and protection (Eltzroth, 2006:28; Pacific Islands
Forum Secretariat, 2010b:6).
But regulatory frameworks are more than just technical spectrum-allocation schemes designed to
maximise the commercial use of the airwaves, as suggested by free-market viewpoints.
Regulations, laws and policies affect “the shape, context and social impacts” of the broadcasting
and telecommunication sectors (Buckley, et al., 2008:iii). Regulatory agencies should ideally
function as referees between commercial interests and the people’s interests by ensuring
broadcasters and telecommunication service providers meet “non-market, public policy objectives”
(Raboy, 2002:13; 2005:8). Without regulatory oversight, commercial broadcasters will focus on
profitable urban markets and inexpensive entertainment formats and they neglect rural audiences
and public-service programming (M. Armstrong, 2005:281; Asian Media Information and
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Communication Centre, 2005:11; Mendel, 2011:3; Steemers, 2002:3-4). Similarly, profit-driven
telecommunication providers, such a mobile telephony services, will “cherry-pick,” serving only
lucrative urban populations and neglecting unprofitable “last mile” rural ones, thus regulators
necessarily protect the interests of poor and rural communities (P. N. Howard & Mazaheri,
2009:1166; Purbo, et al., 2005:13).
The common result of this rationale was to simply separate broadcasting and telecommunication
into two distinct sectors, each with its own regulations and regulator. But as part of the Pacific
telecommunication reform movement, most regulators were merged with broadcasting now
subsumed under telecommunication. When telecommunication reform efforts began in earnest in
the early 2000s, most PIC regulations were considered “outdated, insufficient or non-existent” to
meet the challenges and opportunities of the new converged or digitised global environment
(Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific, 2002:8; Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience
Commission, 2001:4; Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2001:17). Table 4.1 notes each PIC’s
year of market deregulation and the relevant broadcasting legislation.
Table 4.1 Broadcast legislation in select PICs affecting community radio

Country Enabling legislation Open to private broadcasters
Fiji Broadcast Licensing Bill 2006 (before Senate for approval Television 1992
when 2006 Coup dissolved Parliament) Radio 1998
Media Industry Development Decree 2010

Kiribati Broadcasting and Publications Authority 1979 1993
Telecommunications Act 2004, Section 74
Radio-Communications Regulations 2005
Nauru Telecommunications Act 2002 (enacted 2011) 2002, but no private or community
broadcasters as of 2013.
Samoa National Broadcasting Policy 2005 1988
Telecommunications Act of 2005
Radio Spectrum Fees Regulations 2007
Broadcasting Act 2010
Solomons Broadcasting Act 1996 (creation of SIBC) 1995 (television only)
No regulations governing broadcast radio
Tonga Radiocommunication Act 1988 1989
Broadcasting Act 1989 (repealed 2000)
Communications Act 2000
Vanuatu Broadcasting and Television Act 1992 1992
The state of Pacific regulators
Community-media advocates have compiled a series of “best practice” standards to evaluate a

country’s regulatory environment and its “friendliness” toward the community radio sector
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(ARTICLE 19, 2003; Carver, 2006; J. Fairbairn, 2009; International Programme for the
Development of Communication & UNESCO, 2008; Mendel, 2002; Salomon, 2008; Sanchez,
2003). Three benchmarks have been singled out for discussion within the Pacific context: the
creation of a regulator independent of both the government and commercial interests; the licensing-
application process; and restrictions governments place on community and other broadcasters in
terms of content, transmission power or funding resources.
International guidelines suggest that the media regulator should be independent of both government
interference and pressures from the media sector. Indicators of independence include the regulator’s
funding sources and the composition of the regulatory commission. The ideal situation would have
a regulator funded by fees placed upon the media industry through licenses, but realistically, in
smaller economies, the cost of the regulator must be met by the government despite the risks of
government interference (Salomon, 2008:21-22). All regulators in my case study countries except
Vanuatu oversee both the broadcasting and telecommunication sectors, with the latter’s burgeoning
mobile telephony sub-sector commanding most of their attention. Table 4.2 provides more detail.
All regulators, except Solomons, are at least partially funded by their governments.
The Telecommunication Commission Solomon Islands, or TCSI, is funded by the World Bank and
AusAID through 2015, thus opening this regulator to pressures from the international development
community and its free-market orientation (Telecommunication Commission Solomon Islands,
2010:1; 2011:6). This curious arrangement is a direct result of the donor-led push to deregulate the
Solomons’ mobile-telephony sector. In 2003, Solomon Telekom received from the government a
15-year exclusive license to operate mobile telephony services within the country. The passage of
the 2009 Telecommunications Act required the government to open its markets to multiple
providers. The Sogavare Government tried to revoke Solomon Telekom’s exclusive license and
Solomon Telekom sued the government to protect its interests (Islands Business, 2007). A 2009
settlement found Solomon Telekom relinquishing its monopoly license for an undisclosed payment.
The size of this payment will consume, through 2015, the entirety of the 2 percent annual levy
placed upon mobile-telephony service providers to fund the work of the TCSI as allowed in the
Telecommunications Act. The World Bank and AusAID agreed to fund the TCSI until the
government debt to Solomon Telekom has expired (Telecommunication Commission Solomon
Islands, 2011:6). The annual cost of this aid is estimated at SB$13 million (AU$1.7 million)
(Telecommunication Commission Solomon Islands, 2010:1).
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Table 4.2 Broadcast-associated regulators in select PICs
Country Regulatory authority Board composition Scope of authority Funding
Fiji Telecommunications N/A Telecommunication, Government and fees
Regulatory Unit, Ministry broadcasting,
of Public Enterprise, spectrum
Industry, Tourism, Trade
and Communication
Kiribati Telecommunications Appointed by Minister for All telecommuni- Government and fees
Authority of Kiribati Communication, cation including
Transportation and mobile telephony,
Tourism Development maritime, amateur
radio, etc. Also
Chair: Government training and exams
permanent secretary, multi- for radio operator
stakeholder public advisory proficiency
board. certification.
Nauru Republic of Nauru Appointed by Cabinet. National telephone, Revenues from
Telecommunication Includes representatives broadcasting, telephone services,
Corporation or RONTEL from NGOs, consumers, transportation radio telecommunication
business and government. services licenses and, as
needed, government.
Samoa The Office of the Regulator appointed by the Telecommunication, Fees from services
Broadcast Regulator head of state. broadcasting and
(identical to the postal sectors
telecommunication Provisions for separate
regulator) tribunals for appeals of
regulator decisions in
broadcasting and
telecommunication issues.
Solomons Telecommunication Appointment by an All World Bank and
Commission Solomon evaluation committee telecommunication AusAID through 2015.
Islands comprised of the heads of services including
the Central Bank, the broadcasting Fees include
national Chamber of spectrum licenses. administrative, licence
Commerce and Industry, fee, and maximum 2
and the Law Reform percent levy on gross
Committee. revenues.
Tonga Prime Minister, acting as No provision Telecommunication, Fees determined by
Minister for including Department of
Communication broadcasting Communication, plus
government funding
Vanuatu Vanuatu Broadcasting Appointed by minister. Broadcasting, Government and fees
and Television includes licensing of
Corporation (radio Provisions for creation of equipment dealers
licensing), Office of the advisory boards as
Prime Minister needed.
Telecommunication and Appointed by minister. Telecommunication Government and fees
Radiocommunication and spectrum
Regulator (radio No provisions for a
spectrum license) commission.
The degree of independence of other Pacific broadcast regulators varies widely. In Tonga, the
Prime Minister in his capacity as the Minister of Communication is the regulator with no advisory
board or right of appeal of his decisions aside from the national court system (Legislative Assembly
of Tonga, 2000). To foreshadow future discussions within the case studies, this dual role allowed
the Prime Minister’s personal interests in Niua FM to affect the government’s claim of ownership
over Niua FM.
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In Kiribati, Nauru and Vanuatu, the government is closely involved in managing the broadcasting
and telecommunication sectors. In Vanuatu, the national broadcaster is also the broadcasting-
licensing authority, which presents a curious conflict of interest wherein licenses for broadcast
competitors might not be easily let. In mid-2011, the Vanuatu Broadcasting and Television
Corporation, the broadcast regulator, was recruiting its first broadcasting regulatory officer.
By contrast, Samoa’s regulations specifically state the importance of separating government policy
from regulatory functions. It has created a quasi-judicial Broadcasting Tribunal that is free from
even oversight by the national court system (Legislative Assembly of Samoa, 2010). Fiji and the
Solomons have separate disputes panels to adjudicate challenges to decisions made by the regulator.
Kiribati and Vanuatu have established public advisory commissions. Fiji’s 2009 Spectrum Decree
also placed itself outside of the jurisdiction of the nation’s legal system (Government of Fiji, 2009).
The decree converted all existing broadcast licenses to temporary status pending a comprehensive
review of Fiji’s spectrum management policy; broadcasters were issued new broadcasting
frequencies in July 2011.
Community radio in national broadcasting regulations
Regulations that recognise community media as a distinct sub-sector within the overall broadcasting
industry help encourage the growth of the sector (Buckley, 2006a; 2006b:7-9; 2010; Buckley, et al.,
2008:26-39; Dymond, et al., 2011a:80-81; Eltzroth, 2006:30-31; Eltzroth & Kenny, 2003:14; J.
Fairbairn, 2009:28-32; Fraser & Restrepo-Estrada, 2002; Hussain, 2008:5; Karlekar, 2009:9;
McCormack, 2006; McFeatters, 2007:4; Skuse, 2006). Globally, about 100 countries have enacted
regulations that recognise community media. In the Pacific, only Fiji has done so.
Pacific community radio stations find themselves in a problematic regulatory environment where
they are grouped with private broadcasters, meaning they often suffer prohibitively costly licensing
fees, as noted in Table 4.3. Additionally, community radio can face unfair competition from
national and commercial broadcasters that might jealously try to squeeze them out of a limited
advertising market, which is apparently the situation with Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM in Tonga (Buckley,
2010) and (“Ofa,” radio staff, personal communication, 16 Jan. 2012).
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In most PICs, the process to apply for a community radio license is cloudy. Table 4.3 details the
licensing process in the case study PICs. In Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu, potential broadcasters need
to visit separate regulatory agencies to acquire first a broadcasting license and then a spectrum
license. Fiji and Tonga also assess a broadcast station’s business plan for viability before issuing a
broadcast license. In the Solomons, no radio broadcasting regulations exist at all
(Telecommunication Commission Solomon Islands, 2011:8). The TCSI in its role as spectrum
manager issues radio licenses. Broadcasters pay a SB$200 (AUD$23) yearly spectrum fee.
Table 4.3 Licensing process for third-sector media in select PICs, 2011
Country Issuing agency Fee Comments
Fiji Department of FJ$1,500 (AU$795) License duration: 1
Communication, Ministry of year
Public Enterprises, Tourism
and Communication
Kiribati Telecommunications AU$1,000 (set by relevant minister, not License duration: 1
Authority of Kiribati Authority) year
Nauru RONTEL N/a. USP’s Radio Pasifik-Nauru paid License duration: n/a
AU$1,500 for a broadcast license.
Samoa Office of the Regulator Fees (set by the head of state) vary License duration: 1
(telecommunications) according to transmission power and may be year?
based on percentage of revenue generated
Also serves as Office of the by license. Ministry of
Broadcaster Regulator Communication and
First-year license: Information
Application fee: S$50 (AU$21) Technology oversees
Annual charge: S$75-$150 (AU$31.50-$63) Broadcasting Act
2010 (re: market
Renewal: competition and
Application fee: S$35 (AU$14.70) public service
Annual fee: S$75-$150 (AU$31.50-$63) requirements.
Solomons Telecommunication SB$200 spectrum fee (AU$23) License duration: 1
Commission Solomon year
Islands
Tonga Minister or Secretary of T$3000 per annum for a commercial FM License duration: 3
Communication radio license, but Prime Minister can years
determine a fee on case-by-case basis. Fee
may include a percentage of profit of radio
station.
Vanuatu Vanuatu Broadcasting and License Fee: n/a N/a
Television Commission (also
the national broadcaster)
Telecommunications and Spectrum fee and spectrum charge Set by regulator
Radiocommunications
Regulator
Even in countries with strong governmental control of the media sector, such as Tonga, applications
for community-broadcasting licenses appear to be entertained and granted. Tongan regulators said
community radio stations now pay the commercial broadcast license fee of T$3,000 (AUD$1,721)
but can apply for a refund when the country’s communication law is amended in the unspecified
future to accommodate community radio (“Kainga,” engineer, personal communication, 13 Jan.
2012).
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Nearly all PIC broadcasting regulations offer a potential back-door clause that could be used to
license and establish community radio stations. For example, the relevant government minister has
the authority to exempt radio license requirements from certain applicants (Samoa), or to issue
“special licenses” (Tonga, Kiribati), or to develop broadcasting services “to the best advantage and
interests of the country” (Vanuatu).
Some of the new telecommunication regulations could be interpreted to provide support for growth
of community radio under “universal access” provisions. Universal access policies are designed to
encourage the spread of telecommunication, usually mobile telephony, into rural areas where
market conditions alone might not stimulate service providers to offer services there. Fiji, Samoa,
Solomons, Tonga and Vanuatu have enacted such policies. Samoa’s legislation specifically includes
free-to-air broadcasting services in rural areas (Legislative Assembly of Samoa, 2010:26-29).
Vanuatu includes radio and television services under its definition of telecommunication services
requiring universal access (Vanuatu Ministry of Infrastructure and Public Utilities, 2011:3).
The third international “best practice” criterion addresses any exceptional restrictions placed on
community broadcasters in terms of content, transmission power, or funding resources. Often
discussions around media regulations pertaining to content restrictions devolve into conversations
about the need for constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of expression and information (Sanchez,
2003:9; M. Wilson, Hanley, van der Gaag, Whiting, & Dennis, 2004:9). All of the PICs under study
guarantee freedom of expression, but only about half offer specific guarantees of freedom of the
press, as shown in Table 4.4.
All governments, including those in the PICs, use their spectrum-allocation authority to regulate
media content. Most PICs broadcast regulations contain standard prohibitions pertaining to hate
speech and defamation (Government of Fiji, 2010; Legislative Assembly of Samoa, 2010;
Legislative Assembly of Tonga, 2000; Parliament of Solomon Islands, 1995; Republic of Kiribati,
2004; Republic of Nauru, 2002; Republic of Vanuatu, 1992). Many have enacted positive
regulations pertaining to privacy protection and cultural preservation. Fiji’s 2010 Media Industry
Development Decree contains a 34-point list in its media code of ethics and practices (Government
of Fiji, 2010). It also contains the region’s first “shield” law for journalists, intended to safeguard
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journalists’ right to protect news sources, a point seldom discussed in the literature pertaining to this
controversial decree.
Table 4.4 Constitutional freedoms pertaining to expression, information and the press in select
PICs
Country Freedom of Freedom of Freedom of Defamation/
expression press information slander
Fiji section 11 section 11(1)(b) section 11(1)(a) section 11(b)(ii)
Constitution section 11(g) section 11(c)
abrogated 10 April
2009
Kiribati section 3(b) No provision section 12(1) section 12(b)
Constitution enacted section 12
1979
Nauru section 3(b) section 12(3)(c) section 12(3)(b) section 12(3)(b)
Constitution enacted section 12 section 12(3)(d)
1968
Samoa section 13(a) No provision section 13 No provision
Constitution enacted
1962
Solomon Islands section 12(1) section 12(b) section 12(1) section 12(2)(b)
1978
Tonga section 7 section 7 No provision section 7. Includes
Constitution enacted restrictions “for the
1875, revised 1988 protection of the King
and the Royal Family.”
Vanuatu section 5(1)(g) No provision No provision No provision
1980
Fiji and Samoa mandate that private broadcasters meet non-market, public-service requirements,
although these are not quantified in Fiji’s regulations. Samoa’s 2005 National Broadcasting Policy
stipulates eight non-economic objectives that all broadcasters must deliver (Samoa Ministry of
Communications and Information Technology, 2005a:7). Tongan regulators said that radio
broadcasters are required to devote 15 percent of their air time to public-service programming but
this requirement is not made explicit in the country’s licensing laws. The other PICs are silent on
the issue.
Nearly all PIC broadcasting regulations grant the government authority to prevent or force the
airing of material. Tongan broadcasters are required to air religious programming on Sundays
(Legislative Assembly of Tonga, 2000:24-25). Additionally, broadcast-license application
processes have been politicised in Kiribati in 1999, Fiji since 2006, and Vanuatu in 2010 wherein
broadcast licenses have been denied to those opposing the government (Freedom House, 2005;
Perrottet, 2010a).
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Tonga limits the transmission power of all broadcasters to 100 watts. Tonga and Solomons allow
community radio to carry advertising, Fiji prohibits advertising but allows for underwriting or
sponsorships, and the other PICs are silent on these matters.
Several PICs have recently discussed the need to adopt regulatory provisions concerning
community radio. Nauru’s economy is thought to be too small to support a diversified media sector.
In 2009, participants in a UN-sponsored workshop discussed the need to broaden Nauru’s
broadcasting choices beyond the government broadcaster and to explore ways to encourage the
development of an independent or community broadcaster (United Nations Development
Programme, 2009:3). National planning documents call for a “private” broadcasting sector to be
established by 2015 and be fully engaged by 2025 (Nauru Government, 2005:91-92). Samoa, while
reviewing its national broadcast policy in 2005, purposely declined to create tiered licensing
categories that might have acknowledged community media (Samoa Ministry of Communications
and Information Technology, 2005a:8). Samoa has no fewer than six faith-based community
broadcasters. In Vanuatu, the government’s policy appears conflicted. It states as a national priority
that rural areas should be well served by radio services but then restricts the use of public subsidies
to nationwide radio services only (Republic of Vanuatu, 2002:22-23). The national broadcaster,
VBTC, covers about 70 percent of the country.
Fiji’s struggle to enable community media
One of the Pacific’s most interesting media acts that concern community radio is Fiji’s 2010 Media
Industry Development Decree. The case illuminates the forces at play in the struggle to find a
balance between public interest and commercial interests in a nation’s media system. At least three
governments over the course of 23 years have attempted and failed to engender a more public-
interest media system.
Briefly, in the mid-1990s, the Rabuka Government (1992-1999) initiated a review of Fiji’s media
laws during a time of sustained tension between the government and the largely foreign-owned Fiji
press. At the time, Fiji’s broadcasting laws had been in effect and unchanged for 40 years. The
government commissioned a consultant, the UK-based Thomson Foundation, whose influential
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report addressed a number of issues concerning media licensing, foreign and cross-ownership,
journalist training and standards, and freedom of information (Molnar, 2005:134-135). The report
led to the creation in 1998 of the Fiji Media Council, a self-regulating industry panel composed
primarily of commercial media owners. The council lacked representation from working journalists
and third-sector media and has been criticised as protecting media-owner interests (Anthony,
2008:61; Herman, Siwatibau, & Sweetman, 2009:5-6).
The Qarase Government (2000-2006) carried forward the previous government’s media-reform
agenda through the introduction of two bills, the 2003 Media Council Bill and the 2006 Broadcast
Licensing Bill. The latter bill had sought to create an independent Broadcast Licensing Authority to
ensure broadcasters operated in the public interest, to fairly and transparently issue broadcast
licenses, and to equitably share the radio spectrum among the three tiers of broadcasting (public,
private and community), the two types of broadcasters (television and radio), and broadcasters of
different geographic reach (national and local) (Parliament of Fiji Islands, 2006a:4-13). The bill
restricted license holders to Fiji citizens and residents or corporations with majority ownership held
by Fiji citizens and residents. Such ownership restrictions are commonly found in broadcasting laws
around the world (Eltzroth, 2006:20; Eltzroth & Kenny, 2003:12). Both bills elicited harsh and
sustained opposition from local and international media organisations (Parliament of Fiji Islands,
2006). The government withdrew the 2003 bill due to public opposition. The second bill was before
the Fiji Senate for ratification when a coup led by Commander of the Armed Forces Voreqe
“Frank” Bainimarama dissolved the Parliament in December 2006.
The Bainimarama Government inherited a vitriolic relationship with the press. This relationship
soured even further when the military government abrogated the Fiji Constitution in April 2009 and
enacted a series of “public emergency regulations” (PER) that restricted many civil liberties,
including rights of assembly and freedom of the press, and placed military censors in newsrooms.
However, two years prior to these events, the Fiji Human Rights Commission had commissioned its
own review of the freedom and independence of Fiji’s media. The resulting highly controversial
Anthony report, as it is called, recommended the establishment of a media tribunal that would,
among other things, “set about establishing community radio and community/public television”
(Anthony, 2008:11-12). It was suggested that the tribunal be funded by a 7 percent levy on all
media revenue derived from advertising (Anthony, 2008:10). The report was widely condemned by
the Fiji media industry.
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In 2010, the Bainimarama Government resurrected the 2006 Broadcast Licensing Bill, merged into
it elements from the Anthony Report and media laws from other countries, such as Singapore and
France, and enacted it as the 2010 Media Decree. Not surprisingly, the national, regional and
international press responded vociferously, in particular Rupert Murdoch's News Corp
conglomerate that owned the profitable Fiji Times. Media representatives protested against the
restrictions placed on media ownership. The Bainimarama government countered that press reports
in the foreign-owned local press had been biased, inaccurate and sought to destabilise the
government. These confrontations reflect the competing viewpoints found in the NWICO debates
of the 1980s: the first that the free flow of information was an individual human right protected
from government control, and the other that governments could limit individual rights in the interest
of benefiting the nation by balancing the flow of information to protect its culture and social order
(Raube-Wilson, 1986:112-114).
The furore in the international media around the 2010 Media Decree focused solely on journalistic
freedoms and media ownership. Ignored were the provisions in the new decree that supported the
growth of community media, both through specific recognition of the sub-sector and the creation of
a funding scheme to grow it. The decree created both an independent Media Tribunal to adjudicate
public complaints concerning the media and a Media Industry Development Authority (MIDA) to
grow the overall media sector.38 Community radio and television are specifically singled out for
attention. The growth of community media would be seeded through a 7 percent levy on advertising
revenues accrued by commercial media, the same strategy the Anthony Report had recommended
(Moore, 2008:3).
Fiji’s proposed advertising levy resembles France’s community media-funding scheme. The French
broadcasting regulator (Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel) recognises five classifications of
private broadcasters: non-commercial, local, community and student radio stations. Qualified radio
stations can apply for funding ranging from US$5,000-US$150,000 per annum. The fund, known as
the Radio Expression Support Fund (Fonds de Soutien à l’Expression Radiophonique), is sustained
through a tax on advertising expenditures that is paid by advertisers, not by the media outlets
themselves as in Fiji’s decree. By 2004, the French fund was distributing between US$28 million-
US$37.25 million per annum, enough to provide about half of the annual operating expenses for
approximately 600 community radio stations (Buckley, 2010; Dymond, et al., 2011b).
38
The MIDA is comprised of representatives from the government, the media industry and civil society, and thus is thought to be
more responsive to public complaints about media performance that the industry-controlled Fiji Media Council.
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Fiji’s proposed advertising levy also resembles universal-access levies imposed on
telecommunication service providers. As mentioned, both Samoa and Vanuatu include broadcasting
media in their universal access definition (Legislative Assembly of Samoa, 2010:26-29; Vanuatu
Ministry of Infrastructure and Public Utilities, 2011:3) In Vanuatu, telecommunication service
providers are assessed up to 4 percent of their net revenue. In Solomons, the levy stands at a
maximum 2 percent of gross revenue.
The notion that media should place public interest over commercial interests is found repeatedly in
legislation and policy statements issued by both the Qarase and Bainimarama governments (Islands
Business, 2012; National Council for Building a Better Fiji, 2008:57; Republic of Fiji, 2008). Fiji’s
struggles to recognise and grow a community media sector illustrate the challenges that can arise
when the economic interests of powerful foreign-owned media are asked to accommodate another
player in the media landscape. It remains uncertain if the 2010 Media Decree will survive Fiji’s
return to an elected government, set for 2014.
Solomon Islands’s wary support amid spectrum confusion
The Solomon Islands hosts more community radio stations that any other Pacific country despite
concerns within the government about the potential of community radio to reignite ethnic tensions
in the country. As mentioned, the Solomons has no radio broadcasting regulations. The country’s
first community radio station, Radio BOSCO, is one of my case studies.
From 1998-2003, the Solomons was engulfed in a period of violent civil unrest, commonly called
the “tensions,” which nearly destroyed the country, killed at least 200 people, and displaced
thousands of others (Ata, Macher, Madraiwiwi, Laore, & Teke, 2013:3). Radio BOSCO served nine
villages in Tetere in rural Guadalcanal Province, located near the epicentre of the tensions.
For several years in the late-2000s, there was widespread public confusion over the availability of
FM radio spectrum for Guadalcanal Province. In late 2010, engineers in the newly established
Telecommunication Commission Solomon Islands (TCSI) reworked the spectrum allocation plan
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and released additional spectrum. Now that physical spectrum constraints have been eased,
regulators said, they were bracing for more community-radio applications.
The biggest threat that unregulated community radio brings to post-conflict Solomons, according to
one interviewee, “Elias,” is the “politicisation” of a community where station organisers “will align
the people…. Goodness only knows what they will be doing with that radio station” (Personal
communication, 25 Feb. 2011). One example of governmental oversight was the requirement
placed on Radio BOSCO to broadcast only in Solomons pidgin or English, not in the vernacular of
Radio BOSCO’s communities, so that government officials could monitor the programming content
(“Lyndon,” CSO representative, personal communication, 7 March 2011).39 Solomon islanders
speak more than 70 languages. Community radio’s capability to broadcast in vernacular was found
to be important in the Buala FM case study as most rural villagers were not sufficiently fluent in
Solomons pidgin to understand the programming of the national broadcaster.
Interviewees with the telecommunication regulator, the national broadcaster and some non-
governmental organisations all said they were concerned about the potential for community radio to
reignite ethnic tensions in the country. “Elias” said a government policy was needed to set
qualification standards on communities wishing to develop radio stations “because while we want
to promote our culture, we have to link our own needs to our country. We just cannot try to do
something that might contradict what we might call diversity, or unity, or whatever we call it”
(Personal communication, 25 Feb. 2011).
Thus community radio and its perceived potential to enhance community dialogue runs counter to
objectives within the national government to build a sense of national identity and cohesion,
especially within post-conflict areas such as Radio BOSCO’s listening communities.
Vanuatu’s debate over definitions of “local” media
Around the world, governments are acknowledged to have authority to regulate media ownership to
reflect the context of the society in which the media operate (Buckley, et al., 2008:26; Eltzroth,
2006:20; Eltzroth & Kenny, 2003:12). Vanuatu’s 2010 debates about definitions of “local” media
39
However, Radio BOSCO volunteers indicated that they did broadcast in the Tetere vernacular.
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“ownership” has implications for the growth of community radio as about half of the existing
Pacific community radio stations have been established by non-Pacific people or organisations.
In 2010, the publisher of the Vanuatu Daily Post newspaper, Marc Neil-Jones, applied for a radio
broadcast license. Neil-Jones is a controversial journalist noted for his aggressive reporting style.
When he applied for the license, Neil-Jones had lived in Vanuatu for about 21 years and had
become a naturalised citizen. The Media Association of Vanuatu (Media Asosiesen blong Vanuatu)
opposed Neil-Jones’ radio licence application, arguing that media ownership should be restricted to
indigenous ni-Vanuatu (Trease, 2011:518). One opponent stated that even naturalised citizenship
wasn’t sufficient to qualify because “a foreigner is a foreigner … you are still the same and you
have the same mentality” (Perrottet, 2010b:2). The Pacific Islands News Association, a regional
professional organisation, also opposed Neil-Jones’ license application, saying that Pacific
journalists are all ready marginalised in their own countries given than foreigners have better access
to funding to establish media outlets (Perrottet, 2010a).
The issue was not about cross-ownership of media as the director of a competing newspaper also
operated a radio station (Trease, 2011:518). The issue revolved around islanders’ desire to self-
define their roles and identities in a world poised between traditional Pacific values and foreign
influences, in this case in an aggressive Western-style form of journalism.
Definitions addressing who is a “local” person have relevance to Pacific community radio as
foreigners or foreign organisations have established a majority of the radio stations with varying
levels of community participation. As I will argue in future chapters, Pacific community radio
stations often fail because the communities did not feel sufficient levels of ownership toward the
radio stations to sustain them. In other words, the stations failed due to lack of social sustainability.
Definitions that might delimit ownership to those names appearing on a broadcast license do not
reveal the true story. The broadcasting licenses of many faith-based radio stations are held by
islanders but the station programming, financial and organisational matters are orchestrated by an
overseas mother organisation, for example, by the US-based Trinity Broadcasting Network or the
Auckland-based the United Christian Broadcasters Pacific Partners. By contrast, most Pacific
commercial radio stations are owned by islanders (Cass, 2004:98). From a regional perspective,
only Fiji’s regulations clearly delineate media ownership restrictions (Government of Fiji, 2010:14-
16). Samoa’s regulations allow the relevant minister to “consider” a licensee’s residency status
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before granting a license (Legislative Assembly of Samoa, 2010:27). Regulations in the remaining
PICs are silent on the issue of media ownership.
In this chapter I have discussed the Pacific broadcast regulatory environment at the regional and
national levels as it pertains to community radio. The telecommunication reform movement in the
2000s was characterised by aggressive manoeuvring by powerful foreign actors, often to leverage
their own strategic advantage. The new ICT regulatory frameworks have displaced older
broadcasting laws and have further obstructed the emergence of community radio. I have shown
how the technological solutions advocated by foreign development agencies, such as computer-
based telecentres, are ill-suited to meet Pacific development needs at the village level. My research
has revealed little, if any, evidence that participatory development approaches were applied during
the telecommunication sector reform movement. What the data did revealed were tendencies by
powerful development actors to fall back into colonial behavioural patterns and orthodox non-
consultative development models.
However, rural islanders have greatly benefited from the deregulation of the mobile telephony
sector, which is still incomplete given the market dominance of one or two service providers in
each country. Islanders have adopted and adapted mobile telephony to suit their cultural
worldviews, such as to strengthen kinships ties. In this way, they have applied immanent
development models to ICT. I argue that a more nuanced definition of ICTs by Pacific governments
and their development partners could better position community radio as the appropriate technology
for development, particularly through hybrid applications of community radio and mobile telephony
that could be funded through universal-access funds. Fiji’s community media funding model, that
of a reasonable levy imposed on commercial media advertising revenue, has been successfully
applied internationally but it might falter in the Pacific’s smaller economies that already struggle to
support a diversified media sector.
To recap, in the previous three chapters I have laid out my basic argument. Firstly, orthodox
development theories are derived from colonial development models and both are inappropriate for
small island developing states. Colonial models also reinforced and formalised Pacific cultural
tendencies toward rentier behaviour. I demonstrated that alternative or immanent development
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models accentuate Pacific cultural values around consocial identities that are nested in multiple
reciprocal relationships within layers of social networks. Rent-derived wealth, such as economic
remittances, is redistributed through such networks. I also demonstrated that immanent
development models are rational, sustainable, and innovative. I also discussed the difficulties that
arise in operationalising participatory development theories and explored some of the Pacific
cultural attributes that influence participatory development models. The Pacific telecommunication
sector reform movement provided opportunities to observe how Western-propelled development
objectives can privilege the interests of international development actors to the detriment of Pacific
national sovereignty and Pacific-appropriate communication technologies, such as radio. It also
allowed for discussions of the challenges PICs face in their national regulatory environments
pertaining to public-service media, such as community radio. In the next chapter, I will discuss my
research methodology and in subsequent chapters will explore my case studies to investigate if
evidence exists that a Pacific-derived model of development communication is arising within the
community radio sector.
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Chapter 5
Talanoa methodology
Cross-cultural approaches to Pacific research
Introduction
The Pacific’s cultural complexity and its vast distances present significant challenges to
ethnographic research. When I began my research, I had lived on several Western and South Pacific
islands for 17 years, working in media, agricultural extension service, and higher education. I was
keenly interested in applications of educational media in development-oriented distance education
and spent years creating media products suitable for the cultural and socio-economic contexts of
island communities. These efforts involved the use of community radio, first in Guam under a US-
model of community radio, then later in Fiji through a student radio station, and finally in Nauru
where I was the principal organiser of a two-year educational-radio pilot program.
The latter project, Radio Pasifik-Nauru, was a resounding failure despite significant amounts of
effort and funding invested in it by an international project team, many of whom had previous
experience in establishing community radio stations in developing island countries. I began this
research journey to investigate why Radio Pasifik-Nauru failed. Community radio in the South
Pacific seemed such a logical fit given the multiplicity of languages, the vibrancy of the
communities, the orality of the cultures, and the dearth of mass or local media in remote island
communities. Indeed, the Nauruans had welcomed Radio Pasifik-Nauru, eagerly attended my
media-skills workshops, and initially volunteered for radio announcing shifts.
So, what went wrong? I will argue in this chapter that I, like so many foreign development actors
before me, approached community radio from within orthodox development models: implant the
station, gather the people, educate them about specific development goals, inspire them to embrace
the worthiness of these goals, train them to produce local media products in vernacular around these
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goals, then recede with the understanding that the job was well-done and the people could carry on
as a “voice” of their community. Radio Pasifik-Nauru proved this model to be a fallacy.
Given that exogenous orthodox development models have failed to produce sustainable economic
growth or positive social change in the Pacific but that Pacific-derived development models have,
what might be the evidence that similar immanent development models were emerging around
community radio? How could I construct my research methodologies to obtain valid explanations
of the emergence of such phenomena (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994:14)? This chapter discusses
my research journey. I will explain how I applied a culturally appropriate talanoa research
methodology within grounded theory data analysis to evolve my original research design and
objectives, which led to more data accumulation and refinement my theory. I will also discuss the
limitations of my research design and share some of the challenges I faced in cross-cultural
ethnographic research.
My research is important as it is the first such comprehensive study of Pacific community radio
within development communication. It provides an objective and rigorous assessment of the
challenges facing the community media sector, which I contend is a critical component in future
growth of the sector (da Costa, 2012:145). Community radio stands at the crossroads of
development and culture. Foreign development actors, such as myself, have gifted numerous
community radio stations to island communities yet nearly all have failed. This contributes to
“donor fatigue” despite the increasingly competitive nature of the geo-political Pacific “aid game”
which spurs donors to continue investing even more in development projects. Project failures carry
high “opportunity costs” for poor countries (Heeks, 2002:103; Heeks & Kenny, 2002:1). They
redirect large amounts of human and financial resources that could otherwise be employed and what
few benefits do they deliver come at greater costs. Failed projects present “lost opportunities” and
lead to “the collapse of dreams,” disappointment, frustration, and distrust in the receiving
communities (Chand, Leeming, Stork, Agassi, & Biliki, 2005:11, 48; Hodge & Rihuoha, 2008:32;
Jallov, 2003:119; Kalathil, Langlois, & Kaplan, 2008:1). Project failures are also enormously useful
as learning opportunities (P. Lewis, 1993:13; McAnany, 2012:122). Without reflection arising from
reliable assessments such as this one, development actors in times of frustration will fall back onto
familiar orthodox development models that are ill-suited, even harmful, for Pacific island
communities (Curtain, 2003; Heeks, 2002, 2002b; Pscheidt & Weide, 2010; Saovana-Spriggs &
O'Collins, 2003:8; P. M. Swain, 1999:xiv; Walton & Heeks, 2011).
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND PACIFIC APPROACHES
Constructing a culturally appropriate methodology
A new generation of Pacific scholars is beginning to write critically, largely within a post-colonial
viewpoint, about the impacts of 200 years of Western research on island societies (Gegeo &
Watson-Gegeo, 2001; Huffer & Qalo, 2004; Papoutsaki, 2006; A. N. Sharma, 1996; L. T. Smith,
2005). Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2005:9) and others argue that research is linked inextricably to
European imperialist and colonialist endeavours in that it describes, labels and categorises Pacific-
derived knowledge “as if (the islanders’) views did not count and their lives did not matter” (W.
Halapua, 2008a:9; Papoutsaki, 2006:2). Smith’s (2005:3) descriptions about research activities
where “cultural protocols were broken, values negated, small tests failed, and key people ignored”
informed my thinking as a cultural outsider contemplating cross-cultural research designs and
methodologies.
I explored the range of research methodologies to find those that might be culturally appropriate
and would invite islanders into genuine uncontrived conversations around my research questions.
Specifically, what are the obstacles preventing the emergence of community radio in the Pacific?
What are the sustainability issues? How do broadcasters interact with their communities within the
structures of the culture of silence? How is Pacific culture being expressed through the radio
stations? What roles of do civil society organisations (CSOs) play in these broadcasters, perhaps
through joint programming or the sharing of funds? How do the radio stations acquire funding?
Does the nature of the relationship, if any, with foreign donors affect the expression of community
voices? How much influence do foreign donors have, or seek to have, on radio station
programming? How does the Pacific’s rentier orientation reveal itself in the relationships between
community radio stations and their funding agencies? Are foreign development actors even
interested in community radio, as opposed to ICTs? What is the nature of the relationship between
community broadcasters and their governments and how is community radio positioned within the
broadcast regulatory environment?
My epistemological assumptions were, therefore, both naturalistic in that I wanted the research
experience to occur in the real-world Pacific setting with no pre-determined goal or outcome, and
constructionist in nature in that I understood no one truth existed, only the discovery of multiple
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perspectives on the same phenomenon (International Development Research Centre, 2001:2;
Martin, 2006:125; Patton, 2001:39-44). An ethnographic approach conjoined with Grounded
Theory methods, as I will discuss, was suitable for cross-cultural research as it allows for a holistic
approach through direct observation and direct contact with the people under study in an attempt to
see the world through their own eyes, so to speak (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003:142; Berg,
2001:139-140; Denscombe, 2003:92-93, 134; Hammersley & Atkinson, 1996:2-6; Hancock &
Algozzine, 2006:9; Snape & Spencer, 2003:7; van Donge, 2006:186).
All research inquiry is interventionist in nature and I understood that my appearance in the research
setting could, and did, affect the unfolding of the research process and the substance of the data
collected (International Development Research Centre, 2001:2). I also understood that my position
as a palangi, or cultural outsider, would influence both negatively and positively my success in the
fieldwork. The boundaries defining social and cultural spaces can be ambiguous. During my years
living in the islands, I have experienced the extremes of being an honoured guest, laden with gifts
and repeatedly shown signs of respect, to suffering scorn and retribution when islanders perceived
that I had intruded into undefined social spaces where I was not welcome. Once, a noble-class
Tongan confided that I, as a palangi, would “always be welcome but never accepted” in island
societies. From this I inferred I would be granted only superficial and restricted entry into the
intricate web of Pacific social structures. My research strategies needed to be culturally sensitive,
adaptive to and dependent upon the research context, and should be an integral part of the research
design (Patton, 2001:12; A. N. Sharma, 1996:31; L. T. Smith, 2005:15; Taylor, 2010:8-9; Vaioleti,
2006:22-25). I began by searching for potential case study radio stations located in Pacific countries
where I had familiarity with the culture. The boundaries of my study area were limited to
independent Pacific microstates, thus my previous residency in non-sovereign Micronesian states
was of limited use in this regard.
Case study rationale
The use of case studies to investigate community media is a well-established methodology (King, et
al., 1994; Soy, 1997; van Vuuren, 2003; Yin, 1999). Case studies allow for intense focus on a single
phenomenon within contemporary real-life situations and they tolerate a variety of data-collection
methods, such as the Pacific-derived methodologies that I will soon describe.
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I chose to apply a comparative case study approach. The radio stations became the units of analysis
through which I could investigate the interplay between foreign development actors and Pacific
communities, or the interface of development and culture. What was the nature of the contact
between foreign development actors and Pacific communities before and during the design and
implementation of projects? How did foreign development actors view the role of mass and
community media in development? Did they use mass or community media themselves? Similarly,
from the side of the community broadcasters, how did they define their mission and how was this
pursued? What was the nature of the interaction between the broadcasters and the communities they
purported to represent? Did they seek partnerships with other CSOs and if so, what was the nature
of this relationship? How did the radio stations organise themselves, in terms of recruiting and
retaining volunteers and staff, setting the program schedule, securing funding, establishing internal
processes, and engaging with the public around participatory media-content creation?
To answer these questions, I decided to investigate the various relationships among four actors: the
community broadcasters, their peer-level CSOs including those that were not partners, their donors,
and their governments as both broadcast regulators and national broadcasters. In addition to the
case-study community broadcasters, I would research, through interviews and document analysis,
other development-oriented CSOs, a variety of development actors (at the national, regional and
international level), church officials, government broadcast regulators, national broadcasters and as
much as possible radio listeners and interested observers, such as academics in the fields of
journalism and development studies.
The small number of community radio stations operating in the region limited my choice of case
studies.
The most obvious case study was femLINKPACIFIC’s radio station, femTALK FM. I had previous
contact with femLINK because it was located in Suva, Fiji, where I lived at the time and it used the
same suitcase radio unit that I eventually purchased for Radio Pasifik-Nauru. femLINK’s founder,
Sharon Bhagwan Rolls, is one of the region’s most passionate advocates for community radio. She
lobbies for regulatory recognition of the community radio sub-sector and frequently writes about
femLINK’s radio service within her organisation’s wider advocacy around women’s human rights.
femLINK is regarded as one of the Pacific’s most successful CSOs. It uses its radio station in an
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intriguing manner wherein the suitcase radio is physically taken around the country to various rural
towns for weekend broadcasts, through which the voices of the village women are broadcast.
I was also curious about the proliferation of faith-based radio stations in the region and the role of
the church in Pacific development, thus a small faith-based broadcaster in Solomon Islands, Radio
BOSCO, became my second case study. Radio BOSCO was the first community radio station in the
Solomons, which now hosts the most community radio outlets of any Pacific country. Radio
BOSCO’s founder, Fr Ambrose Pereira sdb, had recently been elected president of the Pacific
branch of SIGNIS (the World Catholic Association for Communication). Radio BOSCO also
allowed me to investigate if there might be evidence of Pacific applications of Paulo Freire’s (2005)
Liberation Theology.
Pragmatic factors such travel funds, time constraints, and my lack of Pacific language skills
influenced my choice of the remaining case studies. Such considerations are components of any
executable research design (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1996:38; Patton, 2001:13).
Elsewhere in Solomon Islands, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had
established Buala FM and seven other community radio stations in Isabel Province. These rural
stations were affiliated with the well-known PFNet (People First Network) email-relay network. I
had previously met PFNet’s technical adviser, thus I had a gatekeeper to facilitate my entry into the
research setting. But the Isabel radio stations were positioned in the literature as more of a
technology application, so I was unsure of the level of participatory development practice I might
find there. I was also anxious about the remoteness of the Isabel stations and the fact I would be a
foreign woman traveling independently in a post-conflict area. But the Isabel case studies promised
to be too rich of a setting to pass by as it would allow me to investigate the nature of donor-and-
community relationship from the higher level of the international development sector through
UNDP.
I selected these three stations as case studies, then added two more mid-way through my research,
as I will explain. The case studies were located in both Polynesian and Melanesian societies.
Several other Pacific community radio stations informed my research but were not included as case
studies. These included Radio Pasifik-Nauru, its extant sister station Radio Pasifik at the University
of the South Pacific campus in Suva, CReST FM (a UNICEF-affiliated broadcaster on Tanna Island
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in Vanuatu), and the Solomon Islands Development Trust’s anticipated station in Honiara, Solomon
Islands, One Voice 97.4 FM.
In 2012, as I noticed new lines of inquiry emerging from my field data, I conducted a second round
of fieldwork to further investigate these new directions. Two additional radio stations were added as
potential case studies: Niuatoputapu FM, in far northern Tonga, and femLINK’s sister station, Le’o
‘o e Kakai 98 FM, also located in Tonga. Niua FM was established by a local politician through a
pure application of rentier orientation: he asked donors for a suitcase radio unit that he used as part
of his election campaign. The station failed after 11 months. The second station, Le’o ‘o e Kakai 98
FM, had not yet launched when I visited, thus only thin field data were obtained. This station was
conjoined with femLINK’s radio station into a twin case study looking at women’s activist radio.
One of the drawbacks of using case study methodology is the difficulty of extracting generalisations
from field data as each case study tends to be so embedded in its specific environmental context.
But Gary King and his co-authors (1994:7-8) contend that a small number of case studies
intensively interrogated can allow researchers to make reliable and valid descriptive and causal
inferences about the world which produced the phenomenon under study. The jumbled and
disunified data that can emerge from comparative case studies push researchers to attempt to infer
beyond the immediate data to “something broader that is not directly observed” (King, et al.,
1994:7).
This was the case with my research. I began my initial investigation by looking at radio-based
development programming around the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), if and how donors
were funding the creation of such media products, and how the community broadcasters might be
producing such programming, particularly in participatory ways with their communities. My first
round of fieldwork found no evidence to support this hypothesis. Indeed, I entered the field to find
nearly all my case study radio stations off the air. What programming they had offered had been
mostly entertainment and community announcements. Instead what arose rapidly and repeatedly
from my field data were issues around organisational, managerial, and leadership sustainability, not
matters pertaining to participatory programming. Quite late into my data analysis I discovered
Alfonso Gumucio Dagron’s “three pillars” framework of community media sustainability, those of
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social, organisational and financial sustainability (Dagron, 2003; Dagron & Dlamini, 2004).40
Dagron’s work provided a valuable framework through which to organise discussions arising from
my field data.
My decision to use a comparative case study approach allowed me the flexibility to “discover while
in the process of doing” (Soy, 1997:3-10; Yin, 1999:1211-16). Additionally, my fieldwork efforts
were not “theory driven, but driven to theory” and could be refined to accommodate and explore
new issues as they emerged from the data (Glaser & Strauss, 2006; Patton, 2001:39; Strauss, 2003;
Trochim, 2006a, 2006b). In this view, I was applying grounded theory within accepted community
media research methodologies throughout my research project in what Barney Glaser (2006:2) calls
“the nature of emergent discovery” or to allow both methodology and theory development to
gradually develop as data and interpretations accumulate (Dick, 2012; Holton, 2006:vii-viii; Martin,
2006:123, 127).
Grounded theory
Grounded theory seeks to discover social theory through deep comparative analysis of field data
themselves, not from a priori assumptions that researchers might hold (Glaser, 2002:23; Glaser &
Strauss, 2006:6-18). This process keeps the researcher “faithful to his data” rather than forcing it
into a pre-conceived theory that might harbour Western cultural biases (Glaser & Strauss, 2006:34;
Larmour, 2006:2; Papoutsaki, 2006:4; L. T. Smith, 2005:2).
I found grounded theory to be a useful theory-generating tool as my research was truly imbrued
with a “feeling of ever-developing” (Glaser & Strauss, 2006:32). The application of grounded
theory methods kept me open to “chance discoveries” and “happy accidents” arising during
fieldwork, allowing for the conjoining of serendipity and my previous knowledge of Pacific
cultures to lead to theoretical insights (Åkerström, 2013:10-16; Glaser & Strauss, 2006:2, 167;
Nathaniel, 2011:195; Rivoal & Salazar, 2013:178, 183). This was particularly so in the Buala FM
case study. I had entered the field with two loose hypotheses in mind. Firstly, that the reasons why
40
Dagron’s (2005a, 2005b) “three pillars” of community media sustainability include: 1) social sustainability as expressed through
community ownership of the station (either legal or perceived), community participation in all levels of operations and decision-
making, including creation of relevant programming delivered in local languages; 2) institutional, or organisational, sustainability
such as the internal structures of the station pertaining to its governing board, administrative systems, human resource management,
and related functionality; and 3) financial sustainability, such as the generation of sufficient revenue from mixed funding sources and
through transparent financial-accountability processes.
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community radio was not more prevalent in the South Pacific might relate to community/donor
dynamics, what I initially call the rentier vs real politik dynamic wherein both sides would
manipulate the relationship to gain advantage. At the onset of my research, I couldn’t say for certain
the level of rentier/real politik mentality that I might find but I could think about the ways that it
might be revealed through data derived from interviews, direct observation, document analysis, and
reflexive thinking. Secondly, I suspected that Pacific social norms, such as the culture of silence
and the respect for authority, would influence the level of community engagement with community
radio stations. After reviewing evidence arising from my first round of fieldwork in the Solomon
Islands and Fiji, I initiated a second round in Tonga to test two emerging issues. The first issue
concerned organisational sustainability and leadership development issues within radio stations. I
had not considered these topics prior to entering the field. The second emerging issue concerned
donor engagement with communities prior to the introduction of a radio station. During my
research period, four new community radio stations were established, thus offering possibilities for
new case studies. The application of grounded theory allowed me to adapt my research activities to
accommodate new research directions and to test emerging theories (Hammersley & Atkinson,
1996:138).
The application of grounded theory also helped to ease some of my concerns about the
transferability of my research findings. The Pacific societies are immensely diverse and far from
culturally or socially homogeneous. In addition, my choice to use a culturally appropriate talanoa
methodology, which I will soon explain, meant that my data would be bound by time, place and
participants. Furthermore, I couldn’t be certain if my talanoa-derived data were factual or merely
descriptions of events offered to me by islanders in “a socially desirable way” (Otsuka, 2005:9).
Because I lacked social networks that might protect me from manipulation, I was vulnerable to
islander tendencies to tell me “a story” that might true or otherwise, playful or malicious. Perhaps
the best known example of this is Margaret Mead’s Coming of Age in Samoa where the researcher
was purposely misled for asking what were perceived to be culturally insensitive questions
(Vaioleti, 2006:26). Glaser and Strauss (2006:24-30) warn researchers not become too overly
concerned with establishing data accuracy beyond a reasonable doubt but to understand that the
concepts behind the data will be relevant to theory-building about what is going on in the research
area. This understanding strengthens the validity of my findings and conclusions.
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The talanoa approach
Grounded theory complemented my decision to use a culturally appropriate Pacific-derived

