Badalamenti1988 Article FreudAndTheFallOfMan

Journal of Religion and Health, Vol. 27, No.
1, Spring 1988
F r e u d a n d the
Fall of M a n
ANTHONYF. BADALAMENTI
A B S T R A C T : This paper considers the presence in Freud's psychological theories of conceptual or-
ganizers found in the theory of the Fall of man. The search for such implicit and antecedent princi-
ples is conducted first in his ontogenetic model and then in his model for nosology. A Jungian ex-
planation then follows which proposes that the presence of such organizing principles in Freud's
ideas is an archetypal phenomenon.
Introduction
The Fall of man is a theological concept. It is perhaps surprising to suggest

that there is some r e l a t e d n e s s - - a c t u a l l y similarity of f o r m - - b e t w e e n it and
the psychological thoughts of Freud. However, the Fall of man as a concept has
a great deal to say about the state of h u m a n nature as it is observed out of a
theological context. As a concept, the Fall of man refers to a specific kind of
damage to h u m a n nature which affects man's adaptation to himself and to his
world, among other things. People came to Freud to seek help in their adapta-
tions not merely because of inner or outer f a i l u r e s - - w h i c h could easily be
o b j e c t i v e - - b u t preeminently because of such elusive psychic difficulties as
anxiety, depression, and other distressing subjective states which assailed the
victim's will and well-being.
Freud's attitude toward religion was critical and often negative. It is certain
that he did not approach his patients with an implicit a priori conception
from theology. The same could be said with respect to philosophy, which he
also held in low regard. As an investigator of psychic disorders Freud put his
natural assets of mind and disposition to good use: he was intellectually honest
and enjoyed a highly developed ability to sense the inner workings of another
person's psyche. He began his professional work in the context of neurology
and was only reluctantly but inexorably driven to assume a psychological per-
spective on the sufferings he sought to relieve.
It would seem that Freud, as one lacking religious sentiment and as one co-
erced into psychological thought, would be among the least likely to formulate
Anthony F. Badalamenti, Ph.D., is with The Nathan S. Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research
in Orangeburg, New York. Address reprint request to Dr. Badalamenti, Nathan S. Kline Insti-
tute, Orangeburg Road, Orangeburg, New York, 10862.
23 9 1988 Institutes of Religion and Health

24 Journal of Religion and Health
his inferences in a way t h a t is reminiscent of the Fall of man. I am stressing

this point merely to emphasize t h a t the perspective of this paper is t h a t Freud
was unprejudiced in pursuing a psychological model t h a t in m a n y ways recalls
the Fall of man. There are instances where his narrative suggests t h a t it was
written by St. Augustine or by St. Thomas Aquinas (examples are given later).
Yet it is historically certain t h a t Freud conceptualized without religious
preconception.
I will first review the theology of the Fall and then discuss the psychological
thoughts of Freud with a specific part of t h a t theological context in mind. The
objective is to present sufficient discussion to render credible the position t h a t
the conceptual organizing principles of Freud meet, to some degree and in a spe-
cific way, those of the theology of the Fall. This endeavor, when considered in
the context of the prior comments, motivates a second one: to account for such
similarity as exists. This effort will make recourse to Jung's archetypal think-
ing, whose scrutiny will then make it worthwhile to consider what the notion of
archetype itself means and can mean in the present context.
I have deliberately not used footnoted references in this introduction in order
to avoid distracting the reader. The import of this p a p e r - - t o whatever degree
t e n a b l e - - s t r i k e s me as unusual enough to make this a wise decision, I hope.
Claims made in what follows, as well as those already made, will be referenced.
Usually multiple references for the same concept from different times in Freud's
l i f e - - n o t necessarily in chronological order--will be given in order to demon-
strate the persistent presence of the same organizing principles in his thinking.
T h e Fall o f man: A s u m m a r y
The scriptural basis for the Fall centers around the expulsion of Adam and Eve
from the paradise of Eden as related in chapter 3 of Genesis. The details of the
narrative are familiar and are therefore omitted. The tradition maintained
prior to Christianity is t h a t the h u m a n race is fated to a mortal life and its tra-
vails. That is, the primal transgression of Adam and Even (original sin) made it
thenceforward impossible to secure (secular) immortality or to secure a life
without toil and pain. The first significant thinker to articulate the tradition in
broader terms is St. Augustine (354-430), 1 whose writings show a clear Pla-
tonic influence. In the thirteenth century St. Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-
1274) reviewed the Augustinian tradition and refined it by making reference to
Aristotelean concepts/ a sequence t h a t preserved the chronological order of
Plato and Aristotle.
The implicit starting point is t h a t man was created in an exalted state in
which he enjoyed not merely the gifts of his own nature but others as well.
These other gifts, which are ontologically higher than man's own nature but
less than divine, are usually called preternatural. In addition, man enjoyed the
supernatural gift of participating in God's own life, a gift usually called sancti-
fying grace and often equated with sonship. In the primal state man was at one
Anthony F. Badalamenti 25
with God or, equivalently, man enjoyed God's friendship. It is usually main-
tained t h a t man and the created spirits (angels) had a joint destiny to complete
the material universe in which man was placed.
The conceptual context of the Fall sees man as a psychosomatic being, having
both psyche (soul) and a soma (body). The very definition of man here is t h a t of a
being whose nature is a psychosomatic union. The soul of man separated from
the body of man is not fully man. The preternatural gifts enriched this union
and conferred a sublime security upon it in this world. Prior to the Fall man en-
joyed an internal state which tradition usually refers to as integrity. This has
an exact meaning somewhat removed from its vernacular use. The term "integ-
rity" means t h a t all of man's nature was harmoniously one when man chose to
pursue the purpose for which he was created: to know and to love God. One of
the results of the Fall is termed "concupiscence," whose meaning is also re-
moved from the vernacular. Concupiscence refers to a specific damage to h u m a n
nature in which man's powers tend to seek their own immediate ends, a state
t h a t is something of an inverse to integrity. With integrity man's life processes
and powers were of one mind, and with concupiscence this synergy was lost and
supplanted not merely by the absence of inner cooperation but also by the in-
subordination of parts of the self against others. Man ceased to be master in
his own house, a condition which, interestingly, Freud felt characterized his
patients.
The tradition also maintains t h a t the first parents enjoyed innate knowledge
of n a t u r e - - n o t necessarily unlimited or comprehensive but enough to pursue
happily their destiny as defined in this world. St. Augustine stated t h a t with
the Fall came concupiscence and ignorance? The laborious processes of study
and investigation are the heritage of the race with which to compensate for the
ignorance resulting from the Fall, as well as to compensate for the expulsion
from Eden. Tradition does not clarify to what degree, if any, ignorance sub-
tracted from man an innate knowledge of the Creator. Fortunately this is not
an issue in this paper.
Concupiscence and ignorance refer to the state of fallen h u m a n n a t u r e as
seen from within. Among the preternatural gifts lost in the Fall are immortal-
ity and impassibility. Both of these gifts refer more to man's relation to his
material universe than to himself. Immortality is self-defining. Impassibility
refers to t h a t gifted state in which our nature system could not harm man.
Finally, it is usually held t h a t material nature was also damaged by the Fall.
Discussion of this is limited in the literature, the emphasis being on the wound
to man's nature. The discussion nonetheless seems worthwhile because p a r t of
man's nature is material and literally assimilated from our immediate mate-
rial universe.
These thoughts ought not to be misconstrued to mean t h a t h u m a n n a t u r e or
our nature system is not good. Rather, the tradition emphasizes the loss of pre-
ternatural goods which were added to the n a t u r a l good of creation. This is
wholly consistent with the traditional position of the evil as privatio boni: evil is
the absence of good where good should be? From a theological point of view the
profoundest injury to man was the loss of oneness with God. The first parents
lost both sanctifying grace (sonship with God) and God's friendship (at-one-ness).
In this state, even if man could secure sanctifying grace, he still could not par-
take of the beatific vision because of the rift in the relationship between God
and man2 If this were a theological rather t h a n a comparative psychological
paper, it would now be natural to review the concepts of grace, sacrifice, atone-
ment (restoring at-one-ness), redemption, the likeness of man to God, and so on.
Although such concepts are interesting and often compelling, I will not review
them because they lie outside this paper's purpose.
I hope t h a t it is obvious t h a t the theme of this paper will organize itself
around the concepts of concupiscence and ignorance. The latter concept will also
be useful in trying to account for the suggested similarity of Freudian thought
to the damage to human nature implied by the Fall.
Freud's perspective
Freud's chosen profession was t h a t of a physician specializing in nervous disor-

