LEX CERUVS NOTES 2020
ATTY. SAWADAJAAN CRIMINAL LAW CASE DIGEST
People vs. Nangcas (2018)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA NANGCAS
G.R. No. 218806, June 13, 2018
MARTIRES, J.:
Facts: An Information was filed charging appellant for
Violation of the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003", which
alleges that the accused, unlawfully recruit, transport four (4)
women, three of them are minors, by taking advantage of the
vulnerability of said victims for the purpose of offering and
selling said victims for forced labor, that is, by promising them
local employment (as househelpers in Camella Homes,
Cagayan de Oro City) with a monthly salary of PhP1,500.00
each and that they could go home every Sunday, but instead,
said accused brought them to Marawi City and sold them for
PhP1,600.00 each to their great damage and prejudice.
Nangcas denied the allegations claiming that she had no idea
that the employer would no longer be needing house helpers;
hence, with no money to pay for the fare, she had no other
choice but to stay with Baby Abas in Marawi City.
Issue: Whether or not appellant’s guilt was established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling: Yes, appellant’s guilt was established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Section 4 of RA 9208 provides: It shall be unlawful for any
person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a
person by any means, including those done under the pretext
of domestic or overseas employment or training or
apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography,
sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude
or debt bondage;
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are
considered as qualified trafficking: (a) When the trafficked
person is a child;
In this case, Nangcas induced and coaxed the victims to go
with her by promising the victims and their parents that their
daughters would be working within Cagayan De Oro City, with
an enticing salary of P1,500.00 per month. In Marawi, the
victims were constrained to work with the intention to save
money for their fare going back home; however, when they
asked for their salary they were told that it had already been
given to Nangcas.
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Ratio Decidendi: Deceit is the false representation of a matter
of fact intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it
to his legal injury.
Gist: This an appeal from the Decision of the CA, which
affirmed the Decision of the RTC, finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking
in Persons under Section 4 in relation to Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 9208.
People vs. Tibon Case Digest G.R. No. 188320, June 29,
2010
Facts:
Honorio Tibon (accused-appellant) and his common-law wife
Gina Sumingot (Gina) lived together as husband and wife.
They had two children, Keen Gist (KenKen) and Reguel Albert
(Reguel). They lived together with Tibon’s parents and siblings
on the third floor of a rented house. Gina went to Hongkong to
work as a domestic helper, leaving their children to Tibon’s
custody. After some time, Tibon heard from her sister who was
also working abroad that Gina was having an affair with
another man. After the revelation, he was spotted drinking a lot
and was seen hitting his two children.
On the night of December 12, 1998, at around 11:30 p.m.,
accused-appellant’s mothertaand his siblings (Zernan and
Leilani), went to Tibon’s room. They saw him with the two
children who appeared to be lifeless and bore wounds on their
bodies. When Tibon realized that his mother and siblings had
seen the children lying on the floor he stabbed himself on the
chest with a kitchen knife and jumped out of the window of
their house. At the hospital, accused-appellant survived and
was treated however, the children could no longer be revived.
When Gina heard about the incident, she went home
immediately and confronted Tibon at the hospital where he
was confined. He confessed to stabbing their children and
begged her for forgiveness.
In court, Tibon denied the charges against him and raised
insanity as defense. He said that he could not recall what
happened on the night he allegedly stabbed his two children.
He also could not remember being taken to the hospital. He
said that he was only informed by his siblings that he had
killed his two children, causing him to jump off the window of
their house.
Issue:
Whether or not the exempting circumstance of insanity
applies to the accused-appellant’s case?
Ruling:
No.  Under Article 12 of the RPC “An imbecile or an insane
person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval” is
exempted from criminal liability. Anyone who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of
proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Testimony or
proof of insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding
or coetaneous with the commission of the offense.
The medical records of Tibon with the National Center for
Mental Health (NCMH) is inapplicable for such refers to his
condition to stand trial and not to his mental state immediately
before or during the commission of the crimes.
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Tibon’s behavior was triggered by jealousy because of the some purchases. Sandiganbayan convicted Rene Pondevida,
revelation that his wife was having an affair overseas. the Municipal Treasurer of Badiangan, Iloilo, of three counts of
Uncontrolled jealousy and anger are not equivalent to insanity. the complex crime of malversation of public funds through
falsification of commercial documents.  AMIGABLE and
The court considered Parricide as the applicable law in this GRANDE and the Mayor were acquitted.
case. Under Article 264 Parricide is committed when: (i) a
person is killed; (ii) the deceased is killed by the accused; (iii)    
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Tibon
ISSUE: WON PONDEVIDA IS GUILTY OF
was found guilty by this Court with the punishment of reclusion
MALVERSATION under ARTICLE 217 of the RPC-
perpetua.
YES!

    

PONDEVIDA v. SANDIGANBAYAN           The essential elements common to all acts of

malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are
G.R. Nos. 160929-31 August 16, 2005 CALLEJO, the following:
SR., J.:
 
(a)   That the offender be a public officer.
Based on the submitted cashbook of Pondevida, the State
auditors discovered that the Pondevida had a shortage of (b)   That he had the custody or control of
P1,176,580.59. Thus, 3 Informations for malversation of public funds or property by reason of the
funds through falsification of commercial documents relating to duties of his office.
the checks disbursements were filed in the Sandiganbayan (c)   That those funds or property were
against Mayor Amigable, Pondevida, and three private public funds or property for which he
individuals, namely, Victor Grande, Norma Tiu and Glenn was accountable.
Celis. Allegedly, Amigable and Pondevida, public officers,
conniving with one VICTOR GRANDE, a private individual and (d)   That he appropriated, took,
proprietor of V.N. Grande Enterprises, falsified a commercial misappropriated or consented or,
document consisting of a check of LAND BANK OF THE through abandonment or negligence,
PHILIPPINES, with V.N. Grande Enterprises as the payee, by permitted another person to take
making it appear therein that the municipality of Badiangan them.
has some accounts payable to V.N. Grande Enterprises for

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          A public officer may be liable for malversation even if he
does not use public property or funds under his custody for his
personal benefit, but consents to the taking thereof by another
person, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
such taking. In the present case, the petitioner does not
dispute the fact that, by his overt acts of drawing and issuing Article 217: Malversation of Public Funds
the checks to the order of Victor Grande, Glenn Celis and G.R. No. 184908
Norma Tiu, they were able to encash the checks.  Even if the
petitioner received P893,860.67 from them on June 15, 1997, July 3, 2013
a day after the checks were encashed, by then, the felonies of
Major Joel G. Cantos, Petitioner VS People of the
malversation had already been consummated.  Case law has
Philippines, Respondent
it that the individuals’ taking of funds is completed and is
consummated even if the severance of the funds from the
possession was only for an instant. Restitution of the said
amount after the consummation of the crimes is not a ground FACTS:
for acquittal of the said crimes. On the petitioner’s claim that Major Joel G. Cantos is a Commanding Officer of the
he deposited the amount of P893,890.67 with the LBP on June 22nd Finance Service Center in the Presidential Security
15, 1995 as evidenced by the deposit slips, SC held that it was Group, Malacanang Park in Manila. On December 21, 2000,
petitioner’s burden to prove that the said amount was part of he took and misappropriated the amount of P3, 270,000.00
the deposit he made with the LBP on June 15, 1997, but he from public funds, by reason of his position in the Office and
failed to do so.  for his personal interest.
  Meanwhile, Major Eligio T. Balao, a Disbursing Officer
 Dispositive: at the 22nd FSU who acted as a witness, revealed that Major
Cantos called him at around 12 noon to his office and notified
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.  The assailed Resolution him about the missing Special Duty Allowance for December
dated October 3, 2003 and Decision dated April 11, 2003 are and other Maintenance Operating Expenses under his
AFFIRMED.  supervision all amounting to P3 Million pesos. Balao was
taken aback by what he had just found out about the said
money.
When he asked Major Cantos where he kept it and
asked why he did not keep the money in a safety vault, there

