The Indianization of Funan - An Economic History of Southeast Asia First State

Department of History, National University of Singapore
The "Indianization" of Funan: An Economic History of Southeast Asia's First State

Author(s): Kenneth R. Hall
Source: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Mar., 1982), pp. 81-106
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Department of History, National University
of Singapore
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The "Indianization" of Funan:
An Economic History of Southeast Asia's First State
KENNETH R. HALL
Southeast Asia's strategic position in the major pre-modern international maritime

route connecting East and West brought inevitable interaction between Southeast Asian
peoples and foreign merchants. Initially, foreign merchants were concerned only with
passing through Southeast Asia on their way to China or India. Southeast Asian coastal
centres (entrep?ts) facilitated this trade by providing suitable stopping places for sailors
and traders; available to them were food, water, and shelter as well as storage facilities
and market places for exchange. Soon, however, Southeast Asian merchants began to
supplement demand for Eastern and Western products by substituting the products of
the jungles of the Indonesian archipelago for those from other sources, and then built
upon this initial incursion to market other indigenous forest products. Foreign demand
for Southeast Asian products reached a peak when spices from Indonesia's eastern
archipelago began to flow out of the Java Sea region to the international ports in the
fourth and fifth centuries A.D.
Asian maritime trade may thus be seen as developing in stages. First to develop was
the India-Middle East route, expanding after Rome had established its Pax Romanum
in the first century of the Christian era and corresponding to the diffusion of knowledge
on the use of the monsoon winds for navigation.1 In the first century a regular maritime
route connected India to the Malay Peninsula. After portaging the Malay Peninsula,
goods made their way to south China ports via the entrep?t of the early Southeast Asian
state of Funan, which dominated trade in this sector of the commercial route until the
fifth century. Western maritime contacts were soon extended to include Sumatra and
other commercial centres at the western end of the Java Sea, which in the post-Funan age
came to replace the Malay Peninsula and mainland as the focus of international traders'
interaction with Southeast Asia. The maritime route's final development, making
regular use of the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea, occurred in the late fourth
and early fifth century. All these developments were related to Chinese interest in
maritime trade, which was itself due in part to fluctuations inChina's access to the over
land caravan routes favoured in the previous age. By the fifth century commercial
intercourse between East and West focused on the maritime route. As a consequence of
these developments international trade in Southeast Asia became well-defined, regular,
and prosperous, contributing to the desire to extend existing trade relationships to
include new members and products, and bringing about significant transitions in South
east Asia's political and economic organization.
The initiation of the regular sea passage between East and West and the importance of
Kenneth R. Hall, "The Expansion of Maritime Trade in the Indian Ocean, Part I: Roman Trade in the
Indian Ocean, An Indian Perspective; Part II: The Origin of Maritime Trade in Southeast Asia", The Elmira
Review, 1 (1979): 36-42; 2 (1980): 35-43.
81

82 Kenneth Hall
the resulting relationship between the commercial route and the developing political and
economic systems of Southeast Asia are best understood when one observes in detail the
earliest Southeast Asian political system to maximize its interaction with the route. It
was to Funan on the southern Vietnamese coast that the earliest Chinese envoys to a
Southeast Asian state travelled in the 240s to explore the nature of the route for theWu
emperor. From the reports filed by these envoys, K'ang T'ai and Chu Ying, which are
recorded in later Chinese chronicles,2 the origins of Funan become intelligible. K'ang
T'ai's report provides a contemporary glimpse of the prosperous state, informing his
emperor that the people of Funan "Uve in walled cities, palaces, and houses.... They
devote themselves to agriculture. They sow one year and harvest for three.... Taxes are
paid in gold, silver, pearls, and perfumes.... There are books and depositories of archives
and other things. Their characters for writing resemble those of the Hu [a people of
Central Asia who used a script of Indian origin]".3
With the development of interest in an East-West maritime passage through Southeast
Asia, coastal centres in the vicinity of the Malay Peninsula quickly developed as entrep?ts
to service the growing number of merchants using the sea route. Oc-eo on the lower
Vietnamese coast was one such centre. Louis Malleret's important study of the
archaeological remains at Oc-eo depicts the Funan coast as occupied in the early first
century A.D. by Malay fishing and hunting groups.4 Already building their own ships,
these seamen recognized that the exposure of their coast to the new international route
focusing upon the Kra Isthmus would enable them to provide passage for Indian and
Chinese goods. Soon their coastal centre was booming. Port facilities were constructed,
including buildings for storing goods and hostelries for merchants laying over at the port
until the next season's monsoon winds would allow their return voyage.5
Malleret's data indicate that the development of Funan port's sea contact was
intimately connected to a parallel or previous development of the land's agricultural
base. An elaborate hydraulic system enabled Funan's population to drain salt water out
of the land, allowing the population to produce up to three rice harvests annually ?
producing enough surplus to easily feed foreign merchants resident inOc-eo.6 Historians
have attempted to explain the source of this technological competence and the central
leadership they postulate was necessary for the successful completion of these hydraulic
projects. Was an indigenous development responsible, or was this the result of a
significant input of foreign expertise, especially from India? To propose an answer one
must examine Funan's earliest history.
The Origin of Funan

Chinese sources believe the founding of the Funan state took place in the first century
2Paul Wheatley, The Golden Khersonese (Kuala Lumpur, 1961), pp. 114-15. It discusses in detail the
historical merit of the records of these envoys.
3Paul Pelliot, "Fou-Nan", Bulletin de l'Ecole Fran?aise d'Extr?me-Orient, 3 (1903): 252.
4L. Malleret, L'arch?ologie du delta du Mekong. 4 vols. (Paris, 1959-1963).
5Itmust be remembered that in modern scale Oc-eo would not be considered a major urban centre. Indeed,
its smallness had led historians to question its identity as the initial urban centre of Southeast Asia. See Paul
Wheatley, "Urban Genesis in Mainland South East Asia" in R.B. Smith and W. Watson (eds.), Early
South East Asia (London, 1979), p. 298; also Bennet Bronson, personal comments.
6Not until the French undertook the elaborate reclamation of land in the Mekong delta in the nineteenth
century was the delta region so fully under cultivation. See Charles Robequain, The Economic Development
of French Indochina (New York, 1944).

The Indianization of Funan 83
A.D., and relate a local legend to document Funan's origin. In that age a female ruler
was said to have led a raid upon a merchant ship.7 The raid was beaten off by the ship's
travellers, one of whom was a man from a country "beyond the seas". This man drank
water from the land and then married the local ruler, thereby becoming "king" over the
domain. At the time of their marriage, Funan consisted of only several settlements,
principally along the Mekong, each of which was under the authority of its own local
chief. The first "king" of Funan and his wife transferred their right to rule over seven
of these population centres to their son; the remainder of the domain they retained under
their direct authority.8
The basic details of this legend are reiterated elsewhere in Indian and Southeast Asian
folklore.9 The legend focuses upon the marriage between the foreigner, bearing the Indian
name "Kaundinya" ? a great Brahman, and a local n?gi princess, daughter of the ruler of
the water realm. This legend is broadly used to symbolize the union of Indian and
indigenous cultures, Kaundinya representing the more sophisticated Indian culture and
religion and the n?gi princess symbolic of local ways and indigenous fertility cults. The
marriage myth attempts to explain not only the penetration of Indian culture into South
east Asia, but also the origin of Southeast Asian kingship. Historians have not, however,
been in agreement on its interpretation.
A classic account of the process symbolized in the Kaundinya myth is provided in the
early twentieth century historical reconstruction by the French historian Gabriel Ferrand:
The true picture must have been something like this: two or three Indian vessels
sailing together eventually arrived [there]. The newcomers established relations with
the chiefs of the country, earning favor with them by means of presents, treatment of
illnesses, and amulets.... No one could use such
procedures better than an Indian. He
would undoubtedly pass himself off as of royal or princely extraction, and his host
could not help but be favorably impressed.10
These Indians then united inmarriage with the daughters of the local chiefs as the basis for
converting the rulers and their population to the Indian ways. Because the local popula
tion had no equivalent vocabulary or understanding to deal with the social, moral, and
religious innovations, itwas necessary to impose Indian terminology. Indian culture soon
engulfed the more primitive local civilization as the latter was upgraded into an Indianized
state.
Ferrand's theme of Indians travelling to Southeast Asia and providing guidance over a
cultural transformation is carried to the extreme by several Indian historians who have
argued that large numbers of South Asians not only migrated to but also colonized Funan
and other early centres of civilization in Southeast Asia.11 In opposing the "colonization"
theories, Dutch historian J.C. van Leur, while not denying the role of Indians in guiding
the formation of these early states, stressed the activities of Southeast Asia's indigenous
7Pelliot, op. cit., pp. 245^*6.

8Paul Pelliot, "Quelques textes chinois concernant L'Indochine hindouis?e", ?tudes Asiatiques, publi?es
? l'occasion du vingt-cinqui?me anniversaire de l'Ecole Fran?aise d'Extr?me Orient, 2 (Paris, 1925): 243-63.
9Jean Przyluski, "La princesse a l'odeur de poisson et la nagi dans les traditione de l'Asie Orientale",
Etudes Asiatiques, 2, pp. 265-84.
10Gabriel Ferrand, "Le K'ouen-louen et les anciennes navigations interoc?aniques dans les mers du sud",
Journal Asiatique(Juillet-Ao?t, 1919): 15.
nR.C. Majumdar, Hindu Colonies in the Far East (Calcutta, 1943) and Ancient Indian Colonization in
South-East Asia (Baroda, 1963).

