G.R. No.

142316            November 22, 2001

FRANCISCO A.G. DE LIANO, ALBERTO O. VILLA-ABRILLE, JR., and SAN MIGUEL

CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BENJAMIN A. TANGO, respondents.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari praying for the reversal of the Resolution1 dated June
4, 1999 issued by the former Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60460,
which dismissed the appeal of herein petitioners on procedural grounds as well as its Resolution of
February 23, 2000 which denied their motion for reconsideration.

The relevant facts are:

On March 30, 1998, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 227 issued a Decision2 in Civil
Case No. Q-95-24332,3 the dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant San Miguel Corporation is hereby ordered

1. To release to the plaintiff the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 299551 in the same [sic]
of Benjamin A. Tango;

2. To release to plaintiff the originals of the REM contracts dated December 4, 1990 and
February 17, 1992 and to cause the cancellation of the annotation of the same on plaintiffs
[sic] TCT No. 299551;

3. To pay the plaintiff the following sums:

3.1. P100,000.00 as and by way of moral damages;

3.2. P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees;

3.3. costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

In brief, the case involved the cancellation of two (2) real estate mortgages in favor of petitioner San
Miguel Corporation (SMC) executed by private respondent Benjamin A. Tango over his house and
lot in Quezon City. The mortgages were third party or accommodation mortgages on behalf of the
spouses Bernardino and Carmelita Ibarra who were dealers of SMC products in Aparri, Cagayan.
Other defendants in the case were Francisco A.G. De Liano and Alberto O. Villa-Abrille, Jr., who are
senior executives of petitioner SMC.

SMC, De Liano and Abrille appealed the aforesaid decision to the Court of Appeals. In due time,
their counsel, Atty. Edgar B. Afable, filed an Appellants' Brief4 which failed to comply with Section 13,
Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. The appellee (herein private respondent) was quick to notice these
deficiencies, and accordingly filed a "Motion to Dismiss Appeal"5 dated March 8, 1999. Required to
comment,6 the appellants averred that their brief had substantially complied with the contents as set
forth in the rules. They proffered the excuse that the omissions were only the result of oversight or
inadvertence and as such could be considered "harmless" errors. They prayed for liberality in the
application of technical rules, adding that they have a meritorious defense.

On June 4, 1999, the appellate court issued the first assailed resolution7 dismissing the appeal. The
Court of Appeals held, as follows:

xxx           xxx           xxx

As pointed out by plaintiff-appellee, the Brief does not contain a Subject Index nor a Table of
Cases and Authorities, with page references. Moreover, the Statement of the Case,
Statement of Facts, and Arguments in the Brief has no page reference to the record. These
procedural lapses justify the dismissal of the appeal, pursuant to Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which reads:

"SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may be dismissed by

the Court of Appeals, on its own motion, or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds:

xxx           xxx           xxx

(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's brief, or of page

references to the record as required in section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of
Rule 44;"

xxx           xxx           xxx

Finally, defendants-appellants, despite having been notified of such defects, still failed to
amend their Brief to conform to the Rules, and instead, argues that these are mere
"harmless errors." In the case of Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
113899, February 22, 1996, 241 SCRA 553 [1996], the Supreme Court, in sustaining the
dismissal of the petitioner's appeal for non-compliance with the rule on the contents of the
Appellant's Brief, ruled that:

"Long ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the right to appeal is a statutory
right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must faithfully comply with the rules.
x x x These rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases.
In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, these rules need to be
followed by appellants with greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the
whims and caprices of appellants. x x x

Having ruled as such, the Court need not resolve plaintiff- appellee's contention that the
issues raised in the appeal are mere questions of law.

The appellants (herein petitioners) sought to have the foregoing resolution reconsidered.
Simultaneously, through the same counsel, they filed a "Motion to Admit Amended Defendants-
Appellants' Brief."8 The appellate court denied the consolidated motions in its Resolution9 of
February 23, 2000.

From the denial of their motion for reconsideration, only petitioner SMC interposed the instant
petition.10 As grounds for allowance, petitioner contends that:
 A

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING SMC's APPEAL ON THE BASIS OF

PURE TECHNICALITIES AND EVEN AFTER SMC HAS CORRECTED THE TECHNICAL
DEFECT OF ITS APPEAL.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING SMC's APPEAL WITHOUT

CONSIDERING ITS MERITS.

1. There are valid grounds to reverse the RTC's award of damages in favor of Tango.
The award of damages has no basis in fact or in law.

2. The appeal involves a question of substance which should have been resolved by
the Court of Appeals, to wit: whether a third party mortgagor can unilaterally withdraw
the mortgage without the consent of the debtor and creditor.

The petition has no merit.

The premise that underlies all appeals is that they are merely rights which arise from statute;
therefore, they must be exercised in the manner prescribed by law. It is to this end that rules
governing pleadings and practice before appellate courts were imposed. These rules were designed
to assist the appellate court in the accomplishment of its tasks, and overall, to enhance the orderly
administration of justice.

In his definition of a brief, Justice Malcolm explained thus:

x x x [L]et it be recalled that the word "brief" is derived from the Latin brevis, and the
French briefe, and literally means a short or condensed statement. The purpose of the brief,
as all law students and lawyers know, is to present to the court in concise form the points
and questions in controversy, and by fair argument on the facts and law of the case to assist
the court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion. The brief should be so prepared as to
minimize the labor of the court in the examination of the record upon which the appeal is
heard and determined.11 [emphasis supplied]

Relative thereto, Section 13, Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court governs the format to be
followed by the appellant in drafting his brief, as follows:

Contents of appellant's brief. — The appellant's brief shall contain, in the order herein
indicated, the following:

(a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and page
references, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with
references to the pages where they are cited;

(b) An assignment of errors intended to be urged, which errors shall be separately, distinctly
and concisely stated without repetition and numbered consecutively;

(c) Under the heading "Statement of the Case," a clear and concise statement of the nature
of the action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of the court,
 the nature of the judgment and any other matters necessary to an understanding of the
nature of the controversy, with page references to the record;

(d) Under the heading "Statement of Facts," a clear and concise statement in a narrative
form of the facts admitted by both parties and of those in controversy, together with the
substance of the proof resulting thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible, with
page references to the record;

(e) A clear and concise statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted to the court for
its judgment;

(f) Under the heading "Argument," the appellant's arguments on each assignment of error
with page references to the record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by the page of
the report at which the case begins and the page of the report on which the citation is found;

(g) Under the heading "Relief," a specification of the order or judgment which the appellant
seeks; and

(h) In cases not brought up by record on appeal, the appellant's brief shall contain, as an
appendix, a copy of the judgment or final order appealed from.

This particular rule was instituted with reason, and most certainly, it was not intended to become " a
custom more honored in the breach than in the observance." It has its logic, which is to present to
the appellate court in the most helpful light, the factual and legal antecedents of a case on appeal.

The first requirement of an appellant's brief is a subject index. The index is intended to facilitate the
review of appeals by providing ready reference, functioning much like a table of contents. Unlike in
other jurisdiction, there is no limit on the length of appeal briefs or appeal memoranda filed before
appellate courts. The danger of this is the very real possibility that the reviewing tribunal will be
swamped with voluminous documents. This occurs even though the rules consistently urge the
parties to be "brief" or "concise" in the drafting of pleadings, briefs, and other papers to be filed in
court. The subject index makes readily available at one's fingertips the subject of the contents of the
brief so that the need to thumb through the brief page after page to locate a party's arguments, or a
particular citation, or whatever else needs to be found and considered, is obviated.

An assignment of errors follows the subject index. It is defined in this wise:

An assignment of errors in appellate procedure is an enumeration by appellant or plaintiff in

error of the errors alleged to have been committed by the court below in the trial of the case
upon which he seeks to obtain a reversal of the judgment or decree; it is in the nature of a
pleading, and performs in the appellate court the same office as a declaration or complaint in
a court of original jurisdiction. Such an assignment is appellant's complaint, or pleading, in
the appellate court, and takes the place of a declaration or bill; an appeal without an
assignment of errors would be similar to a suit without a complaint, bill, or declaration. The
assignment is appellant's declaration or complaint against the trial judge, charging harmful
error, and proof vel non of assignment is within the record on appeal.

xxx           xxx           xxx

The object of such pleadings is to point out the specific errors claimed to have been
committed by the court below, in order to enable the reviewing court and the opposing party
 to see on what points appellant or plaintiff in error intends to ask a reversal of the judgment
or decree, and to limit discussion to those points. The office of an assignment of errors is not
to point out legal contentions, but only to inform the appellate court that appellant assigns as
erroneous certain named rulings; the function of the assignment is to group and bring
forward such of the exceptions previously noted in the case on appeal as appellant desires
to preserve and present to the appellant.12

It has been held that a general assignment of errors is unacceptable under the rules. Thus, a
statement of the following tenor: that "the Court of First Instance of this City incurred error in
rendering the judgment appealed from, for it is contrary to law and the weight of the evidence," was
deemed insufficient.13 The appellant has to specify in what aspect of the law or the facts that the trial
court erred. The conclusion, therefore, is that the appellant must carefully formulate his assignment
of errors. Its importance cannot be underestimated, as Section 8, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court will
attest:

Questions that may be decided. — No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the
subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will
be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent
on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain
errors and clerical errors.

The rules then require that an appellant's brief must contain both a "statement of the case" and a
"statement of facts." A statement of the case gives the appellate tribunal an overview of the judicial
antecedents of the case, providing material information regarding the nature of the controversy, the
proceedings before the trial court, the orders and rulings elevated on appeal, and the judgment itself.
These data enable the appellate court to have a better grasp of the matter entrusted to it for its
appraisal.

In turn, the statement of facts comprises the very heart of the appellant's brief. The facts constitute
the backbone of a legal argument; they are determinative of the law and jurisprudence applicable to
the case, and consequently, will govern the appropriate relief. Appellants should remember that the
Court of Appeals is empowered to review both questions of law and of facts. Otherwise, where only
a pure question of law is involved, appeal would pertain to this Court. An appellant, therefore, should
take care to state the facts accurately though it is permissible to present them in a manner favorable
to one party. The brief must state the facts admitted by the parties, as well as the facts in
controversy. To laymen, the distinction may appear insubstantial, but the difference is clear to the
practitioner and the student of law. Facts which are admitted require no further proof, whereas facts
in dispute must be backed by evidence. Relative thereto, the rule specifically requires that one's
statement of facts should be supported by page references to the record. Indeed, disobedience
therewith has been punished by dismissal of the appeal.14 Page references to the record are not an
empty requirement. If a statement of fact is unaccompanied by a page reference to the record, it
may be presumed to be without support in the record and may be stricken or disregarded
altogether.15

When the appellant has given an account of the case and of the facts, he is required to state the
issues to be considered by the appellate court. The statement of issues is not to be confused with
the assignment of errors: they are not one and the same, for otherwise, the rules would not require a
separate statement for each. The statement of issues puts forth the questions of fact or law to be
resolved by the appellate court. What constitutes a question of fact or one of law should be clear by
now:
 At this point, the distinction between a question of fact and a question of law must be clear.
As distinguished from a question of law which exists "when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is on certain state of facts"—"there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" or when the "query
necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to
each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation."16

Thereafter, the appellant is required to present his arguments on each assigned error. An appellant's
arguments go hand in hand with his assignment of errors, for the former provide the justification
supporting his contentions, and in so doing resolves the issues. It will not do to impute error on the
part of the trial court without substantiation. The mere elevation on appeal of a judgment does not
create a presumption that it was rendered in error. The appellant has to show that he is entitled to
the reversal of the judgment appealed, and he cannot do this unless he provides satisfactory
reasons for doing so. It is therefore essential that —

x x x [A]s far as possible, the errors and reasons assigned should be supported by a citation
of authorities. The failure to do so has been said to be inexcusable; and, although a point
made in the brief is before the court even though no authorities are cited and may be
considered and will be where a proposition of well established law is stated, the court is not
required to search out authorities, but may presume that counsel has found no case after
diligent search or that the point has been waived or abandoned, and need not consider the
unsupported errors assigned, and ordinarily will not give consideration to such errors and
reasons unless it is apparent without further research that the assignments of errors
presented are well taken.17

In this regard, the rules require that authorities should be cited by the page of the report at which the
case begins, as well as the page of the report where the citation is found. This rule is imposed for
the convenience of the appellate court, for obvious reasons: since authorities relied upon by the
parties are checked for accuracy and aptness, they are located more easily as the appellate court is
not bound to peruse volume upon volume, and page after page, of reports.

Lastly, the appellant is required to state, under the appropriate heading, the reliefs prayed for. In so
doing, the appellate court is left in no doubt as to the result desired by the appellant, and act as the
circumstances may warrant.

Some may argue that adherence to these formal requirements serves but a meaningless purpose,
that these may be ignored with little risk in the smug certainty that liberality in the application of
procedural rules can always be relied upon to remedy the infirmities. This misses the point. We are
not martinets; in appropriate instances, we are prepared to listen to reason, and to give relief as the
circumstances may warrant. However, when the error relates to something so elementary as to be
inexcusable, our discretion becomes nothing more than an exercise in frustration. It comes as an
unpleasant shock to us that the contents of an appellant's brief should still be raised as an issue
now. There is nothing arcane or novel about the provisions of Section 13, Rule 44. The rule
governing the contents of appellants' briefs has existed since the old Rules of Court,18 which took
effect on July 1, 1940, as well as the Revised Rules of Court,19 which took effect on January 1, 1964,
until they were superseded by the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The provisions were
substantially preserved, with few revisions.

An additional circumstance impels us to deny the reinstatement of petitioner's appeal. We observed

that petitioner submitted an "Amended Appellant's Brief" to cure the infirmities of the one first filed on
its behalf by its lawyer. All things being equal, we would have been inclined to grant the petition until
we realized that the attempt at compliance was, at most, only a cosmetic procedure. On closer
scrutiny, the amended brief was as defective as the first. Where the first brief lacked an assignment
of errors but included a statement of issues, the amended brief suffered a complete reversal: it had
an assignment of errors but no statement of issues. The "statement of facts" lacked page references
to the record, a deficiency symptomatic of the first. Authorities were cited in an improper manner,
that is, the exact page of the report where the citation was lifted went unspecified.20 The amended
brief did not even follow the prescribed order: the assignment of errors came after the statement of
the case and the statement of facts. No one could be expected to ignore such glaring errors, as in
the case at bar. The half-hearted attempt at submitting a supposedly amended brief only serves to
harden our resolve to demand a strict observance of the rules.

We remind members of the bar that their first duty is to comply with the rules, not to seek exceptions.
As was expressed more recently in Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals,21 which was rightfully quoted by
the appellate court, we ruled that:

Petitioner's plea for liberality in applying these rules in preparing Appellants' Brief does not
deserve any sympathy. Long ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the right to appeal
is a statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must faithfully comply with the
rules. In People v. Marong, we held that deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. The
rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate. These rules are designed to
facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled by
clogged dockets, these rules need to be followed by appellants with greater fidelity. Their
observance cannot be after to the whims and caprices of appellants. In the case at bar,
counselor petitioners had all the opportunity to comply with the above rules. He remained
obstinate in his non-observance even when he sought reconsideration of the ruling of the
respondent court dismissing his clients' appeal. Such obstinacy is incongruous with his late
plea for liberality in construing the rules on appeal. [italics supplied]

Anent the second issue, it may prove useful to elucidate on the processing of appeals in the Court of
Appeals. In so doing, it will help to explain why the former Fourteenth Division of the appellate court
could not look into the merits of the appeal, as petitioner corporation is urging us to do now.

The Rules of Court prescribe two (2) modes of appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts to
the Court of Appeals. When the trial court decides a case in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
the mode of review is by an ordinary appeal in accordance with Section 2(a) of Rule 41.22 In contrast,
where the assailed decision was rendered by the trial court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, the mode of appeal is via a petition for review pursuant to Rule 42.23 We are more
concerned here about the first mode since the case at bar involves a decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court exercising its original jurisdiction.

Cases elevated to the Court of Appeals are treated differently depending upon their classification
into one of three (3) categories: appealed civil cases, appealed criminal cases, and special
cases.24 Be it noted that all cases are under the supervision and control of the members of the Court
of Appeals in all stages, from the time of filing until the remand of the cases to the courts or agencies
of origin.25 Ordinary appealed civil cases undergo two (2) stages. The first stage consists of
completion of the records. The second stage is for study and report, which follows when an
appealed case is deemed submitted for decision, thus:

When case deemed submitted for judgment. — A case shall be deemed submitted for
judgment:

A. In ordinary appeals. —
 1) Where no hearing on the merits of the main case is held, upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules or by the court itself, or the
expiration of the period for its filing;

2) Where such a hearing is held, upon its termination or upon the filing of the last
pleading or memorandum as may be required or permitted to be filed by the court, or
the expiration of the period for its filing.26

xxx           xxx           xxx

At each stage, a separate raffle is held. Thus, a preliminary raffle is held at which time an
appealed case is assigned to a Justice for completion. After completion, when the case is
deemed ripe for judgment, a second raffle is conducted to determine the Justice to whom the
case will be assigned for study and report.27 Each stage is distinct; it may happen that the
Justice to whom the case was initially raffled for completion may not be the same Justice
who will write the decision thereon.

The aforesaid distinction has a bearing on the case at bar. It becomes apparent that the merits of the
appeal can only be looked into during the second stage. The Justice in-charge of completion
exceeds his province should he examine the merits of the case since his function is to oversee
completion only. The prerogative of determining the merits of an appeal pertains properly to the
Justice to whom the case is raffled for study and report. The case at bar did not reach the second
stage; it was dismissed during completion stage pursuant to Section 1 (f) of Rule 50. Consequently,
petitioner's contention that the appellate court should have considered the substance of the appeal
prior to dismissing it due to technicalities does not gain our favor.

Generally, the negligence of counsel binds his client. Actually, Atty. Afable is also an employee of
petitioner San Miguel Corporation.28 Yet even this detail will not operate in petitioner's favor. A
corporation, it should be recalled, is an artificial being whose juridical personality is only a fiction
created by law. It can only exercise its powers and transact its business through the instrumentalities
of its board of directors, and through its officers and agents, when authorized by resolution or its by-
laws.

x x x Moreover, " . x x x a corporate officer or agent may represent and bind the corporation
in transactions with third persons to the extent that authority to do so has been conferred
upon him, and this includes powers which have been intentionally conferred, and also such
powers as, in the usual course of the particular business, are incidental to, or may be implied
from, the powers intentionally conferred, powers added by custom and usage, as usually
pertaining to the particular officer or agent, and such apparent powers as the corporation has
caused persons dealing with the officer or agent to believe that it has conferred.29

That Atty. Afable was clothed with sufficient authority to bind petitioner SMC is undisputable.
Petitioner SMC's board resolution of May 5, 1999 attests to that. Coupled with the provision of law
that a lawyer has authority to bind his client in taking appeals and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure,30 a fortiori then, petitioner SMC must be held bound by the actuations of its counsel of
record, Atty. Afable.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with cost against petitioner
San Miguel Corporation.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona, and concurred in by Associate Justices

1

Demetrio G. Demetria and Mariano M. Umali, Fourteenth Division, Rollo, pp. 45-48.

2
 Annex "Q" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 97-101.

 Entitled "Benjamin A. Tango v. San Miguel Corporation, Francisco A.G. De Liano, Alberto
3

O. Villa-Abrille, Jr., and Spouses Carmelita Ibarra and Bernardino Ibarra."

4
 Annex "R" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 107-121.

5
 Annex "S" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 122-125.

6
 Annex "T" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 126-128.

7
 Annex "A" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 45-48.

8
 Annexes "U" and "V" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 129-133 and 134-153, respectively.

9
 Annex "B" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 50.

10
 We note with interest that petitioner has entrusted the instant appeal to external counsel.

11
 Estiva v. Cavil, 59 Phil. 67, 68-69 (1933).

12
 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1217.

13
 Santiago v. Felix, 24 Phil. 378, 384 (1913).

14
 Eg., Heirs of Palomique v. Court of Appeals, 134 SCRA 331, 334 (1985) and Genobiagon
v. Court of Appeals, 76 SCRA 37, 39 (1977). Also, in People v. Marong (119 SCRA 430, 436
[1982]), we disapproved of the Solicitor General's failure to cite page references to the
record in support of its statement of facts.

15
 5 Am Jur 2d, Appellate Review §546.

16
 Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 224, 232 (1992).

17
 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §1325.

18
 Section 17. Rule 48 of which states:

Contents of appellant 's brief. — The appellant's brief shall contain in the order herein
indicated the following:
 (a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with page references and a table of
cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks, and statutes cited with references to the
pages where they are cited, if the brief contains twenty or more pages;

(b) An assignment of errors intended to be urged. Such errors shall be separately,

distinctly, and concisely stated without repetition, and shall be numbered
consecutively;

(c) Under the heading "Statement of Facts," a clear and concise statement in brief
narrative form of the facts of the case, including the nature of the action, the
character of the pleading and proceedings, the substance of the proof in sufficient
detail to make it clearly intelligible, the rulings and orders of the court; the nature of
the judgment, and any other matters necessary to an understanding of the nature of
the controversy on appeal, with page references to the record;

(d) Under the heading "Argument," the appellant's arguments on each assignment of
error with page references to the record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by
the page of the report at which the case begins and the page of the report on which
the citation is found;

(e) Under the beading "Relief," a specification of the order or judgment which the
appellant seeks;

(f) In cases not brought up by record on appeal, the appellant's brief shall contain as
an appendix a copy of the judgment or order appealed from.

19
 Section 16, Rule 46 thereof provides:

Contents of appellant's brief. — The appellant's brief shall contain in the order herein
indicated the following:

(a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the argument and page
references and a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited
with reference to the pages where they are cited;

(b) An assignment of errors intended to be urged. Such errors shall be separately,

distinctly and concisely stated without repetition, and shall be numbered
consecutively;

(c) Under the heading "Statement of the Case," a clear and concise statement of the
nature of the action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders
of the court, the nature of the judgment and any other matters necessary to an
understanding of the nature of the controversy, with page references to the record;

(d) Under the heading "Statement of Facts," a clear and concise statement in a
narrative form of the facts admitted by both parties and of those in controversy,
together with the substance of the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it
clearly intelligible, with page references to the record;

(e) A clear and concise statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted to the
court for its judgment;
 (f) Under the heading "Argument," the appellant's arguments on each assignment of
error with page references to the record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by
the page of the report at which the case begins and the page of the report on which
the citation is found;

(g) Under the heading "Relief," a specification of the order or judgment which the
appellant seeks;

(h) In cases not brought up by record on appeal, the appellant's brief shall contain,
as an appendix, a copy of the judgment or order appealed from.

 As added aggravation, two cases (Filoil Marketing Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate
20

and Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. Court of Appeals) were mis-cited; see Rollo, p. 136.

21
 241 SCRA 553, 557 (1995).

22
 Section 2 (a) states:

(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall
be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate
appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on
appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

23
 Section 1 there of provides:

How appeal taken; time for filing. — A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a
verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the
clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the
amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse
party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment.
Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period,
the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within
which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for
the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

24
 Cases which are considered special include petitions for annulment of judgments of
regional trial courts; petitions for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus; petitions for review of decisions from administrative or quasi-judicial
tribunals and from regional trial courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction; appeals
in agrarian cases; and appeals in special civil actions originating from regional trial courts.

25
 Section 1, Rule 3, Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals [hereafter, "RIRCA"].

26
 Section 1, Rule 51, Rules of Court.
  Per section 6, Rule 3 of the RIRCA, the first raffle is open to the public while the second
27

raffle is strictly confidential.