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was no response from Cantos. Balao further narrated that he
was instructed by Major Cantos to get a screw driver to
unscrew the safety vault and make it appear that the money
was stolen from the vault. Instructions on getting the
combination number of the vault from a certain Major Mendoza
in Taguig were also given to Balao but he was not able to find
Mendoza. When Balao went back to the office, Col. Espinelli
tried to make him disclose that he took the money.
On the part of Major Cantos, he mentioned that he was
informed by Major Mendoza that the safety vault where he
wished to keep the money was defective and so he kept the
money in a duffel bag in a steel cabinet. At that time, he had
the keys to the steel cabinet. The next day, he narrated that
the duffel bag with the money was gone. At first, they wanted
to make it appear that the money was stolen by unscrewing
the vault. But, Cantos later informed Gen. Diaz about the lost
money and was advised to relay the incident to Col. Espinelli
to which Espinelli made an investigation.
In the case at bar, it showed that all the elements of the
crime of malversation of public funds were found. He was
public officer and had complete supervision and control of the
funds and he failed to explain adequately what had happened
to the funds.
ISSUE:
Did the Sandiganbayan make a mistake in finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
malversation of public funds? No.
HELD/RULING:
Petitioner Cantos failed to explain satisfactorily the
missing money amounting to P3 Million and restitute the
amount upon demand. The reasons he gave – the funds being
stolen and forcibly taken -- were not well-supported by
evidence. There was no trace of the steel cabinet where he
placed the money being opened by force and it was only
Cantos who had the keys to the said steel cabinet.
His explanation was insufficient and did not overcome
the presumption that he had put the missing funds to personal
use. Even if no direct evidence of misappropriation exists, it
was mentioned that the only required element is that there is
shortage in the officer’s account which has not been able to be
explained adequately.
The petition was DENIED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in convicting Major Joel G. Cantos of the
crime of Malversation of Public Funds was AFFIRMED and
UPHELD. There were costs against the petitioner.
People v. Paycana GR No 179035| 551 SCRA 657 | 16 April
2008 | Tinga, J. Princess Trisha Joy Z. Uy | Law 110-Criminal
Law II | Grp3
Paycana stabbed his pregnant wife several times and ended
up killing his wife and the unborn child. The elements of
unintentional abortion is in the ratio.
Facts: ! Paycana Jr. was charged with parricide with
unintentional abortion to which he pleaded not guilty ! He
claims it was self-defense, that the wife attacked him first and
so he had to retaliate and he ended up killing his pregnant
wife. Witness version: ! Paycana came home early in the
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morning carrying with him his tools of trade as a butcher (knife,
bolo, sharpener) ! He stabbed his wife 14 times. ! Due to the
shouting, Tito (wife’s father) went to the place to see his
daughter lying near the door. ! Seeing that the accused was
armed, he stepped back. ! Angelina (Paycana’s daughter)
says that Paycana held her mother’s neck and stabbed her.
Paycana version: ! He got the knife from the wife who stabbed
her first ! They had a fight the night before ! He wanted to
separate and while on his way out the wife stabbed him and so
he got the knife from the wife and stabbed her. ! He claims he
was not aware of the number of times because he was dizzy
from blood loss
Issue/Ratio: WON the acts were done in self-defense.
No RTC is better suited to ascertain if it was indeed self-
defense based on the facts. The lower court has appreciated
all the facts and circumstances, and have seen and heard the
witnesses. SC has no reason to disturb its findings. • unlawful
aggression - belied by the witnesses and medical findings that
injuries to Paycana were self-inflicted and superficial. •
reasonable means - 14 times! This shows effort to kill.
Elements of unintentional abortion (1) pregnant woman (2)
violence upon same pregnant woman w/o intending abortion
(3) violence is intentionally exerted (4) fetus dies as a result of
the violence This is a complex crime because one act resulted
to two felonies. The unborn fetus was also killed when the
accused stabbed his wife several times.
PEOPLE v. OYANIB
GR No. 130634-35 MARCH 12, 2001
PARDO, J.
DOCTRINE:
Indeterminate Sentence Law- intended to favor the accused
particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment, depending
upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record
as a prisoner 
CASE SUMMARY:
This is a joint trial of two cases filed against Oyanib for the
killing of his wife, Tita Oyanib and her paramour, Jesus
Esquierdo.
FACTS:
 Manolito and Tita begot 2 children and separated in
fact due to differences
 Manolito kept custody of the children; Tita lived nearby
renting a room at the 2nd floor of Llada’s house
 For the sake of their children, Manolito tried to
reconcile with Tita, but to no avail. Tita was open about
her relationship with other men and would flaunt it in
front of Manolito
 Manolito chanced upon Tita and Jesus in a very
intimate situation by a hanging bridge. He confronted
them and reminded her that she was still his wife. They
just ignored him and threatened to kill him
 Manolito went to the rented house of Tita to inform her
of their child’s failing grade. When he opened the door
using a hunting knife, he caught Jesus and Tita having
sex
 Jesus and Tita died of multiple stab wounds
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 Accused surrendered and admitted the killings but
invoked the exceptional circumstances under RPC 247
 RTC convicted him of homicide and parricide; with 2
mitigating circumstances: passion/obfuscation and
voluntary surrender
ISSUE: W/N accused is entitled to the exceptional
privilege under RPC 247
HELD/ RATIO: Yes
 An absolutory cause is present where the act
committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy
and sentiment, there is no penalty imposed.
 RPC 247 prescribes the following elements for such
defense:
1. that a legally married person surprises his
spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person;
2. that he kills any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter; and
3. that he has not promoted or facilitated the
prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he
or she has not consented to the infidelity of the
other spouse
 There is no question that the first element is present in
the case at bar. The crucial fact that accused must
convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his wife
and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or
immediately thereafter
 Accused have acted within the circumstances
contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife and
her lover in the act of sexual intercourse. Blinded by
jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who
fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger
on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him,
but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as
well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y
Mendoza surrendered to the police when a call for him
to surrender was made
 "The vindication of a Man's honor is justified because
of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is
strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise
her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a
purification is so severe as that it can only be justified
when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante
delicto; and it must be resorted to only with great
caution so much so that the law requires that it be
inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or
immediately thereafter."(People v. Wagas)
SC DECISION: RTC decision reversed. Accused is sentenced
of two (2) years and four (4) months of destierro. He shall not
be permitted to enter Iligan City, nor within a radius of one
hundred (100) kilometers from Iligan city
CASE DIGEST
On
People vs Abarca
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  hit by the shots fired by the accused. Arnold and Lina
vs. Amparado were rushed to the hospital and were rendered
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant. timely medical assistance that prevented their deaths.