methodology, the application of which helps to “de-westernise” cross-cultural research practices
(Du Plessis & Fairbairn-Dunlop, 2009; W. Halapua, 2008a; Huffer & Qalo, 2004; K. R. Lewis,
2011:iii, 11; Nainoca, 2011:32; Otsuka, 2005; Papoutsaki, 2006; A. N. Sharma, 1996; Tamasese, et
al., 2010; Vaioleti, 2006). Talanoa methodology is one such approach that has been successfully
applied in Pacific island settings. The other approaches, such as the Vanua Research Framework
and the Kakala Research Framework, are variations on the talanoa theme (Nainoca, 2011:25).
Talanoa, or the practice of informal group conversation and storytelling often conducted around a
communal kava bowl, is found throughout oceanic Pacific cultures. 41 Talanoa is a derivative of
oral tradition and can be referred to as a conversation, a talk, an exchange of ideas or thinking (Du
Plessis & Fairbairn-Dunlop, 2009:112; K. R. Lewis, 2011:11; Vaioleti, 2006:23). In the Tongan
context, the word is comprised of two parts: tala to tell stories and noa to imply emptiness or space,
specifically the creation of safe space that encourages horizontal communication across social rank
(but not necessarily across gender). Tongan educator Konai Helu Thaman (2008:463-464) defines
this space as vaa or an interval of specific space and time within which relationships are
acknowledged and affirmed. In the Fijian context, talanoa is used to resolve village disagreements,
thus the term connotes the clearing away of rubbish from yesterday, to replant or transplant
yesterday, to load or unload yesterday, which implies the healing of bruised relationships (Nainoca,
2011:35).
Tongan theologian Jione Havea (2010:11) suggests that talanoa has three interrelated components:
that of the story, the act of telling the story, and the occasion of conversation arising around the
telling of the story. In this view, it resembles James Carey’s (1985, 1989) notions of ritualised
communication. Talanoa is “a process of presence” in which emphasis is placed on the importance
of relationship (W. Halapua, 2008a:8-10, 21; Vaioleti, 2006:24). Engaging in talanoa allows for
displays of respect which are shown through deep listening to and consideration of another’s
viewpoints (Nainoca, 2011:104). I theoreticise community radio as a form of talanoa.
41
Yaqona or kava is a mildly sedative drink infused from the dried and pulverised roots of the Piper methysticum plant. It is widely
consumed in leisurely social gatherings.
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Winifereti Nainoca (2011:35) suggests that talanoa can be employed both as a research
methodology through which a researcher can acquire data and as a form of data triangulation, or
verification of data by multiple sources. Talanoa discussions tend to be group discussions that
encourage “collective reflection,” meaning participants correct and augment the story as it is told,
thus triangulating the data emerging from the story (Nainoca, 2011:53; A. N. Sharma, 1996:8). A
researcher can obtain information during talanoa sessions that might not arise in individual
interviews (A. N. Sharma, 1996:8). Use of talanoa research methods reduces the distance between
the researcher and research participants as it forces the researcher to assume more than just an
observer’s role (Vaioleti, 2006:24). By engaging in talanoa as a research method, a researcher is in
essence seeking temporary acceptance into the social group. This act temporarily bestows on the
researcher a thin marker of social status through which other group members can then assess the
researcher’s trustworthiness and acceptability (Robinson & Robinson, 2005:18). This was affirmed
in my fieldwork.
The application of talanoa sensibilities disciplined my interview techniques. I learned not to

interrupt extended silences, which encouraged interviewees to continue telling their stories.
Sometimes these stories wandered off-topic, such as in the retelling of personal, community or
national histories, but frequently little gems of data would emerge within these stories. I could then
use this information to start new conversations with new interviewees. Frequently, interviewees
would probe to learn with whom I had previously spoken. Thus they were testing the validity of my
social network and I was performing communicative or information-sharing functions within it.
Obviously, this probing posed ethical challenges, as I will discuss.
The talanoa approach employs various qualitative instruments with an emphasis on interpersonal
interactions through interviews, focus groups and participant observation. By contrast, conventional
quantitative tools, such as questionnaires, tend not to work effectively in the Pacific for a number of
technical reasons (such as a lack of English language skills) and they are deemed culturally
inappropriate as they fail to provide “opportunities for personal presence, listening and dialogue”
(W. Halapua, 2008b:54-56; Vaioleti, 2006:22).
The application of talanoa methods has its drawbacks. Researchers tend to have reduced control
over the ebb and flow of the group discussion. Sitiveni Halapua (2006) suggests that the agenda-
less format of talanoa – where the process of dialogue is more important than its outcome, where
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conversation flows in various directions, and where topics can loop and repeat without resolution –
is one of its primary strengths, although this can frustrate researchers. The open-ended nature of
talanoa contrasts with more structured Western discussion styles, particularly those organised by
formal institutions where agendas “control” the conversation within set time limits and where the
group chairman will declare a consensus has been reached at the end of the allotted time even if not
all voices have been heard (Fonua, 2005:4-5). Other problems arising from the use of talanoa
methods concern the reproducibility of the data as they will most likely lose their validity over time
(A. N. Sharma, 1996:40; Vaioleti, 2006:32).
Talanoa uses both active dialogue and constructed silences, thus a researcher must be sensitive to
the use of silence as it punctuates the group discussion. Through careful listening of both the stories
and silences, a researcher can intuit the validity of the information offered (Vaioleti, 2006:24). For
example, in the femLINK case study, during a talanoa session, I noticed one volunteer remained
silent, slumped in her chair, and failed to make eye contact with other group members as they
spoke. Later I learned this volunteer was the daughter of an important official and that turning one’s
gaze away from a speaker during talanoa sessions is considered rude behaviour in the Fijian
context (Nainoca, 2011:51). From such observations I could infer tension possibly related to social
status existed within this group’s dynamics. I frequently found that my intuition that something
didn’t seem quite right between the talanoa-derived data and my field observations when compared
with documentary evidence led to analytic insights.
Researchers who ignore talanoa protocols risk offending research participants (Otsuka, 2005:9).
For example, during one femLINK talanoa session, I could sense that two more elderly participants
were withdrawing from conversation. The younger volunteers filled the conversational gaps without
seeming to take notice. When I tried to direct the conversation toward one of the two mature
volunteers in an effort to re-engage her in the dialogue, she cut me off verbally and physically
removed herself from the table. Later I learned that both women were high-ranking elites, so I
surmised that I had unwittingly displayed some form of disrespect.
Scope of data collection
My data-collection methods incorporated standard qualitative instruments with an emphasis on

interpersonal interactions through interviews, focus groups and participant observation in alignment
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with talanoa methodology. Sixty substantial semi-structured interviews and four focus groups were
conducted. Most interviews were one-person semi-structured conversations lasting on average 90
minutes each. Some key people were interviewed twice. Five interviews consisted of two or three
people. One interview can be described as hostile; two were compliantly gruff. All but two
interviews were recorded. All but three were conducted face-to-face; one was conducted via Skype,
one by telephone, one via email. Four focus group interviews were organised with current and
former radio station volunteers (one for Radio Pasifik, three for femTALK FM). Table 5.1 reveals
the intervieweess’ characteristics, while Table 5.2 on page 359 describes more fully interviewee
details, including the pseudonyms I assigned to them.
Table 5.1 Characteristics of significant interviewees

Category No. of No of Indigenous Non-
Agencies interviewees islander indigenous Male Female
Community radio staff or
8 12 9 3 5 7
board members
Community radio 4:8 radio
23 22 1 3 20
volunteers, in focus groups stations
Community radio
3:8 radio
supporters other than 8 5 3 5 3
stations
volunteers
NGO/CSOs 9 10 8 2 9 1
Development agencies 5 7 3 4 5 2
Government regulators 5 5 5 0 5 0
Government officials other
2 2 2 0 2 0
than regulators
National broadcasters 3 5 5 0 3 2
Academic 1 1 1 0 1 0
Total 73 60 13 38 35
Prior to the fieldwork, detailed interview questions were developed for each investigative category
(community radio staff and volunteers, CSO partner, funding partner, development agency, national
broadcaster, and broadcast regulator) and for each interviewee. Interview questions were refined as
the process progressed. The interview schedule was flexibly applied to allow interviewees
maximum space for expression. My general question guidelines are presented in Table 5.3 on page
361.
Briefly, interview questions for community radio station staff investigated the station history, goals
and objectives, guiding philosophy (particularly concerning programming), and current
organisational situation, including the recruitment and training of volunteers. Other questions
related to the station’s relationship with funding partners, government officials, other CSOs, and
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radio listeners or communities. Volunteers were asked about their motivations for volunteering,
how long they had been volunteers, what they wished to gain from the experience, what they like
best and least about their work, how they engaged with communities in their work, what their
definition of community radio was, if their station was fulfilling this definition, and if not, what
could be improved.
Questions posed to national broadcasters related to their programming, relationships with CSOs
around programming creation, relationships with listeners and rural communities, their funding
sources, their relationship with the government, and general questions about the role of mass and
community media in the Pacific.
Questions for CSOs followed similar lines and were used to tease out comparator data around
organisational structures, relationships with funding partners and governments, the nature of their
community engagement, their use of media, and their experiences, if any, with the relevant
community radio station. For faith-based CSOs, additional questions were asked about the role of
churches in development and any views they held about faith-based radio services in the region.
Development agencies were asked a range of questions pertaining to their objectives, the challenges
they faced in achieving their objectives, the nature of development assistance in the region, the role
of churches and CSOs in Pacific development work, their agency’s use of media, if any, and their
perspectives on the role of mass and community media in development.
Broadcast regulators were asked technical questions about spectrum management, broadcasting
regulations, the impact of telecommunication reforms on the broadcasting sector, the present and
future to the broadcasting sector, and their view on the role of radio in the broadcasting landscape.
Copious amounts of primary and secondary documents were collected and analysed. My research
was ambitiously cross-disciplinary. I kept thorough field notes, amassed significant amounts of
documentation, and engaged in constant reflexive thinking to check and counter my cultural
interpretations, assumptions and biases, all in the spirit of Strauss’ (2003:11) advice for researchers
to “mine your experience” as essential data. Primary documents included national, regional and
international reports, broadcasting and other legislation, CSO annual reports and advocacy
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materials, radio station organisational documents, demographic databases, unpublished theses, news
articles, blogs and web sites, and academic publications. One document, a Solomon Islands radio
listener survey, was obtained through an Australian Freedom of Information request. Secondary
documents included such radio station broadcast schedules, financial accounting sheet, volunteer
rosters, and similar materials. I constantly questioned who was writing the documents, for whom,
from what vantage point, and for what aim. This was particularly crucial in the Buala FM case
study as my field data and field observations greatly conflicted with the project literature.
The time boundaries for my research were January 2011-February 2012, thus the data represent a
snapshot of the field as it then existed. The case studies were updated as best as possible to reflect
changes in the field after the fieldwork concluded.
Exploring the insider/outsider dichotomy
As mentioned, I understood from the onset of my research that my status as a palangi, or cultural
outsider, would influence both negatively and positively my success in the fieldwork. Pacific
cultural identities are permeable and outsiders willing to perform culturally appropriate behaviour
can often successfully integrate into Pacific communities (Caughey & Marshall, 1989:15; A.
Howard, 1990:266; Linnekin, 1990:165-169). In my case, this involved offering small gifts (food,
pre-paid telephone cards, mosquito coils, lighters, small torches, batteries, and the like), dressing
appropriately, attending a variety of church services, showing respect to elders, the sharing of
knowledge and skills (such as demonstrating basic computer skills), and being mindful of my status
as a woman. Before entering the field, I worried about my ability to perform within the culture of
silence. Would the elderly men agree to interviews? Would the village women? Was I sensitive
enough to cultural protocols to initiate or participate in talanoa? In hindsight, my initial concerns
about the insider/outsider dichotomy proved to be exaggerated.
Godfrey Baldacchino (2006, 2008a, 2008b) suggests that the role of an “outsider” researcher has
many advantages. He (2008b:43) notes that the clannish social structures characteristic of many
rural communities become “a straightjacket of community surveillance” where islanders suffer “the
small conflicts and petty rivalries” that constrain their speech and activity. Cultural communication
styles such as structured silence, strategic inaction, the avoidance of voicing direct opinion, and the
non-disclosure of vital information all serve to protect individuals as they negotiate the social
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networks of their villages. However, outside observers are unlikely to be so “socially embedded.”
They can serve a useful, perhaps even necessary, function of being able to provide valuable insights
and commentaries on social phenomena because they are not dependent for their survival on the
social network (Baldacchino, 2008b:43). Additionally, islanders might prefer to share knowledge
with outsiders that they wouldn’t otherwise share with each other, again because outsiders are not
socially embedded (Teaiwa, 2005b:20). I found this the case in Niuatoputapu where several women
grew to trust the confidentiality that I offered them. One would come to visit me late at night and
we would sit in the darkness under brilliant starry skies and talk around a range of topics. These
conversations offered valuable insight into the lives of Pacific women living in small isolated
communities. But she often admonished me not to tell others of these meetings. Thus, my data-
collection activities were also informed by Michael Patton’s (2001:50-51) advice that researchers
should cultivate “empathic neutrality,” in other words, refrain from becoming so close to research
participants that one’s judgment is clouded yet not becoming so distant as to reduce understanding
of the context of the research setting.
In hindsight, I realised my status as a palangi relieved me of the many cultural protocols that beset
indigenous researchers, who must negotiate a range of rituals to gain entry into and function within
a village setting (Nainoca, 2011). I surmise that my outsider status and willingness to perform
within the Pacific social norms that I was aware of encouraged islanders to forgive my cultural
transgressions. For example, in Tonga, no work is allowed on Sunday Sabbath. When my
guesthouse host saw me reading, he gently chided me but then said I was free to do as I wished
because I wasn’t a Tongan.
MATTERS ARISING FROM THE FIELD
Logistical challenges
As is often repeated in the literature, among the greatest challenges to development in the Pacific
are inadequacies in transportation and communication infrastructure. Distances are vast.
Transportation is expensive, irregular and often uncomfortable. The durations of two of my field
visits, those to Buala, Solomon Islands, and Niuatoputapu, Tonga, were organized around
transportation schedules, which were found to be limited in frequency or unreliable. For example,
my fieldwork in Niuatoputapu was premised upon either monthly ferries or weekly flights. I chose
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to fly to save time and was assured by the airline that flights were weekly, although the flight days
might vary. However, persistent stormy weather delayed my return flight on a daily basis for a total
of seven extra days. This meant that I missed key interviews in the capital city, including a focus
group session with Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM volunteers which could not be rescheduled. As a result,
field data concerning Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM are thin, consisting only of three interviews (two internal,
one with a comparator agency, and a few scant post-fieldwork emails).
After reflecting on my deep engagement with the Niuatoputapu villagers during my 15-day stay, I
surmised I had stayed too briefly in Isabel Province during fieldwork around Buala FM. (The
Niuatoputapu visit came 11 months after the Isabel fieldwork and had been funded by the
unexpected award of a university travel grant.) I had organised my Buala visit around advice given
by my research-setting gatekeeper and the ferry schedule, which offered either a three- or 10-day
stay. Ten days was unfeasible but the shorter stay deprived me of deeper interaction with the
community. However, as a cultural outsider with no family to support me and with the dearth of
private sector (shops, cafés) in deep rural villages, I had limited access to food in Isabel Province
and again on Niuatoputapu. Before I traveled to Niuatoputapu, one government official warned me
about “having to drop everything down to the meet the conditions” of rural island living: no
electricity, limited plumbed water, unreliable telephony, no transportation, and often no improved
toilets. I understood his comments only in hindsight.
In terms of communication, the lack of telephony and email services in rural areas meant that I
arrived in some research settings nearly unannounced. Even letters posted to potential gatekeepers
months before had failed to arrive. Mail can take up three months to arrive in Niuatoputapu and the
local telephone system is incompatible with the national system. Email was more useful to organise
interviewees based in Fiji.
Islander tendencies not to share potentially negative news meant that I arrived in the Solomons to
find all but one of my case study radio stations off the air. This suggests that research participants
were refraining from telling me the uncomfortable truth and instead were telling me what they
thought I wished to hear in “a socially desirable way” (Otsuka, 2005:9). Michael Patton (2001:54)
had warned researchers to “anticipate the likelihood of the unanticipated.” Interestingly, the fact
that most of the radio stations were off the air did not seem to significantly impact my fieldwork as
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I found research participants perhaps more willing under these conditions to talk about their
stations’ vulnerabilities and challenges.
Gatekeepers
Identifying and working with gatekeepers, those people who can grant or facilitate access to a
research setting, is not always easy nor a satisfactory experience (Hammersley & Atkinson,
1996:64-75). Despite my strong intentions to engage directly with Pacific islanders, my gatekeepers
in the Solomon Islands were palangi, or foreigners. Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2005:157) noted the
importance of indigenous gatekeepers in granting access to research settings. Still, my gatekeepers
in the Solomons were long-time residents and respected in their communities. The importance of
my gatekeepers in facilitating my research cannot be over-emphasised. They introduced me to key
people and assisted with language translation.
I arrived in Niuatoputapu without having a strong sense of a gatekeeper. Additionally, I was

unaware of the contentious political circumstances surrounding Niua FM: it had become a political
football between two political rivals. The island’s top government official was less than welcoming
when he learned that I had come to research the radio station, which had been established by his
rival. I had interviewed the rival prior to traveling to Niuatoputapu and he had told me to “spread
(his) name around” as this would help me to gain entry into the research field. I found myself
walking a thin line between these two adversaries, a situation the island residents were in as well. I
used this common ground to start conversations. To compound matters, Niua FM’s station manager,
who had been referred to me by four people as a promising gatekeeper, had limited English
proficiency and I had no Tongan language skills. This was an awkward situation for both of us as
the manager seemed genuinely intent on helping me but we were not able to communicate beyond a
superficial level.
Cross-cultural dialogue
I began my fieldwork with the assumption that most rural villagers would have rudimentary
conversational English skills based upon their countries’ school curricula. I knew smatterings of
Fijian language, enough to “break the ice,” and carried with me a crib sheet of Solomon pidgin
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phrases. In Fiji and the Solomons, my assumptions about English language competency held true
but in rural Tonga, I faced unexpected and significant language difficulties. Older people, educated
in missionary schools, could speak English well, but middle-aged and younger people, educated in
government schools, struggled to speak English. Some respondents would simply answer “I don’t
know” to various questions, which reassured me to some extent that they were not prone to telling
me empty stories. For one or two interviews, an English-proficient Tongan teenager accompanied
me but interviewees seemed to prefer to struggle to speak to me in English rather than rely on the
teenager to translate. Janet Bujra (2006:177) suggests that a researcher’s reliance upon a young
translator runs the risk that older interviewees might conceive that the translator is acting
disrespectfully through her questioning of village elders.
My inability to contact potential interviewees in Isabel Province prior to my arrival (due to

deficiencies in telephone and postal networks) meant that I relied on my research-setting gatekeeper
to organise interviewees for me; I had no way to measure their English language competencies
beforehand. About half of the interviewees in Buala had less than proficient English language skills
and would frequently stop speaking in mid-sentence with a look on their faces that I interpreted as
frustration. On several occasions I caught myself in the act of prompting them with possible words
(these occasions were recorded in my field notes) and I sought to restrain myself from this activity,
sometimes not too successfully. I intuited that most interviewees, especially university-educated
government officials, used their limited vocabulary purposefully to express their ideas. I was told
on several occasions, with characteristic island gentleness and humour, to return to Solomons again
after I had learned to speak Solomons pidgin.
Ethical issues: anonymity and confidentiality
In many respects, the Pacific is a small community at both national and regional levels. Complex
social networks weave islanders together in a bewildering diversity of relationships. One
international development actor told me the region was large geographically but small “in terms of
the gossip chain.”42
42
“Matthew,” international development agency representative. Personal communication. 8 Feb. 2011.
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I realised my greatest challenge would be to protect the identities of those I interviewed. Godfrey
Baldacchino (2008b:43) cautions researchers to vigilantly protect the identities of their information
sources when working within the tightly woven communicative structures found in island
communities as the interviewees must live with the consequences of those interactions, not the
transient researcher. I offered my interviewees both anonymity (the use of pseudonyms to cloak
their identities) and confidentiality (the removal of elements from field data that could lead to
discovery of individual identities) (Berg, 2001:57). I explained these concepts in detail at the
beginning of each interview. Most research participants welcomed the anonymity, a few were
indifferent, and one insisted that I use his name to protect his ownership of the information he was
giving me. The offers of anonymity appeared to reassure many interviewees, particularly those in
Fiji who frequently wanted to speak about the Bainimarama military government and several in
Solomons who voiced strong negative opinions about one CSO consultant. I chose not to conceal
the identities of the radio stations, CSOs or development agencies as to do so would lead to
unnecessary confusion. Informed consent was verbally requested, verbally received and audio-
recorded in accordance with talanoa approaches (Berg, 2001:56-57). Written consent forms are not
considered culturally appropriate (Nainoca, 2011:38).
In the close-knit communities in which I was working many people simply guessed the identities of
the people with whom I had been talking. As mentioned, I inferred they were testing my
connectedness within the community as a way of assessing my trustworthiness before they engaged
with me (L. T. Smith, 2005:148). While it will be impossible to completely hide the identities of the
radio stations leaders, I decided to continue to cloak their quoted interview statements where
possible while leaving their identities as station administrators clear in the descriptive text
surrounding each case study.
An illustration from the field illuminates some of the ethical complexities encountered in practice.
During the Solomons fieldwork, three indigenous interviewees in separate uncoordinated interviews
offered critical comments about the same project consultant, an expatriate working for an
intermediary CSO. I was surprised by the interviewees’ comments for two reasons: firstly, it is
highly unusual (in my experience) for Pacific islanders to speak negatively in public about another
person, whether islander or palangi, and secondly their statements contained unmistakable emotion.
I intuited that the concepts underlying the statements were crucially important. I struggled for
weeks to understand what the interviewees were saying as it conflicted with the profuse amount of
literature written about this particular project. This reflection led to a significant analytical insight
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that forced me to re-interrogate my field data. I then discovered significant evidence supporting
what I inferred these interviewees were saying about the nature of the relationship between
development and culture in the Pacific that I had hadn’t been sufficiently acculturated to notice
before. The focus of my thesis turned on this insight, moving away from a concentration on the
“products” of development, such as the Millennium Development Goals, and moving toward a
better understanding of the fluidity or “process” of the socio-cultural interface between
development and culture. In this way, I affirmed King and his co-authors’ (1994:12) view that a
researcher must have “the flexibility of mind to overturn old ways of looking at the world” based on
what arises from the “imperfect fit” among the initial research questions, the theory, and the data.
But now I faced an ethical dilemma: how to use the data without causing harm to the consultant.
Both Smith, writing from within an indigenous post-colonial viewpoint, and Hammersley and
Atkinson, writing from within an academic research framework, state that research participants,
such as these three interviewees, had a right to control the information they had given to me
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1996:267; L. T. Smith, 2005:10). Smith (2005:268) argues that “when
participants do not ‘own’ the data they have furnished about themselves they have been robbed of
some essential element of dignity.” This I understood to include the rights of the three interviewees,
speaking within the shield of confidentiality that I had offered to them, to state their opinions
without undue meddling from my side, all in an effort to avoid what Smith (2005:37) describes as
“the politics of interpretation.” My previous experience living in Pacific societies alerted me to the
peculiarity of the three interviewees’ comments. Patton (2001:64) urges researchers to investigate
such hunches as the researcher’s personal perspectives and experiences are part of the research data
as well. On the other hand, the consultant has his own right to privacy and protection from harm.
When I later interviewed the consultant, he revealed his confusion over what he perceived to be
unexplainable manoeuvres by unidentifiable others to ostracise him. I inferred this consultant was
sufficiently sensitive to Pacific culture to sense that something had gone wrong. I also observed that
he did not reflect on the causes nor did he change his behaviour. Displeasure within the wantok
social network against this consultant and his project eventually grew so strong that the project
failed through lack of social sustainability. I made significant efforts to veil the consultant’s identity
while still allowing the interviewees’ statements to stand.
A second ethical dilemma surfaced within the Niua FM case study. Many community members
spontaneously told me that Niua FM failed because the station manager was unfit for the job. These
statements were given matter-of-factly with no apparent emotion. But so many people told me the
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same reason that I stopped asking why the station was off the air as I was concerned that the station
manager’s reputation was being harmed in some way. I reflected on the station manager’s
engagement with me, such as her invitations to share meals featuring delicacies, to accompany her
to church services and to be seated in the front pews, to escort me to an important interview with a
government official, and how she always presented herself to me in her finest attire. I considered
two possibilities: she was using her association with me and my interest in her apparently under-
appreciated role as Niua FM manager as a way to improve her social standing, or that she was
displaying Pacific values by providing embracing hospitality toward a guest.
Ethical issues: researcher intervention
A researcher’s presence can profoundly affect the research setting. Because I was not part of
existing social networks, my presence in the field was welcomed but within restrictions. For
example, my request to observe one of femLINK’s pre-broadcast “consultations” with village
women was denied on the grounds that my outsider presence would upset the consultation. This
unfortunately denied me a valuable opportunity to observe the nature of the interaction between
femLINK volunteers and rural village women during conscientisation sessions.
A story from my fieldwork around Radio BOSCO illustrates some of the challenges of negotiating
researcher interference in a research setting. At the time of my fieldwork in the Solomons, there
was a widespread public understanding that no additional FM broadcasting licenses were available.
Radio BOSCO had suffered a generator failure in 2010 and was off the air. But the nearby Gold
Ridge gold mine was restarting its operations and expressed interest in partnering with Radio
BOSCO. The two parties had entered an informal agreement wherein Radio BOSCO would share its
broadcasting license and the gold mine would provide technical and other support to get the station
back on the air. In exchange, Gold Ridge media staff could use the airwaves when Radio BOSCO
was not on the air.
When I arrived in the field, the gold mine had already purchased new broadcasting equipment, built
a studio, and hired a local project manager, “Ken,” who came from a commercial radio background.
Radio BOSCO’s founder, Fr Ambrose Pereira, and I decided to visit the gold mine to tour the new
radio facilities and chat with Ken. I rang Ken, introduced myself and organised a visit to occur in
about a week’s time. I then immediately went off to conduct an unrelated interview at the Solomon
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Islands telecommunication regulator’s (TCSI) office and while there overheard a Gold Ridge
representative inquiring about a radio license. My TCSI interviewee confirmed this. When I rang Fr
Ambrose that night to confirm our future visit to the Gold Ridge radio studios, I mentioned what I
had seen and heard at the TCSI office, thus I let the proverbial cat out of the bag. He had had no
indication until then that the deal with the gold mine was in peril. Two days later, I was in Buala
conducting fieldwork when Ken from Gold Ridge rang at 11 p.m., startling me because the hour
was so late. He asked abruptly if I would take personal responsibility for funding Radio BOSCO. I
explained that I had no funding as I was only a student researcher, and the line went dead. Within a
week of that phone call, Gold Ridge had applied for and received its own broadcasting license,
leaving its verbal agreement to assist Radio BOSCO in tatters.
This sequence of events concerned me deeply. Fr Ambrose shrugged it off, saying he had long
suspected that Gold Ridge would want to establish a commercial, not community, radio station and
was perhaps using Radio BOSCO’s license as the first step toward the goal. When Fr Ambrose and
I visited Ken at the Gold Ridge radio studios, the meeting was jovial and no mention was made of
the telephone call. After talking with Gold Ridge’s Australia-based staff and after deep reflection, I
deduced that Gold Ridge had already begun its plans to seek a separate radio license prior to my
arrival in the research setting and that my appearance, while perhaps unfortunately timed, did not
appear to hasten or hinder the actions. The impact of my presence was felt because Radio BOSCO
had not been aware of Gold Ridge’s plans until I had shared the news. In hindsight, I’m not sure I
would have changed my action and not told Fr Ambrose what I had learned as the sharing of
information is one way to build social relations. But the story highlights some of the challenges of
negotiating “researcher effects” on the field data-collection activities (Denscombe, 2003:88).
In this chapter, I have discussed the theoretical underpinnings of my qualitative ethnographic

research methodology, which embraced a culturally appropriate talanoa approach that was
enhanced through the application of grounded theory. I explained why I chose a comparative case
study framework and the reasons behind the selection of my case study radio stations. I explained
how I applied grounded theory mid-way through my research to add two more radio stations to
gather new data to test theories arising from the first data set. I also shared some of the logistical
and ethical challenges that emerged during the fieldwork, such as language difficulties,
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transportation and communication bottlenecks, researcher intervention in the research setting, and
the difficulties in protecting the anonymity and confidentiality of informants in small communities.
These discussions highlighted the difficulties of conducting ethnographic research in cross-cultural
environments, which are not dissimilar to the challenges facing foreign development actors when
they attempt to engage with rural communities within participatory development models.
My research does have limitations. Only late in my data-analysis activity did I have the insight that
what the data were revealing had not been the focus of my initial research questions. I had been
looking at the “products” of development and how they were being implemented in “partnership”
with Pacific communities. Unfortunately, I spent months following these misleading pathways.
Instead what my data revealed was the importance of the “process” of development, in particular
how this was expressed in community radio through Pacific rentier orientation, extended social
networks, and reliance on traditional sources of wealth creation such as the community, the chief
and the church. I benefited from a large database because I had over-surveyed the field. This was
auspicious in that I could re-interrogate my data, but I regret that this insight did not occur earlier
when I could have sat in talanoa with villagers and discussed these issues. In some instances, my
research also suffered from lack of sufficient time spent in the field (Buala FM, most notably) and
my lack of Pacific language skills. My discussions might also be too descriptive but as my research
is the first of its kind and thus serves as a foundation for future research, the thick description is
perhaps not too significant a detriment.
As is frequently found in applications of talanoa methodology, my data are defined by time, place
and participants, thus the data are difficult to replicate by subsequent researchers. However, I argue
that my research findings are valid and have been derived through proven scientific qualitative
methods. King and co-authors (1994:9-12) contend that all social science, at its best, is a creative
process of insight and discovery taking place within well-established structures of scientific inquiry.
When such methods are rigorously applied, as I have done, the theories arising from that data might
be “uncertain” or inferential but they are scientifically valid (King, et al., 1994:6).
My research is important because community radio has been proven to be a powerful tool to
improve the quality of life in poor rural communities around the world. This is the first
comprehensive study of Pacific community radio within development communication and it
provides an objective and rigorous assessment of the challenges obstructing the growth of the
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sector. The subsequent chapters explore my multi-faceted research question – why is there not more
community radio in the Pacific – through my four chosen case studies.
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Chapter 6
When community is a “weasel word”43
Buala FM: The clash of development and culture within community radio
“Elias” leaned forward, speaking softly, intensely, about the Isabel Province community radio
project:
People are making a lot of money out of the word ‘community.’ It is the international
selling word for funding. It’s being used to lure funding, but for what purposes? So
now, a community radio station. It comes in a little box for about SB$30,000. So the
community gets the equipment. They don’t know what to do with it…. It doesn’t
matter whether it’s there or not for the community because they’re doing their daily
talks within the village. But these guys (project implementers), they have made a deal
… (but they’re) not giving all the benefits to the project. I’m highly suspicious of this
going on in the Pacific. … So when all of these things are done, we need to just to
look at how important, how valuable, how useful are these so-called ‘community’
projects that they bring there? How useful indeed are these things, promoted in the
world as so-called ‘community?’ How much is it contributing to their livelihood?
How much has it improved them from where they were? Hmmm? (Personal
communication, 25 Feb. 2011).
Introduction
From 1998-2003, the Solomon Islands were engulfed in a period of violent civil unrest, commonly
called the “tensions,” which nearly destroyed the country, killed at least 200 people, and displaced
thousands of others (Ata, et al., 2013:3).44 The tensions created an “extremely attractive” field for
43
“Lyndon,” development agency representative, personal communication, 7 March 2011.
44
The roots of the tensions date to World War II when Malaita Province residents had relocated to Guadalcanal to assist with the
Allied war effort. After the war, the Malaitans stayed on and in time grew to dominate economic, political and media structures to the
exclusion of Guadalcanal natives. Tensions between the two groups erupted in violence in 1998. In June 2000, the Malaita Eagle
Force militia toppled the government and for three years “milked” the nation’s economic institutions into a state of collapse
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dozens of foreign development actors to rush in with abundant resources and self-directed projects
to help stem the violence and restart economic development as a pathway to peace (Bautista,
2012b:26). Among these actors were the UNDP and four other UN agencies that established a pilot
project called the Isabel Province Development Project (IPDP).45 In 2007, the IPDP established
eight community radio stations with the understanding that these stations could improve
communication between the local government and rural communities. The network hub was Buala
FM.
The Isabel community radio case study provides opportunities to discuss the difficulties of
operationalising participatory development theories in the Pacific context and within an aggressive
rent-seeking CSO environment. I argue that both the UN agencies and their local CSO partners
failed to appreciate the importance of Pacific social networks, in this case the Solomons’ wantok
networks, in achieving sustainable development. When the diaspora wantoks associated with the
Isabel communities grew suspicious that aid funds were being sought on behalf of their
communities but misdirected for personal gain by CSO representatives, they withdrew their support
from the radio stations. This led to the radio stations becoming “sustainability failures” due to the
collapse of social sustainability (Bell & Morse, 2008:29; da Costa, 2012:142; Dagron, 2003:4-7;
Heeks, 2002:102; Hussain, 2008:1; Krüger, 2012:1; Lush & Urgoiti, 2012:10-14; Siemering &
Fairbairn, 2006:11; Tavhiso, 2009:56).
No fewer than 12 international development actors have revolved through the Isabel radio project
since its inception, each bringing their own definitions to concepts such as community participation,
sustainability and capacity building. None of the actors sought to build organisational sustainability
around the stations. Funding was only given to create media products around donor-chosen
development themes, sometimes within token participatory development frameworks, and
regardless if the stations were technically or administratively capable of broadcasting this content.
The local CSOs that partnered with the international development community sought to use the
stations as a means to extract significant amounts of aid. By 2010, all eight radio stations were off
the air due to technical failure and the wantoks were questioning where the money had gone. The
stations’ failures were not mentioned in the copious project literature, which was designed to
(Braithwaite, et al., 2010:33). In an effort to contain the spreading unrest, the Solomons Government asked Australia to intervene. A
2,200-person peacekeeping force, known as RAMSI, or the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, arrived in July 2003
and remains today. RAMSI is led by Australia with support from New Zealand and 15 PICs.
45
These agencies were the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN
International Labour Organisation, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA).
167
encourage the continued flow of aid funds. I argue that without attention to organisational
development, the radio stations are incapable of evolving into healthy organisations that articulated
community voices. Rural villagers lack opportunities to learn the business skills needed to run a
radio station. I will also discuss other donor-led media-development initiatives now occurring in the
region. Again, these have focused on media-production skills (to better advance donor-defined
development messages) and have ignored training in organisational-capacity building. I suggest
possible strategies to fill this void around organisational training in the community radio sector.
STATION BIOGRAPHY
Isabel Province (also spelled Ysabel) is one of

nine provinces in the Solomon Islands. It contains
the country’s longest island, the mountainous and
heavily forested Santa Isabel. Unsustainable
logging drives the local economy. Isabel suffers
the same development challenges found elsewhere
in the Solomons in terms of rural health services,
rural education, rural private-sector development,
environmental-resource management, and
transportation and communication infrastructure
deficiencies (Ortega, 2006:3; Solomon Islands Map 6.1 Solomon Islands case study locations
Adapted from: (Australian Museum, 2009)
Rural Development Division, 2001). The most
common mode of transportation is a motorised long boat. The 200-kilometre-long Santa Isabel
Island has a mere three kilometres of improved roads, making it difficult for farmers to deliver
produce to markets in the national capital, Honiara, located a 10-hour sea journey away. Only
Buala, the provincial capital, has electricity. The 1999 census found that 84 percent of Isabel homes
lacked improved toilets, high school enrolment was about 22 percent of the eligible population, and
adult literacy levels were 63 percent (Solomon Islands Rural Development Division, 2001). An
estimated 27,000 people live in Isabel Province. They speak eight languages, most belong to one
church (the Church of Melanesia), and 98 percent engage in subsistence agriculture. Isabel is a land
of tradition and kastom. Isabel Province is renown throughout the Solomons for the strength of its
traditional governance system and its pioneering work in the 1980s-1990s to integrate indigenous
systems within the modern government (White, 2004). Isabel’s estimated 200 village chiefs wield
168
considerable authority in a shared “tripartite” governance arrangement with the modern government
and the church. Relationships among the three groups are deeply intertwined.
Isabel Province was considered an ideal location for the UNDP’s pilot project due to Isabel’s
history of stability and political neutrality. It escaped largely unscathed from the tensions. Prior to
the establishment of the UNDP radio stations, Isabel villages were largely isolated from the outside
world (Leeming, 2009c:4). Reception of the national broadcaster, the Solomon Islands
Broadcasting Corporation or SIBC, was weak. Mobile telephony services were then unreliable.
Copies of the national newspaper, The Solomon Star News, were only sporadically available. In the
early-2000s, Isabel health clinics, schools and police sub-stations had used a shortwave radio
network with some success to provide public service announcements, transportation schedules,
commodity prices, and local government news (Ortega, 2006:21). The radio service ended in 2005.
The tensions period put many international development agencies on a back foot, uncertain whether
they should proceed with their projects in an increasingly lawless environment. In 2001, the Pacific
offices of five UN agencies, led by the UNDP, met to consider how they could join forces to bring
peace, stability and economic growth to the Solomons. In partnership with the Solomon Islands
Government, they agreed to proceed with a pilot project called the Isabel Province Development
Project (IPDP). It was the first comprehensive project in Melanesia to focus on enhancing the
performance of provincial-level government as the primary means of improving delivering of basic
services and fostering more inclusive democratic governance (Hodge & Rihuoha, 2008:4, 32). The
project aimed to train provincial government staff, streamline work processes within local
government, and encourage a greater level of democratic community-engaged decision-making that
would, it was hoped, promote peace and stability (Ortega, 2006:3). The IPDP ran from 2001-2007.
Running on a parallel course was a separate project, also initiated by the UNDP in 2001. This
second project funded the creation of the People First Network (PFNet), a non-profit organisation
affiliated with the Solomons’ Ministry of Provincial Government and Rural Development and a
non-profit entity embedded in the ministry called the Rural Development Volunteers Association.
The PFNet was a rural connectivity project. Small “email stations,” consisting of a trained station
operator equipped with a laptop, high-frequency radio, solar power and later a VSAT (very small
aperture terminal) satellite dish, were built in deep rural communities around the country that had
no other communication services. This affordable point-to-point messaging service allowed
169
villagers to send and receive asynchronous email messages for as little as SB$2 (AU$0.26). The
rural messages were transmitted through a central administrative “hub” in Honiara that relayed
them onto the World Wide Web. This hub also served as a public Internet café to raise
supplemental funds to sustain the rural email stations. By 2010, about 30 email stations had been
built through the country (Tebbutt Research, 2010:12).
The project immediately attracted profuse amounts of uncritical international attention (A. Agassi
& Leeeming, 2002; A. S. Agassi, 2001; Biliki, 2004, 2004b; Chand, et al., 2005; Curtain, 2003;
International Telecommunication Union, n.d.; Kupiainen, 2006; Leeming, 2004, 2007, 2009a,
2009c, 2009d, 2010a, 2010c; Leeming & Biliki, 2003; Leeming, Biliki, Agassi, & Fortier, 2003;
Ma’ai & Leeming, 2008; United Nations Development Programme, 2004). It has received
international recognition: the InfoDev ICT Stories Competition 2002, the Stockholm Challenge
2002 and 2004, and the UNESCO Rural Communications Prize in 2004. PFNet has been cited as an
example of a successful “best practice” telecentre model worthy of replication around the region
and beyond (Chand, et al., 2005:55; Ma’ai & Leeming, 2008:142). However, notions of success can
be elastic depending on one’s point of view (Bell & Morse, 2008:xvii; Dagron, 2001:8).
Internationally, rural telecentres are rarely financially sustainable (Balit, 2004:13; Dagron &
Dlamini, 2004). Much of the PFNet literature fails to critically assess the project’s performance.
PFNet opened the first of four planned email stations on Isabel in 2002, about the same the time
that IPDP project was being launched. A 2006 IPDP project-assessment report had recommended
the use of community radio to improve communication between the local government and rural
communities (Hodge & Rihuoha, 2008:24). Thus the community radio project was wedded to the
email-relay service and PFNet became deeply involved in the Isabel radio project. The IPDP built
four more email stations to bring the total on Isabel to eight and suitcase radio units were added to
the email stations. A small four-computer Internet café was established in Buala in 2005. This
would eventually become the headquarters for Buala FM.
In late 2007, in the last year of the IPDP project, radio stations began broadcasting in eight villages:
Tataba, Sigana, Kolotubi, Susubono, Samasodu, Kia, Lelegia and Buala. All except Buala FM were
solar-powered. The stations could reach about 85 percent of Isabel residents, but their programming
content was not coordinated. Station details for Buala FM are presented in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1 Station details: Buala FM
Frequency FM 91.1
Founder UNDP
Estimated audience 8,000
Years of operation Est. 2007, sporadic service 2009 onward
Broadcast details 6-11 p.m. daily
Programming focus Local and imported music, community announcements, local government
announcements, irregular shows from local government and the local office of the
international NGO, Save The Children.
Estimated no. of volunteers Variable, about 5
Funding sources Music dedications, sporadic donors (Commonwealth of Learning, etc), in-kind local
government support (facilities, electricity, etc).
Equipment Wantok Enterprises 100-watt suitcase radio, miscellaneous, laptop
When I visited Buala FM in January 2011, its entire

operation lay on a tabletop in the corner of a shared
government office otherwise cluttered with broken
computers, a curious collection of locked ballot
boxes, assorted office furniture, and signs posted
here and there by a territorially possessive
officemate saying, “do not touch.” The wall clock
had gone missing; the second microphone was
faulty. The volunteers had dwindled to four, with Photo 6.1 Buala FM volunteers
Source: (Community Media in Solomon Islands,
two then on leave. But Buala FM was on the air, 2012)
broadcasting a mix of commercial reggae and