28
 A manifestation filed by SAN MIGUEL states, in the secretary's certificate attached thereto
(Rollo, pp. 169-172), that Atty. Afable is authorized to represent, prosecute and defend
petitioner in any action against the corporation ". x x x arising from, or in connection with, any
disputes involving any and all contracts, deeds or acts of whatever kind and nature where
the Corporation is a party directly or indirectly . x x x"

29
 Yao Ka Sin Trading v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 763, 781-782 (1992).

30
 Section 23, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court.

[G.R. No. 140205. September 3, 2002.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHNNY DELA CONCHA y DECIPULO

alias "JON JON", Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Accused-appellant Johnny dela Concha (hereafter JOHNNY) seeks a review of the 2 August 1999
Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Criminal Case No. L-5886,
finding him guilty of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay the victim Wiffany Jean Urmatan (hereafter WIFFANY) the amount of P75,000 by way of
civil indemnity and P25,000 as moral damages, plus the costs of the suit. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Upon a verified complaint 2 for rape signed by Purificacion C. Urmatan, WIFFANY’s mother, an
information 3 for rape was filed against JOHNNY, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on or about the 23rd day of April 1998, in the afternoon, at Barangay Biec Duyao, Municipality of
Binmaley, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with Wiffany Jean Urmatan, a minor three (3) years and ten (10) months old, to her damage and
prejudice.

Contrary to Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.

At his arraignment on 15 September 1998, JOHNNY entered a plea of not guilty. 4 Trial on the merits
ensued thereafter.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Purificacion Urmatan, Dr. Mary Gwendolyn Luna,
Joel Pioquinto, Ligaya dela Concha, Concepcion dela Concha, and WIFFANY. Their testimonies
established the following facts: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

At about 3:00 p.m. of 23 April 1998, three-year-old WIFFANY, 5 then playing with one Dandan, was
called by JOHNNY to come over to his house. Once inside the house, he removed her panty; placed
her on his lap, facing him with her legs spread; and inserted his penis into her vagina while pulling her
towards him. WIFFANY felt pain and pleaded JOHNNY to stop. He ignored her pleas. Having
consummated his bestiality, JOHNNY let her go. 6 WIFFANY then ran to her grandmother Concepcion
dela Concha (hereafter Mama Conching) and reported to the latter what JOHNNY had done to her.
Seeing blood oozing from WIFFANY’s vagina, Mama Conching wiped it with a shirt. 7

On the same day, WIFFANY was examined by Dr. Mary Gwendolyn Luna at the Region I Medical
Center, Dagupan City. Dr. Luna found deep fresh hymenal laceration at 6:00 o’clock position and fresh
abrasion on WIFFANY’s labia minora. She also obtained sample stains from WIFFANY’s vaginal canal,
which yielded positive result for the presence of spermatozoa. 8 The following day, a verified
complaint for rape was filed against JOHNNY.

For his part, JOHNNY testified that he was 16 years old at the time of the alleged incident and he is a
first cousin of WIFFANY’s mother. He vehemently denied having committed the offense charged. He
claimed that upon entering their house at around 3:00 p.m. of 23 April 1998, he saw WIFFANY crying
aloud and saying "baba-baba," referring to his grandfather’s swing made of discarded rubber tire. He
then asked her to stop crying. WIFFANY persisted to cry. Afraid that the neighbors might think that he
was maltreating her, he again told WIFFANY to stop crying. Still, WIFFANY kept crying. Left with no
recourse, JOHNNY told WIFFANY to get out of their house; but she remained inside the house and
continued to cry. He then brought her to Mama Conching’s house situated a few meters away from
their house. 9

While JOHNNY was on his way home, he was confronted by his mother whether he knew what
happened to WIFFANY. After answering in the negative, he was slapped by his mother. He thereupon
returned to Mama Conching’s house. There, he got the shock of his life when he was accused by Mama
Conching of having raped WIFFANY. Afraid of the accusation, JOHNNY left their place and proceeded to
Bolinao, Pangasinan, where he stayed for three months. 10

Sherlita dela Concha, mother of JOHNNY, testified that from 2:00 to 3:00 p.m. of 23 April 1998 she
was seated by the door of their house watching people who were playing "tong-its." Her daughter Julie
dela Concha was inside their house, as she was afflicted with chicken pox and had fever. Sherlita
corroborated JOHNNY’s declaration that he was indeed by the roadside and that JOHNNY had asked
oysters from Narsing, Lito and Alfred who were then having a drinking spree. 11

Julie dela Concha, sister of JOHNNY, testified that on 23 April 1998 she was home just watching
television with Windy Mae and Windy Rose, as she was afflicted with chicken pox. At around 3:00
p.m., WIFFANY entered their house; she never said the words "Si Jon-jon, inturok toy otin to ed baok"
; instead, she said "baba baba," which means hammock in English. At the time, JOHNNY was not yet
home; he was at the roadside about 100 meters away from their house. 12

The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of WIFFANY. While conceding that
WIFFANY’s narration of how she was sexually abused by JOHNNY was not "detailed," the trial court,
nonetheless, concluded that it was candidly related by one of such a tender age. Moreover, it declared
that in statutory rape, the crime is not negated by the young victim’s failure to give a detailed account
of how she was abused. As stated earlier, the trial court convicted him of rape and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay WIFFANY the amount of P75,000 by way of civil
indemnity; P25,000 as moral damages; and the costs of suit. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In his Appellant’s Brief, 13 JOHNNY asserts that the trial court erred in (1) giving full faith and
credence to the "coached" testimony of WIFFANY; (2) convicting him of rape and imposing on him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and (3) ordering him to pay the victim the amount of P75,000 by way
of civil indemnity and P25,000 as moral damages.

In support thereof, JOHNNY questions the credibility of WIFFANY. He states that just before the
proceedings in the trial court, WIFFANY was coached by her counsel and family members into falsely
testifying against him by luring her with material things.

JOHNNY also asserts that his alibi of being at the roadside at the time of the commission of the crime
was fully corroborated by the testimonies of Sherlita and Julie. He likewise points to his non-flight
after the incident as an indication of his innocence. If indeed he committed the crime, he would have
immediately left the premises. He further claims that the family of WIFFANY had a motive to falsely
charge him with rape because of harbored ill-feelings against JOHNNY’s family generated by the
following: (a) refusal of his parents to join WIFFANY’s grandfather, Benito dela Concha, in his political
affiliations; (b) conflict concerning their respective inheritances from their predecessors-in-interest;
and (c) alleged rumor mongering of Sherlita that the grandfather of WIFFANY was accused of estafa.

In the Appellee’s Brief, 14 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asseverates that appellant’s failure
to comply with the formal requirements of an appellant’s brief is fatal to his appeal. It points to the
lack in the Appellant’s Brief of (a) table of cases cited; (b) statement of issues; and (3) page
references to the record in the Statement of the Case and in the Statement of Facts. It also argues
that JOHNNY’s alibi and the testimonies of his witnesses corroborating the same cannot prevail over
WIFFANY’s testimony, which the trial court found to be credible and convincing. Moreover, the medical
evidence on record fully supports WIFFANY’s testimony. The lame assertion of JOHNNY that WIFFANY
was lured by her family and counsel into falsely testifying against him by reason of her family’s
harbored ill-feelings against JOHNNY’s family is totally baseless. Finally, the OSG prays that the
decision of the trial court be affirmed in toto.

We shall first address the procedural issue raised by the Solicitor General regarding the contents of
the Appellant’s Brief. Under Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in relation to
Section 7 of Rule 124 and Section 1 of Rule 125 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
appellant’s brief must contain the following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and page references, and
a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages
where they are cited;

(b) An assignment of errors intended to be urged. . .;

(c) Under the heading "Statement of the Case," a clear and concise statement of the nature of the
action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of the court, the nature of the
judgment and any other matters necessary to an understanding of the nature of the controversy, with
page references to the record;

(d) Under the heading "Statement of Facts," a clear and concise statement in a narrative form of the
facts admitted by both parties and of those in controversy, together with the substance of the proof
related thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible, with page references to the record;

(e) A clear and concise statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted to the court for its
judgment;

(f) Under the heading "Argument," the appellant’s arguments on each assignment of error with page
references to the record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by the page of the report at which
the case begins and the page of the report which the citation is found;

(g) Under the heading "Relief," a specification of the order or judgment which the appellant seeks;
and.

(h) In cases not brought up by record on appeal, the appellant’s brief shall contain, as an appendix, a
copy of the judgment or final order appealed from. (Emphasis supplied)

These requirements are intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion
of the case. 15

Indeed, the Appellant’s Brief filed in this case does not contain a table of cases or authorities cited. It
must be pointed out that this requirement is not just a trivial technicality. It is designed to provide
ready and easy reference so that the reviewing court does not have to go over the Brief page after
page to locate a particular citation. 16

Moreover, while there is an assignment of errors in the Appellant’s Brief, no statement of issues can
be found therein. A statement of issues is not to be confused with the assignment of errors; they are
not one and the same, for otherwise the Rules would not require a statement for each. An assignment
of errors sets forth the specific errors claimed to have been committed by the lower court in order to
enable the appellate court and the opposing party to see on what points the appellant intends to ask
for a reversal of judgment. 17 On the other hand, a statement of issues puts forth the question of fact
or law to be resolved by the reviewing court." 18

Furthermore, the Statement of the Case and the Statement of Facts lack page references to the
record. It has been held that a statement of fact unaccompanied by a page reference to the record
may be presumed to be without support in the record and may be stricken or disregarded altogether.
19

Be that as it may, these procedural lapses are not fatal. The case of De Liano cited by the OSG is not
on all fours with the present case. In that case, the non-compliance with the procedural requirements
justified the dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Appeals. The appellant’s brief therein lacked a
subject index and a table of cases; moreover, the Statement of the Case, Statement of Facts and
Arguments had no page references to the record. Under Section 1(f), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, in relation to Section 18 of Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, one
of the grounds for the dismissal of appeals filed with the Court of Appeals is absence of page
references in the following: subject index, table of cases and authorities cited, Statement of Facts,
Statement of the Case, and Arguments, as required under Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f)
of Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Such procedural infraction is not, however, among the grounds for dismissal of appeals filed with this
Court as provided for under Section 5 of Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in relation to
Section 18 of Rule 124 and Section 1 of Rule 125 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hence,
the procedural infirmities of the Appellant’s Brief filed in this case do not warrant a dismissal of herein
appeal.

We are not unmindful of the ruling in People v Fabula 20 wherein the deficiencies of the appellant’s
brief filed in an appeal before this Court were held to be fatal. In that case, the appellant, in his
Appellant’s Brief, directly proceeded to discuss his arguments. His Brief contained no subject index,
statement of facts, statement of the case, assigned errors, statement of the issues, and prayer.
Indeed, such omissions are fatal, since they refer to the substantive contents of an appellant’s brief.
This is not so in the present case.

Nonetheless, it is well-worth to remind lawyers once again that the right to appeal is but a statutory
right, and the party who seeks to avail of it must faithfully comply with the rules. 21 These rules are
designed to facilitate an orderly disposition of cases before the appellate courts; they provide for a
system under which suitors may be heard in the correct form and manner at the prescribed time in an
orderly confrontation before a magistrate. 22

The present appeal must, however, fail — not in form but rather in the merits.

Settled is the principle that the finding of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled
great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination, if not a
disturbance of the same. The reason therefor is that the trial court is in a better and unique position of
hearing first-hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude. 23

A careful scrutiny of the records reveals no cogent reason requiring a disturbance of the trial court’s
findings. We agree with the trial court in giving full credit and merit to WIFFANY’s testimony that she
was raped. It is doctrinally settled that the lone testimony of a rape victim is, by itself, sufficient to
convict if credible. 24 This is so because from the nature of the crime the best evidence that can be
offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant’s testimony. In the instant case,
WIFFANY has established unequivocally in the answers she gave under direct examination how she
was ravished by JOHNNY; thus: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q What were you doing with Dandan at Duyao on April 23, 1998 at about 3:00 o’clock in the
afternoon?
A I was playing.

Atty. Tolete: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q While you were playing with Dandan, do you remember that you saw Jun jun dela Concha?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did Jun-jun do?

A He inserted his penis into my vagina.

Q Where did he insert his penis into your vagina?

A In their house.

Q You mean the house of Jun-jun?

A Yes, sir.

Q How did it happen that you were there in the house of Jun-jun where he inserted his penis into your
vagina?

A He called me, sir.

Q When he called you, what did you do?

A Enough Jun-jun, it is very painful I said but "Sige ni" meaning "more," he said.25 cralaw:red

x          x          x

Q Now you said that Jun jun inserted his penis into your vagina, will you demonstrate how he did it?

A He placed me on his lap.

Q Before Jun jun placed you on his lap at that time, did you have any panty?

A Yes, sir.

Q Was that panty removed?

A Yes, sir. He removed it.

Q After removing it, what did he do?

A I cried.

Q Now, you said that Jun-jun placed you on his lap, if the interpreter is Jun jun, will you demonstrate
how he did it?

A The witness demonstrated it by seating [sic] on the lap of the mother facing each other and her legs
spread upon.

Atty. Tolete: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q While in that position, what did Jun jun do?

A He said he [would] give me camatchili but I don’t [sic] like.

Q While Jun jun placed you on his lap, what happened to your vagina.

A It bleeds [sic].

Q Why did it bleed?

A He inserted his penis to my vagina.

Q How did he insert his penis into your vagina?

A He did it like this (witness demonstrated it by way of pointing her point finger towards her vagina).

Q Now, you said that when Jun jun inserted his penis into your vagina you said that your vagina bleed
[sic]; how did you feel?

A It was painful, sir. 26

The foregoing testimony was corroborated by Conception and Ligaya dela Concha who both stated
that they personally heard WIFFANY narrate what JOHNNY had done to her. They also testified having
seen WIFFANY’s private part bleeding right after the incident. 27 Moreover, the medical findings
showing fresh hymenal laceration and abrasion on WIFFANY’s genitalia, as well as the presence of
spermatozoa, strengthen the claim of rape.

These pieces of evidence cannot be successfully overcome by the attempts of the defense to show
that WIFFANY was lured by her family and her counsel into falsely testifying against JOHNNY. The
material gifts she received were too minute against the physical, mental, and psychological trauma
she felt after the incident. Rather, we consider those material gifts as an attempt of her family to
minimize the trauma she felt by creating an atmosphere of security and love within her.

In the same vein, the allegation that WIFFANY’s counsel coached her deserves a short shrift. A careful
lawyer usually consults the witnesses to be presented before placing them on the stand. The mere fact
that a lawyer, in preparing a case for trial, has talked with the witnesses should not be a ground for
discrediting said witnesses, since it is the duty of the lawyer to learn from the witnesses what
testimonies they can give in order to enable him to conduct the trial on his part with expedition. 28

The alleged ulterior motive of WIFFANY’s family in the filing of this case deserves scant consideration.
It is unnatural for a mother to use her offspring as an instrument of malice or retribution. Much less
would she subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace, or stigma attendant to the prosecution for
rape unless she is motivated solely and rightly by the desire to bring to the bar of justice the person
responsible for the child’s defilement. 29

Moreover, there is at all no indication that WIFFANY allowed herself to be unduly influenced by her
mother and grandfather to conjure a tale of rape merely to execute their vendetta. That she
immediately reported to her grandmother the evil deed done to her by JOHNNY; allowed the
examination of her private parts; and thereafter permitted herself to be subjected to a public trial
were eloquent proof of the truth of her testimony and of her desire to obtain justice. A rape victim will
not come out in the open if her motive is not to obtain justice 30 and to have the culprit apprehended
and punished. 31 This ruling especially holds true when the complainant is young or of tender age. 32

In light of the positive testimony of WIFFANY and the other evidence presented by the prosecution,
JOHNNY’s bare denial and alibi must fail. A mere denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and
constitutes self-serving negative evidence that cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 33 We have also held that when
alibi is established only by the accused, his relatives or close friends, the same should be treated with
strictest scrutiny. 34

JOHNNY’s claim of non-flight deserves no merit. The records reveal that JOHNNY left for Bolinao,
Pangasinan, after the incident and stayed in that place for three months. 35
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997," provides that
the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape was committed against a child below seven
years old. JOHNNY should have been meted the extreme penalty of death had it not for the fact that
he was only 16 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. 36 Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, states: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic Review of Death Penalty
Cases. — The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing
laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of commission of
the crime . . . in which case[] the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.

Thus, being only 16 years old at the time of commission of the crime of rape, JOHNNY benefits from
the above provision.

As regards the trial court’s award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000, the same must stand.
In a plethora of cases, we have held that if the commission of the crime is effectively qualified by any
of the circumstances under which the penalty of death is authorized under R.A. No. 7659, the civil
indemnity for the victim should not be less than P75,2000. 37 This rule applies to Article 266-A, in
relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, under which
JOHNNY was charged because said Articles are a reproduction of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659. 38

In this case, the commission of rape was qualified by the circumstance that "the victim was a child
below seven years old" as provided under no. 5 of the sixth paragraph of Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, which calls for the imposition of the death penalty. The
fact that the death penalty cannot be actually imposed by reason of JOHNNY’s minority at the time of
the commission of the offense will not affect his civil liability.

We modify the trial court’s award of P25,000 as moral damages to WIFFANY. In conformity with
current jurisprudence, we hereby increase it to P50,000. 39

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. L-5886 convicting JOHNNY DELA CONCHA of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim P75,000 as civil
indemnity is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of moral damages in the amount of
P25,000 is hereby increased to P50,000. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Original Record (OR), 154-159; Rollo, 118-122. Per Judge Eugenio G. Ramos.

2. Exhibit "D," OR, 4.

3. Id., 1.

4. Exhibit "D," OR, 34

5. Exhibit "E," Id., 107.

6. TSN, 22 February 1999, 6-11.

7. Id., 10-11; TSN, 6 January 1999, 6-7; TSN, 28 January 1999, 6.

8. Exhibit "A," OR, 5; TSN, 16 December 1998, 16-18.

9. TSN, 29 June 1999, 3, 10-12.

10. Id., 13-15, 33.

11. TSN, 31 May 1999, 8-11, 25-27.

12. TSN, 18 May 1999, 3-8, 11.

13. Rollo, 98-117.

14. Rollo, 144-159.

15. See Philippine Coconut Authority v. Corona International. Inc., 341 SCRA 519, 526 [2000].

16. De Liano v. Court of Appeals, G. R. 142316, 22 November 2001.

17. Id.

18. Id.

19. De Liano v. Court of Appeals, supra note 16.

20. 265 SCRA 607 [1995].

21. Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 553, 557 [1995].

22. Casim v. Flordeliza, G. R No. 139511, 23 January 2002.

23. People v. Francisco, 344 SCRA 110, 119 [2000]. See also People v. Leoterio, 264 SCRA 608, 617 [1996]; People v.
Antolin, 330 SCRA 656, 665 [2000].

24. People v. Delovino, 247 SCRA 637, 650 [1995]; People v. Antido, 278 SCRA 425, 440 [1997]; People v. Aloro, 340
SCRA 346, 355 [2000].

25. TSN, 22 February 1999, 6-7.

26. TSN, 22 February 1999, 8-9.

27. TSN, 28 January 1999, 5-6; TSN, 6 January 1999, 4-8.

28. VII VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, EVIDENCE, Part 2, 515 (1997 ed.).

29. People v. Escober, 281 SCRA 498 [1997].

30. People v. Castromero, 280 SCRA 421, 430 [1997].

31. People v. Napiot, 311 SCRA 772, 780 [1999].

32. People v. Gagto, 253 SCRA 455, 467 [1996]; People v. Abangin, 297 SCRA 655, 665 [1998].

33. People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463, 481 [1997]; People v. Alvero, 329 SCRA 737, 756 [2000]; People v. Arofo, G.R. No.
139433, 11 April 2002.

34. People v. Jerez, 285 SCRA 393, 402 [1998]; People v. Rebato, G.R. No. 139552, 24 May 2001.

35. TSN, 29 June 1999, 33.

36. TSN, 29 June 1999, 3.

37. People v. Victor, 292 SCRA 186, 200-201 [1998]; People v. Mangila, 325 SCRA 586, 598-599 [2000]; People v.
Arizapa, 328 SCRA 214, 221 [2000]; People v. Rebato, G.R. No. 139552, 24 May 2001.

38. People v. Rebato, supra.

39. People v. Remudo, G.R. No. 127905, 30 August 2001; People v. Ugang, G.R. No. 144036, 7 May 2002.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 139910               September 29, 2000

PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
CORONA INTERNATIONAL, INC., respondent.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

For failing to strictly comply with the provisions of Sec. 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure, which specifies the form and contents of the appellant's brief, petitioner Philippine
Coconut Authority's appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56586.
Hence, petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court and seeks the reversal of the resolutions of
the court a quo.

As antecedents, respondent corona International Inc. filed a case against petitioner for the recovery
of the sum of ₱9,082,221.14 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The amount allegedly
represented the unpaid balance of the purchase price of communication and computer facilities sold
by the respondent to the petitioner as well as interest and damages. Petitioner, in its answer, set up
1 

the following defenses: that the installation of said equipment was not done in accordance with good
engineering standards and practices; that some of the equipment delivered were not those specified
in the bid; that private respondent failed to install the communication system it undertook to put up;
and that the certificate of acceptance issued to private respondent was entered either through
misrepresentation or collusion. Hence, as counterclaim, petitioner sought the rescission of the
contract of sale as well as damages. 2

On 10 September 1996, the trial court rendered a decision ruling in favor of the respondent, and
ordered among others that petitioner pay the respondent the amount of ₱9,082,068.00, plus interest
representing the balance of the contract price as well as ₱1,000,000 as attorney's fees. 3

Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
In due course, petitioner filed its appellant's brief, to which respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
appeal based on the following grounds: (1) failure of the petitioner to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court; and (2)
the palpable dilatory character of the appeal. In a Resolution dated 14 October 1998, the appellate
4 

court granted respondent's motion to dismiss, the dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff-appellee's meritorious Motion to Dismiss Appeal is GRANTED, and

accordingly this appeal on authority of Section 1(f), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 5

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the resolution, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals
in its Resolution dated 25 August 1999. 6
Petitioner now comes before this Court raising the following assignment of errors:

FIRST ERROR

The Honorable Court of Appeals Erred in ruling that Appellant's brief does not Comply with the
Requirements prescribed for its contents.

SECOND ERROR

The Honorable Court of Appeals Gravely Erred in Sacrificing Substantial Right in favor of Procedure.

THIRD ERROR

The Honorable Court of Appeals Erred in Dismissing Petitioner (sic) Appeal. 7

We find the petition meritorious.