Facts:

Legal Issues:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional 1. Whether or not Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant defining death inflicted under exceptional
Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder circumstances can be applied in the instant case
with double frustrated murder. The case was elevated to this dissolving the criminal liability of the accused for the
Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the murder of the deceased.
approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of 2. Whether or not the accused is liable for frustrated
death and commuting all existing death sentences to life murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us
whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed
case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing
us that he wished to continue with the case by way of an
appeal.

Holding:

On July 15, 1984 at around 6:00 PM, accused

Francisco Abarca went home and found his wife, Jenny, and 1. Yes, Article 247 can be applied in the instant case.
Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife 2. No, the accused is not liable for frustrated murder for
and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping
above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ranaway.
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. At
around 6:30 p.m. he got an M-16 rifle and went back to his Reasoning/Policy:
house. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He
proceeded to the hangout of Kingsley Koh. The accused found
Koh playing mah-jong and fired at him three times with his
rifle. Koh was hit and died instantaneously. Arnold and Lina
Amparado who were occupying the adjacent room were also

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Article 247 qualifies death to be under exceptional
circumstance when the following elements are present: (1) that
a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2)
that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter.
There is no question that the accused surprised his
wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse. That he
went out to kill one of them immediately thereafter is however
vague. The length of time that passed between the time the
accused discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the
victim and the time the latter was actually shot took almost an
hour. It must be understood however that the shooting was the
continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused. The
killing has been motivated by the same blind impulse and was
the direct by-product of the accused’s rage. Satisfying both
provisions, Article 247 can therefore be applicable in this case.
As a result, accused is not criminally liable for the death of the
deceased as he was under exceptional circumstance upon
employing the act of killing.
As a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the
consequences of his act. However, that rule presupposes that
the act done amounts to a felony. Ruling that Article247 can
be applied in this case, accused was therefore not committing
a felony when he killed the deceased. Having not committing a
felony, it therefore follows that the accused is not liable for the
unintended acts which followed, in this case, for the injuries
suffered by the Amparados.
Summary of Ruling by SC:
The case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the
accused-appellant was not committing murder when he
discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under
exceptional circumstances is not murder. It cannot therefore
hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries
suffered by the Amparados. For the separate injuries suffered
by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the
accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum
periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being the graver
penalty (than destierro).
The decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The
accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to
six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has
been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these
penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and
Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for
hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for
Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
PEOPLE v. ELIZER BEDUYA, GR No. 175315, 2010-08-09
Facts:
appellants Elizer Beduya (Elizer) and Ric Beduya (Ric)
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6th day of May 2002, at about 12:15 o'clock midnight, more or
less, in barangay Baga, Municipality of Pana-on, province of
Misamis Occidental... conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another... attack, box and then stab one
DOMINADOR S. ACOP... use of a knife... hitting him on the
left hypochondriac area which caused his death
also reported to their Barangay Captain, who responded by
going to the residence of the victim.
The victim told him that, "I will die because of this.  x x x  I was
boxed by Ric and I was stabbed by Elizer."[7]  He also told the
Barangay Captain that he had no previous quarrel with the

On May 6, 2002, at around 11:45 p.m., Roy Bughao (Bughao) Beduya brothers
was carrying a torch on his way home from the birthday
celebration of his cousin when Elizer and Ric suddenly On the next day, May 8, 2002, the victim... died due to "septic
appeared.  Ric went around him while his brother Elizer and hypovolemic shock secondary to stabbed wound.
pointed a knife.  He drew back and swung the... torch at them
and shouted, "Why do you hurt me, what is my fault?"[6]  The The Appellants' Version
Beduya brothers did not reply and continued their assault. 
Bughao then scrambled for safety and ran towards the yard of Elizer maintained that he did not commit any crime
victim Dominador S. Acope, Sr. (Acope, Sr.) and hid... in a
dark area.
While on his way home at 10:30 p.m., he was suddenly
attacked and... struck by the victim and Bughao.  He got hit
At around 12:30 a.m. of May 7, 2002, the victim and his son, several times with a piece of wood and Bughao smashed his
Dominador Acope, Jr. (Acope, Jr.), were roused from their right foot.  To defend himself, he pulled out his knife and struck
sleep by a voice coming from the road in front of their house.  randomly.
The victim went outside while his son peeped through the
window.  The victim saw
Eduardo Eltagon
Bughao who readily identified himself and said that Elizer
(Eduardo) testified that he witnessed the event but he did not
pointed a knife at him
interfere since he did not want to get involved.
While in hiding, he saw the Beduya brothers approach the
Elizer continued to walk, and arrived home at 12:15 a.m.   At
victim after they were advised to go home... since it was
1:30 a.m., policemen came to his house and took him to a
already late
hospital.  They passed by the house of his brother Ric before
proceeding to their destination.
Ric slapped the victim while Elizer stabbed him.  The victim
retaliated by striking them with a piece of wood he got hold of.
Ric testified that he was asleep at the time of the incident.
Acope, Jr. immediately proceeded to his uncle's house which
was 40 meters away and sought his help.  The incident was