84 Kenneth Hall
rulers in forging the initial linkage.12 Traders, held by many13 to have been the precursors
and agents of the cultural transformation, were incapable, van Leur reasoned, of trans
mitting most of the more subtle concepts of Indian thought. Rather, local rulers, having
learned of Indian culture through their interaction with Indians on the maritime trade
route, recognized India's advanced level of life and drew from the Indian tradition for their
own benefit by encouraging the migration of Brahman clerks to help them administer
their realms.
George Coed?s, also holding that Indian culture was transplanted to Southeast Asia,
denies this Southeast Asian initiative, holding that Indian Brahmans, or other Indians
claiming to belong to the Indian upper caste, initiated much of this interaction.14 In some
instances they imposed their authority over a local population, in others they strengthened
the power of the local chief, and in yet others they intermarried with the local elite to
legitimize the new high caste status of the "Hinduized" rulers.
Arguing against Coed?s' focus on Indian initiatives, O.W. Wolters has stressed a
mutual sharing process in the evolution of Indianized statecraft in Southeast Asia.15
Southeast Asian traders provided the initial contact with and knowledge of the Indian
cultural traditions. Southeast Asian rulers followed up; thus, the Indianizing of their
realms was due not to commercial pressures (i.e., a desire to convert in order to facilitate
trade with Indian merchants) nor to a massive influx of Indian Brahmans, but to a recog
nition that Indian culture provided certain opportunities for administrative and techno
logical advancement. The initial era of trade contact was one of adaptation and learning
? an "apprenticeship", when rulers of states like Funan were curious about Indian and
other foreign cultural traditions, and were in the habit of looking overseas for their own
benefit. It was a Southeast Asian initiative, not Indian; and it was a slow process of
cultural synthesis, not rapid imposition of Hinduism made possible by a massive influx
of Brahmans, that was responsible for the Indianization of Southeast Asia.16
Wolters has gone yet further in his most recent essays in proposing that the problem
,2J.C. van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History?Thc Hague,
1955).
,3See J.G. De Casparis, "Historical Writing on Indonesia (Early Period)" in D.G.E. Hall (ed.), Historians
of Southeast Asia: Historical Writing on the Peoples of Asia (London, 1961), p. 126.
,4George Coed?s, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia (Honolulu, 1968), pp. 14-35.
,5O.W. Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce (Ithaca, 1967), passim.*
,6Updating and applying Wolters' thesis to a variety of scholarship published in the 1970s, I.W. Mabbett
concludes in his article "The 'Indianization' of Southeast Asia: Reflections on the Prehistoric Sources",
Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies,*, 1 (1977): 1-4; 8, 2(1977): 143-61, that the sea barrier between India and
Southeast Asia was to the process of "Sanskritization"
significant [see M.N. Srinivas, Caste inModern India
and other Essays (Bombay, 1962) and J.F. Staal, "Sanskrit and Sanskritization", Journal of Asian Studies,
22 (1963): 261-75] in Southeast Asia. Firstly, the Indian influences were not constantly maintained by
or other contacts; thus Southeast Asian kingdoms may have initially outwardly exhibited a high
migration
degree of Indian style, but over the centuries became less and less Indian and more indigenous in character.
Secondly, there was no dominant caste group

(e.g., Brahmans) who migrated to Southeast Asia, but small
numbers of individuals from different castes
and regional origin; thus Mabbett finds Southeast Asia's
Sanskrit lore emerging from the contact to be of a highly syncretic character, more so than that found in
"Sanskritized" areas of the Indian subcontinent. Thirdly, the "Sanskritization" process in Southeast Asia was
initiated by elite from the communities being Sanskritized rather than by agents (i.e., Indians) of Sanskritiza
tion, as is revealed in the fact that Southeast Asia never developed a hierarchical caste system with foreigners
assuming high order roles in relation to the indigenous population. Instead, Sanskritization legitimized the
elite status of the indigenous rulers. "There is therefore a false dichotomy between Indian cultural imperialism
and local autonomy.... We should not demand that Indian dominance be represented by the extirpation of
local genius... [the Indian tradition] merely influenced" (p. 161).

in understanding this Indianization process iswith historians, who have tried to under
stand Funan and other early Southeast Asian political systems as unitary kingdoms.
Wolters argues that the difficulty in dealing with the "Hinduization" of early Southeast
Asian states is that they cannot be assumed to be "states" in themodern sense, but must be
viewed as tribal societies which from time to time produced certain chiefs who were able
to mobilize sufficient military power, family networks of relatives and their allies, and
marriage alliances to other chiefs groups to impose their hegemony over neighbouring
chiefs.17 Such overlordship was of temporary duration and was made possible by the
formation of a coalition of those who supported the adventurer seeking hegemony. To the
successful candidate and his coalition there were the rewards of victory. Those who wished
their local power to remain undisturbed would hasten to have their authority confirmed
by the new overlord. Only the Chinese viewed early Southeast Asian states as unified
"kingdoms" with continuous dynastic lines holding "thrones".18 However, there was no
indigenous sense of kingdom and its supra-territorial demands on loyalty among the
Southeast Asians themselves. "Kingship" came about because of a personal achievement,
not because one could claim to be the descendant of an earlier overlord. Political reality
was that of temporary overlordships shifting from this to that group. One group's leader
replaced another, not by a "usurpation" of the throne, but by the renewal of tribal
warfare which would then produce another era of short-lived unity. A "kingdom" was no
more than a territorial measurement of those allied to and acknowledging a leader's
authority.
Local "statecraft" was characterized by personal achievement. The secular accomplish
ments of the overlord were regarded as producing merit. Reinforced by existing beliefs that
there was an uneven distribution of not only secular but also spiritual prowess, overlord
ship provided the successful chief the means of earning additional merit. The superior
spiritual status of the overlord further reinforced the bonds between the leader and his
followers. Wolters' thesis is that Hinduism had certain teachings which were supportive of
these chiefs' efforts to distinguish themselves as spiritual superiors. Specifically, Wolters
documents existing strong concerns over death in early Khmer history. One important
role of a ruler on the Southeast Asian mainland, he holds, was to support his followers'
hopes for a superior death status.19 This was viewed as a "gift" to those whose secular
performances on the chiefs behalf were noteworthy. After consolidating his position by
force, the successful chief thus began to practise Hindu asceticism, which was further
demonstration of his superior spiritual prowess. The overlord projected himself as a
spiritual influence over his supporters' lives and hopes for salvation. Hindu tradition was
thus selectively mobilized to reinforce political alliances within die fragile polity of these
early "states".
Synthesizing the above controversies for the purpose of undertaking the analysis of
Funan's history, I conclude that the entrepreneurial activities of traders of various
,7O.W. Wolters, "Khmer 'Hinduism' in the Seventh Century" in Smith and Watson, op. cit., pp. 427-41.
Wolters' thesis is an extension of the theoretical work of Marshall Sahlins, "Poor Man, Rich Man, Big Man,
Chief: PoliticalTypes in Melanesia and Polynesia", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 5 (1963):
285-303. Mabbett, loc. cit., broadly applying Wolters' thesis to early Southeast Asia, describes the earliest
Southeast Asian "states" (e.g., Funan, Champa, and Srivijaya) as not being "a regular Indian-style
centralized state on the model of the Arthasastra"{p. 148), but may be better understood as "a conglomera
tion of principalities" (p. 154).
18This was consistent with Chinese knowledge of their own historical experience of "kingship" and dynastic
succession.
,9Wolters, loc. cit., p. 434.

86 Kenneth Hall
cultures, utilizing Malay ships to enter Southeast Asian waters, induced the emergence of
new Indianized patterns. Funan's chieftains mediated these initial commercial trans
actions as the instigators and organizers of Funan's port and its Malay population.
Through their contact with the developing international commercial route which was
utilizing the port of Oc-eo, Funan's rulers were subjected to a range of experiences beyond
those of their land-based subordinate population. They received new perceptions of the
world, new life goals, and became particularly aware of new organizational possibilities.
The local ruler thus became a cultural broker, the principal beneficiary of profits directly
derived from the commercial route. The rewards included ceremonial regalia, beads,
textiles, and other items useful to a chief attempting to stress his superiority over other
similar indigenous rulers. Funan's chief thus had a vested interest in the continuation and
expansion of the new system. If his own society's norms restricted his ambition, he was
forced to rise beyond the indigenous system to assume a higher order personal status, an
identity closely associated with the Indian model of divine kingship.
Applying this synthesis, one concludes that the Funan origin myth symbolizes the
union of indigenous and Indian traditions. The Funan princess may be seen leading a
band of Malay seamen on a plundering expedition against a merchant ship and the
foreigner who was travelling on board the ship. Was this, perhaps, an age when inter
national shipping was initiating the China voyage, when various coastal centres in South
east Asia were competing to attract international merchant ships to their ports?
The establishment of a coastal centre as the official entrep?t for traders was the likely
result of a local ruler's initiative in organizing his local population to facilitate this trade.
To attract trade, one must build a port facility. Secondly, a coastal centre had to establish
itself as the source of the goods desired by international traders. In the case of Funan
this would have been initially done by focusing the supply of both Chinese and Western
goods on Oc-eo by providing superior facilities, or, if necessary, by force. Further, to
build Oc-eo's prosperity Funan would have had to form a working alliance with theMalay
sea-going population. Malay sailors had the double potential either of aiding the develop
ment of a commercial entrep?t by facilitating the flow of commercial goods by serving as
transporters of goods or as policemen over the sea channels, or of becoming a detriment,
turning to open piracy against merchant ships.
Thus the myth of Funan's origin may not in any way document an actual marriage
between a native princess and a foreign traveller, as it is usually interpreted as doing.
Instead of symbolizing the "Indianization" of Funan, the Indian myth may more validly
symbolize the establishment of Funan's port of Oc-eo as the dominant Southeast Asian
port for international shipping, reflecting the actual evolution of Funan's power. Firstly, a
local chief is reported to have led a band of Malay seamen from the Funan coast against a
passing merchant ship. This is symbolic of initial efforts to attract shipping to Funan's
port of Oc-eo by force. Interestingly, these attempts at piracy were said to have been
beaten off by the ship's travellers, explaining why such uses of force were not successful
in attracting the traders. Only with the marriage of the local ruler and the ship's traveller
was the prosperity of Funan sealed. The marriage of the local princess and the foreigner
thus sealed a pact, a promise that in the future Funan would be willing to deal more
positively with the foreign merchants.
A successful port in this age would have to present such a cosmopolitan stance to
develop into a thriving entrep?t. As symbolized by the Kaundinya myth, Oc-eo was such
a neutral meeting ground where various foreign merchandise could be peaceably
exchanged. Funan's rulers had to offer a sense of security to the international merchant
groups active in their port, but such protection had to be carefully regulated so that