In dismissing the appeal before it, the Court of Appeals gave the following explanation:

xxx

An examination of the defendant-appellant's brief reveals that it does not comply with the
requirements prescribed for its contents. The appellant's brief under the heading Statement of the
Case does not contain a clear and concise statement of the nature of the action, nor a summary of
the proceedings, nor the nature of the judgment, nor any of the other matters necessary to an
understanding of the nature of the controversy, with page references to the record. The defendant-
appellant simply averred that This is an appeal from the trial court's Decision,… and thereafter
merely quoted the dispositive portion of the said Decision. In the same manner, the defendant-
appellant under the heading Statement of Facts failed to asseverate a clear and concise statement
in narrative form the facts admitted by both parties and of those in controversy, together with the
substance of the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible, with page
references to the record.

xxx 8

We disagree. Our examination of petitioner-appellant's brief reveals that the same has substantially
complied with the requirements set forth in Section 13, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SEC. 13. Contents of appellant's brief.-The appellant's brief shall contain, in the order herein
indicated, the following:

(a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and page references, and
a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages
where they are cited;

xxx

(c) Under the heading "Statement of the Case," a clear an concise statement of the nature of the
action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of the court, the nature of the
judgment and any other matters necessary to an understanding of the nature of the controversy, with
page references to the record;
(d) Under the heading "Statement of Facts," a clear and concise statement in a narrative form of the
facts admitted by both parties and of those in controversy, together with the substance of the proof
relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible, with page references to the record;

xxx

(f) Under the heading "Argument," the appellant's arguments on each assignment of error with page
references to the record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by the page of the report at which
the case begins and the page of the report on which the citation is found; xxx

In compliance with the requirement of Section (c) of the above-quoted, the appellant's brief
contained the following "Statement of the Case:"

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the trial court's Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered-

1. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the total sum of P9,082,068.00 representing the
balance of the contract price for Phase III of the project, the 10% retention for Phase I, II and
III of the project, and the contract price for Phase IV of the project;

2. Ordering the defendant to indemnify plaintiff the sum equal to two (2%) per centum of
P9,082,068.00 up to March 30, 1995, as actual and for damages;

3. Ordering the defendant to indemnify plaintiff the sum equal to 1 and ½% per cent of
P9,082,068.00 monthly from March 30, 1995 up to the time the full amount is fully paid, as
and by way of actual damages;

4. The sum of P1,000,000.00 as and for attorney's fee; plus the costs of the suit.

The counterclaim interposed by the defendant is hereby dismissed for lack of evidence to sustain it.

SO ORDERED. 9

Admittedly, petitioner's above "Statement of the Case" does not strictly adhere to that requirements
of Rule 43, section 13 (c). Nonetheless, we should not lose sight of the purpose of Section 13 ( c)
which is to apprise the court as to the nature of the case before it. Despite its deficiencies, the nature
of the case is easily discernible from a reading of the pleading:

Petitioner's "Statement of the Facts," contains the following allegations:

On 28 January 1992, Appellant Philippine Coconut Authority (hereinafter PCA for brevity) entered
into a contract with Appellee Corona International Incorporated (hereinafter Corona for brevity) for
the supply and delivery/installation of complete communication facility/system with related office
automation hardware. Mr. Charles R. Avila, then Administrator of PCA signed the contract in his
capacity as such while Edgardo S. Silverio signed the same in his capacity as President and
General Manager of Corona. On 11 February 1992, Corona was paid the agreed mobilization fund in
the total amount of P6,727,457.47. Pursuant to the Contract, Corona then had One Hundred Twenty
(120) calendar days from receipt of the Mobilization Fund or until June 11, 1992 within which to
complete the works, thus:

"The covered equipment/facilities shall be delivered and installed by the Contractor in the
places/regions a specified in the Bid Documents within One Hundred Twenty (120) calendar days
from the date of receipt of the Mobilization Fund mentioned in the succeeding paragraph hereof,
which shall include commissioning of the equipment/network xxx"

On 04 March 1992, Mr. Charles R. Avila, Administrator of PCA, in a Special Order issued 04 March
1992, created an Inspection and Acceptance Committee responsible for the inspection, acceptance
and proper documentation of all the units installed and ensure its conformity with the technical
specifications as provided for in the contract. The Committee was headed by Mr. Paulino M.
Raguindin. On 30 April 1992, Mr. Paulino M. Raguindin issued a certification (Exhibit "28") that items
delivered for Phase I under the mentioned Contract has been completed by corona and duly
accepted by the Inspection and Acceptance Committee. On 06 May 1992, another certification
(Exhibit "29") was issued by Mr. Paulino M. Raguindin. This represented payment for Phase I of the
project. On 08 May 1992, another certification of similar tenor was again issued by Mr. Raguindin for
which reason Corona was paid P6,054,711.70 (P6,727,457.44 less 10% retention) representing
payment for Phase II of the project. Payment [was] received on July 4, 1992. On 29 May 1992, a
similar certification (Exhibit "30") was issued by Mr. Raguindin for which reason Corona was paid
P5,718,337.60 representing partial payment for Phase III of the project. Payment was received on
July 1, 1992. On 29 July 1992, then Administrator CharlesR. Avila was replaced by the Incumbent
Administrator, Virgilio M. David (hereinafter Administrator David for brevity). On 25 September 1992,
Administrator David engaged the services of Teleconsultant Incorporated for the purpose of
evaluating the works of Corona. On 18 January 1993, PCA's Administrator David informed Corona's
President, Edgardo Silverio, in a letter dated 14 January 1993 that due to blatant breach of the terms
and conditions of the Contract and fraud, PCA was rescinding or annulling the contract. Instead of
responding, Corona filed the instant Complaint.

Aside from the lack of page reference to the records, we fail to see how the above fails to comply
with Section 13 (d) of Rule 43.

The appellate court rationalizes further its dismissal by stating that:

Needless to state, the purpose of the brief is to present the court in coherent and concise form the
point and questions in controversy, and by fair argument on the facts and law of the case, to assist
the court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion. A haphazard and pellmell presentation will not
do for the brief should be so prepared s to minimize the labor of the court in examination of the
record upon which the appeal is heard and determined. It is certainly, 'the vehicle of counsel to
convey to the court the essential facts of his client's case, a statement of the questions of law
involved, the law he should have applied, and the application he desires of it by the court'." (Casilan
vs. Chavez, 4 SCRA 599) There should be an honest compliance with the requirements regarding
contents of appellant's brief, and among which is that it should contain "a subject index of the matter
in the brief with a digest of the argument and page references."(Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA 65) 10

We do not disagree with the appellate court's above exposition. The requirements laid down in
Section 13, Rule 43 are intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion
of the case. However, we are of the opinion that despite its deficiencies petitioner's appellant's brief
is sufficient in form and substance as to apprise the appellate court of the essential facts and nature
of the case as well as the issues raised and the laws necessary for the disposition of the same.
Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, and not to suppress, substantial justice.
A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may thus, be allowed to attain the prime objective
for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.
11

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 56586, dated 14 October 1998 AND 25 August 1999, are SET ASIDE. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

Regional Trial Court Decision, Rollo, p. 82.

1 

Id., at 82.
2 

Rollo, p. 98.
3 

Id., at 41.
4 

Id., at 43.
5 

Id., at 46-48.
6 

Id., at 35.
7 

Id., at 41-42.
8 

Id., at 65-66.
9 

10 
Id., at 42.

11 
Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastice Corp. vs. CA, 260 SCRA 714, 719 (1996).
 G.R. No. 193494, March 07, 2014

LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION AND

THE PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

There should be no inexplicable delay in the filing of a motion to set aside order of
default. Even when a motion is filed within the required period, excusable negligence
must be properly alleged and proven.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals’ decision1 dated May
24, 2010 and resolution2 dated August 13, 2010 in CA–G.R. CV No. 88023. The Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court of Makati’s decision 3 dated July 4,
2006.

The facts as established from the pleadings of the parties are as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On March 9, 1995, Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a
10–year contract of lease4 over a parcel of land located in Barrio Tigatto, Buhangin,
Davao City. The parcel of land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T–
166476 and was registered under Eli L. Lui. 5

On January 10, 2003, Zuellig Pharma received a letter 6 from the Philippine Bank of
Communications. Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked
Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it. Attached to the letter was a copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 336962 under the name of the Philippine Bank of
Communications.7 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 336962 was derived from Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T–166476.8

Zuellig Pharma promptly informed Lui Enterprises of the Philippine Bank of

Communications’ claim. On January 28, 2003, Lui Enterprises wrote to Zuellig Pharma
and insisted on its right to collect the leased property’s rent. 9

Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications over the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint 10 for
interpleader with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. In its complaint, Zuellig Pharma
alleged that it already consigned in court P604,024.35 as rental payments. Zuellig
Pharma prayed that it be allowed to consign in court its succeeding monthly rental
payments and that Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications be
ordered to litigate their conflicting claims.11

The Philippine Bank of Communications filed its answer 12 to the complaint. On the other
hand, Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss 13 on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s
alleged representative did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on
behalf of the corporation. Under the secretary’s certificate 14 dated May 6, 2003 attached
to the complaint, Atty. Ana L.A. Peralta was only authorized to “initiate and represent
[Zuellig Pharma] in the civil proceedings for consignation of rental payments to be filed
against Lui Enterprises, Inc. and/or [the Philippine Bank of Communications].” 15

According to Lui Enterprises, an earlier filed nullification of deed of dation in payment

case pending with the Regional Trial Court of Davao barred the filing of the interpleader
case.16 Lui Enterprises filed this nullification case against the Philippine Bank of
Communications with respect to several properties it dationed to the bank in payment
of its obligations. The property leased by Zuellig Pharma was among those allegedly
dationed to the Philippine Bank of Communications. 17

In the nullification of deed of dation in payment case, Lui Enterprises raised the issue of
which corporation had the better right over the rental payments. 18 Lui Enterprises
argued that the same issue was involved in the interpleader case. To avoid possible
conflicting decisions of the Davao trial court and the Makati trial court on the same
issue, Lui Enterprises argued that the subsequently filed interpleader case be
dismissed.

To support its argument, Lui Enterprises cited a writ of preliminary injunction 19 dated
July 2, 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao, ordering Lui Enterprises and
the Philippine Bank of Communications “[to maintain] status quo” 20 with respect to the
rent. By virtue of the writ of preliminary injunction, Lui Enterprises argued that it
should continue collecting the rental payments from its lessees until the nullification of
deed of dation in payment case was resolved. The writ of preliminary injunction dated
July 2, 2003 reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREAS, on June 30, 2003, the Court issued an Order, a portion of which is quoted:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue,
restraining and enjoining [the Philippine Bank of Communications], its agents or
[representative], the Office of the Clerk of Court–Sheriff and all persons acting on their
behalf, from conducting auction sale on the properties of [Lui Enterprises] in EJF–REM
Case No. 6272–03 scheduled on July 3, 2003 at 10:00 a.m. at the Hall of Justice,
Ecoland, Davao City, until the final termination of the case, upon plaintiff [sic] filing of a
bond in the amount of P1,000,000.00 to answer for damages that the enjoined parties
may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that applicant
is not entitled thereto.
WHEREAS, that plaintiff posted a bond of P1,000,000.00 duly approved by this Court.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned Judge that, until further orders, [the
Philippine Bank of Communications] and all [its] attorneys, representatives, agents and
any other persons assisting [the bank], are directed to restrain from conducting auction
sale on the Properties of [Lui Enterprises] in EJF–REM Case No. 6272–03 scheduled on
July 3, 2003 at 10:00 a.m. at the Hall of Justice, Ecoland, Davao City, until the final
termination of the case.21

Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition22 to the motion to dismiss. It argued that the motion
to dismiss should be denied for having been filed late. Under Rule 16, Section 1 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss should be filed within the required
time given to file an answer to the complaint, which is 15 days from service of
summons on the defendant.23 Summons was served on Lui Enterprises on July 4, 2003.
It had until July 19, 2003 to file a motion to dismiss, but Lui Enterprises filed the
motion only on July 23, 2003.24
As to Lui Enterprises’ claim that the interpleader case was filed without authority,
Zuellig Pharma argued that an action interpleader “is a necessary consequence of the
action for consignation.”25 Zuellig Pharma consigned its rental payments because of “the
clearly conflicting claims of [Lui Enterprises] and [the Philippine Bank of
Communications].”26 Since Atty. Ana L.A. Peralta was authorized to file a consignation
case, this authority necessarily included an authority to file the interpleader case.

Nevertheless, Zuellig Pharma filed in court the secretary’s certificate dated August 28,
2003,27 which expressly stated that Atty. Ana L.A. Peralta was authorized to file a
consignation and interpleader case on behalf of Zuellig Pharma. 28

With respect to the nullification of deed of dation in payment case, Zuellig Pharma
argued that its pendency did not bar the filing of the interpleader case. It was not a
party to the nullification case.29

As to the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao,
Zuellig Pharma argued that the writ only pertained to properties owned by Lui
Enterprises. Under the writ of preliminary injunction, the Regional Trial Court of Davao
enjoined the July 3, 2003 auction sale of Lui Enterprises’ properties, the proceeds of
which were supposed to satisfy its obligations to the Philippine Bank of
Communications. As early as April 21, 2001, however, the Philippine Bank of
Communications already owned the leased property as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 336962. Thus, the writ of preliminary injunction did not apply to
the leased property.30

Considering that Lui Enterprises filed its motion to dismiss beyond the 15–day period to
file an answer, Zuellig Pharma moved that Lui Enterprises be declared in default. 31

In its compliance32 dated September 15, 2003, the Philippine Bank of Communications

“[joined Zuellig Pharma] in moving to declare [Lui Enterprises] in default, and in
[moving for] the denial of [Lui Enterprises’] motion to dismiss.” 33

The Regional Trial Court of Makati found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion to
dismiss within the reglementary period. Thus, in its order 34 dated October 6, 2003, the
trial court denied Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss and declared it in default. 35

Lui Enterprises did not move for the reconsideration of the order dated October 6,
2003. Thus, the Makati trial court heard the interpleader case without Lui Enterprises’
participation.

Despite having been declared in default, Lui Enterprises filed the manifestation with
prayer36 dated April 15, 2004. It manifested that the Regional Trial Court of Davao
allegedly issued the order37 dated April 1, 2004, ordering all of Lui Enterprises’ lessees
to “observe status quo with regard to the rental payments” 38 and continue remitting
their rental payments to Lui Enterprises while the nullification of deed of dation in
payment case was being resolved. The order dated April 1, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ORDER
Posed for Resolution is the Motion for Amendment of Order filed by [Lui Enterprises] on
September 23, 2003 seeking for the preservation of status quo on the
payment/remittance of rentals to [it] and the disposal/construction of the properties
subject matter of this case.

xxxx

As elsewhere stated, [the Philippine Bank of Communications] did not oppose the
instant motion up to the present. In fact, during the hearing held on March 15, 2004,
[the bank’s] counsel manifested in open court that except for the rentals due from
[Zuellig Pharma] which are the subject of a consignation suit before a Makati Court, the
other rental payments are continuously received by [Lui Enterprises].

There being no objection from [the Philippine Bank of Communications], and in order to
protect the right of [Lui Enterprises] respecting the subject of the action during the
pendency of this case, this Court, in the exercise of its discretion hereby grants the
motion.

Accordingly, consistent with the order of this Court dated June 30, 2003, the parties are
hereby directed to further observe status quo with regard to the rental payments owing
or due from the lessees of the properties subject of the first set of deeds of dacion and
that the defendants are enjoined from disposing of the properties located at Green
Heights Village, Davao City until the case is finally resolved.

With the order dated April 1, 2004 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao as basis,
Lui Enterprises argued that Zuellig Pharma must remit its rental payments to it and
prayed that the interpleader case be dismissed.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati only noted the manifestation with prayer dated April
15, 2004.39

It was only on October 21, 2004, or one year after the issuance of the order of default,
that Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside order of default 40 in the Makati trial court
on the ground of excusable negligence. Lui Enterprises argued that its failure to file a
motion to dismiss on time “was caused by the negligence of [Lui Enterprises’] former
counsel.”41 This negligence was allegedly excusable because “[Lui Enterprises] was
prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting [its] case.” 42

For its allegedly meritorious defense, Lui Enterprises argued that the earlier filed
nullification of deed of dation in payment case barred the filing of the interpleader case.
The two actions allegedly involved the same parties and the same issue of which
corporation had the better right over the rental payments. To prevent “the possibility of
two courts x x x rendering conflicting rulings [on the same issue],” 43 Lui Enterprises
argued that the subsequently filed interpleader case be dismissed.

Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition44 to the motion to set aside order of default. It
argued that a counsel’s failure to file a timely answer was inexcusable negligence which
bound his client.
Further, Zuellig Pharma argued that the pending case for nullification of deed of dation
in payment “[did] not preclude [Zuellig Pharma] from seeking the relief prayed for in
the [interpleader case].”45

While the motion to set aside order of default was still pending for resolution, Lui
Enterprises filed the manifestation and motion to dismiss 46 dated April 21, 2005 in the
Makati trial court. It manifested that the Davao trial court issued another order 47 dated
April 18, 2005 in the nullification of deed of dation in payment case. In this order, the
Davao trial court directed the Philippine Bank of Communications to inform Zuellig
Pharma to pay rent to Lui Enterprises while the Davao trial court’s order dated April 1,
2004 was subsisting. The order dated April 18, 2005 of the Davao trial court reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ORDER

Plaintiffs move for execution or implementation of the Order dated September 14,
2004. In substance, [Lui Enterprises] seek[s] to compel the remittance in their favor of
the rentals from [Zuellig Pharma], one of the lessees alluded to in the September 14,
2004 Order whose rental payments “must be remitted to and collected by [Lui
Enterprises].” [The Philippine Bank of Communications] did not submit any opposition.

It appears from the records that sometime in February 2003, after being threatened
with a lawsuit coming from [the Philippine Bank of Communications], [Zuellig Pharma]
stopped remitting its rentals to [Lui Enterprises] and instead, has reportedly deposited
the monthly rentals before a Makati court for consignation.

As aptly raised by the plaintiffs, a possible impasse may insist should the Makati Court’s
ruling be contrary to or in conflict with the status quo order issued by this Court. To
preclude this spectacle, Zuellig Pharma should accordingly be advised with the import
of the Order dated September 14, 2004, the salient portion of which is quoted:
x x x prior to the institution of the instant case and by agreement of the parties,
plaintiffs were given as they did exercise the right to collect, receive and enjoy rental
payments x x x.

Since the April 1, 2004 status quo order was a necessary implement of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued on June 30, 2003, it follows that plaintiff’s right to collect
and receive rental payments which he enjoyed prior to the filing of this case, must be
respected and protected and maintained until the case is resolved. As such, all rentals
due from the above–enumerated lessees must be remitted to and collected by the
Plaintiffs.

Status quo simply means the last actual peaceable uncontested status that preceded
the actual controversy. (Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 622).
As such, the [Philippine Bank of Communications] [is] hereby directed to forthwith
inform [Zuellig Pharma] of the April 1, 2004 status quo order and the succeeding
September 14, 2004 Order, and consequently, for the said lessee to remit all rentals
due from February 23, 2003 and onwards to [Lui Enterprises] in the meanwhile that the
status quo order is subsisting.

In its manifestation and motion to dismiss, Lui Enterprises reiterated its prayer for the
dismissal of the interpleader case to prevent “the possibility of [the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 143, Makati City] and [the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City]
rendering conflicting rulings [on the same issue of which corporation has the better
right to the rental payments].”48

Without resolving the motion to set aside order of default, the Makati trial court denied
the manifestation with motion to dismiss dated April 21, 2005 on the ground that Lui
Enterprises already lost its standing in court. 49

Lui Enterprises did not file any motion for reconsideration of the denial of the
manifestation and motion to dismiss dated April 21, 2005.

In its decision50 dated July 4, 2006, the Regional Trial Court of Makati ruled that Lui
Enterprises “[was] barred from any claim in respect of the [rental payments]” 51 since it
was declared in default. Thus, according to the trial court, there was no issue as to
which corporation had the better right over the rental payments. 52 The trial court
awarded the total consigned amount of P6,681,327.30 to the Philippine Bank of
Communications and ordered Lui Enterprises to pay Zuellig Pharma P50,000.00 in
attorney’s fees.53

Lui Enterprises appealed to the Court of Appeals.54

The Court of Appeals found Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief insufficient. Under Rule 44,
Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an appellant’s brief must contain a
subject index, page references to the record, table of cases, textbooks and statutes
cited, and the statement of issues, among others. However, Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s
brief did not contain these requirements. 55

As to the denial of Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals sustained
the trial court. The Court of Appeals found that Lui Enterprises filed its motion to
dismiss four days late.56

With respect to Lui Enterprises’ motion to set aside order of default, the Court of
Appeals found that Lui Enterprises failed to show the excusable negligence that
prevented it from filing its motion to dismiss on time. On its allegedly meritorious
defense, the Court of Appeals ruled that the nullification of deed of dation in payment
case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case, with Zuellig Pharma not being a
party to the nullification case.57

On the award of attorney’s fees, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court since
“Zuellig Pharma x x x was constrained to file the action for interpleader with
consignation in order to protect its interests x x x.” 58

Thus, in its decision59 promulgated on May 24, 2010, the Court of Appeals dismissed Lui
Enterprises’ appeal and affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court of Makati’s decision.

Lui Enterprises filed a motion for reconsideration. 60

The Court of Appeals denied Lui Enterprises’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution
promulgated on August 13, 2010.61 Hence, this petition.
In this petition for review on certiorari ,62 Lui Enterprises argued that the Court of
Appeals applied “the rules of procedure strictly” 63 and dismissed its appeal on
technicalities. According to Lui Enterprises, the Court of Appeals should have taken a
liberal stance and allowed its appeal despite the lack of subject index, page references
to the record, table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited, and the statement of issues
in its appellant’s brief.64

Lui Enterprises also claimed that the trial court should have set aside the order of
default since its failure to file a motion to dismiss on time was due to excusable
negligence.65

For its allegedly meritorious defense, Lui Enterprises argued that the pending
nullification of deed of dation in payment case barred the filing of the interpleader case.
The nullification of deed of dation in payment case and the interpleader case allegedly
involved the same issue of which corporation had the better right to the rent. To avoid
conflicting rulings on the same issue, Lui Enterprises argued that the subsequently filed
interpleader case be dismissed.66

No attorney’s fees should have been awarded to Zuellig Pharma as argued by Lui
Enterprises. Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case despite its knowledge of the
nullification of deed of dation in payment case filed in the Davao trial court where the
same issue of which corporation had the better right over the rental payments was
being litigated. Thus, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case in bad faith for which it
was not entitled to attorney’s fees.67

The Philippine Bank of Communications filed its comment 68 on the petition for review
on certiorari . It argued that Lui Enterprises failed to raise any error of law and prayed
that we affirm in toto the Court of Appeals’ decision.

For Zuellig Pharma, it manifested that it was adopting the Philippine Bank of
Communications’ arguments in its comment.69

The issues for our resolution are: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Lui Enterprises’ appeal for lack of
subject index, page references to the record, table of cases, textbooks and statutes
cited, and the statement of issues in Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief;

II.  Whether the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in denying Lui Enterprises’ motion
to set aside order of default;

III. Whether the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the Regional Trial
Court of Davao barred the subsequent filing of the interpleader case in the Regional
Trial Court of Makati; and

IV. Whether Zuellig Pharma was entitled to attorney’s fees.

Lui Enterprises’ petition for review on certiorari is without merit. However, we delete
the award of attorney’s fees.
 I

Lui Enterprises did not comply with the

rules on the contents of the appellant’s
brief

Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court
of Appeals may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the
appellant’s brief lack specific requirements under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a),
(c), (d), and (f): chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be dismissed by the Court
of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief, or of page

references to the record as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of
Rule 44.

These requirements are the subject index of the matter in brief, page references to the
record, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged and with textbooks and statutes
cited:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 13. Contents of the appellant’s brief. – The appellant’s brief shall contain, in the
order herein indicated, the following: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a)  A subject index of the matter in brief with a digest of the arguments and page
references, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited
with references to the pages where they are cited;

xxxx

(c)  Under the heading “Statement of the Case,” a clear and concise statement of the
nature of the action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of
the court, the nature of the controversy, with page references to the record;

(d) Under the heading “Statement of Facts,” a clear and concise statement in a
narrative form of the facts admitted by both parties and of those in controversy,
together with the substance of the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it
clearly intelligible, with page references to the record;

xxxx

(f)  Under the heading “Argument,” the appellant’s arguments on each assignment of
error with page references to the record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by
the page of the report at which the case begins and the page of the report on which the
citation is found;
xxxx

Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record,
and table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule 50, Section 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises’
appeal.