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Barangay Captain and... policemen came to his house with his
brother and asked him to come with them to the hospital.
Issues:
determine whether the appellants killed the victim with abuse
of superior strength for which they were convicted of murder.
Ruling:
in favor of the prosecution, whose witnesses testified candidly
on the events that resulted in the death of the victim.  On the
other hand, the trial court found as unreliable the witnesses
presented by the defense
It held that
Eduardo, at 86 years of age, could not have seen the victim
and Bughao attacking Elizer 30 meters away with a flashlight
as his only source of illumination in the dead of night since a
test on his vision showed that he could not "see at a distance
little more than beyond his... nose."
Moreover, it ruled that the injuries suffered by Elizer were
more consistent with the defensive blows from a piece of wood
the victim used to defend himself, rather than the alleged
assault on him by the victim and Bughao
According to the trial court, the appellants' combined assault
gave them the advantage over the victim who must have...
been taken by surprise.  The retaliation of the victim with a
piece of wood was done only after he had already been
stabbed
The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim
does not per se establish that the crime was committed with
abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative
strength of the aggressors and the... victim."[21]
"Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of... the crime."[20] 
"The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim
does not per se establish that the crime was committed with
abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative
strength of the aggressors and the... victim."[21]  The evidence
must establish that the assailants purposely sought the
advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this
advantage.[22]  "To take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use... excessive force out of proportion to
the means of defense available to the person attacked."[23] 
The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on
the age, size, and strength of the parties.[24]
The prosecution in this case failed to adduce evidence of a
relative disparity in age, size and strength, or force, except for
the showing that two assailants, one of them (Elizer) armed
with a knife, assaulted the victim.  The presence of two
assailants, one of them armed... with a knife, does not ipso
facto indicate an abuse of superior strength.[25]  Mere
superiority in numbers is not indicative of the presence of this
circumstance.[26]  Neither did the prosecution present proof to
show... that the victim suffered from an inferior physical
condition from which the circumstance can be inferred.  In fact,
there is evidence that the victim was able to get hold of a piece
of wood and deliver retaliatory blows against the knife-wielder,
Elizer.[27]
The events leading to the stabbing further disprove any finding
of deliberate intent on the part of the assailants to abuse their
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superior strength over that of the victim.  The testimonies of
the prosecution's witnesses, on the whole, show that the
incident between the... victim and his assailants was
unplanned and unpremeditated. The assailants were in pursuit
of Bughao when the victim advised them to go home since it
was already late at night. There was indeed no conscious
attempt on the part of the assailants to use or take advantage
of any... superior strength that they then enjoyed.  Particularly,
it has not been clearly established that the appellants, with an
advantage in number, purposely resorted to punching the
victim and delivering a fatal stab wound.  Neither has it been
shown that the victim was... simply overwhelmed by the fist
blows delivered by Ric and Elizer's act of stabbing him.  The
evidence on this matter is too insufficient for a definitive
conclusion.  What has been shown with certainty and clarity is
the appellants' intent to kill, as shown by the stab... wound in
the left side of the victim's body which resulted in his death two
days later.  As the knife wielder, Elizer is guilty of assaulting
and killing the victim.
In view of the foregoing, we are compelled to rule out the
presence of abuse of superior strength as a qualifying
circumstance.  Hence, appellants' guilt must be limited to the
crime of homicide.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO
COMADRE
[G.R. No. 153559. June 8, 2004]
at around 7:00 in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert
Agbanlog with four others were having a drinking spree on the
terrace of the house of Robert's father when they noticed
appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo
Lozano stopped in front of the house. While his companions
looked on, Antonio suddenly threw an object on the roof of the
terrace and fled immediately together with his companions.
The object which happened to be a hand grenade suddenly
explode ripping a hole in the roof. Robert and his companions
were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor.
They were all rushed to the Hospital however Robert died
before reaching the hospital.
The undisputed facts show that when Antonio was in the act of
throwing the hand grenade, his companions merely looked on
without uttering a single word of encouragement or performed
any act to assist him. The trial court held that the mere
presence of the two provided encouragement and a sense of
security to Antonio, thus proving the existence of conspiracy.
Issue Can there be a conspiracy based on the foregoing facts?
Ruling
A conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere
presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make
him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship.
The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano
did not have any participation in the commission of the crime
and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the
scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with
Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering
that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime.
Neither was it proven that their act of running away with
Antonio was an act of giving moral assistance to his criminal
act. The ratiocination of the trial court that their presence
provided encouragement and sense of security to Antonio, is
CrimCasedigest-BravoLex | 12
LEX CERUVS NOTES 2020
devoid of any factual basis. Such finding is not supported by
the evidence on record and cannot therefore be a valid basis
of a finding of conspiracy.
Important Details:
CASE DIGEST: De Guzman Jr. vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 178512 | November 26, 2014
Petitioner: Alfredo De Guzman Jr.
Respondent: People of the Philippines
FACTS
Ruling:
 RTC found Alfredo guilty beyond unreasonable reason
in the crime of FRUSTATED HOMICIDE and was
sentenced 6 MONTHS AND 1 DAY of PRISION
CORRECTION as MINIMUM and6 YEARS AND ONE
DAY of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM and pay the
private complainant compensatory damages in amount
of P14,170.35
 CA dismissed the instant appeal and hereby affirmed
the RTC’s decision.
 The SC affirmed the decision promulgated finding
Alexander GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE and was sentenced 4
YEARS of PRISION CORRECTIONAL as MINIMUM
and 8 YEARS AND ONE DAY of PRISION MAYOR as
MAXIMUM and orders the petitioner to pay Alexander
P30,000 (CIVIL INDEMITY), P30,000 (MORAL
DAMAGES) and P14,170.35 plus interest 6% annum
(COMPENSATORY DAMAGES)
 On the evening of Dec. 24, 1997, Alexander Fojo was
fetching water below his rented house in Mandaluyong
City when he was suddenly hit on the nape by Alfredo
De Guzman, brother of Alexander’s land lady, Lucila
Bautista.
 Alexander informed Lucila about what happened and
she apologized on behalf of Alejandro and told the
latter to just go up.
 Later on, at around 12:00 to 12:15 pm, he went down
and continued fetch water. While pouring water, Alfredo
suddenly appeared and stabbed him on left face and
chest
 Cirilino Bantaya, son-in-law of Alexander, saw the
victim bleeding and begging for help. Alexander told
Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him.
 Cirilino brought and rushed him to the Mandaluyong
City Medical Center. Alexander two (2) stabbed
wounds, one in zygoma (FACE), left part and one in
the upper left chest which was fatal. The attending
physician, Francisco Obmerga, stated that the second
wound could have caused Alexander’s death if he did
not get rushed to the hospital.
 Alfredo appealed to the CA, contending that his intent
to kill (CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED) was not established, and that any person
could have inflicted the wounds.
CrimCasedigest-BravoLex | 13
LEX CERUVS NOTES 2020
 Petitioner also insisted that he should be guilty of slight
physical injuries, not frustrated homicide.
Felony/Infraction/Omission:
 FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE – as ruled by RTC, CA
ISSUE
 Whether or not the INTENT TO KILL, which is a
criminal element of the crime charged, is established in
the case. (RELATED TO ARTICLE 3, INTENT)
HELD
 YES. The wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere
scuff-marks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of
a fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and used a
knife in his assault on Alexander. There is also to be no
doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest being
sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely
medical intervention. (ARTICLE 3, INTENT)
INTENT TO KILL is determined by the ff. factors:
1. Nature and number of the weapon used by the
offender in the commission of the crime – STABBED
THE VICTIM USING A KNIFE
2. Nature, number and location of wounds
inflicted/sustained by the victim – 2 wounds: One in the
ZYGOMA (left side), one in the upper left chest
3. The manner of committing the crime – Alfredo stabbed
him 2 times
4. Acts, deeds or words stated by the offender before,
during or immediately after the commission of the crime
– Alejandro was hit on the nape by Alfredo
5. Evidence of the motive (before or after but NOT during
the commission of the crime – direct evidence is not
available)
Note:
Specific Criminal Intent – it must be proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt since the VICTIM
did not die in this case. If the VICTIM died, the intent to kill
becomes a GENERAL CRIMINAL INTENT which is
presumed by law.
The ELEMENTS of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE are:
(1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by
his use of a deadly weapon in his assault;
(2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not
die because of timely medical assistance; and
(3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
present.
SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 185710. January 19, 2010.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROMULO
TUNIACO, JEFFREY DATULAYTA and ALEX ALEMAN,
accused. ALEX ALEMAN, appellant. DECISION ABAD, J p:
This case is about the requirements of a valid extrajudicial
confession and the establishment of the existence of corpus
delicti in murder cases. cACEaI The Facts and the Case The
city prosecutor of General Santos City charged the accused
CrimCasedigest-BravoLex | 14
LEX CERUVS NOTES 2020
Romulo Tuniaco, Jeffrey Datulayta, and Alex Aleman with
murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General
Santos City in Criminal Case 8370. Based on the ?ndings of