Pacific islands music. Volunteers kept the studio equipment operational with targeted thumps on
equipment cases and copious amounts of sticky tape. A handful of supporters struggled through
2011 to give roots to this station so carelessly planted by foreign development actors yet so full of
obvious potential (da Costa, 2012:10).
SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY
Introduction
When communities are engaged in development projects from the start, they can identify their
communication needs, choose the technology platform that best suits their needs, then design,
implement and evaluate the project as it evolves, thus coming to value and support the service
(Balit, 2004:6; Ballantyne, 2003:1, 3; Dagron, 2001:4, 8, 24; Ó Siochrú, 2005:4; Ó Siochrú &
171
Girard, 2005:19, 24). A sense of community ownership is essential to a community radio station’s
sustainability (da Costa, 2012:142; Dagron, 2003:12-13; Duer, 2008; Figueroa, Kincaid, & Rani,
2002:ii; Fröhlich, Däschle, Geerts, & Jannusch, 2012:7; Jallov, 2001:1; 2003:12; 2012:5; Krüger,
2012:5; Lush & Urgoiti, 2012:7-8; Ó Siochrú, 2005:1-2; Tavhiso, 2009:58).
But the IPDP never intended to directly engage with village people. Project implementers applied
orthodox development models that viewed media only as one-way messaging channels. They chose
the communities to receive the radio stations and engaged in only minimal consultation with
villagers. Matters were greatly complicated through the involvement of local CSOs who used the
radio stations as a means to extract foreign funding, or rents, from the lucrative aid streams flowing
through post-conflict Solomon Islands in the 2000s. This section discusses how social sustainability
was undermined and affirms the great importance of Pacific social networks in development work.
Post-conflict environments and participatory development
The tensions period created an “extremely attractive” field for a great variety of foreign
development actors to rush in, all seeking to produce highly visible “good works” through quickly
implemented projects intended to stem the unrest and restart the Solomons economy (Bautista,
2012b:26). In conflict and post-conflict situations, such as the Solomons in the early 2000s, the
immediacy of producing tangible project outcomes often overshadows the importance of working
with communities in participatory ways (Sullivan & Hegarty, 2005:1). Unstable or lawless
environments make it difficult for foreign development actors to safely engage with rural villagers.
Consequently, pre-project feasibility studies are not conducted through which community needs and
wants might be articulated, nor are post-project assessments conducted through which project
impacts might be assessed and reflected upon (Sullivan & Hegarty, 2005:10-11).
The IPDP was not intended to engage with grassroots villagers; methodologies for community
consultations were not included in the project design (Hodge & Rihuoha, 2008:4, 6). The project
implementers worked only with government officials and consulted village chiefs as this was
thought to be a culturally appropriate approach (Biliki, 2004b:9; Chand, et al., 2005:12; Leeming, et
al., 2003:7, 19). In doing so, they failed to recognise the importance of Melanesian social networks,
the wantoks, because a chief only gains and retains his position through the support of wantok
networks (Keesing, 1946:153; White, 2004:4). In this way, a chief resembles more a community
172
manager and serves as its spokesman (White, 2004b:17). The Isabel radio project began on the off-
foot by ignoring the importance of engaging directly with rural villagers in addition to their chiefs
and to at least be aware of the importance of Pacific social networks in the creation of social
sustainability around development projects.
Late in the IPDP project, in 2006, project implementers decided that community radio stations
would provide an “excellent” and cost-effective platform for the Isabel Provincial Government to
use to disseminate information to the widely dispersed villagers in this long and mountainous
province. In this way, the IPDP adopted the orthodox development model by viewing media as
tactical tools for one-way messaging to achieve immediate goals (da Costa, 2012:144; Dagron &
Dlamini, 2004:105; Jallov, 2003:111; Kalathil, et al., 2008:1; McFeatters, 2007b:11; Ó Siochrú &
Girard, 2005:22, 41; Sullivan & Hegarty, 2005:1; Wissenbach, 2007:3, 12). The project
implementers failed to grasp that community radio can instead be used to facilitate peace-building
dialogue around conflict resolution, consensus building, informed decision-making and community
awareness, all of which lead to more lasting peace (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2011:2;
Kalathil, et al., 2008:4; Wissenbach, 2007:11).
The IPDP project implementers also gave scant attention to how the radio stations would survive
after the close of the project. Ann McFeatters (2007b:8-12) calls this “a consultant’s mentality”
where emphasis is placed around achieving short-term goals and little concern given to what is left
behind. Many development projects fail because project implementers lack the will to both “start
off together” with the community and have discussions with the community about post-project
sustainability to ensure there are no misunderstandings and messy handovers (Dagron, 2009:262;
Engberg, 2005:13-14; Saovana-Spriggs & O'Collins, 2003). When communities are not involved in
the early planning around development projects, such projects will simply be viewed as imposed
from the outside, owned by the donor and not the community, and they will subsequently collapse
at the project’s end (Pavarala & Malik, 2007:157; Tavhiso, 2009:75; Wissenbach, 2007:12). This
was indeed the case with Buala FM and its sister stations. The radio stations were hastily shifted to
the purview of the provincial government at the end of UNDP’s involvement in the project; the
local government had neither the resources nor the personnel to sustain the stations.
The IPDP implementation team chose which Isabel villages would receive the radio stations, thus
the stations were not organically arising from community requests (Leeming, 2009d:218). The
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village-selection criteria were not explained. Pre-project community consultations were not
extensive; public meetings were held in only half of the villages (A. S. Agassi, 2001:8; Chand, et
al., 2005:11; Hodge & Rihuoha, 2008:6; Ortega, 2006:13). Once conceived, the radio stations were
rolled-out in rapid succession in late 2006 and 2007. This suggests that the time span for pre-project
community engagement, if it had occurred, was about one year. This contrasts with the longer
timeframes recommended in the literature (a two-year minimum) and employed by comparator
Pacific media-development projects (Balit, 2004:17; Jallov, 2001:1). For example, the Pacific
Media Assistance Scheme (PACMAS) carries a 10-year timeframe, the AusAID-funded Vois Blong
Yumi project in Vanuatu a seven- to 10-year timeframe (ABC International Development, 2011c:2;
Vois Blong Yumi, 2006:35). The Solomon Islands Development Trust worked 11 years with
communities before introducing its theatre-for-development project (“Lyndon,” CSO
representative, personal communication, 7 March 2011). Some observers suggested that IPDP’s
establishment of eight radio stations without the benefit of a pilot project was ambitious (“Mary,”
radio administrator, personal communication, 3 March 2011).
It (the radio station) was kind of imposed on the communities (“Samuel,” radio
partner, personal communication, 11 March 2011).
From my understanding, when they initially implement those community radio

stations, the people said, it’s something new. They were keen and very much
interested in participating. … But exactly what they needed, there was no proper
awareness to the community about the objective of setting up that FM station. That’s
a problem. I looked through the scope of what that project was but I reckon that it
has never been properly planned (“Bernard,” engineer, personal communication, 2
March 2011).
That’s the first thing, we should go to the communities and try to tell the people what
is community broadcasting, what it really aims to do, and from there we develop
material…. But for now, if you go to Isabel, people are still asking, what is
community broadcast? (“Benjamin,” CSO representative, personal communication,
23 Feb. 2011).
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There is no community consultation. There is no information, like educational
programs about the benefits of community radio (“Vince,” radio partner, personal
One reason why foreign development actors frequently gift community radio stations stems from
the economic and political structure of aid, where technology transfer from developed countries to
poor ones is still a widely accepted practice. Funding for ICT-for-development projects has reached
enormous levels. Japan alone has committed US$15 billion to international ICT projects to
overcome the “digital divide.” Many ICT-for-development projects, including the Isabel project,
tend to be designed and implemented by technicians and economists, not by communication
specialists trained in participatory methods (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2011; Balit,
2004:1). The IPDP’s main local CSO partner, PFNet, arrived with a chosen technology platform –
an asynchronous email-relay service – and it applied this one-way transmission orientation to the
community radio stations, thus dismissing the latter’s dialogic potential. Furthermore, PFNet failed
repeatedly through the course of its involvement with the Isabel radio project to listen to the voices
of the communities wherein it might have heard preferences for a different technology application
(Chand, et al., 2005:11; Manyozo, 2004). As I will explain, there was money to be made through
the continuous rollout of email stations and there appeared to be little interest to hear contrary
opinions that might disturb the funding flow.
Connectivity, not community
As mentioned, PFNet began as a separate project around the same time that IPDP was initiated in
2001. The IPDP and PFNet joined in partnership with the IPDP agreeing to build four more email
stations and installing suitcase radio units in all eight email stations. Thus, the PFNet email stations
and Isabel radio stations became in inseparably intertwined. This proved in hindsight to be an
unfortunate misstep as the radio project now focused on connectivity, not community (Ó Siochrú &
Girard, 2005:10).
The Isabel project implementers and their PFNet partner clearly failed to grasp the theory of
participatory communication-for-development approaches, although buzzwords such as community
ownership, participation, partnership and capacity building were, as Peter Ballantyne (2003:2)
states, “bandied around without much precision.” Repeatedly in the literature, PFNet
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representatives and project admirers commented upon the technological details of the hybrid
system, seemingly fully incognisant of the distinction between point-to-point communication
(email) and the dialogic capacity of community broadcasting. I suggest that PFNet fell within that
category of development actor who believes that simply providing poor communities with access to
communication technology will solve development problems, a viewpoint which Matthew Walton
and Richard Heeks (2011:2) call Western rationalist. Providing poor villages with access to
technology is rarely enough (Bell & Morse, 2008:17, 21, 29; Hamelink, 1999:24, 31, 37; Slater,
Tacchi, & Lewis, 2002:54; Tacchi, 2006:5; Walton & Heeks, 2011:5-6). Don Slater and Jo Tacchi
(2004:2-3) state that understanding a village’s “communicative ecology” is critical to effective
implementation of ICT-for-development projects. Complex relationships exist between
technological and social networks (McAnany, 2012:137-138; Tacchi, 2006b:2). What are the
consequences of engaging with, rather than simply accessing, ICTs? How does information and
communication now flow within each Isabel village and how might the introduction of the email
stations or radio stations build upon these existing social networks to advance villager-defined
development objectives (Hearn & Foth, 2007:1; Slater, et al., 2002:4; Tacchi, 2006:4)? Such
questions appear not to have been asked.
Within the PFNet project literature, little thought is given as to how the Isabel radio stations could
actually improve a community’s thinking, reflection and action around specific development
objectives (Balit, 2004:1; Dagron, 2003:17; Pavarala & Malik, 2007:145, 165). ICT projects must
have outcomes that “go somewhere and do something” (Bell & Morse, 2008:202). Richard
Curtain’s (2003:29-30) critique of the Isabel radio project said it could have been strengthened by
targeting some the Millennium Development Goals’ 48 performance indicators; for example,
demonstrating a concrete linkage between use of the radio network and improved agricultural
production. The PFNet email stations, and by affiliation the Isabel radio stations, were repeatedly
heralded in the literature as success stories even though some of PFNet’s own data showed 59
percent of respondents in one survey didn’t see the need for the services at all (Leeming, 2003:18).
The survey’s optimistic findings simply failed to include this category of survey respondents in its
data analysis.
Strategic inaction is an attribute of the Pacific culture of silence. In the case of the Isabel radio
project, evidence of this cultural attribute could have been inferred through more reflective
development practice. A 2010 nationwide survey found only 4 percent of surveyed Isabel residents
had ever used PFNet email services and no data were entered on percentage of listeners to the
176
Isabel radio stations despite the stations’ combined broadcast coverage of 85 percent of Isabel’s
population (Tebbutt Research, 2010:118). Clearly, the majority of Isabel villagers were not using
the email or radio services. Such “project failures” are enormously useful as learning opportunities
if development actors are inclined to evolve into learning organisations that value project
monitoring, participatory evaluation, and reflective practices (Heeks, 2002:102). Such evolution
appears not to have occurred in the Isabel radio project. The sustainability of the Isabel radio station
could have been strengthened through genuine sustained conversation with grassroots villagers and
their wider wantok networks in addition to their chiefs (Heeks, 2002:110; 2002b:14; Heeks &
Kenny, 2002:9).
What I learn in the communities here, the partnership will be more of a reality if the
people participate and be part of it. That’s it. There’s no secret about it. If they are
left out and not being felt as being a part of anything, forgot it, it’s gone (“Bernard,”
engineer, personal communication, 2 March 2011).
Questions now arise about how success is measured, how community participation is defined, and
how sustainability is conceptualised (McAnany, 2012:132-135). As Richard Heeks (2002:104)
notes, every project partner comes with its own version of “actuality.” Upbeat project evaluations
arise because donors are keen to justify their expenditures and project consultants are either donor-
funded or seeking donor funds (Heeks, 2002b:4). But as “Elias” noted in the preface to this chapter,
they all do so in the name of a particular community.
Post-conflict environments and rentier behaviour
PFNet, as an indigenous CSO, was also swept up in the donor-filled, funding-rich environment of
post-tensions Solomons in the 2000s (Bautista, 2012a:14, 17; 2012b:23-31; Low & Davenport,
2002:367; Saovana-Spriggs & O'Collins, 2003:4). Numerous foreign actors, ranging from bi-lateral
aid agencies to international NGOs such as Save the Children, arrived with abundant resources,
transnational networks and superior organisational systems; they simply overwhelmed the local
CSOs (Bautista, 2012b:26-28). The foreign actors seldom worked cooperatively. They showed a
tendency to bypass both formal and traditional governance systems, arrived with “ready-made
ideas” about what projects they would fund, and wooed away talented workers from local CSOs
with higher salaries. Often the agencies were frustrated by transportation and communication
177
infrastructure bottlenecks so they managed rural-based projects from Honiara, meaning they did not
engage with rural villagers. They also preferred to fund similar foreign-affiliated NGOs, not local
CSOs.
Local CSOs and local development consultants found themselves being “squeezed out” (Bautista,
2012b:28). Consequently, they became aggressively competitive in their search for funding, refused
to cooperate with each other and exhibited tendencies to take on development projects outside of
their core organisational missions just to secure funding for survival. In other words, they applied
an aggressive rent-seeking orientation. This provided opportunities for foreign development actors
drive the development agenda because local CSOs willingly aligned with this agenda in return for
funding (Saovana-Spriggs & O'Collins, 2003:7). All of these dynamics were experienced within
PFNet and they informed its relationship with the Isabel radio stations (“Samuel,” radio partner,
personal communication, 11 March 2011).
The abundance of aid flowing in to support the local CSO partners of these foreign development
actors stirred resentment and jealousy within local government agencies (Bautista, 2012a:1, 35;
2012b:29). Pacific governments have long been suspicious about foreign-funded local CSOs and
their motives (Kabutaulaka, 1998:49).
The addition of the Isabel radio stations into PFNet’s overall portfolio was highly advantageous for
PFNet. The radio stations were widely used to enhance PFNet’s international reputation, often
through documents written by PFNet staff. Based on this positive publicity, PFNet accrued more
than US$520,000 between 2000-2004, a significant amount in the Solomons context (Biliki,
2004:36). PFNet received around SB$476,000 (AU$61,880) to establish the eight hybrid Isabel
email-radio stations and the four-computer Internet café in Buala (Leeming & Biliki, 2003:9).
In the turbulent post-tension years, when the Solomons’ economy was imploding and the national
treasury running dry, the amount of aid flowing into IPDP and PFNet did not go unnoticed by local
officials. The IPDP budget of SB$9.2 million (AU$1.2 million) was only slightly less the entire
provincial government’s annual budget of SB$10 million (AU$1.3 million). Repeatedly through the
years, PFNet failed to release annual reports, project financial statements or similar organisational
materials that might contribute to public trust pertaining to its handling of the funding it had
received in the name of the Isabel communities.
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The sustainability of that project (the Isabel radio project), it was not clearly defined.
You know, with most of the projects, people come here, get the money, install it,
implement it. They don’t care for that (sustainability). That’s what I tend to see in the
Solomon Islands in a lot of projects (“Bernard,” engineer, personal communication,
2 March 2011).
When the money comes from such donors, they come in with the money and they try
to dictate the development. This is why most of the projects that are done financed by
the foreign donors don’t last. Some don’t even work. They need to come in and listen
to the community (“Sikeli,” engineer, personal communication, 31 Jan. 2011).
The only problem that I have with that is sustainability, when donor funding finishes.
It’s been happening in an ad hoc manner in the Pacific. When the donors come in,
they come with their plans and their ideas but instead of bringing it to the locals so
the locals can buy into it, they take it upon themselves to say, ‘oh, we take ownership
of this.’ I think that’s been the biggest problem, where (donors are) trying to push it
down the throats of our local communities (“Uriam,” CSO representative, personal
Of kastom and wantok networks
Culture shapes communication, especially so within the daunting cultural diversity found in
Melanesia (Balit, 2004:8; G. M. White, 2007:2; Wickham, 1997:2). Every village has its own
customary modes of governance around which community life is organised (Hogbin, 1958:159;
Keesing, 1946:98, 147; G. M. White, 2007:1). With an estimated 5,000 villages and 70 languages in
the Solomons, the task of engaging in community-based dialogue within culturally appropriate
methodologies can be particularly challenging. Foreign development actors need to understand how
communities organise themselves and how local kastoms are used in intra- and inter-group
relationships in order to converse with villagers (Nanau, 2011:36).46 Toswell Kaua and Rence Sore
46
Kastom can be defined as a social framework around oral codes of behavior that cement group relationships around fundamental
notions of reciprocity, support, caring, and respect (Nanau, 2011). Wantokism can be defined as a kinship-based socio-economic and
political network that arises from shared attachment to a specific village or area as expressed within its specific kastom framework.
179
(2005:1-2) suggest that the reason many donor-led development projects in the Solomons fail is due
to “the lack of appreciation of the diversity, vastness and multi-layered richness of indigenous
society.” The difficulties in understanding kastom and the functionality of wantok systems means
many foreign development actors simply consult with village chiefs, then claim that this sufficient
community participation (Higgins, 2008:7).
Relationship, this is so important to the Solomon Islanders. This is why in the

Solomons, you’ve got to engage the Solomon Islanders (“Lyndon,” CSO
representative, personal communication, 7 March 2011).
The Isabel radio stations were designed to be “controlled” by chief-led committees that would
oversee finances, human resources and programming content. But such elite-controlled committees
can present barriers to community participation in a radio station (Wissenbach, 2007:72). Elites can
“capture” a radio station by limiting access to it, or by not being responsive to comments from non-
elite community members, if they are even voiced (Bell & Morse, 2008:141; Cregan, 2008:6;
Hussain, 2008:4; Jaiman, K., & Sen, 2010:2; Manyozo, 2004). Token participation by project
beneficiaries can be used to bestow legitimacy on donor-led projects (Bell & Morse, 2008:140-141;
Rush, 2009:8). Speaking from within a Solomons-based development organisation, Kate Higgins
(2008:7) states that “lots of talking is done, but are the right people talking?” and that many
consultations are viewed as “merely a tick on the process list.”
The Pacific’s culture of silence also constricted the level of community participation around the
Isabel radio stations. Development, in the eyes of grassroots Solomons villagers, is viewed as the
responsibility of the formal and traditional governance institutions (Kabutaulaka, 1998:20; 2002:29;
Kaua & Sore, 2005:2; Ortega, 2006:19; Wickham, 1998). Villagers quietly accept the status quo of
the chief-led development agenda. Outside development actors usually do not want to upset the
status quo “even if they pay lip service to participation” (Balit, 2004:16).
In Solomons, with the culture … once there’s a leader, everybody always just rely on
the leader. So sometimes the leader don’t have a good decision while the others got
the good one, but they cannot override the leader because it’s like a routine now. So
Wantokism is a moral relationship that binds members of a kinship group, often identified by language, into expanding concentric
circles of reciprocity (Braithwaite, et al., 2010:104; Nanau, 2011).
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it’s a challenge (“Billy,” CSO representative, personal communication, 4 March
2011).
Solomon Islanders don't take development seriously. They relax, sit down. They’re
not motivated (“Benjamin,” CSO representative, personal communication, 10 March
2011).
As with Higgins’ (2008:6) project, it appears the Isabel chiefs failed to understand the development
potential offered by the Isabel radio stations and did not integrate the maintenance of the radio
stations into their communities’ work plans. This was not surprising given that the types of
development projects attractive to islanders are “practical, doable, something that makes a
difference in their lives almost immediately,” such as improved cooking stoves, anti-malarial bed
netting and built toilets (“Lyndon,” CSO representative, personal communication, 7 March 2011).
The development potential of the Isabel radio stations was not immediately apparent to the chiefs
other than as possible conduits for aid to flow into the villages. The project implementers, who
viewed the radio stations as one-way messaging services, were poorly positioned to argue that the
radio stations could contribute to village-defined development objectives within participatory
development models.
Islanders’ notions of “development” are nearly always associated with the capture of donor funding,
thus rentier in orientation.
(If you ask a Solomon Islander what development is, they say) ‘I already know what
development is about. It’s about money. And your job is to get us linked up with
money.’ It’s very simple, huh? (“Lyndon,” CSO representative, personal
communication, 7 March 2011).
In the IPDP project, the chiefs appointed the radio committees. In Kia village, a new chief sacked
the existing committee and installed his own preferences. But a 2005 project report found the
committee-management system was largely dysfunctional and that the radio committees failed to
adequately represent all interests in their communities (Chand, et al., 2005:48). Of those villagers
surveyed in the report, 46 percent said they believed their station committees were not working
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properly; one village committee received a 94 percent disapproval rating. Eighty-nine percent of
survey respondents said their local committees had never called a public consultation meeting.
When committee members were surveyed, 90 percent agreed that the committees did not meet
regularly and when asked why, they said there was no financial incentive for them to so. Such
statements clearly reveal a rent-seeking orientation. Donor-led projects such as the Isabel radio
stations frequently raise expectations that the project will provide jobs and other income (Tavhiso,
2009:3) and (“Kevin,” international development agency representative, personal communication, 2
April 2011; “John,” radio partner, personal communication, 17 March 2011). Within the IPDP
project, project evaluators noted that the four public meetings they had had with villagers
“generated high expectations” which led to frustration when no tangible signs of project impact
were delivered (Hodge & Rihuoha, 2008:32; Ortega, 2006:15). Thus villagers as well as committee
members were seeking rents from the radio stations (Watkins, 2012a:15-23).
But when a chief becomes a champion for a cause, the results can be immediate. For example, a
newly arrived government official was tasked to chair Buala FM’s first radio committee in 2007. It
met once; two subsequent meetings failed to attract any attendees, and the committee dissolved. In
January 2011, a local chief revitalised the radio committee. He hand-picked community
representatives, ordered them to attend meetings, assigned them tasks, and followed up on their
efforts (“Nancy,” radio volunteer, personal communication, 4 March 2011; “Timothy,” radio
management, personal communication, 3 March 2011). By late January 2011, the committee had
met four times with full attendance each time. One of the chief’s relatives was appointed as the
unpaid station manager, the first manager that any of the Isabel radio stations had had. Buala FM
was back on air and the committee was active and task-oriented, even sending members to Honiara
to establish a bank account. Additionally, Buala FM’s sister station, Susubono FM, was a one-man
radio station run by a young chief.
“We are a wantok society”47
If the Isabel chiefs failed to appreciate the economic potential of the Isabel radio stations, Isabel
wantoks quickly ascertained their communication value. Given Isabel Province’s small population
(about 4.6 percent of the national population), Isabel wantoks are found in surprisingly large
47
“Elias,” radio staff. Personal communication. 25 Feb. 2011.
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numbers in the Solomons’ news media, telecommunication and broadcasting sectors. The wantoks
interviewed all expressed support for the notion of introducing more community radio into the
Solomons. All spoke of their wantok obligations to share their professional expertise with their
home villages.
“Elias” and “Bernard,” in particular, said they were initially eager to assist the Isabel radio project.
Both had been involved in its early technical designs. One had developed a signal-relay system that
could join the Isabel radio stations into one shared network that could also include the national
broadcaster, thus providing ways for Isabel villagers to contribute their voices to the national public
sphere. Interviewees said they could offer technical support and training in journalism and
equipment repair. But the wantoks’ enthusiasm soured after a series of “disappointments” while
working with Isabel project representatives. Such negative perceptions among community members
toward project implementers, whether justified or not, can hold back ownership of the whole
activity (Ballantyne, 2003:4).
He (the project representative) was misleading. Very misleading. We said to him, if

you want this project to be sustainable, then you have to have partnership with (us)
so (we) can maintain it for you. He said, no, no, no, no. So (what) he did with most of
the money that was supposed to go for the project was, it’s like been, like, used for
salaries and everything else. It did not really get into maximising that project
(“Bernard,” engineer, personal communication, 2 March 2011).
I would be the only one, the only local person in Isabel who could do a good
assessment, technical. Right on the spot, I could do some servicing. … I said, ‘oh I
have a leave, I can do this, and this will be the costs to get me around and do these
things.’ That did not come through. … To me, the technicality of it is not of
importance to whoever is driving the idea (“Elias,”radio staff, personal
I think with a lot of ex-pats here, they come here with genuinely good reasons and
they genuinely do want to make a change. But they kind of get it into their mind that
‘if I don’t take control of this, it’s not going to happen. So I’m going to take control of
this project because I know what we need to do and no one else will do that.‘ It’s kind
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of like this little empire building of development (“Mary,” radio administrator,
The absence of support from the Honiara-based wantoks around the Isabel radio stations did not go
unnoticed in the villages.
There are people from Isabel that have knowledge or the know-how, eh, but I don’t
know what is their problem for not coming down to their village and to help their
people. They just sit there in Honiara with this big box on their head. But if such
people as “Bernard” came down to their village, came down to the provincial level,
we would always see them as the bigman, eh? ... Then I think these (radio stations)
should be better than what you see here (“Timothy,” radio management, personal
The wantoks were growing uneasy about the way the Isabel radio project was being presented in the
international literature and the significant amounts of foreign funding that PFNet was attracting
through its association with the radio stations. The wantoks began to suspect that the Isabel radio
project was using the word ‘community’ as a “weasel” word to attract funding on behalf of the
Isabel communities that was then misdirected away from them (“Lyndon,” CSO representative,
personal communication, 7 March 2011; “Elias,” radio staff, personal communication, 25 Feb.
2011). As mentioned, PFNet has not published annual reports or financial statements that might
account for the dispersal of received funding, estimated at about US$1 million by 2008 as deduced
from the literature. PFNet received funding from numerous sources, including the UNDP, the
governments of UK, Japan and Taiwan, and international NGOs such as Oxfam. One report said
PFNet was seeking US$250,000 (SB$1.75 million) a year in foreign aid to cover operational costs,
an astounding amount given the Solomons post-conflict economy and PFNet’s organisational size
(United Nations Development Programme, 2004).
From the start of its operations in 2001, PFNet representatives, who were both indigenous islanders
and expatriates, had cultivated strategic alliances with well-placed Western men of the same
generation with interests in ICT who worked in key donor agencies. These personal relationships
provided access to donor funding, invitations to prestigious international conferences, and
involvement in other high-profile projects, such as the One Laptop per Child initiative. The
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literature notes that PFNet representatives were anxious about their “vulnerable” financial situation
as early as 2003, thus they engaged in “a continuous process of advocacy, publicity and liaison with
the donors” (Leeming & Biliki, 2003:2-3). In other words, they adopted a strategic rent-seeking
orientation by cultivating these relationships. Furthermore, PFNet earned 40 percent of its revenue
through project-implementation fees and commissions on equipment sales. Thus there was a
constant push to rollout new email stations to gain the revenue they produced, but there is little
evidence to suggest that PFNet paused to reflect on whether these stations would be sustainable,
financially or otherwise, once placed in the field (Ma’ai & Leeming, 2008:142).
These factors eventually led to a breach of trust between the wantoks and the Isabel radio project
representatives. With the chiefs failing to elevate the Isabel radio stations higher on the village work
agenda and the wantoks withdrawing their support, it is little wonder the grassroots villagers were
sceptical about supporting the community radio stations.
However, there is evidence in literature produced in the late-2000s that some PFNet representatives
were learning and evolving. A 2009 report acknowledged that the Isabel communities did not
sufficiently understand the notions of community ownership and participatory program-creation,
that the radio stations as they then existed were not functioning as truly community-owned media,
and that attempts to address these deficiencies had been based on “assumptions” made by project
implementers that had not been based on community consultation (Leeming, 2009c). What was
needed, the author said, was an interesting project to “connect the dots,” and so the Commonwealth
of Learning joined the team.
ORGANISATIONAL SUSTAINABILITY
Introduction
The Commonwealth of Learning (COL) is an inter-governmental organisation created by the

Commonwealth heads of government to encourage the development and sharing of distance-
learning educational materials. Since the early 2000s, COL has championed the use of community
radio in education (Spaven, 2011:6). All seven case study PICs are members of COL and have been
pushing COL “to work harder to make a difference in the Pacific” (Commonwealth of Learning,
185
2012:40; Spaven, 2010:18). But COL’s emphasis on short-term projects promoting the process of
stimulating community dialogue through the creation of radio programming meant that it was ill-
suited to plant organisational roots under the Isabel radio stations.
COL’s contribution
The COL is a highly sought-after development partner in Commonwealth countries due to its
reputation as an empathetic “listening” organisation (Spaven, 2010:8, 19). Its affiliation brought
significant credibility to the Isabel radio project. The COL arrived in 2009 with two projects: an
eight-month pilot trial of Learning4Peace and a three-month application of the internationally
tested Healthy Communities model of participatory content development. Four of the eight Isabel
radio stations participated in the latter project; each was to produce 12 radio shows around the
health-related Millennium Development Goals (Solomon Star, 2009). Evaluations of the Healthy
Communities project were not found and were not done for the Learning4Peace project (Leeming,
2009a:13).
No fewer than 10 local and regional governmental and development partners were involved in the
two COL projects. Partner responsibilities were not clearly defined. Eventually disagreements
among local CSOs over funding allocations emerged within the Healthy Communities project, again
reflecting a rentier orientation. The Healthy Communities project was further undermined when
technical failures brought down many of the Isabel radio stations in late 2009. Buala FM recorded
only four of its allocated 12 shows because of the funding disagreement; none was broadcast. At the
time, Buala FM was struggling to stay on air due to technical issues, lack of funding to pay for
equipment repairs, and lack of volunteers to run the station. Thus it made little sense to focus on
program creation when there was no radio station to broadcast the shows.
There was huge excitement for people about getting (the COL project) but it's all
been about content, not foundation building. … All of these are great ideas, but right
now everyone just needs to stop, step back for a moment, and help us to build the
foundation, because you can’t start doing podcasts with someone up at the other end
of the island when right now we’re barely managing to fill the (announcer) slots each
night (“Mary,” radio administrator, personal communication, 3 March 2011.)
186
In a sense, that’s where the Isabel stations are very weak. They really still don’t have
a particularly strong organisational foundation. I think that’s where the energy really
needs to go. It’s just frustrating because, of course, that’s a long-term process
(“Kevin,”international development agency representative, personal communication,
2 April 2011.)
Similarly, under the influence of PFNet staff, the Learning4Peace project spiralled off into a
technical orientation around computer-based media software and other ICT tools, resulting in the
creation of only one radio show and the loss of the ICT skills when those who had been trained
drifted away from the Isabel radio project. The Learning4Peace project had sought to “build
capacity” in Isabel youth to use ICT tools to engage in discussions and develop learning materials
around discussion themes. It appears the methodologies applied were unrealistic given Isabel’s
communication and transportation infrastructure constraints. The small group of project participants
(about six in the final group, apparently all men) were expected to use online discussion platforms
such Google Groups, Gmail, WikiEducator, YouTube and Ning, even though the Isabel radio
stations did not have direct Internet access, electricity service was limited, and the cost of traveling
by motor boat to the only facility that had Internet access and electricity was expensive, about
SB$1,000 or AU$130 per round trip. In Buala, the provincial capital, email access was limited to a
dial-up connection on one computer, resulting in hour-long queues and brief online sessions. One
government official reported that staff frequently did not checked email in months.
A “messy” handover”48
Many donors establish community radio stations by providing equipment and media-skills training,
but then leave before “capacity building” and expertise have settled down into the station’s
organisational structure (C. E. Wood, 2011:11). The Isabel radio project is one such example.
At the close of the IPDP in 2007, the UNDP and provincial government signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) that transferred legal ownership of the Isabel radio stations to the
government. The provincial government, however, did not have the staff or the funding to sustain
48
“Mary,” radio administrator, personal communication, 22 Feb. 2011.
187
the radio stations. As Silvia Balit (2004:19) notes, it is not uncommon for media-development
initiatives established within governmental institutions to fail due to faulty assumptions that the
local government has the capacity to sustain such projects. The project handover was described as
“messy.” The MOU, written in English, appears to have used a level of language that the chiefs,
villagers and government officials could not easily understand. Such confusion over language is not
uncommon in interactions between Western development actors and indigenous people (De Weaver
& Lloyd, 2005).
All along (project implementers) were thinking that everybody down here
understands what is in the MOU. The problem with this MOU is that those who
signed it never read it! So they don’t understand or they don’t even know what their
roles are or what is expected of them (“Timothy,” radio management, personal
During the handover, no attempt was apparently made to create a CSO structure around each or all
of the radio stations. The creation of such an organisation is often one of the first steps in creating a
community radio station (Center for International Media Assistance, 2007:9; Dagron, 2001:8;
Jallov, 2003:112; Ó Siochrú & Girard, 2005:19). The existence of a CSO around the radio stations
would have allowed them to apply for grants, such as the US$16,000 PFNet received from AusAID
to purchase media-production equipment for the Learning4Peace project.
A 2008 IPDP evaluation report had recommended that a communications officer should be funded
to oversee the radio project after the project handover, but a funding source was never identified
and the proposal was never implemented (Hodge & Rihuoha, 2008:34). At first, the provincial
government didn’t know where within the government structure to place the radio stations. Initially,
they were placed within the youth division in hope of attracting future funding around youth issues
and to capitalise on the efforts of an interested government employee. But there never was a
dedicated budget, the employee was often preoccupied with non-radio work, and when he left
government service, the stations drifted without direction.
Oversight of the radio stations then shifted to provincial government’s community affairs division,
but still without budgetary support and this time without a “champion” interested in the project.
When the Learning4Peace project implementers assumed that the provincial government would
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take the lead role in the project, they failed to consider if the provincial government had the
institutional capacity to fulfil the role (Watkins, 2012a:2, 7). When equipment failure closed Buala
FM for the entirety of 2010, it lost its office space in the government administrative centre. In late
2010, when an Australian aid worker arrived to help restart Buala FM, she and a handful of
volunteers didn’t even have a functional workspace.
Training and community participation
The Learning4Peace and Healthy Communities projects provided numerous media-production

training opportunities. In the Pacific as elsewhere, many young people use CSO volunteer
opportunities as stepping stones to future paid employment (Bautista, 2012b:18; Jeffrey, 2004:239-
240; Williams, 1999:5; Wollebæk & Selle, 2003:78-81). The media-skills workshops were popular
and often fully booked. But the incessant movement of volunteers in and out the Isabel radio
stations meant the skills left with the individuals and were not embedded in the radio station
organisation (McFeatters, 2007b:13; Pavlicevic, 1999:1). The training regimes never strayed from
media-production skills. No attention was given to the critical area of the business administration.
Similarly, business administration is not found in any of the media-development initiatives offered
in the Pacific region; they narrowly focus on journalism skills. This is not surprising given donor
emphasis on media development to encourage citizen-driven demand for “good governance.” The
transference of media-production skills also harkens back to the MacBride Report, which stated that
people must have the technical means to both speak and be heard if they are to meaningfully engage
in the process of self-defined development (Fore, 1982:9; International Commission for the Study
of Communication Problems, 1980:172-173).
Around the world, most volunteers join community radio stations specifically to create radio shows.
A 2012 international study found that community participation was greatest around program
creation (83 percent) compared to station management (54 percent) or fund-raising (45 percent)
(Fröhlich, et al., 2012:7). Community participation around content production is seen as one of the
best ways to engender a sense of community ownership (Balit, 2004:6; Chanda, 2011:51; Dagron,
2003:12, 16; Lush & Urgoiti, 2012:17; Siemering & Fairbairn, 2006:9). Community participation in
content development also leads to better recall of the development issues addressed in these
programs (Pavarala & Malik, 2007:157). These participants often engaged in informal discussions
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around the development topics with others in their community outside of the radio environment,
thus employing both Katz and Lazarsfeld’s theories about two-step information flows and Rogers’
theories about diffusion of innovation.
The Isabel radio training sessions were difficult and expensive to implement. Typically, a trainer
from a Honiara-based partner, such as PFNet, the Solomon Islands Development Trust or the
AusAID-funded Solomon Islands Media Assistance Scheme (SOLMAS), rotated around Isabel by
motorised watercraft, visiting each radio station for about one day. A typical training regime lasted
15 days with fuel costs alone reaching SB$30,000 (AU$3,900).
But it does little good to have locally produced content when the station is off the air due to
equipment failure, lack of staff, or lack of funding, all of which contributed to Buala FM’s inability
to create and broadcast the Healthy Communities shows. Thus, the inclusion of business skills in
media-development initiatives is imperative and yet nearly always overlooked (McFeatters,
2007b:4, 10-12). A review of Pacific educational institutions (such as the University of the South
Pacific and National University of Samoa), donor-led regional initiatives (PACMAS and
SOLMAS), professional organisations (Pacific Islands News Association and country-level media
associations), and regional media conferences held since 2010 found no evidence of discussion of
or instruction in the business side of community media.
Addressing the foundations
One of Buala FM’s most striking features is the lack of an organisational structure that places the
station at “the centre of attention” (Pringle & David, 2003:104). As mentioned, there appears to
have been no effort to build a CSO around Buala FM or any of the other Isabel radio stations. Some
Pacific regional and national CSO “umbrella” groups do offer leadership and organisational training
opportunities but because the Isabel radio stations were not organised as CSOs, they would have
been ineligible for such training.
Rural villagers have virtually no opportunities to gain experience in the key competency areas
needed to run a radio station: administrative and financial management, staff and volunteer
relations, programming design and production, audience research, technical operations and
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maintenance, and stakeholder relations (Ballantyne, 2003:1-7; da Costa, 2012:139; Dagron &
Dlamini, 2004:104-105; Jallov, 2003:113; Krüger, 2012:3; Lush & Urgoiti, 2012:25; Mainali,
Chapagain, Paneru, & Thakri, 2009; Mainali, Chapagain, & Subb, 2009b:5). Media organisations
are complex systems of many interdependent elements (Renneberg, Green, Kapera, & Manguy,
2010:36). Deficiencies in management and administrative processes often lead to technical
breakdowns, insufficient income generation, and the inability to recruit and retain staff and
volunteers, which in turn hinders the creation and distribution of relevant local programming.
This was precisely Buala FM’s predicament. Because there was no manager until 2011, no one
scheduled routine equipment maintenance, sought advertising or other funding, or worked to
recruit, train and retain volunteers. Buala FM closed in September 2011 when all of its volunteers
left for paid employment, leaving one person, the aforementioned Australian aid worker, to run the
station. Despite this, project implementers pressured Buala FM to complete the Healthy
Communities shows for which it had been funded and to conduct further media-skills training to
attract and enable future station volunteers.
Buala FM lacked both a mission statement that might have articulated the reasons for the station’s
existence and a business plan to achieve its mission. Also missing were all other forms of routine
policies, procedures and house rules that commonly guide radio station operations around the
world. Buala FM’s governing board lacked training and organisational processes to enable it to
fulfil its role in nurturing the station. There was no financial system to account for the received cash
donations, audience research was limited to casual conversations at the market or in church,
equipment sent for repair could not be retrieved for lack of funds, and volunteers were extremely
difficult to recruit and retain. One reason for the latter condition is the Pacific culture of silence:
islanders are too “ashamed” or afraid to speak on air (“Nancy,” radio volunteer, personal
communication, 4 March 2011; “Timothy,” radio management, personal communication, 3 March
2011).
The need to build business administrative capacity within the Isabel radio stations was noted in
project documents as early as 2004 (Leeming, 2004:2). Provincial government officials again raised
their concerns about the lack of attention given to organisational development in the radio stations
in early 2010 (Leeming & Turasi, 2010:7).
191
We do have potential and there are so many things we could do. … But it’s having to
constantly stress to people that we need the foundation. If I’ve been doing anything
for the past seven months, it’s been saying that over and over again, saying to (the
radio committee), saying to the donor organisations, saying to everyone, community
radio is not sustainable without the foundation (“Mary,” radio administrator,
Partnerships and potentialities
Although the organisational needs of the Isabel radio stations fell outside of COL’s primary
objectives, agency representatives said they would continue to support the radio stations through
2012. But COL representatives also explained that their work was obstructed by the lack of viable
local partners to drive the process. The relationship between COL and its Solomons partners was
described as “no action, no results, no follow-through, just disconnection” for two possible reasons
(“Kevin,” international development agency representative, personal communication, 2 April
2011). Firstly, COL was not a significant source of funding, thus it didn’t feed the Pacific rent-
seeking orientation. Secondly, COL’s emphasis on dialogic approaches to community radio
programming was not well understood in comparison to more traditional message-dissemination
applications.
What I am desperately looking for now is organisations that can be our partners.
…You have to have champions, local organisations that are really going to pick it
(community radio) up, keep it on the agenda, keep talking about it, share some
success stories, and hopefully also some non-success stories. And then over time,
stakeholders … at the community level will start to kind of take it on and approach
things in a more organic kind of a way. I think if you really want community radio or
community media stuff to happen, it has to come from the bottom up. And that’s a
very long process (“Kevin,” international development agency representative,
personal communication, 2 April 2011).
One new partner that COL is considering is the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC). The
SPC, through its seven-month residential Community Education Training Centre, offers a four-
week training module in community radio production. Program graduates are found throughout
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Pacific community radio stations, including Buala FM and two other case study radio stations, Niua
FM and Le’o ‘o e Kakai 98 FM, both in Tonga. SPC officials said they were committed to raising
the profile of community radio in the region and were considering converting the existing
curriculum into distance-education modes to make it more accessible (“Norman,” SPC
representative, personal communication, 26 Jan. 2011) and (Koroiwaca, 2010). The SPC is also the
lead implementing agency for the regional Framework for Action on ICT for Development in the
Pacific, which seeks to harness ICTs for economic and political development, thus it is well
positioned to advocate for the growth of community radio.
A possible template to guide SPC’s potential evolution into a regional community-media champion
is found within one of COL’s divisions, the Commonwealth Educational Media Centre For Asia
(CEMCA). Since 2007, CEMCA has been a major promoter of community radio in South Asia
(Spaven, 2011:58). In association with the Indira Gandhi National Open University, CEMCA has
developed a one-year certificate program that addresses the business and administrative aspects of
community radio (Spaven, 2011:60; Venkaiah, 2011:11). In another version of “connect the dots,”
Indira Gandhi National Open University and the University of the South Pacific (USP) have a
curriculum-sharing agreement; COL and USP have 20-year relationship around distance-education
delivery in the Pacific; and USP has a student radio station that is capable of broadcasting via
satellite to university centres in 12 PICs. However, engendering the political will of the leadership
within these institutions to support Pacific community radio in distance education and development
studies is another matter altogether (“Peter,” radio administrator, personal communication, 4 Feb.
2011). Currently, community radio is not addressed in USP’s journalism coursework (“Anita,”
radio staff, personal communication, 11 Feb. 2011).
Regional media-development initiatives, such as the AusAID-funded PACMAS and SOLMAS,

give scant attention to the community media sector. Both focus primarily on strengthening national
broadcasters and improving journalism training. However, AusAID has employed successful
“twinning” partnerships, both between Australia’s national broadcaster and national broadcasters in
Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu and between Australian and Pacific churches (AusAID, 2008;
Hauck, et al., 2005; Renneberg, et al., 2010; Vois Blong Yumi, 2006). Similar twinning
relationships between Pacific island community broadcasters and the many Pacific ethnic
community broadcasters in Australia and New Zealand could potentially provide opportunities for
the transference of organisational-development skills. In this approach, “the method is the model”
wherein Pacific islanders self-direct their own “capacity building” through temporary attachments
193
with overseas community broadcasters (Vois Blong Yumi, 2006:19). Kate Higgins (2008:2) argues
that exchange programs which provide islanders with temporary assignments in similar overseas
organisations are superior to existing approaches where Australian aid workers are sent into the
PICs.
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY
Introduction
Frequently, sustainability issues around community radio are reduced to matters of financial
solvency (Lush & Urgoiti, 2012:10; Siemering & Fairbairn, 2006:5; Tavhiso, 2009:11). When
Buala FM’s governing committee spent entire meetings discussing where to find money to pay
electricity bills and equipment repairs, they were doing what countless other radio committees
around the world do: focus on money and equipment (Center for International Media Assistance,
2007:17; da Costa, 2012:139; Myers, 2011:18; Pringle & David, 2003:101).
However, sustainability does not arise from money alone but rather through the creation of social
and organisational sustainability (Dagron & Dlamini, 2004:103, 106; Krüger, 2012:1). A poor
community’s pride in its radio station (social sustainability) and trust in its management
(organisational sustainability) lead to revenue flow (financial sustainability). For Buala FM, village
cash donations were often enough to cover daily operational expenses but insufficient to cover
major equipment repairs. The spectre of continued dependency on donor funding appears to be a
long-term reality for Buala FM, and one that is acknowledged by donors themselves.
This is a very donor-oriented country. There will always be another donor (“Ellen,”
SOLMAS representative, personal communication, 8 March 2011).49
(Isabel listeners) don’t see the value of it (the radio station). If they see the value in
it, I’m sure they will support it. Even if they have a dollar in their pocket, they can
49
When I heard “Ellen’s” comment, I detected a tone that I inferred was disparaging. I recalled and reflected upon Alfonso
Gumucio Dagron’s (2009:456-458) suggestion that some donors never truly intend to relinquish power over a project to the local
community.
194
throw away 50 cents and say, ‘OK, this is my support to my community’ (“Vince,”
radio partner, personal communication, 23 Feb. 2011).
Failing funding models
The 2007 ownership-transfer agreement between UNDP and the provincial government contained a
funding model derived from the PFNet email stations and applied without reflection onto the radio
stations. Project implementers estimated, based upon unexplained criteria, that the hybrid
email/radio stations could generate income between SB$300-SB$1,200 (AUD$39-AU$156) per
month (Chand, et al., 2005:65-69; Leeming, 2004:3; Ortega, 2006:21). The provincial government
agreed to assume ownership of the Isabel radio stations based on the understanding that each radio
station was obliged to pay SB$300 (AU$39) monthly into a general fund to cover equipment
maintenance and repairs. Few stations, if any, contributed.50 When widespread equipment failures
began to occur in all radio stations in late 2009, no funds were available to pay for repairs and the
provincial government did not have the capacity or political will to cover the shortfall (“Timothy,”
radio management, personal communication, 3 March 2011).
The existing MOU basically came out of UNDP. It didn’t really come out of much
community discussions about what the communities actual thought would work. …
They (the government) understand how important (Buala FM) is. They love it, they
support it, but when the cards are on the table, it's a money thing (“Mary,” radio
administrator, personal communication, 3 March 2011).
The funding model was found to be unsustainable as early as 2002 when PFNet itself began running
monthly losses of SB$13,600 (US$1,950) (Leeming & Biliki, 2003:8). Two factors contributed to
this, both related to the deregulation of the Solomons telecommunication sector in the mid-2000s.
Firstly, a proliferation of competing Internet cafés in Honiara undermined the profitability of
PFNet’s revenue-generating Internet café. Secondly, the expansion of mobile telephony into rural
villages eroded usage of the email-relay stations. In 2005, 88 percent of Isabel residents who visited
the email stations used them to email family members (Chand, et al., 2005:28). By 2011, mobile
50
Isabel’s transportation infrastructure would have frustrated stations’ efforts to pay their contribution. Only Buala has a bank. The
rural radio stations would have had to send cash whenever a trusted individual was planning to travel to Buala in a motorised
watercraft. The cost of a round-trip journey was estimated at SB$1,000 or AU$130, a significant amount given Isabel’s cash-poor
economy. The methodology of the UNDP funding scheme was ill suited to the realities of the Isabel context.
195
telephony was providing a more accessible, although potentially more expensive, means for
villagers to communicate with family members living elsewhere in the Solomons and overseas.
Programming and income generation
The main revenue source for Buala FM was listener-requested music dedications, each costing
SB$2 (AU$0.26). In some weeks, Buala FM earned as much as SB$140 (AU$18) from music
requests and personal announcements, such as birthday greetings. Thus, Buala FM was keen to play
the popular music requested by listeners in order to earn income to the detriment of more
development-oriented programming.
Efforts had been made to create a more diversified programming schedule. Government
departments as such the police, the hospital, and the agricultural extension service had been
allocated airtime, but few used the opportunities, thus deeply frustrating station volunteers who
were trying to create more participatory programming (“Felise,” radio administration, personal
communication, 3 March 2011). The international NGO, Save the Children, did produce four 15-
minute radio shows in early 2011. These were recorded in a makeshift studio at the NGO’s office
because Buala FM’s shared facilities were not available during work hours. It is not known if Save
the Children paid for the airtime. Most likely any participating government department would not
have had the funds to pay for airtime; provincial government budgets in 2011 were half of what
they were in the late-1990s before the tensions (Warner, et al., 2007:x, 8).
One thing that certainly didn’t go very well was the programs that they put together
for broadcasting. … It did not get right down to schools or communities, that they
would go around and the kids in the schools might have a chance to be interviewed,
or some programs that would be able to present to the schools or communities. So
it’s rather more or less the content was out of context to what it’s supposed to be
dealing with from what the objective of setting up that community radio was
(“Bernard,” engineer, personal communication, 2 March 2011).
Buala FM’s lack of organisational structure also meant that no one person was tasked with
investigating other funding sources, such as Honiara-based wantoks, overseas wantok communities,
196
local churches, or even patronage agreements with Isabel’s logging and mining sectors, similar to
Radio BOSCO’s partnership with the Gold Ridge gold mine.51 Buala’s tiny private sector (13
shops) meant advertising dollars were scarce. In January 2011, three fresh fish shops each agreed to
pay SB$20 (AU$2.60) a night for four advertisements each but only after persistent lobbying by
Buala FM’s new station manager.
Lacking the capacity to build capacity
Since the mid-2000s, donor interest has been growing around the creation of contestable funds that
would enable community radio stations to grow without creating donor dependency (Center for
International Media Assistance, 2007:13, 16; Foster, 2011:15-16; Lush & Urgoiti, 2012:25;
McFeatters, 2007b:16; Myers, 2011:21-24).
The most interesting contestable fund pertaining to community radio is incorporated in the second
phase of the AusAID-funded PACMAS, or Pacific Media Assistance Scheme. PACMAS is a
regional 10-year initiative managed by ABC International, a department within Australia’s national
broadcaster (Pacific Media Assistance Scheme, 2012). PACMAS’ first phase (2008-2010) was not
without its critics (ABC International Development, 2011b, 2011c; Akauola, 2010; Reitz, 2011).
The scope of PACMAS Phase 2 (2011-2014) has been broadened to include community media as
framed by AusAID’s good-governance development objectives (Pacific Media Assistance Scheme,
2012; The Cook Islands Herald Online, 2012). Media outlets, CSOs, universities and similar non-
state actors in 14 PICs are eligible to apply to PACMAS’ quarterly “innovation” fund. Two funding
categories exist: in-country projects of regional research significance (AU$30,000 maximum) and
regional or multi-country projects (AU$30,000-$50,000), thus the potential funding is significant.
More than AU$706,000 was dispersed during the fund’s first round of allocations in April 2012.
Among those projects receiving funding was a two-day “Pacific round table on community radio,”
which was held in February 2013 and organised by Sharon Bhagwan-Rolls, founder of
femLINKPACIFIC, in association with the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters
(AMARC) and the Pacific branch of the World Association for Christian Communication.
However, the round table agenda did not address organisational sustainability issues pertaining to
51
In late 2012, the Isabel Provincial Government was exploring a partnership with Sumitomo Metal Mining Company Ltd to
provide technical assistance to some of the Isabel radio stations, in partnership with the Isabel Investment Corporation. The
government was also considering shifting ownership of the radio stations to the Isabel Investment Corporation (Watkins, 2012a).
197
community media. It focused instead on general awareness raising and regulatory policy (Pacific
Media Assistance Scheme, 2013).
Given the current state of technical and organisational instability in the Isabel radio stations (at least
five were off air in May 2013), it is doubtful that they would have the capacity to meet PACMAS’
requirements around project management, funding accountability, and monitoring and evaluation.52
In this way, the Isabel radio stations are similar to numerous other Pacific CSOs that suffer from
“internal organisational capacity deficiencies” which constrain their ability to survive (AusAID,
2008:12; Bautista, 2012a:ii; 2012b:27; Bird, 2007:2, 13; Chapman, et al., 1998:53; Hauck, et al.,
2005:9, 23; Ortega, 2006:2, 10; Warner, et al., 2007:xii, 10). As a 2008 evaluation report on the
initial UNDP IPDP project noted, “there was not enough ‘capacity’ to ‘build capacity’” (Hodge &
Rihuoha, 2008:7). Little has been done through the years to change that situation despite the
multiplicity of international, regional and local development actors moving through the Isabel radio
project, each in pursuit of its own objectives, which are often simply rent accrual.
In this chapter, I have analysed some the complexities that arise within Pacific community radio
when orthodox development models meet Pacific cultural sensibilities. Three key findings emerge
from the Buala FM case study to provide evidence on what impedes the emergence of community
radio in the Pacific. Firstly, Pacific social networks are tremendously important in the creation of
social sustainability around development projects, yet foreign development agencies have yet to
recognise or develop strategies to engage with this cultural phenomenon. Secondly, engendering
organisational sustainability within community radio stations is critically important to their
survival, yet development actors of all varieties fail to address, or even acknowledge, this need.
Thirdly, the Pacific’s under-developed rural private sector means rural community radio stations
will be dependent on foreign aid for their survival for some time to come, thus perpetuating the
cycle of tensions between orthodox and immanent models of development.
The Pacific’s rentier orientation can obstruct development in numerous ways, as seen within this
case study. Local CSOs, such as PFNet and others, often privilege their organisational needs above
52
A September 2012 consultant’s report noted that Buala FM had been permanently closed, its equipment boxed and stored, and
few in the provincial government expressed any interest in restarting the station (Watkins, 2012a).
198
the needs of the communities they purport to represent. The villagers within the Buala FM case
study defined development as financial or rent-generating, thus they have an under-appreciation for
participatory development methods that might produce community cohesion, but not income. Many
foreign and Pacific development actors continue to view broadcast media as messaging platforms,
not as catalysts for community dialogue around development issues.
The Buala FM case clearly illustrates that a balance needs to be found between the “products” and
“processes” of development communication. An over-emphasis on either extreme – the creation of
media products, as exemplified by the Learning4Peace project, or on the process of creating
dialogue within community radio applications, such as within the Healthy Communities project –
ignores the organisational-sustainability challenges facing community broadcasters and deprives
them of administrative funding. Without a functional radio station, there is little logic in creating
media content, whether through participatory methods or otherwise. Without organisational
“foundations” in place, Pacific community radio stations will repeatedly suffer from technical,
financial, and human-resource deficiencies. Yet donor-led media-development initiatives
systematically fail to address the business side of community media.
The situation is further compounded by the widespread dearth within development agencies of
media specialists trained in participatory communication techniques. Too often this allows
technicians to skew projects in overly technical directions, placing the form of the technology ahead
of its communicative function. For example, the Learning4Peace initiative focused on imparting
technical skills, such as software competency, within media formats not suitable to the local
context, such as computer-based online formats. But these ICT applications are attractive to
international donors and thus generate rents.
Another worrying finding from the Buala FM case study was the ease with which a clever CSO
could position itself, largely through strategic alliances and skilful marketing, within lucrative aid
streams. Foreign donors failed to interrogate the PFNet project literature before committing funds.
Even if they had, so little is known about the interface between development and Pacific culture
that they might not have understood the gaps in the PFNet-generated data. Donors contributed
significant amounts of funding, at least in the Solomons context, which PFNet failed to
transparently account for, either to its funding agencies or beneficiary communities. This
represented a breach in the reciprocity and trust that lay at the heart of Pacific cultural values.
199
Here I reflect on the theories of rentier economics and on the hazy distinction between “good” rents
that benefit society and “bad” rents which benefit personal gain (Alkhater, 2012; Khan, et al.,
2000:78, 90; Pasour, 1987:123; Tullock, 2005:x). Much seems to depend on the motives for the
rent-seeking behaviour and the processes used to create and distribute rent-derived wealth
(Alkhater, 2012:55; Pasour, 1987:136-137). The Isabel wantoks sensed impropriety in how these
funds were gained (in the name of their communities) and used (little evidence of them being
distributed in the communities). The wantoks could do little to stymie the funding flow. They could,
however, withdraw their support from the radio project, which contributed to the collapse of the
social sustainability around the radio stations.
By 2011, PFNet was not economically self-sustaining and hadn’t been for years (“Vince,” radio
partner, personal communication, 23 Feb. 2011). The PFNet email-relay network would eventually
be superseded by the growth of mobile telephony services, although some email stations in far-
remote communities, such as Tikopia, located 1,000 kilometres from Honiara, remain lifelines.
Buala FM and its sister stations provide useful points of contemplation on why community radio
stations implanted by foreign development agencies fail. The next study explores two community
radio stations arising from within the Pacific women’s social movement that demonstrate successful
applications of Pacific development models that maximise social networks and rentier orientation to
affect positive social change.
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Chapter 7
When the radio is “incidental”
Women’s activist radio in the Pacific
In the foyer of a busy restaurant during one of femTALK FM’s broadcast events, Sera wore a look
of deep consternation as she sat before the microphone, her first time on live radio. Around her
were other femTALK FM volunteers in their uniform purple shirts, frantically waving their hands
and silently mouthing words of encouragement. Sera’s partner in the simple interview show kept
angling questions in different ways, trying to break Sera out of her trembling one-word replies.
Finally, Sera took a breath and began to softly speak. When the interview ended and the music bed
faded in, the volunteers burst into applause and cheers while Sera dipped her head bashfully and
smiled. “Sera!” the team leader called out, “you’ve got your voice now!”
Introduction
Community radio is frequently used by women’s human rights organisations to reach rural poor
women and draw them into the public sphere to discuss matters affecting their lives (Cabrera-
Balleza, 2008; Fröhlich, et al., 2012:6; Gatua, 2007:7; Jeffrey, 2004:82; Malhotra, Chauhan,
Randhawa, Aqrabawe, & Miglioretto, 2008; Solervicens, 2008).
In the Pacific, women’s poverty has much more to do with access to information, communication,
participation and empowerment than with basic needs (Barr, 2003:2; Haley, 2008:3; Rahman &
Naz, 2006:339; Rajivan, et al., 2010:25). Pacific woman face a number of obstacles to the
expression of their “voice” in decisions that affect their lives, including entrenched patterns of
patriarchy and the culture of silence. Voice refers to the capacity and ability of people to express
views and opinions through various channels of civic engagement, usually collectively through
CSOs and often through community radio (B. Sharma, 2008:10; Tacchi, 2006a:1). But the voices of
marginalised people, such as poor rural women, are prone to “capture” by urban-based elite-run
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CSOs claiming to represent poor rural communities. The Pacific rentier orientation and competitive
CSO environment exasperate this danger.
This case study looks are two women’s community radio stations: femLINKPACIFIC’s femTALK
89.2 FM in Fiji and Ma’a Fafine mo e Famili’s (MFF) Le’o ‘o e Kakai 98 FM in Tonga.53 Each of
my case studies addresses various issues around sustainability (defined as social, organisational and
financial); these two case studies highlight how rentier behaviour is revealed in organisational and
financial sustainability and how their social sustainability arises from within the Pacific women’s
movement. I will investigate these topics through discussions around voice and accountability. Is
there evidence that these two indigenous radio stations are employing immanent development
models to achieve sustainability? Does their position as “cultural insiders” enhance their ability to
achieve sustainability? How is Pacific culture revealed in their work within development
communication?
STATION BIOGRAPHIES
Historical context
Both femLINKPACIFIC and MFF are situated within the Pacific women’s social movement, the
history of which is well documented (Fiji Women's Rights Movement, 2011; George, 2011, 2012;
Griffen, 1976, 1989, 2006; Reddy, 2012; Rose, 2006; Seddon, 1986; Women Leading Change,
2009). The UN Decade for Women (1976-1985) coincided with the independence of many PICs,
creating a sense of “pioneer” optimism wherein new nations were being birthed and perceived
oppressive political, economic and social conditions could be challenged and changed (George,
2012:73). Hundreds of Pacific women attended international conferences during this era where they
advocated around two central themes, the decolonisation and denuclearisation of the Pacific.
Historically and contemporarily, Pacific women’s organisations have been interwoven into the
global women’s social movement, working backward and forward to both infuse Pacific voices into
the global discourse and to draw strength from the international movement to promote women’s
53
The women’s CSO Women United Together in the Marshall Islands (WUTMI) trial-launched FM 105 in May 2011
(YokweOnline, 2011). The Marshall Islands lie outside of my research area.
202
equality in deeply patriarchal Pacific societies. Since the 2000s, much of Pacific women’s advocacy
has sought to address the “feminisation of poverty” and violence against women.54
Of relevancy to my case studies are the divergent views within the Pacific around the concept of
“feminism” (Antrobus, 2004:1; George, 2012:69-72, 83-85; Seddon, 1986:6-8). Activist women
from the global North often attributed the roots of gender inequality to familial roles and societal
expectations around them. Women from Polynesian societies strongly disagreed, saying their
cultures provided them with privileged social status that ameliorated most forms of gender
discrimination. However, women from Melanesian societies disagreed with the Polynesians, saying
some of their cultures’ attributes, such as patriarchy and the culture of silence, were just as
oppressive toward women as colonialisation and westernisation and the racism and poverty that
they had produced (Griffen, 1976, 1989; Huffer, 2006b:33, 40). Said differently, the disagreement
was between traditionalists who found security in their culturally defined roles of mothers and
wives, and modernists who saw these culturally ascribed roles as potentially oppressive because
they further contributed to the “invisibility” of women in decision-making and undermined
women’s political, economic and personal rights. In broad terms, femLINKPACIFIC addresses the
latter concern, while MFF addresses the former.
femTALK FM
femLINKPACIFIC was born amid the violence of Fiji’s May 2000 coup. The socio-political causes
behind the coups are complex and well documented (Firth, et al., 2007; Lal, et al., 2008; Newland,
2009; Refugee Review Tribunal, 2010). Coup leaders had stormed the Parliament House and held
the prime minister and the 36 parliamentarians hostage for 56 days. The takeover deeply
traumatised Fiji. A group of concerned women, including the then-secretary of the National Council
for Women Fiji, Sharon Bhagwan Rolls, began holding daily prayer vigils at a nearby Anglican
church. It was out of this so-called “blue ribbon” campaign that femLINKPACIFIC arose.
As with Fiji’s previous coups, the 2000 coup inflicted tremendous economic and social hardship on
all Fiji citizens. By the mid-2000s, 30 percent of the population was living below the poverty line.
54
The PICs have among the highest rates of violence against women in the world (United Nations Development Programme,
2008:11, 17). One in three Pacific women has suffered physical or sexual violence (AusAID, 2011b:3; Middleton, 2008:48). A recent
study found 77 percent of 600 surveyed Tongan women had been victims of violence perpetuated by fathers or teachers (Ma’a Fafine
mo e Famili, 2012).
203
Each of Fiji’s four coups has rekindled tensions around ethno-nationalism, strengthened cultural
patriarchy, and questioned the role of women in society. All have escalated poverty rates, by some
estimates wiping away three years of economic growth for each coup (George, 2011:30). Each coup
has resulted in soaring rates of violence against women, estimated at a six-fold increase following
each coup (George, 2012:126).
femLINK’s founder, Sharon Bhagwan Rolls, had witnessed the devastation Fiji’s repeated coups
had inflicted upon women, especially poor rural women, both during her youth within a politically
active family living in semi-rural Fiji and as a young radio producer with the national broadcaster.
femLINK’s media initiatives conjoin Rolls’ interests in media and gender equality. Rolls has been
active in the Fiji YWCA since her youth and had attended the UN Fourth Conference for Women in
Beijing in 1995.55 In many ways, femLINK operationalises in near textbook replication the World
YWCA’s women’s empowerment agenda (World YWCA, 2011).
femLINK was established to serve as a peace-building vehicle to “empower women and