ders. His initial repertoire of remedies was t h a t of his contemporaries: hypno-
tism, electrotherapy, and remonstrances, none of which were particularly effec-
tive. It was only through a stranger-than-fiction sequence of events t h a t Freud
the physician evolved into Freud the psychologist.6 At no time did Freud make
recourse to philosophical or religious concepts.7 Psychoanalysis as both theory
and therapy had its origins in what he found to be compelling clinical data from
his patients as well as from within himself. He was fully persuaded of biological
determinism and Darwinian evolution as orienting perspectives. However, it
would not be accurate to maintain t h a t Freud regarded the psyche as no more
t h a n an epiphenomenon of biochemical or material processes. The truth of the
m a t t e r is that, although Freud insisted on the empirical gathering of clinical
data, he nevertheless had unremitting faith in the ability of his intuitive
powers to "make sense" of the data. The phrase "make sense" refers to both
causal and nosological models. He had equal, if not greater, faith in the poet's
power to divine gracefully the psychological formulations he had to struggle to
obtain.
Freud viewed man from the natural plane only. He did not see himself as an
investigator or physician of the soul. Therapeutically he regarded psychoana-
lytic therapy as a form of education, even though securing eventual relief of
pain with this form of therapy usually involved still more pain. Theoretically
he saw his work as a subset of psychology and, to some degree, of biology. His
choice of the word "psyche" was deliberate because of its etymological and
mythological Greek roots. It is difficult to define precisely what he meant by the
word p s y c h e - - h e himself never d i d - - b u t it should be noted t h a t he carefully
avoided using the term which translated as "soul.''8 I do not believe
t h a t Freud meant what he said in anything other than an unresolved emotion-
al sense when he disclaimed belief in a creator. To substantiate this belief I

would cite his high regard for Einstein's opinion (compare Einstein's wry re-
m a r k t h a t God does not play dice with the universe), his deeply rooted pride in
being Jewish, and the following quotation from Jones:
I could not contemplate with any sort of comfort a life without work. Creative
imagination and work go together with me; I take no delight in anything else . . . .
What is one to do on a day when thoughts cease to flow and proper words won't
come? One cannot help trembling at this possiblity. That is why, despite the acqui-
escence in fate that becomes an upright man, I secretly pray: no paralysis of one's
powers through bodily distress. We'll die with harness on, as King Macbeth said?
It is probably accurate to define psyche here as an alloy of the restriction of

the theological concept of soul to the n a t u r a l domain with its biological mani-
festations in the mind-body relationship. With this and the above comments in
mind, Freud's goals can now be identified. He felt t h a t in unraveling the riddles
of psychoneurotic symptoms he was converging on t h a t psychic structure which
is integral to the biological essence of man. In particular, he felt t h a t any psy-
chological model t h a t could correctly account for psychic illness could also char-
acterize psychic health. In this pursuit he did not "discover" the unconscious,
but, rather, he advanced far into a general model of unconscious psychic life? ~
Freud regarded a higher level of self-knowledge as necessary for relief of psy-
chological suffering as well as for growth in general. "Making the unconscious
conscious" was among his favorite renderings for one of the goals of therapy. He
conceptualized in terms of the now familiar id, ego, and superego (these will be
reviewed as needed), terms which underwent continual revision, as did his for-
mulations in general. His frequent references to the unconscious, to sexuality,
and to aggression are equally familiar but, in my view, misunderstood or mis-
represented. These terms recur densely in his thoughts and are frequently cited
in this paper.
The term "unconscious" occurs as a noun and as an adjective. As a noun
Freud used it to refer to: (1) the organic support or substrate for psychic function
and (2) those things which for pathological reasons are not yet conscious but
which should be. Note t hat (1) refers to health and t h a t (2) refers to illness or
psychopathology. The term is also used as no more t h a n an adjective, in which
case its connotation could be negative (unhealthy), neutral, or positive
(healthy). Context usually clarifies how the word is used. Freud's references to
sexual and aggressive instincts underwent considerable revision, but one p a r t
of their usage remained constant; the meaning of instinct. In German Freud
used the term "der Trieb," which emphasizes impulsiveness or being driven. 11It
is not used to refer to innate and performed behavioral patterns. If the theologi-
cal definitions of concupiscence and ignorance are brought to mind here, t h e n
the need to stress this point in this paper should become apparent.
It is tr u e t h a t in Freud's early thoughts the t e r m "sex" usually referred to
erotic sex. He segregated the self-preservative instincts from the sexual in-
stincts, assigning the former to the ego and the latter to the id. As his thoughts
matured, however, he revised his use of the term sex to refer to those instincts
t h a t tend toward individual or species survival, with survival understood
widely enough to encompass well-being. 12 As for the aggressive instincts,
their biological function is mastery. In the widest sense their goal is reality
modification, whether inner or outer. When the aim of an aggressive instinct is
other t h a n appropriate and mature mastery or modification, then the aggres-
sive instincts are called destructive or hostile. Sadism is a good example of
this. Freud postulated t h a t the sexual and aggressive instincts, in healthy de-
velopment (ontogenesis), fuse in various combinations and with remarkable
elasticity. For example, a child disassembling a toy reflects the use of a sexual
instinct (epistemophilia equals love of knowledge equals curiosity) and an ag-
gressive instinct (motor mastery). An example of an unhealthy fusion is sa-
dism, where aggression is enlisted to derive sexual (here sexual equals erotic)
pleasure by subjugating other persons or creatures. Note t h a t his model im-
plies t h a t virtually every behavioral event must have sexual and aggressive
contributions, the one providing an aim or object, the other enabling pursuit.
The fusion model is therefore rather reasonable.
The details of the Freud-Fall comparison begin at the end of this section. To
make the transition graceful and to suggest a perspective on what follows, I
would like to give one of the Freudian interpretations of the events described
in Genesis (there are m a n y levels of psychanalytic interpretation). The expul-
sion from Eden can be taken as a metaphor for the neurotic's longing to return
to a state of blissful dependence on the all-caring family. It captures the usual
neurotic resistance to giving up the frustrated claims of childhood in favor of
discovering one's own strengths. At a deeper level and in the tradition of Otto
Rank, 13the expulsion from Eden gives expression to the narcissistic infantile
longing for a return to the completely satisfying prenatal and intra-uterine
life. '4
Freud and concupiscence: Psychosexual development
As Freud's thinking matured, he increasingly viewed biological man as a