visiting merchants did not feel threatened. If Funan's rulers placed too many restraints
on these traders, the traders would have shifted their operations to other ports which
allowed them more freedom to transact their business.20
Funan's origin myth goes on to say that the foreign traveller drank the water of the land
previous to his marriage to the local princess. This is clearly an allusion to the draining of
Funan's fields of sea water and to the establishment of the hydraulic system, described by
Malleret in his archaeological reconstruction, which allowed Funan to broaden its agri
cultural productivity. Interestingly, this draining of the land was associated with the
founding of the Funan "state" and was specifically attributed to the foreign traveller,
leading many historians to conclude that the application of foreign technology or the
supervision of foreigners, or the corresponding development within Funan's statecraft of a
foreign component was critical to this process of expanding Funan's agrarian base.
Funan's hydraulic projects are not without controversy. Malleret himself was
undecided whether their purpose was irrigation or land drainage. Further, he dated the
construction of the works to the fifth or sixth century, a period corresponding ? as
developed in this paper ? to the demise rather than origin of the Funan state.21
I.W. Mabbett has recently argued, based upon K'ang T'ai's report that Funan residents
sowed seed one year and harvested the next three years, that Funan's agriculture was
characterized by rain-fed cultivation, and that in no way did an intensive irrigation system
constitute the basis for a territorial, well-populated Funan state.22 Despite Malleret's
fifth and sixth century dating of the remaining evidence of hydraulic works, the Funan
origin myth and K'ang T'ai's report both stress a developed agrarian sector as being
a key ingredient in Funan's prosperity.
While the Funan origin myth first deals with sea contacts, its secondary focus upon the
land reflects the dual nature of Funan's domain. Not only was Funan's prosperity the
result of its successful interaction with the sea, but itswealth was equally due to its agrarian
base. Stimulation for agrarian development came from the maritime sector, where
merchants and seamen putting up at Oc-eo demanded food during their periods of
"layover". Rather than depending upon imported rice to meet this demand,23 this market
for rice necessitated the production of a rice surplus by Funan's indigenous agrarian
20In exchange for facilitating this trade Funan's rulers would have been permitted to collect fees from those
using their port. Such usage fees would have been channelled directly into the royal treasury and become an
important source of the royal family's revenue base.
2,Malleret, 3, p. 324; 4, p. 131. Despite the fifth and sixth century dating of the remaining evidence of a
hydraulic system, Iwould note that Malleret's methodology is severely criticized by contemporary archaeo
logists and his dates are subject to revision. The Funan origin myth as well as K'ang T'ai's report both stress a
well-developed agrarian sector previous to the fifth century.
22Mabbett, op. cit., pp. 11, 145. "Let us remember that the port of Oc-eo, however highly organized and
cosmopolitan, need not have been the hub of a dense population sustained by intensive irrigated rice
cultivation as were some kingdoms [e.g., Angkor] much later...."
23This was the case with Malacca in the fifteenth century, importing rice from Java. See M.A.P. Meilink
Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence, 1500-1620 (The Hague, 1962), pp. 36-38. Imust suggest, in
reply to Mabbett, that a matter of scale and timing is significant in evaluating this earliest era of Funan's exis
tence. During the Funan era there was as yet little indigenous competition to undermine Funan's commercial
leadership, and the maritime itself was not of the volume

trade it was when the maritime passage totally
replaced the overland caravan
routes as the principal line of commercial intercourse between East and West.
Oc-eo need not have been a large port; there was in this age, as compared to later eras, limited travel along the
? ?
maritime passage. Accomodations including food stocks for visiting merchants need not have been
beyond the capacity of Funan's initial population base. O.W. Wolters argues a similar case in his recent
defence of southeastern Sumatra coastal centres as being the focus of Srivijaya's hegemony. See O.W.
Wolters, "Studying Srivijaya", Journal of the Malay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. 52, 2 (1979): 1-38.

88 Kenneth Hall
population. The hydraulic projects, regardless of the role in their creation played by rulers
or foreigners, would have facilitated this additional productivity. Funan's agrarian
development thus supported Oc-eo*s growth as an important entrep?t, while Oc-eo's
growth as a cosmopolitan commercial centre encouraged the expansion of Funan's
agrarian base.
Thirdly, the Funan origin myth describes the early Funan domain as being comprised
of several settlements each ruled by its own chief. Agreeing with Wolters' noted synthesis,
I have argued that early Southeast Asian states, including Funan, derived their power
from their control over manpower.24 Initially Funan's might was derived from local
tribesmen who both cultivated and went to war on behalf of their chiefs. As depicted in the
Funan origin myth, the first Funan king was said to have ruled directly over a specific
sector of land, assigning his son seven "centres", or subordinate chiefdoms to supervise.
The seven subordinate population centres were thus ruled indirectly, their loyalty
questionable beyond their personal ties to the Funan ruler/ chief. The success of the Funan
chief in initiating the synthesis of the sea and land economic bases allowed this ruler to use
revenues derived from these two income sources to establish his supremacy over his fellow
chiefs. Revenues collected in Oc-eo, usage fees collected from those using Funan's port
facilities, flowed directly into the royal treasury. Funan's ruler utilized these revenues to
expand its economic base not only in the commercial sector, upgrading Oc-eo, but in its
agrarian sector as well. Trade-derived wealth allowed Funan to build larger hydraulic
projects, thus making more land fit for cultivation and expanding the economic potential
of its agrarian core. This added potential in turn allowed Funan's chief to support a larger
manpower base, encouraging more chiefs and their followers to share in his prosperity.
These economic transformations in turn brought parallel social and political evolution.
In a recent article Paul Wheatley has explained the process of economic transformation in
Southeast Asia as being marked by a transition in a society's mechanisms of exchange.25
In a less complicated tribal existence reciprocity, a sharing process among family,
community, and religious groups maintained the social unit. Wheatley views Southeast
Asia previous to the maritime route's expansion in the first century as being "occupied
exclusively by societies whose most advanced level of political organization was the chief
dom and among whom the instrumental exchanges characteristic of a reciprocative
mode of integration dominated".26 Except for the Ton-kin region of northern Vietnam,
which was under Chinese political authority and was thus subjected to the sudden
imposition of an external tribute system, the exchange mechanisms of most of Southeast
Asia were gradually transformed. Entrepreneurial advances brought social imbalances
within societies like that of Funan, resulting in the transformation of the indigenous
economy and the emergence of political entities based on redistributive exchange.
Redistribution is here defined as the allocation of rewards and facilities by an individual
(a tribal chief) or a small group (a tribal, merchant, or religious elite) for the purpose of
integrating that society. Applying Wheatley's transformation analysis to Funan, one is
24See Kenneth R. Hall, "An Introductory Essay on Southeast Asian Statecraft in the Classical Period" in
Kenneth R. Hall and John K. Whitmore (eds.), Explorations in Early Southeast Asian History: The Origins
of Southeast Asian Statecraft (Ann Arbor, 1976), pp. 1-24.

25Paul Wheatley, "Saty?nrta in Suvarnadvipa: From
Reciprocity to Redistribution in Ancient Southeast
Asia" in J.A. Sabloff and C.C. Lamberg-Karlovsky (eds.), Ancient Civilization and Trade (Albuquerque,
1975), pp. 227-38. Wheatley's recent writings by Marshall
thesis is based upon Sahlins, Stone Age Economics
(Chicago, 1972) and Talcott Parsons [see Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, Economy and Society,
A Study in the Integration of Economic and Social Theory (London, 1956)].
26Ibid., p. 228.

inclined to view the initial efforts of Funan's ruler to subordinate those other chiefs who
shared wealth derived from the trade route as a redistribution of the chiefs treasury for
the purpose of integrating Funan's society under his authority.
Wheatley holds that several Southeast Asian societies went beyond this level of
integration, developing strong mobilizative sectors in their economies. Such mobilization
oriented economies Wheatley views as having developed organizational mechanisms for
the acquisition, control, and disposal of resources in pursuit of collective goals, most of
which were political. While in the redistributive economy the resources of the realm
"naturally" flow to a centre to be redistributed for the benefit of all, in the mobilization
oriented economy impersonalism takes hold. Tribal gifts and tribute are transposed and
agricultural surplus was taxed by state administrators to support a court. Tribesmen are
not only replaced as warriors by a royal army paid from a central treasury but also
demoted from cultivators to peasant status, becoming less personally involved in the
affairs of their former chief.27 Their chief is transformed into a divine king, his legitimacy
defined no longer by tribal tradition but by elaborate Sanskrit ritual ? his hut has become
a palace, the tribal spirit house a temple, the local spirit stone a powerful lingua, and the
tribe's village becomes the centre of the king's rule over the villages of other tribes, as these
villages and their tribesmen are integrated into a state.28 With the development of the
institutional structures necessary to administer this expanded political realm, the society's
old reciprocity networks were overlaid with redistributive and mobilizative systems as in
some way all sectors of the state inevitably interacted with the new order.
While Wolters holds in his recent essay that Funan cannot be catgorized as a state,
Wheatley's synthesis of the process of state development can be documented in Funan's
history. I have argued that the seven chiefs initially allied with the Funan chief, who in
turn appointed his son to integrate these seven under his authority, were in part drawn
to support Funan's chief by their desire to participate in his rapidly expanding economic
base and by the potential of taking part in his prosperous redistributive network. Another
pressure, however, was the likely threat of conquest by Funan's chief, whose wealth from
the developing commercial and agrarian sectors could be equally mobilized to attract
additional troops to his band of armed supporters. One of the key issues in constituting
Wolters' state is that of continuity from ruler to son. In this sense I interpret the appoint
ment of the first Funan ruler's son as overlord of the seven subordinate chiefs as an
attempt to more fully integrate these centres into Funan, and as well to provide a founda
?
tion ? a manpower base for his son when the time comes, after his father's death, for
the son to assume the Funan throne. While the Chinese sources are rather vague on the
question of succession, there does appear to have been continuity among Funan's initial
rulers through the second half of the second century.
The task of categorizing Funan's polity may better be served by first determining what
constituted a Southeast Asian ttstate"within the context of contemporary Southeast Asian
statecraft, rather than by viewing Funan as a "state" which fulfilled the Chinese or modern
historical understanding of the word. Herein archaeological evidence provides clues.
In analyzing central Thailand's relationship to the Funan region, Bennet Bronson has
focused upon the archaeological evidence of a contact between the Oc-eo area and central
Thailand's Chansen.29 Firstly, Bronson notes that the Oc-eo area's sites show a high degree
2?See Eric Wolf, Peasants (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966).

^Wheatley, loc. cit., p. 247.
^Bennet Bronson, "The Late Prehistory and Early History of Central Thailand" in Smith and Watson,
op. cit., pp. 315-36.

90 Kenneth Hall
of uniformity and economic integration in the Funan age, as demonstrated by the uni
ceramic ? those of not.
formity of types contemporary central Thailand do While
Bronson holds that it is difficult to speak of extensive regional economies or political
development in central Thailand until the seventh century (although there is previous evi
dence of sub-regional integration and development), he views the ceramic evidence from
the Funan sites as representing a higher level of regional economic and political integra
tion. In central Thailand the principal evidence for this indigenous consolidation is not
only the distribution of local pottery types which have their own special character but also
the growing number of trade goods from external sources, especially those from Funan,
which have their own distinctive and consistent markings. Bronson holds that external
contacts between central Thailand and Funan were of a commercial and religious rather
than political nature ? archaeological evidence will not support the conclusion that the
area was ever conquered or colonized by outsiders. Bronson views Funan's growth as a
stimulus to the state-building process in central Thailand, as the flow of trade goods into
the region supplied the demand of an emerging foreign-oriented elite class who came to
emulate Funan.30
Bronson's theme is similar to Wheatley's, that there is a potential for economic and
political integration to take place simultaneously. External trade, in Bronson's view, was
a likely stimulus to local trade, the growth of domestic commerce promoting the need for
a higher order of economic integration. The need for economic integration in turn necessi
tated more capable control over areas of potential conflict, management of the economic
resources of one's domain, and the ability to deal with a rising population density in the
area. Bronson's comparative analysis of the archaeological evidence from Funan, which
exhibits a higher level of economic integration than those of central Thailand sites,
supports the conclusion that Funan is best understood as the first of Southeast Asia's
"states".
C. Jacques' recent study of the Kaundinya-n?gi myth is supportive of Bronson's view