communities by giving them a voice to fully participate in decision making for equality,
development and peace” (femLINKPACIFIC, 2012b). The CSO defines itself as “a catalyst for
change” based on “feminist principles” that seeks to “challenge the status quo”
(femLINKPACIFIC, 2012b; Rolls, 2008:8). Rolls centres her organisation around four global
conventions on women’s human rights: the UN Convention to Eliminate All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (or CEDAW), the Beijing Platform for Action (particularly Section
J which calls for greater involvement of women in media); the UN Security Council Resolution
1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325), and the Global Partnership for the Prevention
of Armed Conflict. UNSCR 1325 is described as femLINK’s “mantra;” themes of peace and
women’s security, defined as political, economic and individual security, are central to its mission
(femLINKPACIFIC, 2011:5; 2012:2).
In 2004, femLINK acquired a suitcase radio unit and established femTALK 89.2 FM. In 2011, two
additional suitcase radio units were acquired. femLINK uses its community radio in three ways: 1)
as a tool within the Freirean conscientisation model to educate rural women about their human
rights and to help them develop the skills to form and articulate opinions; 2) as a media training tool
for femLINK volunteers; and 3) as a research tool to gather anecdotal evidence that is
55
The Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) established its first Pacific branch in Fiji in 1961.
204
“transformed” into a variety of advocacy materials, such as print documents and online video, audio
and social media (Rolls, 2008b:86). These materials are distributed to national policy makers, the
local and international media, and regional and international development agencies and women’s
groups, but there is no evidence they are distributed in rural communities.
femLINK maximises the portability of the suitcase radio by moving it around the country to
facilitate occasional weekend broadcasts in rural areas, often in partnership with other women’s
CSOs. Five target communities have been visited at least annually over the course of four to five
years. Typically, femLINK volunteers “consult” with village women a few days before a broadcast
event to educate them about UNSCR 1325. On broadcast day, the village women share their
personal stories and opinions, usually through interview formats conducted by femLINK
volunteers. The interviews are simultaneously translated into Fiji’s three main languages, are
broadcast live within a 10- to 20-kilometre transmission footprint, and the recorded interviews are
sometimes uploaded onto femLINK’s web site. Thus, the suitcase radio is used as a tool for
conscientisation and to promote the dialogic “process” of peace-building; the broadcast output is
described by femLINK volunteers as “incidental.” femTALK FM station details are presented in
Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Station details: femTALK FM

Frequency/Call sign 89.2 FM
Founder Sharon Bhagwan Rolls, femLINKPACIFIC
Location Fiji, near Suva (capital city), Nadi (western Viti Levu), and Labasa (north, on
Vanua Levu).
Estimated listenership Less than 1 percent of national audience
Years of operation Established 2004
Broadcast details Suitcase radio unit is moved around the country to rural villages for weekend
broadcasts at variable intervals.
Programming focus Women’s human rights, with focus on UNSCR 1325. Live broadcasts from
villages featuring interviews with rural women, pre-recorded audio documentaries
produced by volunteers, some international programming from UN sources,
minimal women’s world music.
Estimated no. of About 22 in Suva, about 4-6 each in Labasa and Nadi.
volunteers
Funding sources UNESCO seed funds. Various international, regional and local.
This femLINK model of women’s activist media, that of a roving suitcase radio that enables the
“voice” of rural women, is thought be to unique in the world. Rolls maximises the use of the global
women’s movement through extensive use of its transnational information and communication
networks to advance her organisation’s objectives within Fiji’s politically restrictive environment,
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to solidify femLINK’s reputation as a quality partner in gender-equality development work, and to
contribute Pacific perspectives to global discourses. Rolls is one of the Pacific’s leading champions
for regulatory recognition of community radio.
Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM
In 2007, femLINK established a regional women’s network with CSO counterparts in Solomons,
Papua New Guinea, and Tonga. Due to Tonga’s reluctance to adopt CEDAW and its failure in 2010
to elect a woman to Parliament, femLINK extended funding to a sister CSO in Tonga, Ma’a Fafine
mo e Famili (MFF), to establish a community radio station. Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM went to air on
International Women’s Day in March 2012.56
In 2013, Tonga remained one of only six countries not to ratify CEDAW, which has been described
as the international bill of rights for women (Jivan & Forster, 2006:i; UN Women, 2009). CEDAW
discusses in detail various legal, political, economic and cultural constraints that inhibit women
from achieving their full entitlement of rights. CEDAW Article 16 addresses reproductive health
issues and calls for gender equality in property ownership. The first drew dismay from Tonga’s
conservative churches; the second is said to contradict Tongan custom where only males can own
land. Some of CEDAW’s Pacific critics argue that the notion of granting women equality with men
was a Western-imposed concept that contradicted biblical scripture, was agitated for by “feminist
extremists,” and was an affront to Pacific customs (Kilby & Crawford, 2011:26; Slatter, 2010:99).
In 2009, then-Prime Minister Feleti Sevele told the UN General Assembly that he would make “no
apologies” for Tonga’s opposition to CEDAW because to ratify it would “cut across the cultural
and social heritage that makes up the unique Tongan way of life” (Somera, 2009).
In Tongan culture, elder sisters are accorded the highest social status under a system called fehu,
wherein brothers are obligated to respect and support their sisters, female cousins and their father’s
sisters. Fehu grants women a higher social rank while a complementary ‘ulumotu’a system accords
men greater political power through land ownership (Guttenbeil-Likiliki, 2006:197). Under Tonga’s
1875 Constitution, all males over the age of 16 are entitled to 8.25 acres of farmland and .25 acre of
town land but women are denied this. There is not enough land now to meet the existing male land
56
Le’o ‘o e Kakai translates into “Voice of the People.”
206
entitlements; 60 percent of Tongan men go without (Douaire-Marsaudon, 2005:228). Ratification of
CEDAW would worsen the land-entitlement situation. Denial of land-ownership impinges on
women’s abilities to secure business loans as land is the preferred form of collateral.
Higher cultural status compels women to behave in certain ways. Conversations about politics and
sexuality are forbidden in mixed gender company (Guttenbeil-Likiliki, 2006:161-162). There is
strong resistance in schools, churches and the media to discuss reproductive health, domestic
violence and similar gender-informed topics. Politics is considered a man’s world as the rough-and-
tumble language and posturing associated with it is seen as “unfeminine” and “too aggressive” for a
“real” Tongan woman (Guttenbeil-Likiliki, 2006:196; Huffer, 2006b:45). Since 1951, when Tongan
women were granted suffrage, only four women have been elected to Parliament, thus women’s
views and voices are not well represented. The Tongan government has supported various regional
and international initiatives concerning women’s rights including the Beijing Platform for Action,
the Millennium Development Goals, and UNSCR 1325 (Guttenbeil-Likiliki, 2006:148-151). But
the 2009 Tonga National Strategic Planning Framework does not acknowledge gender as a
development priority and a majority of Tongans, including women, do not regard gender issues as a
problem or a development priority (IMG Inc., 2010:5-6, 8). All of these will challenge Le’o ‘o e
Kakai FM in its role as a women’s advocacy radio station.
Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM’s founder, Betty Blake, is

a retired schoolteacher who established a
well-known “legal literacy” project within the
Catholic Women’s League in 1996. The
Legal Literacy Project sought to raise
women’s awareness about human rights,
family law, gender discrimination, and good-
governance issues. In 2008, Blake founded Photo 7.1
Sharon Bhagwan Rolls (front row, left) and Betty Blake (front
MFF and shifted the legal literacy project into row, centre) with volunteers from Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM.
MFF. She unsuccessfully ran for Parliament Source: (Taimi Media Network, 2011)
in 2010. She has no media experience, but
she brings competencies in community work and organisational management.
207
MFF views itself as “a caretaker” of a community radio station that is offered freely to other
community groups to use to discuss issues pertaining to peace-building and women’s
empowerment. This positioning is similar to that theoreticised by Nico Carpertier (2007) and others
in which community radio could act as a “rhizome” that enables the growth of other CSOs
(Meadows, et al., 2009:154). In March 2012, Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM was working in partnership with
six women’s groups and the Ministry of Education, Women's Affairs and Culture. Unlike femTALK
FM, Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM would be stationary. Station details are presented in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 Station details: Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM

Frequency/Call sign 98 FM
Founder Betty Blake, Ma’a Fafine mo e Famili
Location Nuku’alofa (capital city), Tonga
Estimated listenership Estimated 10,000 in the greater Nuku’alofa area.
Years of operation Established March 2012.
Broadcast details Estimated seven hours daily, Monday-Saturday,
Programming focus Women’s human rights, in conjunction with local women’s CSOs and Ministry of
Education, Women’s Affairs and Culture
Estimated no. of 8
volunteers
Funding sources femLINKPACIFIC, British High Commission and Canada Fund for start-up.
Unknown recurrent sources.
Given Tonga’s resistance toward adopting CEDAW and CEDAW’s centrality to the Pacific
women’s movement, MFF could experience quite a different level of success than femLINK, which
so far has received tacit support from Fiji’s Bainimarama Government (Empower Fiji, 2011). Fijian
and Tongan governments have histories of suppressing political speech and “overly political” CSOs
(Bautista, 2012a:35, 48). This also raises challenges for Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM if it chooses to address
more liberal aspects of the women’s movement’s agenda around reproductive health, domestic
violence and women’s economic and political rights. It is unknown if femLINK’s model can be
replicated elsewhere in the Pacific. Much of the successful gender-development work in the region
is driven by individual personalities and played out in an environment of strong competition among
CSOs for funding and influence (Kilby & Crawford, 2011:8-11). Development initiatives that are
intended to enhance “voice,” such as community radio, are highly dependent on the local context;
few models are transferable from one social context to another (McAnany, 2012:118; Menocal &
Sharma, 2008; O’Neil, et al., 2007:v; B. Sharma, 2009).
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Introduction
This section explores the social sustainability of Pacific women’s activist media through
discussions of voice and accountability. Voice refers to the capacity and ability of people to express
views and opinions through various channels of civic engagement, usually collectively through
CSOs (Foresti, et al., 2007:7; B. Sharma, 2009:5). Accountability refers to the willingness or
capacity of formal and informal (churches and chiefs) institutions to respond to those expressed
voices. Notions of accountability also apply to activist CSOs and their relationships with the
communities they profess to represent, their donors and their peer CSOs.
Advocacy CSOs that seek to enhance the voice of marginalised people, such as femLINK, are
bound in two vertical accountability relationships: downwardly to the communities from which they
derive their power base and upwardly to their donors to account for received funding (Foresti, et al.,
2007; Menocal & Sharma, 2008; B. Sharma, 2009). In the case of the Pacific women’s movement,
notions of horizontal accountability between peer-level CSOs can also be conceptualised (Neville,
2008:3). Another critical accountability relationship exists between CSOs and their governments,
especially in the Pacific where women’s rights are often seen as a foreign concept that is not
particularly relevant to Pacific cultures or development agendas (George, 2012:108; IMG Inc.,
2010:5-6, 8; Kilby & Crawford, 2011:26; Slatter, 2010:99; United Nations Development
Programme, 2008:10).
The media, theoretically, are fundamental to development and social change in that they educate
people about issues, offer space for expression of public views, and act as mechanisms to pressure
governments and informal institutions to become more responsive and “accountable” (Farrington,
2003). But femLINK’s founder, Sharon Bhagwan Rolls, argues (2007b:23) that a “total
disconnection” has occurred between “corporate” media, referring to both semi-privatised national
broadcasters and commercial ones, and rural villagers due to market deregulation which “handed
power to advertisers to dictate where radio goes.” Media sociologist Nick Couldry (2010:1, 9-12)
contends that such free-market economic forces cause “injury” to the voices of poor and
marginalised populations in that corporate broadcasters no longer “value” voices that have no
market value. In both media sub-sectors, women are largely absent from management positions,
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thus decisions around “women’s” programming reflect male biases that perpetuate gender
inequalities. In the late-1990s, Rolls left her position with the national broadcaster after becoming
increasingly frustrated with broadcaster’s prioritisation of profit-making over public-service
programming and due to perceived male bias in programming content. In 2003, when Rolls
approached the national broadcaster with a suggestion for programming around International
Women’s Day, she was told “women were not commercially viable” (Personal communication, 1
Feb. 2011). Rolls responded by establishing her own radio station to enable women’s voices.
femTALK FM is an unusual radio station. The portable suitcase unit is shifted among four to five
villages annually to enable weekend broadcasts. Its small broadcast footprint of 10-20 kilometres
and its focus on the “process” of creating dialogue over the programming “product” means the
station’s content is not “zip-zap” audience engaging, thus some of its critics contend it is making
little lasting development impact at all (“Vicky,” CSO representative, personal communication, 31
Jan. 2011; “Anthony,” academic, personal communication, 7 Feb. 2011; “Josefa,” CSO
representative, personal communication, 8 Feb. 2011). How effective are femLINK’s
methodologies in achieving its prescribed aims of empowering rural women by giving them a voice
to fully participate in decision-making around issues that affect their lives? Is knowledge-induced
dialogue enough, or does it have to “go somewhere and do something?” (Bell & Morse, 2008:202).
Voice and accountability
In the Pacific, as elsewhere, rural women face a number of obstacles to the expression of their
voice, including the absence of mobility, telephony, and media reception that can create situations
of extreme isolation (Lefort, et al., 1997:7; B. Sharma, 2008:10; Tacchi, 2005:348; Varani-Norton,
2005:225). Because rural woman are deprived of information, they are disadvantaged when trying
to articulate an informed voice. Additionally, many Pacific women live their entire lives in silence,
or in a state where men, elders and religious leaders shape and control what a woman may talk
about and how she may express herself (Reddy, 2012:155; Rose, 2006:155; Williams, 1999:6).
Women’s views within Pacific patriarchal societies are often devalued.
Speaking from my experience, from my community, people think that women just talk
nonsense. That’s our mentality, in people’s minds, in men’s minds. And men think, in
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Fiji, with the patriarchal society and all of that, they think that women talk crap, yeah
(“Anita,” femLINK staff, personal communication, 11 Feb. 2011).
Since the 1990s, the international development community has recognised the importance of voice
in improving the quality of governance in formal (state) and informal (cultural, religious and social)
institutions in successful development work. “Good governance” can be viewed as the relationship
between those holding power (those to be held accountable) and those seeking to influence power
(those exercising voice and demanding accountability) (Foresti, et al., 2007; Menocal & Sharma,
2008, 2009; O’Neil, et al., 2007; B. Sharma, 2008; Tembo, 2012). In the Pacific, informal socio-
cultural institutions and practices (such as the culture of silence and rent-seeking behaviour) affect
how formal institutions operate and can further impede the expression of voice for marginalised
people.
Voice is a critical component in participatory development: if people don’t speak their views, their
perspectives will not be reflected in government development agendas nor will the project
beneficiaries gain a sense of ownership or responsibility toward development projects (Menocal &
Sharma, 2009:1; O’Neil, et al., 2007:v, 8; Seddon, 1986:15; B. Sharma, 2008:26; 2009:4).
Increasing women’s participation in decision-making at all levels of Pacific society improves not
only the quality of women’s lives but those of their communities, families and future generations
(AusAID, 2011b:11). Education, information sharing, and the creation of multiple channels of
expression, such as through community radio, are strategies that can soften the culture of silence
and lead to the inclusion of women’s voices in the public sphere (Farrington, 2003; Lefko, 1997;
Menocal & Sharma, 2008:30; Mitchell, 1998; Rolls, 2005:4-5; Williams, 1999:12).
Expressions of collective voice, such as through CSOs, can open “closed” spaces in the public
sphere and bring sensitive issues, such as violence against women, into the public discourse. Pacific
CSOs offer women relief from cultural constraints as well as create social networks that cut across
the divides of geography, ethnicity, religion and social status (Seddon, 1986:75; Williams, 1999:5;
Wollebæk & Selle, 2003:67). Pacific women gain social status through participation in local
women’s groups (M. Cox, et al., 2007:12-13, 31-32). More than 1,000 CSOs are thought to exist in
the Pacific and islanders have higher rates of participation in CSOs than found elsewhere in the
world (Bautista, 2012a:1; Hill, 1994:123). Commonly, politically active Pacific women hold
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membership in two or more political CSOs and thus “pragmatically strategise” their multiple
political interests, as was found in this case study (Gandhi & Shah, 2006:73-75).
Exploring femLINK’s methodology
Activist CSOs that seek to expand the voice of marginalised people face a quandary. The creation
of voice can be “messy” given the multiplicity of voices in any society that compete for attention
and influence, thus civic engagement needs to be managed (Mariano, et al., 2007:383; B. Sharma,
2008:22; 2009:6). Increasing the number of people participating in public dialogues can reduce the
quality of the conversation. Quality voices arise when people are educated about the issues, given
skills and confidence to articulate their opinions, and offered access to channels, such as community
radio, through which to express their views, all of which femLINK strives to accomplish. Thus a
trade-off emerges: greater participation can reduce the quality of the dialogue while improving the
quality of the dialogue necessitates including fewer voices.
femLINK addresses this paradox in two ways: firstly, by engaging directly with village women
around a rural broadcast event and secondly, by “transforming” their stories into anecdotal data that
are then used to create advocacy materials targeted at national and regional policy-makers and
others. Said differently, the first point of engagement concerns advancing the “voice” the rural
women, while the second point concerns femLINK’s “accountability” around its representation of
that voice.
Pertaining to the first point, femLINK volunteers “consult” with rural village women a few days
before a broadcast event to educate women on UNSCR 1325. Such pre-event “consultations” reflect
Freirean notions of conscientisation where rural women receive information about their human
rights that they otherwise would not receive and are given space and support to formulate and
articulate their views. The village broadcasts are then used to encourage women to speak about the
issues that affect their lives as framed by their new understanding of women’s security rights. The
broadcasts align with the Beijing Platform for Action’s Section J, where women, though the use of
appropriate media platforms, become active creators, not just passive recipients, of media content.
The consultations are also applications of Katz and Lazarsfeld’s theories about two-step
information dissemination and Roger’s theories about diffusion of innovation.
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Many women’s and human-rights advocacy groups use media, specifically radio, to advance their
objectives, as I will discuss. But Rolls’ (2007b:19, 25) criticises her sister women’s CSOs for not
more proactively addressing gender inequalities that exist in the access to and control of media and
ICT resources, thus further perpetuating women’s roles as consumers of “patriarchal” male-
produced media, not creators of programming that expresses their lived realities. Issues of voice,
often framed within discussions around access and participation, appear frequently in international
discourses around community media (Berrigan, 1977:6-7, 19, 25; Hamelink, 1999:34-35; P. Lewis,
1993:12; Meadows, et al., 2009:152; Quade, 2007; van Vuuren, 2009:175). But they take on
particular poignancy in the Pacific context given the culture of silence where women are denied
even the physical act of speaking in public. Nick Couldry (2010:7, 90-109) contributes insightful
notions around the “valuing” of voice, which he defines as a process of choosing to value the
narrative someone gives about her life and of the world in which she acts. When a woman tells her
story on femTALK FM, she is engaging a public speech performance outside of the culture of
silence. The telling of her story interweaves it with other women’s narratives as told on femTALK
FM, thus creating a collective recognition and validation of all of their stories, something that is
denied them by mainstream media. Additionally, the performances are witnessed, or heard via the
radio, by non-participants, including men and village leaders.
Rolls (2007b:20) states that participating women are free to express their opinions and beliefs in “a
peaceful and inclusive manner.” But I reflected on Freire’s (2005:89-91) warnings about a thin line
existing between development actors working to conscientise people by sharing information that
leads people to self-reflect on the causes of their suffering, and the “depositing” of ideas into them
to be “consumed” without reflection. Unfortunately, I was unable to gain access to a village
consultation to observe how femLINK volunteers interacted with village women, as femLINK staff
suggested that my outsider status would be a distraction.57 During interviews with femLINK
volunteers around questions about how they interacted with the rural women, only one volunteer
used phrases like “direct them” or “the concepts that we want them to bring up” (“Ann,” personal
communication, 1 Feb. 2011). Comments from the other volunteers reflected their training under
Rolls’ mentorship that the community radio be used to engender the process of dialogue around
peace-building.
57
The rural broadcast event that I did observe, held on 11-12 Feb. 2011, was an aberration due to the death of Fiji’s President Ratu
Josefa Iloilo. The women’s groups that had been organised to participate in the broadcast cancelled due to their cultural obligations.
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The work of our community radio station is more than just putting content out. It’s
very much about a process, the process of developing content by taking media tools
to women in their communities. … So it is very much that tool of empowerment, to be
able to support people to feel empowered, to have their voices heard and to be able to
engage (Sharon Bhagwan Rolls. Personal communication, 1 Feb. 2011).
“Anita,” a femLINK staff member, said that in her two years working for femLINK she had seen
changes in the consulted communities.
Women were not aware that there are actually international conventions which they
could use to actually take a step towards, you know, doing something about (their
problems). Before they used to think, ‘oh, we have these issues but what’s happening,
you know, nothing. What can we do, nothing.’ But now, we have leaders. Their
capacity has built and this is really good (Personal communication, 11 Feb. 2011).
femLINK frequently uploads selected recordings from the rural broadcasts onto its website, which
proved to be a useful source of field data. In 2009, these podcasts frequently featured interviews
with grassroots women who provided poignant insights into their lives. The women often talked at
length without prompting. But by 2012, most of the available podcasts featured a mix of scripted
presentations or basic question-and-answer (non-conversational) interviews with leaders of rural
women’s CSOs. Due to this change in the content of the podcasts, I began to reflect on issues of
women’s representation as opposed to participation, which I will discuss in the next section.
femLINK critiques
Interviews with femLINK’s CSO partners and others, such as church and government officials,
international development agencies and other Pacific community radio practitioners, presented a
mixed view about femLINK’s field methodology. Some praised femLINK’s drive and commitment
to providing channels of voice for rural women (“Uriam,” CSO representative, personal
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Certainly the way they conceptualise their work and the values that they express as
being important in the work they are doing, it’s spot on. I think the radio set-up that
they’ve got is great because really it’s process oriented. They’re not so worried about
the product. It’s around engagement (“Kevin,” international development agency
representative, personal communication, 2 April 2011).
Others were more tentative in their assessments. Some said that “consciousness-raising” was a
worthy goal but what was lacking was “constructive dialogue” leading to action (“Josefa,” CSO
representative, personal communication, 8 Feb. 2011). Other commentators contend that femTALK
FM’s irregular broadcast activity, its small broadcast footprint – even its occasional broadcasts in
Suva fail to cover much of the capital city – and its lack of attention to producing more engaging
programming minimised any lasting development impact arising from its field work (“Vicky,” CSO
representative, personal communication, 31 Jan. 2011; “Anthony,” academic, personal
What femLINK is doing is quite commendable, where it goes out to encourage people
to discuss issues and then come in and later to do the broadcast. In other places, it’s
a kind of one-way practice. The guys at (the national broadcaster) make all the
programs and you just listen. That’s all, you just listen. But just an observation, when
you do things like that (femLINK’s work), it must involve some kind of positive
change at the end of the lived day or after a while, the women will just go away
(“Jope,” CSO representative. personal communication, 3 Feb. 2011).
I think femLINK try very hard. They go out into the community and they hear
women’s stories and things and that’s very good. But who listens to femLINK?
Nobody listens to femLINK. You can’t hear it. I’ve never in my life heard a thing on
femLINK. If I ask anybody in Fiji, have you heard femLINK? No. It hasn’t reached
anybody so why on earth are you doing it? (“Vicky,” CSO representative, personal
communication, 31 Jan. 2011).
Thus I began to reflect on whether a Pacific woman’s public performance of her voice was
sufficient to count as “positive change,” in “Jope’s” words, or a reason for doing radio work at all,
in “Vicky’s” view. Indeed, would a rural woman who broke the culture of silence by speaking
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publicly and politically on femTALK FM suffer village sanctions, or be perceived as bringing
“shame” onto her family, thus risking violence (Nainoca, 2011:48, 85)?58 Does the process of
expressing “voice” through femTALK FM lead to improvement in the quality of life for rural
women? How does educating a village woman about her human-security rights as enshrined in
various international conventions help her mollify an abusive husband? The answers are elusive.
Measuring the “impacts” of voice-enhancing media engagement may not be possible (Hamelink,
1999:24; P. Lewis, 1993:13). Couldry (2010:18, 72) states that those engaging in voice-valuing
work, such as femLINK, “face the unknowability of the transformations which a current way of
living will undergo,” but he contends social change, however small it might be, would not possible
at all without the valuing or respecting of a person’s innate human right to give an account of her
life and the conditions under which she lives.
femLINK’s methodology also puzzled other Pacific community broadcasters. One was intrigued by
femLINK’s focus on the “process” of dialogue creation, which contrasted with his radio station’s
focus on community participation around the creation of media content which then sought the
widest listening audience possible (“Thomas,” radio administrator, personal communication, 23
Feb. 2011). Several interviewees suggested femLINK’s appearance in a rural village affected the
village’s natural harmony and social cohesion (“Anthony,” academic, personal communication, 7
Feb. 2011). One community radio practitioner went to far as to suggest that femLINK was not a
community radio station in his definition of the term.
What I understand about (femLINK’s) services is it’s a knapsack radio. Well, in the
community there isn’t a regular broadcast as such, is there? So it’s only when they
are present on the ground that they get the involvement of people and, while it is
good and you have people sort of active in making content, I don’t think it is
community, unfortunately. My way of thinking is that community radio is one that is
not influenced by the presence of other organisations. … Maybe the people’s
participation is because of the presence of organisations like femLINK in the
community (“Vince,” radio partner, personal communication, 23 Feb. 2011).
58
A 2013 survey of 3,200 Fijian women found three out of five had suffered emotional, physical or sexual violence perpetrated by
men. Rates for rural women were higher than for urban women. Of the surveyed women, 64 percent said it was important for a
husband or partner to show that “he was the boss,” inplying an acquiescence toward violence (Fiji Women's Crisis Centre, 2013).
216
Vince’s comments have merit because femLINK does offer stipends to the village women who
participate in the weekend broadcasts, which could contribute to a rent-seeking orientation.
However, international research suggests that the “less poor” participate more in community radio
than the “extreme poor,” thus a small cash payment to support the participation of the “extreme
poor” appears to be acceptable (Tacchi, Foth, & Hearn, 2009:11).
Voice and action
Many of the comments offered by others about femLINK’s service reduce to this: is the provision
of voice “enough” or must voice engender effective action? Freire (2005:89) wrote of the
“dialectical unity producing knowledge in solidarity with action,” thus implying voice and action go
hand in hand.
Changing engendered power relations is a lengthy process and one that is difficult to measure. As
yet, there is no evidence derived from international research to prove that empowerment projects
around the creation of voice have contributed to poverty reduction (Menocal & Sharma, 2008:xi,
33-35). Voice-enhancing work can produce limited immediate results, such as raising public
awareness through radio shows around defined topics such as domestic violence, but evidence of
more permanent change occurring in formal or informal institutions is difficult to assess. In this
view, media-based voice channels, such as community radio, contribute to the creation of
“pathways for change” but not change itself (Menocal & Sharma, 2008:35). These views raise
questions about the efficacy of femLINK’s methodology of rural engagement.
Voice and accountability come together when informed citizens and their governments meet in
dialogue that leads to action (Haley, 2008;2; Hou, 1999:iv; Low & Davenport, 2002:370; Pacific
Centre for Peacebuilding, 2010:8; Rahman & Naz, 2006:328; B. Sharma, 2008:12-13; Tembo,
2012:2). Additionally, “empowerment” derives from women’s participation in development
projects through which they mutually learn to develop themselves (Suadnya, 2005:2-3). The sharing
of information alone does little to achieve women’s empowerment or community development
(“Lyndon,” CSO representative, personal communication, 7 March 2011).
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Would the action derived from the public expression of voice, such as that around femTALK FM,
qualify as development in the eyes of most rural islanders? Field data suggest it would not. As
mentioned, islanders’ notions of “development” are nearly always associated with the capture of
donor funding, thus they are rentier in orientation (“Lyndon,” CSO representative, personal
communication, 7 March 2011). The types of development projects attractive to islanders are
“practical, doable, something that makes a difference in their lives almost immediately” (“Lyndon,”
CSO representative, personal communication, 7 March 2011). For example, the oldest development
NGO in the Solomons, the Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT), has hosted its Radio
Reachout show on the national broadcaster for nearly 25 years. But the radio show was criticised by
villagers for being “preaching and teaching” (in other words, educational awareness) without
actually providing the means for villagers to achieve the topics being discussed (Hou, 1999:111).
The same survey found 93 percent of respondents preferred community “theatre for development”
over radio, which was seen as “not a traditional way” to disseminate information (Hou, 1999:102).
In response, SIDT changed its methodology, realising that the sharing of information was
“absolutely necessary and totally insufficient” to achieving development outcomes (R. Narayan,
2010; P. M. Swain, 1999:129) and (“Lyndon,” CSO representative, personal communication, 7
March 2011).
Voice alone will have little impact on formal and informal institutions that either lack the capacity
or the political will to respond (B. Sharma, 2009:6). femLINK’s methodology does little to directly
connect village women to their governance institutions. Instead femLINK acts as a bridging agent
wherein the women’s voices derived from the broadcasts are “transformed” into anecdotal data that
are then used to create advocacy materials targeted at national and regional policy-makers and
others.
By way of comparison, another CSO, the Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding (PCP), also centres its
work around UNSCR 1325 and peace-building, the latter of which it defines as the transference of
information, skills and approaches through which rural women can respond to situations of
oppression through non-violent means (Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding, 2012:15). The PCP also
seeks to conscientise women but primarily as a means leading to action. PCP works in the some of
the same communities as femLINK, is funded partially by the same donors, and even shares some
of the same staff (thus the women are maximising their social networks by belonging to multiple
political CSOs). PCP seeks to raise awareness around women’s security rights and “facilitate”
dialogue among village women, allowing them to discover and set their economic-security
218
priorities, such as the building of a co-operative store, a seed bank, a handicraft market stall, a
poultry farm, and a water tank (Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding, 2010, 2011, 2012). The latter case
involved village women (Indo-Fijian) negotiating with a landowner (an indigenous Fijian) who
demanded fees for water pipes traversing his land. The result was a series of meetings involving the
women, the landowner and local government officials through which they talked, reached
consensus, and agreed on a plan of action. The meetings provided concrete opportunities to
transcend barriers of ethnicity, social status and gender. In other words, village women learned to
express their voice, demand their economic-security rights, employ non-violent communication
approaches, and successfully implement a village-led water-delivery project that solved a decade-
old problem.
The PCP approach is influenced by its relationship with shared femLINK staff and their feminist
philosophy but it does appear to take it one step farther. In contrast, femLINK acts as an
intermediary presence between the rural women and national and regional policy-makers. Only in
2012 did voices of local government officials begin to appear in femLINK’s rural radio broadcasts.
The creation of space for dialogue to occur between local government officials and marginalised
rural people strengthens the “voice and accountability” relationship between these two groups and
gives rise to more appropriate development policies. But international development actors
repeatedly neglect to invest effort and funding into improving these vital communication channels
between rural people, their representative CSOs, and their governments (Foresti, et al., 2007:6;
Menocal & Sharma, 2009:5; O’Neil, et al., 2007:14).
Advocacy through media
Many women’s and human-rights advocacy groups use media, specifically radio, to advance their
objectives. A survey of Fijian political CSOs found that 94 percent said radio was the most
accessible medium for grassroots people and 67 percent said it was the most effective media tool
(Mariano, et al., 2007:347-371). But a closer examination reveals that 81 percent of the survey
respondents used media for information dissemination or for organisational promotion, with no
mention made of the dialogic potential of radio broadcasting (Mariano, et al., 2007:350-351).
Many political CSOs synchronise their media usage. For example, SIDT addresses the same
development topic through vernacular magazines and comic books distributed in villages,
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community theatre, and its weekly radio show on the national broadcaster. Many CSOs have
websites but these tend to be targeted at national elites, donors and international audiences. ECREA
uses text-messaging to deliver news to informal urban settlements.59
Many CSOs also use talkback shows on national broadcasters to reach the widest possible audience.
The Fiji Women’s Rights Movement (FWRM) has had a national radio show since the late-1980s,
shifting the show between the national broadcaster and a nationwide commercial radio network,
possibly due to its frequently strained relationship with the government (Fiji Women's Rights
Movement, 2011). Governments can react punitively against activist CSOs that use national
broadcasters. In Solomons in the late-1980s and 1990s, the SIDT talkback radio show was twice
was knocked off the air in mid-broadcast when the prime minister took offence to caller comments
(P. M. Swain, 1999:154). In 2009, the leaders of the FWRM and The Citizens’ Constitutional
Forum were threatened on the air by Fiji’s military dictator for anti-government comments they had
made at a UN conference (Fiji Women's Rights Movement, 2011b:2). femLINK has invited other
CSOs to use femTALK FM but the response from nationwide human-rights CSOs has apparently
been limited.
Throughout the Pacific, civil-society regulatory environments still reflect colonial-era charity
registration laws that have been used punitively to silence critical voices (Bautista, 2012a:35, 48;
Lakshmanan, 2002; Radio New Zealand International, 2005; The Citizens’ Constitutional Forum,
2011:12). In contrast to other women’s and human-rights organisations, femLINK has suffered no
repercussions from the Bainimarama military government. It abided by the media censorship
decree, submitted its broadcasting logs fortnightly to the government, and secured public-assembly
permits to conduct rural broadcasts. Its broadcast license has been continuously renewed without
comment. (During field interviews, one broadcast regulator recalled with apparent fondness his
contribution to femTALK FM’s maiden broadcast in 2004.) femLINK is thought to have had
minimal friction from the government because its pro-women, pro-poor platform coincides with the
government’s position, its work strives to be inclusive toward other CSOs and government
ministries, and its radio output is too minimal to attract much notice (“Vicky,” CSO representative,
personal communication, 31 Jan. 2011; “Joeli,” CSO representative, personal communication, 27
Feb. 2011; “Matthew,” international development agency representative, personal communication,
59
The Ecumenical Centre for Research, Education and Advocacy.
220
8 Feb. 2011).60 femLINK’s style of engagement with the government, described as “knock and
talk” or interpersonal conversation, is also thought to contribute to its success (“Uriam,” CSO
representative, personal communication, 28 Feb. 2011).
femLINK finds out through the community radio, taking those issues to the minister
for that policy or for rural development that they consider women’s projects. She
doesn’t talk against them (the government), and she’s able to talk issues that are
relevant to the people (“Joeli,” CSO representative, personal communication, 27
Feb. 2011).
Working from the inside and the outside
Notions of accountability also come to bear upon political CSOs, such as femLINK, to accurately
and fairly represent those people they profess to represent (B. Sharma, 2009:10). When femLINK
“transforms” the recorded rural broadcasts into advocacy materials, it assumes the role of
representing rural women’s voices to those in power. This process helps to overcome the limitations
of femTALK FM’s broadcasting activity. In 2011, femLINK was initiating more regular weekend
and weekday morning broadcasts in Suva in an effort to reach national decision-makers and provide
openings for partnership with interested CSOs.
Questions arise about the authenticity of the “transformation” of rural women’s voices and the
impact the advocacy materials have on improving gender equality in formal and informal
institutions. On one hand, femLINK, as a cultural “insider,” can successfully navigate the
complexity of Fiji’s informal socio-cultural institutions, the very structures that frustrate the efforts
of foreign development actors (Menocal & Sharma, 2009:2-3; O’Neil, et al., 2007:9; B. Sharma,
2008:18). Some field data suggest that femLINK’s presence in a rural village can overpower, not
empower, the dialogic process (Suadnya, 2005:1). Evidence also exists that femLINK is
strategically working from the inside (through conscientisation of grassroots women) and the
outside (through advocacy within national and regional governments) to enhance women’s equality.
femLINK’s “outside” advocacy work has contributed to some limited policy successes, such as
60
Working to achieve accountability from Fiji’s military government around women’s issues presents surprises. “The sexual assault
act, I mean, women have been working on that since … 1988, 1989. We’ve been trying all these years and then they (the military
government) just put in a decree and change it all. You sort of think, yeah! C’mon, this is what we want! (“Vicky,” CSO
representative. Personal communication. 31 Jan. 2011).
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greater inclusion of CSOs in regional policy debates within the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
(long closed to non-government voices), mention of community radio in the Forum’s 2005 Digital
Strategy and subsequent 2010 Framework for Action on ICT for Development in the Pacific, and
the Forum leaders’ adoption in 2012 of a Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. But
as evidenced by the Pacific’s slow movement toward women’s equality despite ratification of
numerous international conventions, regional policy statements seldom lead to concrete changes in
the lives of islanders.
Given the competitive CSO-funding environment in the Pacific and the complex social networks
through which CSOs work, CSOs can act as a self-correcting horizontal accountability mechanism.
Disreputable organisations tend to be winnowed out through innuendo and other social-control
mechanisms as “a lot of gossip swirls around these types of things” (“Matthew,” international
development agency representative, personal communication, 8 Feb. 2011).
In summary, evidence exists that femTALK FM has achieved a level of social sustainability among
its peer-level CSOs, within the regional and international women’s movement, and with Fiji’s
military government. The lingering unanswered question is the relationship of femLINK’s
accountability to the rural women it purports to represent as there appeared to be no formal
feedback mechanisms through which rural women could affect femLINK’s performance.
The risk of co-option
The international development community realises that working within the Pacific socio-cultural
context is the key to the successful implementation of development projects, thus they seek to build
relationships with local CSOs that can serve as cultural “bridging mechanisms” (Boege, Brigg,
Brown, Curth, & Wiuff-Moe, 2012:2, 7; Foresti, et al., 2007:6; George, 2011:3; K. R. Lewis,
2011:58; Menocal & Sharma, 2009:2-3; O’Neil, et al., 2007:vii; Tembo, 2012:1; United Nations
Development Programme, 2008:12; Yabusaki, 2007:58, 61).
222
However, some foreign development actors seek to embed CSOs into frameworks that advance
their own development objectives, often “using” CSOs as “cheap delivery mechanisms” and as
ways to circumvent governments (Hill, 1994:125; Smillie, 1998:3-4; Tonkin, 2008:33; K. G.
Wilkins & Mody, 2001:393). For example, in 2010, tensions between Fiji’s military government
and the outspoken leaders of the Fiji Women’s Rights Movement (FWRM) resulted in a dozen or so
women being arrested, the FWRM offices being ransacked, and some representatives banned from
international travel. In 2011, AusAID nearly doubled its funding to FWRM, where it constituted 56
percent of the CSO’s annual budget, compared to 12 percent in 2010 and 3 percent in 2009 (Fiji
Women's Rights Movement, 2011b:26; 2012:19).61
Throughout the region, Pacific CSOs are “chronically starved” for funding and constantly “on the
look out” for new funding partners, which is a recipe for the implementation of aggressive rent-
seeking behaviour (Bautista, 2012a:26; 2012b:37). As a result, Pacific CSOs are vulnerable to
“capture,” will frequently align their organisational objectives to match those of their donors, and
are highly susceptible to unpredictable donor whims (Bautista, 2012a:11; Brodhead, 1987:2; DAC
Network on Gender Equality, 2008:8; T. Parks, 2008:218; Rice & Austria, 2007:68; Tonkin,
2008:34-35) and (“Anthony,” academic, personal communication, 7 Feb. 2011).62 Development
commentators have described this pressure on CSOs – to constantly strive to meet changing
development needs among their constituents within capricious funding environments – as leading to
“organisational schizophrenia,” while the competitive nature of the CSO funding environment can
become “a race to the middle” that shaves off the harsher edges of CSO political advocacy
(Bautista, 2012a:11; Brodhead, 1987:4). Due to the large amounts of aid flowing to many advocacy
CSOs, Pacific governments often view the motivations and activities of such CSOs with suspicion,
seeing them as usurping the power of the government or simply as competitors for donor funds
(Bautista, 2012a:35).
Fiji’s human-rights CSO, while frequently appearing publicly to work in unity, become highly
competitive concerning funding. Nearly all of Pacific women’s activist CSOs, including femLINK,
draw from the same pool of 12 or so major international development actors, such as AusAID,
Global Fund for Women, International Women’s Development Agency, Canada Fund, the EU,
61
Australia is the Pacific’s largest aid donor. Of its 2010 allocation of US$977 million, 40 percent was earmarked for CSOs and
government social-service departments (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012:10; 2012b). In 2012,
Australia committed an additional AU$320 million over 10 years to advance women’s equality (World YWCA, 2012).
62
One frequently mentioned example of donor capriciousness is the experience of the Foundation for the Peoples of the South
Pacific International, which also uses radio content-production in its outreach to rural women in Fiji and Vanuatu. It was thrown into
chaos in 2009 when NZAID abruptly cancelled NZ$12 million in funding due to a change of government.
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Oxfam, World Association for Christian Communication, and various UN agencies (Spence,
Siwatibau, Holden, & Brusset, 2010:40).
What I think is really quite sad for me is that they (women’s CSOs) tend to have the
knives out for each other. (femLINK) far less than anyone else. She’s quite inclusive.
But, boy, they have it in for her sometimes (“Matthew,” international development
agency representative, personal communication, 8 Feb. 2011).
One of femLINK’s partners summarised the plight of many Pacific CSOs; her comments also
reflect the Pacific rentier orientation.
My only little thing is the money, if (femLINK) gave more money. Because what she
gives is what, you know? We don’t have core funding. We don’t have cover to pay
rent or anything. We need money for the new license, to help with our maintenance,
with our electricity. How does the radio work without us having the core funding to
pay our bill? You see, once (femLINK) is being supported, everything goes through
(femLINK). I don’t know how we can come in. … There’s another thing that caught
my eye: she is also living at a higher and she spends money. I feel there are
unnecessary things because when we go there, it’s dinner, dinner, dinner, and, yes,
it’s the Pacific Way, but I wish that money comes down to us because we need more
money here. Anyway, we don’t want to criticise that but on top of all the good that
she’s doing (“Ofa,” personal communication, 16 Jan. 2012).
Strategic positioning: donors
Strategic thinking occurs on both sides of the donor-CSO relationship. Donors often strive to “do
more with less,” thus requesting or expecting partner CSOs to take on projects that lie outside of the
mission or are beyond their capacity to deliver, as was seen within the Buala FM case study
(Menocal & Sharma, 2009:4).
Relationships with donors can be fraught. Donors will fund project-oriented work around their
interests but will not provide funding to support CSO administration (DAC Network on Gender
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Equality, 2008:1; Davenport, 2000:2; Low & Davenport, 2002:370; Spence, et al., 2010:4; The
European Centre on Pacific Issues, 2001a:13). Donors often seek to work with convenient CSOs,
those that are urban-based, English-speaking and led by Westernised elites. Those CSOs lacking
administrative capacity or are philosophically opposed to donor development agendas fail to receive
funding (Boege, et al., 2012:8; DAC Network on Gender Equality, 2008:5; Tonkin, 2008:33-34)
and (“Vicky,” CSO representative. Personal communication. 31 Jan. 2011). Most donors fail to
establish “exit” strategies, assuming without evidence that their partner CSOs will grow to self-
sufficiency and carry the project forward after the official project-closure date, as was found in the
Buala FM case study (Low & Davenport, 2002:371; O’Neil, et al., 2007:vii; United Nations
Development Programme, 2008:22). Even more troubling, international development actors
working in the area of women’s human rights often continue to portray women in developing
countries as passive, powerless and voiceless, just the reverse of the image Pacific women’s CSOs
are attempting to project (Kilby & Crawford, 2011:19; Marchand & Parpart, 1995:23, 25).
Women are basically perceived as victims in any society and that it should be that
way. And when you’re talking about village women, that’s precisely what the funders
want (“Josefa,” CSO representative, personal communication, 8 Feb. 2011).
Seldom do international development actors address both voice and accountability simultaneously.
If international development actors fund voice-enhancing projects, they often do so through
technical assistance, such as to national broadcasters, or through the promotion of more direct
government accountability, such as freedom of information legislation. If any attention is given to
voice, it is treated as a component of broader “good governance” initiatives; globally, only 40
percent of good-governance initiatives include funding for voice-enhancement work and most of
these are in partnership with governments, not CSOs (Foresti, et al., 2007:6). Very few international
development actors provide funding specifically to enlarge the public sphere to include voices from
marginalised communities, such as through community radio, and even fewer still seek to work
with women or rural populations (Foresti, et al., 2007:6; Menocal & Sharma, 2009:28).
There’s no real sort of funding for community media-led innovation. And so we’re
kind of caught between whatever is available for civil society and whatever is
available for mainstream media. We might just get somewhere in between
(“Vanessa,” femLINK staff, personal communication, 11 Feb. 2011).
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Strategic positioning: femLINK
With the danger of co-option ever present, women’s advocacy CSOs must strategically place
themselves within donor streams and carefully chose their partners, realising the latter option is
seldom available to financially struggling CSOs (Bautista, 2012b:27; E. Leigh, 2006:87; P. M.
Swain, 1999:157). In the Pacific, dangers of co-option also stem from “conservative” elements in
the socio-cultural environment, such as churches, that establish women’s organisations alleging to
represent women but instead seek to reduce women’s rights, especially in the area of reproductive
health (Antrobus, 2004:139; Global Fund for Women, 2010).
Given the depth of Pacific CSOs’ “accountability challenges,” stemming largely from inadequate
organisational and management capacities, many international development actors consider the
reputation of CSO leaders while making funding decisions (Jaques, 2006:9; K. R. Lewis, 2011:58;
C. A. Meyer, 1997:1136; D. Singh, 2010:7, 15; Tonkin, 2008:34-35).
It is within this capacity that femLINK leadership excels by maximising applications of immanent
development models based upon extensive social networks and reciprocal wealth distribution. Rolls
draws on her wide social networks within the Pacific women’s movement, in local and international
media (such as regular appearances on ABC’s Pacific Beat program), and at regional and
international policy levels to gain inclusion into policy circles and then to build strength upon
strength. femLINK’s leadership, in the words of one staff, is “really strategical” (“Anita,” personal
In many respects, the Pacific region is a small community given its population base, extensive
social networks, and lack of specialist experts, thus an ambitious and competent leader can carve a
sustainable niche (“Matthew, international development agency representative, personal
communication, 8 Feb. 2011). For example, Rolls has assumed vice-presidency positions on
governing board for WACC-Pacific and AMARC-Pacific, and while both regional groups are small
and fairly moribund, her positions within them serve to accentuate her international reputation.63
63
WACC is the World Association for Christian Communication. AMARC is the World Association of Community Radio
Broadcasters.
226
For example, in 2010 Rolls was appointed to a UN expert panel on the role of women in peace and
security, a position that now places her on stage at mid-level UN global gatherings.
Strikingly absent from femLINK’s abundant advocacy and organisational documentation are
financial statements (femLINKPACIFIC, 2009d, 2010, 2011, 2012). Of those peer-level Fiji
human-rights CSOs investigated for comparison (Fiji Women’s Rights Movement, The Citizens’
Constitutional Forum, Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding, and Women’s Action for Change), all but
one presented audited financial statements in their annual reports. Organisational documentation for
femLINK’s Tonga partner, MFF, was also not found. This raises questions about the transparency
of both femLINK’s and its donors’ accountability to constituents at various levels. In an
environment characterised by strong CSO competition for funding, government suspicion around
foreign funding to CSOs, and rivalry among donors themselves for influence and position within
the CSO sector, transparency of aid allocation on both sides of the CSO-donor equation would
reduce project duplication and encourage more harmonious and cooperative relationships (Pacific
Centre for Peacebuilding, 2010:11; D. Singh, 2010:16).
femLINK’s concentrated focus on enhancing rural women’s participation in decision-making