wish-driven entity. The word "wish" as used here refers to conscious or uncon-
scious desire and also to psychic conative tendencies, some of which may ap-
proximate closely to the organic. This m a y be why the teleology in Freud's
model is not apparent and is usually not emphasized. It is easy to see that frus-
tration of infantile wishes, in the sense defined, can be pathological; but it
is not so immediately apparent t h a t such sustained frustration can impair
nature's maturational goal. That these two things are equivalent in Freud's
model is even less obvious. Causal thinking in Freud's model becomes trans-
parent in his id, ego, and superego formulations. The same could be said of his
teleological thinking, but t h a t is easier to see in his theory of psychosexual
staging which, by the way, partially implies the id, ego, and superego concep-
tions.
At the moment of birth the infant enters the world in the oral stage, which is
characterized by a certain psychosexual structure and by certain maturational
goals. 1~ The neonate has little psychic structure and essentially no capacity
for differentiating objects. These primitive properties make neonatal life a lu-
cid model with which to demonstrate Freud's conception t h a t the ego is cortical
to the id. The term "cortical" means on the surface of, as the brain cortex. At
this time the neonate uses a preformed reflex TM to secure nutrition through
oral erotic ingestion. Note t h a t this involves two sexual instincts. One is the
nonerotic sexual hunger instinct whose satisfaction is found in nourishment,
and the other is the erotic sexual instinct for oral pleasure in sucking. Freud
referred to the contingent but simultaneous satisfaction of one instinct via an-
other as anaclitic. He himself took nursing as a model for the concept. When
h u n g r y but not yet fed, the neonate resorts to communicating gestures such as
screaming. Such gestures reveal a primitive (weakly differentiated) aggres-
sive instinct. '7 These two i n s t i n c t s - - h u n g e r and the aggressive effort to
c o m m u n i c a t e - - a r e loosely fused, or it might be said joined, to secure through
joint effort the slaking of hunger. This implies some prior satisfaction of the
aggressive trend, a point t h a t Freud ignores.
It would be inappropriate to detail how hunger encompasses more t h a n the
wish for food, but it is worth pausing to note t h a t Freud postulated an instinct
he named "contrectation. '''s It is an instinct for touching, and together with
the hunger instinct it subsumes the wider wishes and needs implicit in the in-
fant's wish for nursing. Other sexual and aggressive instincts are present at
birth, but this brief sketch already can serve as a simple model of how
the ego, as an adaptive organized entity, emerges from the id: driven by
instinctual hunger and anaclitic oral eroticism, the rudimentary ego
communicates--perhaps u n p l e a s a n t l y - - i t s states, and thus secures a recipro-
cal relation with the mothering person which satisfies its instinctual cravings.
Aggression is twice used here: once for communicating and then again in
nursing proper. TM
Concupiscence-like (CL) thinking suggests itself when some of the life princi-
ples and maturational goals of the oral stage are noted. With reference to the id
and life at the ego-id frontier Freud states:
The sovereign tendency obeyed by these primary processes is easy of recog-

nition; it is called the pleasure-pain principle (Lust-Unlust), or more shortly the
pleasure-principle. These processes strive toward gaining pleasure; from any oper-
ation which might arouse unpleasantness ("pain") mental activity draws back
(repression).2~
Elsewhere he states:
From the evidence of the existence of these two tendencies to condensation and dis-
placement our theory infers that in the unconscious id the energy is in a freely mo-
bile state and that the id sets more store by the possibility of discharging quanti-
ties of excitation than by any other consideration . . . . 21
The words "condensation" and "displacement" are descriptors of w h a t F r e u d

t e r m e d t h e p r i m a r y processes. This unconscious process is present, to a primi-
tive degree, at b i r t h but is a c t u a l l y an oral m a t u r a t i o n a l goal. Freud discusses
t h e p r i m a r y process at l e n g t h in The Interpretation of Dreams. 22 However, he
s u m s up his c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of life in t h e id a n d id-ego b o u n d a r y as follows:
The processes of the system Ucs are timeless; i.e. they are not ordered temporally,
are not altered by the passage of time, in fact bear no relation to time at all. The
time-relation is bound up with the work of the system Cs.
The processes of the Ucs are just as little related to reality. They are subject to
the pleasure-principle; their fate depends only upon the degree of their strength
and upon their conformity to regulation by pleasure and pain.
Let us sum up: exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process (moti-
lity of cathexis), timelessness, and substitution of psychic reality for external
reality--these are the characteristics which we may expect to find in processes be-
longing to the system Ucs.2~
I n t h e above "Ucs" a n d "Cs" denote, as systems, the unconscious and t h e con-

scious. The t e r m "cathexis" refers essentially to psychic allocation of energy or,
in J u n g i a n terms, i n v e s t m e n t of interest. One more quotation from Freud is re-
quired to note t h e CL t h r e a d here. In t h e above Freud was implicitly referring
to t h e id, of which he says:
It is the dark, inaccessible part of our personality; what little we know of it we

have learnt from our study of the dream-work and the construction of neurotic
symptoms. . . . We approach the id with analogies: we call it a chaos, a cauldron full
of seething excitations . . . . It is filled with energy reaching it from the instincts,
but it has no organization, produces no collective will, but only a striving to bring
about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of the
pleasure princple. The logical laws of thought do not apply in the id, and this is
true above all of the law of contradiction. Contrary impulses exist side by side,
without cancelling each other out or diminishing each o t h e r . . . .
The id of course knows no judgement of value: no good and evil, no morality . . . .
Instinctual cathexes seeking discharge--that, in our view, is all there is in the
id. ~4
Some of the above n a r r a t i v e from Freud will a g a i n be referred to when dis-