Except for cases provided in the Constitution, 70 appeal is a “purely statutory

right.”71 The right to appeal “must be exercised in the manner prescribed by law” 72 and
requires strict compliance with the Rules of Court on appeals. 73 Otherwise, the appeal
shall be dismissed, and its dismissal shall not be a deprivation of due process of law.

In Mendoza v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc.,74 this court sustained the Court of
Appeals’ dismissal of Mendoza’s appeal. Mendoza’s appellant’s brief lacked a subject
index, assignment of errors, and page references to the record. In De Liano v. Court of
Appeals,75 this court also sustained the dismissal of De Liano’s appeal. De Liano’s
appellant’s brief lacked a subject index, a table of cases and authorities, and page
references to the record.

There are exceptions to this rule. In Philippine Coconut Authority v. Corona

International, Inc.,76 the Philippine Coconut Authority’s appellant’s brief lacked a clear
and concise statement of the nature of the action, a summary of the proceedings, the
nature of the judgment, and page references to the record. However, this court found
that the Philippine Coconut Authority substantially complied with the Rules. Its
appellant’s brief “apprise[d] [the Court of Appeals] of the essential facts and nature of
the case as well as the issues raised and the laws necessary [to dispose of the
case].”77 This court “[deviated] from a rigid enforcement of the rules” 78 and ordered the
Court of Appeals to resolve the Philippine Coconut Authority’s appeal.

In Go v. Chaves,79 Go’s 17–page appellant’s brief lacked a subject index. However, Go

subsequently filed a subject index. This court excused Go’s procedural lapse since the
appellant’s brief “[consisted] only of 17 pages which [the Court of Appeals] may easily
peruse to apprise it of [the case] and of the relief sought.” 80 This court ordered the
Court of Appeals to resolve Go’s appeal “in the interest of justice.” 81

In Philippine Coconut Authority and Go, the appellants substantially complied with the
rules on the contents of the appellant’s brief. Thus, this court excused the appellants’
procedural lapses.

In this case, Lui Enterprises did not substantially comply with the rules on the contents
of the appellant’s brief. It admitted that its appellant’s brief lacked the required subject
index, page references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited.
However, it did not even correct its admitted “technical omissions” 82 by filing an
amended appellant’s brief with the required contents. 83 Thus, this case does not allow a
relaxation of the rules. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises’
appeal.

Rules on appeal “are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases before the
Court of Appeals.”84 With respect to the appellant’s brief, its required contents are
designed “to minimize the [Court of Appeals’] labor in [examining] the record upon
which the appeal is heard and determined.”85

The subject index serves as the brief’s table of contents. 86 Instead of “[thumbing]
through the [appellant’s brief]”87 every time the Court of Appeals Justice encounters an
argument or citation, the Justice deciding the case only has to refer to the subject index
for the argument or citation he or she needs. 88 This saves the Court of Appeals time in
reviewing the appealed case. Efficiency allows the justices of the appellate court to
substantially attend to this case as well as other cases.

Page references to the record guarantee that the facts stated in the appellant’s brief are
supported by the record.89 A statement of fact without a page reference to the record
creates the presumption that it is unsupported by the record and, thus, “may be
stricken or disregarded altogether.”90

As for the table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited, this is required so that the
Court of Appeals can easily verify the authorities cited “for accuracy and aptness.” 91

Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record,
and a table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited. These requirements “were designed
to assist the appellate court in the accomplishment of its tasks, and, overall, to enhance
the orderly administration of justice.”92 This court will not disregard rules on appeal “in
the guise of liberal construction.”93 For this court to liberally construe the Rules, the
party must substantially comply with the Rules and correct its procedural lapses. 94 Lui
Enterprises failed to remedy these errors.

All told, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises’ appeal. It failed
to comply with Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure on the required contents of the appellant’s brief.

II

Lui Enterprises failed to show that its

failure to answer the complaint within
the required period was due to excusable
negligence

When a defendant is served with summons and a copy of the complaint, he or she is
required to answer within 15 days from the day he or she was served with
summons.95 The defendant may also move to dismiss the complaint “[w]ithin the time
for but before filing the answer.”96

Fifteen days is sufficient time for a defendant to answer with good defenses against the
plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint. Thus, a defendant who fails to answer within 15
days from service of summons either presents no defenses against the plaintiff’s
allegations in the complaint or was prevented from filing his or her answer within the
required period due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. 97

In either case, the court may declare the defendant in default on plaintiff’s motion and
notice to defendant.98 The court shall then try the case until judgment without
defendant’s participation99 and grant the plaintiff such relief as his or her complaint may
warrant.100

A defendant declared in default loses his or her standing in court. 101 He or she is
“deprived of the right to take part in the trial and forfeits his [or her] rights as a party
litigant,”102 has no right “to present evidence [supporting his or her] allegations,” 103 and
has no right to “control the proceedings [or] cross–examine witnesses.” 104 Moreover, he
or she “has no right to expect that [the court] would [act] upon [his or her
pleadings]”105 or that he or she “may [oppose] motions filed against him [or her].” 106

However, the defendant declared in default “does not [waive] all of [his or her]
rights.”107 He or she still has the right to “receive notice of subsequent
proceedings.”108 Also, the plaintiff must still present evidence supporting his or her
allegations “despite the default of [the defendant].” 109

Default, therefore, is not meant to punish the defendant but to enforce the prompt
filing of the answer to the complaint. For a defendant without good defenses, default
saves him or her “the embarrassment of openly appearing to defend the
indefensible.”110 As this court explained in Gochangco v. The Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, Branch IV:111

It does make sense for a defendant without defenses, and who accepts the correctness
of the specific relief  prayed for in the complaint, to forego the filing of the answer or
any sort of intervention in the action at all. For even if he did intervene, the result
would be the same: since he would be unable to establish any good defense, having
none in fact, judgment would inevitably go against him. And this would be an
acceptable result, if not being in his power to alter or prevent it, provided that the
judgment did not go beyond or differ from the specific relief stated in the complaint. x x
x.112 (Emphasis in the original)

On the other hand, for a defendant with good defenses, “it would be unnatural for him
[or her] not to set x x x up [his or her defenses] properly and timely.” 113 Thus, “it must
be presumed that some insuperable cause prevented him [or her] from [answering the
complaint].”114 In which case, his or her proper remedy depends on when he or she
discovered the default and whether the default judgment was already rendered by the
trial court.

After notice of the declaration of default but before the court renders the default
judgment, the defendant may file, under oath, a motion to set aside order of default.
The defendant must properly show that his or her failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident,115 mistake116 or excusable negligence.117 The defendant must also have a
meritorious defense. Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 3. Default; declaration of. – x x x x

(b) Relief from order of default.  – A party declared in default may at any time after
notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of
default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case,
the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may
impose in the interest of justice.

If the defendant discovers his or her default after judgment but prior to the judgment
becoming final and executory, he or she may file a motion for new trial under Rule 37,
Section 1, paragraph (a) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 118 If he or she discovers
his or her default after the judgment has become final and executory, a petition for
relief from judgment under Rule 38, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure may
be filed.119

Appeal is also available to the defendant declared in default. He or she may appeal the
judgment for being contrary to the evidence or to the law under Rule 41, Section 2 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.120 He or she may do so even if he or she did not file a
petition to set aside order of default.121

A petition for certiorari may also be filed if the trial court declared the defendant in
default with grave abuse of discretion.122

The remedies of the motion to set aside order of default, motion for new trial, and
petition for relief from judgment are mutually exclusive, not alternative or cumulative.
This is to compel defendants to remedy their default at the earliest possible
opportunity. Depending on when the default was discovered and whether a default
judgment was already rendered, a defendant declared in default may avail of only one
of the three remedies.

Thus, if a defendant discovers his or her default before the trial court renders
judgment, he or she shall file a motion to set aside order of default. If this motion to
set aside order of default is denied, the defendant declared in default cannot await the
rendition of judgment, and he or she cannot file a motion for new trial before the
judgment becomes final and executory, or a petition for relief from judgment after the
judgment becomes final and executory.

Also, the remedies against default become narrower and narrower as the trial nears
judgment. The defendant enjoys the most liberality from this court with a motion to set
aside order of default, as he or she has no default judgment to contend with, and he or
she has the whole period before judgment to remedy his or her default.

With a motion for new trial, the defendant must file the motion within the period for
taking an appeal123 or within 15 days from notice of the default judgment. Although a
default judgment has already been rendered, the filing of the motion for new trial tolls
the reglementary period of appeal, and the default judgment cannot be executed
against the defendant.

A petition for relief from judgment is filed after the default judgment has become final
and executory. Thus, the filing of the petition for relief from judgment does not stay the
execution of the default judgment unless a writ of preliminary injunction is issued
pending the petition’s resolution.124

Upon the grant of a motion to set aside order of default, motion for new trial, or a
petition for relief from judgment, the defendant is given the chance to present his or
her evidence against that of plaintiff’s. With an appeal, however, the defendant has no
right to present evidence on his or her behalf and can only appeal the judgment for
being contrary to plaintiff’s evidence or the law.

Similar to an appeal, a petition for certiorari does not allow the defendant to present

evidence on his or her behalf. The defendant can only argue that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring him or her in default.

Thus, should a defendant prefer to present evidence on his or her behalf, he or she
must file either a motion to set aside order of default, motion for new trial, or a petition
for relief from judgment.

In this case, Lui Enterprises had discovered its default before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati rendered judgment. Thus, it timely filed a motion to set aside order of default,
raising the ground of excusable negligence.

Excusable negligence is “one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against.”125 The circumstances should be properly alleged and proved. In this
case, we find that Lui Enterprises’ failure to answer within the required period is
inexcusable.

Lui Enterprises’ counsel filed its motion to dismiss four days late. It did not immediately
take steps to remedy its default and took one year from discovery of default to file a
motion to set aside order of default. In its motion to set aside order of default, Lui
Enterprises only “conveniently blamed its x x x counsel [for the late filing of the
answer]”126 without offering any excuse for the late filing. This is not excusable
negligence under Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b)127 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not err in refusing to set aside
the order of default.

Lui Enterprises argued that the Regional Trial Court of Makati should have been liberal
in setting aside its order of default. After it had been declared in default, Lui Enterprises
filed several manifestations informing the Makati trial court of the earlier filed
nullification of deed of dation in payment case which barred the filing of the
interpleader case. Lui Enterprises’ president, Eli L. Lui, and counsel even flew in from
Davao to Makati to “formally [manifest that] a [similar] action between [Lui
Enterprises] and [the Philippine Bank of Communications]” 128 was already pending in
the Regional Trial Court of Davao. However, the trial court did not recognize Lui
Enterprises’ standing in court.

The general rule is that courts should proceed with deciding cases on the merits and set
aside orders of default as default judgments are “frowned upon.” 129 As much as
possible, cases should be decided with both parties “given every chance to fight their
case fairly and in the open, without resort to technicality.” 130

However, the basic requirements of Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure must first be complied with. 131 The defendant’s motion to set aside
order of default must satisfy three conditions. First is the time element. The defendant
must challenge the default order before judgment. Second, the defendant must have
been prevented from filing his answer due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. Third, he must have a meritorious defense. As this court held in SSS v.
Hon. Chaves:132

Procedural rules are not to be disregarded or dismissed simply because their non–
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all
rules[,] they are to be followed, except only when for the most persuasive of reasons
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. x x x. 133

As discussed, Lui Enterprises never explained why its counsel failed to file the motion to
dismiss on time. It just argued that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of
default. Even assuming that it had a meritorious defense and that its representative
and counsel had to fly in from Davao to Makati to personally appear and manifest in
court its meritorious defense, Lui Enterprises must first show that its failure to answer
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. This Lui Enterprises did
not do.

Lui Enterprises argued that Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to compel Lui
Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications to litigate their claims. Thus,
“[d]eclaring the other claimant in default would ironically defeat the very purpose of the
suit.”134 The Regional Trial Court of Makati should not have declared Lui Enterprises in
default.

Under Rule 62, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person may file a
special civil action for interpleader if conflicting claims are made against him or her over
a subject matter in which he or she has no interest. The action is brought against the
claimants to compel them to litigate their conflicting claims among themselves. Rule 62,
Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever
in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to
interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.

An interpleader complaint may be filed by a lessee against those who have conflicting
claims over the rent due for the property leased. 135 This remedy is for the lessee to
protect him or her from “double vexation in respect of one liability.” 136 He or she may
file the interpleader case to extinguish his or her obligation to pay rent, remove him or
her from the adverse claimants’ dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting claims
to litigate among themselves.

In this case, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to extinguish its obligation to
pay rent. Its purpose in filing the interpleader case “was not defeated” 137 when the
Makati trial court declared Lui Enterprises in default.

At any rate, an adverse claimant in an interpleader case may be declared in default.

Under Rule 62, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a claimant who fails to
answer within the required period may, on motion, be declared in default. The
consequence of the default is that the court may “render judgment barring [the
defaulted claimant] from any claim in respect to the subject matter.” 138 The Rules would
not have allowed claimants in interpleader cases to be declared in default if it would
“ironically defeat the very purpose of the suit.” 139

The Regional Trial Court of Makati declared Lui Enterprises in default when it failed to
answer the complaint within the required period. Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set
aside order of default without an acceptable excuse why its counsel failed to answer the
complaint. It failed to prove the excusable negligence. Thus, the Makati trial court did
not err in refusing to set aside the order of default.

III

The nullification of deed in dation in

payment case did not bar the filing of
the interpleader case. Litis pendentia
is not present in this case.

Lui Enterprises allegedly filed for nullification of deed of dation in payment with the
Regional Trial Court of Davao. It sought to nullify the deed of dation in payment
through which the Philippine Bank of Communications acquired title over the leased
property. Lui Enterprises argued that this pending nullification case barred the Regional
Trial Court of Makati from hearing the interpleader case. Since the interpleader case
was filed subsequently to the nullification case, the interpleader case should be
dismissed.

Under Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion
to dismiss may be filed on the ground of litis pendentia: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 1.  Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint
or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

(e)  That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;

xxxx

Litis pendentia is Latin for “a pending suit.”140 It exists when “another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action x x x.” 141 The subsequent action
is “unnecessary and vexatious”142 and is instituted to “harass the respondent [in the
subsequent action].”143

The requisites of litis pendentia are: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;
(2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same
facts; and
(3) The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.144

All of the requisites must be present. 145 Absent one requisite, there is no litis
pendentia.146

In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in the

nullification of deed of dation in payment case and the interpleader case. Zuellig
Pharma is not a party to the nullification case filed in the Davao trial court.

There is also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Lui Enterprises filed
the first case to nullify the deed of dation in payment it executed in favor of the
Philippine Bank of Communications. Zuellig Pharma subsequently filed the interpleader
case to consign in court the rental payments and extinguish its obligation as lessee. The
interpleader case was necessary and was not instituted to harass either Lui Enterprises
or the Philippine Bank of Communications.

Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.

Lui Enterprises cited Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals147 as authority to set aside the subsequently filed interpleader case. In this
cited case, petitioner Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. entered into a lease
contract with Westin Seafood Market, Inc. The latter failed to pay rent. Thus,
Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. repossessed the leased premises,
inventoried the movable properties inside the leased premises, and scheduled the
public sale of the inventoried properties as they agreed upon in their lease contract.

Westin Seafood Market, Inc. filed for forcible entry with damages against Progressive
Development Corporation, Inc. It subsequently filed an action for damages against
Progressive Development Corporation for its “forcible takeover of the leased
premises.”148

This court ordered the subsequently filed action for damages dismissed as the pending
forcible entry with damages case barred the subsequently filed damages case.

Progressive Development Corporation, Inc.  does not apply in this case. The action for
forcible entry with damages and the subsequent action for damages were filed by the
same plaintiff against the same defendant. There is identity of parties in both cases.

In this case, the nullification of deed of dation in payment case was filed by Lui
Enterprises against the Philippine Bank of Communications. The interpleader case was
filed by Zuellig Pharma against Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications. A different plaintiff filed the interpleader case against Lui Enterprises
and the Philippine Bank of Communications. Thus, there is no identity of parties, and
the first requisite of  litis pendentia  is absent.

As discussed, Lui Enterprises filed the nullification of deed of dation in payment to

recover ownership of the leased premises. Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to
extinguish its obligation to pay rent. There is no identity of reliefs prayed for, and the
second requisite of litis pendentia is absent.
Since two requisites of litis pendentia are absent, the nullification of deed of dation in
payment case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.

Lui Enterprises alleged that the Regional Trial Court of Davao issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Regional Trial
Court of Davao allegedly enjoined the Regional Trial Court of Makati from taking
cognizance of the interpleader case. Lui Enterprises argued that the Regional Trial Court
of Makati “should have respected the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao.”149 Lui Enterprises cited Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Court of
Appeals150 where this court allegedly held: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x [T]he issuance of the said writ by the RTC of Agoo, La Union not only seeks to
enjoin Branch 9 of the RTC of Manila from proceedingwith the foreclosure case but also
has the effect of pre–empting the latter’s order. x x x. 151

Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas is not an authority for the claim that a court
can issue a writ of preliminary injunction against a co–equal court. The cited sentence
was taken out of context. In Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, this court held
that the Regional Trial Court of Agoo had no power to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction against the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 152 A court cannot enjoin the
proceedings of a co–equal court.

Thus, when this court said that the Regional Trial Court of Agoo’s writ of preliminary
injunction “not only seeks to enjoin x x x [the Regional Trial Court of Manila] from
proceeding with the foreclosure case but also has the effect of pre–empting the latter’s
orders,”153 this court followed with “[t]his we cannot countenance.” 154

At any rate, the Regional Trial Court of Davao’s order dated April 18, 2005 was not a
writ of preliminary injunction. It was a mere order directing the Philippine Bank of
Communications to inform Zuellig Pharma to pay rent to Lui Enterprises while the
status quo order between Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications
was subsisting. The Regional Trial Court of Davao did not enjoin the proceedings before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The order dated April 18, 2005 provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As such, [the Philippine Bank of Communications] [is] hereby directed to forthwith

inform Zuellig Pharma Corp., of the April 1, 2004 status quo order and the succeeding
September 14, 2004 Order, and consequently, for the said lessee to remit all rentals
due from February 23, 2003 and onwards to plaintiff Lui Enterprises, Inc., in the
meanwhile that the status quo order is subsisting. 155

Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Davao did not enjoin the Regional Trial Court of Makati
from hearing the interpleader case.

All told, the trial court did not err in proceeding with the interpleader case. The
nullification of deed of dation in payment case pending with the Regional Trial Court of
Davao did not bar the filing of the interpleader case with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati.

IV
The Court of Appeals erred in awarding attorney’s fees

In its ordinary sense, attorney’s fees “represent the reasonable compensation [a client
pays his or her lawyer] [for legal service rendered].” 156 In its extraordinary sense,
attorney’s fees “[are] awarded x x x as indemnity for damages [the losing party pays
the prevailing party].”157

The award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the rule. 158 It is not awarded
to the prevailing party “as a matter of course.” 159 Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code,
attorney’s fees cannot be recovered in the absence of stipulation, except under specific
circumstances: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.160

Even if a party is “compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to

protect his [or her] rights,”161 attorney’s fees will not be awarded if no bad faith “could
be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case.” 162

To award attorney’s fees, the court must have “factual, legal, [and] equitable
justification.”163 The court must state the award’s basis in its decision.164 These rules are
based on the policy that “no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.” 165

In this case, the Court of Appeals awarded attorney’s fees as “[Zuellig Pharma] was
compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect [its]
interest[s].”166 This is not a compelling reason to award attorney’s fees. That Zuellig
Pharma had to file an interpleader case to consign its rental payments did not mean
that Lui Enterprises was in bad faith in insisting that rental payments be paid to it.
Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Zuellig Pharma.

All told, the Court of Appeals’ award of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees must be deleted.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

The Court of Appeals’ decision and resolution in CA–G.R. CV No. 88023
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of P50,000.00 attorney’s fees to
Zuellig Pharma Corporation is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

March 28, 2014

N O T I C E  OF J U D G M E N T

Sirs/Mesdames: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Please take notice that on ___March 12, 2014___ a Decision, copy attached herewith,
was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above–entitled case, the original of which
was received by this Office on March 28, 2014 at 2:00 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANO
Division Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 28–41. This decision was penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr.,
with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Florito S. Macalino, concurring.

2
 Id. at 43–44.

3
 Id. at 74–79.

4
 Id. at 53–66.

5
 Record, p. 44.

6
Rollo, p. 68.

7
 Id. at 69–70.

8
 Id. at 77, decision dated July 4, 2006.

9
 Id. at 71.
10
 Id. at 47–52, complaint dated May 7, 2003.

11
 Id. at 30.

12
 Record, pp. 37–47.

13
Rollo, pp. 80–82.

14
 Id. at 52.

15
 Id.

16
 Record, p. 405.

17
  Rollo, p. 81.

18
 Record, pp. 77–80.

19
 Id. at 87.

20
Rollo, p. 81.

21
 Record, p. 87.

22
 Id. at 93–98.

23
 Rules of Court, Rule 11, sec. 1.

24
Rollo, pp. 30–31.

25
 Record, p. 94.

26
 Id. at 95.

27
 Id. at 98.

28
 Id., secretary’s certificate dated August 28, 2003, states: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLVED, that the Board of Directors of ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION (the

“Corporation”) hereby authorize ATTY. ANA L.A. PERALTA with address as that of the
Corporation, to initiate, represent and act on behalf of the Corporation, including the
authority to execute verifications and certificate of non–forum shopping, in the civil
proceedings for consignation of rental payments and interpleader and in all other legal
suits or proceedings to be filed against Lui Enterprises, Inc. and/or Philippine Bank of
Communications, and to be the Corporation’s true and lawful attorney–in–fact, in its
name, place and stead.

29
 Record, p. 95.

30
 Id. at 95–96.
31
 Id. at 96.

32
 Id. at 101–103.

33
 Id. at 101.

34
 Id. at 111–113.

35
 Id. at 112.

36
 Id. at 208–209.

37
 Id. at 210–211.

38
 Id. at 211.

39
 Id. at 215, in an order dated April 29, 2004.

40
 Id. at 402–409.

41
 Id. at 402.

42
 Id.

43
 Id. at 405.

44
 Id. at 393–395.

45
 Id. at 394.

46
Rollo, pp. 83–88.

47
 Id. at 89–90.
48
 Id. at 87.

49
 Record, p. 451, in an order dated May 3, 2005.

50
Rollo, pp. 74–79.

51
 Id. at 77.

52
 Id.

53
 Id. at 78–79.

54
 Court of Appeals rollo, pp. 17–38.

55
Rollo, pp. 33–35.
56
 Id. at 35–36.

57
 Id. at 36–37.

58
 Id. at 40.

59
 Id. at 28–41.

60
 Court of Appeals rollo,  pp. 128–137.

61
Rollo, pp. 43–44.

62
 Id. at 6–26.

63
 Id. at 16.

64
 Id. at 14–16.

65
 Id. at 18–19.

66
 Id. at 20–21.

67
 Id. at 22–23.

68
 Id. at 104–121.

69
 Id. at 129–130.

70
 CONSTI., Art. VIII, sec. 5, par. 2 provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,  as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is  reclusion perpetua  or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

71
Mendoza v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 165575, February 2, 2011,
641 SCRA 333, 345 [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
72
De Liano v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 1033, 1040 (2001) [Per J. De Leon, Jr.,
Second Division].