around UNSCR 1325 through the use of community radio places it advantageously at the
intersection of the Millennium Development Goals and similar global development agendas. For
example, for most of the 2000s, UNESCO’s Pacific office focused in only two policy areas:
women’s empowerment and media development, thus creating a highly specific point of entry for
femLINK. This contributed to femLINK receiving at least three UNESCO-IPDC grants totalling
US$75,800 (FJ$138,714) between 2004-2012 (International Programme for the Development of
Communication, 2004, 2007; 2012:35-39).
Equally lucrative is the AusAID gender-equality platform. femLINK’s mission objectives

identically match two of the four AusAID focus areas. The value of AusAID’s gender initiatives in
the Pacific is estimated at AU$320 million through 2022 (AusAID, 2011b; World YWCA, 2012).
In 2011, AusAID earmarked AU$2.5 million in support for Fiji CSOs; of this, femLINK received
AU$150,000 (FJ$274,500) to purchase two suitcase radio units and a utility vehicle (Datt, 2011).
Funding sources intermingle: femLINK has received unspecified annual funding from the
International Women’s Development Agency (IWDA) since at least 2009; IWDA receives about 40
percent of its funding from AusAID (International Women's Development Agency, 2010:16, 18;
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2011:27; 2012:9, 14; 2013:14). Additionally, femLINK has received about US$71,600
(FJ$131,000) in grants from the Global Fund for Women between 2005-2011 (Global Fund for
Women, 2011). Sometimes funding to femLINK is shared with other women’s CSOs, such as
around the inaugural Fiji Women’s Forum in 2012 and femLINK’s two regional “peace talk”
networks. Such overlapping alliances demonstrate the “unity in diversity” of the Pacific women’s
movement and femLINK’s apparent capacity to accrue and redistribute funding to like-minded
CSOs according to its internal objectives.
Not infrequently, femLINK combines its own institutional development with donor-led activities,
such as the AusAID-funded 2013 regional Pacific Round Table on Community Radio which
coincided with femLINK’s annual volunteer training, thus combining donor objectives with
femLINK’s financial and organisational sustainability (Pacific Media Assistance Scheme, 2013).
The personal nature of the Pacific was also demonstrated in 2008 with the launch of the second
phrase of AusAID’s Pacific Media Development Scheme (PACMAS 2). Effort was made to
constitute a project governing board that would reflect gender balance and openness to community
media, thus a board position was nearly reserved for Rolls as she is the only South Pacific woman
to combine these two characteristics and she is personally known to project implementers (Pacific
Media Assistance Scheme, 2012b). Interestingly, in 2012 Rolls, in her position as the AMARC-
Pacific vice-president, secured an AU$50,000 (FJ$91,500) PACMAS grant to conduct the
previously mentioned Pacific community radio round table, raising questions about conflict of
interest given Rolls’ position on the PACMAS project board and the transparency of the grant
application, submitted in the name of AMARC but then applied to fulfil femLINK’s organisational
development objectives (Pacific Media Assistance Scheme, 2012c).
Staving off co-option
While femLINK’s organisational documents are thin on funding details, they do list about two
dozen funding sources, ranging from international development agencies to local Fiji businesses.
This indicates the existence of a strategy to accrue funding from a diversity of sources, which is one
approach that enables CSOs to maintain their independence and stave off donor co-option.
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One factor contributing to femLINK’s financial success is that it consistently stays focused on its
core mission of enhancing women’s voice and political participation through community radio.
Rolls explained:
That’s been the problem for funding for women’s civil society. Women feel that ‘this
year I have to do health and next year I have to do environment because that’s where
the funding is.’ No. How do you become a specialised entity focused on your issues? I
need the resources to be able to pursue the growth of community radio for women,
you know. I can’t be having to juggle doing a health program because that’s where
the money is (Personal communication, 11 Feb. 2011).
Additionally, the funding available for media development in the Pacific tends to focus on
“institutionalised” media, such as national broadcasters.
I’m starting to challenge the status quo even more because if you’re talking about
media and media assistance in the Pacific, it shouldn’t just be about public-service
broadcast, it shouldn’t be about journalism. I think, why journalism? News formats
have changed so much in the region that it should be about training on the
production of media content. ... It can be news, but current affairs programs are what
we do. We’re a current affairs producer. If you took community media out and put in
current affairs, we do women’s current affairs every week. … (So) there is funding for
the institutionalisation of media … but there is no money for the creative use of
media (Sharon Bhagwan Rolls, personal communication, 11 Feb. 2011).
As can be expected, femLINK’s financial success has its critics. One femLINK donor agency
representative said he is often criticised by other CSOs for funding an “IGO” or an individual non-
governmental organisation, referring to Rolls’ strong presence within femLINK (“Matthew,”
personal communication, 8 Feb. 2011). Others attributed femLINK’s enviable financial success to
Rolls’ “high profile” and “UN connections” which they said they personally found “really
uncomfortable” despite their obvious profitability (“Vicky,” CSO representative, personal
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In summary, evidence exists to support the argument that femLINK employs a cultural Pacific
development model wherein femLINK skilfully exploits social networks and rent-seeking
behaviour to build its financial sustainability as a women’s activist media outlet.
ORGANISATIONAL SUSTAINABILITY
Feminist approaches to capacity building
Donors are driven to identify individuals and organisations “that can get things done,” that have
demonstrated they have the human resources, technical skills, processes and systems, and other
competencies to deliver projects, and to do so through close participatory relationship with their
constituencies (DAC Network on Gender Equality, 2008:11; K. R. Lewis, 2011:58; Menocal &
Sharma, 2008:xii; 2009:6; T. Parks, 2008:217-218; Rao, 2006:64; B. Sharma, 2008:10, 23).
But it is widely acknowledged that throughout the Pacific, CSOs of all varieties suffer from
numerous deficiencies that significantly affect their “absorptive capacity,” meaning CSOs might be
able to attract donor funding but they often fail to have the capability to deliver the output (Bautista,
2012a:20; Hauck, et al., 2005:ii, 13-16; Low & Davenport, 2002:373; McKeon, 2009:140; P.
Morgan, 2006:14; D. Singh, 2010:7; The European Centre on Pacific Issues, 2001a:3). Too often
Pacific CSOs neglect improving their capacity to perform better due to the daily pressures of simply
running the organisation. Instead they rely on donor-led training schemes which tend to offer non-
customised workshop-based instruction in technical, but not administrative, areas. Outcomes from
such training are seldom embedded in the organisation and are lost when the trained individual
moves on (Bautista, 2012a:20; 2012c:3, 6; Low & Davenport, 2002:373; Pitcoff, 2004:11).
For women’s activist organisations, capacity-building activities are often imbued with feminist
perspectives. In femLINK’s case, this means preparing the next generation of women’s activists.
Two areas of interest are worthy of exploration: femLINK’s approach to empowering volunteers
through the use of community radio and the struggle to engender sustainable leadership within the
Pacific cultural context.
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Generation Next
In 2007, three years after the launch of femTALK FM, femLINK established a young women’s
training program called Generation Next. In 2011, about 22 young women comprised the Suva
cohort with four volunteers situated in the western town of Nadi (on Fiji’s largest island of Viti
Levu) and four in the northern town of Labasa (on Fiji’s second largest island of Vanua Levu). By
2011, about 50 young women had passed through the program since its inception
(femLINKPACIFIC, 2012:12).
These “Gen Next” women are recruited from women’s groups associated with the National Council
of Women Fiji, an umbrella organisation consisting of about 45 sub-national CSOs. Most of the
women interviewed during the fieldwork were in their late-teens to mid-20s. The young women
came from both rural and urban backgrounds and reflected Fiji’s multi-cultural, multi-religious
demographics. Most had been working for femLINK about two years; one had been a volunteer for
six years. Primarily, they are tasked with operating the suitcase radio during both village-based and
Suva-based weekend broadcasts. Each volunteer is required to produce two 30- to 45-minute audio
shows a month around various themes or campaigns, such as the International Women’s Day or the
global 16 Days of Activism that occurs every December. The audio shows are largely based on live
field interviews with minimal post-production work. In 2011, Gen Next produced 156 hours of
broadcast material (femLINKPACIFIC, 2012:12).
The young women learn a variety of skills, including technical proficiency (such as computer
literacy and operation of the broadcast console), improved communication competencies (such as
writing, interviewing, oral presentation, and interpersonal dialogue), and basic work-place skills
(such as employee reliability and time management). The Gen Next groups meet weekly, thus
gaining experience in teambuilding, conflict resolution, and minor financial management. The
women work about 32 hours a month and receive about FJ$300 (AU$162) a month plus
transportation and food allowances when they engage in field work. Thus they earn about FJ$9 an
hour, which is a reasonable middle-class wage within Fijian standards.64
64
One of the greatest development challenges facing the PICs is the creation of wage employment opportunities for youth. Fiji alone
needs to add 20,000 jobs each year to accommodate school leavers. Regional youth unemployment rates stood around 40 percent in
2011. Also, by wage comparison, a certified mid-level media-equipment repair technician, such as one employed by the University
of South Pacific, earns around FJ$9 an hour.
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The Gen Next volunteers work in a loosely coordinated fashion with femLINK’s national network
of “rural correspondents” and “focal points” located in five rural-town areas. These outlier women
also reflected Fiji’s multi-cultural, multi-religious demographics but were middle-aged or older and
frequently leaders of smaller women’s CSOs. They serve as community liaisons by organising
monthly meetings around UNSCR 1325. The two rural correspondents are paid FJ$420 (AU$227) a
month; the five focal points receive stipends of FJ$120 (AU$65) a month. All are equipped with
cassette recorders and batteries that they use to record additional audio material during monthly
UNSCR 1325 meetings. The raw material is sent to Suva for inclusion in radio shows or as data
around which advocacy materials are created. Additionally, each of femLINK’s five rural “centres”
receives about FJ$175 (AU$95) a month to offset costs associated with transportation, refreshments
and administration arising from the monthly meetings (femLINKPACIFIC, 2010:12). In total, the
annual costs to support Gen Next and the rural women’s media network amount to roughly
FJ$138,520 (AU$74,800), exclusive of the wages paid to femLINK’s seven paid full-time staff.
Operationalising feminist leadership
femLINK’s approach to its human-resource capacity building reflects the organisation’s grounding
in the global women’s movement as expressed through the Beijing Platform of Action’s Section J,
the YWCA’s young women’s leadership strategy, and similar international policy positions
(Cabrera-Balleza, 2008; Dery, 2008; Malhotra, et al., 2008; Mitchell, 1998; Solervicens, 2008;
World YWCA, 2011).
Specifically, opportunities for inter-generational dialogue occur within the interaction among
femLINK’s rural correspondents, focal points and Gen Next volunteers. Such work is deemed
essential for the survival of the global women’s movement as research suggests younger women are
drifting away to join other social movements, such as those around the environment, in part due to
barriers erected to their participation by older women activists (Antrobus, 2004:147-148; Jeffrey,
2004:188; E. Leigh, 2006:86; Menon, 2006:42-43; Muthien, 2006; World YWCA, 2011:2, 16).
femLINK emphasises mentor-based and peer-to-peer “buddy” learning, which is highly appropriate
within Pacific socio-cultural contexts (Bautista, 2012a:48; 2012c:6; Low & Davenport, 2002:373;
Smillie, 1998:8; Thaman, 1992:11; World YWCA, 2011:16-17). Donors looking for evidence of
femLINK’s close participatory relationship with rural constituents are able to observe Next Gen’s
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facilitation of rural broadcasts and the monthly community meetings organised by members of
femLINK’s rural media network.
Additionally, the use of highly appropriate media technology, such as cassette recorders,
“demystifies” technology (Mitchell, 1998:80). In the age of ICT exuberance, femLINK’s continued
use of simple cassette recorders is important for at least two reasons. Firstly, the devices are easily
mastered by rural women participating in monthly UNSCR 1325 meetings. The recorders are often
passed around the group, thus offering some women their first experience to record and hear their
voices. Secondly, the tactile nature of cassette recorders allow visually impaired volunteers to
operate the equipment independently.
femLINK contributes to the cohesion of the local and regional CSO sector in a number of ways
(DAC Network on Gender Equality, 2008:11; Griffen, 1976:109; Jaques, 2006:5; Kilby &
Crawford, 2011:22; R. Leigh, et al., 2011:90; Rice & Austria, 2007:157-158; Seddon, 1986:14; The
European Centre on Pacific Issues, 2001a:15). It offers media training to other CSOs upon request
and often without charge. Through dissemination of its numerous press releases and other material,
femLINK strengthens information and communication channels among women’s and other CSOs.
In 2011, a cohort of femLINK staff and volunteers travelled to Tonga to train Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM
volunteers, thus providing opportunities for young women to build relationships within the larger
Pacific women’s movement. femLINK staff have also been sent in pairs to regional and
international conferences, again providing valuable opportunities for personal growth, the creation
of personal social networks, and the embedding of knowledge gained back into femLINK.
But most significantly, femLINK creates a “safe space” for young women to formulate and
articulate their voice as well as create media content that reflects women’s perspectives and
challenges the male bias perceived to exist in mainstream media (Ramilo, 2006; United Nations
Development Programme, 2008:14). Men are largely absent from femLINK’s work.
Voluntarism and rentier orientation
The notion of “formal” voluntarism, or unpaid work for an organisation or social cause, is not well
understood in the Pacific (Low & Davenport, 2002:376; Office for the Community and Voluntary
233
Sector, 2002; Tamasese, et al., 2010; Webster, 2007:9-11). From a Western perspective,
voluntarism is conceived as having no financial remuneration (R. Leigh, et al., 2011:4; Office for
the Community and Voluntary Sector, 2002:2; Tamasese, et al., 2010:9, 18). Around the world,
community broadcasters rely on unpaid volunteers to survive, although different levels of volunteer
contribution are acknowledged and more skilled positions, such as an audio producer, might elicit
some financial compensation (“Kevin,” international development agency representative, personal
communication, 2 April 2011).
But within the Pacific’s pragmatic rent-seeking orientation and the dearth of wage employment
opportunities for youth, financial incentives are often needed to attract and retain volunteers.
I keep saying to people, if you’re not going to pay your volunteers, they’re not going
to come. … You gotta pay them or you get monkeys (“Vicky,” CSO representative,
personal communication, 31 Jan. 2011).
Small monetary stipends are also culturally appropriate within Pacific reciprocity relationships as a
way to express gratitude to people for their intellectual and physical contribution to a development
project (“Benjamin,” CSO representative, personal communication, 23 Feb. 2011).
Among the case study radio stations and comparative CSOs, all but one sought to pay its
“volunteer” work force. Among the community radio stations, Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM, Niua FM and
the Isabel radio network were not yet capable of doing so, which radio representatives said
contributed to crippling volunteer turnover rates and unreliable volunteer attendance (“Ofa,” radio
administrator, personal communication, 16 Jan. 2012; “Felise,” radio administrator, personal
communication, 3 March 2011; “Catherine,” radio volunteer, personal communication, 24 Feb.
2011; “Rui,” regional development organisation representative, personal communication, 26 Jan.
2011). Only Radio BOSCO declined to pay its volunteers beyond occasional small reimbursements
for transportation and refreshments because to do so would degrade the importance of selfless
service to one’s community (“Christopher,” radio administrator, personal communication, 1 March
2011).
234
The Pacific’s rentier orientation is also revealed when a radio station is introduced into a
community as people anticipate that it will provide some kind of wage employment (“Kevin,”
international development agency representative, personal communication, 2 April 2011). As
“John,” a CReST FM (Vanuatu) supporter, explains:
I was disappointed to hear that CReST was off the air… their issue is ownership …
and who gets the theoretical income from the station … which of course there is none
… but there is a perceived income and everyone wants part of it…. (Personal
communication, punctuation as in the original correspondence, 17 March 2011).
As mentioned, the village women participating in femLINK’s rural broadcasts receive allowances
to offset transportation and meal costs. The value of these stipends is not known.
Pragmatic motivation
Results from three focus groups with femTALK FM volunteers indicate that most of the young
women placed top priority on the opportunity to gain valuable job skills. Eight Suva-based Gen
Next volunteers were asked about their motivations for working with femLINK: four said they
came for the experience and to learn more, one said to learn more about broadcasting, one
mentioned women’s issues, and two declined to answer. When the same question was posed to six
Nadi-based Gen Next volunteers, four said they volunteered to learn more (two mentioned
technology), and two said “for the work” or “to do the broadcast.” These findings, although meagre,
do support other research findings that suggest volunteers place personal motives, such as learning,
networking, and gaining work-related economic advantage, ahead of altruistic motivations
(Wollebæk & Selle, 2003:78-81). In the Pacific, many young people use CSO volunteer
opportunities as stepping stones to future paid employment (Bautista, 2012b:18; Jeffrey, 2004:239-
240; Williams, 1999:5).
femLINK staff also commented on their difficulty to attract young women from the Indo-Fijian
community as participation in CSOs is often perceived as political and therefore dangerous given
Fiji’s restive racial situation (“Vanessa,” femLINK staff, personal communication, 11 Feb. 2011).
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For femLINK’s young women volunteers, stepping outside of the Pacific’s culture of silence can be
emotional.
Like, last year we had our first actual training in community broadcasting for
women. And there were lots of womens here from all the Nadi takina (a collection of
villages). So we were all sitting here and it was my turn to do broadcasting and I was
just looking at my piece of paper and I didn’t even feel like talking. When it was my
turn, my voice get, I was very nervous. I nearly cried (femLINK volunteer, personal
Similar results were found in the Buala FM case study where field interviews revealed a “fear of
the microphone” or “too ashamed” to go on air (“Timothy,” radio management, personal
communication, 3 March 2011; “Nancy,” radio volunteer, personal communication, 4 March 2011).
Rowan Mary Jeffrey’s research of expatriate Pacific Island radio announcers at a community radio
station in New Zealand found the same results. Jeffrey (2004:109, 182) noted the difficulties in
encouraging Pacific Island women to volunteer, to speak on air, to resolve a fear of technology, and
to overcome “obstacles to participation” arising from the women’s perception of their socio-cultural
position within their communities.
Leadership dynamics
During field interviews, one question was repeatedly asked: what is needed to encourage the
emergence of community radio in the Pacific? Resoundingly, the same answer arose: leadership
(“Terence,” regional development agency representative, personal communication, 9 Feb. 2011;
“Benjamin,” CSO representative, personal communication, 23 Feb. 2011; “Theresa,” regional
development agency representative, personal communication. 26 Jan. 2011; “Sikeli,” engineer.
personal communication, 31 Jan. 2011; “Kisi,” radio volunteer, personal communication, 5 Feb.
2011).
Part of the problem just right across the board is having someone who's not only
passionate but committed to do it. Everything depends on finding the right people and
236
they drive it. Yes, leadership and commitment (“Norman,” regional development
agency representative, personal communication, 26 Jan. 2011).
Yet getting the relationship right around leadership development and leadership succession can be
tricky in the Pacific for a number of reasons. In the Pacific and globally within activist women’s
CSOs, founding members are nearing retirement age. As Rolls herself exemplifies, this generation
was often propelled into social action due to strong passions around social justice issues and they
learned “on the job” as they grew within their organisations (Menon, 2006). Today, however, young
activists tend to view involvement with women’s CSOs as a career path and exhibit a tendency to
shift strategically among organisations for personal advancement, as was seen within the Fiji
Women’s Rights Movement and femLINK (Fiji Women's Rights Movement, 2011b:2; Pitcoff,
2004:27).
The Pacific’s culture of silence also greatly influences CSO leadership dynamics with its emphasis
on respect for leaders, a preference for hierarchical organisational structures, and a deep
dependence on mentoring relationships (Bautista, 2012b:35). Ample evidence supports the fact that
Rolls is a passionate and committed feminist leader with a deep love for broadcasting and she holds
the respect of her staff and volunteers. She affects a significant “hands-on” presence in all aspects
of the organisation and she models the personal mentoring she received in her early years from the
YWCA and the Pacific women’s movement.
Efforts to engender leadership succession in the Pacific context can be stressful to reflective
leaders. At times, Rolls expressed frustration at the perceived inaction of some staff to assume
responsibility (Personal communication, 11 Feb. 2011). This perceived lack of confidence on the
part of volunteers was also found within Buala FM, Radio BOSCO and SIDT’s media work and
was noted among New Zealand-based Pacific islanders (Jeffrey, 2004; Quade, 2007).
On the other hand, Rolls’ passion for media work can undermine her best intentions to empower her
volunteers. She was observed stepping in when opportunities arose. In many ways, Rolls’
leadership style is distinctly Pacific and authoritarian: she was observed giving forceful orders and
then dissolving into sustained hearty laughter that sweeten the impact of her directives. In response,
femLINK’s office hums with activity and the esprit de corps among its volunteers is palpable.
237
Thus, strong Pacific leadership traits conjoin with volunteer inclinations to follow along because it
is to their strategic advantage to do so; thus far, the formula has been successful.
That’s why I admire Sharon. She can work that team. She can ride them (“Jope,”
CSO representative, personal communication, 3 Feb. 2011).
femLINK’s internal leadership dynamic has puzzled some of its partners. One noted that Rolls does
much of femLINK’s “high-end work” while her paid staff and senior volunteers, “while being an
extremely competent group of young women,” appear to be “not very empowered” (“Kevin,”
international development agency representative, personal communication, 2 April 2011). But
again, this reflects Pacific cultural sensibilities around respecting and serving leaders. Rolls
exemplifies what Emile McAnany (2012:108, 111-112) calls a social entrepreneur: someone who
places her social mission at the primacy of her work and employs creative approaches and ethical
leadership to fulfill it.
Rolls is poignantly aware of femLINK’s leadership dynamic and the role her unique qualifications
play in engendering successive leadership.
As the founder, I come with multiple skills. I mean, I came out of broadcasting
management. I came out of programming. I came out of writing. I came out of
presentation. I came out of women’s movement. So, someone (a successor) might
come, might be able to do it in a couple of years. … But also realising that at the
board level, your board is also recognising that: ‘What! We’ll never find another
Sharon!’ Because this is my 45 years of learning. But what I can do is help identify
people. … Now all I need to do is keep creating that space to build (their) capacity
up (Personal communication, 11 Feb. 2011).
Leadership succession within the Pacific cultural context troubles other peer-level CSOs that are led
by powerful personalities (“Vicky,” CSO representative, personal communication, 31 Jan. 2011).
238
Well, if I drop dead, this organisation will, I mean, succession is an issue. It’s a
challenge to all NGOs (“Josefa,” CSO representative, personal communication, 8
Feb. 2011).
In this chapter I have discussed and analysed femLINK to further my theories about immanent
development models and sustainable development within community radio. femLINK clearly
employs immanent development models within a talanoa framework in its field methodologies. It
strategically engages in forward and backward linkages with the international women’s movement:
forward in that it injects Pacific voices into global discourses, and backward through the extraction
of rents which it redistributes through horizontal relationships with other women’ CSOs and in
vertical relationships with its rural communities. While its work with rural women has been
criticised for not producing more measurable development outcomes at the village level, this is one
of the features of talanoa, where the emphasis is placed upon acknowledging and affirming
relationships within dialogue that can be flowing, repeating and not outcome-oriented (S. Halapua,
2006).
Because femLINK is an indigenous CSO, it can access these rural voices through culturally
appropriate channels in ways that foreign development actors cannot. The use of a portable suitcase
radio unit as a focal point around which women gather to learn and talk is indeed incidental. Before
it acquired a portable radio station, femLINK used community video applications. The shift in
technology focus toward radio and the use of simple tools like cassette recorders reflects a
commitment to use Pacific-appropriate technology, thus reaffirming the MacBride Report and the
Beijing Platform for Action. femLINK’s continued use of older technology has even puzzled its
partner organisations at the international level, such as the women’s advocacy NGO, ISIS Manila,
that is moving firmly toward the use of ICT tools in its work (Mariano, et al., 2007). Again, the
rural Pacific’s lack of electrification and deficiencies in communication and transportation
infrastructure reinforce radio’s position as the appropriate medium for grassroots islanders.
femLINK is widely regarded as one of the region’s most financially successful CSOs. Field data
revealed that some comparator CSOs are uneasy about femLINK’s displays of wealth, but again,
like village chiefs of old, a village’s economic health and social cohesion are revealed through the
239
corpulence of its chief. femLINK does redistribute the wealth it generates by creating wage
employment for young and rural women and through joint projects with other CSOs. Additionally,
how does one measure the value of relationships in peace-building and development work? Rural
women from many surrounding villages will journey to participate in a femLINK rural broadcast.
Perhaps they are attracted by the small stipends they receive, but they are also offered opportunities
to travel away from their isolated homes, to share meals and laughter, and to meet other women to
explore the commonalities of their rural lives across barriers created by age, geography, social
status, race and religion.65 femTALK FM’s limited broadcast range pushes the boundaries of the
culture of silence for participating women who engage in public speech performances but perhaps
not so far as to become overly threatening.
femLINK also reflects the Pacific’s cultural sensibilities around consocial identity and respect for
authority figures. Other women’s CSOs monitor each other’s activities and use innuendo and other
forms of social-control mechanisms to winnow out those CSOs that violate social norms, such
reciprocity and generosity. Evidence suggests that such comments directed at femLINK are more a
form of jeolousy around its financial success than umbrage toward its service. femLINK’s
organisational structure accentuates the volunteers’ respect toward their leader; a successful leader
organises the community around wealth-creation and wealth-redistribution activities, which in this
case is the perpetuation of the women’s social movement and its commitment to women’s
empowerment.
femLINK’s success is clearly derived from the immense dedication and unique characteristics of its
leader and her commitment to the Pacific women’s movement. The Pacific women’s movement is
uniquely positioned to support community media. No other social movement offers the breadth of
development objectives at the political, social, economic, and individual levels. No other global
movement, such as environmentalism, is so deeply embedded in rural Pacific communities.
femTALK FM conjoins the dual interests of its founder, that of media and women’s human rights. In
its efforts to nurture a new generation of women’s activists, femLINK is also training a new
generation of community media practitioners. femLINK is the only known agency to specifically
train in the area of community media business management, although here too this is a secondary
interest behind training in media-production skills.
65
One element of Pacific women’s views of empowerment is the freedom to travel independently, which reflects cultural
orientations toward malaga, or journeys undertaken to enhance social networks, personal knowledge, and wealth acquisition. One
example is the popular rural “peace bus” organised by Fiji’s Catholic Women’s League (Mariano, et al., 2007:399-400).
240
Successful development models are highly dependent on the local context and are not easily
transferable. Herein lies femLINK’s Achilles’ heel. I doubt that Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM in Tonga will
achieve a similar level of success for a number of reasons. Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM can be viewed as
another externally imposed development project. While the station is embedded in a local women’s
CSO and lead by a respected leader, it is not organically arising from the Tongan community and
thus faces potential resistance from churches, the government and even Tongan women themselves.
Additionally, Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM leadership does not derive from a media background and its
nascent financial model, where other women’s CSOs freely use the radio station, is questionably
sound. Similarly, given the pervasive influence of femLINK’s founder in all aspects of her
organisation and affiliated community radio station, I question if femLINK can also carry on at this
same level of unadulterated service to rural women if and when its charismatic leader moves on.
As voices of their communities, CSOs represent one of the three traditional Pacific sources of
development. The next chapter investigates the role of the church in development and community
broadcasting.
241
Chapter 8
“In every village, you see a church”66
Radio BOSCO: The role of churches in Pacific community radio
My fieldwork in Fiji returned me to Suva, my home for nine years. Those had been challenging
times marked by political unrest, ethnic tensions, and rising poverty. I was eager to see the changes
and quickly noticed how the price of food, transportation and daily necessities had skyrocketed in
my absence. The Fijian dollar had been devalued by 20 percent and the consumer tax was now 15
percent. Everything seemed at least twice the price it used to be. One afternoon, I was strolling
along the Laucala Beach foreshore near an informal village when two young Fijian boys bound out
of the water toward me, laughing and loudly calling “bula” (hello). A large woman slowly waded
to shore after them, pulling a nylon line with a meagre catch of fish. As we chatted, I asked the
women how she managed to care for her family in these apparently hard times. “Io (yes),” she said
with a warm broken-toothed smile. “We pray to God. It's God.”
Introduction
Christianity has been called the single most transformative globalising force to ever arrive in the
Pacific (Ernst, 2006:694). The Pacific has been described as the “Christian continent,” with 95
percent of all islanders professing the faith.67 Christianity has been deeply indigenised and
intricately interwoven into Pacific cultural understandings and consocial identities that implore
islanders to care for the welfare of their families and communities within reciprocal relationships.
Islanders often refer to their world as the “three-legged stool” consisting of the community, the
chief and the church (Hassall, 2012:3; Newland, 2009:189; Thornton, Kerslake, & Binns, 2010:1;
Thornton, Sakai, & Hassall, 2012:784-788; Vosabalavu, 2003:189). Every village places a church
at its centre, often at one end of a public meeting place with the chief’s abode facing it at the
66
“Uriam,” CSO representative, personal communication, 28 Feb. 2011.
67
Percentages would be higher if Fiji were excluded. Fiji has the largest population of the PICs; 28 percent are Hindus and 6 percent
Muslims.
242
opposite end (Macpherson, 2007a, 2007b). Even far-remote Niuatoputapu hosted 12 churches
among a population of 900 people.
Since the 1990s, islanders have been leaving colonial-era or mainline churches (in the Pacific
context, defined as the Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian, and similar others) in
significant numbers and joining “newer religious groups” (NRGs), particularly those of the
Pentecostal persuasion.68 Today, one in five Pacific islanders self-identifies as a member of a
Pentecostal or similar NRG (Ernst, 1994:14; 2006:703). This movement affects how development is
defined and how its challenges, such as rising poverty rates, are understood and addressed.
Significantly, Pentecostal churches and similar affiliated denominations are characterised by their
skilful use of mass media and ICTs (B. Meyer, 2010:123). Faith-based broadcasters now account
for half of all Pacific community radio broadcasters.
In this chapter I explore and analyse the role of faith-based broadcasters in development and
culture. Are such broadcasters an expression of their communities of interest or are they a different
sub-set of the broadcasting sector, one that allows foreign content and finances to crowd out local
voices, as some Pacific secular community broadcasters contend (“Vince,” radio partner, personal
communication, 23 Feb. 2011; “Vanessa,” radio staff, personal communication, 11 Feb. 2011)? Is
there evidence that Pacific faith communities are expressing a rentier orientation that seeks to adopt
and adapt these foreign influences to suit their self-defined development needs, or are faith-based
broadcasters another expression of Western cultural and economic ideology (Tarico, 2010)?
68
The phrase “new religious groups” describes those churches that entered the Pacific primarily after World War II, such as the
Assemblies of God, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS or Mormon), and the Seventh-Day Adventists (SDA). The
NRGs defy easy categorisation (Bergunder, 2010:53; Harris, 2008:vii; Robins, 2010:23). They can broadly be defined as religious
renewal movements that fall along the spectrum of conservative and liberal orientation (Goethals, 1993:29; Robeck, 2010:283;
Woods, 2009). Many originated in the US in the mid-19th Century and spread internationally in the mid-20th Century. They
frequently differ from mainline churches through their varying beliefs in the Trinitarian nature of God, their use of additional sacred
text beyond the Bible, and their particular interpretation of Biblical scripture (Hackett & Grim, 2011:40). They are also often
characterised by extensive evangelism, participatory worship styles, and their belief in charismatic gifts such as faith healing,
prophesy, and glossolalia, or “talking in tongues” (Anderson, et al., 2010:2; S. F. Brown, 2009:84-86, 125; Hauck, et al., 2005;
Robins, 2010:23-25; The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2005; Wacker, 2001:146).
243
THE BACKGROUND CONTEXT: RELIGION IN DEVELOPMENT
The forgotten factor
For most of the 20th Century, orthodox and Marxist development models viewed religion and
religious faith as obstacles to modernisation that were predicted to wane as rational
“enlightenment” values penetrated more deeply into the social fabric of developing countries
(Boehle, 2010:276-277; De Cordier, 2009:677; de Jong, et al., 2008:11-12; Lunn, 2009:939;
Rakodi, 2012a:638-640; P. Singer, 2000:49). Consequently, the role of religious faith and
institutions has long been neglected in development discourses (Boehle, 2010:285; Clarke, 2007:77;
Lunn, 2009:937; McDuie-Ra & Rees, 2010:21; Rakodi, 2012a:621; 2012b:634; Vidal, 2001:1).69
However, the World Bank’s Voices of the Poor report, issued in 1999, highlighted the importance
of religion in the lives of the global poor (Marshall & Marsh, 2003; D. Narayan, Patel, Schafft,
Rademacher, & Koch-Schulte, 1999).
By the 1990s and early 2000s, development discourses had taken a decisive took “a turn toward
religion” as part of the widening inclusion of civil society actors in policy dialogues and the re-
emergence of religious identity, particularly in the aftermath of the 2011 al-Qaeda attacks in the US
(Tomalin, 2012:690). Churches and faith-based organisations (FBOs)70 were positioned as powerful
new partners in international efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
(Clarke, 2007:80; Marshall & Marsh, 2003:xii, 27-30; Tomalin, 2012:691).
Churches and FBOs were perceived by many to have several advantages over secular CSOs and
international development agencies. These included the trust that people placed in religious leaders
and institutions, the churches’ “unrivalled rural reach,” their long history of delivering welfare
services, their ability to tap resources from within international networks, and their ability to
mobilise local resources such as volunteer workers (Bird, 2007:4; Boehle, 2010:295; 2012; Ferris,
2005:317-321; Kelly & Chapman, 2003:2; Lunn, 2009:944; Vidal, 2001:14). Churches and FBOs
69
Definitions of the terms “religion” and “faith” are numerous. Lunn (2009:937) suggests that religion is an institutionalised system
of beliefs and practices, while faith is the human trust or belief in a transcendent reality. Hoffstaedter (2011:14) regards faith as a
personal set of moral values and religion the institutional representation of those values.
70
Definitions of faith-based organisations vary. Some authors use terms such as religious NGO, or variations of faith-affiliated,
faith-related, faith-centred or faith-permeated to described such civil society groups (Hoffstaedter, 2011:7; Rakodi, 2012b:649). I
have chosen to use “faith-based organisations” (FBOs) to label faith-informed development actors and “churches” to denote the
institutional religious organisation.
244
were thought to be more stable and cost-effective, more committed to long-term community
engagement, and potentially more capable of delivering holistic, culturally appropriate and
community-owned development programs. Many mainline churches often exercise their “prophetic
voices,” thus projecting moral perspectives to social-policy dialogue (Clarke, 2007:78). Within this
argument, churches and FBOs were conceived as “agents of transformation” and “drivers of
change” (Clarke, 2007:77; de Jong, et al., 2008:10).
But not all development actors agreed. Due to strong views about the separation of church and state,
many international development actors feared that churches and FBOs would mix evangelism with
development activities or exclude non-adherents from their services. In the rush to engage with
FBOs, little attention was given to assessing FBO effectiveness in achieving the MDGs (Tomalin,
2012:691). For example, some churches fail to advance women’s human rights and issues around
reproductive rights and HIV/AIDS remain highly contentious. More importantly, numerous studies
indicate churches and FBOs simply lacked organisational capacity to effectively deliver welfare
services or to adequately participate in policy dialogue (APRODEV Rights and Development
Group, 2008:14, 17; Boehle, 2010:289-291; Ferris, 2005:311, 325; Vidal, 2001:22). Organisational-
capacity constraints are particularly troublesome for Pacific churches (AusAID, 2008:28; Bird,
2007:1-2; Ernst, 2006:708-709; Hauck, et al., 2005:18, 23).
In an effort to “do development better,” international donors have dramatically increased funding to
FBOs in the past 15 years (Ferris, 2005:317; Rakodi, 2012a:623). In 2009, about one-third of
AusAID’s total funding to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) was allocated to development-
oriented FBOs (Hoffstaedter, 2011:10). Relationships are further hampered because development
actors have little “religious literacy” and faith leaders have little awareness of development theories
and practices (de Jong, et al., 2008:14; Rakodi, 2012a:623; 2012b:637).
Donor-FBO partnerships are often unequal. FBOs are pressured to “leave their faith at the door” in
order to receive funding, to curtail their prophetic voices so as not to alienate donors, and to adhere
to an “ecumenical discipline” that some faith groups find distasteful (Clarke, 2007:84; Ferris,
2005:319). Most Pacific NRGs refuse join interfaith bodies as they view such membership as a
threat to their sovereignty and an impingement on their evangelising mission (Pagaialii, 2004:276).
Donor “mistrust of evangelism” means NRGs fail to receive aid funds even though such churches
tend to have a more favourable record in achieving the MDGs pertaining to health and education.
245
The trend of donor funding to FBOs raises other concerns: that “prophetic” voices will be co-opted
as donors will use such partnerships to legitimise donor-defined development agendas; that smaller
community-based FBOs will lack the capacity to meet “professional” project-reporting
requirements; and that FBOs will become more competitive and less ecumenically cooperative in
the pursuit of funding. Some international development FBOs receive as much as 90 percent of
their annual funding from government aid sources; this creates an “infinite dependence” on and
pervasive appeasement toward their donors (Ferris, 2005:317; McDuie-Ra & Rees, 2010:24).
Parent churches in the Global North heavily subsidise some Pacific churches, particularly the
Church of Latter-Day Saints (LDS), the Seventh-Day Adventists (SDA), and Assemblies of God.71
In areas of the world such as the Pacific where people are deeply religious, making a distinction
between faith-based and secular CSOs is often inappropriate (Rakodi, 2012b:648).72 For example,
femLINKPACIFIC is an example of a secular CSO that is informed, but not defined, by Christian
values. The Pacific Island News Association, a regional professional media organisation, conducts
training with churches that link the MDGs to Bible scripture. The Pacific Conference of Churches
(PCC)’s membership encompasses 37 PICs, thus its representation exceeds that of the Pacific
Islands Forum Secretariat or the Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Much of PCC’s work, such
as its controversial 2010 manifesto “Rethinking Oceania,” contains strong political critiques of
Pacific neo-liberal economic development trends, linking them to rising levels of poverty (Tevu,
2010). Similarly, Fiji’s The Citizens’ Constitutional Forum (CCF) is an influential political-
advocacy CSO led by a controversial Methodist minister who is also chairman of World
Association for Christian Communication-Pacific.
The Pacific historical context
Christianity was deeply entwined with European colonisation efforts, often with deadly
consequences for islanders caught between competing missionary groups (Forman, 1978:4; Ieuti,
1992:77, 101; Langi, 1992; T. Swain & Trompf, 1995:163; Thornley, 2005:155; Uriam, 2005:299).
71
Within the LDS doctrine, Polynesians are given privileged attention as they are thought to be direct descendants of Abraham and
one of the lost tribes of ancient Israel (Cowan, 2008:146). LDS membership is particularly strong in Samoa, Tonga and French
Polynesia.
72
Clarke’s typology of FBOs is widely accepted and differentiates interfaith representative organisations, faith-based charities or
development organisations, faith-based socio-political organisations, faith-based missionaries organisations, and faith-based illegal
or terrorists groups (Clarke, 2006:840-846; Hoffstaedter, 2011:6; McDuie-Ra & Rees, 2010:29; Tomalin, 2012:695).
246
But missionaries could only gain traction through political alliances with powerful chiefs, who
often astutely manipulated the missionaries to gain access to their wealth and technology (Ernst,
2006:691-692; Hamilton, 2005:94; Langi, 1992:13; T. Swain & Trompf, 1995:168-170; Thornley,
2005:136). Missionary groups affiliated with paramount chiefs, such as Fiji’s Cakobau and Tonga’s
Taufa’ahua, evolved into the dominant church and remain so today. Villagers refused to convert to
Christianity unless their chief did so; if the chief converted, villagers dutifully followed into the
chief’s chosen church. Thus, the first point is an example of the chiefs’ rentier orientation toward
the missionaries, and the latter a display of cultural respect. Pacific theologian Manfred Ernst
(1994:265) suggests that many islanders continue participate in these churches due to socio-political
pressure, not faith conviction.
Western-derived notions about the separation of church and state are functionally non-existent in
the Pacific. Pacific churches arrived nearly a century before the creation of the modern nation-state,
thus they have a greater legitimacy in the minds of islanders. In Fiji, this melding of church and
state is described as a three-legged stool comprising the church, the chief and the state (Hassall,
2012:3; Vosabalavu, 2003:189). In Samoa, the three-legged stool is defined as the church, the chief
and the family or community, implying that the church adequately represents the state interests
(Newland, 2009:189; Thornton, et al., 2010:1; Thornton, et al., 2012:784-788).
Unfortunately, they’ve gone to a stage where, in my opinion, it is becoming a big

salad bowl. Sometimes it’s a bit difficult to define or identify where the vanua
[traditional governance] stops and where the gospel starts (“Jope,” FBO
Throughout the Pacific, the government and the church are deeply conjoined. The involvement of
Fiji’s Methodist Church in three of the country’s four political coups and its suppression by the
Bainimarama military government (due to perceptions that the church mixed ethno-nationalistic
political activism with its religious teachings) are well documented (Hassall, 2012:5; Newland,
2009; Refugee Review Tribunal, 2010; Vosabalavu, 2003).73 The history of the church in Tonga is
the most turbulent in the Pacific; it has suffered four schisms in 100 years (Finau, 1992; Forman,
1978). In 1885, King George Tupou I established his own Wesleyan-affiliated church so he could
73
One example of ethno-nationalism is the recurring effort to constitutionally proclaim Fiji as a Christian state. About 35 percent of
the population is non-Christian (Hindu, Muslim, Sikh); religious affiliation tends to reflect ethnic lines.
247
be both head of state and church. In Samoa and Kiribati, village chiefs are most frequently church
leaders; their political success is often judged by how much their villages contribute to the church
(Ieuti, 1992:80-81; Thornton, et al., 2012:789). Vanuatu’s first prime minister was an Anglican
priest.
While all PIC constitutions explicitly support of religious freedom, in reality, the dominant
government-embedded church functions as the de facto state church (Ernst, 2006:729). Within this
close relationship, the “prophetic” role of the church is significantly compromised.
The rise of Pacific Pentecostalism
Since World War II and especially in the 2000s under the impact of economic globalisation, all
PICs have experienced rapid destabilising social change. By studying religious demographic trends,
development actors can gain insight into localised social change (Banchoff, et al., 2008:221). In the
past 30 years, the NRGs in some PICs have experienced membership growths as high as 30 percent
of the national population and nearly all at the expense of mainline Protestant churches (Ernst,
1994:5). Today, one in five Pacific islanders self-identifies as a member of a Pentecostal or other
NRG (Ernst, 1994:14; 2006:703).
Within its brief 100-year history, Pentecostalism has become the second largest category of
Christian faith, second only to the Roman Catholic Church. Pentecostalism is characterised by its
“liquidity” or ability to mould itself to localised historical, socio-cultural and political-economic
situations (B. Meyer, 2010:115, 121). The rapid rise of Pentecostalism since the 1990s is part of a
sweeping global phenomenon that has reshaped the face of Christianity (Anderson, et al., 2010:1;
Harris, 2008:ix). The emergence of global Pentecostalism coincided with the rise of neo-liberal
capitalism and is seen by some as an expression of modernity as opposed to a reaction to it
(Anderson, et al., 2010:3; B. Meyer, 2010:114-116; D. E. Miller & Yamamori, 2007:33;
Woodhead, 2004:121). Today 60 percent of all Christians live in the Global South, thus the global
Pentecostal movement has projected their voices strongly into the world religious system
(Anderson, et al., 2010:1; Banchoff, et al., 2008:106; Burrows, 2008:xi; D. E. Miller & Yamamori,
2007:20; Robbins, 2010:2; Robins, 2010:108; The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2005).
248
This movement away from mainline churches affects how development challenges, such as rising
poverty rates, are understood and addressed. For example, some groups believe illness and poverty
are caused by impure faith, not man-made causes and conditions. Pentecostals from the Global
South tend to be more conservative around issues of gender rights and reproductive health, but
express more liberal views around economic policy and moderate views about good governance
and environmental conservation (Funk, 2011:12; The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life,
2005, 2006b). Some groups go so far as to argue that climate change and ocean rise, which threaten
the existence of many small PICs, are reminders that “our home is in heaven” and not in the
material world (Operation World, 2013).
Pacific churches and modernity
Numerous hypotheses have been proposed as to why islanders are so attracted to the NRGs as
conversion carries substantial risks. People who shift allegiances away from the sanctioned village
church face banishment and denial of customary rights, such as land entitlement. Conversion
divides families and villages, sometimes leading to violence (Bryan, 2010:11-13; Ernst, 1994:247,
274, 276; Robbins, 2010:159; Thornton, et al., 2010:2).
The NRGs present themselves as youthful, modern, innovative, confident, entrepreneurial,