cussing theological ignorance. As for CL o r g a n i z a t i o n of thought, I wish to sum
up w h a t m a y be a l t o g e t h e r obvious already. Freud's description of the id is simi-
lar to t h e state of m a n after the loss of integrity. Its life p r i n c i p l e - - t h e pleasure
p r i n c i p l e - - i s clearly antagonistic to t h a t state of inner h a r m o n y where all t h a t
man is cooperates in the internal hierarchy of knowing and loving God. This is
not to suggest t h a t from the theological perspective pleasure was not to be part
of the h u m a n experience but, rather, to suggest t h a t Freud's id-model stresses a
too-ready pursuit of pleasure within us. On the n a t u r a l plane, this is antagonis-
tic to integration of personality.
The primary process itself needs comment. Freud theorized t h a t the mecha-
nisms of dream formation and of symptom formation are identical, both given
by the primary process. However, the essence of t h a t process is the capacity
for the lower ego, ontogenetically and phylogenetically less differentiated, to
achieve easily displacements of energy and affect from one object's psychic rep-
resentation to another, even when both are utterly without mutual connection
when viewed logically. This is easily seen in dreams and in psychotic symptoms.
From a theological point of view, the primary process appears to be over-
determined: t h a t is, it is too quick to exchange one object for another in identi-
fying things as appropriate for id satisfaction. With reference 15 in mind, this
raises a relevant issue: clearly we need the lability of the primary process for
our adaptation to an equally labile (outer) world, but to what degree is it
overdetermined? If it were to be argued theologically t h a t in Eden there was no
primary process, then it would be necessary to postulate a far less labile world.
However, our world is material, and by theological definition matter is t h a t
which can suffer substantial change. It therefore appears reasonable to main-
tain t h a t the primary process always was integral to n a t u r a l man but t h a t its
lability was increased with the loss of integrity. In closing the discussion of the
primary process, its importance to creativity should be noted so t h a t once again
CL thinking surfaces in making the primary process a good thing gone par-
tially bad, from the theological vantage: to the theologian the primary process
as now observed is a wounded process.
It comes as no surprise t h a t love is a leitmotif in Freud's thinking. He traced
the capacity to love to the very beginning of extrauterine life and labeled the
earliest oral period the objectless stage. The central concept here is narcissism,
by which he intended no more t h a n the usual meaning of self-love. Specifically,
Freud called the love capacity of the objectless stage primary narcissism to em-
phasize the absence of distinction--or even a w a r e n e s s - - o f self from mother,
much less anything else. One of the maturational goals of the oral stage is to
achieve transition to secondary narcissism in which the self is loved as an object
perceived as distinct from the mother and others. Achieving this psychic differ-
entiation is a precursor, in Freud's view, to m a t u r i n g to ever higher levels of ob-
ject choice, t h a t is, love choices other t h a n the self. The prominence of narcis-
sism in psychopathology will be addressed later. At this point it should be noted
t h a t in Freud's view we are born narcissistic and struggle all our lives to cast off
the narcissistic fetters, even in the normal case. Once again this is a CL formu-
lation, not merely because the sin of Eden was a choice of self above all else but
because the theological destiny of m a n is to love God, a thing manifested here in
love of others, of the universe, and in appropriate self-love. In psychobiological
t e r m s , n a r c i s s i s m should yield to object love, a n d significant failures to do so a r e

pathological. In t h e l a t t e r case secondary n a r c i s s i s m u s u a l l y refers to r e n u n c i a -
tion of love objects in f a v o r of t h e self.
D e v e l o p m e n t f r o m t h e oral s t a g e into t h e (next) a n a l s t a g e is continuous. Ma-
jor changes in id content a n d ego s t r u c t u r e t a k e place, a n d t h e superego (con-
science) begins to form. 25 It is easier to follow Freud's t h o u g h t s by r e t r a c i n g his
steps f r o m the id to implied c h a n g e s elsewhere. E n t r y into the a n a l stage sees
t h e e m e r g e n c e of a n a l eroticism, a s o m a t i c i m p l i c a t i o n of changes in t h e id. J u s t
as oral eroticism is a reference point for t h e oral stage, so likewise is a n a l eroti-
c i s m such a point for t h e a n a l stage. 26 In discussing t h e e m e r g e n c e of a n a l i t y
F r e u d states:
During this oral phase sadistic impulses already o c c u r . . . . Their extent is far
greater in the second phase, which we describe as the sadistic-anal one, because
satisfaction is then sought in aggression and in the excretory function. Our justifi-
cation for including aggressive urges under the libido is based on the view that sa-
dism is an instinctual fusion of purely libidinal and purely destructive urges, a fu-
sion which thenceforward persists uninterruptedly. 27
E l s e w h e r e h e states:
Abraham showed in 1924 that two stages can be distinguished in the sadistic-anal
phase. The earlier of these is dominated by the destructive trends of destroying
and losing, the later one by trends friendly towards objects--those of keeping and
possessing. It is in the middle phase, therefore, that consideration for the object
makes its first appearance as a precursor of a later erotic cathexis. 2s
N o t e t h a t F r e u d refers to t h e n e w l y a r i s i n g instincts as sadistic a n d destruc-

tive. In discussing p r e g e n i t a l (that is, oral or anal) childhood sexuality, he
s t a t e s of t h e id:
This widespread and copious but dissociated sexual life of children, in which each
separate instinct pursues its own acquisition of pleasure independently of all the
rest, is now brought together and organized in two main directions, so that by
the end of puberty the individual's final sexual character is as a rule completely
formed. ~9
F i n a l l y he also states:
Manifestations of the sexual instincts can be observed from the very first, but to
begin with they are not yet directed towards any external object. The separate in-
stinctual components of sexuality work independently of one another to obtain
pleasure and find satisfaction in the subject's own body. This stage is known as
that of autoeroticism and it is succeeded by one in which an object is chosen2 ~
F r o m Freud's perspective it is evident t h a t he r e g a r d e d a n a l i t y as i d - a d d i t i v e

to o r a l i t y a n d as p r i o r to a m o r e coordinated psychosexual organization. T h i s
l a t t e r organization, however, is u s u a l l y a c h i e v e d in only a s u b o p t i m a l way, so
t h a t m u c h of his c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t h e a n a l stage, a n d of p r e g e n i t a l life, per-
sists. W i t h CL f o r m u l a t i o n in mind, it s e e m s i m m e d i a t e t h a t Freud's
p o s t u l a t i n g t h e independent quest of p l e a s u r e of each instinct is a l m o s t a theo-
logical s t a t e m e n t . In t h e n e x t section t h e r e l a t i o n of concupiscence to Freud's
t h i n k i n g on psychopathology will be detailed. For t h e m o m e n t I would like to
b r e a k t h e p r e s e n t flow f r o m o r a l i t y t h r o u g h a n a l i t y to t h e phallic stage w i t h a
p e r s p e c t i v e on p a t h o l o g y which is r e m i n i s c e n t of St. Augustine. In his e a r l y
work, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, he s t a t e s of perversions:
9 9 . they represent the converted expression of impulses which in a broader sense

