JOAQUIN G.

BONIFACIO, Complainant vs. ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE

KAREN B. BRAGAS, Respondents

A.C. No. 11754; October 3, 2017; Tijam, J.

FACTS:

 Abucejo Group, represented by Era and Associates Law Office through Atty. Era, lodged
an illegal dismissal case against Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine Rebuilders
Corporation

 LA found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for illegal dismissal and consequently,
ordered them to pay Abucejo Group.

 In SC, their appeals and motions were decided against them also.

 A Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment was issued.

 Two alias writs were issued directing sheriff to collect the sum P4,012,166.43.

 MEANWHILE, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for representing
conflicting interests.

 (July 6, 2013) The court found Atty. Era GUILTY of the charge. (Violation of Rule 15.03
of Canon 15 and Canon 17 of the CPR)

 Court imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years

 (November 28, 2013) the scheduled public auction over Bonifacio’s and/or the
corporation’s properties in the business establishment was conducted to implement the
alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated therein.

 Atty. Era tendered bid for his clients who were declared as highest bidders.

 Atty. Era were to pull out the subject properties but stopped to negotiate with Bonifacio’s
children, but the parties were NOT able to settle.

 Attys. Era and Bragas went back to Bonifacio's business establishment together with
their clients and several men, and forced open the establishment to pull out the
auctioned properties.

 Prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for malicious mischief, robbery, and
trespassing.

 Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Attys. Era and Bragas for
grave coercion.
  Meanwhile, Atty. Era’s name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC and
this Court sometime in February and April 2014 regarding subject labor case.

 (August 8, 2014) Bonifacio filed the instant administrative complaint

 Atty. Era further argued that he did not violate the Court's order of suspension from the
practice of law as he merely acted as his clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to a Special
Power of Attomey20 (SPA) dated May 3, 2006. It is Atty. Era's theory that with such SP
A, he was not engaged in the practice of law in representing his clients in the
implementation of the alias writ. He added that he never signed any document or
pleading on behalf of his clients during his suspension. For Atty. Bragas, being an
associate of Era and Associates Law Firm, she was merely representing the Abucejo
Group as said law firm's clients.

 Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera recommended the dismissal

of the instant administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

 The IBP Board of Governors reversed and set aside the Investigating Commissioner's
findings and conclusions

 They ruled that Atty. Era had no authority under the SP A to represent his clients during
the November 28, 2013 auction and to pull out and receive the corporation's machines
as payment of the judgment award.

 At any rate, according to the Board, Atty. Era's clients relied on his legal knowledge in
having the judgment award satisfied. Clearly, Atty. Era violated Section 28,32 Rule 138
of the Rules of Court

 Hence, the records of this case were transmitted to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Era engaged in the practice of law during his suspension that
would warrant another disciplinary action against him

RULING:

Yes. Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law".

On this matter, Our pronouncement in the landmark case of Renato L. Cayetano v. Christian
Monsod, et. al. 36 is on point. Thus, We quote herein the relevant portions of the said Decision,
viz.:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered
by his associate." (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N .E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:

"xxx for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. CS. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1) appeared on behalf
of his winning clients in the public auction of the condemned properties; (2) tendered bid in the
auction for his clients; (3) secured the certificate of sale and presented the said document to the
corporation's officers and employees present in the premises at that time; (4) insisted that his
clients are now the new owners of the subject properties, hence, should be allowed entry in the
premises; (5) initiated the pull out of the properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children
in his law office as regards the payment of the judgment award with interest instead of pulling
out the properties.

It is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating matters relating to the same may
not be exclusively for lawyers, as opined by the Investigating Commissioner. However, in this
case, as aptly put by the Board in its Resolution, Atty. Era's acts clearly involved the
determination by a trained legal mind of the legal effects and consequences of each course of
action in the satisfaction of the judgment award.

Indubitably, Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized law practice.

Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful order of this Court, which under
Section 27,44 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is found GUILTY of willfully

disobeying this Court's lawful order and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) years
GIZALE O. TUMBAGA, Complainant vs. ATTY. MANUEL P. TEOXON, Respondent

November 21, 2017; A.C. No. 5573; Leonardo- De Castro, J.

FACTS:

 Gizale Tumbaga filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Manuel Teoxon charging
him with gross immorality, deceitful and fraudulent conduct, and gross misconduct.