technologically savvy, and internationally networked. They provide opportunities for personal
advancement through education, regional and international missionary travel, church leadership,
and sometimes wage employment. Worship styles are inclusive, exuberant and often life
encompassing, such as through sports teams and youth clubs. In this way, they reflect Pacific
consocial identities. The NRGs’ future-looking orientation, although eschatological, instils a belief
that people can take control of their lives even amid turbulent times. Many churches provide an
attractive “prosperity” gospel, promising that blessings of wealth and health will be bestowed upon
the righteous. Theologian Manfred Ernst (2006:736) describes this as the “gospel of capitalism.”
Membership in NRGs allows islanders to seize the benefits of modernity, namely education, wealth,
technology and social networks, within an indigenous cultural framework without having to
embrace the secular aspects of Western development approaches and their Euro-American cultural
trappings (Woodhead, 2004:120-121). In this view, Pentecostal notions of development reinterpret
modernisation theory: islanders transform themselves into a modern, educated, democratically
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committed, and thoroughly capitalist persona but one inspired by indigenised religious faith, not
secular Enlightenment ideals. By comparison, the mainline churches seem old-fashioned, staid, out
of touch, hierarchical, elite-driven, and too embedded in local politics (Ernst, 1994:268; 2006:720,
734; Hamilton, 2005:291, 297; Ieuti, 1992:137) and (“Joeli,” FBO representative, personal
communication, 27 Feb. 2011; “Uriam,” CSO representative, personal communication, 28 Feb.
2011; “Len,” FBO representative, personal communication, 27 Jan. 2011).
Some of the practices of the mainline churches, in particular tithing, are pushing many islanders
into the NRGs.
Pacific mainline churches were also “decolonised” in the 1960s and 1970s when their Euro-
American parent churches withdrew funding (Ernst, 1994:263; 2006:738, 745; Uriam, 2005:298).
In the drive toward self-sufficiency, Pacific churches imposed levies; through the years, these have
grown to burdensome levels. In Samoa, the level of tithing has been directly linked to increasing
poverty rates (Thornton, et al., 2010:8). Families donate as much as 30-50 percent of their income
due to combined pressures from chiefs, clergy and community. The level of expected tithing and
the social pressure caused by public announcements of donation amounts (a practice called folofolo)
have pushed many Samoans toward NRGs which are perceived to be less costly and more
anonymous. Unique among Pacific churches is the view in Samoa that the extended family, not the
church, is responsible for social welfare (Thornton, et al., 2010:13). Church funds are used to
support organisational needs, such as church construction and pastor wages. Elsewhere in the
Pacific, levies imposed by the Kiribati Protestant Church can equal one month’s wages (Ieuti,
1992:79). In Tonga, annual church contributions (called misinale) are also publicly announced.
Families succumb to social pressures to contribute more than they can afford and without the
freedom not to contribute (Finau, 1992:171-173). Families are also expected to provide Sunday
feasts for pastors (a practice called fakaafe). The giving of copious amounts of food is fundamental
to Tongan identity, but the practice can also stress limited family resources. In Samoa and Fiji, an
informal “one village, one church” policy can divide families and villages. In Fiji, rural families
sometimes struggle to maintain membership in two churches, with the women and children joining
NRGs while the men remain in the mainline church to uphold village allegiances (Ernst, 2006:735;
Varani-Norton, 2005). Thus rural women are prone to sacrifice limited family resources to support
multiple churches and receive little sympathy from church leaders since such offerings are seen as
indicators of faith (Varani-Norton, 2005:225-231). Church tithing expectations can be unreasonable
given poverty conditions in rural villages (Varani-Norton, 2005:229).
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However, the NRGs seem unlikely agents of social change as they generally eschew social-justice
advocacy and often discourage their members from engaging in political action (Ernst, 1994:276;
D. E. Miller & Yamamori, 2007:21; Wacker, 2001:154). The NRGs instead emphasise behaviour
change at the individual level, with evangelism being their top priority (Ernst, 2006:735; Funk,
2011:15; Woodhead, 2004:31). Recent studies reveal an emerging “progressive” trend toward more
proactive social-justice advocacy in some NRGs in Africa and Latin America, but Pacific NRGs
continue to keep at arm’s length from social advocacy (Funk, 2011:34, 41; D. E. Miller &
Yamamori, 2007:7-10). Donald Miller and Tetsunao Yamamori (2007:32-33) suggest NRGs have
the potential to become “agents of social transformation” in three ways: by offering hope that a
better future is possible, by “uplifting” the health and wealth of their adherents, and through the use
of their social networks and media to create transnational communities. In this way, Pentecostal
faith reflects Pacific cultural orientation toward collective self-development propelled by extensive
social networks that adopt and adapt exogenous influences.
The technology of salvation
One of the defining characteristics of Pentecostal NRGs is their prolific use of mass media
(Anderson, et al., 2010:1; K. Armstrong, 2000:113, 239; Horsfield, 1982; Hunt, 2010:193; B.
Meyer, 2010:113, 123; Robbins, 2010:167; Robins, 2010:16; Waldman, 2011:186). Pentecostals
were, and still are, early enthusiastic adopters of communication technology. They have been
building transnational media empires since the 1930s (Kay, 2009:252; S. J. Miller, 1935:137-138).
Today, US programming dominates the international religious media landscape. In the US,
Pentecostal and charismatic churches own more radio and television stations than any other
Christian group (Alexander, 2009:vii, 12). By the 1970s, the US airwaves were crowded with
competing religious broadcasters, meaning that their audience shares were fragmenting and
decreasing in size. The major US religious broadcasting networks, such as Trinity Broadcasting
Network (TBN) and the Christian Broadcasting Network, faced the awkward situation of either
losing audience share, which would reflect poorly on their Prosperity Gospel orientation that
promised ever-increasing wealth and success to the faithful, or simply seeking new markets
overseas, which they have done with great success (Horsfield, 1982). With the establishment of
Letio Faka-Kalisitiane FM in Tonga 1991, the Pentecostal media networks entered the Pacific.
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STATION BIOGRAPHY
Radio BOSCO was a small rural radio station owned by the Salesians of Don Bosco, thus one of the
few Pacific community broadcasters affiliated with the Catholic Church. When Radio BOSCO was
established in 2005, it was the Solomon Islands’ first community radio station. There are now at
least 14. The station was created specifically to provide a platform for youth expression. This was
complemented by separate monthly “media education seminars” through which hundreds of
Solomons youth have gained valuable media literacy skills, include the ability to produce their own
media products around topics of their choosing.
Radio BOSCO was located in rural Tetere, a cluster of nine villages located about 27 kilometres
from the national capital, Honiara, as shown on Map 6.1, page 167. Tetere is located in a lush oil
palm plantation on the coastal plains. Income from the palm oil and nearby gold mine makes Tetere
one of the wealthiest areas in Guadalcanal Province. The villages are widely dispersed, the farthest
one being a three-hour walk from the Tetere town centre. Communication among the villages is
difficult. Tetere town consists of a Don Bosco Regional Training Centre (one of several vocational-
training schools in the Solomons run by the Salesians of Don Bosco), the Good Samaritan Hospital,
and the administrative offices for the Christ the King Catholic parish. The nearby Gold Ridge mine
was the epicentre of “the tensions,” a five-year period of deadly civil unrest in the 2000s.
The radio station’s founder, Fr Ambrose Pereira sdb, arrived in Solomon Islands in 1999 to work as
director of the communications division of the Catholic Church Solomon Islands. He first learned
about parish radio at an international conference and thought such a low-power FM might help rural
Tetere in two ways: by facilitating better communication among the dispersed villages and by
creating a platform for youth to express “their own issues of community” (Personal communication,
1 March 2011). Fr Ambrose applied for a broadcasting license in 2003 but because it was the
Solomons’ first application for a community radio station, broadcast regulators were unsure how to
handle it. Nearly 2.5 years passed before a license was issued. Radio BOSCO went to air in March
2005. The radio station was housed in a small classroom at the school.
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Table 8.1 Station details: Radio BOSCO
Frequency/Call sign 89.9 FM
Founder Fr Ambrose Pereira, sdb
Location Tetere, a cluster of nine villages, rural Guadalcanal Province, Solomons
Estimated listenership 5,000
Years of operation 2005-2010
Broadcast details 4-6 p.m. daily
Programming focus Weekly shows: health, youth issues, village news, children’s programming,
popular and local music, song dedications, quizzes, kastom stories, limited
amounts of religious programming
Estimated no. of volunteers About 5 (unpaid)
Funding sources Personal funds, equipment donations
Equipment A donated second-hand Italian 60-watt transmitter, miscellaneous, computer
Radio BOSCO’s station details are represented in Table 8.1. The station’s broadcast signal could be
heard in Honiara. According to 2010 audience survey, Radio BOSCO reached 8 percent of the
Solomons radio audience (Tebbutt Research, 2010:117). While community engagement appeared to
be healthy – a message box outside of the station room often received up to 30 music requests daily
– the communities competed with each other and none assumed responsibility for the station
(“Catherine,” radio volunteer, personal communication, 24 Feb. 2011).
In 2007, Fr Ambrose was appointed acting rector (and eventually rector) of another Don Bosco
vocational training centre, this one located in peri-urban Honiara. This transfer reduced the amount
of time and energy he could devote to Radio BOSCO. The succession of priests who followed him
in Tetere parish failed to see the worth of the radio station as a platform for youth expression, or
even recognise its place within dialogic “communication theology,” thus they and higher church
authorities failed to support Radio BOSCO. The station closed in mid-2010 due to a faulty
generator. Replacement costs, estimated at SB$776,000 (AUD$100,000), were beyond the parish’s
capacity. The youth media literacy seminars continued and remain highly successful.
In mid-2010, after Radio BOSCO had closed, Fr Ambrose’s colleagues in the local media and CSO
sectors encouraged him to talk with officials at Gold Ridge mine. The mine was then under new
Australian ownership and was eager to be seen as a good neighbour in the troubled Gold Ridge
area. Australian-based company officials welcomed the idea of working with Fr Ambrose to
rejuvenate Radio BOSCO. At that time, it was widely understood that no further FM broadcasting
licenses were available for Guadalcanal Province due to spectrum over-subscription. Thus, the
verbal agreement between Radio BOSCO and Gold Ridge entailed the sharing of the station’s
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broadcast license in exchange for a new
transmitter, studio space and electricity. The gold
mine could then use the airwaves for its
programming outside of Radio BOSCO’s
broadcast times. It seemed a win-win situation
for both parties. Such private-sector linkages
with community radio are rare but not unknown
in the Pacific. New Dawn FM in Papua New
Guinea is a commercial broadcaster with a strong
community orientation and the religious
broadcaster, Hope FM in Fiji, works with private
sector partners. In late 2010, telecommunication
engineers reworked the country’s spectrum plan
and found additional spectrum. In early 2011,
Gold Ridge hired a local project manager who
came with extensive commercial radio
experience. Unbeknownst to Radio BOSCO,
Gold Ridge applied for and received its own
Photo 8.1 (top) Radio BOSCO volunteer
broadcast license in March 2011 and began Source: (Community Media in Solomon Islands, 2011b)
broadcasting in May 2011. This left the Radio Photo 8.2 (bottom) Fr. Ambrose Pereira, sdb
Source: author
BOSCO agreement in tatters.
Gold FM’s programming is a commercial pop-music format and its colossal 600-watt transmitter,
perched atop a 2,000-metre-high mountain, overpowers all other Honiara radio broadcasters. Gold
FM’s Australian-based supervisor said he were displeased with this turn of events, saying that the
company had indeed wished to operate a community-oriented radio station. He stated that his
Solomons staff appeared unaware of the distinction between commercial and community radio
(“Alan,” radio supporter, personal communication, 12 March 2012). This is a reasonable
assumption given the recent arrival and limited penetration of community radio in the Pacific.
Additionally, Gold FM had been excluded from participation in the AusAID-funded media-training
initiative, SOLMAS (Solomon Islanders Media Assistance Scheme) (“Ellen,” development agency
representative, personal communication, 8 March 2011). In mid-2013, Gold FM was ensconced in
Honiara’s commercial media sector, Radio BOSCO was still silent, and the youth media-education
seminars were growing from strength to strength.
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Introduction
Religious or faith-based broadcasters comprise about 30 percent of all third-sector media in the
Global South and thus offer an attractive point of entry for development communication (Fröhlich,
et al., 2012:3). In the Pacific, 16 faith-based community radio stations exist today, making religious
broadcasting the largest sub-sector of Pacific community media. But some Pacific secular
community broadcasters contend that faith-based broadcasters comprise a distinct media sub-sector
altogether given their reliance on foreign funding and imported programming that some
broadcasters contend crowd out indigenous voices. As seen in Table 8.2, US-affiliated broadcasters
dominate the Pacific faith-based media sector.
Social sustainability encompasses three defining characteristics: community ownership of and

participation in the communication process, the development of local content, and the language and
cultural relevance of that programming (Dagron, 2003:4, 12; 2005a; Dagron & Dlamini, 2004:103).
Alfonsio Gumucio Dagron (2007a:203) and others caution against over-emphasis on the “purity” of
ownership of religious community-based media (Jankowski, 2002:9). The more important question,
Dagron (2007a:204) proposes, is not who owns the media but the social change that is initiated by
media activities; said differently, “who acts with the people and who invades the community.”
Given this, how well do Pacific faith-based broadcasters serve their communities’ expressive and
informational needs?
Pacific religious broadcasting
Pacific faith-based broadcasters can be categorised into three groups: NRGs affiliated with
international broadcasting partners, such as Seventh-Day Adventist (SDA) or the Trinity
Broadcasting Network (TBN), small independent NRGs, such as Laef FM and United Christian
Broadcasters Pacific Partners, and the Catholic Church. All but Radio BOSCO place evangelism at
the heart of their broadcasting work. Several are affiliated with television stations.
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Table 8.2 Faith-based radio broadcasters in select PICs, 2013
Radio station Year Owner/Description
Fiji Radio Light 104 FM 1996 Pacific Islands Christian Network consists of three stations
Radio Naya Jiwan FM 94.6 2003 broadcasting in three languages. Fiji’s oldest gospel radio
Nai Talai FM 103.4 (online stations. Founded by Evangelical Bible Mission Fiji, an
only post-2013 cyclone) affiliate of the US EBM International.
Harvest Radio 89.8 FM 2000 Christian Mission Fellowship International (US and Australia).
A complementary TV station, Trinity FM, was established
2002. Together they are known as World Harvest Broadcast
Network. Based in Suva.
Hope FM 2004 Seventh Day Adventist. Affiliated TV station. Contemporary
97.6 Greater Suva, Christian music in Western, Indian and Fijian varieties, and
107 FM in Western local programming. Based in near Suva. Affiliate of HCJB
Division International.
Kiribati Heart FM 2004 St Paul’s Communication Centre, Diocese of Tarawa.
87.7 FM License issued in 2004. Reported launch date June 2011.
Samoa Radio Graceland 2001 Graceland Broadcasting Network, US. Affiliated TV station.
90 FM (Apia)
94.9 FM (Savai’I)
Aiga Fesilafai Radio Pre-2005 The Catholic Church in Samoa. Based in Apia.
90.5 FM
Youth for Christ -- No further information. Listed in government documents
2011.
Laufou ole Talalelei -- No further information. Listed in government documents
2011.
Showers of Blessings -- Showers of Blessings Church. Studios in Pago Pago,
97.5 FM and 89.9 American Samoa, and in Apia, Samoa. Affiliate of HCJB
International.
EFKS Television and May Ekalesia Fa’apotopotoga Kerisiano Samoa (The
Radio Broadcasting 2013 Congregational Christian Church of Samoa). Combined
TV/radio services. Based in Apia.
Solomons Gud Nius Radio 2004 United Christian Broadcasters Pacific Partners. Registered in
88 FM US, offices in New Zealand. Off-air from September
2011–January 2013 due to technical and financial difficulties.
Based in Honiara. Affiliate of HCJB International.
Radio BOSCO 2005- Salesians of Don Bosco. Based in semi-rural Guadalcanal
89.9 FM 2010. Province.
Tonga Letio Faka-Kalisitiane 1993 United Christian Broadcasters Pacific Partners. Based in
93.1 FM Nuku’alofa. Affiliate of HCJB International.
Vanuatu Radio Laef 2003 Vanuatu Christian Broadcasting Network and US-based
90 FM Trinity Broadcasting Network. Based in Port Vila.
Noticeably absent from Table 9.2 are mainline Protestant churches (Samoa’s Congregational
Church being the exception), the LDS, and, in Fiji, Hindu and Muslim religious groups. Field
interviews suggest that the LDS Church prefers face-to-face evangelism, while Fiji’s Hindu and
Muslim communities are too preoccupied with charity work to consider a broadcasting presence
(“Rick,” missionary, personal communication, 31 Jan. 2012; “Lateefa,” radio volunteer, personal
communication, 12 Feb. 2011). Some international donors support Pacific “radio ministries” to
directly confront the rapid growth of NRGs, specifically the LDS and SDA, as they are seen as
“people who think they are Christians but really aren’t” (Operation World, 2013; Tarico, 2010).
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On both sides of the funding relationship, donors and community broadcasters clearly state their
objectives. The Pacific’s newest faith-based broadcaster, the Ekalesia Fa’apotopotoga Kerisiano
Samoa (EFKS) or the Congregational Christian Church Samoa, sought funding for its US$1.1
million television and radio network from the contemporary embodiment of the colonial London
Missionary Society, now known as the Council for World Mission (Tupufia, 2013a). Church
officials noted that present-day relationships with the former colonial church were strictly for
seeking “monetary and other forms of aid” (Ekalesia Fa’apotopotoga Kerisiano Samoa, 2012). The
ability to successful engage with rent-seeking behaviour was seen as an expression of the church’s
“own strength.” The new stations launched in February 2013 and can reach about 70 percent of the
country (Tupufia, 2013a). On the other side, international missionary media-support organisations,
such as HCJB Global and Operation World, stated that the primary role of faith-based media was to
evangelise, which they construed to be an integral part of “nation strengthening” and was necessary
to “redeem” certain aspects of Pacific culture (Johnson, 2013; Kurtenbach & Goerzen, 2013;
Operation World, 2013).
Samoa contains the largest number of faith-based media outlets in the region, which is not
surprising given that Samoa has one of the highest rates of denominational diversity (US Bureau of
Democracy Human Rights and Labor, 2011). The newest entrants into Samoa’s religious media
sector are all television stations: the aforementioned EFKS, the Samoan Catholic Church
(established 2011), and the Showers of Blessings’ Kingdom TV (established 2009) (Faletoi, 2009;
Huch, 2012; Radio New Zealand International, 2011b). In American Samoa, K11UU-D, established
2004, claims to be the only free-to-air Baha’i faith television station in the world (LinkedIn, n.d.).
Religious television programming is available through subscription satellite services in most PICs;
the US-based TBN is the dominant content provider.
When the PICs deregulated their media sectors in the 1980s-1990s, religious broadcasters were
often the first entrants. In 1986, the New Zealand-based United Christian Broadcasters Pacific
Partners (or Pacific Partners) began lobbying for regulatory reform in Tonga to allow for private
media ownership; its Letio Faka-Kalisitiane FM claims to be the first Christian radio station in the
Pacific (UCB Pacific Partners, 2012). Radio Laef FM was the first non-government broadcaster in
Vanuatu. As mentioned, Radio BOSCO was the first community radio station in the Solomons. In
Kiribati, the Catholic Church’s Heart FM claims to be the first licensed community radio station in
the country, although the AusAID-funded Kiritimati Radio 93.5 FM was established in 1988 on
Christmas Island (Dagron, 2001:192-195).
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In addition, all Pacific national broadcasters provide airtime to churches and religious groups, often
for a fee. This is an attractive option for smaller churches. The Solomon Islands Broadcasting
Corporation opened its airwaves to “minority church reports” in 2003 (“Elias,” radio staff, personal
communication, 25 Feb. 2011) and (Molnar, 2005:1). In Samoa, participating churches must be a
member of the National Council of Churches, which includes at least two NRGs (Pagaialii,
2004:276; World Council of Churches, 2006). Fiji’s national broadcaster offers free airtime for
Christian, Hindu and Islamic “devotional” programming (“Aasha,” radio staff, personal
communication, 2 Feb. 2011). Fiji’s military government used its public-emergency regulations in
2009 to banned the controversial New Methodist Church from all media outlets, calling it a security
risk due to its aggressive evangelism targeted at non-Christians (McGeough, 2009).
International linkages
The nature and size of the Pacific’s faith-based media sector has surprisingly been a point of
contention within the community media sector overall. In international discourses, views are
divided on whether church-owned media can be considered “community” radio given concerns
about the nature of their ownership and management (Fraser & Restrepo-Estrada, 2001:49, 61, 66;
2002:70; P. M. Lewis, 2008:13, 20; Siemering, 2007b:2; Siemering & Fairbairn, 2006:7-8).
It’s a completely different thing. When it’s evangelical and it’s all just “preach,
preach, preach” and it’s got this hypnotic tone to it, that for me is terrifying. I get
terrified because I just see people, they just sort of get brain-washed. ... But if it’s
truly a community radio, [it comes from] where the people are coming from. Now,
it’s just hearing a whole lot of Americans on the radio (“Vicky,” CSO representative,
personal communication, 31 Jan. 2011).
“Vicky’s” comments accurately describe the penetration of the TBN into the Pacific religious
media space. The widespread presence of TBN in the Pacific revisits concerns raised in the 1980s
in the New World Information and Communication Order debates pertaining to the global
dominance of Western-derived media programming (P. Lewis, 1993:16). Such international
programming rarely encourages listeners to participate in their community churches, nor does its
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one-size-fits-all orientation adapt to localised cultural conditions (Carter, 2012b; Fore, 1993:62;
Goethals, 1993:50). Without a local connection, syndicated religious programming has little
relevance or effect (Gaddy, 1984; Horsfield, 1982; Schramm, 1961:178; Woods, n.d.). But TBN
affiliation provides Pacific faith-based broadcasters with funding, equipment and technical training
opportunities, thus it offers a rent source to be exploited by communities otherwise too small to
support a local radio station (Seventh-Day Adventist Church Fiji Mission, 2011).
The TBN, with its “prosperity gospel” orientation and annual revenue in excess of US$170 million,
is the world’s largest religious broadcasting organisation with a presence in about 75 countries,
including Fiji, Samoa, Solomons, Tonga and Vanuatu (Trinity Broadcasting Network, 2012a,
2012b). It frequently provides broadcasting equipment and training to affiliate stations in return for
guaranteed airtime for its programming. Pacific TBN affiliates include Tonga’s Doulos
Broadcasting Network (television only), the Vanuatu Christian Broadcasting Network (TV/radio),
Fiji’s World Harvest Broadcast Network (TV/radio), and the former Graceland Broadcasting
Network (TV/radio) in Samoa. A lawsuit between TBN and Graceland Broadcasting over TBN’s
objections to the sale of the Samoan facilities to another Christian broadcaster effectively
bankrupted Graceland (The Supreme Court of Samoa, 2011). Under its agreement with TBN,
Graceland had been required to fill half of its broadcast schedule with TBN content. In Tonga,
Doulos Broadcasting Network fills 70 percent of its airtime with TBN content (Doulos
Broadcasting Network, 2012). Tonga’s other privately owned television network, Oceania
Broadcasting Network (OBN), began as a TBN affiliate and remains closely associated with the
local Takaikolo Christian Fellowship, a breakaway group from the Free Wesleyan Church. OBN’s
programming diversified into secular content after it dropped its TBN affiliation, but it still carries
significant amounts of US and local religious programming.
Also present in the Pacific is the international Adventist World Radio (AWR) network, which is
administered from Sydney. Its Asia and Pacific service broadcasts from studios on Guam, which
received a transmission-system upgrade in early 2013. Worldwide, AWR operates 425 radio
stations, partners with 1,600 other broadcasters, and claims to reach 70 percent of the world’s
population (Adventist Media Network 2012a; Adventist World Radio, 2010:9). Its affiliated Pacific
broadcaster is Fiji’s Hope FM. At its launch in 2003, Hope FM aspired to become the largest
producer of local news in the country by drawing on its church membership, which included several
well-known media professionals, to produce 22 local news bulletins daily (Stacey, 2003). Broadcast
content is mostly Christian music (Western, South Asian and Fijian styles) and religious shows but
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some programming is locally derived, interview based, and in local vernacular (Tan, 2008). This
has included local programming around the MDGs pertaining to health and women’s security. Hope
FM delivers weekly targeted programming to inmates in Fiji’s Naboro prison, as does the
Pentecostal broadcaster, Harvest FM, the latter of which donated fixed-tuned solar-powered radio
units in 2008 for use by the prisoners (HCJB Global, n.d.). Hope FM was assisted in its early years
by Harvest FM, which shared its broadcast tower, thus indicating an ecumenical camaraderie exists
among some faith-based broadcasters. Hope FM’s sister television station, the Hope Channel, was
required to carry 20 percent local programming as part of its broadcast license (Stacey, 2004).
Several Pacific radio broadcasters – Showers of Blessings in Samoa, UCB Pacific Partner’s two
stations, and Radio Light FM and its sister stations in Fiji – are affiliated with HCJB Global. Since
1992, this US-based missionary organisation has “planted” 400 radio stations in 100 countries
(HCJB Global, 2012a, 2012b). HCJB Global provides broadcasting equipment and production and
technical training, although evidence of monetary infusions to support station administration was
not found. HCJB Global does maintain its relationships with its seeded stations, however, and
assists them in recovering from natural disasters. Radio Light FM, one HCJB Global affiliate in Fiji,
was founded by an American missionary from the US-based Evangelical Bible Mission
International. Station content is primarily Christian music interspersed with Bible teachings and
short programs, which appear to be interview based and locally produced. Radio Light FM is one of
three radio stations in the Pacific Islands Christian Network; each broadcasts in one of Fiji’s three
main languages. In December 2012, Cyclone Evan destroyed half of Pacific Islands Christian
Network’s transmission system, meaning its Fijian language radio station, Nai Talai FM, has
shifted to broadcasting as an online radio station (Kurtenbach & Goerzen, 2013).
United Christian Broadcasters Pacific Partners, a small network with two stations in Tonga and
Solomons, is also a HCJB Global affiliate. Pacific Partners is registered as a tax-exempt
organisation in the US, but is administered from offices in Auckland by its New Zealand founder. It
aims to provide a “Christian radio for every Pacific islander” (UCB Pacific Partners, 2012). Pacific
Partners builds small urban radio stations, employs up to four local staff to run each station, and
trains volunteers to provide extensive in-home Bible studies with radio listeners. Its Tonga station,
Letio Faka-Kalisitiane FM, has about 15 staff. Its Honiara station, Gud Nius FM, which features a
broadcast relay in Gizo, Western Province, attracted 19 percent audience share in a 2010
nationwide survey (Tebbutt Research, 2010:118). Broadcast content is primarily Christian music
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and vernacular Bible teachings with a focus on creating culturally appropriate local programming
that is used to support talanoa evangelism (Carter, 2012b).
Pacific Partners provides technical support and training, but not financial assistance, to The Change
104 FM in the Marshall Islands and Laef FM in Vanuatu. Laef FM is part of the Vanuatu Christian
Broadcasting Network, established in 2003 by ni-Vanuatu minister Jim Moli James and his wife
Jenny, both affiliated with the Apostolic Life Ministry in Port Vila. The network offers both
television and radio services and is affiliated with both TBN and HCJB Global (Vanuatu Christian
Broadcasting Network, 2006).
Technology innovators
Many Pacific faith-based broadcaster “enthusiastically embrace” media technology, thus reflecting
the NRG’s propensity toward presenting themselves as modern, innovative and technologically
savvy (Adventist Media Network 2012a:2). As mentioned, cyclone damage forced Fiji’s Nai Talai
FM to reinvent itself as an online broadcaster. Hope FM uses text-messaging to deliver daily Bible
verses (Tan, 2008). Nearly all radio stations associated with large churches, such as Radio Light FM
and Harvest FM in Fiji, have busy FaceBook pages and corporate-style web sites, many of which
feature downloadable podcasts and streamed local and internationally produced audio and video
content (Christian Mission Fellowship International Fiji, 2009). The SDA uses “Godpods,” or small
solar-powered digital-audio players, for its Bible study classes in some Pacific countries (It Is
Written, 2012; Kellner, 2006). The SDA’s South Pacific division owns its own music label, offers
regional satellite broadcasting services, features simultaneous webcasts and radio broadcasts of
church events, provides a plethora of online resources, and even hosts an online church in the
Second Life virtual world (Adventist Media Network 2012a). Thus, some Pacific faith-based
broadcasters diffuse new technology into their communities and in limited cases, provide
opportunities for Pacific voices to contribute to the international Christian movement.74
But how relevant to islanders is such programming, with its thick proselytising content often
imbued with American interpretations of scripture? Joys Eggins’ (2005:11; 2007:117) research into
74
Harvest FM’s mother church, Christian Mission Fellowship International Fiji, describes itself as a worldwide ministry. The
church engages in extensive international missionary work. Three affiliated churches exist in Australia with evidence indicating they
serve diaspora Fijian communities (Christian Mission Fellowship International Fiji, 2012; Ryle, 2010:139).
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faith-based broadcasting in Papua New Guinea found religious broadcasters do contribute to
community development regardless of their foreign ownership or use of imported programming.
Her research indicated that the “moralistic” component of the broadcasters’ content was “attractive”
to surveyed listeners, 97 percent of whom were regular church-goers (Eggins, 2007:122). Ninety-
one percent of surveyed villagers listened both stations (one was Baptist, the other Catholic). Less
than 5 percent of the broadcasters’ programming could be considered development oriented, such as
pertaining to education, agriculture or health. Eggins concluded that the stations’ popularity was
based on the provision, however small, of development-oriented information that spoke to the
villagers’ daily lives and which was absent from commercial and government-affiliated
broadcasting services. While Eggins surmised (2007:116-123) that religious broadcasters were not
community broadcasters in her definition, she found that they did fill an “invaluable” role in
community development.
Radio BOSCO’s singularity
Among the Pacific’s faith-based broadcasters, Radio BOSCO was found to be alone in its focus on
youth and community expression as opposed to strictly functioning as a church-based broadcaster.
It was not like really church radio. The people asked us to go more into this church
way, to do more programs with religion and religion songs…. One time Fr Ambrose
asked us to put the rosary on the radio, every night. Never done! (“Catherine,”
volunteer, personal communication, 24 Feb. 2011).
Station volunteers, about half a dozen men and women in their mid-20s from various communities
and churches, both Catholic and Protestant, had no formal training in radio production or
journalism. Instead, their content ideas came from “just what’s coming from the life” (“Catherine,”
radio volunteer, personal communication, 24 Feb. 2011). They used their family and social
networks to locate interesting villagers to interview around health, youth issues, local news, kastom
stories, and to provide local music. Church-centred programming was limited to Sundays and was
not a high priority (“Lionel,” radio volunteer, personal communication, 2 March 2011). Unlike
programming on commercial radio stations in nearby Honiara, Radio BOSCO programs were
delivered in the local Tetere dialect. Radio BOSCO staff and volunteers also created a youth radio
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magazine and talkback show, Youth of Today, on the Solomons’ national broadcaster in 2006
(UNICEF-Pacific, 2007).
But when Radio BOSCO’s generator failed, neither the local parish nor community listeners felt
responsible to pay for its repairs.
The radio is just planned by Fr Ambrose and the youth within the parish. … Some
other leaders from the parish, they don’t really understand what is work of the radio
and what the radio do. They don’t have plan. So when it’s time to breakdown, then
people don’t have ideas (“Lionel,”radio volunteer, personal communication, 2
March 2011).
Curiously, there appeared to be no overlap between Radio BOSCO and the media-education
seminars Fr Ambrose was conducting separately for youth from the greater Honiara area. One
explanation could be that Radio BOSCO served as a point of expression for nine specific
communities, while media-seminar students came from many other communities.
Communication theology
The value of dialogic communication in religious and socio-economic development is not always
self-apparent. Most churches, in the Pacific and internationally, still view media as one-way
messaging channels. In this way, Pacific churches reflect the orientation of their governments.
Religious media analyst Jim McDonnell (1993:91) queries why churches have traditionally
advanced education as a means of affecting social change, as they have tremendously in the Pacific,
but have failed to engage with communication media to achieve similar goals. Churches, both
mainline and NRGs, have failed to consider if communication processes, such as dialogue, have
theological value and, similarly, if there are theological consequences to using mass media, such as
televised sermons that offer little interactivity (Gaddy, 1984; Horsfield, 1982:289; Soukup,
2002:14; 2011:5).
Since the 1960s with the rise of Liberation Theology and the Second Vatican Council, both
Protestant and Catholic church leaders have been entangled in the “unavoidable dialogue” about the
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relationship among mass media, cultural change, and theology (Eilers, 2005:2; Hoover, 1997:1;
Palakeel, 2011:9-10; Plude, 2011:5; Ruiz, 2011:1). Mass media, in particular television, challenge
religion’s role in setting societal values and beliefs. Historically, churches approached mass media
in two ways: as information-dissemination channels to be used or as content-carriers to be critiqued
and possibly censored (Arthur, 1993a:2; Soukup, 2002:6). Film censorship still occurs in the PICs.
Within discourses around communication theology, churches are encouraged to rethink how they
use their media and to assume a “stewardship” role wherein they provide media for community-
based dialogue, especially for poor and marginalised people (Fore, 1987:8; National Council of
Churches, 1995:3, 8-11; Palakeel, 2011:1, 6, 9; Plude, 1995:6-9; 2011:2). This is the application
Radio BOSCO attempted to follow. The first step in this process is for churches to “democratise”
their own media and open them to community expressions of Christian faith (Arthur, 1993b:284;
Forrester, 1993:85). To be able to do this, clergy themselves need to learn how to engage with
media to advance dialogic communication and not merely use media to “package and sell” religious
programming (Forrester, 1993:75). There is an urgent need to include media and communication
studies in clerical training (Arthur, 1993a:6, 285-286; Fore, 1993:63-64; Horsfield, 1982; Plude,
2011:3-4; Shegog, 1993:81-85; Soukup, 2005:6). However, of the Pacific’s two leading religious
training institutions, the Pacific Theological College and the Pacific Regional Seminary, only the
latter mentions media training, which is included as a subset in its pastoral training component (The
Pacific Regional Seminary, 2006:17). Without this understanding around community radio’s
potential to foster dialogic communication, the successive priests assigned to the Tetere parish
failed to see the value of Radio BOSCO, as did Fr Ambrose’s superiors in the larger church
hierarchy.
FINANCIAL AND ORGANISATIONAL SUSTAINABILITY
Introduction
In the international discourses about the role of FBOs in development work, such organisations
were theorised as having particular advantages: they were more stable, more culturally embedded,
and capable of engendering change at the local level. Given the Pacific’s rentier orientation, which
is clearly revealed within faith-based broadcasters, what has been their experience in engendering
development within their communities?
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Nearly all Pacific faith-based broadcasters survive on foreign funding derived from a mother church
located in the Global North or an international missionary organisation, such as HCJB Global
(HCJB Global, 2012a; Tan, 2008). Radio BOSCO appears to be the exception as field evidence
suggests no attention was given to building organisational or financial structure around the station
and, as mentioned, such support was not offered from within the church itself.
As with Radio BOSCO, Pacific broadcasters associated with the Catholic Church appear to be
financially constrained. The St Paul’s Catholic Centre in Tarawa, Kiribati, struggled for seven years
to raise funds to expand Heart FM (Kabwebwenibeia, 2011; Malone, 2011; Molnar, 2005:192-193).
Prior to its expansion in June 2011, Heart FM offered fortnightly 45-minute devotional programs
and Mass celebrations three Sundays a month. The St Paul’s Centre earns about AU$110 a month
though the sale of CDs and video recordings produced by its small media staff. This income is used
in part to pay for airtime on the Kiribati national broadcaster (Kabwebwenibeia, 2011). Similarly,
the Catholic Radio Network of Papua New Guinea established at least eight radio stations in 2002-
2003. However, high costs associated with maintaining the satellite-linked network compounded by
lack of sustainable financial and human resources led to the network being assumed by the Vatican-
based World Family of Radio Maria in 2006 (The Voice of Peter ToRot of Papua New Guinea,
n.d.). In 2012, the PNG Radio Maria network was still reliant on Vatican funding as monetary
donations from local communities amount to only 3 percent of annual operational costs (We-en,
2012).
The financial sustainability of Pacific Pentecostal broadcasters presents a mixed picture.
As mentioned, the US-based TBN frequently provides broadcasting equipment and training to
affiliated stations in return for guaranteed airtime for its programming. When Trinity Fiji, Harvest
FM’s sister television station, launched in 2002, press reports said the station was 100 percent
funding by TBN and would initially carry 100 percent TBN content until it could start its own
production efforts (Pacific Media Watch, 2002). But little evidence was found that TBN contributed
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direct financial support to the community radio stations it has seeded in Samoa, Tonga and
Vanuatu.
The smaller Pacific Partners network appears to have a fairly precarious financial situation. New
facilities for its Tonga station, Letio Faka-Kalisitiane FM, were needed in the aftermath of Cyclone
René in 2010; these were largely built from donated materials salvaged from a dismantled house in
New Zealand and shipped to Tonga, along with other small material and monetary donations from
the US and New Zealand (UCB Pacific Partners, 2012b). In Honiara, due to irregular electricity
service, Gud Nius FM was struggling to meet a US$600 a month diesel-fuel bill for its stand-by
generator (UCB Pacific Partners, 2011). In late 2011, the station learned that a third party had
“hacked” its electricity line, resulting in an unexpected SB$32,000 (US$4,000) utility bill (UCB
Pacific Partners, 2012, 2013). This pushed the station off the air until the bill could be paid. It took
17 months for station volunteers to raise the funds, primarily through food sales at the Honiara
market and fund-raising dinners. The station went back on air in early 2013, only to be
compromised by a faulty transmitter. In mid-2013, Gud Nius FM volunteers were seeking to raise
AB$11,000 (US$1,600) to pay for repairs; undisclosed financial assistance had been received from
HCJB Global (UCB Pacific Partners, 2013). The stories illustrate the dedication of Gud Nius FM’s
volunteers.
In December 2012, HCJB Global also assisted Radio Light FM and its sister stations in Fiji and
Showers of Blessings in Samoa recover from Cyclone Evan (Johnson, 2013; Kurtenbach &
Goerzen, 2013). The Fiji network lost two repeater towers valued as US$30,000 while the Samoan
station suffered US$15,000 in structural damage.
Thus, some Pacific faith-based broadcasters have been able to work their international social
networks to gain assistance in crisis times that otherwise they might not have found.
Samoa’s newest broadcaster, EFKS, took a different approach to financial sustainability: it created
a commercial broadcaster. Samoa’s broadcast regulations fail to provide differential licenses for
community broadcasters, thus all have commercial broadcast licenses, but EFKS officials said they
intended to create a family-oriented commercial broadcaster that provided drama, sports, news,
youth and health programs, and “missionary” programming (Tupufia, 2013a).
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Organisational sustainability
The greatest difference between Pacific faith-based and secular broadcasters is their organisational
vibrancy. Faith-based broadcasters have proven to be stable organisations, some more than 17 years
old, and have provided wage employment for dozens of islanders. For example, EKFS in Samoa
launched with a paid staff of seven. Hope FM in Fiji began in 2003 with one paid staff and at least
20 volunteers working in local program production; in 2013 it had five paid staff, two of whom
were on lower “volunteer” wages, and an unknown number of volunteers (Seventh-Day Adventist
Church Fiji Mission, 2011; Stacey, 2003). Radio Light FM and its sister stations have a combined
staff of about 11 (Pacific Islands Christian Network, 2013). Nearly all faith-based broadcasters are
led and staffed by indigenous islanders, although foreign missionaries founded many of the stations,
such as Radio Light FM, Pacific Partners’ two stations, and the former Radio Graceland in Samoa.
Radio BOSCO
Radio BOSCO was specifically created to provide channels for youth expression. Pacific youth face
significant obstacles in expressing their views, due in part to the culture of silence. A recent survey
of 900 youths in six PICs found their biggest issue was “the fear and reality of finding themselves
marginalised and voiceless” (Jayaweera & Morioka, 2008:10, 90). Pacific youth suffer the impacts
of modernisation more keenly than demographic groups, yet their voices are largely absent from
policy discussions and decision-making.
See, for me, the goal (for Radio BOSCO) is very different. I’m trying to get the
youngsters to believe, to get up confidence, and motivate them. And sometimes even
the ones up above [his superiors] will ask me, ‘well, what’s the purpose, we don’t see
anything’ (Fr Ambrose, radio administrator, personal communication, 1 March
2011).
Fr Ambrose’s affiliated media-literacy workshops did offer opportunities for youths to express their
views around development issues. In 2000 and prior to the establishment of Radio BOSCO, Fr
Ambrose initiated a regular series of media-education seminars, or residential weekend retreats for
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up to 50 youths from various secondary schools. Youths interact with local and visiting media
professionals to learn a diverse set of print and broadcasting production skills. In 2011-2012,
student-selected topics revealed an eagerness to address the most pressing issues of the day:
domestic violence, illicit drug use, climate change, peer pressure, waste management, logging, land
use, and pollution. In 2012, the seminars expanded (supplemented by UNDP funding) to include
tertiary-level students producing media products on environmental conservation. The seminars have
been a sustained success, but few of the student media projects appear to have been widely
broadcast or published.
The conduct of the media seminars reflects what religious media scholar William F. Fore (1987:12-
15) calls “revelation as communication.” As such, religious faith can be revealed and expressed in
communication processes between people and within communities that occur separate and distinct
from conventional worship practices and places. But within Radio BOSCO’s case study, the strong
emphasis placed facilitating the dialogic aspects of youth expression meant that Radio BOSCO’s
organisational-sustainability issues were neglected. The planned partnership with the Gold Ridge
gold mine most likely would have provided the necessary organisational and financial sustainability
to enable Radio BOSCO to continue, but the gold mine’s media personnel, just as the parish priests,
failed to recognise the dialogic potential of community media.
In this chapter, I have discussed and analysed the role of Pacific faith-based broadcasters within the
interface of development and culture. Despite differences of opinion within the Pacific community
radio sector around the appropriateness of the foreign-derived content that many faith-based
broadcasters use, these radio stations have grown to be viable channels for their communities’ faith
expression. They have been able to successfully negotiate within asymmetrical relationships with
international missionary organisations and global churches to create and sustain radio stations that
they otherwise could not have established from within their local resources. These stations do
broadcast a substantial amount of relevant local programming. Faith-based broadcasters are
marginalised in nearly all of the Pacific’s media-development initiatives, such as the Secretariat of
the Pacific Community’s media-training courses, the regional Pacific Islands News Association,
national professional media organisations, and AusAID-funded projects like SOLMAS (Solomon
Islands Media Assistance Scheme). There is no evidence that secular development actors, such as
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AusAID, have given any attention to the development potential offered by the faith-based
broadcasters, thus reflecting the entrenched secular orientation of the international donor
community.
In many ways, the Pacific Pentecostal faith is evolving into a powerful driver of social change. The
historical alliances between mainline churches and their governments are weakening under pressure
from the NRGs, although not without resistance from the mainline churches. I agree with
Jacqueline Ryle’s (2010:140) view that these NRGs reflect the dynamics of continuity and change,
of modernity and kastom. Pacific mainline churches emphasise the continuance of kastom through
traditional obligations to community, chief and church, which can lead to rising levels of hardship
and poverty. Pentecostalism, however, evokes a more oceanic fluidity in that it embraces a global
social network around a common view that one’s relationship to God is expressed through
reciprocal interpersonal relationships that seek to address the challenges of globalisation (Ryle,
2010:143, 151-152). Thus, Pentecostalism is highly compatible with Pacific cultural sensibilities.
Ryles (2010:143) also contends that small poor countries like Fiji can assume a dignified place in
the global community through the sharing, or exportation, of their deep Christian faith. For
example, Harvest FM’s mother church, the Christian Mission Fellowship International Fiji, engages
in extensive international missionary work and many Pacific churches send missionaries within the
Pacific region.
Pacific faith-based broadcasters, by definition, serve “communities of interest,” not geographically