might be designated as perverse if they could manifest themselves directly in
phantasies and acts without deviating from consciousness . . . . The neurosis is, so
to say, the negative of the perversion? 1
L a t e r in t h e s a m e w o r k he says:
In view of the now recognized great diffusion of tendencies to perversion the idea
forced itself upon us that the disposition to perversions is the primitive and uni-
versal disposition of the human sexual impulse, from which the normal sexual be-
havior develops in consequence of organic changes and psychic inhibitions of the
course of maturity. 32
Finally, in t h e middle of t h e s a m e w o r k he states:
It is instructive to know that under the influence of seduction the child may be-
come polymorphous-perverse and may be misled into all sorts of transgressions.
9 The formulation of such perversions meets but slight resistance because the
psychic dams against sexual transgressions, such as shame, loathing, and moral-
i t y - - w h i c h depend on the age of the c h i l d - - a r e not yet erected or are only in the
process of formation. 3~
T h e p o i n t F r e u d is a d d r e s s i n g is t h a t in a p e r v e r s i o n no s i g n i f i c a n t effect is
m a d e e i t h e r to i n t e g r a t e a c o m p o n e n t i n s t i n c t (health) or to defend a g a i n s t it
(illness) b u t t h a t , r a t h e r , t h e i n s t i n c t is allowed to s e e k its o w n end. H e addi-
t i o n a l l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d children as p o l y m o r p h o u s l y p e r v e r s e . H e m a i n t a i n e d
t h e s e positions t h r o u g h o u t t h e m a t u r a t i o n of his thoughts 9 I feel t h a t no CL
discussion is n e e d e d here. E l s e w h e r e F r e u d a g a i n p r e s e n t e d this v i e w lucidly
in stating:
It may happen that not all the component instincts submit to the dominance of
the genital zone. An instinct which remains in this way independent leads to
what we describe as a perversion, and may substitute its own sexual aim for the
normal o n e . 34
All t h e a b o v e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s of i n s t i n c t u a l c o m p o n e n t s a p p l y to t h e oral
s t a g e a n d to s u b s e q u e n t stages. I w a i t e d u n t i l t h e a n a l s t a g e to p r e s e n t t h e m
b e c a u s e a n a l i n s t i n c t u a l life is m o r e obvious.
W h i l e a n a l i t y is e m e r g i n g as a n i n s t i n c t u a l trend, so is t h e child's capacity to
p e r c e i v e a n d assess reality. T h e s e l a t t e r c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e ego functions. It is in-
t u i t i v e l y clear t h a t in t h e w a k i n g s t a t e t h e lability of t h e p r i m a r y process
o u g h t to be t e m p e r e d b y o t h e r processes w h i c h c a n a d d r e s t r a i n t a n d so b r i n g
t h e p r i m a r y process to s o m e f o r m of convergence. T h e class of c a p a c i t i e s
t h a t c o n s t i t u t e o u r a b i l i t y to assess r e a l i t y is labeled t h e s e c o n d a r y process. I t s
e m e r g e n c e is s e e n in t h e a n a l s t a g e w h e r e it is i n t e g r a l to t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of
w h a t F r e u d called t h e r e a l i t y principle, w h i c h is needed to t e m p e r t h e p l e a s u r e
p r i n c i p l e in t h e i n t e r e s t of a d a p t a t i o n . F r e u d s t a t e s of t h i s t r a n s i t i o n :
We know that the pleasure principle is proper to a primary method of working on

the part of the mental apparatus, but that, from the point of view of the self-
preservation of the organism among the difficulties of the external world, it is
from the very outset inefficient or even highly dangerous. Under the influence of
the ego's instincts of self-preservation, the pleasure principle is replaced by the
reality principle. This latter principle does not abandon the intention of ulti-
mately obtaining pleasure, but it nevertheless demands and carries into effect the
postponement of satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of possibilities of
gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on the
long indirect road to pleasure. The pleasure principle long persists, however, as
the method of working employed by the sexual instincts, which are so hard to "ed-
ucate" a n d . . , it often succeeds in overcoming the reality principle, to the detri-
ment of the organism as a whole2 ~
E a r l i e r in his life F r e u d s i m i l a r l y stated:
Instead, the mental apparatus had to decide to form a conception of the real cir-
cumstances in the outer world and to exert itself to alter them. A new principle of
mental functioning was thus introduced; what was conceived of was no longer
that which was pleasant, but that which was real, even if it should be unpleasant.
This institution of the reality-principle proved a momentous step. 36
W i t h e v e n g r e a t e r clarify F r e u d r e n d e r e d it as follows:
Moreover, the ego seeks to bring the influence of the external world to bear upon
the id and its tendencies, and endeavors to substitute the reality principle for the
pleasure principle which reigns unrestrictedly in the id. For the ego, perception
plays the part which in the id falls to instinct. The ego represents what may
be called reason and common sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the
passions. 37
C l e a r l y t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e r e a l i t y principle as a n ego function p r e s u p -

poses s o m e s e c o n d a r y process capability. T h e point a d d r e s s e d h e r e is t h e im-
plicit reference to conflict in ontogenesis, again recalling concupiscence. It

m a y not yet be apparent t h a t the id and ego changes alluded to imply the so-
cialization of the child and the emergence of the third of Freud's psychic con-
structs, the superego. Taking toilet training as a model, Freud argues t h a t in
h e a l t h y development the child rewards maternal care and its injunctions with
compliance. This presupposes a level of perception and judgment which is not
found in orality but which is found in anality. However, should the child resent
"the battle of the chamber pot," it can retaliate by soiling or by withholding. It
requires little discussion to see how anal eroticism can be used to retaliate sa-
distically against an oppressive parental environment. However, when things
proceed well, where is the ontogenetic role of anal eroticism to be found? It is
more t h a n a source of pleasure attending the vital function of elimination.
When the child is properly related to, its anal erotic experiences deepen the joy
of its socialization, making it easier to accept maternal and familial injunc-
tions. This has implications for the familiar process of sublimation.
In Freud's view nature has not so designed us t h a t we can rage against an-
other without guilt. 38When the child experiences its mother's and others' good
feelings over its compliance, the child internalizes this sweet caring as a part of
itself: the (good) mother and father become an inner source of self-esteem and
well-being. This process of internalizing what is pleasant and of so establish-
ing an inner psychic image (superego) of outer r e q u i r e m e n t s - - m o t h e r and
f a m i l y - - i s easy to see when things proceed pleasantly. But what happens
when the child retaliates as suggested above under less favorable circum-
stances? In this instance the child experiences guilt both as an intrinsic reac-
tion to injuring another and because of its fear of loss of the love of the caring
figure or figures against whom it retaliates. In this case anger of the oppres-
sive f i g u r e - - w h e t h e r objective or projected by the child onto this f i g u r e - - i s
internalized. In this case the child's guilt seeks relief by t u r n i n g its sadistic
(aggressive) drives against itself punitively or, so to speak, to expiate. The su-
perego so formed can be harsh and cruel. Note the implied intrapsychic strife
(CL).
An essential point here is t h a t superego formation, an event beginning in
the anal stage, in Freud's view, derives both from internalization processes
and from new id content. The following excerpt is often quoted:
But the derivation of the superego from the first object-cathexes of the id, from the
Oedipus complex, signifies even more for it. This derivation.., brings it into rela-
tion with the phylogenetic acquisition of the id . . . . Thus the superego is always
close to the id . . . . It reaches deep down into the id and for that reason is farther
from consciousness than the ego is. 39
Freud is here emphasising the harshness of the superego as a reactive event

to guilt whose energies are id-appropriated.
The two pregenital stages, oral and anal, feature structures and prin-
ciples which, although they exhibit CL divergence, are part of an ontogenetic
t r e n d - - a teleological goal in Freud's v i e w - - w h i c h should see convergence.