that during the first few centuries of the Christian era, when Funan's level of integration
is compared to the low levels of economic integration in other areas of Southeast Asia in
the same period, Funan's level is clearly of a higher order. Jacques concludes in his study
that the myth is commonly used not only by the Funanese, but also by later Khmer rulers
as the basis for the construction of their genealogies.31 It is Jacques' view that the Funan
domain was ruled by a "royal family" whose members were all descended from the
original Kaundinya, whether in fact or by law, suggesting a level of cultural integration
beyond the tribal level.
Further supporting this thesis of a higher order of cultural integration in Funan are two
recent essays by H. H. E. Loof s32and A. H. Christie,33 which argue that Funan was a cultural
^This would as well have enabled these people to defend themselves from Funan. Ibid., p. 324.
"
3,C. Jacques, Tunan', 'Zhenla': The Reality Concealed by These Chinese Views of Indochina" in
Smith and Watson, op. cit., pp. 371-79. Myuseof Jacques'essay distorts Jacques'intent, which was to contest
the proposition of "Funan". Jacques argues that there is a need
to understand what "Funan" really was
instead of accepting the term as representing a well-ordered state system, as he views too many historians of
the past were doing. It would be better, he reasons, to omit reference to "Funan" and focus analysis upon
the early developing centres of mainland civilization instead. I interpret Jacques' study supporting my view of
Funan civilization, as I have paraphrased Jacques'.
32H.H.E. Loofs, "Problems of Continuity between the Pre-Buddhist and Buddhist Periods in Central
Thailand, with Special Reference to U-Thong" ibid., pp. 342-51.
33A.H. Christie, "Lin-i, Fu-nan, Java" ibid., pp. 283-84. Christie, too, is questioning the existence of a
"Funan" state in the traditional sense, preferring to consider the "Funan" realm as a cultural centre of great
significance in early Southeast Asian history.

axis as well as a commercial centre connecting three cultural realms. Loofs believes one
cultural zone to have extended from lower Burma (Chin-lin) to Funan and to have been
inhabited by Mon-Khmer and Pyu ethnic groups. A second cultural zone extended from
Funan up the Vietnamese coast and was populated by Chams and Vietnamese. Christie
documents Funan's contacts with a third zone, one extending from Funan into the Java
Sea cultural realm with itsMalay population. Loofs and Christie argue that Funan, as a
cultural axis connecting these three zones, diffused ideas into each of the zones and itwas
natural for Funan to perform this role since it was an active participant in each of these
three cultural realms. They too view Funan as an area of a higher order of cultural integra
tion, and on this basis consider Funan to have been Southeast Asia's first "state".
My argument, following the lead of Bronson, Jacques, Loofs, and Christie as well as
most earlier Southeast Asian historians, is that Funan is indeed the first Southeast Asian
"state". Firstly, I have presented Funan as a higher order economic centre, possessing
a dual economic base which was supportive of a more sophisticated level of political
integration than was true previously. My definition of integration focuses upon the
attempts of Funan's initial ruler, as depicted in the origin myth, to build a continuous
manpower base, subordinating local chiefs to his authority as well as that of his successors.
The resulting "royal family" of Funan and later Angkor, descended from the original
Kaundinya, is evidence of a continuity associated with higher levels of political integra
tion. Within the Funan realm were developed more elaborate cultural forms, which overa
period of time synthesized pre-existing indigenous cultural and ethnic diversity with
external ideology to create a new syncretic higher-order cultural base. Archaeological
evidence, notably the remains at Oc-eo and sites as well as a number of
surrounding
contemporary population centres in areas beyond Funan's political authority which had
varying degrees of commercial contact with Funan, substantiates that Funan not only
demonstrated a higher degree of cultural sophistication but also served as the locus of
contact between assorted regional and local marketing systems and the higher order
international marketing network, facilitating the exchange of Southeast Asian and goods
of international origin within Oc-eo and its other ports.34 These economic ties in turn
facilitated the diffusion of Funan's political, economic, and cultural achievements into
secondary zones of Southeast Asian development.
Let us examine the early history of Funan to explore the character of this first "state"
and the process of economic, cultural, and political diffusion as it relates to the
"Indianization" of Southeast Asia.
The Extension of Funan's Hegemony

In the Chinese account of Funan's early history, during the second half of the second
century, Hun P'an-huang, a descendant of the original Kaundinya, was said to have
enjoyed a long reign, further consolidating his state's hold over local chiefs by sowing
dissension among them. Having thus fragmented their unity, he attacked and conquered
these chiefs. He then sent his sons and grandsons to directly rule over their political
centres.35
By the late second century reign of Hun P'an-huang the original seven subordinate
tribal centres and now others as well were thus being incorporated into the area directly
34For a discussion of pre-modern marketing systems in Southeast Asia, see Kenneth R. Hall, Maritime
Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia (forthcoming).
35Pelliot, "Quelques textes..."

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ruled by the Funan monarch, as the pattern of Funan's statecraft began to emerge. The
origin myth stipulates that these victories were the consequence of the successful sowing of
dissension among the ruler's enemies, using his ever-increasing wealth to either directly
bribe or to at least create envy among his rival chiefs followers, exploiting weaknesses in
the local political systems to extend his power. Having first fragmented the potential
for united resistance among his opponents, the Funan ruler finally extended his hegemony
over them. Funan's ruler was then able to send his sons and grandsons, his direct kin ?
? to rule over his former rivals,
those whose personal loyalty he depended upon
integrating these groups fully under Funan's direct control.
Looking back upon the previous century, K'ang T'ai's third century report to the
Chinese emperor supplies further information on Hun P'an-huang's conquests. Hun
P'an-huang is said to have captured large elephants while on hunting expeditions into the
jungle, and while domesticating these elephants brought about the submission of many
"countries" whose lands he hunted upon. George Coed?s and O. W. Wolters have related
this tale of the hunting king to the origin of Funan's capital of Vy?dhapura, "the city of the
hunter king".36 The Funan name is itself a derivative of the Khmer phnom (bnarri) or
"mountain"; Funan's rulers were known as kurung bnam, "kings of the mountain".37
According to Chinese records the sacred mountain of Funan was located five hundred li
(200 km) from the sea, which is almost exactly the distance from the Ba Phnom mountain
to the site of Oc-eo's remains, adding authenticity to the Chinese accounts.38 Vyadhapura
was constructed adjacent to the sacred mountain of Ba Phnom. Because the Funan state
and its rulers derived their name from this sacred mountain, it is therefore reasonable to
date the origin of a Funan state to the conquests of Hun P'an-huang and the establishment
of his capital city in the interior at Vyadhapura, the city named in his honour.
Vy?dhapura, adjacent to Funan's sacred mountain, was strategically placed to establish
the cosmological and supernatural base drawn upon to substantiate the legitimacy of
future Funan rulers. According to tradition, the mountain was the repository of super
natural powers which were dispensed by Funan's monarchs to benefit their subjects.39 The
mountain symbolized the ruler's authority. From this mountain, as from the monarch
himself, came the domain's prosperity. This contact with the supernatural enhanced
Funan rulers' superior status and further legitimized the submission of adjacent popula
tions to the Funan monarch.40
During the early third century, Funan rule passed to a great "general", Fan Shih-man,
who is said to have been selected to rule by Funan's population after the death of Hun
36See Coed?s' discussion of their conversation on this issue in Coed?s, Indianized States, p. 275, n. 5.
37Ibid., p. 36.
38Pelliot, "Fou-Nan", p. 263.
39This reinforcement of the ruler's supernatural powers was related to traditional views that the successful
ruler could influence one's post-death status, as discussed earlier.
^In to its position
addition near the sacred mountain, there were additional to Vy?dhapura's
advantages
inland In this age a land-based capital was easier to defend than a coastal centre. As noted, the
location.
Malay
seamen who were key to Oc-eo's economic vitality could equally turn to piracy in times when the sea route was
unproductive, and might even pillage the land surrounding their port base. Southeast Asian oral tradition as
well as Chinese chronicles are full of tales about piracy in Southeast Asia and the raids of
Malay seamen upon
coastal centres. By moving Funan's capital to the interior, Hun P'an-huang not only mystically integrated
his rule over the realms of the land and the sea by focusing his legitimacy upon Vy?dhapura and itsmountain
based cult, but this also placed his capital in a more secure position defensively away from the more vulnerable
sea coast. Kenneth R. Hall, "EleventhCentury Commercial Developments in Angkor and Champa", Journal
of Southeast Asian Studies, 10, 2 (1979): 420-34, discusses the difficulties presented by such maritime
communities to the Cham domain in a later era.

94 Kenneth Hall
P'an-huang's son. In dealing with records of Fan Shih-man's reign, one must first note
that the legend of Fan Shih-man's succession to the throne stressed his selection by
Funan's subjects. The shift of Funan's leadership to someone who was not a direct relative
of Hun P'an-huang would seemingly have raised questions of Fan Shih-man's legitimacy.
Such a problem was apparently alleviated by taking the issue "to the people",
demonstrating the selection process discussed earlier whereby Fan Shih-man was
nominated to rule principally because he had sufficient military power to impose his
hegemony over Funan's chiefs. Fan Shih-man's legitimacy was thus based upon his past
success as a leader of Funan's warrior armies and his current position as the leader of a
sizeable body of troops. It was likely that Fan Shih-man could have easily seized power
with or without the validation of a council of chiefs or tribal elders representing
"the people" of Funan. Whatever the circumstances of his succession, Fan Shih-man
assumed power with the "approval" of Funan's population.
Building upon this indigenous "vote of confidence", Fan Shih-man soon embarked
upon a campaign to extend Funan's authority. He first consolidated Funan's hold over
the Mekong delta, annexing territory northward up to the mouth of the Tonle Sap and
then subjugating the Cham domain to the south on the north edge of the delta.41 Having
thus secured his mainland base, Fan Shih-man's next move was a naval expedition against
the Malay coast, utilizing Malay seamen of Oc-eo. This campaign was clearly an attempt
to assume direct authority over the trade centres on the Peninsula, thereby solidifying
Funan's dominance over the flow of commerce through Southeast Asia. His conquest of
the Malay coast is described by the Chinese envoys:
[Fan Shih-man] attacked and conquered the neighbouring kingdoms. All recognized
themselves his vassals. [As a result] he took the title of "Great King of Funan". Then
he had great built and crossing the immense sea he attacked more than ten
ships
kingdoms, [including]... Tun-sun. He extended his territory 5,000 or 6,000 li. Then he
wished to subdue the country of Chin-lin [lower Burma]. But he fell ill [and died].42
Fan Shih-man's on the Peninsula was Tun-sun. T'ai reports that
key conquest K'ang
Tun-sun was a "state" where:
all the countries beyond the frontier [beyond the Chinese frontier, i.e., Southeast
come and go in pursuit of trade.... At this mart East and West meet together
Asia]
rare merchandise ?
so that every day great crowds gather there. Precious goods and
they are all there....43
K'ang T'ai further reported that it was a thirty days' sail from Funan to Tun-sun.
Tun-sun's polity focused on a city some ten li from the sea. Five "kings" (chiefs) shared the
rule over the northern Peninsula, the ruler of Tun-sun being dominant among these. But
after Fan Shih-man's conquest all these chiefs transferred their loyalty to Funan. Resident
in Tun-sun were one thousand "Indian Brahmans" who were receiving the daughters of
the local population inmarriage, which encouraged the Indians to stay. There were also
?
some five hundred families of "Persian" origin likely western merchant families.44
The conquest of Tun-sun and other Peninsula centres completed the expansion of
41See Golden p. 286, fig. 46. The subjugation

Khersonese, of the Cham domain is documented
Wheatley,
in the first known Sanskrit attributed to Funan, issued in the late third century by Fan Shih-man's
inscription
descendant Fan Ch'an and placed at Vo-canh within the Cham realm. See Coed?s, Indianized States,
pp. 40 and 278; nn. 38, 39.