73
Mendoza v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 165575, February 2, 2011,
641 SCRA 333, 345 [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].

74
 Id. at 333.

75
 421 Phil. 1033 (2001) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division].

76
 395 Phil. 742 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].

77
 Id. at 750.

78
 Id.

79
 G.R. No. 182341, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 333 [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

80
 Id. at 344.

81
 Id. at 342.

82
Rollo, p. 14.

83
Mendoza v. United Coconut Planters, Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 165575, February 2, 2011,
641 SCRA 333, 348 [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].

84
 Id.

85
De Liano v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 1033, 1041 (2001) [Per J. De Leon, Jr.,
Second Division], citing Estiva v. Cawil, 59 Phil. 67, 68–69 (1933) [Per J. Malcolm, En
Banc].

86
 Id. at 1042.
87
 Id.

88
 Id.

89
 Id. at 1044.

90
 Id.

91
 Id. at 1045–1046.

92
 Id. at 1040.

93
Mendoza v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 165575, February 2, 2011,
641 SCRA 333, 348 [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
94
 Id.

95
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 11, sec.1.

96
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 16, sec. 1.

97
Gochangco v. The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV, 241 Phil.
48, 67 (1988) [Per C.J. Narvasa, En Banc].

98
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, sec. 3.

99
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, sec. 3 (a).

100
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, sec. 3.

101
Otero v. Tan, G.R. No. 200134, August 15, 2012, 678 SCRA 583, 591 [Per J. Reyes,
Second Division].

102
Mediserv, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation, 408 Phil. 745, 755 (2001) [Per J.
Gonzaga–Reyes, Third Division].

103
  SSS v. Hon. Chaves, 483 Phil. 292, 301 (2004) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].

104
 Otero v. Tan, G.R. No. 200134, August 15, 2012, 678 SCRA 583, 591 [Per J. Reyes,
Second Division].

105
  Id. at 591–592.

106
  Id. at 592.

107
  SSS v. Hon. Chaves,  483 Phil. 292, 301 (2004) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].

108
  Mediserv, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation, 408 Phil. 745, 755 (2001) [Per J.
Gonzaga–Reyes, Third Division].
109
 SSS v. Hon. Chaves, 483 Phil. 292, 302 (2004) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].

110
 Gochangco v. The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV, 241 Phil.
48, 67 (1988) [Per C.J. Narvasa, En Banc].

111
 241 Phil. 48 (1988) [Per C.J. Narvasa, En Banc].

112
 Id. at 67.

113
 Id.

114
 Id.

115
Ong Guan Can v. Century Insurance Co., 45 Phil. 667 (1924) [Per J. Johnson, En
Banc], cited in The Mechanics of Lifting an Order of Default, Annotation, December 14,
1981, 110 SCRA 223, 226.

116
Tanchan v. Court of Appeals, 365 Phil. 34 (1999) [Per J. Purisima, Third Division].

117
Santos v. Hon. Samson, 196 Phil. 398 (1981) [Per C.J. Concepcion, Jr., Second
Division].

118
David v. Judge Gutierrez–Fruelda, 597 Phil. 354, 361 (2009) [Per Acting C.J.
Quisumbing, Second Division].

119
 Id.

120
 Id.

121
 Id.

122
 Sps. Delos Santos v. Judge Carpio, 533 Phil. 42, 53–54 (2006) [Per J. Austria–
Martinez, First Division]; Acance v. Court of Appeals, 493 Phil. 676, 685 (2005) [Per J.
Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher
Education, 408 Phil. 483, 497 (2001) [Per C.J. Panganiban, Third Division].

123
 Rules of Court, Rule 37, sec. 1.

124
 Rules of Court, Rule 38, sec. 5.

125
Magtoto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 175792, November 21, 2012, 686 SCRA 88,
101 [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

126
Rollo, p. 36.

127
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, sec. 3, par. (b) Relief from order of default. – A party
declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a
motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure
to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has
a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such
terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.

128
 Id. at 18.

129
Republic v. Sandiganbayan,  565 Phil. 172, 185 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second
Division]; Samartino v. Raon, 433 Phil. 173, 187 (2002) [Per J. Ynares–Santiago, First
Division];  Tanchan v. Court of Appeals, 365 Phil. 34, 41 (1999) [Per J. Purisima, Third
Division].

130
Tanchan v. Court of Appeals, 365 Phil. 34, 41 (1999) [Per J. Purisima, Third Division].

131
  David v. Judge Gutierrez–Fruelda, 597 Phil. 354, 362 (2009) [Per Acting C.J.
Quisumbing, Second Division].

132
 483 Phil. 292 [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].
133
 Id. at 301.

134
Rollo, p. 19.

135
Pasricha v. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc., 572 Phil. 52, 69 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third
Division]; Ocampo v. Tirona, 495 Phil. 55, 68 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].

136
Pasricha v. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc., 572 Phil. 52, 69 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third
Division]; Ocampo v. Tirona, 495 Phil. 55, 68 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].

137
Rollo,  p. 19.

138
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 62, sec. 5.

139
Rollo, p. 19.

140
Feliciano v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 499, 505 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, First
Division].

141
 University Physicians Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 54, 67 (2000) [Per
J. Gonzaga–Reyes, Third Division].

142
 Id.

143
 Id.

144
Feliciano v. Court of Appeals,  350 Phil. 499, 505–506 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, First
Division].

145
University Physicians Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,  381 Phil. 54, 67 (2000) [Per
J. Gonzaga–Reyes, Third Division].

146
 Id.
147
 361 Phil. 566 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].

148
 Id. at 581.

149
Rollo, p. 22.

150
 422 Phil. 405 (2001) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division].

151
 Id. at 422.

152
 Id.

153
 Id.

154
 Id.
155
Rollo,  p. 90.

156
Philippine National Construction Corporation v. APAC Marketing Corporation, G.R. No.
190957, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 441, 449 [Per C.J. Sereno, First Division],
citing Benedicto v. Villaflores,  G.R. No. 185020, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 446.

157
 Id.

158
 Id. at 450.

159
 Id.

160
 CIVIL CODE, Art. 2208.

161
Philippine National Construction Corporation v. APAC Marketing Corporation, G.R. No.
190957, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 441, 449 [Per C.J. Sereno, First Division],
citing ABS–CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CA, 361 Phil. 499 (1999).

162
 Id.

163
 Id. at 450.

164
 Id.

165
 Id. at 449.

166
Rollo, p. 40

G.R. No. 148194            April 12, 2002

WILLY TAN y CHUA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:

On 12 December 1996, petitioner Willy Tan was found guilty of bigamy by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 75, of San Mateo, Rizal. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of prision correccional in
its medium period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to four (4) years and
two (2) months. On 23 December 1996, petitioner applied for probation. On 8 January 1997, the
application was granted by the trial court but the release order was withheld in view of the filing by
the prosecution, on 21 January 1997, of a motion for modification of the penalty. The prosecution
pointed out that the penalty for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was prision
mayor and the impassable penalty, absent any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, should be
the medium period of prision mayor, or from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Thus,
the prosecution argued, petitioner was not eligible for probation.

The trial court denied the motion of the prosecution for having been filed out of time since the
decision sought to be modified had already attained finality. Indeed, petitioner had meanwhile
applied for probation. Upon motion of the prosecution, however, the trial court reconsidered its order
and rendered an amended decision, promulgated on 10 July 1998, concluding thusly:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Willy

Tan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, is hereby sentenced to suffer a minimum prison term of prision
[correccional] TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY to a maximum
prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY." 1

On 13 July 1998, petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the trial court and elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals, contending that -

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE FIRST DECISION INCREASING THE
PENALTY AFTER THE SAME HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY." 2

The Court of Appeals, in a decision, dated 18 August 2000, dismissed petitioner's appeal on the
ground that petitioner raised a pure question of law. Citing Article VIII, Section 5(2)(e), of the
Constitution, the appellate court explained that jurisdiction over the case was vested exclusively in
the Supreme Court and that, in accordance with Rule 122, Section 3(e), of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the appeal should have been brought up by way of a petition for review on certiorari with
this Court and not by merely filing a notice of appeal before the trial court.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which, on 18 May 2001, was denied by the appellate
court. The petition for review on certiorari before this Court raised the following issues:

"I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING SECTION 2, RULE 50 ON

DISMISSAL OF IMPROPER APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAID
SECTION REFERS TO AN APPEAL UNDER RULE 41 IN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION BUT
NOT TO AN APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES WHICH IS GOVERNED BY RULE 122 OF THE
REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

"II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS
EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION ON PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW.
 "III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BECAUSE THE
APPEAL RAISED PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW, IT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO
RESOLVE THE ISSUE RAISED IN THE APPEAL.

"IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL

OUTRIGHT INSTEAD OF DECLARING THE AMENDED DECISION VOID FOR UTTER
WANT OF JURISDICTION. 1âwphi1.nêt

"V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RULE 65 IS THE PROPER
REMEDY TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION AND IF SO IN NOT TREATING THE
APPEAL AS A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI." 3

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner prescribed by
law. While this right is statutory, once it is granted by law, however, its suppression would be a
4 

violation of due process, itself a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Section 3(a), Rule 122 of the
5 

Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

"Section 3. How appeal is taken. –

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. (Emphasis supplied).

The above rule is plain and unambiguous – the remedy of ordinary appeal by notice of appeal,
although not necessarily preclusive of other remedies provided for by the rules, is open and
available to petitioner.

The notice of appeal was timely filed by petitioner on 13 July 1998, three days after the questioned
decision was promulgated. It was a remedy that the law allowed him to avail himself of, and it threw
6 

the whole case effectively open for review on both questions of law and of fact whether or not raised
by the parties.

Neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Criminal Procedure exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
the power to hear cases on appeal in which only an error of law is involved. Indeed, the Court of
7 

Appeals, under Rule 42 and 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is authorized to determine "errors of
fact, of law, or both." These rules are expressly adopted to apply to appeals in criminal cases, and
8  9 

they do not thereby divest the Supreme Court of its ultimate jurisdiction over such questions.

Anent the argument that petitioner should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it might
be pointed out that this remedy can only be resorted to when there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Appeal, being a remedy still available
10 

to petitioner, a petition for certiorari would have been premature.

In fine, petitioner had taken an appropriate legal step in filing a notice of appeal with the trial court.
Ordinarily, the Court should have the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings. The clear impingement upon petitioner's basic right against double jeopardy, however,
11 

should here warrant the exercise of the prerogative by this Court to relax the stringent application of
the rules on the matter. When the trial court increased the penalty on petitioner for his crime of
bigamy after it had already pronounced judgment and on which basis he then, in fact, applied for
probation, the previous verdict could only be deemed to have lapsed into finality.
Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure that states –

"Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. – A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the

accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after
the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his
right to appeal, or has applied for probation"-

implements a substantive provision of the Probation Law which enunciates that the mere filing of an
application for probation forecloses the right to appeal.

"SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. – Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may,
after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence
and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions
as it may deem best: Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment or conviction.

"Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine
only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

"An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (As amended by PD 1257,
and by PD 1990, Oct. 5, 1985.)" 12

Such a waiver amounts to a voluntary compliance with the decision and writes finis to the jurisdiction
of the trial court over the judgment. There is no principle better settled, or of more universal
13 

application, than that no court can reverse or annul, reconsider or amend, its own final decree or
judgment. Any attempt by the court to thereafter alter, amend or modify the same, except in respect
14 

to correct clerical errors, would be unwarranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course. The assailed amendatory judgment of the trial court
is SET ASIDE and its decision of 12 December 1996 is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio,
JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., See dissent.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., JJ., joins the dissenting opinion of J. Mendoza.
Panganiban, J., in the result.

Footnotes

Rollo, pp. 109 – 112.

1 

Appellant's Brief, p. 5.
2 
 Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 15.
3 

Section 1(i), Rule 115, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

4 

Estoya vs. Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1.

5 

See Section 6, Rule 122, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

6 

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

7 

x x x           x x x           x x x

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

Section 2, Rule 42; Section 15, Rule 44, Rules of Civil Procedure
8 

Section 18, Rule 124, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

9 

10 
Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Civil Procedure.

11 
Gregorio vs. Director of Prisons, 43 Phil. 650; US vs. Hart, 24 Phil. 578.

Establishing A Probation System, Appropriating Funds Therefor And For Other Purposes
12 

(P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990.

13 
Lanestosa vs. Santamaria, 52 Phil. 67.

14 
United States vs. Ballad and Tamaray, 35 Phil. 15.

Justice Jose Feria, commenting on the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, has this to say –

"A judgment of conviction may now be modified by the court rendering it only `upon motion of
the accused.' This provision changes the previous rulings of the Supreme Court to the effect
that such modification may be made upon motion of the fiscal, provided the same is made
before the judgment has become final or an appeal has been perfected." (Feria, Philippine
Legal Studies Series No. 2.)
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

G.R. No. 148194             April 12, 2002

WILLY TAN y CHUA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DISSENTING OPINION

MENDOZA, J.:

The reasons for my disagreement with the majority will be spelled out in detail, but in brief they are
as follows: (1) The case before the Court of Appeals did not involve an error of judgment but an
alleged error of jurisdiction and, therefore, appeal was not the appropriate remedy to bring the matter
to that court. (2) Even assuming the case involved an error of judgment and therefore appeal was
the appropriate remedy open to petitioner, the appeal should have been brought before this Court
and not the Court of Appeals, and it should not be by mere notice of appeal but by a petition for
review. (3) The correct remedy is certiorari. (4) Even equity will not excuse petitioner's failure to
observe the rules for seeking a review, and this Court is not justified in deciding the issue which
petitioner should have first brought before the Court of Appeals.

There is no dispute as to the following facts.

Petitioner Willy Tan and Mildred Gococo-Tan were married on January 14, 1979. On November 28,
1981, while their marriage was subsisting, petitioner contracted marriage with Estela G. Infante. On
the complaint of Mildred Gococo-Tan, petitioner and Estela G. Infante were charged with bigamy.
The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal, which, on
December 12, 1996, found petitioner Willy Tan guilty of bigamy and sentenced him "to suffer a
prison term of prision correccional in its medium period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months." The case against Estela g. Infante, who was
at large, was ordered archived without prejudice to its revival upon her arrest.

On the basis of the penalty imposed on him, petitioner applied for probation on December 23, 1996.
His application was granted by the trial court in its order of January 8, 1997, but release of the order
was withheld in view of the filing on January 21, 1997 by the prosecution of a motion for modification
of the penalty. The prosecution pointed out that the penalty for bigamy prescribed under Art. 349 of
the Revised Penal Code is prision mayor and that the maximum imposable penalty, in the absence
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, is the medium period of prision mayor, which is from
eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Petitioner was thus not eligible for probation, it was
argued.
On August 5, 1997, the trial court denied the prosecution's motion for having been filed out of time,
the decision sought to be modified having become final when petitioner applied for probation.
However, upon motion of the prosecution, the trial court reconsidered its order and, on April 14,
1998, amended the dispositive portion of its decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Willy tan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, is hereby sentenced to suffer a minimum prison term of prision [correccional]
of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY to a maximum prison term of
EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY. 1

The decision, as thus amended, was promulgated on July 10, 1998.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the trial court on July 13,
1998. Petitioner contended that –

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE FIRST DECISION INCREASING THE
PENALTY AFTER THE SAME HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. 2

In its decision, dated August 18, 2000, now the subject of this review, the Court of
Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction petitioner's appeal on the ground that it raised a pure
3 

question of law. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the Court
of Appeals in its resolution of May 18, 2001.

In dismissing petitioner's appeal from the amended decision of the Regional Trial Court, the Court of
Appeals held that the appeal raised only a question of law; that, pursuant to Art. VIII, §5(2)(e) of the
Constitution, appellate jurisdiction over the case was vested exclusively in the Supreme Court; and
that, in accordance with Rule 122, §3(e) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the appeal should be
brought by filing with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, not by filing a notice of appeal in
the trial court.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Rule 122, §3 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

How appeal taken. –

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.

(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional
Trial Court is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed
but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence
that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with
paragraph (a) of this section.
 (d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the
Regional Trial Court. The same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as
provided in section 10 of this Rule.

(e) Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the
Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

The majority holds that petitioner's appeal to the Court of Appeals by mere notice is justified under
Rule 122, §3(a) as above quoted. Petitioner argues that Rule 44, §15 in fact allows assignments of
errors to be made concerning questions of law or fact in appeals to the Court of Appeals. The Court
thus sustains the following contention of petitioner:

. . . Rule 122 governing appeals in criminal cases does not direct as it does in ordinary
appeals in civil cases under Rule 41 which provides that in all cases where only questions of
law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

Under Rule 122(a), the appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in
criminal cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party unfettered by any
restriction on the questions that may be raised on appeal[.] Section 3(d) Rule 122 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure transposed to par. (e) cited in the footnote by the Court of
[A]ppeals decision merely provides that "All other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by
petition for certiorari." As worded in the present rule "Except as provided in the last
paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45."

It did not direct as it does in Rule 41 that appeal in criminal cases on pure questions of law
shall only be to the Supreme Court. What the rule directs is that when an appeal is to be
made to the Supreme Court the appeal shall be by petition for review.

Rule 41 cannot likewise to applied by analogy in appeals in criminal cases since Rule 41 is
not among the rules that was expressly adopted to apply to appeals in criminal cases. Under
Section 18 of Rule 124:

SEC. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. – The

provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of
Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be
applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Rule.

The exclusion of Rule 41 which refers to appeals in civil cases from Rule 122 which refers to
appeals in criminal cases clearly indicates that the modes of appeal in ordinary civil actions
is not applicable in criminal cases. On the other hand, Section 18 of the Rule 122 expressly
provides that Rule 44 on procedure in the Court of Appeals in ordinary appealed cases shall
be applied in criminal cases. As will hereafter be shown[,] Rule 44, like Rules 42 and 43
alternatively allows assignment of errors on questions of fact or of law, meaning a[n]
assignment of error only on pure questions of law are allowable in appeals to the Court of
Appeals. Section 18 clearly connotes that when the rules allow the application of
a particular rule in a particular situation, it does so expressly. Note that Rule 47 on
Annulment of Judgments was also excluded.
I respectfully disagree with the majority ruling for the following reasons:

First. Appeal is not the appropriate remedy because it is not an error of judgment, but an error of
jurisdiction allegedly committed by the trial court, which petitioner was raising in the Court of
Appeals. The question whether the trial court could correct an error in computing the penalty after its
decision had become final was not passed upon by the trial court in deciding the criminal case
before it but was determined by it only as an incident of the case. Indeed, the issue in that case was
whether petitioner Willy Tan y Chua was guilty of bigamy as the trial court found. If petitioner did not
agree with his conviction, an appeal by mere notice to that effect would have been perfectly correct
under Rule 122, §3(a). 1âwphi1.nêt

But the decision of the trial court on this question has never been disputed by petitioner. No error of
judgment had been imputed to the trial court. Rather, what petitioner questioned was the power of
the trial court to amend its decision to correct a mistake it had made in fixing the maximum term of
the sentence, after the decision had become final. This is a question of jurisdiction. There is
therefore no basis for applying Rule 122, §3(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

While a question of jurisdiction may be raised on appeal, in the context of this case, this was not
possible because the majority's premise is precisely that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the
case as its decision had become final while at the same time saying that appeal was petitioner's
appropriate remedy. Nor can it be argued that petitioner could not have appealed until the trial court
modified its judgment because petitioner was not questioning the original decision but only the
decision as modified. Amendments retroact to the date of the original judgment. At any rate, this only
shows the absurdity of allowing appeal when the reason of the majority is that the decision of the
trial court could no longer be modified because it had become final. This brings me to my second
point.

Second. Even assuming that appeal was the appropriate remedy, because it was a question of law
that petitioner wanted to raise, the appeal should have been to this Court, not the Court of Appeals,
and it should have been by petition for review on certiorari, not by mere notice of appeal.

Art. VIII, §5(2)(e) of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction over "all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved." This jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court is exclusive by reason of §17, par. 4(4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, which
provides:

SEC. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. - . . . .

The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revised, reverse,

modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in –

….

(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided,
however, That if, in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the
cases mentioned in the three next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of
fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court
of Appeals; and the final judgment or decision of the latter may be reviewed, revised,
reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; . . . .
(Emphasis added)
Art. VIII, §5(2)(e) of the Constitution provides that the appeal shall be "by certiorari as the law or the
rules of court may provide." Accordingly, Rule 122, §3(d) states that "all other appeals to the
Supreme Court [in criminal cases other than those involving the imposition of reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment or death] shall be by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45." As petitioner
simply filed a mere notice of appeal with the trial court, his appeal was correctly dismissed by the
Court of Appeals.

The majority contends that the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over cases in which the
only question is a question of law that may be brought by mere notice of appeal filed with the trial
court because of Rule 42, §2 and Rule 44, §15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which are
made applicable to criminal cases by Rule 124, §18 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. These
4 

Rules state:

Rule 42, §2. Form and contents. – The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with
the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall
(a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or
judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates
showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved,
the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by
the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the
appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the
judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and
other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. . . .
(Emphasis added)

Rule 44, §15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. – Whether or not the appellant has
filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any
question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues
framed by the parties. (Emphasis added)

Mixed questions of fact and law may be raised in the Court of Appeals but not pure questions of law.
This is clear from §17, par. 4(4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as quoted above. The exclusive
jurisdiction of this Court over appeals in which only errors or questions of law are involved is affirmed
in B.P. Blg. 129, §9 defining the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. This provision reads in part:

SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

....

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under PD No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph
and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. . . .
(Emphasis added)

The phrase "errors of fact or law or both" found in Rule 42, §2 and the phrase "any question of law or
fact" in Rule 44, §15 must, therefore, be understood to mean "question of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law" when referring to cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
The reason for this is simple. Rule 42, §2 and Rule 44, §15 are procedural rules, and it is
conventional learning that procedural rules cannot amend or change substantive laws, such as the
Constitution, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296), and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
(B.P. Blg. 129).

As petitioner's appeal did not involve either a question of fact or a mixed question of fact and law, but
solely a question of law, resort to the Court of Appeals by mere notice of appeal was erroneous, and
therefore the appeal was correctly dismissed. Under no circumstance can the appeal be taken to the
Court of Appeals without violating the Judiciary Act of 1948 and B.P. Blg. 129.

Third. Petitioner's remedy was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, §1 for, as already shown,
the question raised is not an error of law but an alleged error of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the Court of Appeals pursuant to B.P. Blg. 129, §9 by means of special civil action of
certiorari. Such petition should have been brought within 60 days from notice to petitioner of the
ruling of the trial court, which is now long over.
1âwphi1.nêt

Nonetheless, the majority argues that this Court should relax the rules and decide directly the
question raised by petitioner in the Court of Appeals, namely, whether the trial court could correct
the penalty imposed on petitioner after its decision had become final. It is contended that this is
necessary because a constitutional right of petitioner has been violated, i.e., the right of petitioner
not to be placed in double jeopardy.

Rules governing jurisdiction and the procedure for appeals as discussed above are not mere
technicalities. They are part and parcel of the system of doing justice. It is justice according to law
which we administer. As the majority notes, Rule 115, §1(i) gives every accused the right to appeal
from a judgment of conviction. The same Rule provides, however, that the exercise of the right to
appeal must be "in the manner prescribed by law."

Nor is it tenable to invoke "demands of substantial justice" in this case as ground for setting aside
the rules. Justice is due the State and the complainant in the criminal case as much as it is due
petitioner. Again and again, the majority harps on the fact that the decision of the trial court had
already become final and therefore it could no longer be modified even if that was to correct a plain
error in computing the penalty. We are told that petitioner has the right not to be placed in double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. This is not however the issue before this Court. The
issue here is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner's appeal (1) because
appeals in cases in which the only error assigned is a question of law are exclusively cognizable by
this Court and petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, not a mere notice of
appeal given to the trial court and (2) because petitioner's remedy was really a special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65.