Such convergence and integration should occur in the phallic s t a g e y The
pregenital stages are characterized by absence of a sense of biological sexual
identity because of literal somatic i m m a t u r i t y in the child. A major result of
this is ambivalence, which will be discussed later in considering obsessionals.
With the advent of the third and final childhood psychosexual stage there are
again implied id, ego, and superego changes. However, the implied changes
should complete psychosexual structure in an integrated s e n s e - - a s a develop-
mental ideal, of course. Freud stated his position well in 1923:
I stated.., that "often or perhaps regularly, complete object-choice is established

in early childhood, of the kind that we have inferred to be characteristic of the
pubertal phase of development, namely.., when all the sexual trends become di-
rected toward one single person, and in that person seek to reach their aims. This
constitutes the most complete approximation possible in childhood to the defini-
tive form taken by sexual life after puberty. The sole difference from the latter is
that the coalescence of the component impulses and their concentration under the
primacy of the genital organs is not effected in childhood, or only very imper-
fectly. The institution of this primacy is, therefore, the last phase which the sex-
ual organization undergoes."
I am today no longer satisfied with the statement that the primacy of the genitals
is not effected in the early period of childhood, or only very imperfectly. The ap-
proximation of childhood-sexuality to that of the adult goes much farther and is
not limited solely to the establishment of an object-attachment. Even if perfect
concentration of the component-impulses under the primacy of the genitals is not
attained, at any rate at the height of the development of childhood-sexuality the
functioning of the genitals and the interest in them reaches predominant signifi-
cance, which comes little short of that reached in maturity.41
Primacy of the genitals here implies t h a t sexual and aggressive instincts

have synergistically converged to achieve a psychosexual (that is, id-ego-
superego) organization which is object-oriented. The term "object-oriented"
means seeking satisfaction in an interpersonal, presumably heterosexual,
relation. Freud emphasizes the degree to which the childhood psychic form,
achieved by, say, the age of five, approximates to finality. Freud actually does
postulate a fourth sexual s t a g e - - t h e genital (not phallic) s t a g e - - s e e n at pu-
berty where the genitals achieve reproductive capacity. However, in his view
the psychosexual structure of the personality is, in essence, secured by the end
of the phallic phase, at about the age of five. The phallic stage is so named be-
cause of the convergence of interest of both sexes on the male sexual organ. It
is not true that Freud ignored or underestimated the female's clitoris. He felt
t h a t children of both sexes tend to perceive it as a diminutive phallus.
Following the phallic stage and prior to puberty is an interim period he
termed latency, where sexual interest u s u a l l y - - b u t not a l w a y s - - d i m i n i s h e s
and the superego takes on ever sharper form. Intellectual powers usually
flourish here also.
It may appear that while there are CL ideas in the oral and anal epochs
there are few in the phallic stage. This is not the case. In fact, the phallic stage
is the site of the Oedipus complex whose content can approximate to the ordi-
nary meaning of the word concupiscence.
This section has presented a brief sketch of Freud's view of psychosexual
staging. It is indeed incomplete in several ways but most especially in the ab-
sence of reference to libido theory. Its omission is justified, in my view, by its
implicit inclusion in sexuality and the ego-id interface. Furthermore, libido is
an energic concept; Freud actually defined it as sexual energy. This raises a
problem because Freud has no unified energy theory; he has none at all for the
aggressive instincts. In addition, although he uses the term "energy" outside
the libidinal frame, he never defines it. It struck me as appropriate to limit my
discussion to the more complete trends in Freud's model. 42 The CL theme of
this section has been that in the very process of development the personality,
as seen by Freud, consists of a g e n c i e s - - t o use Freud's favorite term for id, ego,
and superego reference--which emerge with basic innate tendencies to diver-
gence from within. Some capacity for cross-agency antagonism was presented,
such as the ego aspiring toward the reality principle in the'presence of the id's
pleasure principle.
The next section will attempt to show more dramatically the presence of
concupiscence as an organizer by looking at the w a y Freud conceptualized the
causes of the various disorders. Intrapsychic conflict is at the center of his
thoughts. A closer look at his models presents a psyche at war with itself, and
in the extreme case of psychosis, a psyche struggling to hold itself together.
The phrase "at war with itself" was deliberately selected because Freud not
only identified himself with military figures, especially Hannibal, but also be-
cause he made frequent use of military analogies to clarify his ideas on psycho-
neurotic processes.
Freud and concupiscence: The psychic disorders
In reviewing Freud's theory of psychosexual staging I moved forward in

time from birth to the phallic stage and emphasized the presence of divergent
trends within each of the nascent psychic systems. The study of psychopathol-
ogy is very much a study of the ways in which integration of the psychic sys-
tems, an event achieved (ideally) in all essentials in the phallic stage, can mis-
carry. That is, while Freud saw divergent tendencies in each stage, he also
envisioned an ultimate organization of the psyche as nature's intended goal.
The expression of that goal is literally acted out in the phallic stage in the Oed-
ipus complex. It should be stressed that the Oedipal attachment is a normal
and ideal outcome contingent upon healthy prior development. Furthermore,
it is the child's first expression of psychosexual i d e n t i t y - - t h a t is, as a male or
f e m a l e - - i n an object relation, prior efforts not having this character because