the RTC, in the morning of June 13, 1992 some police of?cers
from the Lagao Police Sub-Station requested police of?cer
Jaime Tabucon of the Central Police Station of General
Santos City homicide division to take the statement of accused
Alex Aleman regarding the slaying of a certain Dondon Cortez.
On his arrival at the sub-station, Tabucon noted the presence
of Atty. Ruperto Besinga, Jr. of the Public Attorney's Of?ce
(PAO) who was conversing with those taken into custody for
the offense. When queried if the suspects would be willing to
give their statements, Atty. Besinga said that they were. Some
other police of?cer ?rst took the statement of accused Jeffrey
Datulayta. Of?cer Tabucon next took the statement of accused
Aleman, whom he observed to be in good physical shape.
Before anything else, of?cer Tabucon informed accused
Aleman in Cebuano of his constitutional right to remain silent
and to the assistance of counsel of his own choice and asked
him if he was willing to give a statement. Aleman answered in
the af?rmative. When asked if he had any complaint to make,
Aleman said that he had none. When Aleman said that he had
no lawyer, Tabucon pointed to Atty. Besinga who claimed that
he was assisting all the suspects in the case. Tabucon warned
Aleman that anything he would say may be used against him
later in court. Afterwards, the police officer started taking down
Aleman's statement. Accused Aleman said that in the course
of a drinking bout with accused Datulayta and Tuniaco at
around 9 p.m. on June 6, 1992, Dondon Cortez threatened to
report his drinking companions' illegal activities to the police
unless they gave him money for his forthcoming marriage.
According to Aleman, Datulayta and Tuniaco had already
planned to kill Cortez in Tupi, South Cotabato, for making the
same threats and now they decided to do it. They got Cortez
drunk then led him out supposedly to get the money he
needed. CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
The three accused brought Cortez to Apopong near the dump
site and, as they were walking, accused Aleman turned on
Cortez and stabbed him on the stomach. Accused Datulayta,
on the other hand, drew out his single shot homemade M16
pistol 1 and shot Cortez on the head, causing him to fall.
Datulayta handed over the gun to Aleman who ?red another
shot on Cortez's head. Accused Tuniaco used the same gun to
pump some bullets into Cortez's body. Then they covered him
with rice husks. After taking down the statement, Tabucon
explained the substance of it to accused Aleman who then
signed it in the presence of Atty. Besinga. On June 15, 1992
the police brought Aleman to the City Prosecutor's Of?ce
where he swore to his statement before an assistant city
prosecutor. In the afternoon, accused Datulayta and Aleman
led Tabucon, the city prosecutor, and a police inspector, to the
dump site where they left their victim's body. After some
search, the group found a spot covered with burnt rice husks
and a partially burnt body of a man. About a foot from the
body, they found the shells of a 5.56 caliber gun and an
armalite rifle. On being arraigned, all three accused, assisted
by Atty. Besinga, pleaded not guilty to the murder charge.
After the prosecution rested its case, accused Tuniaco ?led a
demurrer to evidence which the Court granted, resulting in the
dismissal of the case against him. On being re-arraigned at his
request, accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of Homicide. The trial court sentenced him to
imprisonment of six years and one day and to pay P50,000.00
to the victim's family. For some reason, the trial court had
Aleman subjected to psychiatric examination at the Davao
Mental Hospital. But, shortly after, the hospital sent word that
Aleman had escaped. He was later recaptured. When trial in
the case resumed, Aleman's new PAO lawyer raised the
CrimCasedigest-BravoLex | 15
LEX CERUVS NOTES 2020
defense of insanity. This prompted the court to require the
Provincial Jail Warden to issue a certi?cation regarding
Aleman's behavior and mental condition while in jail to
determine if he was ?t to stand trial. The warden complied,
stating that Aleman had been observed to have good mental
condition and did not commit any infraction while in jail.
Although the prosecution and defense stipulated that Atty.
Besinga assisted accused Aleman during the taking of his
extrajudicial confession, the latter, however, recanted what he
said to the police during the trial. He testi?ed that sometime in
1992, some police of?cers took him from his aunt's house in
Purok Palen, Labangal, General Santos City, and brought him
to the Lagao police station. He was there asked to admit
having taken part in the murder of Cortez. When he refused,
they tortured him until he agreed to sign a document admitting
his part in the crime. Accused Aleman also testi?ed that he
could not remember having been assisted by Atty. Besinga
during the police investigation. He even denied ever knowing
the lawyer. Aleman further denied prior association with
accused Tuniaco and Datulayta. He said that he met them
only at the city jail where they were detained for the death of
Cortez. EDSAac On October 8, 2001 the RTC rendered
judgment, ?nding accused Aleman guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty o f reclusion perpetua. The court also ordered him to
pay death indemnity of P70,000.00 and moral damages of
P50,000.00 to the heirs of Cortez. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00311, the court rendered
judgment on January 21, 2008, af?rming the decision of the
RTC with the modi?cation that directed accused Aleman and
Datulayta to indemnify the heirs of CD Technologies Asia, Inc.
© 2016 cdasiaonline.com Cortez, jointly and severally, in the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as
moral damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Aleman appealed to this
Court. The Issues Presented Accused Aleman raises two
issues: a) whether or not the prosecution was able to present
evidence of corpus delicti; and b) whether or not accused
Aleman’s extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence.
The Rulings of the Court 1. Corpus delicti has been de?ned as
the body, foundation, or substance of a crime. The evidence of
a dead body with a gunshot wound on its back would be
evidence that murder has been committed. 2 Corpus delicti
has two elements: (a) that a certain result has been
established, for example, that a man has died and (b) that
some person is criminally responsible for it. 3 The prosecution
is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt
either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive
evidence. 4 The defense claims that the prosecution failed to
prove corpus delicti since it did not bother to present a medical
certi?cate identifying the remains found at the dump site and
an autopsy report showing such remains sustained gunshot
and stab wounds that resulted in death; and the shells of the
guns used in killing the victim. But corpus delicti need not be
proved by an autopsy report of the dead victim’s body or even
by the testimony of the physician who examined such body. 5
While such report or testimony is useful for understanding the
nature of the injuries the victim suffered, they are not
indispensable proof of such injuries or of the fact of death. 6
Nor is the presentation of the murder weapons also
indispensable since the physical existence of such weapons is
not an element of the crime of murder. 7 Here, the police
authorities found the remains of Cortez at the place pointed to
by accused Aleman. That physical con?rmation, coming after
his testimony of the gruesome murder, suf?ciently establishes
the corpus delicti of the crime. Of course, that statement must
be admissible in evidence. 2. There is no reason for it not to
be. Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made
CrimCasedigest-BravoLex | 16
LEX CERUVS NOTES 2020
with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel;
c) express; and d) in writing. 8 These requirements were met
here. A lawyer, not working with or was not beholden to the
police, Atty. Besinga, assisted accused Aleman during the
custodial investigation. Of?cer Tabucon testi?ed that he saw
accused Aleman, before the taking of his statement,
conversing with counsel at the police station. Atty. Besinga did
not dispute this claim. Aleman alleges torture as the reason for
the execution of the confession. The appellate court is correct
in ruling that such allegation is baseless. It is a settled rule that
where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion,
where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action
against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence
of violence was presented, all these will be considered as
indicating voluntariness. 9 Here, although Aleman claimed that
he bore torture marks on his head, he never brought this to the
attention of his counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor who
administered his oath. Accused Aleman claims, citing People
v. Galit, 10 that long questions followed by monosyllabic
answers do not satisfy the requirement that the accused is
amply informed of his rights. But this does not apply here.
Tabucon testi?ed that he spoke to CD Technologies Asia, Inc.
© 2016 cdasiaonline.com Aleman clearly in the language he
knew. Aleman, joined by Atty. Besinga, even signed a certi?
cation that the investigator suf?ciently explained to him his
constitutional rights and that he was still willing to give his
statement. Further, Aleman asserts that he was lacking in
education and so he did not fully realize the consequences of
a confession. But as the CA said, no law or jurisprudence
requires the police of?cer to ascertain the educational
attainment of the accused. All that is needed is an effective
communication between the interrogator and the suspect to
the end that the latter is able to understand his rights. 11 This
appears to have been done in this case. Moreover, as the
lower court noted, it is improbable that the police fabricated
Aleman's confession and just forced him to sign it. The
confession has details that only the person who committed the
crime could have possibly known. 12 What is more, accused
Datulayta’s confession corroborate that of Aleman in important
details. Under the doctrine of interlocking confessions, such
corroboration is circumstantial evidence against the person
implicated in it. 13 The Court notes that, when it modi?ed the
award of civil damages to the heirs of Cortez, the CA made
both accused Aleman and Datulayta, jointly and severally
liable, for the damages as modi?ed. But the appeal by one or
more of several accused cannot affect those who did not
appeal, except if the judgment of the appellate court is
favorable and applicable to them. 14 Here accused Datulayta
pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide and the trial
court ordered him to pay only P50,000.00 in civil indemnity to
the heirs of Cortez. The CA erred in expanding that liability
when he did not appeal from his conviction. 15 DICSaH IN
LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court AFFIRMS the Court
of Appeals' judgment in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00311 dated January
21, 2008 against accused Alex Aleman. The Court, however,
DELETES from such judgment the portion increasing the civil
liability of accused Jeffrey Datulayta who did not appeal from
the RTC decision against him. SO ORDERED. Carpio, Brion,
Del Castillo and Jose P. Perez, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1. CA