 Atty. Manuel visited her often, and even volunteered to be her son’s god father.

 Respondent also assured complainant’s mother that although he was already married to
Luzviminda Balang, his marriage was a sham because their marriage contract was not
registered.

 Complainant moved in with respondent at the Puncia Apartment in Naga City.

 She became pregnant.

 Respondent spent more time with them and used their apartment as a temporary law
office

 Complainant decided to work but respondent compelled her to resign assuring that he
would take care of their financial needs.

 Respondent failed to fulfill this promise

 Complainant sought assistance from the Office of the City Fiscal in Naga City

 Respondent subsequently gave complainant an affidavit of support, to which he again

reneged or failed to fulfill

 Complainant moved out of their apartment as the respondent didn’t pay rentals anymore

 Respondent raided complainant's new residence, accompanied by three SWAT

members and his wife.

 Visibly drunk, respondent threatened to hurt complainant with the bolo and the lead pipe
that he was carrying if she will not return the personal belongings that he left in their
previous apartment unit.

 Gizale Tumbaga filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Manuel Teoxon charging
him with gross immorality, deceitful and fraudulent conduct, and gross misconduct.

 Respondent denied the allegations and asserted that complainant merely wanted to
exact money from him.
  The parties appeared before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for a few hearings
and the marking of their respective evidence.

 The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report and Recommendation, finding
that respondent maintained an illicit affair with complainant and that he should be meted
the penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years.

 IBP Board of Governors approved the recommendation and increased the

recommended period of suspension to 3 years

 Respondent filed an MR

 IBP Board of Governors denied

 Hence, the case was transmitted to the SC

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s actuations in this case showed his failure to live up the
good moral conduct required of the members of the legal profession

RULING: Yes.

The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their
application for admission to the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the practice
of law. In this regard, the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in
fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a
member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to
remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks
should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing
fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as
the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to
show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the
basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is,
it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the common sense of decency. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for the imposition of the penalty of
disbarment or suspension if a member of the Bar is found guilty of committing grossly immoral
conduct, to wit:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
.conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.

In order to justify the imposition of the above administrative penalties on a member of the Bar,
his/her guilt must first be established by substantial evidence.33 As explained in Re: Rafael
Dimaano,34 substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

After a thorough review of the records of the case, the Court upholds the findings of the IBP as
there is indeed substantial evidence that respondent committed gross immorality by maintaining
an extramarital affair with complainant.

One of the key pieces of evidence that the IBP considered in ruling against respondent is the
Decision dated May 8, 2006 of the MTCC of Naga City in Civil Case No. 11546 for replevin.

In said case, respondent made it appear that he was merely seeking to recover personal
belongings that he left behind at one time in complainant's house. The items included a
traveling bag with various articles of clothing and file folders of cases that he was handling. He
also tried to recover the pieces of furniture that he allegedly bought for the complainant, which
the latter failed to reimburse as promised. These include a brass bed with foam mattress, a
plastic dining table with six plastic chairs, a brass sala set with a center table, and a plastic
drawer. For her defense, complainant argued that the respondent gradually left the items of
clothing in their apartment unit during the period that they cohabited therein from time to time.
She also said that the furniture were gifts to her and Billy John.

In its decision, the MTCC did rule in favor of respondent.1âwphi1 However, the following
elucidation by the MTCC is quite telling:

To the Court, this is one case that should not have been brought to court because [respondent]
could have resorted to a more diplomatic or tactful way of retrieving his personal belongings
rather than going on record with a lot of pretext and evasion as if the presiding judge is too
naive to appreciate human nature and the truth. [Respondent] would have done well if he was
gentleman, candid and responsible enough to admit his misadventure and accept responsibility
for his misdeeds rather than try to distort facts and avoid facing the truth. It is not manly.
Of course, the [MTCC] is fully convinced that the personal belongings listed in the complaint
[are] owned by him and the [furniture] that were eventually sold by [complainant] was bought by
him, even without showing any receipts for it. However, the [MTCC] is not persuaded by his
allegation that he left his bag with [complainant] because he was in a hurry in going to Manila.
He boldly declared in [the trial court] that he has three residences in Naga City and of all places
he had to leave his shirt and underwear with a lady whom he had visited "only twice".