of psychobiological i m m a t u r i t y or simply because stage-appropriate oral and
anal object relations cannot by their very nature support such a form of love.
The Oedipal attachment is an event which heralds closure and integration of
the personality; and, interestingly here, this "final" event is an effort to suc-
ceed at love.
Some prefatory remarks are needed here. I feel t h a t it will be clearer to ap-
proach the disorders in the usual way: from the least serious to the most seri-
ous, a journey from mild neurosis (hysteria) to the worst psychosis (schizophre-
nia). Most of the n a r r a t i v e - - m i n e or the quotations from F r e u d - - a d d r e s s e s
both sexes. When this is not the case, the context will usually involve the
male's fear of castration and the female's analogous penis envy with implied
hatred for the mother for such deprivation as well as identification with the fa-
ther as a psychic means of securing the envied organ.
Not all disorders will be addressed. Almost all forms of psychic suffering re-
solve themselves, in Freud's theory, into combinations of five "pure" forms:
hysteria, the obsessional, paranoia, manic-depressive psychosis, and schizo-
phrenia. The combinations realizable are essentially without constraint, so
t h a t a neurotic can be mixed hysteric-obsessional or a psychotic can be mixed
paranoid-obsessional (this is usually the case clinically) or even schizophrenic-
hysteric. Other disorders are implicitly contained. For example, the psycho-
path is essentially a combination of pervert (previously defined) with narcis-
sistic psychotic flight from the superego at a mixed oral-anal level of psychic
development, hence the preservation of some reality testing in psychopaths.
In his mature years Freud succeeded in reducing the varieties of psychic ill-
ness to a formula form t h a t emphasized conflict. He summarized as follows:
Neurosis is the result of a conflict between the ego and the id, whereas psychosis
is the analogous outcome of a similar disturbance in the relation between the ego
and its environment (outer world).43
This formula will be augmented later in discussing manic-depressive psy-

chosis. Note t h a t his formulation rests on conflict (CL) between the psychic
agencies, each of which is seen as evolving with inner divergence from its in-
ception. In outlining the disorders, it should be borne in mind that the level of
maturity, and hence of organization, of the id, ego, or superego is t h a t seen at
the implied psychosexual stage. Furthermore, where there is conflict, there
is frustration, a thought t h a t recurs frequently in Freud's discussion of the
causes of psychic illness. 44 It is implicit here that the events of childhood are
repeated on a larger, often more severe, scale during puberty. However, Freud
saw the childhood events as decisive, as mentioned previously.
The epochal event of childhood whose insufficient resolution ushers in psy-
chic illness in childhood or later is the Oedipus complex, of which Freud says:
What I have in mind is rivalry in love, with a clear emphasis on the subject's sex.
While he is still a small child, a son will already begin to develop a special affec-
tion for his mother, whom he regards as belonging to him; he begins to feel his fa-
ther as a rival who disputes his sole possession. And in the same way a little girl
looks on her mother as a person who occupies a position which she herself could
very well fill. Observation shows us to what early years these attitudes go back.
We refer to them as the "Oedipus complex" because the legend of Oedipus real-
izes, with only a slight softening, the two extreme wishes that arise from the son's
situation--to kill his father and take his mother to wife. The Oedipus complex...
is a regular and very important factor in a child's mental life, and there is more
danger of our underestimating rather than overestimating its influence . . . . Inci-
dentally, children often react in their Oedipus attitude to a stimulus coming from
their p a r e n t s . . , so that the father will choose his daughter and the mother her
son as a favorite . . . . . . .
It w o u l d be a m i s t a k e to u n d e r e s t i m a t e h o w i n t e n s e Oedipal r i v a l r y c a n be
in F r e u d ' s view. I n t h i s v e i n F r e u d quotes Diderot:
Yet more than a century before the emergence of psychoanalysis the French phi-
losopher Diderot bore witness to the importance of the Oedipus complex by ex-
pressing the difference between the primitive and civilized worlds in this sen-
tence: "If the little savage were left to himself, preserving all his foolishness and
adding to the small sense of a child in the cradle the violent passions of a man of
thirty, he would strangle his father and lie with his mother. ''46
F r e u d f r e q u e n t l y q u o t e d t h e s e lines.
T h e s e t r e n d s in t h e little boy a r e to be u n d e r s t o o d in t h e context of his level
of s e x u a l (erotic) knowledge, u s u a l l y i n a d e q u a t e . W h a t t h e child w a n t s is
e x c l u s i v e possession, s e n s i n g t h a t s a t i s f a c t i o n of phallic drives is s o m e h o w
l i n k e d w i t h t h e m o t h e r . T h e issue of h a t r e d for t h e f a t h e r - r i v a l is q u i t e l i t e r a l
in F r e u d ' s view. I n t h e w o r k j u s t cited F r e u d d e t a i l s t h e onset of t h e c a s t r a t i o n
complex, a g a i n a t h i n g to be t a k e n l i t e r a l l y a l b e i t n o t e n t i r e l y consciously in
t h e child. I f t h e f a t h e r is p e r c e i v e d b y t h e child as objecting too s t r o n g l y to t h e
child's a m b i t i o n or as b e i n g too f o r m i d a b l e a n a d v e r s a r y , t h e child will b e a t a
h a s t y r e t r e a t f r o m Oedipal p u r s u i t , f e a r i n g not m e r e l y loss of love, b u t loss of
t h e o r g a n t h a t it senses is s o m e h o w t h e source of its l o n g i n g s ( c a s t r a t i o n a n x i -
ety). T h e idea a n d its associated affects a r e d r i v e n f r o m consciousness a n d f r o m
access to e x p r e s s i o n v i a repression. I n fact, F r e u d often defined h y s t e r i a as a
n e u r o s i s of p u r e repression. T h e disorder can arise, w i t h or w i t h o u t t h e f r i g h t -
e n i n g p e r c e p t i o n of t h e f a t h e r as a rival, if t h e child only feels t h a t his over-
t u r e s a r e o t h e r w i s e u n w e l c o m e to e i t h e r or b o t h p a r e n t s . Indeed, h y s t e r i a c a n
arise, if for no o t h e r reason, f r o m t h e m o t h e r ' s a n x i o u s m i s m a n a g e m e n t of t h e
attachment.
T h a t t h i s fits t h e model of a n ego-id conflict is clear. T h e s y m p t o m s of h y s t e -
r i a a r e formed, as in all disorders, a c c o r d i n g to t h e p r i m a r y process. D e b a r r e d
from integration (and hence from adaptive use) into the personality, the phal-
lic tendencies that strove for integration via confluence are banished to live in
the unconscious. Note that the instinctual trend continues to exist and to seek
satisfaction but not where it should and in the way it should (CL). Via the pri-
m a r y process the feared impulses find substitute outlets in symptoms such as
dizziness, phobias, stereotyped behavior, excessive fantasy, abulias, and so on.
If the repressed should find too close an approximation to its proper object,
then the classic symptom of an anxiety attack ensues. The fact that symptoms
involve gratification may appear puzzling because they involve pain. Freud
often noted that symptoms are "compromise formations" between opposing
trends (CL) in the psyche. So, for example, dizziness mimes the rapture of sex-
ual (erotic) excitement, but the fact that dizziness is distressing relieves guilt
anxiety. This illustrates how the Oedipus complex determines the superego. In
fact, Freud called the superego the "heir to the Oedipus complex. ''47
Some forms of hysteria also find somatic expression. This form of the disor-
der is called conversion hysteria, as opposed to anxiety hysteria. For it to arise
Freud felt that a phenomenon he labeled "somatic compliance" is necessary.
This arises if at the time of the conflict's emergence, there is also present an as-
sociated somatic state which could be invested (cathected, in Freud's parlance)
with the libido that is defensively diverted by repression. For example, sup-
pose that in the Oedipal attachment a child has a bronchial infection. Natu-
rally, this results in his mother's solicitude. As repression sets in, the primary
process could easily perpetuate the respiratory distress because it is a somatic
equivalent of sighing and/or swooning with affection. In this case the illness
offers the advantage of ongoing maternal care, an example of what Freud
termed "secondary gain" of illness. Historically most hysterical conversion
symptoms have been paralyses which set in because of motor activity present
associatively at the critical time of repression? s
If maturation in prior states is insufficient or if the stress and frustration of
the Oedipal attachment are too great, then the child's ego must resort to more
v i g o r o u s - - a n d impoverishing--means of defense. The major characteristic of
the obsessional is a regression away from the phallic stage, which enables the
Oedipal position, to the anal stage where sexual ambivalence still prevails.
The regression back to ambivalence is a guarantee, so to speak--pathological,
of c o u r s e - - a g a i n s t Oedipal striving. Here psychic structure is actually undone
and instinctual defusions see the dominance of anal sadistic trends. Before
proceeding further, it should be emphasized that the "pure" obsessional sees
both (insufficient) represention and subsequent regression triggered by the in-
sufficiency of the regression. Sexual identity is loosely defined here, depending
on the degree of regression, and so the stage is set for the perversions, includ-
ing homosexuality? 9 The perversions are most often rooted in anal eroticism,
another obsessional characteristic. The relation of anal eroticism to homosexu-
ality is clear. Many corruptions of reality testing follow the regression, such as
magical thinking and undoing as methods of avoiding affect.
In fact, the avoidance of affect is a central feature of this disorder which