rollo, p. 11. 2. People v. Cariño, 438 Phil. 771, 777 (2002). 3.
People v. Cabodoc, 331 Phil. 491, 509-510 (1996). 4. People
v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 123939, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 52,
77. 5. People v. Cariño, supra note 2. 6. People v. Barro, Sr.,
392 Phil. 857, 873 (2000). 7. People v. Piedad, 441 Phil. 818,
836 (2002). 8. People v. Gallardo, 380 Phil. 182, 194 (2000).
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com 9.
People v. Del Rosario, 411 Phil. 676, 690-691 (2001). 10. 220
Phil. 143, 150-151 (1985). 11. People v. Muleta, 368 Phil. 451,
CrimCasedigest-BravoLex | 17
LEX CERUVS NOTES 2020
464 (1999). 12. People v. Villanueva, 334 Phil. 324, 330
(1997). 13. People v. Lising, 340 Phil. 530, 560-561 (1998).
14. Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 122, Sec. 11.
15. People v. Napud, Jr., 418 Phil. 268, 284 (2001). CD
Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
PEOPLE Vs. UNLAGADA
FACTS:
On 27 January 1989 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening
Danilo Laurel left his house together with Edwin Selda, a
visitor from Bacolod City, to attend a public dance at Rizal St.,
Mag-asawang Taytay, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. Two (2)
hours later, or around 11:00 o'clock that evening, Danilo asked
Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to their
personal necessities outside the dance hall. Once outside,
they decided to have a drink and bought two (2) bottles of
Gold Eagle beer at a nearby store.
Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for
a place to relieve himself. According to Edwin, he was only
about three (3) meters from Danilo who was relieving himself
when a short, dark bearded man walked past him, approached
Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Danilo retaliated by
striking his assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost
simultaneously, a group of men numbering about seven (7),
ganged up on Danilo and hit him with assorted weapons, i.e.,
bamboo poles, stones and pieces of wood. Edwin, who was
petrified, could only watch helplessly as Danilo was being
mauled and overpowered by his assailants. Danilo fell to the
ground and died before he could be given any medical
assistance.
Edwin Selda testified that on 29 January 1989 the police
invited him to the Municipal Building of Hinigaran to give his
statement regarding the killing incident and, if necessary, to
confirm the identity of the suspect who was then in their
custody. Thereat, he executed an affidavit and affirmed before
the police authorities that the man under detention, whom he
later identified as accused Anecito Unlagada, was the same
man who stabbed his friend Danilo.
Respondent however contended that at around 10:00 o'clock
in evening of 27 January 1989 while he was inside the dance
hall, an altercation ensued near the gate between the
gatekeeper and a group of four (4) individuals who, despite
their disruptive behavior, were eventually allowed to get
through the gate. At around 11:00 o'clock, a gunshot suddenly
rang out. From the people around he learned that a rumble
had taken place and that somebody was killed. But he came to
learn the victim's identity only the following morning when he
and a certain Lorenzo Patos were brought by a police officer to
the Municipal Building for questioning. At the Municipal
Building, he heard somebody asking who "Lapad" was and an
alleged eyewitness, who later turned out to be Edwin Selda,
pointed to him as the man referred to by that name. Anecito
Unlagada and Lorenzo Patos were put in jail and a complaint
was filed against them before the Municipal Trial Court of
Hinigaran. Meanwhile the case against Lorenzo was
dismissed leaving Aniceto alone to face the charge of murder.
The trial court dismissed as incredible the alibi of the accused
and the testimonies of the defense witnesses negating
Anecito's culpability.
Accused Anecito Unlagada now assails his conviction on the
ground that it was error for the trial court to give full faith and
credence to the lone and uncorroborated testimony of witness
CrimCasedigest-BravoLex | 18
LEX CERUVS NOTES 2020
Edwin Selda, and in finding that the crime of murder was
committed instead of "death caused in a tumultuous affray"
under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime committed was “death caused in a
tumultuous affray" under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATION: Accused-appellant
ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUE a.k.a. "Lapad" is
ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Danilo Laurel
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus moral damages in the
reduced amount of P50,000.00. Costs against accused-
appellant.
RATIO:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while
several persons, not composing groups organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and
tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is
killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious
physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons
shall be punished by prision mayor.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs
between several persons who engage in a confused and
tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person is killed or
wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.5 The
quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct group of
individuals, one of whom was sufficiently identified as the
principal author of the killing, as against a common, particular
victim. It is not, as the defense suggests, a "tumultuous affray"
within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code,
that is, a melee or free-for-all, where several persons not
comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one another in
a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or
injury of one or some of them.
Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased
was relieving himself, fully unaware of any danger to his
person when suddenly the accused walked past witness
Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the
side. There was hardly any risk at all to accused-appellant; the
attack was completely without warning, the victim was caught
by surprise, and given no chance to put up any defense.
Hence rime committed was murder.
Tanega vs Masakayan
Art. 158
FACTS:
Guiding Provision: Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00
constitute a light penalty. By Article 92 of the Revised Penal
Code, light penalties "imposed by final sentence" prescribe in
one year. The period of prescription of penalties — so the
succeeding Article 93 provides — "shall commence to run from
the date when the culprit should evade the service of his
sentence".
Petitioner was convicted of slander by the City Court of
Quezon City and appealed to the CFI but was found guilty and
she was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to indemnify
the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with
CrimCasedigest-BravoLex | 19
LEX CERUVS NOTES 2020
the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the
costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
On January 11, 1965, the petitioner was directed that
execution of the sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On
petitioner's motion, execution was deferred to February 12,
1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and hour, petitioner
failed to show up. This prompted the respondent judge, on
February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for her arrest, and on
March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest. Petitioner was
never arrested.
Then, on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to
quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March
23, 1965. Petitioner's assertion is that Penalty has prescribed.
On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the
penalty imposed upon the accused has to be served", rejected
the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the
issuance of another alias warrant of arrest. Hence, the present
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Evasion of
Service of Sentence
Held: The case was dismissed. Article 157 of the Revised
Penal Code furnishes the ready answer. Says Article 157:
ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall
be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his
sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment 6 by
reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or escape
shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking
doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors, or by using
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation,
or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the
penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its
maximum period.
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the
offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his
sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he
evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence. This must be so. For, by the express terms of the
statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence", by
"escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of
final judgment." That escape should take place while serving
sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second
sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if
such "evasion or escape shall have taken by means of
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls,
roofs, or floors or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise,
deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with
other convicts or employees of the penal institution, ... "
Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the
term "jail breaking".
Ruling: The Court ruled that for prescription of penalty of
imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run,
the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment. Adverting to the facts, the case of a convict who
was sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment was
thereafter never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty,
then, does not run in her favor.
US vs Casipong and Hongoy
Topic: Art. 155- Alarms and Scandals
Facts: On March 5, 1909, Juan Casipong contracted civil
marriage with Teodora Juanico before the justice of the peace
of the pueblo of Dumanjug, witnesses thereto being Telesforo
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Quirante and Macario Pasculado, as shown in the certificate
issued by the acting municipal secretary of that municipality.
Two weeks after the ceremony Casipong left his wife and
moved to the barrio of Bolocboc to live with Gregoria Hongoy.
For the purpose of assuring that her husband was really living
with another woman, Teodora, the offended wife went to said
barrio, where she actually saw her husband, Casipong,
maintaining marital relations with the aforesaid Gregoria
Hongoy, and although she did not see them in carnal
intercourse, still she saw the two lying side by side and or
several occasions going together to different places in that
barrio, and that there was no one besides them in the house
where they lived.
Accordingly, the provincial fiscal on August 24, 1910, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, charging Juan
Casipong and Gregoria Hongoy with the crime of
concubinage, wherein the judge rendered decision the same
day, sentencing the defendant Casipong to one year eight
months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and the