It is I think misplaced sentimentality to argue on the constitutional right of petitioner when he had his
remedies to seek vindication of this right but lost them by default by failing to avail himself of those
remedies in the law. What about the right of the State and of complainant to have the correct penalty
imposed on petitioner who does not question his conviction? After all, the mistake in the imposition
of the penalty was that of the trial court, not that of the State and the complainant.

The demands of justice would seem to indicate that petitioner be not allowed to invoke the finality of
the erroneous sentence in order to escape his just deserts. After all, what the trial court did in this
case was to correct an error it had made in fixing the maximum term of the sentence on petitioner.
Petitioner, who does not question his liability for bigamy, can claim no vested right in the erroneous
sentence.
To summarize them, petitioner had remedies available to him for the correction of an error allegedly
committed by the trial court. But he lost those remedies by default. We cannot set aside the rules
just so he will be able to raise the questions which he sought to raise in the Court of Appeals. We
must abide by our rules. This is the essence of the Rule of Law.

I vote therefore to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Footnotes

CA Decision, p. 1; Rollo, pp. 109 – 112.

1 

Appellant's Brief, p. 5; id., p. 97.

2 

Through Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (ponente) and Justices Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and
3 

Remedios Salazar-Fernando.

This provision states: "Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. – The
4 

provision of Rule 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and
in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases
insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule."

G.R. No. 193374, June 08, 2016

HEIRS OF THE LATE GERRY* ECARMA, NAMELY: AVELINA SUIZA-ECARMA,

DENNIS ECARMA, JERRY LYN ECARMA PENA, ANTONIO ECARMA AND NATALIA
ECARMA SANGALANG, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND RENATO A.
ECARMA, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

We here have another case of heirs quarrelling over inherited properties, some of them
refusing their partition.

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the

twin Resolutions2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92375 for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction.
The appellate court dismissed outright the appeal of petitioners, heirs of Gerry Ecarma
for a number of procedural defects, including failure to comply with Section 13, Rule 44
of the Rules of Court on the contents of their appellants' brief. Petitioners sought to
appeal the two (2) Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 220, Quezon City
in SP PROC. No. Q-90-6332 which approved the Project of Partition proposed by
respondent Renato Ecarma, administrator in the intestate proceedings to settle the
estate of decedent Arminda vda. de Ecarma covering four (4) properties.

Because of the outright dismissal of their appeal before the CA, we have a dearth of
facts we had to glean from the bare pleadings of petitioners.

The decedent Arminda was married to Natalio Ecarma who predeceased her on 9 May
1970. During their marriage, they acquired several properties and begat seven (7)
children: (1) Angelita; (2) Rodolfo; (3) respondent Renato; (4) Maria Arminda; (5)
Gerry Anthony Ecarma, husband and father respectively of herein petitioners Avelina
Suiza Ecarma, Dennis Ecarma, Gerry Lyn Ecarma Pena, Antonio Ecarma and Natalia
Ecarma Sangalang (collectively petitioners and/or heirs of Gerry Ecarma); (6) Fe
Shirley; and (7) Rolando.

After Natalio's death, his heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate 4 covering
four (4) properties designated as Kitanlad, Cuyapo and Lala (consisting of two separate
lots), half of which was specifically noted as pertaining to herein decedent Arminda's
share in their property regime of conjugal partnership of gains. In the same
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate signed by all the heirs, the four (4) properties were
partitioned among them: Arminda was assigned an undivided two-ninth's (2/9's)
proportion and all their children in equal proportion of one-ninth (1/9) each.
Significantly, despite the partition agreement, no physical division of the properties was
effected, Natalio's heirs remaining in co-ownership (pro indiviso) even at the time of
their mother's, decedent Arminda's, death on 17 April 1983.

On 18 May 1990, after his petition for the probate of Arminda's will was dismissed by
the RTC, Branch 86, Quezon City, respondent Renato filed the subject intestate
proceedings before the RTC, Branch 220.

On 30 January 1991, Renato was appointed Special Administrator by the RTC, Branch
220.

After what appears to be continuing conflict between Gerry Ecarma and the other heirs
of Natalio and Arminda over actual division of their inherited properties, by 9 March
2005, Renato unequivocally moved to terminate their co-ownership: he filed a Project
of Partition of the Kitanlad Property, alleging that:

1. This probate case has been left unresolved for 16 years now because of the incessant
opposition by Oppositor and legal heir, Jerry Ecarma, the only legal heir who stays in
Kitanlad, for reasons they had ventilated already in this Court in their previous
pleadings, xxx

2. This, Court has ordered the sale of the assets of the estate in an earlier order, but
efforts to sell the Kitanlad property, the most contentious issue, by the Regular
Administrator, [Renato Ecarma |, has been thwarted by Jerry for reasons already
known by this Court, xxx

3. The law frowns on the indivision of property held in common indefinitely.

Furthermore, the legal heirs, except Jerry and perhaps the Oppositor, have expressed
their desire to have the Kitanlad property partitioned. The fairest legal way to partition
the property without any legal heir getting a share bigger than the others is to sell the
property and divide the net proceeds, but Jerry's objection to its sale at a price which
will attract interested buyers has rendered nugatory this option. The next best option,
with no legal heir getting an undue advantage over the others, is to divide the property
longitudinally from the frontage down to the other end in seven equal parts. Although
this option will render the improvements unusable, it must be realised that these
improvements are now fully depreciated. The. duplex house is 57 years old, while the
apartments are now 40 years old. All seven parts will be equal to each other in all their
aspects: the measurements, length and width, will be the same, each part will have a
frontage to the street. Each legal heir will have complete control over his/her portion.
Me/she may keep it if he/she wishes, or sell it if he/she desires. Allocation of these
seven parts will be by lot.5

On 7 April 2005, Renato filed another motion, Omnibus Motion: Project of Partition of
the Lala and Cuyapo Properties.

Finding the motions impressed with merit, the RTC, Branch 220, on 28 July
2005,6 issued a lengthy Order approving the proposed partition of the properties:

1. That the property be divided longitudinally from the frontage down to the
other end in seven (7) equal parts. The shares of Jerry Ecarma and
Rodolfo Ecarma shall be contiguous to each other on one side of the
property nearest the main entrance, while the shares of the other five (5)
legal heirs shall comprise the balance thereof. Following this general
guideline, Jerry Ecarma and Rodolfo Ecarma shall determine among
themselves their respective share. Similarly, the five (5) remaining legal
heirs shall determine among themselves by draw of lot their respective
shares. They shall submit to the Petitioner/Regular Administrator their
choice of their specific shares not later [than] fifteen (15) days upon
receipt of this Order. Should they fail to comply, the Regular
Administrator is hereby directed to assign the respective share of each
legal heir.

xxxx

II. Cuyapo Property

1. The Cuyapo farm lot shall be partitioned into seven (7) equal parts
substantially in accordance with Annex "A" of the "Partial Project of
Partition of Estate" dated 22 June 1992. Lots 1 and 2 will be allocated to
Jerry Ecarma and Rodolfo Ecarma, so that the remaining balance will
remain contiguous to one another. The remaining balance, as prayed for,
can now be donated by the five (5) other legal heirs to the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP). This manner of partition will effectuate the desire
of the five (5) remaining legal heirs to donate their share to the AFP.
 2. The Regular Administrator is hereby directed to cause the partition and
titling of the property.

3. Expenses for the partition and titling of the property shall be for the
personal account of each legal heir, which shall be deducted from their
share of the estate.

III. Lala Property

1. The Lala Property consisting of two (2) farm lots contiguous to each other,
one consisting of more than six (6) hectares and the other more than 13
hectares shall each be partitioned into seven (7) equal parts substantially
in accordance with Annex "B" of the aforecited "Partial Project of Partition
of Estate" dated 22 June 1992, as submitted by the Regular
Administrator. Lots 6 and 7 of the six-hectare lot will while Lots 1 and 2 of
the 13-hectare lot will be likewise allocated to Jerry Ecarma and each
other. The remaining balance can now be donated by the five (5) other
legal heirs to the AFP. This manner of partition will effectuate the desire of
the five (5) remaining legal heirs to donate their shares to the AFP. 7

Gerry Ecarma filed a motion for reconsideration on the following grounds: (1) the
project of partition of the Kitanlad properties is not feasible, impractical and detrimental
to the interests of the heirs of the Spouses Natalio and Arminda Ecarma; (2) the
planned partition is not in accordance with the wishes of the decedents, the spouses
Natalio and Arminda; and (3) the RTC, Branch 220, as the court settling the intestate
estate of Arminda, has no jurisdiction over part of.the subject properties which do not
form part of Arminda's estate, such undivided share already pertaining to the other
heirs as part of their inheritance from their deceased father, Natalio.

The other oppositor to the partition, Rodolfo Ecarma, likewise filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the 28 July 2005 Order of Partition on the main ground, akin to the
3rd ground raised by Gerry in his motion, that the RTC, Branch 220 acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction by ordering the partition of the subject properties, portions of
which do not belong to the intestate estate of Arminda.

After Renato filed his Comment/Opposition to the two motions for reconsideration, the
RTC, Branch 220, finding no cogent reason to reverse or modify its prior order of
partition, issued an Order denying Gerry's and Renato's motions.

Thereafter, Gerry filed both a Notice of Appeal and a Record on Appeal before the RTC,
Branch 220 to bring up on appeal to the CA the trial court's partition order.

It appears that sometime before 4 May 2009, counsel of Gerry Ecarma filed a Notice of
Death of Gerry Ecarma before the appellate court and was subsequently required by the
latter to submit a certified true copy of Gerry Ecarma's death certificate within a
prescribed period.8
Meanwhile, herein petitioners, presumably in substitution of the deceased Gerry
Ecarma, filed their Appellants' Brief pursuant to the order of the appellate court. From
this incident of herein petitioners' Appellants' Brief before the CA, and its contents, the
controversy has reached us.

Renato forthwith filed a Motion to Dismiss Appellants' Brief, to which the CA required a
comment from petitioner.9

The Resolutions of the CA finding insufficient herein petitioners' Appellants' Brief are
now before us. The CA ruled that:

The Court xxx finds [petitioners'] submission [that their brief substantially complied
with the requirements under Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court] to be utterly
devoid of merit. Indeed, [petitioners'] brief does not contain a subject index, table of
cases and authorities, statement of case, statement of facts and page references to the
record in violation of Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure xxx.

xxxx

Non-compliance with these requirements warrants the dismissal of appeal under

Section 1(1), Rule 50.

xxxx

[Petitioners] could have easily cured these multiple defects in the same manner their
counsel did with his MCLE compliance and SPA. But, they opted not to. Instead, they
stubbornly insist, albeit erroneously, that their appellants' brief substantially complied
with the requirements. They failed, however, to point out with specificity what part or
parts of their brief contain their so-called substantial compliance. Surely, the Court
cannot countenance [petitioners'] careless attitude, if not irreverent disregard, of the
procedural rules intended precisely to ensure orderly administration of justice.

xxxx

Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED.10

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of their appeal, attaching a

Supplemental Appellants' Brief11 to their motion. However, the appellate court again
deemed the Supplemental Appellants' Brief to be unsatisfactory and non-compliant with
the rules and denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration:

Notably, the new appeal brief, just like the original one, does not contain reference to
the relevant portions of the record pertaining to its statement of facts. Further, the
subject index does not contain a summary of arguments and reference to the specific
pages of the brief, and the supporting laws and authorities. 12

From that denial, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court almost sixty (60) days from the time they received the appellate court's denial
of their motion for reconsideration.
At the outset, we see through petitioners' obvious ploy to avoid the necessary
consequence of their failure to file, within the required fifteen-day period, the correct
remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 4513 of the Rules of Court, from the assailed
ruling of the CA. On this score alone, the present petition should have been dismissed
outright.

Petitioners simple allegation of grave abuse of discretion in the CA's dismissal of their
appeal cannot substitute for the correct remedy of a lost appeal. 14

Notably, as they have stubbornly done so in the appellate court, petitioners urge us to
reverse these adverse rulings of the appellate court without abiding by the rules
therefor.

First. An appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is different from a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 thereof. A special civil action for certiorari may be
availed of only if the lower tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and if there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. 5 Simply imputing in a petition that the ruling sought to be reviewed is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion does not magically transform a petition into a special civil
action for certiorari.

The appellate court's outright dismissal of therein appellants' appeal was a final order
which left it with nothing more to do to resolve the case. 16 That disposition is a final and
executory order, appealable to, and may be questioned before, this Court by persons
aggrieved thereby, such as herein petitioners,  via Rule 45.

Moreover, the dismissal of therein appellants', herein petitioners', appeal before the CA
is expressly allowed by Section 1(f),17 Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The appellate
court, therefore, cannot be charged with grave abuse of discretion as there is no
showing that, in the exercise of its judgment, it acted in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Absent grave abuse of
discretion, petitioners should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The soundness of the ruling dismissing
petitioners' appeal before the appellate court is a matter of judgment with respect to
which the remedy of the party aggrieved is a Rule 45 petition. An error of judgment
committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as
grave abuse of discretion. Errors of judgment are correctible by appeal, while those of
jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari.18

Even if we were to take a liberal stance and consider this present petition as that filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising grave error in the appellate courts' ruling,
such cannot cure the unavoidable consequence of dismissal for failure to file an appeal
within the reglementary fifteen-day period provided under Section 2 19 of Rule 45.

Second. The CA correctly dismissed herein petitioners' Appellants' Brief for failure to
comply with the content requirement specified under Section 13 20 of Rule 44.

Petitioners are adamant, however, that they complied with the required content
specified in the rules even attaching a sample copy of an Appellant's Brief found in
Guevarra's Legal Forms which was purportedly their guideline in revising and
submitting their Supplemental Appellants' Brief to the appellate court. 21

We assiduously went through the Supplemental Appellants' Brief of herein petitioners

and as the CA have, we likewise find it wanting, a lame attempt at compliance through
superficial changes, devoid of substance. 22

In fact, the Supplemental Appellants' Brief could only cite Section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court as its sole legal authority in questioning the RTC, Branch 220's Order of
Partition.23 Petitioners, even in their present petition before us, are unable to grasp the
necessity of supporting and anchoring their arguments with legal basis. They cannot
simply cite one section of one rule without expounding thereon.

In the recent case of Lui Enterprises, Inc., v. Zuellig Pharma Corporation, et al.  ,24 we
reiterated the faithful adherence to the rules on the specific contents of an Appellant's
Brief as provided in Section 14, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court:

Lui Enterprises did not comply with the

rules on the contents of the appellant's brief

Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court
of Appeals may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the
appellant's brief lack specific requirements under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a),
(c), (d), and (f):
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - An appeal may be dismissed by the Court
of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's brief, or of page

references to the record as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of
Rule 44[.]
These requirements are the subject index of the matter in brief, page references to the
record, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged and with textbooks and statutes
cited:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 13. Contents of the appellant's brief. - The appellant's brief shall contain, in the
order herein indicated, the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) A subject index of the matter in brief with a digest of the arguments and page
references, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited
with references to the pages where they are cited;

xxxx

(c) Under the heading "Statement of the Case," a clear and concise statement of the
nature of the action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of
the court, the nature of the controversy, with page references to the record;

(d) Under the heading "Statement of Facts," a clear and concise statement in a
narrative form of the facts admitted by both parties and of those in controversy,
together with the substance of the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it
clearly intelligible, with page references to the record;
xxxx

(f) Under the heading "Argument," the appellant's arguments on each assignment of
error with page references' to the record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by
the page of the report at which the case begins and the page of the report on which the
citation is found;
xxxx

Lui Enterprises' appellant's brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record,
and table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule 50, Section 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises'
appeal.

Except for cases provided in the Constitution, appeal is a "purely statutory right."The
right to appeal "must be exercised in. the manner prescribed by law" and requires strict
compliance with the Rules of Court on appeals. Otherwise, the appeal shall be
dismissed, and its dismissal shall not be a deprivation of due process of law.

In Mendoza v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc., this court sustained the Court of
Appeals' dismissal of Mendoza's appeal. Mendoza's appellant's brief lacked a subject
index, assignment of errors, and page references to the record. In De Liano v. Court of
Appeal, this court also sustained the dismissal of De Liano's appeal. De Liano's
appellant's brief lacked a subject index, a table of cases and authorities, and page
references to the record.

There are exceptions to this rule. In Philippine Coconut Authority v. Corona

International, Inc., the Philippine Coconut Authority's appellant's brief lacked a clear
and "concise statement of the nature of the action, a summary of the proceedings, the
nature of the judgment, and page references to the record. However, this court found
that the Philippine Coconut Authority substantially complied with the Rules. Its
appellant's brief apprise[d] [the Court of Appeals] of the essential facts and nature of
the case as well as the issues raised and the laws necessary [to dispose of the case]."
This court "[deviated] from a rigid enforcement of the rules" and ordered the Court of
Appeals to resolve the Philippine Coconut Authority's appeal.

In Go v. Chaves, Go's 17-page appellant's brief lacked a subject index. However, Go
subsequently filed a subject index. This court excused Go's procedural lapse since the
appellant's brief "[consisted] only of 17 pages which [the Court of Appeals] may easily
peruse to apprise it of [the case] and of the relief sought." This court ordered the Court
of Appeals to resolve Go's appeal "in the interest of justice."
In Philippine Coconut Authority and Go, the appellants substantially complied with the
rules on the contents of the appellant's brief. Thus, this court excused the appellants'
procedural lapses.

In this case, Lui Enterprises did not substantially comply with the rules on the contents
of the appellant's brief. It admitted that its appellant's brief lacked the required subject
index, page references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited.
However, it did not even correct its admitted "technical omissions" by filing an amended
appellant's brief with the required contents. Thus, this case does not allow a relaxation
of the rules. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises' appeal.

Rules on appeal "are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases before the
Court of Appeals." With respect to the appellant's brief, its required contents are
designed "to minimize the [Court of Appeals'] labor in [examining] the record upon
which the appeal is heard and determined."

The subject index serves as the briefs table of contents. Instead of "[thumbing] through
the [appellant's brief]" every time the Court of Appeals Justice encounters an argument
or citation, the Justice deciding the case only has to refer to the subject index for the
argument or citation he or she needs. This saves the Court of Appeals time in reviewing
the appealed case. Efficiency allows the justices of the appellate court to substantially
attend to this case as well as other cases.

Page references to the record guarantee that the facts stated in the appellant's brief are
supported by the record. A statement of fact without a page reference to the record
creates the presumption that it is unsupported by the record and, thus, "may be
stricken or disregarded altogether."

As for the table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited, this is required so that the
Court of Appeals can easily verify the authorities cited "for accuracy and aptness."

Lui Enterprises' appellant's brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record,
and a table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited. These requirements "were designed
to assist the appellate court in the accomplishment of its tasks, and, overall, to enhance
the orderly administration of justice." This court will not disregard rules on appeal "in
the guise of liberal construction." For this court to liberally construe the Rules, the party
must substantially comply with the Rules and correct its procedural lapses. Lui
Enterprises failed to remedy these errors.

All told, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises' appeal. It failed
to comply with Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure on the required contents of the appellant's brief.

Third. While we sustain the appellate court's dismissal of herein petitioners' appeal, we
find it imperative to rule on the merits of the RTC, Branch 220's Order of Partition to
forestall any further delay in the settlement of decedent Arminda's estate which has
been pending since 1990 where Order of Partition of the subject properties was issued
on 28 July 2005. We note also that petitioners themselves pray for a ruling thereon.

There is no quarrel from any of the parties that the subject properties were originally
part of the conjugal partnership of gains property regime of the deceased spouses
Natalio and Arminda.25 The nature of these properties as part of the spouses' conjugal
properties was confirmed in the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Natalio signed
by all his heirs, his spouse Arminda and their children, including predecessor of herein
petitioners, Gerry Ecarma.26

Essentially, pursuant to this Extrajudicial Settlement, Arminda was apportioned two-

ninth's (2/9's) share, while her children were equally ascribed one-ninth (1/9) portion,
of the subject properties. Upon Arminda's death, her heirs' rights to the succession
(covering Arminda's share in the subject properties) vested and their co-ownership over
the subject properties has consolidated by operation of law. 27 Effectively, without a
valid will of Arminda, and as Arminda's compulsory heirs, 28 herein parties (specifically
Gerry Ecarma prior to his death and substitution by herein petitioners) all ipso facto  co-
owned the subject properties in equal proportion being compulsory heirs of the
deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda.29

There appears to be no clear objection, therefore, to the RTC, Branch 220's Order of
Partition approving the proposal of the administrator, herein respondent Renato, for the
equal division of the properties:

1. The Kitanlad property: longitudinally from the frontage down to the other end with
the shares of the [oppositors to the partition] Jerry Ecarnia and Rodolfo Ecarma
contiguous to each other on one side of the property nearest to the main entrance; and

xxxx

2. The Cuyapo and Lala properties: partitioned into seven (7) equal parts with Jerry's
and Rodolfo's respective shares contiguous to each other, and the remainder to be
donated by the other legal heirs, as manifested by them, to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP).

Their objection to the actual partition notwithstanding, herein petitioners and even
Rodolfo Ecarma cannot compel the other co-heirs to remain in perpetual co-ownership
over the subject properties. Article 494, in relation to Article 1083, of the Civil Code
provides:

Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time,
not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new
agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty
years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-
heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the estate unless the
testator should have expressly forbidden its partition, in which case the period of
indivision shall not exceed twenty years as provided in Article 494. This power of the
testator to prohibit division applies to the legitime.

Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership terminates when any of the
causes for which partnership is dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for
compelling reasons that division should be ordered, upon petition of one of the co-heirs.

The impasse between the parties is due to herein petitioners' persistent objection to
proposals for the partition of the subject properties. The deceased Gerry Ecarma,
Rodolfo Ecarma and herein petitioners consistently opposed the proposed partition of
the administrator, respondent Renato, since such is ostensibly "not feasible, impractical
and renders detrimental use of the Kitanlad property." However, it is apparent that
Gerry Ecarma and his heirs (herein petitioners) completely object to any kind of
partition of the subject properties, contravening even the proposed sale thereof.

We note that petitioners have been careful not to proffer that the subject properties are
indivisible or that physical division of thereof would render such unserviceable since
Article 49530 of the Civil Code provides the remedy of termination of co-ownership in
accordance with Article 49831 of the same Code, i.e. sale of the property and
distribution of the proceeds. Ineluctably, therefore, herein petitioners' absolute
opposition to the partition of the subject properties which are co-owned has no basis in
law. As mere co-owners, herein petitioners, representing the share of the deceased
Gerry Ecarma, cannot preclude the other owners likewise compulsory heirs of the
deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda, from exercising all incidences of their full
ownership.32

Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeal's dismissal of the Appeal in
CA-G.R. CV No. 92375 is FINAL. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Peralta, J., on official leave.
Jardeleza, J., on wellness leave. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

G.R. No. 128119 October 17, 1997

MURLI SADHWANI, GOBIND SADHWANI, HARESH SADHWANI and NARESH

SADHWANI, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ORIENT ELECTRONICS CORP., HOMOBONO
SAWIT, (represented by the heirs), and SILVER SWAN MANUFACTURING CO.,
INC., respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review, filed by Murli Sadhwani, Gobind Sadhwani, Haresh Sadhwani and
Naresh Sadhwani, of the decision dated August 13, 1996 of the Court of Appeals, reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 164, Pasig, Metro Manila rendered in petitioners' favor
and the resolution dated February 18, 1997 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The facts
are as follows:

Respondent Homobono Sawit was the registered owner of a 2,030 square-meter lot, located at No.
102 E. Rodriguez, Ugong, Pasig, Metro Manila, on which two buildings are built. Under a contract
effective from June 16, 1981 to June 15, 1986, Sawit leased his property to respondent Orient
Electronics Corporation (Orient Electronics). By agreement of the parties, the lease was
subsequently extended to June 14, 1989. Among other things, the lessor gave the lessee, herein
respondent Orient Electronics, the right of first refusal in the event the lessor decided to sell his
property. The contract provided:

The LESSEE hereby expressly recognizes the absolute right of LESSOR to sell the leased
property to any person or entity at any time. However, the LESSEE is hereby given the right
of FIRST REFUSAL. This contract is binding with whoever is [the] new owner.