[Respondent] could deny all the way up to high heaven that he has no child with [complainant]
but the [MTCC] will forever wonder why the latter would refuse to part with the shirts and pants
unless she is a bareface extortionist. But to the [MTCC], she did not appear to be so. In fact, the
[MTCC] had the occasion to observe [complainant] with two little handsome boys who appeared
to be her sons. Hence, this lends credence to the fact that she might have really demanded
money in exchange for the shirts and pants to support her children.

Be that as it may, the [MTCC] is duty bound to apply the law. There is no issue on the
ownership of the personal belongings contained in a bag allegedly left by the [respondent] in the
house of [complainant].

xxxx

However, as far as the [furniture] is concerned, like the brass bed, sala set, dining table and
plastic drawer, the [MTCC] is not persuaded by [respondent's] claim that he meant to be paid by
[complainant] for it. [Respondent] is a lawyer and although he is not engage[d] in the buying and
selling of [furniture] he should have known that if he really intended to be paid back for it, he
should have asked [complainant] to [sign] a promissory note or even a memorandum. As it is,
he failed to show any evidence of such an undertaking. That it was a gift of love is more like
it.35

The IBP posited that the above ruling was more than sufficient to prove that respondent tried to
distort the truth that he and complainant did live together as husband and wife in one apartment
unit. The Court agrees with the IBP on this matter.

A perusal of the above decision reveals that the findings and conclusions therein were arrived at
by the MTCC after a trial on the merits of the case. In other words, the trial court first heard the
parties and received their respective evidence before it rendered a decision. As such, the trial
court cannot be accused of arriving at the aforementioned findings lightly
 HEIRS OF JUAN DE DIOS E. CARLOS, NAMELY, JENNIFER N. CARLOS, JOCELYN N.
CARLOS, JACQUELINE CARLOS-DOMINGUEZ, JO-ANN CARLOS-TABUTON, JIMMY N.
CARLOS, LORNA A. CARLOS, JERUSHA ANN A. CARLOS AND JAN JOSHUA A.
CARLOS, Complainants, v. ATTY. JAIME S. LINSANGAN, Respondent.

A.C. No. 11494, July 24, 2017

FACTS:

 Complainants are late children of the late Juan De Dios Carlos who presently seek to
disbar respondent Atty. Jaime Linsangan.
 Complainants alleged that Atty. Linsangan forced them to sign pleadings and
documents, sold the parcel of land in Alabang in cahoots with complainants’ estranged
mother, and evaded payment of income taxes when he divided his share in the subject
property as his supposed attorney’s fees to wife and children, all in violation of his oath
as a lawyer.
 Spouses Carlos previously owned a parcel of land in Alabang.
 Teofilo Carlos (their son) convinced them to transfer said title to his name with a promise
to distribute the same to his brothers and sisters.
 However, Teofilo sold the entire property to Pedro
 Juan engaged the services of Atty. Linsangan for purposes of recovering such property.
 Atty Linsangan, for Juan, filed
(a) a case against Felicidad (Pedro’s wife) which was settled with the latter
acknowledging Juan's one-half interest and ownership over the property;
(b) a case against Pedro which was concluded on September 12, 1997; and
(c) another case against Felicidad, albeit filed by another lawyer who acted under the
direct control and supervision of Atty. Linsangan.
 Atty. Linsangan also represented Juan in several cases involving the subject property
aside from the first ones
 Atty. Linsangan and Juan executed a Contract for Professional Services.
 Par 5 - CLIENT hereby confirms and ratifies that he has agreed and bound himself to
pay ATTORNEY a contingent fee in an amount equivalent to FIFTY PERCENT (50%) of
the market value of the property, or portion thereof, which may be recovered, or the
zonal value thereof, whichever is higher
 Subsequently, a Supplemental Compromise Agreement was submitted by the heirs of
Juan and Atty. Linsangan, dividing among them the 7,500 square meter-portion of the
property as follows: 3,750 square meters to the heirs of Juan and 3,750 square meters
to Atty. Linsangan pursuant to the Contract for Professional Services.
 In said Supplemental Compromise Agreement, Atty. Linsangan waived in favor of his
wife and children his 3,750 square meter share, except as to the 250 square meters
thereof.
 Atty. Linsangan executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with a certain Helen Perez covering
the entire property and sold such property
 Complainants wrote a letter to Atty. Linsangan revoking the SPA which they executed in
his favor
 In said letter, complainants accused Atty Linsangan of conniving with their mother in
selling the subject property.
 Complainants however recognized Atty. Linsangan’s services for which they proposed
that the latter be paid quantum meruit instead of 50% of subject property
 Atty. Linsangan aers that the SCA was never questioned by the complainants until now.
 Atty Linsangan also admits that the subject of the sale with Helen is the property in
Alabang and that the complainants were not given a share from the payments because
such were specifically made applicable to his and family’s share in the subject property
only.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Linsangan is guilty of violating his Lawyer’s Oath
RULING:
YES.
After a careful review of the record of the case, the Court finds that respondent committed
acts in violation of his oath as an attorney thereby warranting the Court's exercise of its
disciplinary power.
We begin by emphasizing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by
the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Whether or not a lawyer
is still entitled to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him,
based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney. The avowed purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney
is not to punish the lawyer, but to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct
has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an
office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the
administration of justice. The lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a
ground for suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.43
The record shows and Atty. Linsangan does not deny, that while the cases involving the
subject property were still pending resolution and final determination, Atty. Linsangan
entered into a Contract for Professional Services with Juan wherein his attorney's fees shall
be that equivalent to 50% of the value of the property, or a portion thereof, that may be
recovered. It is likewise not denied by Atty. Linsangan that he apportioned upon himself, and
to his wife and children, half of the property awarded to complainants as heirs of Juan,
through a Supplemental Compromise Agreement. Similarly, such Supplemental
Compromise Agreement was entered into by Atty. Linsangan and the heirs of Juan
concurrently with the pendency of several cases before the CA and this Court44 involving
the very same property. What is more, Atty. Linsangan, probably anticipating that he may be
charged of having undue interest over his client's property in litigation, caused another
lawyer to appear but all the while making it absolutely clear to Juan that the latter's
appearance was nevertheless under Atty. Linsangan's "direct control and supervision."
Plainly, these acts are in direct contravention of Article 1491(5)45 of the Civil Code which
forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has been the
subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their profession. While Canon
10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer should not
purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," is no
longer reproduced in the new Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), such proscription
still applies considering that Canon I of the CPR is clear in requiring that "a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
process" and Rule 138, Sec. 3 which requires every lawyer to take an oath to "obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein."46 Here, the law
transgressed by Atty. Linsangan is Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, in violation of his
lawyer's oath.
While jurisprudence provides an exception to the above proscription, i.e., if the payment of
contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's property
but only after the judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer, such is
not applicable to the instant case. To reiterate, the transfer to Atty. Linsangan was made
while the subject property was still under litigation, or at least concurrently with the
pendency of the certiorari proceedings in the CA and the petitions for review in this Court.
As mentioned, there was nothing in the record which would show that these cases were
likewise dismissed with finality either before the execution of, or by virtue of, the
Compromise Agreement and the Supplemental Compromise Agreement between
complainants and Atty. Linsangan.
What is more, Atty. Linsangan, at the guise of merely waiving portions of the subject
property in favor of his wife and children, actually divided his attorney's fee with persons who
are not licensed to practice law in contravention of Rule 9.02,49 Canon 950 of the CPR.
Another misconduct committed by Atty. Linsangan was his act of selling the entire 12,331
square meters property and making it appear that he was specifically authorized to do so by
complainants as well as by the other persons51 to whom portions of the property had been
previously adjudicated. However, a perusal of the supposed Special Power of Attorney
attached to the Deed of Absolute Sale, save for that executed by his wife and children, only
authorizes Atty. Linsangan to represent complainants in the litigation of cases involving
Juan's properties. Nothing in said Special Power of Attorney authorizes Atty. Linsangan to
sell the entire property including complainants' undivided share therein.
Atty. Linsangan's reasoning that he only took it upon himself to sell the property because
complainants were unfamiliar with real estate transactions does not exculpate him from
liability. If indeed that were the case, then it is incumbent upon Atty. Linsangan to make it
clear to the complainants that he was acting in such capacity and not as their lawyer. But
even this, Atty. Linsangan failed to do.
Worse, Atty. Linsangan does not deny having received the downpayment for the property
from Helen. Atty. Linsangan does not also deny failing to give complainants' share for the
reason that he applied said payment as his share in the property. In so doing, Atty.
Linsangan determined all by himself that the downpayment accrues to him and immediately
appropriated the same, without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. Such act
constitutes a breach of his client's trust and a violation of Canon 1653 of the CPR. Indeed, a
lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere
fact that the client owes him attorneys fees. The failure of an attorney to return the client's
money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice and violation of the general morality, as well as of professional
ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. In
short, a lawyer's unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in this case,
warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.55