defendant Gregoria Hongoy to two years of banishment,
prohibiting her during the period of the sentence from going
within a radius of 25 kilometers of the place where the crime
was committed, the barrio of Bituon, pueblo of Dumanjug; with
half the costs against each party. From this judgment the
defendants appealed, but later Casipong withdrew his appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Casipong and Hongoy publicly exhibited
a scandalous act.
Held: From the text of this article it appears that it is an
indispensable condition for convicting the husband of
concubinage outside of his home that his conduct produce
scandal and set a bad example among his neighbors, and,
according to a principle laid down by the supreme court of
Spain, publicity of an immoral act produces scandal, for by the
bad example set it gives offense and wounds the virtuous
sentiments of others.
The crime in this case is provided for and penalized by article
437 of the Penal Code, (old) as follows: The husband who
shall keep a concubine in his home, or out of it with scandal,
shall be punished with the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium degrees. The concubine shall be
punished with banishment. The unlawful union of a married
man with a woman not his wife, when the two live within a
town and in the same house as lawful husband and wife, go
together through the streets of the town, frequent places
where large crowds gather, and commit acts in plain sight of
the community without caution and with effrontery, is a
procedure that gives rises to criticism and general protest
among the neighbors and by its bad example offends the
conscience and feelings of every moral person; and when
these conditions attend the conduct of a married persons it is
indubitable that his concubinage with another woman, even
though she does not live in his home, carries with it the
circumstance of scandal required by the law to make his action
criminal.
It is to be noted in considering such complex actions that in
order to regard them as criminal it is necessary and
indispensable that they be performed by a married man and a
woman, or by both, the man being the active and the woman
the passive agent, each with separate responsibility.
Therefore, notwithstanding the man's withdrawal of his appeal
and the fact that the appeal taken by Gregoria Hongoy will
alone be the subject of the decision, yet the arguments
bearing upon the perpetration of the crime and proof of it will
necessarily affect the man who is the alleged active agent
thereof.
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On this hypothesis and as a result of the hearing in this case, it
is impossible to affirm that Juan Casipong, husband of
Teodora Juanico, has been living in concubinage with public
scandal with another woman, Gregoria Hongoy, because of
lack of conclusive proof demonstrating the reality of the crime
with the conditions the law requires for punishing the
perpetrator thereof and his concubine.
Nothing would be easier than to adduce proofs of the criminal
act, if said Casipong really forsook his wife and unlawfully
entered into relations with Gregoria Hongoy, for if they have
lived publicly in concubinage and in sight of everybody,
various witnesses, residents not only of the place of residence
of the offended wife and her husband but also of the barrio of
Bolocboc, to which the unfaithful husband removed in order to
live with his paramour, could have testified. The statement of
the offended wife and of the witness Hilaria Lumban, who only
once saw them together, is not sufficient to prove the
aggregate of acts performed by the two accused, with the
scandal produced by the bad example set in their
neighborhood.
Ruling: For these reasons and from lack of proof of the facts
alleged in this case, it is our opinion that the judgment
appealed from should reversed and Gregoria Hongoy,
acquitted, as we hereby do, with half of the cots in each
instance de oficio. As the defendant Juan Casipong, through
withdrawal of his appeal, is now serving sentence for a crime
which is held in this decision to be not proven,
Case 7
Artigas Losada v. Acenas
An appeal from an order, dated July 20, 1946, justice of the
peace of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, in the absence of the
judge of first instance (Act 131), directed the release on
habeas corpus, of Manuel Artigas Losada, Getulio Geocada,
Santiago Aguda, Francisco Danao, inmates of the Davao
Penal Colony Inagawan, Palawan.
The first is undergoing a maximum sentence of 15 years, 2
months and 2 days for estafa, and estafa through falsification.
Such term is due to expire, with good conduct allowance, on
July 16, 1947.
The second, Getulio Geocada, doing time for illegal
possession of counterfeit money is due for release April 25,
1974.
The third, Santiago Aguda, serving a sentence of 12 years and
1 day for homicide, would be entitled to his liberty about
January 7, 1948, should he observe good conduct in the
meantime.
The last, Francisco Danao, jailed for abduction with rape, will
complete the service of his sentence, with good conduct
allowance, about June 19, 1948.
As above stated, the court decreed in July, 1946, that these
four penal colonists should forthwith be freed from restraint.
Reason for the decree was their allegation, and the court’s
opinion, that they had earned a special time allowance in the
form of a deduction of one-fifth of their respective sentences
under articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code
Court’s opinion: those prisoners who, having all the chances to
escape and did not escape but remained in their prison cell
during the disorder caused by war have shown more
convincingly their loyalty than those who escaped under the
circumstances specifically enumerated in article 158 and give
themselves up within 48 hours. After the executive
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proclamation for the latter, that is, the prisoner who escaped
might have been persuded to give themselves up merely
because they could see but a slim chance to avoid capture
inasmuch as the government then was functioning with all its
normal efficiency. And if those who arc loyal merely in times of
conflagration, earthquake, explosion and other similar
catastrophe are considered loyal and are for that reason given
in their favor on fifth reduction of their sentence, with more
reason that those who stayed in their places of confinement
during the war.
Issue:
WON to grant them for release basing it on habeas corpus
Held:
The appealed decision is reversed and the petition for habeas
corpus denied. No costs. So ordered.
There are considerations that more properly belong to the
legislative department, should an amendment to the law be
proposed. They are likewise equitable pleas, which the
executive department could properly entertain in connection
with petitions for parole or pardon of the prisoners. but they
may not authorize the courts to read into the statute additional
conditions or situations. The special allowance for loyalty
authorized by articles 98 and the Revised Penal Code refers to
those convicts who, having evaded the service of their
sentences by leaving the penal institution, give themselves up
within two days.
As these petitioners are not in that class, because they have
not escaped, they have no claim to that allowance.
For one thing there is no showing that they ever had the
opportunity to escape, or that having such opportunity they
have the mettle to take advantage of it or to brave the perils in
connection with a jailbreak. And there is no assurance that had
they successfully run away and regained their precious liberty
they would have, nevertheless voluntarily exchanged it later
with the privations of prison life impelled by that sense of right
and loyalty to the Government, which is sought to be rewarded
will the special allowance. Wherefore, it is not plain that their
case comes within the spirit of the law they have involved.
must be observed in this connection that the only
circumstance favorable to petitioners is the admission of the
respondent that they "remained in the penal colony and did not
try to escape during the war."
Case # 6
G.R. No. L-27191
February 28, 1967
TANEGA vs. MASAKAYAN
FACTS :
Petitioner was convicted of slander by the City Court of
Quezon City. He appealed once again but was found guilty
again by the Court of First Instance. She was sentenced to 20
days of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended party, Pilar B.
Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, and to pay the costs which the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
On January 11, 1965, the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, directed that execution of the sentence be set for January
27, 1965. On petitioner's motion, execution was deferred to
February 12, 1965. However, the petitioner did not show up.
This prompted the respondent judge, on February 15, 1965, to
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issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the
warrant of arrest. Petitioner was never arrested. penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its
maximum period.
On December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to
quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March Elements of evasion of service of sentence are:
23, 1965. Petitioner's ground: Penalty has prescribed.
(1) the offender is a convict by final judgment;
On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the
(2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of
penalty imposed upon the accused has to be served", rejected
liberty"; and
the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the
issuance of another alias warrant of arrest. (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term
of his sentence.
ISSUE : Whether or not prescription of sentence has
commenced This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a
convict evades "service of his sentence", by "escaping during
HELD :
the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That
No. escape should take place while serving sentence, is
emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence of
By Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code, light penalties
Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion
"imposed by final sentence" prescribe in one year. The period
or escape shall have taken by means of unlawful entry, by
of prescription of penalties — so the succeeding Article 93
breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors or by
provides — "shall commence to run from the date when the
using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or
culprit should evade the service of his sentence".
intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence employees of the penal institution, ... " Indeed, evasion of
Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking".
answer. Says Article 157:
The court ruled that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment
ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his
Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who
sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment 6 by
— sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment — was
reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or escape
thereafter never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty,
shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking
then, does not run in her favor.
doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors, or by using
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation,