In addition, respondent Orient Electronics was granted the right to sublease the property.
Accordingly, it entered into a contract with petitioners Sadhwanis, first, on June 18, 1984 for the
sublease of one building and again, on November 17, 1987, for the sublease of the other building,
for periods coinciding with the date of expiration of the Sawit-Orient lease contract. The whereas
clauses of the two contracts of sublease in pertinent parts recited:

WHEREAS, the SUB-LESSOR is the lessee in a Contract of Lease dated . . . with MR.
HOMOBONO SAWIT as lessor, a copy of which is attached herewith as Annex "A" and
made an integral part hereof.

WHEREAS, under the Contract of Lease, the lessee therein, SUB-LESSOR herein, has the
right to sublease the . . . building of the property situated at 102 E. Rodriquez Ave., Pasig,
Metro Manila, more particularly described as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, the SUB-LESSOR wishes to sublease said building to the SUB-LESSEE and
the SUB-LESSEE wishes to sublease the same from the SUB-LESSOR.

In December 1988, i.e., six (6) months before the expiration of both the lease and sublease
contracts, respondent Sawit sold his property to respondent Silver Swan Manufacturing Co., Inc.
(Silver Swan Mfg.). Petitioners protested the sale, claiming they had the right of first refusal because
their contracts of sublease with Orient Electronics expressly incorporated the Sawit-Orient lease
contract as "integral part" of such contracts. They further claimed that in a meeting with the
representatives of respondents Sawit, Orient Electronics, and Silver Swan Mfg., it was agreed upon
that petitioners could buy back the property from Silver Swan Mfg. for the same price which the latter
had paid in the amount of P4.5 million, provided another property could be found for Silver Swan
Mfg. As nothing materialized out of the alleged agreement, petitioners alleged that they had to bring
this action for the annulment of contract of sale, cancellation of title and specific performance.
The action was brought against respondents Orient Electronics, Sawit and Silver Swan Mfg. in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. Respondent Orient Electronics was declared in default
because while it filed an answer, it failed to serve a copy on petitioners. Orient Electronics appealed
the order to the Court of Appeals, but its appeal was dismissed on February 28, 1991.

On June 3, 1994, the trial court  rendered judgment sustaining petitioners' claim of right of first
1

refusal. It held that the parties' intention, as revealed particularly in the whereas clauses of the
sublease contracts, was to assign the entire lease, with all the rights and obligations of respondent
Orient Electronics, to the petitioners as sublessees. Accordingly, the trial court ordered respondent
Silver Swan Mfg. to execute a deed of absolute sale over the subleased property in favor of
petitioners within 30 days from receipt of the decision and to pay moral and exemplary damages as
well as attorney's fees. Orient Electronics was absolved from civil liability to the petitioners.

Respondents Sawit and Silver Swan Mfg. appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on August 13,
1996, reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint.  The appellate court ruled
2

that there was no assignment of Orient Electronics' right of first refusal to the petitioners and that,
even if there was, the right to buy the property was forfeited by petitioners by their failure to pay P4
million unconditionally and instead making a counteroffer of P3.5 million. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but their motion was denied in a resolution dated February 18, 1997
of the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners contend:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DIRECTING SEPARATE

APPELLANTS SAWIT AND SILVER SWAN TO ATTACH TO THEIR APPEAL BRIEFS, A
COPY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ENFORCING PETITIONERS'

RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RESCINDING THE SALE BY

SAWIT TO SILVER SWAN OF THE LEASED PREMISES SUBJECT OF THE RIGHT OF
FIRST REFUSAL AND IN NOT FINDING SAWIT AND SILVER SWAN TO BE IN BAD
FAITH.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ORDERING SAWIT TO SELL

THE PROPERTY TO THE PETITIONERS AT THE PURCHASE PRICE OF P4 MILLION
WITHOUT INTEREST.

V.
 THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BY THE FOREGOING ASSIGNED
ERRORS IN ACCORDANCE WITH JURISPRUDENCE.

The assignment of errors raise three basic issues, namely: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in
not dismissing the appeal of Sawit and Silver Swan Mfg. because of their failure to append a copy of
the trial court's decision to their respective appellants' briefs, (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that petitioners did not have the right of first refusal and in not ordering respondent Sawit
to sell the said property to them, and (3) whether nevertheless petitioners were offered by
Homobono Sawit the property in question but, in bad faith, the latter sold the property to Silver Swan
Mfg.

First. Petitioners point out that respondents Sawit and Silver Swan Mfg. failed to append a copy of
the trial court's decision to their appeal briefs in the Court of Appeals as required in Rule 46, § 16(h)
of the Rules of Court,  but despite the fact that they called the attention of the Court of Appeals to
3

this failure, the appellate court did nothing. This provision states:

Sec. 16. Contents of appellant's brief . — The appellant's brief shall contain in the order
herein indicated the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) In cases not brought up by record on appeal, the appellant's brief shall contain, as an
appendix, a copy of the judgment or order appealed from.

Petitioners contend that the appellate court should have required respondents Sawit and Silver
Swan Mfg. to comply with this provision and, in the event they failed to do so, dismiss their appeals.
On the other hand, respondent Silver Swan Mfg. argues that this requirement is a superfluity
because anyway the original record of the trial court, containing a copy of its decision, was elevated
to the Court of Appeals.

We find both contentions to be without merit, although we hold that the Court of Appeals committed
no reversible error in doing nothing about petitioners' complaint, it appearing that respondent Silver
Swan Mfg. immediately responded by submitting a copy of the trial court's decision.

The provision in question is not new, being Rule 46, §16(h) of the 1964 Rules of Court. The only
difference between the present provision and its counterpart in the 1964 Rules being as to the cases
in which appeal was "not brought by record on appeal." Under the 1964 Rules, in the generality of
cases, the appeal was by record on appeal.  The only instances where appeal was not by record on
4

appeal were (1) in certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto and employee's liability cases,  (2)5

in habeas corpus cases   and (3) in cases decided by the Social Security Commission and the then
6

Court of Agrarian Relations.  In such cases, instead of a record on appeal, the original record of the
7

case was transmitted to the appellate court.

When the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980  took effect on August 14, 1981, the rule was
8

reversed. Instead of record on appeal, the general requirement is that the original record shall be
transmitted. The only instances in which records on appeal in lieu of the original records are filed in
the Court of Appeals are in appeals in special proceedings and in cases where multiple appeals are
allowed.9
But whether under the 1964 Rules or the present one, a copy of the appealed decision is made
available to the appellate court because it is contained either in the record on appeal or in the
original record transmitted to it. It is therefore error for respondent Silver Swan Mfg. to contend that
the requirement that a copy of the decision must be appended to the brief of the appellant is a
superfluity because anyway in appeals not brought by record on appeal the original record is
transmitted to the Court of Appeals. As far as the appellate court is concerned, the requirement in
Rule 46, §16 is for its convenience. But it is appellee's counsel who may have need for a copy of the
decision and it is for him that the requirement is made. Appellee's counsel needs a copy of the trial
court's decision to enable him to prepare his brief.

However, appellee or his counsel must apply to the appellate court for an order directing the
appellant to comply with the rule if the appellant's brief does not contain a copy of the decision
appealed from. He must ask the appellate court for such an order before he files his brief, otherwise
he will be deemed to have waived his objection.

In the case at bar, petitioners called the appellate court's attention to Silver Swan Mfg. and Sawit's
failure to comply with the rule only in petitioners' brief, by way of pointing out that the dispositive
portion of the trial court, as quoted in the Sawit's appellant's brief, was not "exactly a verbatim
reproduction of the said dispositive portion." The fact that they could say the quotation was not a
"verbatim reproduction" could only mean they had access to the trial court's decision. They should
have earlier filed a separate motion in the appellate court for an order to respondents Sawit and
Silver Swan Mfg. to append to their brief copies of the decision appealed from instead of doing so
only in their appellees' brief. The record of the Court of Appeals shows, however, that as soon as
this was pointed out by petitioners, respondent Silver Swan Mfg. lost no time submitting a copy of
the decision of the trial court. Given this fact, there was nothing else for the Court of Appeals to do.

Second. The ultimate question which this Court must confront is whether under their contracts with
Orient Electronics, petitioners have a right of first refusal in the event the leased property was sold.
To begin with, it is a fundamental principle in contract law that a contract binds only the parties to
it.  The right of first refusal was embodied in the contract of lease between respondents Sawit and
10

Orient Electronics. Petitioners were not parties to that contract. While their contracts with respondent
Orient Electronics made the lease contract "an integral part" of the contracts of sublease, there is no
proof that respondent Sawit consented to an assignment of the lease to the petitioners. What Sawit
had agreed to was simply to give Orient Electronics the right to sublease the property. For that
matter, Sawit did not have to give his consent to the sublease because under Art. 1650 of the Civil
Code, when in the contract of lease there is no express prohibition, the lessee may sublet the thing
leased.

The rule is different, however, with respect to assignments of lease. Art. 1649 provides that "the
lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary." Petitioners have not cited any provision of the contract of lease between respondents
Homobono Sawit and Orient Electronics giving Orient Electronics the right to assign the contract.
Petitioners' efforts to bind respondent Sawit by invoking a whereas clause in their contracts with
Orient Electronics must thus fail. For the fact is that respondent Sawit is not a party to those
contracts.

Indeed, the consent of the lessor is necessary because the assignment of lease would involve the
transfer not only of rights but also of obligations. Such assignment would constitute novation by the
substitution of one of the parties, i.e., the lessee.
11

There is no evidence in this case to show that respondent Sawit subsequently agreed to a
substitution of petitioners in place of respondent Orient Electronics as lessees of the premises.
Petitioners claim that Jose Protacio collected the rentals from them in behalf of respondent Sawit.
They cite the following testimony of Protacio: 12

Yes, Sir, I used to help him [Sawit] when he asked me to collect rentals from his tenant
Orient Electronics Corporation which is incidentally also one of my clients.

As respondent Silver Swan Mfg. points out in its comment,  however, Protacio never stated that in
13

collecting rentals from petitioners he was acting in behalf of respondent Sawit. What he stated was
that he collected rents from Orient Electronics for Sawit.

It is true Protacio said that Orient Electronics was also his client but it would be reading things into
his statement to say that after Orient Electronics had subleased the property to petitioners, he
continued collecting rents for Sawit. The rents from petitioners were payable to Orient Electronics
and if Protacio collected rents from petitioners, the presumption is that he did so in behalf of Orient
Electronics, which was his client. At all events, petitioners should have presented receipts issued to
them for payments made by them for possible indication of the party in whose behalf the collection
was made. For their failure to show otherwise, petitioners must be presumed to have paid their rent
to Orient Electronics, as their lessor.

Petitioners claim that they spent P400,000.00 in repairing the damaged portion of one of the
subleased buildings which had been destroyed by fire. Again, not only is there no document to prove
this allegation but even if it is true, the Court cannot see how this could show that petitioners had
become the primary lessee since the repair of the leased property is not an obligation of lessee but
of the lessor.
14

Petitioners also cite the recent decision in Equatorial Development Inc. v. Mayfair Theater  to15

support their claim of right. In the Equatorial case, the Court upheld the right of first refusal expressly
granted to Mayfair Theater as lessee of a property after finding that the property had been
improperly sold by the owner-lessor, Carmelo and Bauermann, Inc. to a third party (Equatorial
Development, Inc.). But in that case, there was no dispute as to the existence of the right of first
refusal of Mayfair Theater. On the other hand, in this case, the existence of the right is doubtful. As
already stated, there was no assignment to the petitioners of either the Sawit-Orient lease contract
or the right of first refusal which was solely granted to respondent Orient Electronics. Hence, the
remedy of rescission, which was successfully invoked by Mayfair Theater in that case, is not
available to herein petitioners. It is noteworthy that the party to whom the right of first refusal was
given in this case (Orient Electronics) did not invoke this right or seek the rescission of the sale to
respondent Silver Swan Mfg. nor did it join cause with petitioners in bringing this case.

Third. Petitioners claim that respondent Sawit's sister-in-law Lydia Sawit offered to sell the property
to them for P4 million late in 1987. They claim that they offered to buy the property for P3.5 million
and that Lydia Sawit promised to consider their offer. They further allege that when they did not hear
from Lydia Sawit, they called her up in the United States on December 3 and 6, 1988 and they were
advised by her to directly communicate their offer to Sawit, but when they did so, they were ignored.
Petitioners contend that because the negotiation between them and respondent Sawit was going on
at the time the property was sold to respondent Silver Swan Mfg., respondents Sawit and Silver
Swan Mfg. acted in bad faith. The sale of the property to respondent Silver Swan Mfg. should be
rescinded and respondent Sawit should be ordered to sell the property to them for P4 million without
interest.

On this point, the Court of Appeals held that even if there was no assignment of lease, respondent
Sawit nonetheless offered to sell his property to petitioners for P4 million, but because petitioners
were willing to give only P3.5 million for the property, petitioners forfeited whatever option had been
extended to them by respondent Sawit.

It is really unnecessary to pass upon this claim because there is nothing in the record to show that
either Protacio or Lydia Sawit was authorized to negotiate the sale of the property by Sawit. As
petitioners themselves state in their petition,  Lydia Sawit told them to communicate their
16

counteroffer directly to respondent Sawit himself. This could only mean either that Lydia Sawit was
not respondent Sawit's agent or that if she was, her agency had already been terminated when
petitioners made their counteroffer. The fact that respondent Sawit ignored their offer could only
mean that he was not interested in selling the property to the petitioners.

Indeed, the alleged offer made to petitioners rests solely on their allegation. But mere allegation or
claim is not proof. Aside from the testimony of petitioner Gobind Sadhwani, there is no other proof
that Lydia Sawit offered the property to them for P4 million. As the party claiming affirmative reliefs
from the courts of law, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to convincingly prove their claim. They
failed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado and Torres, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Per Judge Apolonio R. Chavez, Jr.

2 Per Justice Ruben T. Reyes and concurred in by Justices Fidel P. Purisima and
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.

3 Now Rule 44, §13(h) or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

4 Rule 41, §3.

5 Id., §17.

6 Id., §21.

7 Id., §23.

8 B.P. Blg. 129.

9 B.P. Blg. 129, §39.

10 CIVIL CODE, Art. 1311.

 11 Vda. e Hijos de Pio Barretto y Cia. v. Sevilla, Inc., 62 Phil. 593 (1935); Bangayan
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123581, Aug. 29, 1997.

12 T.S.N., p. 6, Aug. 30, 1993.

13 Rollo, pp. 186-187.

14 Art. 1654(2).

15 G.R. No. 106063, November 21, 1996.

16 Rollo, p. 24.

G.R. No. 151132             June 22, 2006

FIRST BANCORP, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JANE THOMAS LIGHTNER, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The First Bancorp, Inc. (Bancorp for brevity) is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in
Alabang, Muntinlupa covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 201126 issued by the Registry of
Deeds on May 19, 1995.1

On October 10, 1997, Jane Thomas Lightner, an American citizen who resided in California, U.S.A.,
filed a Complaint against Bancorp with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City with the
following allegations:

1. Plaintiff is of legal age, widowed, American citizen, and a resident of California, United
States. She may be served with process in this case through undersigned counsel.

2. Defendant is a corporation created under the laws of the Philippines with address at c/o
Carpio Villaraza & Cruz, 5th Floor, LTA Building, 118 Perea Street, Legaspi Village, Makati
City, Metro Manila, where it may be served with processes of the Honorable Court.

2.1. According to defendant’s General Information Sheet dated 23 September 1997

filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the corporate officers of
defendant who may be served with the summons in behalf of defendant are:

Atty. F. Arthur L. Villaraza – Chairman/President

Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos – Director

 Atty. Jose M. Jose – Director/Corporate Secretary

Atty. Augusto A. San Pedro, Jr. – Director

Atty. Alejandro Alfonso E. Navarro – Director

Venus C. Catacutan – Treasurer

A copy of defendant’s General Information Sheet dated 23 September 1997 is

attached hereto as Annex "A."

3. Plaintiff is the widow of Donald Clifford Lightner, Jr., an American citizen who passed
away in Hongkong on 29 June 1997. They were married on 24 April 1977 in the United
States.

3.1. Plaintiff and Donald C. Lightner, Jr. never obtained a valid decree of divorce,
legal separation, separation of properties, or dissolution of the conjugal partnership.

4. Defendant is the registered owner of a parcel of land and house and other improvements
with address at 144 San Juanico Street, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 201126 of the Register of Deeds of the City of
Makati, hereinafter referred to as the "Property."

5. Notwithstanding the fact that title to the Property is registered in the name of defendant,
the Property in actuality belongs to the estate of Donald C. Lightner, Jr. and plaintiff jointly.

5.1. The Property was acquired with conjugal or community funds and therefore is a
conjugal or community asset.

5.2. The Property was used exclusively as the primary residence of Donald C.
Lightner, Jr. and his mistress Aida Villaluz until his death. Ms. Villaluz continues to
reside on the Property.

6. In an attempt to divest and defraud plaintiff out of her 50% undivided interest in the
Property (or in the conjugal/community funds used to acquire the Property) as well as her
compulsory inheritance from his estate’s 50% undivided interest therein, Donald C. Lightner,
Jr. caused the title to the Property to be registered in the name of defendant.

6.1. Defendant is apparently only a holding corporation owned by nominees. All of its
stockholders, directors and officers are lawyers and, in the case of Venus C.
Catacutan, an accounting staff person of the law firm of Carpio, Villaraza & Cruz. The
total capitalization of defendant is only P100,000 as of 23 September 1997, so it
could not have purchased the Property (see Annex "A").2

She prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered declaring that defendant holds a
50% undivided interest in the property as trustee and in trust for the benefit of plaintiff.

Other relief just and equitable in the premises are also prayed for.3
Bancorp filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF’S

ALLEGED FIFTY PERCENT UNDIVIDED INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
CONSIDERING THAT, UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, PLAINTIFF, WHO IS AN AMERICAN
CITIZEN, CANNOT OWN REAL PROPERTY IN THE PHILIPPINES.

II

A CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR THE FILING OF THE CLAIM ASSERTED IN THE COMPLAINT
HAS NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH CONSIDERING THAT THE ALLEGED CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP HAS NOT YET BEEN LIQUIDATED IN THE PROPERTY ESTATE
PROCEEDINGS.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT
CONSIDERING THAT THE SUMMONS IN THE INSTANT CASE WERE IMPROPERLY SERVED.

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CASE
CONSIDERING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ALLEGE THE VALUE OF THE REAL PROPERTY
INVOLVED IN THE INSTANT REAL ACTION AND FAILED TO PAY THE PROPER DOCKET
FEES.4

Lightner opposed the motion, contending that she had paid the requisite docket fees. Contrary to the
allegation of the defendant, her action was not a real action; hence, she need not allege the
assessed value of the property. In any event, even if the amount she paid as docket fees was
insufficient, she should be allowed a reasonable time to pay the deficiency. She further claimed that
the liquidation of their conjugal partnership properties is not a condition precedent to the filing of her
complaint because her action is against defendant, a third party who is an outsider to her husband’s
estate. Moreover, her claimed right to a declaration of a constructive trust in her favor to enable her
to sell her 50% conjugal partnership share in the proceeds of the sale is not a violation of the
Constitution. She pointed out that when a favorable judgment is rendered in her favor, she would still
be compelled to sell the property to a qualified Filipino. Thus, the court’s mere declaration of
Bancorp as trustee is not prohibited by the Constitution. She further alleged that Bancorp was
estopped from raising such a defense against her based on the doctrine of pari delicto.

On January 20, 1996, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of Bancorp,5 prompting it to file a
motion for reconsideration6 on the following grounds:

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE PERFUNCTORY DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

IN THE ORDER DATED 20 JANUARY 1998 VIOLATES SECTION 3, RULE 16 OF THE 1997
REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AS IT FAILED TO STATE CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY
THE REASONS THEREFOR.
 II

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE ORDER DATED 20 JANUARY 1998 DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF
DUE PROCESS CONSIDERING THAT ITS RIGHT TO FILE A REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S
OPPOSITION DATED 14 JANUARY 1998 WHICH WAS GRANTED TO DEFENDANT IN A
PREVIOUS ORDER DATED 05 DECEMBER 1997 WAS ARBITRARILY CURTAILED.

III

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER AND SET ASIDE THE
ORDER DATED 20 JANUARY 1998 AND INSTEAD ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF THE INSTANT
CASE, CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE DECLARATION OF

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGED FIFTY PERCENT UNDIVIDED INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY SINCE SUCH A CLAIM BY AN ALIEN IS PROSCRIBED UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.

B. ASSUMING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BELONGS TO THE ALLEGED

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND THE LATE DONALD C.
LIGHTNER, JR., THE LIQUIDATION OF THE ALLEGED CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IN
THE PROPER ESTATE PROCEEDINGS IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR THE FILING
OF THE CLAIM ASSERTED IN THE COMPLAINT.

C. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
OF DEFENDANT SINCE THE SUMMONS IN THE INSTANT CASE WAS IMPROPERLY
SERVED.

D. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE

INSTANT CASE SINCE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ALLEGE IN HER COMPLAINT THE VALUE
OF THE REAL PROPERTY INVOLVED IN THE INSTANT REAL ACTION AND FAILED TO
PAY THE PROPER DOCKET FEES AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES OF COURT.7

Lightner opposed the motion.8 This time, however, the RTC issued an Order on April 14, 1998
granting the motion of Bancorp, and ordered the complaint dismissed. The trial court ratiocinated
that:

[a]s a rule, the allegation set forth in the Complaint and not the prayer for relief that determines the
nature of the cause of action of the plaintiff. In the complaint, it is alleged that plaintiff is an American
Citizen and that the subject property purportedly belongs to the plaintiff and the estate of the late
Donald C. Lightner, Jr. The relief prayed for in the complaint dated 08 October 1997 is premised on
an alleged right of ownership being claimed by the plaintiff as a consequence of the alleged
acquisition of the Subject Property purportedly using the conjugal funds of the plaintiff and the late
Donald C. Lightner, Jr., who are both aliens. Consequently, it is clear from the allegations in the
Complaint that plaintiff traces her alleged right to the Subject Property to an unlawful conveyance
which is clearly proscribed under the Constitution.

"Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution categorically provides the following prohibition:

Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire lands of the public domain."
Accordingly, while plaintiff is ostensibly asking for a mere declaration of plaintiff’s alleged fifty
percent (50%) undivided interest over the Subject Property as stated in the prayer of the Complaint
dated 08 October 1997, plaintiff in reality is demanding the declaration of the Subject Property as
owned jointly by her and the estate of the late Donald C. Lightner, Jr. which is clearly prohibited
under the Constitution.