Pointedly, the relationship of attorney and client has consistently been treated as one of
special trust and confidence. An attorney must therefore exercise utmost good faith and
fairness in all his relationship with his client. Measured against this standard, respondent's
act clearly fell short and had, in fact, placed his personal interest above that of his clients.
Considering the foregoing violations of his lawyer's oath, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code,
Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and Canon 16 of the CPR, the Court deems it appropriate to impose
upon respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.
ROMAN DELA ROSA VERANO* , Complainant vs. ATTY. LUIS FERNAN DIORES, JR.,
Respondent November 7, 201; A.C. No. 8887

FACTS:

 Verano executed a SPA in favor of Atty. Diores authorizing the latter to use Verano’s
parcel of land as guaranty to obtain a bail bond for particular criminal cases that had
been filed against Atty. Diores.

 Verano was surprised when he subsequently discovered that Atty. Diores executed a M
(MOA) with Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation (Visayan Surety) in order to use
the subject property as guarantee to obtain bail bonds for at least 61 cases

 Verano alleged that he did not authorize Atty. Diores to use the subject property as
collateral for those 61 cases

 RTC found Atty Dolores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of Estafa through
false pretenses and fraudulent means under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC

 Verano filed a letter-complaint against Atty. Diores

 No comment was made by Atty Diores

 Case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation

 Commissioner Antiguiera rendered a Report and Recommendation finding Atty Diores

guilty of deceit in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR holding that Atty. Diores:
(1) took undue advantage of the trust reposed on him by Verano by secretly
entering into the subject MOA; (2) jumped bail on some of the criminal cases and
failed to serve sentence in those where he was duly convicted by final judgment;
and (3) refused to comply with the orders of the Court and the IBP to submit his
comment and position paper, and to attend the mandatory conference.

 the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the said Report and
Recommendation, but recommended that Atty. Diores be disbarred

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court must adopt and approve the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors

RULING:

Yes. After a judicious examination of the records and submissions of the parties, the Court has
no compelling reason to diverge from the factual findings of Commissioner Antiquiera and the
recommended penalty of the IBP Board of Governors.

In dealing with clients or other people, lawyers are expected to observe the highest degree of
good faith, fairness and candor, both in their private and professional capacities. Thus, any form
of deception or fraudulent act committed by a lawyer in either capacity is not only disgraceful
and dishonorable, but also severely undermines the trust and confidence of people in the legal
profession, violates Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR, and puts the lawyer's moral character into
serious doubt as a member of the Bar, rendering him unfit to continue his practice of law.
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to obey lawful orders of a superior court and the IBP. Willful
disobedience to such orders, especially to those issued by this Court, is a sufficient ground to
disbar a lawyer or suspend him from the practice of law under Section 27,22 Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court.

In this case, Commissioner Antiquiera observed that while there was an SPA executed by
Verano in favor of Atty. Di ores for the latter to use Verano's land as guarantee for the bail
bonds, it only authorized Atty. Diores to use the same for specific criminal cases, and not for the
other criminal cases filed against him. In addition, Atty. Diores failed to file his comment to
Verano's letter-complaint filed against him despite two (2) notices from the Court ordering him to
do so, failed to attend the mandatory conference and file his position paper despite orders from
the IBP, and jumped bail in the criminal cases filed against him.

The Court agrees with Commissioner Antiquiera's observation. While the SPA executed by
Verano empowered Atty. Diores, in his private capacity, to use the subject property as guaranty
for his bail bond in some of his criminal cases, this did not grant him carte blanche to use the
said property to secure bail bonds in his other criminal cases which were not included in the SP
A, much less enter into a MOA with Visayan Surety for the said purpose. Such act not only
violates the trust granted to him by Verano, but also shows doubt as to his moral character.

Moreover, the fact that Atty. Diores jumped bail in the criminal cases filed against him, failed to
file a comment in the instant case despite notice from the Court, and also failed to attend the
mandatory conference and file his position paper when he was directed to do so by the IBP,
shows his propensity to willfully disobey the orders - of the Court, no less - and other judicial
authorities, including the IBP, which is a grave affront to the legal profession, and which should
be penalized to the greatest extent.