42Pelliot, "Fou-nan", pp. 265-66.
43Wheatley, loc. cit., p. 16.
"Wheatley, "Saty?nrta", p. 243.

Funan's commercial base. At the time that Fan Shih-man embarked on his sea expedition,
voyages between theMalay Peninsula and China via the South China Sea sailed near the
coast. Ships seldom ventured beyond the coast into the open sea until the fifth century.
Because of this preference for coastal navigation Funan's strategic location in the lower
Mekong delta region allowed it to dominate the coastal voyages from the Malay
Peninsula to China. The Chinese account cited above reports that the regular voyages of
merchant ships from Tun-sun to Oc-eo took thirty days. This voyage lasted so long
principally because ships were navigating close to the coast rather than sailing directly
across the Gulf of Thailand to Oc-eo. For Funan to totally dominate the early Southeast
Asian trade, including the Malay Peninsula transit ? which was Fan Shih-man's
?
ambition Funan needed to acquire a base on the Malay Peninsula. Tun-sun, already
well-established as a cosmopolitan centre of commerce on the Malay Peninsula's upper
east coast and a terminus for the Kra Isthmus portage, was a well-chosen victim for
Fan Shih-man's superior naval power.45
Described by the Chinese envoys as a loose confederation of five chiefs whose territories
stretched from coast to coast, Tun-sun was representative of other settlements on the Kra
Isthmus area which had developed because of and depended upon the trans-peninsular
portage of commercial goods. In addition to Tun-sun, which controlled the upper coast,
Langkasuka on the Perak River system,46 Tambralinga in the area south of Chaiya,47 and
Tukuapa on the west coast48 are all believed to have been major Malay entrep?ts during
this initial age of commercial development. Fan Shih-man's conquest of Tun-sun not only
provided Funan with a solid position on both sides of the Gulf of Thailand, but also
allowed Funan's sovereign to extend his dominance over these other entrep?ts. While
these Malay entrep?ts were river valley-based political entities, no more than loose tribal
confederacies ruled by chiefs (similar to the five tribal groups whose territories comprised
Tun-sun's domain), Funan had by this time evolved a more broadly based polity. As
noted, Funan's agrarian system stabilized the revenue flow of Funan's rulers. Using the
combined revenues derived from maritime trade and its ricelands, Funan had developed a
political and economic potential beyond that of the more simple tribal societies of the
Isthmus, which depended almost entirely upon trade revenues to finance their statecraft.
Funan thus had a definite edge in its ability to attract the loyalty of the Malay sea
population of the Gulf. The economic stability built upon Funan's dual economic
base allowed Funan's rulers to provide consistent payoffs to Malay seamen. Malay
seamen were thus attracted to Funan's ports in the hopes of sharing in this prosperity, in
return supplying Funan with a naval force like that which Fan Shih-man had used to
45This consolidationof Funan's control over the coastline was of economic importance to Funan, and
demonstrates the significance of trade-related revenues to Funan's economic well-being. Traders at this time
were few in number and were thus easy to control. As a visitor, merchants were vulnerable to the reasonable
revenue demands and controls of their host, as discussed earlier. The capital the Funan state derived from
trade was utilized for public works as well as for territorial expansion of the type undertaken by Fan Shih
man. By controlling the entire coastline between Funan and the Malay Peninsula, the Funan rulers would
have monopolized the contemporary maritime trade passing through Southeast Asia and the revenues
associated with the trade. Bennet Bronson has pointed out that such efforts to control inter-regional
commerce stimulated state formation in central Thailand (see Bronson, op. cit.). A similar argument could be
made in relation to Fan Shih-man's efforts to totally control the maritime channels.
^Coed?s, Indianized States, p. 39; Wheatley, Golden Khersonese, pp. 252-67.
47O.W. Wolters, "T?mbralinga", Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 21,3 (1958):
587-607.
48Wheatley, loc. cit., pp. 268-72.

96 Kenneth Hall
extend Funan's authority over other Malay entrep?ts; these seamen also policed the sea
lanes between the Malay Peninsula and southern China.49
The conquest of Tun-sun and the acquisition of a Peninsula base had other than purely
economic significance for Funan, for itwas after Fan Shih-man's reign that Funan's state
craft began to exhibit signs of stronger Sanskritic influence. Chinese sources imply that
the likely source of Funan's new Indian mannerisms were the conquered Peninsula
entrep?t, which already had substantial Indian character prior to the extension of Funan's
authority over the Peninsula. Tun-sun was not the only Peninsula centre having an Indian
?
element in its population at the time of its conquest by Funan the Chinese account
quoted above reported one thousand Indian Brahmans (or those with Indianized
behaviour) in residence. P'an P'an, an entrep?t south of Tun-sun also conquered by
Fan Shih-man was said to have been inhabited by "numerous Brahmans [who] have come
from India to seek wealth by serving the [local] king, with whom they are in high favor".50
The most dramatic consequence of these initial influences appears to have been the
growing use of Sanskrit in Funan; Funan's first known Sanskrit inscription was issued
shortly after Fan Shih-man's death.51
Although Funan's statecraft began to utilize Indian vocabulary, Indian cosmology and
statecraft had little significance as yet in the actual workings of Funan's political system,
as evinced in the transfer of power to Fan Shih-man's successor. When Fan Shih-man's
son attempted to assume the Funan throne after his father's death he was put to death
by Fan Ch'an, son of Fan Shih-man's sister, whose claim to the throne was based upon
his recognition as war chief by two thousand men.52 As had been the case with Fan Shih
man's succession to the throne, control over manpower was still the most important
variable in determining legitimate succession in Funan. One of the most important
features of Fan Ch'an's reign according to K'ang T'ai's account is that a man called
Chia Hsiang-li came from India in the time of Fan Ch'an buying and selling, and told the
Funari monarch all about India.53 It is remarkable that the Funan ruler had such a high
degree of ignorance about India when Indian traders had been following the route to
China via Funan for a century. Fan Ch'an's limited knowledge of the trade route is further
testimony to the internal dynamic of Funan's early statecraft.
49WTiile Funan's followers among the land-based population were also attracted to serve under Funan s
rulers owing to the magical qualities of the ruler ? the supernatural powers attributed to the Funan ruler
?
which could be shared with his loyal subjects the seamen's loyalty would seem to have been more directly
the consequence of trade prosperity alone. Thus as will be argued later, when Funan's monopoly over the sea
channels collapsed the Malay seamen quickly shifted their loyalties to more prosperous ports.
50Wheatley, loc. cit., pp. 47-51.
51Coed?s, Indianized States, p. 40 and George Coed?s, "Le date de l'inscription sanskrit de Vo-Canh",
Indian Historical Quarterly, 16 (1940): 484-88.
52That is, Fan Shih-man's sister had married someone sufficiently powerful that her son was provided a
manpower base from which he could seize power from Fan Shih-man's son. As noted above, such marriage
alliances between one's family and subordinate groups were intended to solidify one's power. However, such
marriages could enhance the prestige of the allied family, providing them with a legitimate claim to the
throne as a member of the extended royal family.
53Itwas during Fan Ch'an's reign that regular diplomatic contact between Funan and both India and China
was said to have been established. As a result of commercial interests rather than political ambition, Fan
Ch'an sent a relative to India to gather information and to solicit trade. Embarking at Takuapa, a port on the
west coast of the Malay Peninsula also brought under Funan's authority by Fan Shih-man, Fan Ch'an's
envoy sailed to the mouth of the Ganges on the Bengal coast. From there he travelled inland some 7,000 li up
the Ganges until he reached the court of a Kushana prince. This prince was so impressed with the visit that
he sent back a present of four horses to Funan's ruler. Later in his reign Fan Ch'an also dispatched Funan's
first official embassy to China. See Pelliot, "Fou-Nan", pp. 271-78.

The politics of Funan were still dominated by war bands in themid-third century when
Fan Ch'an's life was terminated by another of Fan Shih-man's sons (an infant at the time
of his father's death), who had assembled a significant band of supporters. This son had
? ?
taken refuge "living among the people" during Fan Ch'an's reign, and "was able to
collect good soldiers of the country" from among these.54 These "soldiers" were the
kinsmen of this son's mother who, when the opportunity arose, had mobilized their own
allies to support a new bid for hegemony. This son was in turn assassinated by Fan Ch'an's
Fan-Hsun, yet another chief with his own manpower resources, who assumed
"general"
the Funan throne around A.D. 240.
It was during Fan Hsun's long reign in the middle of the third century that Funan's
commercial prosperity reached its zenith. The Wu emperor Sun Ch'uan sent his envoys
K'ang T'ai and Chu Ying to visit Funan around A.D. 240, who reported extensively on
the prosperity of Fan-Hsun's domain and its history. In K'ang T'ai's report cited earlier,
Funan is correctly viewed as being a wealthy political domain whose rulers supplemented
?
their income from the land with the taxes paid by foreign merchants "gold, silver, pearls,
and perfumes...."^Funan was utilizing an Indian vocabulary and showed Indian techno
gical influence, but its political theory and religious philosophy were still strongly indigen
ous in character. It was not until the mid-fifth century that any significant Indianization
took place. Then a sudden transition from the previously followed indigenous patterns
was in some way related to the take-over of the Funan throne by a new line of monarchs.
Fifth Century Transitions
Traditionally, Funan's new dynastic line is viewed as originating in themore Indianized

peninsular state of P'an P'an, which had come under Funan's authority during Fan
Shih-man's reign. In the record of Fan Shih-man's conquests, it is stressed that P'an P'an's
rulers were patrons of Indian Brahmans, as if this were quite different from the practice of
Funan's rulers. The succession to the Funan throne is reported in the Chinese Liang-shu:
The people of Funan heard of him [the ruler of P'an P'an]. The whole kingdom rose
with joy. They came to him and chose him king. He changed all the rules according to
the custom of India.56
Was this "second as this new ruler is known from P'an

Kaundinya", by historians, P'an,
or was he actually of Indian origin?57 The strongly Indian character of Funan's fifth
century statecraft has been thought to have been the work of an Indian Brahman or a ruler
who patronized Brahmans and gave them a significant role in the creation of a new
ideological focus for Funan's political system,58 but the only concrete evidence of
Indian Brahmans resident in Southeast Asian courts is all post-eighth century in date.59
54Wolters, "Khmer 'Hinduism' ", p. 428.