defined communities, which is frequently how the international donor community envisages
community radio in the Pacific context. Many international donors establish “community” radio
stations to drive their own development agendas; nearly all collapse within a few years. In contrast,
many faith-based radio stations have achieved greater levels of social, organisational and financial
sustainability than secular community radio stations. Faith-based broadcasters were the first
entrants when the PIC’s opened their media markets in the 1980s and 1990s. Some faith-based
broadcasters are 20 years old and many provide stable employment. I contend they do authentically
articulate the views of their “communities of interest” within islander-defined and faith-informed
development models. As Joys Eggins’ (2005, 2007) research confirmed, faith-based broadcasters
are often the only ones to speak to their communities’ needs.
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As Radio BOSCO exemplified, understandings of communication theology are not deeply
embedded in Pacific clergy who still view media as one-way messaging channels, if they consider
them at all. Radio BOSCO represents a missed opportunity: neither its church hierarchy nor its
private sector partner understood the dialogical potential of community radio in advancing faith and
development, thus both failed to support its organisational and financial sustainability.
In the next chapter, I turn to the last of the three traditional Pacific sources of development, the
chief, as now embodied by the government, to investigate the state of Pacific public-service
broadcasting and the role of community radio within it.
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Chapter 9
Radio for all75
Niua FM: Pacific public-service broadcasting
Most afternoons, Niuatoputapu resident Emele, age 83, homebound and in the early stages of
dementia, could be found sitting on her front veranda. She would gaze down the empty coral lane,
waiting for someone to pass by so she could call out a greeting. One afternoon, Emele’s husband
emerged from the cool of the house carrying a radio. He dialled in Radio Tonga, the national
broadcaster, which had begun broadcasting on an upgraded AM signal just weeks before. A
cheerful island tune began to play and Emele smiled with delight. She gently swayed to the music,
silently clapping her small hands, and softly humming. I was moved by the poignancy of the
moment, by the depth of her isolation and loneliness, and how something so simple as a song on the
radio could bring such sweet relief to deep rural Pacific people.
Introduction
Modern Pacific islanders often view to their governments as if they were paramount chiefs, or
traditional sources of wealth leading to development. Some government officials complain that
communities see the government as the answer to their problems and seek assistance in a range of
areas including financial support for CSOs, businesses, churches, communities and even individual
families (Tonga Ministry of Finance and Central Planning Department, 2008:20-21; Watkins,
2012a:16).
Given the development constraints facing rural communities – lack of electricity, technical support,
training opportunities, income generation – it is not surprising that they seek assistance from their
governments to sustain community radio stations. Donors agree and have funded several
75
“Kainga,” engineer, describing Niua FM once it is under government sponsorship, personal communication, 13 Jan. 2012.
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“community” broadcasters in association with governments in the Solomons and Vanuatu. This is a
rational strategy as information deprivation is a cause of poverty (A. Singer, 2008:149; Slater &
Tacchi, 2004:58). Rural islanders are information poor and media starved (Molnar, 2005:11). In the
Pacific, poverty, especially for rural women, has much more to do with access to information,
communication, participation and empowerment than with basic needs (Barr, 2003:2; Haley,
2008:3; Rahman & Naz, 2006:339; Rajivan, et al., 2010:25). Many islanders, like Emele, still live
at the fringes of a media-saturated world.
In this chapter, I explore the role of government affiliation with community radio. Throughout the
Pacific, state-owned national broadcasters are valued for their ability to delivery emergency
weather information and other vital “life and death” news to remote islanders. But how well do they
serve the information and expressive needs of rural communities? How do they engage with rural
islanders? How relevant is their programming? What obstacles do national broadcasters face in
fulfilling their missions around nation-building and invigorating a national dialogue that includes
rural voices? Is there a role in this for community radio?
Pacific national broadcasters have not evolved into true public-service broadcasters based upon
international standards. As I will discuss, national broadcasters throughout the region suffer from
crippling levels of political interference and financial insecurity that impact on their ability to serve
rural islanders. National broadcasters in small countries with under-developed economies are
seldom able to evolve into PSBs due to their heavy reliance on state funding and the resulting
political interference (Jõesaar, 2011). Poorer countries have higher rates of state ownership of PSBs
(Islam, et al., 2002:155).
Given this, since the late 2000s, the international development community has been working to
“reform” Pacific national broadcasters within “good governance” agendas pertaining to state-owned
enterprises (SOE), or entities created by the state to engage in commercial services. Some of these
reforms provide promising opportunities for community radio stations to position themselves within
sustainable financial streams while providing essential development-oriented programming.
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BACKGROUND CONTEXT: NATIONAL BROADCASTERS IN THEORY AND PACIFIC PRAXIS
Introduction
Community radio and national public-service broadcasters (PSBs) are positioned within similar
theoretical models, the greatest differences often being in the nature of their ownership and
broadcast coverage. All PICs have a publicly owned national broadcaster, but none has evolved into
a public-service broadcaster as defined by international standards pertaining to independence from
political interference and market forces, and the capacity to provide nationwide broadcast coverage
(Asian Media Information and Communication Centre, 2005:14; Price & Raboy, 2001:5, 20, 40; E.
Smith, 2012:10; World Radio and Television Council, 2000:4). Pacific national broadcasters
entered the 21st Century without adequate regulatory protection to ensure their political, economic
or technical survival within a deregulated media landscape. This section discusses the state of
Pacific national broadcasters, the challenges they face serving rural islanders like Niuatoputapuans,
and why emerging trends intended to “reform” national broadcasters can help strengthen
community broadcasters like Niua FM.
Public-service broadcasting theory
The concept of public-service broadcasting as first articulated by the BBC’s first director-general
Sir John Reith in 1922 – that of informing, educating and entertaining – is the predominant model
in the PICs under study (M. Armstrong, 2005:281; Mendel & Salomon, 2011:46; Moe, 2011:59-60)
and (“Aasha,” radio staff, personal communication, 2 Feb. 2011; “Mikeli,” radio staff, personal
Theoretically, public-service media occupy a middle ground between commercial and national
broadcasters based upon assumptions that neither the market (driven by commercial imperatives)
nor the state (driven by political objectives) can serve the public interest (Asia-Pacific Institute for
Broadcasting Development, 2009; Asian Media Information and Communication Centre, 2005:14;
Cowling & Tambini, 2002:4; Joseph, 2005:19, 28; Price & Raboy, 2001:1; E. Smith, 2012:4, 10).
Thus, community radio is positioned within public-service broadcasting. Public-service
broadcasting has been described as a “merit good” comparable to a village green (a rara in Fijian)
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where all citizens can gather, hear and discuss the issues affecting their lives (Cregan, 2008:3; Moe,
2011:61-62). At its best, PSB engages people in their role as citizens in the larger political process,
both as receivers of relevant information and as participants in a community-level or national
dialogue, often through talkback shows or program creation involving civil society groups (Asian
Media Information and Communication Centre, 2005:87; Coleman, 2002:89; Cowling & Tambini,
2002:19-20; Jakubowicz, Berry, & Gwynne, 2007:17; Joseph, 2005:13, 23; E. Smith, 2012:57).
Given the narrow profit orientation of commercial media, the diversity of broadcasting content
needs to be “engineered” through policies such as “must carry” obligations placed on all media
outlets (Gardam, et al., 2008:12). These “must carry’ obligations are being redefined as
“community service obligations” with the SOE reform movement, as I will discuss.
Many PICs lack policies that would oblige commercial broadcasters to carry public-service
programming, thus commercial broadcasters focus on profitable urban markets that can be satisfied
with inexpensive entertainment formats delivered by low-cost FM transmission; they pay little
attention to unprofitable rural audiences (M. Armstrong, 2005:281; Asian Media Information and
Communication Centre, 2005:11; Mendel, 2011:3; Steemers, 2002:3-4). Commercial broadcasters
are often reluctant to assume “must carry” obligations – one reason is that quality PSB
programming can be expensive to produce – but well-designed regulations will compel commercial
broadcasters to produce such programming and market competition will ensure they do it well
(Jakubowicz, et al., 2007:21; McKinsey & Company & British Broadcasting Corporation, 1999:20).
“Must carry” regulations are particularly important in near-monopoly broadcasting situations, such
as those found in smaller PICs such as Nauru and Kiribati (Asian Media Information and
Communication Centre, 2005:82; Hargrave & Shaw, 2009:31). Only in Fiji and Samoa do
broadcasting regulations contain explicit PSB “must-carry” requirements (Government of Fiji,
2010; Samoa Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, 2005a:7). In Tonga, radio
broadcasters are required to devote 15 percent of their air time to public-service programming but
this requirement is not made explicit in the country’s licensing laws (“Kainga,” engineer, personal
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“The invisible hand of control”
The paradox facing Pacific national broadcasters, as found elsewhere in the world, is to receive
state funding and be held accountable for it, yet remain free from undesirable political control.
Well-crafted regulations are the key to ensuring that PSBs operate at “arm’s length” from their
governments and within clearly defined service remits (Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting
Development, 2009; Asian Media Information and Communication Centre, 2005:32, 51, 73;
Hargrave & Shaw, 2009:57; Islam, et al., 2002:7, 59, 199; Mendel, 2005:2, 4; 2011:13; Price &
Raboy, 2001:6, 13; E. Smith, 2012:7, 41-46).
But telecommunication sector reforms in the 2000s weakened or erased broadcasting regulations
throughout the Pacific region. Foundation legislation establishing the service remits of Pacific
national broadcasters was enacted decades ago: in Kiribati in 1979, Fiji 1953, Nauru 1974, Samoa
1959, Solomons 1976, Tonga 1989, Vanuatu 1992. Often regulations were last amended in the
1980s-1990s to remove the broadcaster’s monopoly status.
Pacific governments still hold colonial views around the role of national broadcasters, often
reducing them to mouthpieces for the government rather than impartial sources of news and
information (Mendel, 2011:3; Price & Raboy, 2001:2).
That is the understanding: 'We (the government) granted that license and you’d
better, you know, listen to us' (“Peter,” radio staff, personal communication, 4 Feb.
2011).
This tendency by Pacific governments to impose an “invisible hand of control” upon their national
broadcasters has created a chilling effect wherein development or political CSOs are reluctant to
use the services of national broadcasters for fear of perceived censorship even though such
decisions impoverish the national dialogue (K. R. Lewis, 2011:63-64; Vois Blong Yumi, 2006:3-4).
Journalists within national broadcasters often engage in self-censorship to protect their jobs and to
uphold cultural traditions of respecting and obeying elders (Korauaba, 2007b:30; Vois Blong Yumi,
2006:3-4). In small media markets such as Nauru and Kiribati where the national broadcaster is the
275
largest or only media provider, political interference in station operations, including its broadcast
programming, can significantly obstruct their citizens’ right to information.
A review of legislation in the case study countries found no regulations that specifically protected
broadcasters from political interference. On the contrary, in most countries, such as Kiribati, Fiji,
Solomons, and Tonga, the prime minister or responsible minister can, and frequently does, direct or
prohibit broadcasting content. In Fiji, Kiribati, Solomons, Tonga and Vanuatu, the prime minister or
relevant minister appoints members to the national-broadcaster governing boards. At times, the
rapidly changing composition of broadcast governing boards can have a destabilising effect. In
Vanuatu, the prime minister changed the national broadcaster’s governing board three times in
2011; station employees felt threatened and vigilantly engaged in self-censorship to protect their
jobs (Vois Blong Yumi, 2006:3-4). In Kiribati and Nauru, the office of the prime minister or
president pre-approves all government-generated media materials. Table 9.1 describes each national
broadcaster’s relevant legislation, service remit, network and coverage details, and relevant content
codes.
Denying opposition voices access to national broadcasters is the most common form of political
interference and has been well documented around the region: Kiribati (Korauaba, 2007, 2007b,
2012); Nauru (Dorney, 2004; Rigamoto, Ivarature, & Buresova, 2010:27; Sennitt, 2010b; United
Nations Development Programme-Pacific Centre, 2009a:3); Samoa (Beales, 2005; Committee to
Protect Journalists, 2001; Molnar, 2005:291; Nadkarni, 2007; Sennitt, 2008); Tonga (N. Fifita,
2010; Moala, 2008, 2010; S. Singh, 2005:51-52; S. Singh & Prakash, 2006:72-76; Vikilani, 2010);
and Vanuatu (AusAID, 2011:5; Ligo, 2010; Path, 2011; Vois Blong Yumi, 2006, 2011).
Pacific governments are often the largest advertisers in their small media markets, thus they can
exert political pressure even on commercial media outlets to present pro-government programming
and deny access to opposition voices. In Kiribati, the government has frequently withheld or shifted
its advertising funds punitively among media outlets (Korauaba, 2007:40). During Tonga’s 2008
elections where pro-democracy candidates were challenging the king’s authority, King George
Tupou V used his personal network to convince private media owners to bar these candidates from
the airwaves (Vikilani, 2010:215-216).
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277
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The financial impacts of deregulation
Deregulation of the Pacific media sector in the 1980s-1990s hit national broadcasters particularly
hard. After decades of privileged, albeit paternalistic, treatment by their colonial and post-
colonials governments – one veteran broadcaster recalled an era when “money fell out of the
sky” – many national broadcasters were stunned by the financial hardship imposed by
corporatisation where broadcasters now have to “fend for ourselves” in competitive markets
without relief from government-mandated service requirements (“Rohit,” radio staff, personal
communication, 28 Jan. 2011; “Aasha,” radio staff, personal communication, 2 Feb. 2011;
“Vanessa,” radio staff, personal communication, 1 Feb. 2011).
Within the seven case study countries, five of the national broadcasters have been “corporatised”
into semi-commercial entities. Only two, Radio Nauru and Samoa’s 2AP, remain within
government departments. All heavily rely (directly or indirectly) on government subsidies that
are supplemented by advertising revenue and the sale of airtime to government agencies, CSOs
and other users. This model, which Marc Raboy (2002:5) calls a hybrid “state-core system,”
offers the worst of both worlds. The receipt of state funds opens national broadcasters to political
manipulation while the constant pressure to compete in small advertising markets with
commercial broadcasters further diminishing their capability to reach and interact with rural
audiences, especially given the higher costs of transmitting on the AM frequencies and limited, if
any, funding for rural news-gathering efforts (Gordon-Smith, 2002:102; McKinsey & Company
& British Broadcasting Corporation, 1999:5, 29, 32; Mendel, 2011:4-5; Mendel & Salomon,
2011:7, 18, 49; Price & Raboy, 2001:10) and (“Aasha,” radio staff, personal communication, 2
Feb. 2011). The sale of airtime to government ministries is the largest revenue source for the
national broadcasters under study. This provides an entry point for community broadcasters
within the SOE reform movement, as I will discuss.
Government subsidies to the national broadcasters under study range from about 20 percent in the
Solomons, to roughly 25 percent in Samoa, to 80 percent in Nauru. Government funding can vary
greatly from year to year. In early 2007, the Solomons Islands Government cancelled its subsidy
to SIBC just weeks after allocating it, causing significant organisational disarray (Sennitt,
2007b). Funding constraints were so tight in 2010 that SIBC cancelled its overnight BBC
rebroadcast service to save SB$90,000 (AU$12,800) per annum on electricity costs (Sennitt,
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2010c). Many broadcasters contend the government funding is never enough to cover their
mandates to serve rural audiences (“Rohit,” radio staff, personal communication, 2 Feb. 2011;
“Mikeli,” radio staff, personal communication, 2 Feb. 2011; “Elias,” radio staff, personal
communicationp 25 Feb. 2011).
One radio staff, “Aasha,” described the predicament facing Pacific national broadcasters:
We do the programs but they (the government) do the costing. It’s a big problem,
the government funding. We can’t work on that because that’s not enough. … So a
lot of times we are compromising the standard of programs because we are just
getting to them by telephones instead of going to the village, seeing the set-up, and
all those (things) where it makes a good program. … I think we’re in a dilemma
right now because the bottom line is the dollar. … Fiji business, they run our radio
stations. I mean, you give your accountability to the people who are funding you
(Personal communication, 2 Feb. 2011).
Some national broadcasters are mandated to return a set amount of revenue to the government:
Samoa’s 2AP returns S$571,200 (AU$234,102) per annum; the Nauru Media Bureau (the parent
agency of Radio Nauru) AU$50,000 per annum (Legislative Assembly of Samoa, 2009:42;
2010b:45; 2011:26; 2012:26; Molnar, 2005:197; Republic of Nauru, 2011:26, 29, 62).
Noteworthy is Samoa’s construction of a second AM radio station to be built on higher ground in
response to the same deadly 2009 tsunami that inundated Niua. The station is expected to launch
in late 2012.
Well-managed national broadcasters can be profitable. In Fiji in 2008, the first year the national
broadcaster, Fiji Broadcasting Corporation Ltd (FBCL), was under its new military government-
appointed general manager, the two PSB stations generated FJ$500,000 (AU$270,000) in profit,
more than the accumulated profits of the 10 previous years. In fourth quarter 2010 alone, Radio
Fiji One and Radio Fiji Two generated FJ$2.6 million (AU$1.45 million) in combined revenue.
Similarly, Kiribati’s Broadcasting and Publications Authority, Radio Kiribati’s parent
organisation, earns about AU$1 million in revenue annually (Kiribati National Audit Office,
2012:7, 9). Radio Tonga has not received a direct government subsidy since its inception in 1975
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but it earns roughly 80 percent of its revenue from airtime sales to government agencies, CSOs
and businesses (N. Fifita, 2010; PACNEWS, 1999). This includes about AU$600,000 per annum
from the broadcasts of Parliamentary sessions and AU$24,000 per annum through formal school-
related programming (Korauaba, 2007:8; Molnar, 2005:178)
VBTC’s challenges
The Vanuatu Broadcasting and Television Corporation (VBTC) is the most compromised of the
national broadcasters under study. It provides an insightful example of how national broadcasters
can be abused by their governments.
Since its corporatised in 1993, VBTC has not turned a profit despite receiving a reasonable
annual government subsidy of vt45 million (AU$450,000) and has been “technically insolvent”
for decades (Renneberg, Thompson, & Taurakoto, 2009:8, 24; Vois Blong Yumi, 2006:5).
Salaries and staff housing allowances consume 116 percent of its annual subsidy (Vois Blong
Yumi, 2011:11). The VBTC is carries debt amounting to more than its annual government
subsidy, is beset by intransigent labour unrest, and is governed by an unqualified board appointed
through the course of at least three successive governments solely on the basis of political
patronage (AusAID, 2011:5; Path, 2011; Vois Blong Yumi, 2006:2-3, 6; 2011:6, 47). Since its
inception, VBTC has been governed or managed by four individuals who have rotated through
board and senior management positions (Vois Blong Yumi, 2006:3). An audit-general’s
investigation found that in 2010-2011, the board and general manager gave themselves illegal
“goodwill payments” and cash advances in excess of vt1.1 million (AU$11,000) (Path, 2011:20).
Thus, the government used its control over the broadcaster to extract and redistribute rents in
what economist Gordon Tullock (2005:x) would call “bad” or corruption-inducing ways.
As a result of this mismanagement, VBTC’s transmission network lay crippled for nearly eight
years (1996-2004), reaching only 14 percent of the population with no apparent political will to
spend the vt6.8 million (AU$85,000 or 15 percent of its annual subsidy) needed to repair the
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network.76 This led to a popular belief among listeners that the government “didn’t want them to
know what was happening” (Vois Blong Yumi, 2006:7-8).
In 2006, AusAID initiated the Vois Blong Yumi project (valued at AU$8.4 million over six
years) to address VBTC’s governance, management and accountability issues. By 2010, positive
changes were apparent: annual revenues had risen to vt86.9 million (AU$869,000), its debt
decreased by 42 percent, and its broadcast footprint grew to cover 70 percent of the population.
However, the sustainability of these changes remained questionable due to an entrenched
organisational “malaise” and resistance to change wherein VBTC senior management were
“blocking” the suggested reforms (Renneberg, et al., 2009:11-12, 23; Vois Blong Yumi, 2006:1,
27, 45; 2011:45).
Thus a spiralling chain of causal effects emerges in the Pacific context: governments view
national broadcasters within colonial notions that such broadcasters should serve the
governments that fund them; state funding is offered or withheld based upon the government’s
perception of broadcaster’s support of the government; the governing boards of national
broadcasters are stacked with political appointees who mismanage their funds (sometimes for
personal gain) and neglect investing in the broadcaster’s organisational capacity and transmission
infrastructure; and the national dialogue around development goals that national broadcasters are
uniquely positioned to create implodes due to equipment failures and loss of social trust. Without
the capacity to transmit nationwide, Pacific national broadcasters lose much of the justification
for their public funding or even existence. Without capable and committed national broadcasters,
rural islanders, such as those on Niuatoputapu, are left isolated and alienated from the national
conversation.
Positive trends toward reform
The governance issues facing Pacific national broadcasters mirror the larger political dynamics in
each country. As governments change and new political leaders emerge, opportunities arise for
76
In 2009, the Kalpokas Government directed VBTC to establish a television station and was considering restarting its
newspaper (which had closed in 2001), all seemingly without regard to VBTC’s inability to finance its existing services. The
largest portion of VBTC’s debt derives from electricity costs (Vois Blong Yumi, 2011).
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national broadcasters to evolve toward becoming a more conventional PSB (Fiji, Samoa),
devolve into a deeply politicised entity (Nauru, Vanuatu), or exist in state of staid functionality
(Kiribati, Solomons, Tonga). The existence of media-sensitive national leadership can spur
national broadcasters into more reciprocal relationships with rural listeners.
In Fiji, soon after the Bainimarama military government came to power in 2006, it installed as
head of the national broadcaster a respected journalist who is also the brother of Fiji’s new
Attorney-General. This intimacy between the government and the national broadcaster, although
highly controversial, has been advantageous for the broadcaster. In 2010, the government drafted
a proposal insisting that the national broadcaster devolve into a government-controlled talk-only
format. FBCL staff rallied and successfully argued that a national broadcaster should uphold the
Reithian notions of informing, educating and entertaining, and not serve as a government
propagandist.
We put our foot down (and said) that that kind of radio will not work here in Fiji.
We told them, this is not radio (“Aasha,” radio staff, personal communication, 2
Feb. 2011).
The government yielded, although government censors remained in all newsrooms throughout
the country until mid-2012. FBCL show hosts also played on the knowledge that government
officials were monitoring broadcasts to immediately include them in on-air discussions around
issues raised by talkback callers (“Aasha,” radio staff, personal communication, 2 Feb. 2011;
“Mikeli,” radio staff, personal communication, 2 Feb. 2011). Additionally, the new FBCL
management arrived to found a “very wanting” transmission infrastructure, outdated production
equipment, and a decrepit “rat hole” headquarters. The new general manager used his personal
contacts to invite the prime minister and cabinet to tour the 53-year-old broadcasting house just
as a rainstorm began pelting the leaky roof, sending radio employees scurrying with buckets to
catch the rivulets while government officials watched abashedly.
We convinced the government. We said, look, there’s one of two choices: you either
don’t help us and we close down in about a year or two years’ time, or you help us
as the state broadcaster – no, not the state broadcaster, the national broadcaster –
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and you help us. They said, all right (“Rohit,” radio staff, personal
The resulting FJ$22 million (AU$12 million) loan, offered at a high 12 percent interest rate
through the Fiji Development Bank because commercial banks balked from working with the
military government, is the largest government investment in a Pacific national broadcaster to
date (V. Lal, 2012). FBCL has replaced all production equipment with digital technology,
consolidated and upgraded its AM transmission facilities, established a well-received public
television station in 2011, and opened an attractive mid-town headquarters.77 Interviewees were
clearly proud that even rural listeners could now hear a quality radio signal (“Rohit,” radio staff,
personal communication, 28 Jan. 2011). In 2010, the Bainimarama Government also enacted the
2010 Media Industry Development Decree, the only Pacific legislation to recognise community
media as a distinct media sub-sector and to provide a funding model for it seeding and growth.
Similarly, in Samoa, the Maleilegaoi Government came to power in 1998 after a decade of bitter
tension between the government and local media. The new government immediately sought to
reconcile with the local media and initiated a series of public consultations around the 2005
National Broadcasting Policy, the 2010 Broadcasting Act, and a Media Code of Practices
(Beales, 2005; Nadkarni, 2007; Samoa Ministry of Communication and Information Technology,
2006, 2007). In 2003, the government corporatised the state-owned radio and television stations.
In 2007, it sold the profitable FM radio and television stations for US$1 million in what is often
cited as a regional best-practice example of neo-liberal governmental reform (Darcy & Russell,
2011:31-33; Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2006:7-9; Sennitt, 2008). The government
retained ownership of the AM national broadcaster, 2AP, for two reasons: it acknowledged the
importance of its nationwide broadcast coverage in times of weather emergencies, and the
company that purchased the former government-owned media stations showed no interest in
buying 2AP.78 In 2001 the Malielegaoi Government passed the Public Bodies (Performance and
Accountability) Act, one of the first attempts in the Pacific to reform SOEs, such as national
broadcasters.
77
This contrasts with the tendency throughout the Pacific to ask international donors to fund equipment upgrades for national
broadcasters, as evidenced by AusAID AU$450,000 investment to rebuild Nauru’s entire broadcast system, Taiwan’s donation of
a AU$163,300 transmitter to Radio Kiribati in 2010, South Korea’s Communications Commission’s AU$560,000 donation of a
new AM mast and transmitter to Radio Tonga in 2011 (Jackson, 2010; Kiribati Ministry of Finance and Economic Development,
2010:75). Tonga is also receiving international aid to upgrade to digital terrestrial television broadcasting by 2015.
78
Samoa’s 2AP serves as the official emergency-weather broadcaster for Niue, Tokelau and American Samoa.
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Since the early 2000s, the international development community has focused its attention on
reforming national broadcasters that exist as SOEs as a means to both develop the media sector
and to promote “good governance,” or audience-led demand leading to better accountability of
formal and informal governance institutions (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2012). It is
through this portal that Niua FM enters the story.
STATION BIOGRAPHY
The Kingdom of Tonga consists of about 170 islands

clustered into four main groups. The northern-most
group consists of three islands known collectively as the
Niuas; the largest island is Niuatoputapu. The Niuas are
located closer to Samoa, 320 kilometres to the northeast,
than they are to the Tongan capital, Nuku’alofa, 520
kilometres to the south. Map 8.1 shows Niuatoputapu’s
position in the Tongan archipelago. Niuatoputapu, also
called Niua, measures four by eight kilometres and is
home to about 900 people. Three modest villages rim its
northern shore. The middle village of Vaipoa was the
home of Niua FM from May 2010 to April 2011.
On the morning of 30 September 2009, three

earthquakes measuring in magnitude from 7.8 to 8.1
struck two minutes apart in the central Pacific (National
Science Foundation, 2010).79 Within minutes and in Map 9.1 Tonga and Niuatoputapu
Source: (US CIA, 2012)
rapid succession, three waves up to 17 meters high Inset adapted from: (Tonga Travel, 2009)
engulfed Niuatoputapu. The waves bifurcated when they
made landfall and wrapped themselves around the island in a deadly embrace. At Hihifo village,
they swept away the government complex housing the police station, the Tonga Communications
Corporation office, the bank, the medical clinic and a prison. The tsunami killed nine people and
79
Due to the International Dateline, the tsunami struck on 30 September in Tonga and on 29 September in Samoa and American
Samoa. The triple quakes and resulting tsunami killed 149 people in Samoa and 34 in American Samoa.
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injured dozens. More than 46 percent of the island was inundated, 57 percent of the houses
destroyed, and nearly all of the fishing fleet damaged. The tsunami caused such profound
environmental damage to forests, soils and shoreline that scientists predict it will take decades to
recover (K. Wilson, et al., 2009). The waves stopped meters short of the Niuatoputapu District
High School where a PacRICS (Pacific Rural Internet Connectivity System) office was located.
This satellite-based Internet system was funded by AusAID and has been administered by
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) since 2010. It was the island’s only contact with the
outside world in the chaotic days after the disaster.
At the time of disaster, a Niuatoputapuan, Sosefo Fe’aomoeata Vakata, was employed as a radio-
licensing officer in the national Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC). He was
also planning his parliamentary election campaign. Vakata had previously worked with the SPC
to establish Niua’s PacRICS office in 2008-2009. In reaction to the disaster and as part of his
election campaign, he requested from the SPC a suitcase radio unit to help assist in disaster-
recovery efforts. Thus he used his social networks to extract from the international development
community a radio station for his island.80
Niua FM began broadcasting in May 2010 from the Vaipoa village Catholic Church, of which
Vakata was a member. The church provided a room, a generator and fuel. The radio had
previously been tested at the PacRICS office but the broadcast signal did not to reach all three
villages. The church building was of questionable structural integrity; volunteers said they
frightened to work there (“Lavani,” radio staff, personal communication, 19 Jan. 2012).
Niuatoputapuans greatly enjoyed listening to Niua FM as it was the only radio service available
to most of them. The national broadcaster, Radio Tonga, can barely be heard on Niua even with
its new transmission tower, erected in late 2011 with Korean funding (Tonga Ministry of
Information and Communications, 2011). Samoa’s 2AP can sometimes be heard at night. Niua
FM station details are presented in Table 9.2.
Vakata had appointed a local woman as station manager, although many in the community now
contend that she didn’t have adequate managerial skills to perform well. Regardless, she and four
80
Vakata and the SPC also placed a UNESCO’s ‘radio in a box’ unit on Niuafo’ou, located 240 kilometres west of Niuatoputapu,
at about the same time. The Niuafo’ou station, too, was placed in a Catholic Church and it operated for only a few months.
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unpaid volunteers ran Niua FM for 11 months, broadcasting about six hours nightly, Monday
through Saturday. Programming consisted primarily of popular music and community news.
Table 9.2 Station details: Niua FM

Frequency/Call sign FM 88, A3NTT
Founder Mr Sosefo Fe’aomoeata Vakata, a former radio-licensing officer in the Ministry of
Information and Communications, now a member of Parliament
Location Niuatoputapu island, Northern Tonga
Estimated listenership 900
Years of operation May 2010-April 2011
Broadcast details Monday-Saturday, six hours nightly
Programming focus Music and community announcements, school news, a weekly health show,
cooking show
Estimated no. of 5 (unpaid)
volunteers
Funding sources Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and Commonwealth of Learning for
equipment, Vaipoa village Catholic Church for facilities and generator. Small
amounts of local advertising.
Project donors had initially been happy to provide a suitcase radio to help with disaster-recovery
efforts, but soon they began questioning if there had been a legitimate need for the station at all
given the “depressing” project-assessment reports (“Kevin,” international development agency
representative, personal communication, 2 April 2011; “Rui,” regional development agency
representative, personal communication, 26 Jan. 2011). They said they had expected a more
substantial and diversified programming schedule. When the church generator failed, the radio
station closed.
All of this activity occurred outside of the government’s knowledge. There are no project
documents to be found, not even a broadcast license, which Vakata himself hinted never existed.
National government officials learned of Niua FM’s existence several weeks after it began
broadcasting. The prime minister, in his dual role as the Minister of Communication, quickly
surmised Niua FM’s usefulness.
Once Vakata was elected to office in 2010, his support of both Niua FM and the PacRICS project
ended. When the church generator failed and Niua FM fell silent, the government expressed
interest in assuming ownership of Niua FM. Government officials presented several convincing
arguments why a closer relationship would benefit both. The government could supply facilities,
electricity, media training, technical expertise, recurrent funding and quality programming,
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including national and international news, entertainment, and development-oriented content
produced by the government and CSOs. Radio Tonga has long struggled to provide full broadcast
coverage throughout the long archipelago, thus a partnership with Niua FM would help it fulfil its
nation-building mandate.
But first, the Prime Minister insisted, the station must

be moved away from the Catholic church to ensure all
Niuatoputapuans would feel comfortable using the
service. While Tonga’s Constitution explicitly
guarantees religious freedom, the king’s church, The
Free Wesleyan Church, and affiliated Methodist
denominations function as the de facto state church
(Ernst, 2006:729). As found elsewhere in Tonga, Niua
has rapidly growing membership in the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS). Tonga has
among the highest per capita LDS membership in the
world, now about 17 percent of the population
(Vakaoti, 2008:617). While Niua FM’s volunteers
represented various churches, Vakata is Catholic,
Niua’s top government administrator is affiliated with
the LDS Church, and key ministry officials are
affiliated with Methodist denominations. The radio Photo 9.1 (top) Niua FM facilities
Photo 9.2 (bottom) Niua FM studio
station’s location in the Catholic Church compound Sources: author
became a point of contestation.
The man the Prime Minister assigned to oversee the station’s relocation was Niua’s top
government administrator or king’s man, Peau’afi Haukinima. Among Haukinima’s many
responsibilities was oversight of the construction of the new village to replace the houses and
government buildings destroyed by the tsunami. A place within the new government
administrative centre had been reserved for Niua FM. In the meantime, a temporary building was
made available, located near the high school (for Internet connectivity) and other government
offices (for electricity).
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But Vakata refused to allow Niua FM to be relocated. He and Haukinima are entrenched political
adversaries. Their spite for each other is openly shown and widely known. Thus Niua FM
became political football between these two powerful rivals.
Vakata and his supporters accused Haukinima of trying to “take control” of Niua FM when in
many respects Haukinima is simply following the Prime Minister’s directions. Vakata admitted
that Niua FM’s facility at the Catholic Church was dangerous and inadequate (Personal
communication, 16 Jan. 2012). He said he would welcome a move to a “neutral” location but
emphatically not to a government-owned facility. On the other hand, it is openly acknowledged
that Vataka’s motivation for establishing Niua FM was to boost his election campaign firstly, and
to serve his community secondly (“Tukupa,” community resident, personal communication, 23
Jan. 2012; “Papahi,” radio staff, personal communication, 3 Feb. 2012).
To further complicate the situation, the donors (SPC and the Commonwealth of Learning)
thought they were negotiating with the national government when they helped establish Niua FM
because of Vakata’s position within the MIC at the time. One could then deduce that the
government could claim rightful ownership of the station. Would Niua FM still be a
“community” radio station if it were owned by the government? Or would government
involvement create a more inclusive community? What is clear is that well-intentioned donors
“just threw the money out at them” without actually engaging with the Niuatoputapuans before
gifting the station (“Kainga,” engineer, personal communication, 13 Jan. 2012).
As the two politicians sought to outmanoeuvre each other in 2011-2012, villagers began quietly
organising themselves. The secretary of the local branch of the national women’s committee
expressed interest in managing the station. One woman secured a scholarship to attend SPC’s
Community Education Training Centre specifically to take its community radio course.
It’s a pity that the station didn’t work. … It was a failure from the very beginning.
It’s just that (it didn’t) have the right motive and the spirit, you know…. Both
(Haukinima) and (Vakata) need to stand aside and let us run the station, for the
sake of the community. If (they’re) involved again, it will only cause problems
(“Tukupa,” community resident, personal communication, 23 Jan 2012).
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In November 2012, government officials took possession of Niua FM’s suitcase radio unit and
moved it to the national capital. In December 2012, the new village was completed and
inaugurated. As mentioned, an office for Niua FM was included in the new village’s building
plans. It is not known if or when the government will return the suitcase radion unit to
Niuatoputapu.
Side story: Radio Temotu
Niua FM is not the only community radio station gifted by donors and established in partnership
with Pacific governments to benefit tsunami-devastated communities. In February 2013, an 8.0-
magnitude earthquake and tsunami struck Temotu Province in eastern Solomon Islands, resulting
in 10 deaths, the destruction of three villages and 500 homes, and disruption of transportation,
communication, water and electrical infrastructure. Consequently, the Solomons national
broadcaster, SIBC, entered into a partnership with the international development agency World
Vision New Zealand and the New Zealand Aid Programme to establish a temporary
“community” broadcaster in Lata, the provincial capital of Temotu Province (Levy, 2013; New
Zealand Aid Programme, 2013a; Radio Australia, 2013a). Temotu, like Niua, is a far remote area,
laying 600 kilometres (or a three-hour plane flight) from the national capital, factors that
hampered humanitarian-relief and disaster-recovery efforts. Lata had been the site of an SIBC
AM relay radio station, Radio Temotu, which has been off the air at least since the early 2000s
due to transmitter failure (Sennitt, 2004c). Under the World Vision-NZAID proposal (valued at
NZ$125,000 or AU$98,750), the new Temotu FM station would operate for about six months
with SIBC providing technical and broadcasting staff.
Introduction
The presence of a pluralistic broadcasting environment that offers accurate news, diverse
viewpoints, and a range of programming enables people to make better informed decisions and
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more effectively participate in a national dialogue around development issues (Duer, 2008:109;
Wessberg, 1999:87-88; Yoon, 1999:102).
But Pacific realities tend to amend this view. Some Pacific economies are thought to be too small
to support a diversified media sector. Kiribati (population 102,000) closed its national television
broadcaster in March 2013 due to unpayable debts and lack of qualified personnel (Kiribati
Independent, 2013a). Nauru (population 9,400) has struggled for years to expand its media sector
beyond the government broadcaster (Nauru Government, 2005:91-92; United Nations
Development Programme, 2009:3). In many smaller PICs, near-monopoly situations exist where
the national broadcaster and one or two commercial broadcasters are the only media providers.
Throughout the region, the “coconut wireless” or casual face-to-face conversation, especially
when conducted in public areas such as markets and churches, remains a key mode of
information sharing and is often seen as more effective than media outreach (Secretariat of the
Pacific Community & Nauru Bureau of Statistics, 2006:6; The Pacific Media and
Communication Research Consortium, 2013a:10, 27; 2013b:6; 2013c:6, 14; 2013d:8; 2013e:6;
2013f:5; 2013g:5; 2013h:5). Within the Pacific island region as elsewhere, national broadcasters
are uniquely positioned to engage all citizens in a national conversation. Radio Sunshine in Niue
(population 1,400, 260 square kilometres) has been described as a Pacific national broadcaster
that behaves like a community radio station (Molnar, 2005:12). Even established Pacific
community radio stations, such as Buala FM, view temporary partnerships with national
broadcasters as “stepping stones” toward their own future financial and organisational
sustainability (“Vince,” radio partner, personal communication, 23 Feb. 2011).
Given this, the international development community has focused its attention since the early-
2000s on transforming Pacific national broadcasters with SOE (state-owned enterprise) reforms
(Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2012). Of the seven national broadcasters under study, five
national broadcasters are SOEs with 100 percent government ownership; two national
broadcasters, Radio Nauru and Samoa’s 2AP, remain embedded within government ministries.
The SOE reform movement offers opportunities to strengthen and grow the Pacific community
radio sector. But how well founded are such hopes that Pacific community broadcasters can
benefit from alliances with national broadcasters within SOE reforms without being subsumed by
the political pressures that accompany national broadcasters? Nearly all PICs and their national
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broadcasters, with the possible exception of Radio Tonga, welcome the growth of community
radio. But is community radio conceived of as an independent voice of communities or another
channel through which to extend government control over the media? As “Kainga,” an MIC
engineer, said enigmatically, “No people, no government. Government is for the people!
Government has to support (Niua FM)” (Personal communication, 13 Jan. 2012).
National broadcasters as SOEs
Under-performing SOEs, such as national broadcasters and telecommunication, water and

electricity providers, are thought to crowd out private sector growth (a return to arguments that
state aid to national broadcasters gives them an unfair advantage in deregulated media markets),
provide low returns on government investment, and “absorb” large amounts of scarce resources
that could otherwise be applied to high-yield sectors as health and education (Asian Development
Bank, 2010d:1; Darcy & Russell, 2011:ii; Iffland, 2012:6). For example, the nine Solomon
Islands SOEs (which includes SIBC) amassed losses of SB$184 million (AU$24 million)
between 2002-2008 (Asian Development Bank, 2011:1). The SIBC is the first Pacific national
broadcaster to undergo SOE reform; its pilot project is set for completion in 2012. Similarly,
Radio Kiribati’s parent agency, the Broadcasting and Publications Authority, is one of 23 SOEs
in Kiribati and is among the half that are out of compliance with financial-performance
requirements (Kiribati National Audit Office, 2012b:43). In mid-2012, the Kiribati government
issued a plea to international donors for assistance with a looming financial crisis linked to
AU$12 million in bailouts extended to under-performing SOEs since 2009 (Government of
Kiribati, 2012).
SOEs under-perform for a number of reasons: poorly defined service mandates, weak governance
structures including politicised governing boards and government interference with their
operations, the absence of performance benchmarks and public-accountability mechanisms, and
the lack of “hard budget constraints,” meaning a lack of incentive to be financially self-sufficient
because the government will bail them out (Iffland, 2012:9-10). All of these reasons apply to
Pacific national broadcasters. The SOE-reform movement strives to “professionalise” national
broadcasters in three areas: the creation of legal and regulatory frameworks around community-
service obligations, the strengthening SOE governance structures such as depoliticising
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governing boards, and placing an “unambiguous” commercial focus at the heart of SOE
operations (Iffland, 2012:1, 14; Solomon Islands Ministry of Finance & Treasury, 2010).
Samoa’s Public Bodies 2001 Act, often cited as a model regulation, states that SOEs should be
“as profitable and efficient as comparable businesses that are not owned by the state” (Legislative
Assembly of Samoa, 2001:7). Within this view, national broadcasters are to be fully privatised
wherever possible and those that remain state owned are to be radically transformed,
professionalised, and placed under measurable “community service obligation” (CSOb) contracts
(Iffland, 2012:5; Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2006:8). Legislation to reform SOEs currently
exists in Fiji, Samoa, Solomons and Tonga and is pending in Kiribati and Vanuatu.
Moving into a multi-player PSB environment
Community-service obligations are defined as non-commercial goods or services purchased by

the government on behalf of the community that are then provided by the SOE or another capable
organisation, such as an NGO, church or private business (Darcy & Russell, 2011:30; Pacific
Islands Forum Secretariat, 2006:3, 7; Solomon Islands Ministry of Finance & Treasury, 2010).
Community-service obligations can be construed as public-service broadcasting content such as
agricultural extension shows, public health programs and children’s programming. Community-
service obligations must be clearly linked to government policies and development priorities
(meaning they are no longer ad hoc requirements imposed by governing boards or politicians)
and are otherwise not provided by the market (meaning private companies wouldn’t provide them
without financial incentives).
In this view, the SOE-reform model would redefine the entire media system as a public good,
allowing for the imposition of public-service requirements onto commercial broadcasters through
licensing regulations and the enabling of CSOs and other non-state actors to produce PSB
programming through the provision of contestable funding sources (Asian Media Information
and Communication Centre, 2005:46; Price & Raboy, 2001:40-42). Said differently, public-
service broadcasting would be less defined by a single national broadcaster and more configured
as a cluster of multiple media providers working within set contracts to deliver specified and
measurable PSB content. Theoretically, this multi-provider “distributed” model is focused on
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content and fully supported by market dynamics (Asian Media Information and Communication
Centre, 2005:123; Cregan, 2008:1; Jakubowicz, et al., 2007:14-15; Lilley, 2008:99, 126).
At least three versions of this model are possible. Firstly, community broadcasters can “cluster”
into a network of radio stations with the combined capacity to broadcast nationwide and thus
serve as an alternative to a single institutionalised national broadcaster (Duer, 2008:110-111;
Vois Blong Yumi, 2006:34). Elements of this model are already emerging in the region. In the
Solomons, the SIBC sought to interact with the Isabel Province radio network through the
recruitment of rural news “stringers” to generate local content (International Programme for the
Development of Communication, 2012:26-29). This effort was undermined, however, when
PFNet, an intermediary CSO associated with the Isabel radio project, established its own news
service independent of the national broadcaster and other existing new-media outlets. Radio
Vanuatu’s program-exchange agreement with the community broadcaster, CReST FM, provides
another example (Vois Blong Yumi, 2011:22).
Secondly, national broadcasters could be decentralised, similar to SIBC’s situation with its relay
broadcaster in Gizo and the new aid-funded broadcaster in Temotu Province, and the Tongan
government’s interest in acquiring Niua FM. In the mid-2000s, a proposal to decentralise Fiji’s
FBCL into 12 provincial “community” stations had been considered but failed due to coup-
related political instability (“Uriam,” CSO representative, personal communication, 28 Feb.
2011).
Thirdly, the provision of contestable funding sources can enable CSOs, universities, private
media houses, community broadcasters and similar others to create PSB programming. Such
funding pools can be derived from government funding, such as that allocated to line ministries,
or by taxes levied on the private media sector, such as found in Fiji’s 2010 Media Decree and
Samoa’s 2010 Broadcasting Act, or through donor-generated funding, such as the AusAID-
funded Pacific Media Assistance Scheme (PACMAS 2).
Under the SOE reforms, Pacific governments are encouraged to outsource PSB contracts. Fiji’s
national broadcaster has been operating under a version of a CSOb-contract since 1998 wherein
every three years the government puts to tender a contract that stipulates percentages of
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programming by category (religion, culture and language, education, family issues, children,
health, agriculture, weather). The package, valued at FJ$1.1 million (AU$596,645), has rotated
through Fiji’s two largest media networks (FBCL and Fiji Communications Ltd), although not
without controversy and court challenges (Sennitt, 2004b).
The SOE-reform movement presents several advantages for both national and community
broadcasters. For national broadcasters, it would depoliticise their boards and management
through the adoption of director qualification, job descriptions and performance standards.
Samoa’s Public Bodies Act 2001 carries financial penalties for poorly performing board members
(Darcy & Russell, 2011b:16). The SOE reforms would also impose accountability mechanisms,
such annual reports and audience surveys. Nearly all PIC national broadcasters are mandated to
produce annual reports and a few are required to conduct regular audience surveys, but these are
rarely produced. Some national broadcasters, such as those in Kiribati and Solomons, haven’t
issued annual reports in more than a decade (Government of Kiribati, 2012; Kiribati National
Audit Office, 2012b:43; Solomon Islands Office of the Auditor-General, 2011:35). Tonga’s 2010
Public Enterprises Amendment Act requires SOEs to publish annual reports in local newspapers
(Darcy & Russell, 2011:2, 20).
Similarly, capable community broadcasters could be guaranteed stable multi-year funding around
which they could adequately plan their activities. Their programming could also infuse the voices
of their rural communities into the national dialogue.
Flaws in the SOE model
But the SOE-reform model also contains serious drawbacks when applied to both national and
community broadcasters. Significantly, it threatens to reduce national broadcasters to their
transmission infrastructure, thus equating them with telecommunication or electricity providers
and overlooking their role as enablers of a public space for citizenship engagement which cannot
be reduced to per-unit costs (Darcy & Russell, 2011:8; Iffland, 2012:5; Pacific Islands Forum
Secretariat, 2006:8; Solomon Islands Ministry of Finance & Treasury, 2010).
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Samoa’s 2007 privatisation of its national broadcaster is often cited as a best-practice example,
but the literature ignores that fact that only the profitable FM and television stations were sold
(Darcy & Russell, 2011:31-33; Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2006:7-9). Thus, the
assumption that the private sector will be interested in assuming PSB mandates, especially the
requirement to provide national coverage which can only be accomplished through expensive
AM broadcasting, is not supported. Due to the electricity-intensive nature of AM transmission,
half of all Pacific national broadcasters are estimated to operate at reduced power to save money,
thus curtailing their outreach to rural audiences (Ricquish, 2008; Sennitt, 2005b, 2010c).81
Additionally, Pacific community broadcasters are valued for their ability to produce
programming in vernacular (“Mary,” radio staff, personal communication, 3 March 2011). Due to
irregularities in some rural educational systems, many islanders have only limited fluency in
pidgin languages as compared with their local languages. Some villagers struggle to understand
SIBC’s programming which is delivered in Solomons pidgin as part of SIBC’s nation-building
mandate. The Solomons has more than 70 indigenous languages, Vanuatu an estimated 130. Will
the lure of CSOb contracts diminish the “community” orientation as expressed through the
language used by community broadcasters?
Motivating Pacific governments to reform their SOEs can also be unpopular. In Samoa, 10 years
passed between the adoption of its public bodies law and its implementation. Pacific governments
have been reluctant to let go of their SOEs, relinquish the revenues they generate, and remove
political appointees from governing boards (Asian Development Bank, 2010d:2; 2012:1; Iffland,
2012:2-3).82 In general, PIC governments lack the political will to reform their SOEs (Darcy &
Russell, 2011:1; Iffland, 2012:10).
81
According to a 2006 report, the Pacific islands are littered with rusted, unreliable and outdated shortwave and AM transmitters
characterised by high maintenance costs, patchy coverage and soaring utility bills (Vois Blong Yumi, 2006:23). The cost to
replace aging equipment could run “into the millions;” estimated repair costs to Vanuatu’s shortwave transmission system alone
were AU$1.2 million (Vois Blong Yumi, 2006:23). International donors and PIC broadcasters are increasingly turning to
digitisation technology to reduce operational costs while improving broadcast coverage and signal quality (“Rohit,” radio staff,
personal communication, 28 Jan. 2011; “Sikeli,” engineer, personal communication, 31 Jan. 2011; “Elias,” radio staff, personal
82
Darcy and Russell’s (2011:24) analysis of the number of elected officials and public servants serving as directors on Pacific
SOE governing boards is insightful: 10 percent in Tonga, 24 percent in Fiji, 42 percent in Solomons, and 48 percent in Samoa.
Vanuatu was not included in their study.
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Introduction
As international development trends augur the continued application of SOE reforms upon
Pacific national broadcasters, it is a useful exercise to assess what is really at stake financially
within the Pacific PSB sector. Research reveals Pacific governments heavily subsidise their
national broadcasters, both directly through budgetary allocations and indirectly through
“publicity and promotion” or similar media disbursements to government ministries, thus Pacific
national broadcasters are far from impoverished. Given this, how might community broadcasters
gain access to funding around PSB content production? How strongly would national
broadcasters resist the entry of community broadcasters into these funding streams?
Unpacking the SOE financial model
Within the proposed SOE-reform model, community-service obligations (CSObs) would be

defined, costed and adequately funded. Specific ministries, such as health or agriculture, would
contract (after a competitive bidding process) with a broadcaster for defined and measurable
outputs and pay for the service from within their annual budgets. The broadcasters – whether they
are national broadcasters, commercial stations or community radio outlets – could be guaranteed
stable multi-year funding around which they could adequately plan their activities. With service
objectives and performance benchmarks now clearly defined through the CSOb contracts,
governments could more accurately determine the true cost of the requested community services,
assess if public funds are being spent efficiently and effectively, and determine if social
objectives are actually being met (Solomon Islands Ministry of Finance & Treasury, 2010).
As is frequently the case, government ministries and CSOs are unaware of the true cost of
broadcasting, thus they complain that their national broadcasters should offer free or reduced-rate
airtime (“Benjamin,” CSO representative, personal communication, 23 Feb. 2011; “Papahi,”
radio staff, personal communication, 3 Feb. 2012). The proposed CSOb model might actually
decrease the amount of development-oriented programming, given that a revised and more
accurate costing of such content might rise considerably over current rates.
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The sale of airtime to government ministries is the largest revenue source for the national
broadcasters under study, and thus an entry point for community broadcasters depending on the
nature of the service. Government departments in all study countries except Nauru generate
substantial amounts of radio programming pertaining to women’s affairs, health, education,
primary industries, police and public safety, weather, and commerce/business. Some
programming would require a national broadcast footprint, such as parliamentary or similar
broadcasts and formal school-related broadcasts, the two largest revenue-generation categories
around the region. But health, agricultural extension, and police or public safety programming
could be localised by community broadcasters to good effect. International experience has shown
that agricultural extension services provided by non-state actors, such as community broadcasters
and CSOs, are consistently more effective, better targeted and more cost-effective than those
provided by the government (Greer & Garaehangavulu, 2008:28). In Vanuatu, the community
broadcaster CReST FM’s existing program-exchange agreement with Radio Vanuatu provides the
possibility that its content could be heard by about 70 percent of the nation. A partnership with
CReST FM is also significantly more affordable: the community broadcaster charges a flat rate of
vt500 (AU$5) for a 30-minute show, compared with Radio Vanuatu’s rate of vt20,000 (AU$200)
for a 15-minute show (Molnar, 2005:381).
Under SOE reform initiatives, such ministry-level funding would become accessible to
community broadcasters and others through contestable CSOb contracts. But many government
ministries and development CSOs rely on donor funding and international grants to pay for
airtime costs. Such activities tend to be project specific and they cease when the funding expires.
For example, Kiribati Ministry of Health’s stopped its radio programming in 2005 when donor
funding ended (Molnar, 2005:179).
Additionally, the SOE-reform model assumes government ministries remain interested in using
radio broadcasting in their work, which is far from proven given the growing popularity of
television and the longer lasting impact of print media such as posters. The CSOb model also
assumes community broadcasters have the capacity and government ministries the political will
to negotiate and monitor multiple contracts. One deficiency in the CSOb model is that it fails to
address the organisational capacity-building needs of community broadcasters.
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The SOE model in praxis
Radio Tonga provides insight into how the CSOb-contract system might unfold. Tongan
government ministries are allocated media-activity funds in each year’s national budget. These
funds are not exclusively earmarked for Radio Tonga or its sister stations within the Tonga
Broadcasting Corporation but can be used to buy airtime on any local broadcaster, such as
theoretically Niua FM or more practically the privately owned BroadCom 98 FM, which is
positioning itself as a PSB even though it lacks national broadcast coverage (International
Programme for the Development of Communication, 2012:31). In fiscal year (FY) 2013, Tongan
government ministries received T$311,368 (AU$174,383) for media activities, a 66 percent
increase over FY2012 and a 247 percent increase since FY2009. The notable funding increase
suggests influences arising from the pro-democracy political movement (2006-2008) and the
government’s subsequent attempt to broaden its engagement with the public (‘Akolo, 2012;
Tonga Ministry of Finance and Central Planning Department, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011).
Similarly, Fiji’s Department of Agriculture has consistently produced at least 480 radio programs
a year since the late-1990s. (Its information unit was established in 1946.) The shows, each two
minutes long and produced in two languages, are broadcast on both public and private
broadcasters, with the bulk of the programming (70 percent) being garnered by the national
broadcaster’s two radio stations (Fiji Ministry of Primary Industries Information and
Communication Section, 2007:28-29). But this also indicates entry points do exist for other
broadcasters to vie for delivery of the service. Government funding for the radio farm shows has
been steadily increasing. In 2010, the cost of radio extension programming was FJ$290,920
(AU$157,097), an increase of 8 percent over FY2009 (Fiji Department of Agriculture, 2010:39).
Vanuatu’s Ministry of Agriculture, Quarantine/Livestock, Forestry and Fisheries (MAQFF)