As for the recommended penalty, the Court agrees with, and hereby adopts, the IBP's
recommendation that Atty. Diores should be disbarred, in view of the totality of infractions he
had committed, compounded by his conviction for six (6) counts of Estafa by the RTC.

It is also well-settled that Estafa, which is an act of defrauding another person, whether
committed through abuse of confidence, false pretenses or other fraudulent acts,24 is a crime
involving moral turpitude25 which is also a violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR, and a
ground to disbar or suspend a lawyer as gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court.

Here, Atty. Diores was convicted of not only one, but six (6) counts of Estafa through false
pretenses and fraudulent means under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Such
conviction simply shows his criminal tendency to defraud and deceive other people into
remitting to him their hard-earned money, which the legal profession condemns in the strongest
terms. This, together with his willful disobedience of court orders and his act of using Verano's
subject property as guaranty for his bail bond outside the criminal cases wherein he was
authorized, cements his utter unfitness to continue exercising his duties as a lawyer. Thus, the
Court will not hesitate to adopt the penalty of the IBP and hereby disbar Atty. Diores to protect
the trust and confidence of the people in this noble profession.
 MANUEL L. VALIN AND HONORIO L. VALIN, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROLANDO T.
RUIZ, Respondent.

A.C. No. 10564, November 07, 2017

FACTS:

 Complainants averred that they are two of the surviving children of their deceased
parents, Pedro and Cecilia
 Pedro was the original registered owner of a parcel of land in Cagayan.
 Pedro died in December 1992
 Honorio discovered that the subject property has been transferred to respondent (Atty.
Ruiz), the godson of Pedro.
 He learned that subject land was conveyed to respondent by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale for 10k purportedly by Pedro with the consent of Cceilia
 Complainants alleged that the subject deed was falsified and signatures therein were
forgeries since Pedro was already dead and Cecilia was in Hawaii.
 The complainants pointed to respondent as the author of such falsification.
 Respondent claimed that Rogelio L. Valin (Rogelio), one of the children of Pedro and
Cecilia, sold the subject land to him allegedly in representation of Pedro.
 Respondent agreed to buy the land. Respondent even asked for Rogelio’s authority to
sell but the latter claimed that he could not locate his authority.
 Respondent alleged that Rogelio undertook to transfer the title.
 Respondent also denied having knowledge regarding the execution of the subject deed
in 1996. He insisted that he neither falsified-the said deed and Pedro's CTC No.
2259388 nor forged the signatures of Pedro and Cecilia as it was Rogelio who
processed the transfer of the title of the subject land in his name.
 Complainants stressed that the document, which was a falsified deed, was executed in
1996. They also pointed out that records from the RD revealed that on August 19, 1996,
the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-11655(s) was released to Baligad, the
housemaid of respondent. In fact, respondent admitted in his answer that he instructed
Baligad to pick up the said copy from the RD as he was busy at that time. Thus,
respondent's sweeping denial of any knowledge with respect to the. subject deed is
unmeritorious and his claim of good faith must be denied.
 Respondent imputed the falsification of the deed to Rogelio arguing that he must have
forged the signatures of his parents in his attempt to have the title of the subject land
transferred to respondent.
 IBP CBD found respondent to be unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney.
 t reasoned that as the beneficiary of the falsified deed, respondent was presumed to be
the author thereof. The IBP-CBD opined that he failed to overcome this presumption
despite his attempt to deflect the blame to Rogelio for his failure to adduce evidence in
support of his claim.
 IBP Board adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the IBP CBD
 Respondent filed an MR, dismissed.
 Respondent filed this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 1.01 and 10.01 of the CPR

RULING:

Yes. The Court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP-CBD and the recommendation
of the IBP Board.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) states that "[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Lawyers must conduct themselves
beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large,
and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.

Further, the lawyer's oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to
refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in
court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to
observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It
is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the CPR. In this light, Rule 1 0.01, Canon 10 of
the CPR provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."

It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer
has the privilege and right to practice law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it
for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard
has afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, and attorney's right to
practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct
rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney.21 In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for
the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.