55Pelliot, "Fou-Nan", pp. 252, 268.
56Ibid., p. 299, a passage translated from the Uang-shu.
"Possibly he could have come from the Kushana realm with which Fan Ch'an had entered relations (see
fn. 53). Artistic evidence from the fifth century does reveal Persian influence in Funan. Statues wear short
tunics, sashes, and the boots of horsemen; all seem to reflect a northwestern Indian source. It is unclear,
however, whether these came to Funan via diplomatic or commercial channels. See Coed?s, Indianized
States, pp. 46-47.
58
Most I.W. Mabbettnotes in his general study of the patterns of Indianization
recently that fourth and
fifth century evidence is more convincing testimony of direct Indian political influence. See Mabbett,
"The Indianization of Southeast Asia", p. 147.
59Wheatley, "Saty?nrta", pp. 244-45, stresses the role of Brahmans in this Indianization process, but notes
problems in determining their origin. Wheatley argues, as do other historians, that although evidence of a
Brahman presence is all post-eighth century in date, it is reasonable to expect similar practice in earlier times.

98 Kenneth Hall
Although Brahmans may well have had input into the new Funan polity, I believe that it is
not necessary to trace the origin of these fifth century transitions all the way to India;
rather, these changes reflect an internal evolution in Funan's dynastic system, and are
best understood within this indigenous context.
My sense of the Uang-shu's report of the fifth century "Kaundinya" is that the people
of Funan had become embroiled in another succession dispute or some other internal dis
harmony between regional armed factions. As a consequence a new line, having its base in
P'an P'an, was either invited by Funan's clan elders to restore internal order, or a P'an
P'an based chief and his supporters seized power directly. Most prominent is the pressure
felt by this new line to establish its legitimacy by imposing substantially new patterns of
?
state administration upon Funan "changing all the rules according to the custom of
India". It is from this era onward that Sanskrit comes into widespread official usage.
Saka era dating becomes standard. Funan's worship of Indian deities, especially the
state's official worship of the Siva linga Mahesvara and icons of the Mahayana
Bodhisattva Lokesvara and the lord Visnu is systematized and extended. The Sanskrit
? varman is added to the names of rulers. There was also an attempt to
honorific title
consolidate and construct an official genealogy for Funan's royal line, elaborately tracing
the origin of Funan's monarchs to the marriage of the first Kaundinya and the n?gi
a to refocus the basis of a Funan
princess. All of these changes reflect significant attempt
monarch's legitimacy and especially to elevate more distinctly the prestige of Funan's ruler
above that of his subordinate chiefs, now focusing the monarch's legitimacy upon
Indianized forms.
As depicted in Chinese records, succession to Funan's throne in the pre-fifth century era
was dependent firstly upon one's having royal blood, designated by the holding of the Fan
clan prefix to one's name,60 and secondly on one's having enough armed supporters to
guarantee one's "election" by a group of clan elders (chiefs). While earlier Funan practice
exhibited only superficial Indian content, the Chinese viewed the rulers of P'an P'an origin
to have for some time made a commitment to Indianized statecraft, and by the time of
Fan Shih-man's conquest of P'an P'an to have already solicited the administrative services
of Indian Brahmans.61 With the succession of P'an P'an's ruling line to the Funan throne,
60The Fan prefix was used by the Chinese in their records of Funan history to designate the indigenous
element of the Funan royal line, as opposed to other family prefix, e.g., the Chu prefix was used to identify
p. 252, n. 4; Coed?s, loe. cit., p. 276, n. 16. This evidence is

people native to India. See Pelliot, "Fou-Nan",
cited as that Funan was not being ruled by kings emphasizing an Indian heritage in pre-fifth
normally proof
century Funan history.
61See above and Wheatley, Golden Khersonese, pp. 47-51. It should be noted that P'an P'an had
"Indianized" more extensively than Funan because of its more intense direct interaction with Indian
merchants. As noted above, in the reign of Fan Ch'an, an Indian merchant visited the Funan monarch and
informed him about India, apparently that there was little opportunity for Funan monarchs to
testifying
information about India; i.e., there were few Indian-based merchants who were visiting
acquire first hand
Oc-eo but instead were concentrating their activities in the maritime zone between India and the Malay
Peninsula entrep?ts. This would testify that Funan's Malay seamen were providing passage for goods between
the Malay and Oc-eo, and likely between Oc-eo and China ports as well.Thus
Peninsula in P'an P'an as well as
other Malay Peninsula entrep?ts which facilitated the international trade, "Indianization" was a means of
elevating the indigenous rulers' status in the eyes of their own people, but as well with the visiting Indian
merchants whose presence in these Malay Peninsula entrep?ts was essential to their continuing pros
As I will argue later, Funan's reasons for "Indianization" were quite different. In the fifth century
perity.
of developing an agrarian base as the principle
Funan began to refocus its statecraft because of the necessity
source of royal revenue collections. "Indianized" statecraft became extremely useful in facilitating this transi
tion from the earlier maritime focus of Funan to a state in which the prosperity of the agrarian sector was the
most essential contributing factor to the state's continuing existence.

P'an P'an's previously developed administrative style was most likely synthesized with
earlier Funan practice, producing a more Indian character to Funan's state.
My thesis of a fifth century dynastic crisis and resulting transition is further sub
stantiated in other sources. I note first that Chinese court records report Funan embassies
to China in 268, 286, and 287,62 a period marking the fall of the Wu Dynasty and their
replacement by the Chin. Applying O.W. Wolters' thesis that embassies to the Chinese
court were sent only in times of upheaval,63 one may interpret these three embassies
in the third century as guaranteeing continued commercial interaction between Funan
and southern China under the new Chin rulers. Apparently the effort was successful, for
Funan did not send another embassy until 357. Fifth century embassies reached China
only in 434 and again in 484, dates corresponding to the era of political transition in
Funan. Since the succession to the Funan throne by the P'an P'an ruler took place around
the date of Funan's embassy in 434,04 the embassy in 434 can be seen as being sent by
Funan's new rulers to renew the Chinese commercial relationship.
Secondly, an inscription dated 478 issued by a Funan prince named Gunavarman, who
is believed to have been the second Kaundinya's grandson, is even more telling in that
Gunavarman's father, King Jayavarman (son of Kaundinya) is said to have ruled over a
domain "conquered in the mud". George Coed?s believed that this passage symbolized the
recovery of land accomplished by the draining of Mekong delta swamps, the source of
Funan's agrarian base as discussed earlier. Such an association fits well with the fifth and
sixth century dates assigned to the Oc-eo area canals by Malleret. However, in the light of
evidence of a fifth century dynastic crisis, I hold that the "conquered in themud" statement
may better be understood as reflecting an actual war which took place in Funan's ricelands
in the Mekong delta. Chinese reports support this interpretation, further relating that
during the mid-fifth century, a Funan prince fled from Funan to the Cham kingdom of
Lin-yi, where he ultimately became the king of the Chams. This prince has been thought to
have been a second son of the Funan king Jayavarman (Gunavarman's father and
Kaundinya's son), who was forced to flee after he had failed in an attempt to usurp his
father's throne.65 Chinese accounts record this second son's name as Fan Tang, employing
the old Funan royal clan's name, when the Chinese officially recognized his rule over
Lin-yi in 491.66 If Fan Tang was the son of King Jayavarman, as Coed?s has proposed, the
use of the Fan prefix in his name would suggest that Jayavarman and his son
Gunavarman, as well as the second "Kaundinya", although all taking Indian titles, were in
fact regarded by the Chinese as being members of the indigenous Funan royal line. It
should be remembered that Fan Shih-man and other Funan kings had traditionally sent
close relatives to rule over conquered territories or had intermarried with the families of
these territories. Thus P'an P'an was probably ruled in the early fifth century by a kin
group which was in some way related to the Funan royal family. P'an P'an's fifth century
rulers were therefore not "foreigners", but were blood relatives of the line currently
?Pelliot, "Fou-Nan", pp. 251-52.

63See O.W. Wolters, The Fall of Srivijaya inMalay History (Ithaca, 1970), pp. 39-48.
^This date is derived from a Ta Prohm inscription dated A.D. 478, discussed later, which was issued by a
Funan prince named Gunavarman, who is identified by George Coed?s as the second Kaundinya's grandson.
See George Coed?s, "Deux inscriptions sanskrites du Founan", Bulletin de l'Ecole Fran?aise d'Extr?me
Orient, 31 (1931): 1-8; George Coed?s, "A New Inscription from Fu-nan", Journal of the Greater India
Society, 4 (1937): 117-121.
65Coed?s, loe. cit.
^Georges Maspero, Le royaume de Champa (Paris, 1928), p. 77.

100 Kenneth Hall
holding the Funan throne. In the dynastic crisis of the early fifth century, P'an P'an's line
became the dominant lineage group in Funan's political system.
Having assumed the throne, the P'an P'an line began to change the character of Funan's
statecraft, as discussed earlier. The nature of these innovations more clearly distinguished
the Funan monarch from other Funan elite, employing Indian vocabulary, deities, and
"Brahman" bureaucrats in a new state polity. One intended consequence of this new
organization was to avert the factional competition for the throne which was characteris
tic of the earlier era. It is likely that Funan's old elite were not entirely pleased with their
diminished status within the new order. Thus a civil war between Funan's new rulers and
those of the old order could well have taken place, and Fan Tang, who ultimately became
ruler of Lin-yi, may well have taken part. Although the new Funan line was able to retain
its authority and continued to "Indianize" their state, under Fan Tang's leadership a
rival faction of Funan elite left Funan's territory to take refuge in Lin-yi, where they
waged war "in the mud" to establish their independence from Funan.67 In Lin-yi this rival
Funan faction most probably posed a continuing threat to the new rulers of Funan, whose
imposition of the new Indianized system of legitimacy may well have been a necessary step
in distinguishing themselves from their rivals, now operating from their self-imposed
exile in Lin-yi.
Thirdly, by the fourth century, significant changes were taking place in the international
maritime route which had profound impact on Funan's internal crisis. In the second half
of the fourth century, the Chinese Chin dynasty lost access to the central Asian caravan
routes. While in the third century, the Wu had depended totally on the maritime route to
provide them with the luxury goods of theWest, the Chin had been able to balance their
reliance on routes, receiving goods from both the maritime and northern overland routes.
However, when the Chin lost their access to the caravan route in the late fourth century,
they too began to encourage the further development of the sea route. Of greatest conse
quence to Funan was the response of Southeast Asian entrep?ts beyond the Malay
Peninsula to the new commercial initiatives on the part of the Chinese. In 430, the ruler of
Ho-lo-tan/t'o (western Java) petitioned the Chinese court to provide protection for his
ships, which were then sailing on a regular basis to China.68 The significance of this
embassy is that it documents the fact that shipping was finally making a direct voyage
from the Sunda Straits region to China across the South China Sea.
Ko-ying, another entrep?t from this Sunda Straits area, was described in sixth century
Chinese records as having been previously cut off from China. "For generations", Ko-ying
had traded with China via Fu?an.69 As O. W. Wolters has shown, Ko-ying evolved during
the Funan era as a terminus for Indian shipping, a point of departure for trade between
India and the eastern archipelago.70 At Ko-ying, Indian merchants acquired the forest
products and spices of the archipelago in exchange for pearls, gold, jade, areca nuts, glass
ware, and horses. In the fifth century, however, Ko-ying's economic position was
challenged by the western Java commercial centre of Ho-lo-tan/t'o.71 Both fifth century
entrep?ts were trading directly with China rather than utilizing Funan's ports.
67It should be remembered that since Fan Shih-man's conquest around A.D. 200, Lin-yi had been a
"vassal state" of Funan.
68Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce, p. 157.
69Ibid., p. 59.
70Ibid., pp. 50-61; see Wolters' latest reconsideration of Ko-ying, which he originally placed on the south
eastern Sumatra coast, but now favours the northern Java coast, in Wolters, "Studying Srivijaya".
71 both were replaced by Kan-t'o-li and its successor Srivijaya as the dominant in the
Ultimately entrep?ts
Java Sea realm. See Wolters, "Studying Srivijaya".