Plaintiff, who is an alien, cannot even assert a claim for a fifty percent (50%) undivided interest over
the Subject Property as her alleged conjugal share.

Plaintiff states that liquidation of the conjugal partnership in the estate proceeding is not a precedent
for the filing of the suit.

It has been held that the declaration of a fifty percent (50%) undivided interest over a parcel of land
is tantamount to the conferment of absolute title thereto, including the right to dispose and convey
title to said property. As held in the case of Meralco v. Viardo, 5 SCRA 859-868 (1962):

x x x The other one-half undivided interest of the latter was not in litigation and therefore the trial
court correctly held that Pilar Belmonte, as the owner of this undivided one-half interest, had a right
to sell it and convey absolute title thereto or to parts thereof. x x x

In the case of Suyon v. Collantes, 69 SCRA 514-520 (1976), the Supreme Court ruled that in
determining whether a Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action, assuming the truth of the
allegations of fact therein, the Honorable Court should first determine whether it could render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer in the Complaint. In the instant case, plaintiff prays that she
be declared the owner of the fifty percent (50%) undivided interest in the Subject Property. For the
Court to render judgment in favor of plaintiff as prayed for in her Complaint, it is enough that the
Subject Property be shown to belong to her and the late Donald C. Lightner, Jr. It must also be
established that she is qualified under the Constitution and our laws to own or hold the interest she
claims in the Subject Property. In the instant case, the very allegations of her Complaint show that
she is disqualified, being an alien, from being declared the owner of fifty percent (50%) undivided
interest in the Subject Property. For this reason, plaintiff’s Complaint clearly states no cause of
action.

Plaintiff alleges that the conjugal partnership must be liquidated in an estate proceeding applies only
when the suit is filed against the estate for the recovery of a specific asset or property. It does not
apply to a suit against a third party who is an outsider to the estate. In this action, plaintiff has sued a
third party to declare it as holding title to the property in constructive trust for plaintiff.

Defendant, however, states that, Article 129 of the Family Code (Executive Order 209), the conjugal
partnership must first be liquidated before the plaintiff can assert her alleged claim to any specific
conjugal partnership asset because it is in the liquidation of the alleged conjugal partnership that a
determination is made as to which properties pertain to the conjugal partnership and what
constitutes the net remainder thereof to which the surviving spouse may become entitled.

That prior to the liquidation, plaintiff cannot assert ownership over specific conjugal assets. What the
plaintiff will eventually become entitled to would be the net remainder of the alleged conjugal
partnership after the payment of all the debts and obligations of the alleged conjugal partnership and
the distribution of the exclusive paraphernal properties of each of the spouses.

In the instant case, even before the alleged conjugal partnership could be liquidated pursuant to
Article 129 of the Family Code, plaintiff is already asserting a claim to her alleged conjugal share
over a specific conjugal property, on the erroneous assumption that Subject Property supposedly
constitutes conjugal property. Clearly, plaintiff’s claim over the subject property, even assuming the
same to be conjugal, is premature as she can only be entitled to the net remainder of the alleged
conjugal partnership under the law. At present, the net remainder of the alleged partnership has not
yet been determined considering that the condition precedent of liquidating the alleged conjugal
partnership has yet to be complied with. Thus, plaintiff cannot assert her alleged claim for a
supposed fifty (50%) undivided interest over the Subject Property which she claims to be part of the
conjugal partnership assets.

Considering the foregoing discussions, this Court finds it is no longer necessary to discuss further
the remaining issues raised by both parties as it is the opinion of this Court that the above mentioned
contention would be sufficient enough for this Court to finally determine the assertion of the parties.9

Lightner filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the questioned order is
contrary to the relevant facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence.10 For its part, Bancorp filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that:

THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT

APPEAL WHICH INVOLVES PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW AND IS PROPERLY COGNIZABLE BY
THE SUPREME COURT; HENCE, THE INSTANT APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHT.11

Lightner opposed the Motion to Dismiss Appeal, claiming that her appeal involved both questions of
law and questions of facts.12

On October 19, 2000, the CA resolved to deny the Motion to Dismiss Appeal filed by Bancorp.13 The
latter received a copy of the resolution on October 30, 2000, and moved for its reconsideration on
November 13, 2000.

Lightner opposed the motion, insisting that questions of fact or law may be raised on appeal to the
CA by writ of error. She maintained that Bancorp indulged in speculations when it averred in its
Motion to Dismiss the Appeal that her appeal would only raise questions of law, that such an
argument would have no basis until the issues have actually been delineated and the assignment of
errors stated in her brief as appellant.

Meanwhile, Lightner filed her Brief14 dated March 22, 2001 in which she averred that:

The lower court erred in finding that the complaint states no cause of action.

II

The lower court erred in finding that the complaint was filed prematurely.15

Bancorp filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that only legal issues had
been raised in the appellant’s brief, hence, the appeal should be dismissed.

On March 21, 2001, the appellate court resolved to deny the motion for reconsideration of its
October 19, 2000 Resolution filed by Bancorp.16 The CA held that under Section 15, Rule 44 of the
Rules of Court, the appellant may raise either questions of fact or law.
On October 26, 2001, the CA denied the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Bancorp.17 The latter received a copy of this resolution on November 16, 2001, and thereafter filed its
Brief as appellee ad cautelam in the CA, alleging that

I. The Honorable Court Has No Jurisdiction To Take Cognizance Of The Instant Appeal
Which Involves Pure Questions Of Law And Is Properly Cognizable By The Supreme Court;
Hence, The Instant Appeal Should Be Dismissed Outright.

II. Assuming Arguendo That The Honorable Court Has Jurisdiction Over The Instant Appeal,
The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That Plaintiff-Appellant Lightner’s Complaint States No
Cause Of Action For The Declaration Of Her Alleged Fifty Percent Undivided Interest Over
The Subject Property Since Such A Claim By An Alien Is Proscribed Under The Constitution;
And Hence, Should Be Dismissed.

III. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That Plaintiff-Appellant Lightner’s Complaint Was
Prematurely Filed And, Hence, Should Be Dismissed Considering That Even Assuming That
The Subject Property Belongs To The Alleged Conjugal Partnership Between Plaintiff-
Appellant Lightner And The Late Donald C. Lightner, Jr., The Liquidation Of Their Alleged
Conjugal Partnership In The Proper Estate Proceedings Is A Condition Precedent For The
Filing Of The Claim Asserted In The Complaint.18

On January 11, 2002, Bancorp, now petitioner, filed the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with this Court on the following allegations:

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS

JURISDICTION OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT ASSUMED JURISDICTION AND TOOK
COGNIZANCE OF THE APPEAL OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT LIGHTNER WHEN IT CLEARLY
AND PLAINLY HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER IT AS THE SAID APPEAL INVOLVES PURE
QUESTIONS OF LAW AND IS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURI[S]DICTION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT.19

To buttress this claim, petitioner reiterates its arguments in the CA, in support of its motion to
dismiss the appeal of respondent.

For her part, respondent avers that, under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the mode of
appeal from all final orders of the trial court is by writ of error as provided in Section 2(a), Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court. Conformably with Section 15, Rule 44, questions of fact or law or both may be
raised on appeal in the CA. In any event, respondent asserts, her appeal to the CA raises questions
of fact, to wit: (1) whether the conjugal partnership has been liquidated; and (2) whether her
complaint states a cause of action. To support her contention, respondent cites the rulings of this
Court in Heirs of Coscolluela, Sr. v. Rico General Insurance Corporation20 and PCGG v. Gorospe.21

Respondent maintains that her appeal should not be dismissed based solely on technicalities.

The petition is meritorious.

The order of the trial court dismissing the complaint of respondent (plaintiff below) on the ground that
it is premature and states no cause of action is final because it terminated the proceedings so that
nothing more can be done in the trial court. The order ended the litigation.22 There are two modes of
appeal from a final order of the trial court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction – (1) by writ of
error under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court if questions of fact or questions of fact and
law are raised or involved; or (2) appeal by certiorari under Section 2(c), Rule 41, in relation to Rule
45, where only questions of law are raised or involved:

Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. –

(a) Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases
of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record
on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

xxxx

(c) Appeal by certiorari. – In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal
shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.23

The period to appeal by writ of error is provided in Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or
final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

Under Section 5 of the same rule, "the notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the appeal,
specify the judgment or final order or part thereof appealed from, specify the court to which the
appeal is being taken, and state the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal."

On the other hand, an appeal by certiorari is via a petition for review to be filed with the Supreme
Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the final order or resolution appealed from or of the
dismissal of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the
final order or resolution:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth.24

If the aggrieved party appeals by writ of error under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the CA and it
turns out, from the brief of appellant, that only questions of law are raised, the appeal shall be
dismissed:

Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. – An appeal under Rule 41 taken from
the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed,
issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal
instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be
dismissed.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court
but shall be dismissed outright.25

The nature of the issues to be raised on appeal can be gleaned from the appellant’s notice of appeal
filed in the trial court and in his or her brief as appellant in the appellate court.26

The provision relied upon by respondent, Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, reads:

Sec. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. – Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion
for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact
that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.

This rule, however, does not relate to the nature of the issues that may be raised on appeal by the
aggrieved party, whether issues of fact or issues of law, or the mode of appeal of the aggrieved party
from a final order or resolution of the trial court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; it merely
provides the nature of the issues appellant may include in his assignment of error incorporated in his
Brief as appellant. It may happen that the appellant may have raised in the trial court errors of fact or
law or both, and need not include all said issues in his appeal in the appellate court. The appellant
has the right to choose which issues of law he or she may raise in the CA in addition to factual
issues already raised.

A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts. If
the query requires a reevaluation of the credibility of witnesses or the existence or relevance of
surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual. On the
other hand, there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties-litigants. In a case involving a question of law, the resolution of the issue
rests solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.27 Ordinarily, the
determination of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or both questions of law and fact
is best left to the appellate court.28 All doubts as to the correctness of the conclusions of the
appellate court will be resolved in favor of the CA unless it commits an error or commits a grave
abuse of discretion.29

In the present case, respondent appealed the order of the trial court, which dismissed her complaint
on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action against petitioner (defendant therein), and for
prematurity, as the conjugal partnership between her and her deceased husband had not yet been
liquidated prior to its filing.

Petitioner maintains that the trial court acted in accord with law when it dismissed the complaint.
While it admits that when it filed its motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint of respondent
states no cause of action, it theoretically admitted the truth of the factual and material allegations in
the complaint and not mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor conclusions of law;
nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter.30 Petitioner agrees that the court may
not inquire into the truth of the allegations and find them to be false before a hearing is had on the
merits of the case; and it is improper to inject in the allegations of the complaint facts not alleged or
proved, and use these as basis for said motion.31 The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon
the same in accordance with the prayer of plaintiff. A complaint may also be dismissed for failure of
plaintiff to comply with a condition precedent. There can be no cause of action for filing a complaint
in court unless the condition precedent has been complied with. Performance or fulfillment of all
conditions precedent whether proscribed by statement or by agreement of the parties or implied by
law upon which a right of action depends must be sufficiently alleged.32

With the foregoing premises, we agree with petitioner’s contention that a question of whether or not
a complaint states a cause of action against defendant or that the action is premature is one of law.
The determination thereof is one of law and not of facts.33 Indeed, in China Road and Bridge
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,34 the Court ruled that:

In a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be any question of
fact or "doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood of facts," simply because there are no
findings of fact in the first place. What the trial court merely does is to apply the law to the facts as
alleged in the complaint, assuming such allegations to be true. It follows then that any appeal
therefrom could only raise questions of law or "doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts." Therefore, a decision dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a cause
of action necessarily precludes a review of the same decision on questions of fact. One is the legal
and logical opposite of the other.35

The Court further ruled that a review of a finding of lack of cause of action based on the factual and
material allegations of the complaint would only limit itself to whether the law was properly applied
given the facts alleged in the complaint. What would inevitably arise from such a review are pure
questions of law, and not questions of fact:

JADEBANK in its Appellant’s Brief raised the following questions, which it erroneously designated as
questions of fact, in an attempt to place its appeal within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals:

4.1.1. Whether or not the amended complaint together with the Annexes attached and
forming an integral part thereof, states a sufficient cause of action against the defendant-
appellee;

4.1.2. Whether or not there was an unwarranted reversal of the Honorable Regional Trial
Court’s Orders stating that the complaint states a sufficient cause of action;

4.2.1. Whether or not the Motion to Dismiss the complaint can be considered also as a
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.

We fail to see how these issues raised by JADEBANK could be properly denominated questions of
fact. The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise, it is a question of fact. Applying the test to the instant case, it is clear that private
respondent raises pure questions of law which are not proper in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41,
but should be raised by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

We agree with private respondent that in a motion to dismiss due to failure to state a cause of action,
the trial court can consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on
record. However in so doing, the trial court does not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It
merely includes such documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding of lack of
cause of action based on these documents would not involve a calibration of the probative value of
such pieces of evidence but would only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the law was properly
applied given the facts and these supporting documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise from
such a review are pure questions of law, and not questions of fact.36
Respondent cannot find solace in the ruling of this Court in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.37 In
that case, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that it failed to state a
cause of action and that plaintiffs had their right of action against defendants because they had not
established their status as heirs. Instead of appealing the order of the court, plaintiff filed a special
civil action for certiorari in this Court under Rule 65. The Court dismissed the petition, declaring that
the proper remedy was to appeal the order and not file a petition for certiorari.

It must be stressed that an order of dismissal, be it right or wrong, is a final order which is subject to
appeal, not the proper subject of certiorari. Where appeal is available as a remedy, certiorari will not
lie. In Meneses v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court reiterated the rule that:

It must also be stressed that the trial court’s order of 5 June 1992 dismissing the petitioner’s
complaint was, whether it was right or wrong, a final order because it had put an end to the particular
matter resolved, or settled definitely the matter therein disposed of and left nothing more to be done
by the trial court except the execution of the order. It is a firmly settled rule that the remedy against
such order is the remedy of appeal and not certiorari. That appeal may be solely on questions of law,
in which case it may be taken only to this Court; or on questions of fact and law, in which case the
appeal should be brought to the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Murillo v. Consul, the appeal to this
Court should be by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In the instant case then, if the petitioner had chosen to appeal from the dismissal order of the trial
court solely on questions of law, then he should have filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court. If he wanted to raise in his appeal both questions of law and of fact, then he should have
pursued the remedy of an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals and not by way of a petition for
review under Rule 45. The Court of Appeals did not then commit any reversible error when it
dismissed the petition for review of the petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 29328.39

Thus, the appeal of respondent to the CA by writ of error is a wrong mode of appeal; consequently,
the appeal should have been dismissed.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 60-62.

2
 Id. at 49-51.

3
 Id. at 51.

4
 Id. at 63-64.

5
 Id. at 95.

6
 Id. at 96-124.

7
 Id. at 96-98.

8
 Id. at 125-139.

9
 Id. at 140-143.

10
 Id. at 144-145.

11
 Id. at 146.

12
 Id. at 204-213.

13
 Id. at 42-43.

14
 Id. at 311-337.

15
 Id. at 311-347.

16
 Id. at 45.

17
 Id. at 47-48.

18
 Id. at 356-357.

19
 Id. at 23.
 20
 G.R. No. 84628, November 16, 1989, 179 SCRA 511.

21
 Minute Resolution dated October 19, 1998 in G.R. No. 135316.

 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Jancom Environmental Corporation, 425

22

Phil. 961, 972 (2002).

23
 Rules of Court, Rule 41, Section 2.

24
 Rules of Court, Rule 45, Section 1.

25
 Section 2, Rule 50, Rules of Court.

 Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158397, November 26, 2004, 444 SCRA 509,
26

517.

27
 Cucueco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139278, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 290, 298.

 See Philippine National Bank v. Romillo, Jr., No. L-70681, October 16, 1985, 139 SCRA
28

320.

29
 China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 590, 599 (2000).

30
 De Dios v. Bristol Laboratories (Phils.), Inc., 154 Phil. 311, 318 (1974).

 Rava Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96825, July 3, 1992, 211
31

SCRA 144; Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87678, June 16, 1992,
210 SCRA 33, 38.

 Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 87434,
32

August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 194, 207.

 See Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1184
33

(1997).

34
 Supra note 29.

35
 Id. at 600.

36
 Id. at 601-602.

37
 363 Phil. 393 (1999).

38
 G.R. No. 109053, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 484.

39
 Id. at 491-492.

G.R. No. 165793             October 27, 2006

ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION, RAUL
VALINO, NEAL CRUZ, ERNESTO TOLENTINO, NOEL CABRERA, THELMA SAN JUAN, GERRY
ZARAGOZA, DONNA GATDULA, RODNEY P. DIOLA and ROBERT COYIUTO, JR., respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari1 assails the July 27, 20042 and October 25, 20043 Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76995 denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration.

In his complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136, docketed as Civil
Case No. 94-1114, petitioner Alfonso T. Yuchengco alleged that in the last quarter of 1994,
respondents published in the Manila Chronicle a series of defamatory articles against him, to wit: (1)
that he was a "Marcos crony" or a "Marcos-Romualdez crony," which term according to him is
commonly understood to describe an individual who received special and undeserving favors from
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his brother-in-law Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez,
thereby allowing him to engage in illegal and dishonorable business activities; (2) that he engaged in
unsound and immoral business practices by taking control of Oriental Petroleum Mineral Corporation
in order to divert its resources to rescue the debt-ridden Benguet Corporation; (3) that he was an
unfair and uncaring employer; (4) that he induced Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation to violate
the provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans; (5) that he induced others to disobey the
lawful orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission; and (6) that he was a "corporate raider,"
or one who seeks to profit for something he did not work for.4

On November 8, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision,5 the dispositive portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is herby rendered as follows:

1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendants Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz,
Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul
Valino and Rodney Diola to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:

a. the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as moral damages; and

b. the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as exemplary damages.

2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants Robert Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle
Publishing to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:

a. the amount of Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) as moral damages; and

 b. the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) as exemplary damages.

3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly
and severally, the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as attorney’s fees and legal
costs.

SO ORDERED.6

After the trial court promulgated its decision, respondents appealed the same to the Court of
Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76995. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals in a
notice dated October 3, 2003 required respondents to file their appellant’s brief.

Respondents Cruz and Tolentino filed their appellants’ brief on February 4, 2004 while respondents
The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragosa,
Donna Gatdula, Rodney Viola, Raul Valino, and Robert Coyiuto filed their appellants’ brief on March
3, 2004.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the appellants’ briefs submitted by
respondents were not in the prescribed size and did not have page references.

The Court of Appeals denied the motion to dismiss holding that although procedural rules are
required to be followed as a general rule, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his noncompliance with the procedure required. Petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition on the sole issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not ordering the dismissal of private
respondents’ appeal.

Petitioner alleges that respondents’ appellants’ briefs were not in the prescribed size and did not
have page references as required by Section 13 (c) and (d) of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court which is
a ground to dismiss the appeal under Section 1 (f) of Rule 50. Likewise, petitioner avers that he was
not served two copies of respondents Coyiuto, et al.’s brief as required by Section 7 of Rule 44
which constitutes another ground to dismiss the appeal under Section 1 (e) of Rule 50.

Respondents aver that the Court of Appeals may have committed errors of procedures but it does
not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner’s claim that the appellants’ briefs did not contain a
"citation of authorities" is misleading because they cited authorities and made references to specific
pages in the TSNs. They argue that if the appellants’ briefs suffered from any infirmity, the same is
inconsequential and would not justify the dismissal of their appeal, more so considering that the
primordial issue at hand is whether or not giving due course to the appeal would serve substantial
justice.

The petition lacks merit.

Indeed, Section 7 of Rule 44 requires the appellants to serve two copies of the appellants’ brief to
the appellee. However, the failure to serve the required number of copies does not automatically
result in the dismissal of the appeal. The Court of Appeals has the discretion whether to dismiss or
not to dismiss the appeal. Thus, we held in Philippine National Bank v. Philippine Milling Co.,
Inc.7 that:
 [P]ursuant to Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, "an appeal may be dismissed by
the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee" upon the ground, among
others, of "failure of the appellant . . . to serve and file the required number of copies of his
brief," within the reglementary period. Manifestly, this provision confers a power and
does not impose a duty. What is more, it is directory, not mandatory.

Contrary to petitioners’ assertion that, on November 22, 1966, "it became its (Court of
Appeals’) ministerial duty to dismiss the appeal and remand the case for execution to the
Court of origin," the Court of Appeals had, under said provision of the Rules of
Court, discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss respondents’ appeal. Although said
discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case, the presumption is that it
has been so exercised. It was incumbent upon herein petitioners, as actors in the case at
bar, to offset this presumption. Yet, the record before us does not satisfactorily show
that the Court of Appeals has abused its discretion much less gravely. Petitioners’
assertion of abuse of discretion is predicated solely upon the alleged "ministerial" duty of
said Court to dismiss the appeal therein, which is devoid of legal foundation. It is inconsistent
with our views in Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo and Alquiza v. Alquiza. (Emphasis
supplied)

Likewise, Section 13 (c) & (d) requires that the appellants’ brief should contain a clear statement of
the case and facts with page references to the record. The absence of page reference is a ground
for dismissal of the appeal, however, the same is not mandatory but directory on the part of the
Court of Appeals. Thus, we held in De Leon v. Court of Appeals8 that:

The Court of Appeals rightly exercised its discretion when, in denying petitioner’s
motion to dismiss, it ruled that the citations contained in the appellants’ brief were in
substantial compliance with the rules. Where the citations found in the appellants’ brief
could sufficiently enable the appellate court to locate expeditiously the portions of the record
referred to, there is substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 13 (c) and (d),
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Such determination was properly within the appellate
court’s discretion. Nothing in the records indicate that it was exercised capriciously,
whimsically, or with a view of permitting injury upon a party litigant. For the same reasons,
we hold that the respondent Court of Appeals also did not err when it did not dismiss the
appeal based on the allegation that appellants’ brief failed to comply with the internal rules of
said court. (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, the Appellants’ Brief contained a statement of facts with references to Exhibits
and TSNs and attachments. The Appellants’ Brief may not have referred to the exact pages of the
records, however, the same is not fatal to their cause since the references they made enabled the
appellate court to expeditiously locate the portions of the record referred to. Consequently,
respondents substantially complied with the requirements of Section 13 (c) and (d) of Rule 44.

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.9 The Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse
its discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss.

Moreover, the Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice, but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will
be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why
courts, in rendering justice, have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by
the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other
way around.10 Circumspect leniency will give the appellant "the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his complaint rather than to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities."11

The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just
and inexpensive determination of the cases before them. Liberal construction of the rules and the
pleadings is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.12

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated July 27,
2004 and October 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76995 denying petitioner’s
motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez,Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 6-22.

 Id. at 24; penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, with Associate Justices Jose L.
2

Sabio, Jr. and Danilo B. Pine, concurring.

 Id. at 26; penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, with Associate Justices Jose L.
3

Sabio, Jr. and Eubulo G. Verzola, concurring.

4
 Id. at 27-28.

5
 Id. at 27-47. Penned by Judge Rebecca R. Mariano.

6
 Id. at 47.

7
 136 Phil. 212, 215 (1969).

8
 432 Phil. 775, 790 (2002).

 Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154920, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 285, 289, citing
9

D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Esguerra, 328 Phil. 1168, 1181 (1996).

 Heirs of Spouses Eugenio Natonton and Regina Arcilla v. Spouses Eulogio and Lily
10

Magaway, G.R. No. 147011, March 31, 2006.

11
 Jaro v. Court of Appeals, 427 Phil. 532, 536 (2002).

12
 Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil. 665, 673 (2003).