agricultural extension radio service provides another example. In the 1980s-early 1990s,
Vanuatu’s farm radio service was well respected throughout the region, but it slid into decline in
the late-1990s due to a combination of factors: a devastating 1993 civil-servant strike and the
government’s retaliatory response, and the imposition in 1997 of neo-liberal economic reforms
designed to “right size” the government (Greer & Garaehangavulu, 2008). In 2000, MAQFF
shifted its radio program away from the national broadcaster to the faith-based Trinity
Broadcasting Network’s FM station which offered free airtime but a limited broadcast range
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(Molnar, 2005:389). The radio service continued to whither due to a variety of capacity issues
within the MAQFF. A 2008 MAQFF departmental review offered two recommendations: firstly,
that MAQFF outsource the agriculture extension work to non-state actors (such CSOs, vocational
training schools or the private sector) through contestable funds and CSOb contracts, and
secondly, that it resuscitate the MAQFF information unit so that radio broadcasts could again be
delivered to rural farmers. The report mentioned a possible pilot project on Tanna Island, home
of CReST FM. As mentioned, CReST FM has a program-exchange agreement with the national
broadcaster and its affordable production rates offer a significant cost-savings to the MAQFF.
How strongly would national broadcasters resist the entry of community broadcasters into these
government funding streams? Field evidence from Tonga suggests quite strongly. Community
broadcasters, in the view of some Radio Tonga staff, are competitors for funding that will be used
only to serve the community broadcasters’ self-interests, not those of the nation (“Papahi,”
personal communication, 3 Feb 2012). Community broadcasters like Niua FM and the women’s
community radio station, Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM, are built around “hidden agendas” that are not
intended to serve the development needs of the wider population (“Papahi,” personal
communication, 3 Feb 2012). For example, Niua FM was established to advance a politician’s
election campaign, while Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM is intended to advance women’s human rights.
Additionally, government ministries sometimes lose interest in using radio broadcasting in their
outreach activities. In 2004-2005, the Samoa Ministry of Health hosted a popular weekly
talkback radio show and produced 35 radio programs and 180 radio spots within an annual media
budget of S$100,000 (AU$41,000) (Molnar, 2005:299; Samoa Ministry of Health, 2004:45-46).
But the ministry’s radio presence began a steady decline in 2005 due to staff losses and other
internal factors (Samoa Ministry of Health, 2005:44, 46; 2006:55; 2009:29). By 2011, the
ministry’s health-promotion activities were largely defined by international donors that preferred
to fund health fairs and community meetings, not radio shows. Consequently more funds were
being spent on vehicle hire, maintenance and fuel to enable village meetings than on
“advertising” (Samoa Ministry of Health, 2007:37; 2011:6-7, 22-23). Grassroots Samoans might
now benefit from more personalised health information delivered within their communities but
the ministry’s health message is now fragmented and no longer engages all citizens in the same
conversation.
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Engaging civil society through contestable funding
One of the accepted characteristics of PSB is the distinctiveness of its programming, in particular
the affordable access it offers to common people and CSOs to participate in a national dialogue
through program creation (Cregan, 2008:8; Duer, 2008:111; Joseph, 2005:10-12; Raboy,
2002:11; E. Smith, 2012:64, 66). CSOs prefer to use national broadcasters because of their
national coverage (Molnar, 2005:194; Wessberg, 1999:86).83 But the rising cost of airtime on
most Pacific national broadcasters means many development CSOs and even government
ministries are finding the cost of broadcasting prohibitive (“Benjamin,” CSO representative,
personal communication, 23 Feb. 2011). Despite the high airtime costs, CSOs have worked well
with Pacific national broadcasters to deliver a broad diversity of development-oriented
programming to rural communities (Radio Fiji One, 2012; Radio Fiji Two, 2012; Solomon
Islands Broadcasting Corporation, 2010).
Many national broadcasters offer discounts rates to CSOs (Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa, Solomons,
Vanuatu). Rates vary: a 15-minute show can cost AU$18.50 in Tonga (T$33-37), AU$62 in
Solomons (SB$475), AU$72 in Samoa (S$175), and AU$200 in Vanuatu (vt20,000). As
previously mentioned, the Vanuatu-based community broadcaster, CReST FM, charges a flat rate
of vt500 (AU$5) for a 30-minute show. Some governments (Fiji, Solomons, Vanuatu) restrict
CSO access to their national broadcasters (Molnar, 2005:393) and (“Josefa,” CSO representative,
personal communication, 8 Feb. 2011; “Elias,” radio staff, personal communication, 25 Feb.
2011).
Many CSOs appear unaware of the benefits of delivering development information via broadcast
media, which they often use for organisational self-promotion, or they prefer to engage in inter-
personal community meetings (Haughton, 2011:7, 9; Samoa Umbrella for Non Governmental
Organisations, 2011:8) and (“Elias,” radio staff, personal communication, 25 Feb. 2011). There
are exceptions. In Solomons, the country’s oldest development organisation, Solomon Islands
Development Trust (SIDT), has delivered its Radio Reachout show on SIBC for 25 years. SIDT
83
Interestingly, Sione Vikilani’s (2010:225) post-election analyses of Tonga’s 2008 pro-democracy election found that those
candidates who broadcast campaign ads on Radio Tonga, the only radio station capable of reaching the outer islands, performed
poorly compared to others who had used commercial broadcasters, indicating a possible erosion of listener trust in the impartiality
of the national broadcaster.
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pays for airtime and production costs and invites others to participate. Since 2010, SIDT has been
organising funding to launch its own community radio station, One Voice FM, which was still not
on the air by mid-2013. In Fiji, the Consumer Council of Fiji frequently enjoys free airtime by
being invited to participate in existing radio shows as opposed to initiating its own show
(Consumer Council of Fiji, 2008:9). In 2010, the council paid for 54 radio programs but benefited
from 2,775 unpaid radio appearances. By this date, the council was placing more importance on
its relationship with a popular private broadcaster than with the national broadcaster (Consumer
Council of Fiji, 2010:12).
Peter Maynard Lewis’ (2008:89) research into development-communication methodologies

among Tongan development-oriented CSOs found the preferred mode of engagement with
communities was through interpersonal social networks; media campaigns were used only as “a
necessary precursor.” Similar findings appeared in studies in Samoa (Tonkin, 2008) and
Solomons (P. M. Swain, 1999). Some CSO interviewees questioned the need for community
broadcasters at all given the geographical smallness of some PICs and the fact that most PICs are
served by competent, if politically hamstrung, national broadcasters (“Josefa,” CSO
One of the best ways to support CSO and other voices within the SOE-reform model is through
the creation of a contestable programming fund (Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting
Development, 2009; E. Smith, 2012:54). Such funds exist in many countries, including New
Zealand, and are sometimes endowed through taxes on commercial media, media advertisers or
telecommunication providers. New Zealand’s fund, established in 1989, has had mixed success.
Commissioned content has not always been broadcast due to lack of funds to pay for airtime on
commercial or national broadcasters (Thompson, 2002:127).
In the Pacific context, Fiji’s 2010 Media Decree and Samoa’s 2010 Broadcasting Act both
established contestable programming funds. The second phase of the AusAID-funded Pacific
Media Assistance Scheme (PACMAS 2) features an “innovation fund” wherein independent
media producers, such as community radio stations, make application in two funding streams:
AU$30,000 for in-country projects and AU$30,000-$50,000 for multi-country projects (Pacific
Media Assistance Scheme, 2011:6-7). More than AU$706,000 was dispersed during the fund’s
first round of allocations in April 2012, thus the potential funding available for community
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broadcasters is significant if they have the organisational capacity to meet the project
requirements around project management, funding accountability, and monitoring and evaluation.
The AusAID-funded Vois Blong Yumi project in Vanuatu is another insightful example. As
mentioned, in 2006, AusAID in partnership with Australia’s national broadcaster, the ABC,
initiated the Vois Blong Yumi project (valued at AU$8.4 million over six years) to address
governance, management and accountability issues within Vanuatu’s national broadcaster. The
project also featured a “program bank” that provided AU$55,000 (vt5.5 million) over two years
to enable CSOs and others to produce radio programming (Vois Blong Yumi, 2006:30). Nine
organisations applied for and received funding, including two youth groups, a women’s council, a
disabled persons advocacy group, the Chamber of Commerce, and an agricultural college. One
recipient, the Vanuatu Young People’s Project, created 16 15-minute shows, 10 of which were
aired, and hosted a talkback show on a popular commercial FM station. Partnership with the
commercial FM station was found to be useful in disseminating information on HIV/AIDS to
youth, which research indicated did not listen to the national broadcaster (Rosenbaum, et al.,
2010:18-23; Vois Blong Yumi, 2006:44). Another recipient, the Vanuatu Women’s Centre,
created 61 radio programs and three talkback shows (AusAID, 2012:10). Subsequent studies
found that women seeking services at rural health clinics rose in response to the broadcasts
(Renneberg, et al., 2009:9). Thus, contestable funding can be a successful means to enable a
diversity of voices to enter the mediasphere.
In this chapter I have analysed the potential for constructive partnerships to arise between Pacific
national broadcasters and community radio stations within the SOE reform movement. As the
MacBride report stated, each form of media, from large national broadcasters to small
community broadcasters, has its rightful place (International Commission for the Study of
Communication Problems, 1980:57).
Pacific national broadcasters performed admirably well to deliver a diversity of development-

related programming within often challenging political and economic environments and
frequently in cordial partnerships with local CSOs and international development actors. Pacific
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governments do seem to appreciate their broadcasters’ national broadcast coverage. Well-
managed national broadcasters can become profitable enterprises. Broadcasters that were
interviewed firmly upheld Reithian notions of public-service programming and appeared to be
committed to engaging with rural listeners as best they could within the broadcasters’ financial
limitations.
But whether closer relationships between national and community broadcasters will benefit the
latter party is not known. Two deficiencies arise within the SOE model: broadcasters are reduced
to their transmission, not dialogic, capabilities and no evidence is found that administrative
training for community broadcasters could be envisaged within the SOE framework. It is
doubtful given the existing state of organisational-capacity deficiencies within community
broadcasters that they would be in a position to negotiate CSOb contracts or similar contestable-
funding opportunities or deliver the content. Additionally, the proposed CSOb model might
actually decrease the amount of development-oriented radio programming, given that a more
accurate costing of such programming might rise considerably over current rates.
Government and CSO interest in using radio for development communication waxes and wanes
for various reasons: changes in organisational leadership and vision within governments and
CSOs, the lack of consistent and reliable funding, a lack of appreciation of the value of radio
broadcasting in development work, and donor-led trends toward the use of other media, such
television and the Internet. Field evidence also suggests that some national broadcasters will
resist the entry of community broadcasters into their funding streams.
As for Niua FM, its future is uncertain. Will the government return the radio unit and support its
operations, given the political tensions around the radio station between the island’s two leading
politicians? Will the community coalesce around the station or view it as a branch of the national
broadcaster? Niua FM’s story reflects the unique socio-cultural characteristics of Tonga, one of
the world’s last monarchies. For centuries, Tongans have been fiercely proud of their culture in
which the king (as paramount chief) and his government are seen as sources of wealth generation
and redistribution. Thus the Tongan government’s interest in supporting and sustaining Niua FM
is culturally acceptable, if not pre-determined, within Tongan notions of consocial identity and
the socially defined reciprocal relationship between the government and the governed. Given
Niua’s tiny private sector, its cash-poor listening audience and the existing community
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nervousness about enlarging the role of churches in station operations, Niua FM’s best chances
for survival lie in closer relations with the government despite the inherent risks of co-option.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion and Recommendations
Reflections at the journey’s end
Voices from the field:
Q: Any thoughts on the future of community radio in the Pacific?
“Kevin”: It’s going to be fantastic!
Q: Oh really?
“Kevin”: I think it will be, actually. This is a no-brainer: community-based

communications in a place where the communities seem to be so strong. Maybe
that’s part of the problem, of getting it started, but I think once if you could get it
started, you know, we just have to figure out the right way to start the fire.84
Introduction
This thesis investigated the dynamic interaction between development and culture through the
phenomenon of community radio in seven independent oceanic South Pacific microstates. I have
argued that Pacific community radio lies at the interface of Western-defined development
agendas and indigenous cultural sensibilities. My essential research question sought to learn why
there is not more community radio in the Pacific islands amid these cultures that seem so
naturally predisposed to this oral, affordable and flexibly adaptive broadcast medium. Islanders
are hearty consumers of broadcast radio, yet community radio is a relatively new phenomenon in
the Pacific. So why hasn’t it emerged with the vibrancy that so many of us believe is potentially
possible?
84
International development agency representative, personal communication, 2 April 2011.
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Development and culture
While this thesis has extensively discussed the interface of development and culture in the South
Pacific as viewed through the phenomenon of community radio, in the end, it does not present an
argument about development versus culture. But it is difficult to find a balance point between
Western desires to achieve measurable outcome or “product” from development initiatives and
the “process” orientation of immanent development models that accentuate relationship
affirmation within social networks imbued with rent-seeking sensibilities. Pacific islanders are
modernising but they are doing so through adopting and adapting exogenous influences to suit
their self-defined development needs within their unique cultural, historical, economic and
political circumstances. They are turning to traditional sources of wealth generation and
redistribution – the community, the chief and the church – to establish and sustain their
community radio stations, with varying levels of success. Thus they contribute alternative models
of community media to the field of development communication theory.
Have I proven the existence of a Pacific-derived theory around development communication and
community media that is singularly different from other models? I contend that I have made a
good first step toward proving this but more research is needed. One component of such a theory
would include definitions around how communities are defined in the Pacific context. Donors
tend to define communities as geographical entities while islanders understand their communities
to be unbounded “communities of interest” linked through intricate social networks and
incorporating diaspora populations. Other components of such a theory would include the donor-
donee relationship, the Pacific rentier orientation, and Pacific cultural attributes such as the
culture of silence.
Development is, in essense, social and sustainable development is all about people. What my
research has clearly revealed is that the point of contention is not so much the goals of Western-
defined development but the relational process through which these goals are negotiated and
advanced. What is frequently missing in exogenous development projects is the process, or the
quality of the relationship between the international development community and the island
communities. In the Pacific, people come first.85 Relationships matter. This is exemplified in the
85
John Herrmann, Cook Islands Secretary of Education, personal communication, circa 2002.
307
pan-Pacific practice of talanoa, where the process of engaging in relationship-affirming dialogue
is more important than achieving an outcome and where conversations flow in various directions
or no direction at all. This isn’t to say that technology or wealth are not important as well, only
that people come first in the Pacific view of development.
In the Pacific context, the field of development communication is awash with donor self-
interests, as I demonstrated in Chapter 4 within discussions around telecommunication sector
reforms. The international development community continues to define, push and fund the
Pacific development agenda, frequently to meet its own economic and strategic objectives and
often with lingering colonial undertones that imply Westerners know what kind of development
is appropriate and essential for Pacific islanders into the 21st Century. I have advanced this
argument in several locations, for example, in Chapter 3 around discussions of American
Samoa’s educational television project and through examination of the immigration policies of
Pacific metropole countries that restrict the entry of low skilled but remittance-producing island
labour, and in Chapter 6 within the Buala FM case study.
Due to a variety of reasons, such as field logistical challenges, foreign development actors make
little effort to engage in participatory development methodologies with Pacific communities.
They all too often fall back into familiar routines around top-down orthodox development
models, as seen with Buala FM and Niua FM. The international development community happily
gifts inexpensive suitcase radio units to rural villages, as was seen in the Buala FM, Niua FM and
Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM case studies, and provides minimal training around media-content
production, but they do this primarily to advance dissemination of their self-defined development
messages and often within token participatory models.
But the gifting of technology is never enough. If such radio stations don’t reflect the
community’s “communicative ecology,” if they don’t meld with existing modes of
communication and information dissemination now used by villagers, there is little hope that
these stations will achieve social or other forms of sustainability. One could question if there is a
role for community radio at all in the Pacific island context given the smallness of many rural
villages and islanders’ preference for face-to-face conversation. In many small villages, the
“coconut wireless” easily supplants the radio wireless. I contend that the applicability of
community radio depends on the community context. National broadcasters in small PICs, like
308
Nauru (population 9,400), could function as adequate platforms of community expression.
However, deeply remote commununities like those on Niuatoputapu (population 900) and in
Isabel Province (14 villages, population 26,000) can barely hear the national broadcaster (which
might broadcast in non-local vernacular) and have no way to disseminate vital information such
as transportation schedules and emergency-weather news. In this view, faith-based broadcasters
have a perceived advantage because churches are hubs for daily gatherings and conversations.
Powerful donor countries are now defining and funding satellite- and computer-based ICTs as
appropriate technologies to drive Pacific development. These simply aren’t appropriate
technologies for rural Pacific villages, as I argued in Chapter 4. The ICT sector, however,
generates profits for many in the international development community. Many donors appear to
have lost interest in supporting radio broadcasting in development work. My research provides
evidence that public-service radio conjoined with mobile telephony is appropriate technology for
the Pacific, yet no mention is made of this hybrid model in the regional Framework for Action on
ICT for Development in the Pacific or in the many similar ICT-for-development proposals.
The Pacific’s rentier orientation also permeates the community radio sector. Chiefs and local
government officials expect the radio stations to channel aid flows into their villages, radio
volunteers expect to receive personal income, partner CSOs expect to receive funding which they
use primarily to sustain their organisations, and listeners often expect radio content that provides
information on how to generate wealth at the village level, as seen within SIDT’s Radio Reachout
program. Donors, however, resist providing such funding, arguing that to do so would engender
aid dependency. Yet no evidence was found that any donor agency offered training in
organisational management that might assist the villagers in achieving financial sustainability on
their own, thus the radio stations are caught in limbo, heavily dependent on capricious donor
funding and unable to grow into self-sufficiency from their own resource base.
Community radio is a new phenomenon in the Pacific; many islanders are unaware of its
development potential within participatory development models. Instead, they use these radio
stations to fulfil Pacific cultural objectives, such broadcasting local music and announcing
personal messages in their vernacular. Thus they are celebrating their cultures, affirming their
consocial identities, and building relationships through horizontal and vertical dialogue with each
other and their chiefs and some times local government officials. Donors are discouraged by such
309
programming, however, because they had envisaged a more “substantial” development-oriented
broadcast schedule, one that suited their development objectives, as was seen with Niua FM and
Buala FM.
These trends reflect the persistent friction between donor focus on delivering the “products” of a
development initiative and the Pacific focus on the “process” of relationship building and
affirmation. Donors need to justify their tax-funded projects through the monitoring and
evaluating of project outcomes. But what if the most valuable outcome is simply the affirming of
relationship? Must talanoa radio achieve measurable outcomes? Is the dissemination of Western-
defined aid-driven development content the only way to achieve financial sustainability for these
rural broadcasters even if such content threatens to crowd out local voices?
Even femLINK, the region’s most successful secular community broadcaster, is confronted by
the dilemma between product versus process. Is the “process” of giving poor rural women a
“voice” through femTALK FM enough or must there be associated effective action or “product?”
The sharing of a poor woman’s story in a public speech performance around femTALK FM does
bring recognition to the value of her voice and helps to open the culture of silence. But do such
speech performances lead to improvements in the quality of her life in the village? How does
educating her about international conventions enshrining her human security rights help her
mollify an abusive husband? The answers are elusive. Social change occurs subtly at the local
level and is difficult to measure. But field evidence supports the fact that Pacific community
broadcasters do have innate understandings of the sorts of information their communities desire
and strive within their limitations to provide it, as evidenced in programming content of Niua FM
and Radio BOSCO.
Transmission models of media
Throughout the region, broadcast media are still widely regarded as one-way messaging
channels. Government officials, CSO representatives, foreign development actors, church
leaders, media professionals, media training providers, and grassroots islanders seem unaware of
or uninspired by the dialogic potential of community radio. Community radio is still a novelty,
310
champions for the cause are rare, and rarer still are successful community radio stations to serve
as role models.
Since the mid-2000s, talkback radio shows hosted by national and commercial broadcasters have
become popular and offer some potential for listeners to contribute their voices to radio content,
but talk-time costs are high for rural callers and the dialogue is constrained within boundaries set
by the broadcaster. National broadcasters perform admirably well given their political and
financial constraints to deliver development-oriented content, but they are often more concerned
with nation-building and less so about empowering community expression. Most PICs lack
regulations that would require commercial broadcasters to carry public-service programming.
Faith-based broadcasters, some of whom are financially and organisationally sustainable, deliver
large amounts of imported religious programming with limited opportunities for listener
engagement.
The business side of community broadcasting
One resounding research finding is the need to train islanders interested in community radio in
organisational-management skills, not just media-production skills. Donors simply fail to do this.
No evidence was found to suggest that any national or regional Pacific media-development
initiative, such as those offered by national or regional professional organisations like the Pacific
Islands News Association (PINA), regional development organisations like the Secretariat of the
Pacific Community (SPC), or donor-led efforts such as SOLMAS and PACMAS address the
business side of media, much less community radio. Most media-training initiatives focus on
journalism skills.
Rural villagers have very limited opportunities to learn how to manage a community radio
station. Donors appear disinterested in providing relevant organisational training, thus leaving
community radio stations in a state of either perpetual dependency or erratic functionality.
Villagers are not exposed to community radio and are unaware of the need to support their
community stations, financially and otherwise. Without organisational training, community radio
stations have little chance to survive, much less evolve into vibrant broadcasters capable of
articulating the voices of their communities.
311
Civil society and development communication
Many international development actors do appear to be aware of the importance of working

within Pacific cultural frameworks to achieve sustainable development, but they often struggle to
understand how best it do this. Many seek out intermediary local partners, such as CSOs, to
provide entryways into the Pacific socio-cultural fabric and to better drive the development
project. As seen within the Buala FM and Niua FM case studies, sometimes these intermediary
actors employ rentier behaviours that steer development projects off-course. But as shown in the
femTALK FM and Radio BOSCO chapters, often it is only indigenous actors who have the
cultural aptitude to engage with Pacific social networks. Chiefs and local government officials
can be strong allies of community radio if they sense revenue can be generated. Pacific CSOs
widely conceive of media as information-dissemination channels; they prefer to work within
culturally appropriate small-group interpersonal methods (talanoa), or with print media (for
longer self life) or community theatre. Many CSOs rely heavily on donor funding, thus their
media usage is influenced by donors’ media preferences.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Given my research findings, what pragmatic approaches could be taken to foster the growth of
Pacific community radio? Below I list some possible considerations.
To advance social sustainability
Clearly, working in harmony with the Pacific’s extensive social networks is the key toward
fostering social sustainability.
• Nurture community radio “champions” within regional media organisations and national
telecommunication and broadcasting regulators. Organisations like the Pacific Association of
Public Service Broadcasters and PINA already contain community-media supporters on their
boards and among their staff. Field data indicated that mid-level technical officials in
312
telecommunication and/or broadcasting regulatory agencies were keen about community
radio. Many expressed desires to establish radio stations in both their home and diaspora
villages. Many had regional and international professional and social networks and the
personal interest to dabble in the field, so to speak. National professional media associations,
or press clubs, tend to tightly focus on journalism-related issues but awareness-raising work
within those groups would break down apprehension around the role of community radio in
the larger media sector.
• Pacific faith-based broadcasters are an under-valued resource. Sometimes they are

excluded from media-training initiatives, such as those offered by SOLMAS, PACMAS and
the SPC. During field interviews, SPC officials expressed an interest toward including faith-
based broadcasters in future workshops. The PINA does include faith-based broadcasters
within its membership but they are a small minority. The media-savvy, 37-country Pacific
Conference of Churches could be a useful ally in promoting community radio. Among its
staff are media professionals but the organisation’s preference currently appears to be toward
ICTs. Pacific clerical-training institutions, such as the Pacific Regional Seminary and Pacific
Theological College, could be persuaded to include media and communication theology
courses in their curricula. Additionally, the Pacific branches of SIGNIS (the World Catholic
Association for Communication) and WACC (the World Association for Christian
Communication) appear to be fairly moribund but they share membership with community
radio broadcasters (Radio BOSCO in SIGNIS and femLINK in WACC), thus allowing for
cross-fertilisation. The WACC-Pacific appears re-energised after new board elections in 2012
and is now advocating around a “communication rights” platform that could be made more
inclusive of community media. Despite the discomfort some secular community broadcasters
feel toward faith-based broadcasters and their strong international linkages, many faith-based
broadcasters are stable, passionate, fairly well staffed, and produce relevant programming for
their communities.
• Pacific CSOs as embodied by umbrella groups, such as the regional PIANGO (Pacific
Islands Association of NGOs) and national liaison units, still view media as messaging
channels. There appears to be thin awareness of the dialogic potential of radio, either at the
community-radio level or via talkback shows on commercial and national broadcasters. Many
CSO umbrella groups offer workshops on how to work with the media, such as through the
writing of press releases. These offer opportunities for the introduction of training materials
around facilitating dialogue through media work. Community broadcasters that are organised
as CSOs, like femTALK FM but not Buala FM, Niua FM or Radio BOSCO, could avail
313
themselves of the business-management workshops offered by umbrella groups. Youth CSOs
interested in media work provide opportunities to work within global social movements, as
femLINK has done within the women’s movement. Youth voices are also affected by the
culture of silence. The international development community has historically provided
funding for youth CSOs to create radio content in partnership with national broadcasters.86
• Expand the curricula offered by formal media-training institutions such as the University
of the South Pacific (USP), Fiji National University, Samoa National University, and various
vocational-technical schools.87 Many tertiary institutions host student radio stations that could
serve as experimental or training labouratories. Currently, neither community media nor the
business side of media are presented in course offerings. Most student radio stations, such as
USP’s Radio Pasifik, deliver mostly entertainment content, news headlines and some
talkback shows in regional languages. The USP has significant potential to be a community
radio ally if the university leadership can be so persuaded.88 It offers a strong journalism
program taught by respected Pacific journalists. Radio Pasifik has the capacity to broadcast
via satellite to university centres in 12 PICs, thus providing opportunities for youth
expression, participatory program creation and exchange, and the seeding of community
media sensibilities in the next generation of Pacific media professionals.
• Expand the SPC’s existing community-radio curricula into distance-education modes,

with the possible inclusion of business-related training modules derived from CEMCA (the
Commonwealth Educational Media Centre For Asia). CEMCA is a department within the
Commonwealth of Learning, which is both an SPC and USP partner.
To advance organisational sustainability
Again, the Pacific’s social networks are important contributors to engendering organisational
sustainability of community radio.
86
For example, in Papua New Guinea, a World Bank-funded youth-led Yu Tok Radio project aired daily half-hour shows around
development themes for 12 weeks in 2006. Its Sunday talkback show attracted 51 percent of the youth listening audience (Ali,
2008; The Yu Tok Blog, 2009). The project did not survive beyond its initial funding period. The UNESCO-affiliated “On The
Spot” radio project in Tonga produced eight weekly shows on the MDGs, which were aired on Radio Tonga in 2006. Project
organisers said local media outlets expressed “only a vague interest” in the radio series and that youth media producers faced “a
constant challenge to be taken seriously” (E. Fifita & On the Spot, 2006:7, 12).
87
The newest campus of the regional AusAID-funded Australia-Pacific Technical College opened in June 2013 in partnership
with the Don Bosco vocational-training school administered by Fr Ambrose Pereira in Honiara, thus providing a linkage with a
community radio champion and a functional radio station that lacks only electricity.
88
To win support from university management, Radio Pasifik must demonstrate that it is financially sustainable, which leads
back to inculcating organisational-management skills into its volunteers.
314
• The SPC is well positioned to assume a more pro-active role in growing regional
community media, perhaps within a model similar to that of CEMCA. The SPC has a busy
regional media centre that already conducts media-skills trainings throughout the region. The
SPC is a diverse development agency with ready access to content experts in a variety of
development sectors and access to regional satellite-connectivity services. The SPC also hosts
an under-utilised radio training station within its Community Education and Training Centre;
graduates from this program were found throughout the case study radio stations. However,
their training appears to have focused only on announcing skills and basic scriptwriting. In
2011, SPC media staff had expressed interest in taking a stronger advocacy position around
community radio, however personnel changes in 2012 might have weakened SPC’s
commitment to this goal. Still, SPC has the capacity and apparent political will to evolve into
a Pacific version of CEMCA, given its excellent regional reputation, its 22-country
membership, its existing linkages to international donor agencies, and its relationship with
CEMCA’s parent organisation, the Commonwealth of Learning. The SPC is perhaps the only
regional organisation that could evolve into a clearinghouse or hub for regional community
broadcasters.
• Pacific community broadcasters expressed a deep interest in station-to-station staff

exchanges that would enable community broadcasters to learn from each other, which was
seen as a superior approach than donor-led one-off workshops. Such efforts could be funded
by regional bi-lateral donors. AusAID has a good track record in “twinning” projects,
wherein Australian and Pacific CSOs and churches of similar characteristics have been placed
into partnership. Additionally, New Zealand has a vibrant pan-Pacific community media
sector, thus providing linkages into Pacific diaspora populations and the wealth they generate.
Conceivably, short-term attachments would allow Pacific community radio staff to be
embedded in Australian or New Zealand ethnic community radio stations, thus allowing
islanders opportunities to self-direct their own learning within culturally appropriate
environments.
• The Commonwealth of Learning (COL) remains a valuable Pacific partner given its
involvement in numerous community radio projects, both regionally and around the world
and in particular in Caribbean island states. The COL’s ability to liaise with major Pacific
donors, such as AusAID and NZAID, could be beneficial. During field interviews, COL staff
indicated an interest in organising international funding for a trial project around community-
radio awareness in the Pacific. Many interviewees expressed their admiration for COL’s
315
activities. They also expressed a desire that AMARC (the World Association of Community
Radio Broadcasters) would have a stronger regional presence. Other international media
organisations also work in the Pacific region and could be persuaded to pay more attention to
growing the community-media sector. The Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcast Development
offers a community broadcasting training component but the organisation has a rather weak
presence in the region. The Commonwealth Broadcasting Association tends to focus its
training on digital media (video) and Pacific national broadcasters.
To advance financial sustainability
Securing financial sustainability of Pacific community broadcasters is a significant challenge, as

it is for most community broadcasters worldwide. Weaknesses in organisational sustainability
directly impact on a radio station’s financial situation, so strengthening the business skills within
Pacific community broadcasters in such areas as grant writing, computer access and skills,
project management, financial accounting, audience engagement, and evaluation and monitoring
techniques will greatly help them locate and secure financial support.
• Work for regulatory recognition of community radio as a distinct sub-sector in national

broadcasting legislation. The current lack of such recognition everywhere but in Fiji does not
appear to directly obstruct the emergence of community radio; there is no evidence that
Pacific governments have denied license applications. But the cost of commercial
broadcasting licenses can be a significant financial burden to small community broadcasters,
as was seen in the Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM case study.
• Additionally, international development actors need to be repeatedly reminded that

broadcast radio is the appropriate Pacific medium, not satellite- or computer-based ICTs.
A proposed hybrid model of radio conjoined with mobile telephony might prove to be
economically attractive enough to win the attention of the international development
community. But to advocate for such a model entails the sensitising of Pacific government
ministers who engage in regional and international policy work to the importance of
supporting radio in the Pacific media sector. Field evidence suggests such ministers “go
along” with the donor-led ICT agendas because of the rents that can be accrued and because
such ministers are largely technical engineers, not communication professionals.
316
• The Solomons’ national broadcaster, SIBC, is the first in the region to undergo state-owned
enterprise (SOE) reform within “community service obligation contracts” (CSOb). Given
the multiplicity of community broadcasters in the Solomons, this provides an interesting test
case to explore how well these CSOb contracts perform in the Pacific context. Again, much
will depend on how well capacitated community broadcasters are or how well they can
partner in joint applications with non-media CSOs that could provide the necessary business-
management skills. Given the rentier orientation within the Pacific CSO sector, such
partnerships would need to be carefully defined.
• Donor-funded contestable funds to enable CSOs, community radio outlets and similar
others to create radio content have been successful, as proven by the Vois Blog Yumi project
in Vanuatu and PACMAS phase 2. AusAID and NZAID could be encouraged to build more
of these funding models into their regional development programs around “good governance”
and CSO capacity building. Staff within UNDP’s Pacific Centre said they support the
emergence of community radio in the region, but they acknowledged there is little funding
from their side to foster this. UNESCO’s Pacific office could also be encouraged to have a
higher profile in community radio. For much of the 2000s, UNESCO-Pacific, if it funded
media projects at all, funded journalism training.
• Similarly, national-level contestable funding to enable the emergence of community

broadcasters exists in Fiji’s and Samoa’s media regulations and within telecommunication
regulations around “universal access” provisions in Samoa and Vanuatu. These would benefit
from pilot projects to test the applicability of such schemes in the Pacific context. Fiji’s
Media Industry Development Authority (MIDA) has the authority to impose a 7 percent levy
on the advertising revenues of commercial broadcasters to fund the community media sub-
sector. It appears this model has not yet been tested. If the model proves to be successfully
implemented, it could serve as an example for other PICs to follow. However, it appears the
MIDA lacks its own organisational capacity and Fiji’s return to democratic governance in
2014 might find that the MIDA’s statutory legislation, the 2010 Media Decree, is revoked.
Expanding definitions of “universal access” provisions in national telecommunication
regulations to include community media could provide funding streams.
• Investigate partnerships with national broadcasters in the areas of technical and

administrative personnel attachments and through programming-exchange agreements similar
to that between Vanuatu’s national broadcaster and CReST FM. These could allow for rural
voices to enter the national dialogue through transmission on the national broadcaster and
possibly provide stable funding sources for community radio stations.
317
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Appendices
Table 5.2 Interviewees, with pseudonyms

Interviewee Date of Interview Type of Interview
Community radio
Buala FM “Felise” 3 March 2011 Semi-structured (SS),
(Solomon Islands) multiple
“Frank” 3 March 2011 SS
“Mary” 22 Feb., 2011 SS, multiple
3 March 2011
“Nancy” 4 March 2011 SS
“Patricia” 3 March 2011 SS
“Samuel” 11 March 2011 SS
“Timothy” 3 March 2011 SS
“Vince” 23 Feb. 2011 SS
CReST FM (Vanuatu) “John” 17 March 2011 Email
“Maraia” 1 Feb. 2011 Brief
femLINK PACIFIC/ “Anita” 11 Feb. 2011 SS
femTALK FM (Fiji)
“Lateefa” 12 Feb. 2011 SS
“Vanessa” 1 Feb., 2011 SS, multiple
11 Feb. 2011
Volunteers, about 14 total 1 Feb.,11-12 Feb. Focus group (FG)
2011
Ma’a Fafine mo’ ‘e Familie/ “Kesi” 16 Jan. 2012 SS
Le’o ‘o e Kakai FM (Tonga)
“Ofa” 16 Jan. 2012 SS
Niuatoputapu FM “Hiva” 23 Jan. 2012 SS
(Tonga)
“Lavani” 19 Jan. 2012 SS
“Tukupa” 23 Jan. 2012 SS, multiple
Radio Bosco “Alan” 25 March 2012 SS
(Solomon Islands)
“Catherine” 24 Feb. 2011 SS
“Christopher” 1 March, 10 March SS, multiple
2011
“Ken” 10 March 2011 FG
“Lionel” 2 March 2011 SS
Radio Pasifik (University of “Peter” 4 Feb. 2011 SS
the South Pacific, Fiji)
Three volunteers 5 Feb. 2011 FG
SIDT “Benjamin” and “Thomas” 23 Feb. 2011 SS
(Solomon Islands)
“Benjamin” 10 March 2011 Brief
Broadcast Regulators
Fiji Ministry of Public “Sikeli” and “Gregory” 31 Jan. 2011 SS
Enterprise, Tourism and
Communications
Telecommunications “Charles” 24 Feb. 2011 SS
Commission Solomon Islands
“Bernard” 2 March 2011 SS
Tonga Ministry of Information “Kainga” 13 Jan. 2012 SS, multiple
and Communication 2 Feb. 2012
National broadcasters
Fiji Broadcasting Corporation “Aasha” and “Mikeli” 2 Feb. 2011 SS
“Rohit” 28 Jan. 2011 SS
Solomon Islands Broadcasting “Elias” 25 Feb. 2011 SS
Corporation
Tonga Broadcasting “Papahi” 3 Feb. 2012 SS
Corporation
CSOs
362
The Citizens’ Constitutional “Josefa” 8 Feb. 2011 SS
Forum (CCF)
Ecumenical Centre for “Joeli” and “Luke” 27 Feb. 2011 SS
Research Education and
Advocacy (ECREA)
Foundation for the People of “Terence” 9 Feb. 2011 SS
the South Pacific (FSPI)
Pacific Conference of “Len” 27 Jan. 2011 SS
Churches (PCC)
Pacific Islands News “Uriam” 28 Feb.2011 SS
Association
Save the Children “Billy” 4 March 2011 SS
Solomon Islands Development “Lyndon” 7 March 2011 SS
Trust (SIDT)
Women Action for Change “Vicky” 31 Jan. 2011 SS
World Association of Christian “Jope” 3 Feb. 2011 SS
Communication-Pacific
(WACC)
Development agencies
Commonwealth of Learning “Kevin” 2 April 2011 SS
Pacific Islands Forum “Ron” 9 Feb. 2011 SS
Secretariat (PIFS)
Secretariat of the Pacific “Norman,” “Rui,” and “Theresa” 26 Jan. 2011 SS
Community (SPC)
SOLMAS, AusAID “Ellen” 8 March 2011 SS
UNDP-Pacific Centre “Mathew” 8 Feb. 2011 SS
Government, miscellaneous
Tonga “Mafu,” elected official 16 Jan. 2012 SS
Tonga “Kapo,” civil servant 19 Jan. 2012 SS
Miscellaneous
University of the South Pacific “Anthony” 7 Feb. 2011 SS
MIssionary “Rick” 31 Jan. 2012 Brief
363
Table 5.3 General Guideline of Interview Questions, by category
Community radio
For management:
• Tell me about your hopes and dreams when you first initiated the station. What prompted you to set up a
radio station? What unexpected advantages or obstacles have you encountered?
• What is their working definition of CR; what is its role in the overall media environment.
• What are the challenges facing CR in the Pacific. What keeps it from reaching its potential?
• Background information on staffing: number of paid staff, number of volunteers, general characteristics of
volunteers, how/where recruited, average length of service, training needs and provisions. For femLINK, ask
about gender (male volunteers).
• Organisational structure: background on governance board, activities concerning leadership training for
succession, nature of diversity of leadership within CR.
• Programming: how content decisions are made, is funding tied to shows.
• Funding models: Where revenues are derived. How donors are found and kept. Philosophy about donors and
CR independence/dependency.
• The role of PSB in the overall media environment. What is relationship between PSB and CR.
• The use of ICT in CR work. General questions about the nature/limitations of their current technology.
• Linkages between CR and other CSOs – who do they work with, nature of relationship (programming
creation? Issue solidarity? Funding only?)
• The Pacific “cultures of silence” and what role might CR have in moderating these cultural aspects.
• General questions about participation in regional/international media organisations.
Extra for Fiji:

• Is there any attempt to replicate femLINK in other PICs?
• Where does interim government’s interest in or sensitivity toward CR come from? What is your experience
with the Fiji Govt? Views on MIDA.
• Views on the Fiji Broadcasting Bill 2006 recommendation to tax commercial media to foster the growth of
CR and C-TV.
For volunteers:
• Note gender, age, etc
• How long has each volunteered at (case study), nature of work (hours involved, etc).
• What motivates them to volunteer.
• Is there any compensation (stipend, taxi fare, lunch, etc).
• What is their definition of CR. What makes CR different from other media.
• What do they think the role of CR is. Does the station fulfill this role? If not, what needs to be done to
accomplish this?
• How program content is decided?
• How they interact with community/hear feedback from community?
• What they wish to obtain from their engagement with CR .
• What they like best, what they like least about their CR and their job in it. Things they would like their CR to do
in the future.
Broadcast regulators
• How does the regulator see the role of CR and PSB in the broadcast environment.
• Have there been any noticeable trends in license applications in recent years? Who is making application? Is
there ever a case when applications are denied? What is the survival rate of new stations? How would he
define CR. Is it useful to make a distinction between secular and faith-based CR?
• Specific questions about country’s regulatory environment, license fees, length of licenses, etc. Any there
any licensing requirement concerning for local programming content, etc.
• Most of the broadcasting regulations in the PICs are silent on the issue of CR. Why do you think this is so?
Do you think there a need to specifically break out third-sector media in the regulations, perhaps into a different
tier like the Fiji regulations do?
• Questions about radio broadcast spectrum. Is there enough? How is it allocated? Is there a threat to analogue
broadcasters and their access to the spectrum posed by this explosion of ICT users?
• What are the largest issues today in Fiji’s broadcasting environment?
• In many PICS the media broadcast spectrum appears to be subsumed under ICT spectrum plans. How
credible is the concern that the older broadcast technologies might be subsumed under the newer ICT
regulations?
• Tell me what you think about the use of ICT technology in the Pacific where Internet penetrations are so
limited and too expensive for the average person.
364
Extra for Solomons:
• Tell me what makes SI so open to CR. How many CRs are there now in SI?
Extra for Fiji:

• Questions about the Fiji Broadcasting Bill, the establishment of a 7 percent tax on commercial media
advertising revenue to fund CR and C-TV. Any viewpoints on this?
National broadcasters
• What do you see as the role of PSB in the overall media environment, your philosophy.
• What are the challenges facing PSB in Fiji/Solomons/the region?
• What is the role of PSB in development in the Pacific?
• How are programming decisions made? Are there any linkages between programming content and national
development plans or goals?
• From where does FBCL/SIBC derive its revenue?
• How does FBCL/SIBC engage with the grassroots listeners? How do radio producers know what the audience
is thinking or might want in terms of content?
• Do you work with CSOs and/or government ministries in program creation?
• In some countries, the PSB is seen more as a spokesman for the government. How does a PSB maintain its
balance and impartiality under pressures from government officials?
• Most of the broadcasting regulations in the PICs are silent on the issue of CR. Why do you think this is so?
• How do you define CR? What are the challenges facing the growth of CR in the Pacific?
• What are your views on the role of faith-based community radio in the media landscape? … In development
work?
• How do you see the broadcasting environment in the PICs evolving in the next few years?
• What would the ideal PSB environment in the Pacific look like? How close are we to attaining that vision?
• In many PICS the media broadcast spectrum appears to be subsumed under ICT spectrum plans. Do you think
there a threat to analogue broadcasters …?
Extra for Solomons:

• Tell me what makes Solomons so open to community radio.
Extra for Fiji:

• CR is mentioned in the 2010 Media Decree. Where did this interest in CR originate? What is the thinking behind
this, as most PICs are silent on the issue of CR.
• Should there be some level public-service programming on commercial broadcasters?
• The Fiji Broadcasting Bill and Anthony report both recommend the establishment of a 7 percent tax on
commercial media advertising revenue…. Some of these funds would be used to develop CR and CTV. What
are your thoughts about this?
CSOs/Churches
• What is the role of CSOs in development? (What is the role of churches/faith-based organisations in
development?)
• Who sets the development agenda?
• Who speaks for the people?
• What are the main challenges facing Pacific CSOs?
• How well do Pacific CSOs work together?
• What is the role of communication in CSO activities. What challenges do they face working with the mainstream
media?
• How do CSOs address the Pacific “culture of silence?”
• What is the relationship between CSOs and their donors? How CSOs strike a balance between their
organisational goals and objectives and those of their donors?
• Do you have any experience working with community radio (the case studies).
• Do PIC governments represent the interests of grassroots people sufficiently well enough?
• How would you describe PIFSs engagement with CSOs? How well are the views of grassroots people
expressed through the Pacific Plan and PACER-Plus?
• Specific CSO questions.
365
Development agencies/donors
• Who sets the Pacific development agenda?

• Tell me your thoughts about the MDGs from within a Pacific viewpoint.
• What is the role of CSOs in development? (What is the role of churches/faith-based organisations in
development?) What do you see as the main challenges facing Pacific CSOs? In what areas are CSOs doing
particularly good work?
• How do you engage with the CSOs that you work with? What is the usual procedure?
• How can CSOs strike a balance between their need for donor funds and the mandates that are often attached
to aid by the donor? How involved do donors become in the work that they fund? How involved does your
agency become? Where is balance point?
• How would you characterise Pacific CSOs?
• How would you characterise PIC donors?
• What is the role of media in development?
• How well do you think the voices of grassroots people are expressed in Pacific development initiatives such as
the Pacific Plan?
• Do you think the government representatives adequately express the voices of the Pacific people? Are CSOs
“closer” to the people than governements? How about churches?
• Are you familiar with community radio? Have you given any thought to the role such media might play
in improving communication and dialogue about development issues?
• What is the role for “outsiders?” in Pacific development?
366

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Talanoa Radio: Exploring the Interface of

Development, Culture and Community Radio

in the South Pacific

Linda Susan Austin

Bachelor of Arts in Government/Journalism, California State University at Sacramento, 1980

Master of Science in Journalism, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1990

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at

The University of Queensland in 2013

School of Journalism and Communication

Publications included in this thesis

community radio, development communication, south pacific, rentier economics, pacific

Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classifications (ANZSRC)

ANZSRC code: 200103 International and Development Communication, 60%

ANZSRC code: 169905 Studies of Pacific Peoples' Societies, 40%

Fields of Research (FoR) Classification

FoR code: 2001 Communication and Media Studies, 60%

FoR code: 1699 Other Studies in Human Society, 40%

Chapter 10 Conclusion and recommendations

Table 2.1 Pacific ODA sources by year and amount.......................................................... 60

Map 1.1 Research area ...................................................................................................... 31

Photo 6.1 Buala FM volunteers......................................................................................... 171

Table 5.2 Interviewees, with pseudonyms ......................................................................... 362

Table 5.3 General guideline of interview questions, by category ....................................... 364

ABC Australian Broadcasting Corporation

Development, culture and community radio in the South Pacific

Summary of the argument: development

Similarly, development theories around participatory or people-led development are challenged in

Summary of the argument: culture

The research questions

My research reconceptualises rentier economics and culturally informed rent-seeking behaviour

Greater Oceania encompasses one

My four case studies are:

• Niuatoputapu FM in northern Tonga, the ownership of which was eventually assumed by

This thesis is organised as follows:

Chapter 2 presents an overview of orthodox development theory and alternative Pacific

Encounters with Difference

Development and culture in the Pacific island context

As my main research interest is to discover evidence that a Pacific-centric model of community

THE OTHER SIDE OF HEAVEN9

ISLANDS IN ORTHODOX DEVELOPMENT THEORY

Islands in the world

Colonial legacies: early period

Colonial legacies: late period

Colonial-era economists failed to recognise the connection between increased development-aid

Pacific development in the mid-20th Century

ISLANDS AND RENTIER DEVELOPMENT MODELS

The Dependency Model

The Rentier Model

Islanders in the world: aid

Table 2.1 Pacific ODA sources by year and amount*

Table 2.3 ODA to select PICs, by donor and sector, 2010

Islanders on the Internet

Islanders in the sky: Tongasat

Table 2.4 PIC migration demographics

“The economics of affection”29

Table 2.5 Remittance Flows by Select PIC

Allowing for the movement of Pacific workers within trade-liberalisation agreements is a

The Pacific talking

The use of communication technology is an essential component in this migration-remittance

Table 2.6 Permanent migration, by countries of origin and destination, by decade

Participatory development and media in the Pacific context

MEDIA IN DEVELOPMENT THEORY

The historical context