The first Chinese evidence of the bypassing of Funan via theMalacca Straits and South
China Sea passage is provided in the fifth century accounts of the Buddhist pilgrim
Fa Hsien and the Indian prince Gunavarman, both of whom sailed from India to China
via the Malacca Straits.72 Fa Hsien landed at Yeh-p'o-t'i, an entrep?t believed to have
been located on the western coast of Borneo. Archaeological evidence from the supposed
site of Fa Hsien's Yeh-p'o-t'i substantiates a cultural link to Funan, indicating that, as with
other archipelago and mainland coastal centres, earlier interaction between Borneo and
the Chinese and Indian commercial markets had focused on Funan's ports.73 However,
Fa Hsien did not sail from Yeh-p'o-t'i to Funan, but instead departed for Canton,
according to Fa Hsien a normal voyage in those days of fifty days.74 Fa Hsien's
omission of reference to Funan and his statement that normally ships sailed directly from
the Borneo coast entrep?t to China substantiates a fifth century transition in the mari
time patterns of Asian trade.
Gunavarman landed at the Java entrep?t of She-p'o on his way from India to China.
From She-p'o, he departed with the intention of making an intermediate stop in a Cham
(i.e., Lin-yi) port, not a Funan port, before entering China. The winds were unfavourable,
however, so the merchant ship he was on sailed non-stop for China.75
The significance of Fa Hsien's and Gunavarman's statements and corresponding
Chinese dynastic evidence of a direct commercial link between the Java Sea region and
China in that time is that by the fifth century, Funan's role as the principal commercial
centre in the Southeast Asian realm was being seriously jeopardized. Chinese interest in
expanding the volume of trade along the sea route resulted in an immediate response by
a number of China Sea entrep?ts which had previously been trading indirectly with China
via Funan's ports, but which quickly seized the opportunity to bypass Funan's
intermediary ports to trade directly with China. Instead of portaging goods across the
Malay Peninsula or sailing from Java Sea ports to Funan entrep?t, international
merchants began to shift their China trade to ports at the western end of the Java
Sea.
Whether this refocusing of the international route was directly responsible for Funan's
fifth century dynastic crisis is not certain, but itwas likely to have had profound conse
quences on Funan's future. The shifting of the commercial shipping routes to theMalacca
Straits and the subsequent omission of a stop at Funan's ports denied Funan's rulers of
significant trade-derived revenues. Deprived of this important source of royal income, not
only the ruler but also his followers, including his subordinate chiefs and their
supporters, found their prosperity diminished. Such a decline in royal income could
well have touched off a dynastic crisis as rival claimants, promoting their own ability
to restore Funan's prosperity, attempted to gather enough supporters to seize the
throne.
Because of the trade route's shift, diplomatic interaction between Funan and China
diminished in the fifth century. Apart from the embassy in 434, Funan's only other
72See Hall, "The Origin of Maritime Trade in Southeast Asia".
73Development of an Indianized culture on the western Borneo coast shows only a temporary existence.
Historians have proposed that this was due to the fluctuations of the maritime trade and the refocusing of the
trade on rival commercial centres that brought the demise of these early "Indianized"entrepots on the Borneo
coast. No further development of an Indianized base seems to have taken place thereafter. See F.H. Van
Naerssen, The Economic and Administrative History of Early Indonesia (Leiden, 1977), pp. 18-23.
74H.A. Giles, The Travels of Fa-hsien (399-414 A.D.) (London, 1956), p. 79. See Hall, "The Expansion
of Maritime Trade", Part 2.
75Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce, p. 35.

102 Kenneth Hall
recorded contact with China in the fifth century took place around 484, when Funan's
King Jayavarman was reported to have sent a group of merchants to Canton to solicit
Chinese trade. The Indian Buddhist monk N?gasena accompanied them on their return,
and then was sent back to the Chinese court by the ruler of Funan to plead for Chinese
aid against the Chams. N?gasena's comments to the Chinese emperor fail to reflect
regular interaction between Funan and China and hint at the growing instability in
Funan's politics. N?gasena reports that Funan is "ceaselessly invaded by Lin-yi and has
[therefore] not entered into relations with Gia-Chau [Ton-kin]. That is why their
embassies so seldom come".76
Since embassies initiated by the Chinese emperor were sent to three Indonesian
entrep?ts in 449 to confer titles on these "states" rulers, it is significant that no similar
initiative was taken by the Chinese to recognize the ruler of Funan, their old trade partner.
Under normal conditions the Chinese tried to maintain their commercial relationships
with Southeast Asian states.77 The implication of this fifth century evidence is that the
Chinese fully recognized by 449 that Funan's ports were no longer the most important
source of international trade, having been replaced by Indonesian entrep?ts as the
dominant force in Southeast Asian commerce. Thus Chinese efforts to solicit trade and
recognize the rulers of successful Southeast Asian entrep?ts were directed not at Funan,
but at the western end of the Java Sea.
In 491, the Chinese court similarly bestowed a significant title upon Fan Tang, ruler
of Lin-yi, proclaiming him "General Pacifier of the South, Commander-in-Chief of the
Military Affairs of the Seashore, and King of Lin-yi".78 Doing this after N?gasena's appeal
in 484 on Funan's behalf for Chinese aid against the Chams reflects the low opinion the
Chinese had of Funan at that time, and when considered in the light of the initiatives of
449, indicates that Lin-yi was the more important trade ally to China by the late fifth
century. It should be remembered that Gunavarman's voyage from the Ja v?nese entrep?t
of She-p'o to China was originally to have made an intermediate stop on the Cham coast,
not at Funan. The title the Chinese emperor bestowed upon Fan Tang ? "General
Pacifier of the South, Commander-in-Chief of the Military Affairs of the Seashore, and
king of Lin-yi" places more emphasis on Fan Tang's role as protector of the Cham sea
coast than on his role as Lin-yi's monarch. N?gasena's comments to the Chinese emperor
included the report that he had been shipwrecked on the Cham coast, where his
possessions had been stolen. The implication of N?gasena's remarks and the Chinese
investiture of Fan Tang as "Commander of the Seashore" is that Fan Tang was now held
responsible for curtailing such acts of piracy on the lower Vietnamese coast.
Further evidence of Funan's diminished status within the trade routes is provided in
Ho-lo-tan/t'o's petition in 430 to the Chinese court seeking protection for its ships sailing
from the western Javanese coast to China. Similar to voyages from She-p'o, navigation
from Java to China probably sailed within range of the lower Vietnamese coast. Here it
would seem Javanese shipping was threatened by piracy. This piracy was either the result
of Funan's attempts to retain its control over the maritime channels, forcing regional
shipping to utilize its ports as intermediaries in the China trade, or Funan's decline as a
major commercial centre had forced its Malay maritime colony to support itself via
open piracy. It would seem that Fan Tang's investiture by the Chinese court was in
7*Pelliot,"Fou-Nan", p. 267.
77Wolters, The Fall of Srivijaya, pp. 39-48.
78Maspero, op. eft., pp. 77-78.

response to the instabilities precipitated by Funan's commercial demise.79 The Chinese

interest in the South was clearly to keep the flow of goods moving into south China's
ports. Despite the fact that throughout the third and fourth centuries Lin-yi had, with
Funan's aid, continually harassed the Chinese Ton-kin province in the Red River delta to
the north,80 the Chinese emperor found himself able to overlook this inconvenience in
bestowing the "Commander" title upon Fan Tang, Lin-yi's ruler.81
It is thus apparent that by the mid-fifth century Funan was no longer a major trade
centre. One further likely consequence of Funan's commercial demise was the shift of its
Malay sea population to more prosperous Cham ports. By 431, Lin-yi's ruler was capable
of drawing together a force of over one hundred ships to pillage the northern Vietnamese
coast.82 The shift of Fan Tang and his faction from Funan to Lin-yi may well have further
facilitated this continuing shift. Fan Tang, who I have proposed was the leader of an
opposing political faction in a power struggle within Funan, by maintaining the old
style of Funan statecraft, at least for the present, provided a certain amount of continuity
in the relationship of his state and the sea trade. Significantly, Fan Tang's move to the
Cham domain and the growth of Lin-yi's maritime prominence in Chinese eyes coincide,
making this reconstruction plausible. Thus while Funan appears to have been more
concerned with restructuring its internal administrative structure at this time, because of
the loss of its prominence over trade, Lin-yi's ports were in the meantime becoming more
involved as intermediaries in the trade which had formerly focused on Funan's ports.
When in the latter half of the fifth century Funan's ruler was trying to re-attract traders
to his ports, Lin-yi's ports had already assumed a dominant commercial position on the
southern Vietnamese coast as a result of their more strategic geographical proximity to
the now restructured international maritime route, which was making direct contact with
the western edge of the Java Sea prior tomaking the northward voyage to China. This fact
was recognized by the Chinese in their eulogy in 491 to Fan Tang and also in
Gunavarman's statement that voyages from Java Sea entrep?ts to China normally
stopped in Cham ports.
79I.W. Mabbett has recently characterized both Funan and Lin-yi during this era as being "a conglomera
tion of semi-piratical rival ports and lowland river valley populations...." (Mabbett, p. 154). George Coed?s'
latest reconstruction of Cham history in the late fifth century argues that Fan Tang of Lin-yi was overthrown
by a usurper (a rival faction?) one year after the 491 Chinese recognition by a descendant of Yang Mah, a great
Cham ruler of the earlier (430s and 440s) fifth century, whose royal line had been usurped by Fan Tang.
Lin-yi's new ruler, Chu Nong, reigned for six years, but was drowned in the sea in 498, apparently leading a
naval expedition/ raid against Ton-kin. See Coed?s, Indianized States, p. 59.
80See R. Stein, "La Lin-yi", Han-Hiue (Bulletin du centre d'?tudes sinologiques de P?kin), 2(1947): 1-54.
8,This also is a comment upon the Chinese relationship with Ton-kin. Recent research by Keith Taylor,
"The Rise of Dai Viet and the Establishment of Thang-long" in Hall and Whitmore, pp. 149-91, has pointed
out that Chinese interaction with the Red River delta region during these times was minimal and was more
concerned with tribute and holding Ton-kin
extracting as an outpost and port region to facilitate maritime
contact with the southern China
realm. Cham raids against Ton-kin's lands, controlled by an indigenous
Vietnamese elite, were probably of little concern to the Chinese, whose main interest was in keeping the sea
channels open between Ton-kin and Canton.
82Coed?s Jndianized States, pp. 56-57. Considering this 431 date, the concerns of Holo-tan/t'o for the
safety of their shipping may best be seen as a response to the shift of Malay seamen to Cham ports and the
initial attempts of Cham rulers to replace Funan as the dominant intermediary in the China trade. In the 430s
Lin-yi was under the authority of Yang Mah, the strongest of Lin-yi's fifth century rulers. Among Yang Mah's
activities were numerous maritime raids against Ton-kin, raids which necessitated the support of Malay
seamen. Such plundering expeditions were no doubt an incentive for former Funan seamen to transfer their
base to Cham ports.

