Jadewell Parking vs.

Lidua
G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage
the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City
Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru its General Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel Januario
S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents Edwin Ang,
Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a
Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and
unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly
removed with a piece of metal is P26,250.00. The fines of P500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of P500.00
were also not paid by the respondents herein.

Jadewell filed two cases against respondents for Robbery it was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City
on May 23, 2003. A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed
a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of
Authority/Grave Coercion.

On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25,
2003.

Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed on January 20, 2004
a Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation[8] on February 2, 2004.

In an Order[10] dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004 Order.

Respondents argued that in Zaldivia v. Reyes held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, refer to judicial proceedings. Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of
the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were
filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
the cases.

The RTC of Baguio City, Branch 7 favored the respondents. In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the RTC of Baguio City
Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari.

Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in an
August 15, 2005 Order.

ISSUE:

Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period
of the commission of the offense charged against respondents

HELD:

The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules governing the
prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that
provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law
provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that
Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.

In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, this Court defined the parameters of prescription: In resolving the issue of prescription of
the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the
time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.

With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense charged under
City Ordinance 003-2000.

The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day.
These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period
where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in
Zaldivia v. Reyes. In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts
and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received
on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.

Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision
does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be
deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary
investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed
in court and not on any date before that.

Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then files the
Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period.

Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already
prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against
respondents.
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the case
against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription
period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to
say concerning the effects of its ruling:

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably
with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it
is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent
as reasonably deduced from their plain language.

The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought
to be corrected.33

WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.