In this case, the complainants allege that respondent breached his lawyer's oath and
violated the law because he falsified the subject deed of sale in 1996 to acquire the land
of Pedro even though the latter died in 1992. On the other hand, respondent claims that
he had nothing to do with the sale in 1996; rather, he imputes the execution of the
subject deed and its registration to Rogelio, brother of the complainants.

The Court finds that respondent violated the lawyer's oath, Rule 1.01 and 10.01 of the CPR.
MARJORIE A. APOLINAR-PETILO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARISTEDES A. MARAMOT,
Respondent. A.C. No. 9067, January 31, 2018

Bersamin, J.

FACTS:

 Complainant Majorie Petilo alleges that the respondent consented to, abetted and
participated in the illegal act of falsifying a public document in violation of Art 171 (4) in
relation to Art 172 (2) of the RPC
 And that respondent violated that he thereby violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 1.01 and
1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 The public document in question was the deed of donation executed in favor of Princess
Anne and Mommayda who were minors at the time of execution
 Asserting that the respondent had known of the minority of the donees, Marjorie insists
that he was thereby guilty of falsification first in his capacity as a lawyer by preparing the
deed of donation and indicating therein that both donees were then "of legal age"; and
as a notary public by notarizing the document.
 She claims that he, being Mommayda's counsel in the latter's adoption case, was aware
of the untruthful statements he made in the deed of donation because he thereafter
submitted the deed of donation as evidence therein.
 Respondent submitted that he did not employ any falsity because it was only Margarita
— the donor — who had in fact attested to the execution of the deed of donation in the
notarial acknowledgement of the deed of donation; that it was inconsequential even if
Princess Anne had signed the deed of donation not in his presence; that in
conveyances, only the person encumbering or conveying needed to personally appear,
sign and acknowledge the deed before the notary public; and that Princess Anne and
Mommayda's names were placed in the document merely for them to accept the
donation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Maramot participated in the illegal act of falsifying a public
document and thereby violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule
10.01 of Canon 10. (YES)

RULING:

As a Lawyer

 Pertinent in this case are Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1; and Rule 10.1 of Canon
10, which provide:
 Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
 Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.
 Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
7

 The respondent prepared the deed of donation. At the time of his preparation of the
document, he actually knew that Princess Anne was a minor; hence, his claim of having
then advised that her parents should represent her in the execution of the document.
Mommayda was likewise a minor.
 His awareness of the latter's minority at the time was not disputed because he was also
representing Mommayda in the latter's adoption proceedings aside from being
Mommayda's neighbor. Nonetheless, he still indicated in the deed of donation that the
donees were of legal age.
 His doing so, being undeniably dishonest, was contrary to his oath as a lawyer
not to utter a falsehood. He thereby consciously engaged in an unlawful and
dishonest conduct, defying the law and contributing to the erosion of confidence
in the Law Profession. The respondent cannot be relieved by his justifications and
submissions. As a lawyer, he should not invoke good faith and good intentions as
sufficient to excuse him from discharging his obligation to be truthful and honest in his
professional actions. His duty and responsibility in that regard were clear and
unambiguous.
 In Young v. Batuegas, the Court reminded that truthfulness and honesty had the highest
value for attorneys.

As a Notary Public

 The respondent is also being hereby charged with having executed the notarial
acknowledgment for the deed of donation despite Princess Anne not having actually
appeared before him. The respondent explains that he did not employ any falsity or
dishonesty, and that he did not make untruthful statements in executing the notarial
acknowledgment.
 Nonetheless, the respondent's denial of having employed any falsity or dishonesty, or of
making untruthful statements in executing the notarial acknowledgment does not
necessarily save the day for him. There is no question that a donation can be accepted
in a separate instrument. However, the deed of donation in question was also the same
instrument that apparently contained the acceptance. The names of Princess Anne and
Mommayda as the donees, even if still minors, should have been included in the notarial
acknowledgment of the deed itself; and, in view of their minority, the names of their
respective parents (or legal guardians) assisting them should have also been indicated
thereon. This requirement was not complied with. Moreover, Princess Anne and
Mommayda should have also signed the deed of donation themselves along with their
assisting parents or legal guardians. The omission indicated that the deed of donation
was not complete.
 Hence, the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation was improper. Rule II
Section 1 of the Rules on Notarial Practice provides that:

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. — "Acknowledgment" refers to an act inwhich an

individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an integrally complete instrument or document;