104 Kenneth Hall
Conclusion
I hold that Funan's fifth century Indianization is related to the loss of its former role
as principal Southeast Asian intermediary in the international China trade. This
transition in Funan's statecraft was largely caused by the shift of the international
maritime route to the Malacca Straits, and also the result of an internal political
reorganization. Facing the elimination of trade-derived revenues, Funan's rulers were
forced to reorganize their statecraft, internalizing their rule to better maximize revenue
collections from their agrarian economic base. The Indian system of statecraft and its
focus upon the land was better suited to the new situation in Funan.83 Formerly, Funan's
rule was characterized more by clan and tribal alliances. Rulers had been selected based
upon consideration of the number of armed supporters they could claim. Funan's
capacity to extract revenues from these subordinates had been most probably limited
through the nature of Funan's statecraft itself, which was based upon potentially unstable
reciprocal alliances. The court's limited revenue demands upon its agrarian base had been
due in part to this political instability, but also to the fact that sufficient revenue had been
derived from the Funan ports to allow ample redistributions to loyal royal supporters as
well as to finance the royal court and its projects. With the loss of the port trade, however,
Funan's rulers were forced to reorganize their statecraft to maximize their revenue
collections from their agrarian base. Previously revenue collections from the land had
only supplemented trade-derived revenues,84 but with the movement of trade away from
Funan's ports on a permanent basis, Funan's rulers now faced the necessity of financing
their rule from their landed base. In this light, it is significant that Malleret has dated the
remaining evidence of Funan's hydraulic projects to exactly the fifth and early sixth
century era, when the necessity of expanding the Funan state's agrarian base became
critical. Such hydraulic projects, as noted earlier, would have indeed facilitated both the
extension of Funan's agrarian community and the concentration of manpower on lands
under the direct authority of Funan's new rulers.
The Indian system of statecraft and its focus upon the land was better suited to the new
legal needs of Funan's rulers. There ismore convincing testimony in fifth century accounts
of Indian political and religious influence. N?gasena's description of Funan at the end of
the fifth century reports the systematic worship of Indian deities, inmarked contrast to the
reports of the mid-third century Chinese envoys K'ang T'ai and Chu Ying, who found
Indian style worship at Malay Peninsula entrep?t subordinate to Funan's hegemony but
not in the Funan political core itself. In the fifth century, Funan's rulers were rendering
worship to the Siva li?ga Mahesvara and stressed the linga as the source of the fertility
of the land. In effect this was a synthesis with existing fertility cults, giving the indigenous
beliefs legitimacy and also more clearly focusing the fertility cults upon Funan's monarch.
Funan's sacred mountain, the Ba Phnom, became the Mahesvara's residence. From this
sacred mountain the "king" of Funan, as Funan's ruler was now known in inscriptions.85
personally received the benefits of the god's power, and then the king bestowed these
benefits upon the entire population. The king, also the patron of knowledge, promoted
Indian intellectualism as his court became the cultural and intellectual centre of his realm,
and the king the personal benefactor of numbers of "Brahmans", who in addition to being
83A useful summary of Indian statecraft is provided by Louis Dumont, Religion, Politics and History in
India, Collected Papers in Indian Sociology (The Hague, 1970), pp. 62-88.
84As noted, this potential was especially important in times when the international trade was in a state
of flux.
85Coedes "Deus inscriptions", references to King (Sri) Jayavarman.

an intellectual elite conducted Indian rituals, which further stressed the Funan monarch's
superior status.86
As a result of the fifth century transition in the maritime route from the Kra to the
Malacca Straits, Funan was thus peripheral to the mainstream of the international
maritime route. To participate in the route's trade, Funan's traders had to go to other
places to make contact, just as in the previous age Southeast Asia's seafarers had come
to Funan's ports to transact exchanges with international merchants. Responding to this
diminished status, Funan's Malay maritime colony either shifted its base to new ports or
turned to open piracy. The resultant rise of piracy on the lower Vietnamese coast further
encouraged a wide girth beyond the reach of Funan and Cham pirates, and ships began to
sail directly to China from the Sunda Straits entrep?ts on the southeastern Sumatra and
northwestern Javanese coasts.87
During the latter part of the fifth century Funan made one final attempt to reclaim a
significant role in the international trade route, appealing directly to the Chinese throne
to once again favour Funan's ports. Failure in this effort resulted in the collapse of Oc-eo
as a major maritime centre. Immediately Funan's former "vassals" began to break away
and establish their own independent identity as centres of trade. Not only the Chams, but
numerous river valley centres on the Malay Peninsula coast also began to send tribute
missions directly to the Chinese court in an attempt to solicit a favourable trade relation
ship with the Chinese.
Bereft of the prosperity of the previous age, Funan's rulers withdrew to their civilization
inland, concentrating their rule on the ricelands of the upper Mekong delta. Funan's state
craft took on a more Indian character. Better suited to an agrarian economic base, Indian
celestial deities provided the sacro-religious legitimacy which Funan's new rulers required
as a base for their new kingship. Funan's rulers were also able to draw upon "Indians",
those who had become students of the Indian civilization in India itself or in trade centres
such as P'an P'an or Tun-sun, whose rulers were patrons of the Indian culture,
previous
whose literacy was drawn upon to assist Funan's rulers in the efficient administration of
the royal court and the ricelands which now brought Funan's ruler most of his income.
This effort to reorganize did not work. By the mid-sixth century, Funan's attempts to
survive as an independent political entity were dealt a severe blow as internal power strug
gles continued to weaken the state. Recognizing Funan's internal crisis, Funan's neigh
bours applied increasing external pressure. The Chams moved to fill the power void in
the lower Mekong delta and the peoples of the Khmer domain known as Chen-la began to
move against Funan from the north.88 As a result in part of Lin-yi's constant preoccupa
tion with petty wars against its northern Vietnamese neighbours, the Funan domain was
ultimately conquered by Chen-la. The Khmer were thus responsible for Funan's final
demise, either destroying or failing to maintain Funan's hydraulic networks. Funan's
lands were depopulated as its cultivators shifted their labour to more productive and
secure lands. What remained of Funan's agrarian population moved either by choice or by
force to the Khmer rulers' developing economic base in the Tonle Sap area to the north.
86This intellectual
elite's prominence was also due to their ability to read and write Sanskrit, and allowed
them to serve as an administrative elite in the ruler's developing court bureaucracy. This clerical aspect of
Brahman service is developed in an essay by F.D.K. Bosch, "The Problem of the Hindu Colonisation of
Indonesia" in Selected Studies in Indonesian Archaeology (The Hague, 1961), pp. 3-22.
87N?gasena's tale of being robbed of his possessions on the Cham coast illustrates this problem.
88On the history of Chen-la and its legacy from Funan, see Wolters, "Khmer 'Hinduism' ", and
O.W. Wolters, "North-Western Cambodia in the Seventh Century", Bulletin of the School of Oriental and
African Studies, 37, 2 (1974): 355-84.

106 Kenneth Hall
Largely depopulated, their hydraulic system laid to waste, and no longer receiving
administrative supervision and the financial support from a central authority necessary to
maintain a high level of political and economic integration in the area, Funan's ricelands
quickly returned to jungle. Soon the former Funan coastal domain declined as the centres
of Cham and Khmer authority became the focal points for post-Funan civilization on the
mainland, the Chams controlling the Southern Vietnamese coast and the Khmer building
one of pre-modern Southeast Asia's greatest agrarian civilizations at Angkor. Both these
peoples traced their lineage to Funan, and based their developing statecraft upon the
Indianized structures of administration developed by Funan's rulers. While Funan's rulers
had begun to bridge the gap between tribal politics and Indianized statecraft, it remained
for the Chams and especially the Khmer to develop the Southeast Asian classical state to
its fullest.89
89See Hall, "Eleventh Century Commercial Developments in Angkor and Champa."


The Indianization of Funan - An Economic History of Southeast Asia First State

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Department of History, National University of Singapore

The "Indianization" of Funan: An Economic History of Southeast Asia's First State

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Southeast Asia's strategic position in the major pre-modern international maritime

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The Origin of Funan

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7Pelliot, op. cit., pp. 245^*6.

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Secondly, there was no dominant caste group

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leadership, and the maritime itself was not of the volume

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of Southeast Asian Statecraft (Ann Arbor, 1976), pp. 1-24.

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2?See Eric Wolf, Peasants (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966).

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C. Jacques' recent study of the Kaundinya-n?gi myth is supportive of Bronson's view

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The Extension of Funan's Hegemony

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'^V TON-gT ff)

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they are all there....43

41See Golden p. 286, fig. 46. The subjugation

pp. 40 and 278; nn. 38, 39.

"Wheatley, "Saty?nrta", p. 243.

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Fifth Century Transitions

Traditionally, Funan's new dynastic line is viewed as originating in themore Indianized

Was this "second as this new ruler is known from P'an

54Wolters, "Khmer 'Hinduism' ", p. 428.

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p. 252, n. 4; Coed?s, loe. cit., p. 276, n. 16. This evidence is

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?Pelliot, "Fou-Nan", pp. 251-52.

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72See Hall, "The Origin of Maritime Trade in Southeast Asia".

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response to the instabilities precipitated by Funan's commercial demise.79 The Chinese

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89See Hall, "Eleventh Century Commercial Developments in Angkor and Champa."

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