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For the reasons given, the Court resolved to dismiss the
petition for certiorari and prohibition. No costs. So ordered.
10 DADO VS. PEOPLE
TOPIC: Discharge of firearms
FACTS:
 On May 25, 1992, in order to intercept cattle rustlers,
the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed
three teams, which composed of petitioner SPO4
Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco
Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga. Alfredo Balinas
and Rufo Alga were both armed with M14 armalite
rifles, while petitioner was armed with a caliber .45
pistol and accused Francisco Eraso was carrying an
M16 armalite rifle.
 The team saw somebody approaching who was half-
naked. When he was about 5 meters away from the
team, Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas
could beam his flash light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite
rifle at the approaching man.
o Thereafter, Dado fired a single shot from his .45
caliber pistol. Dado admitted that when he
heard the rapid gun burst, he did not turn to
face the source thereof and instead fired his .45
caliber pistol in front of him purposely to
demoralize their enemy.
 The victim turned out to be Silvestre "Butsoy" Balinas,
the nephew of Alfredo Balinas and not the cattle rustler
the team were ordered to intercept. Accused Eraso
embraced Alfredo Balinas and told him that it was not
intentionally done and it was merely an accident.
Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot
wounds he sustained.
 Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, who conducted the post-
mortem examination on the cadaver of Silvestre
Balinas testified that the fatal wound that caused the
death of the victim was the one inflicted on the mid-
inner thigh. The bullet pierced through and injured the
organs in the pelvic region where she found three
irregularly shaped metallic fragments. She added that
the position of the victim at that time of the shooting
was higher than the assailant considering that the
trajectory of the bullets was upwards.
 Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D.
Piedad, the three metallic fragments recovered from
the fatal wound of the victim turned out to be fragments
of a 5.56 mm jacketed bullet. However, on cross-
examination, he declared that he is not sure whether
the 2 other metallic fragments recovered from the fatal
wound of the victim are indeed parts of a copper jacket
of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet.
TRIAL COURT: Convicted Dado and accused Eraso of the
crime of homicide which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Accused Eraso filed a Petition for Review but was denied by
CA; on the other hand petitioner, filed this petition.
Issue: W/N the lower courts erred in finding Dado guilty of
homicide? – YES, he is guilty of discharge of firearm.
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The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner
fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. However, it
appears that there is no evidence to prove that petitioner had
intent to kill the victim. The prosecution witnesses did not see
whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim. Intent to kill cannot
be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of
firearms is dangerous to life. Intent to kill must be established
with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other
elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not
be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove
such intent beyond reasonable doubt.
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the
victim, petitioner should be held liable for the crime of
ILLEGAL DISCHARGE OF FIREARM under Article 254 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The elements of this crime are:
(1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at
another person; and
(2) that the offender has no intention to kill that person

There is no conspiracy in this case. Thus, petitioner can only

be held responsible for the acts or omissions which can
be proved to have been committed by him personally. In
other words, his criminal accountability, if any, should be
determined on an individual rather than on a collective basis.
Petitioner could not be made to answer for the acts done by
his co-accused, Franciso Eraso, unless it be shown that he
participated directly and personally in the commission of those
acts. It becomes important therefore to determine whether
petitioner inflicted the fatal wound that directly caused the
death of the victim.

In here, the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic

fragments found in the fatal wound of the victim are particles of
a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol
fired by petitioner. For this reason, the Court cannot in good
conscience affirm his conviction for the crime of homicide.

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