fascinated Freud. He was astonished at how completely obsessionals
could entertain t h o u g h t s - - i n c l u d i n g pathogenic thoughts from their child-
h o o d s - - w i t h o u t any accompanying affect. He referred to this as isolation (CL
because one psychic element, thinking, is dissociated from another, feeling,
which it ought not to be in health). Freud gives a dramatic example of this in
his description of Leonardo da Vinci's absence of affect in his notes on the
death of Caterina, who is presumed to be his mother by most biographers; if
not his mother, then Freud's example still stands. 5~
The isolation is only one instance of the rigidity of personality t h a t charac-
terizes the obsessional. It is accurate to regard this rigidity as over-compen-
sated defense against frightening instinctual trends. Most powerful among
these is anal-sadistic rage, usually directed at the father-castrator. The guilt
stirred by this defused aggression causes pain so great t h a t Freud said of it:
An obessional neurotic may be weighed down by a sense of guilt that would be ap-
propriate in a mass-murderer, while in fact, from his childhood onward, he has
behaved to his fellowmen as the most considerate and scrupulous member of soci-
ety. Nevertheless, his sense of guilt has a justification: it is founded on the intense
and frequent death-wishes against his fellows which are unconsciously at work in
him. It has a justification if what we take into account are unconscious thoughts
and not intentional deeds. Thus the omnipotence of thoughts, the overvaluation of
mental processes as compared with reality, is seen to have unrestricted play in
the emotional life of neurotic patients and in everything that derives from it. ~1
Besides ambivalence and defusion, the major corruption of psychic life

brought on by obsessional regression is the t u r n i n g of aggression against
the self in the guise of a cruel and stern superego. This can be seen in
overcompensated reaction-formations against hostile feelings. For example,
obsessionals are excessively courteous and often assume blame where there is
none.
As pathology deepens from the obsessional to the paranoid, the power of the
ego-id conflict to drive a (psychotic) ego-reality conflict begins to surface. In
Freud's thinking unresolved homosexual a t t a c h m e n t is a fundamental cause
of paranoia. Recall here t h a t anal regression sees the return of sexual ambiva-
lence, priming the way for homosexual object choice. Regressions back to vari-
ous fixation points are facilitated either by insufficient prior maturation or ex-
cessive prior indulgence, m a k i n g the retreat "safe." Paranoia eventuates in
the case of homosexual attachment only when the subject perceives it as objec-
tionable, usually because of the unconscious identity of homosexual-feminine-
castrated. There are four ways in which a paranoid can deny the attachment.
However, these four ways seem to me to be so much in the spirit of theological
ignorance t h a t I would rather present them in the next section.
It is unusual for paranoids to hallucinate. On the other hand, their p e n c h a n t
for delusions is well known. The delusions are efforts to misinterpret valid per-
ceptions so as to deny the existence of the homosexual trend (CL). The depth
and generality of regression in paranoia are greater t h a n in obsessionals. It is
not unusual to see regression from paranoia into schizophrenia, thus moving
from early anal backwards into oral events. This suggests the degree of regres-
sive impoverishment of the paranoid's personality. Incidentally, the para-
noid, like the obsessional, also resorts to regression against the Oedipal
and thence the homosexual trends. However, it is differentiated from the
obsessional by the extent of anal regression with possibly oral elements in the
regression. The paranoid is almost always more narcissistic t h a n the obses-
sional (CL), and only in extreme cases do the rigid systematizing efforts of
obsessionals approach the delusional behavior of paranoids.
In Freud's theory paranoia is transitional from neurosis to psychosis. In ap-
proaching the first of the two psychoses it is worth noting the increasing pov-
erty of object relations. Put plainly, object relations refer to the capacity to love
someone else maturely, especially someone of the opposite sex. The hysteric
has some capacity for such love, the obsessional significantly less owing to am-
bivalence, the paranoid even less owing to the homosexual trend (CL). The
degradation of the capacity for such object relations is central in manic-depres-
sive psychosis where repression to orality is fundamental. Freud theorized
t h a t identification precedes the capacity to love, calling to mind the theological
position t h a t knowledges precedes love. The manic-depressive is fixated at an
oral identification with a figure for whom its feelings are ambivalent, as they
must be, owing to the degree of regression and/or fixation. Freud stated his
own views on the causes and characteristics of manic-depressive psychosis
succinctly:
The occasions giving rise to melancholia for the most part extend beyond the clear
case of a loss by death, and include all those situations of being wounded, hurt,
neglected, out of favour, or disappointed, which can import opposite feelings of
love and hate into the relationship or reinforce an already existing ambivalence.
This conflict of ambivalence, the origin of which lies now more in actual experi-
ence, now more in constitution, must not be neglected among the conditioning
factors in melancholia. If the object-love, which cannot be given up, takes refuge
in narcissistic identification, while the object itself is abandoned, then hate is ex-
pended upon this new substitute-object, railing at it, depreciating it, making it
suffer and deriving sadistic gratification from its suffering. The self-torments of
melancholiacs, which are without doubt pleasurable, signify, just like the corre-
sponding phenomenon in the obsessional neurosis, a gratification of sadistic ten-
dencies and of hate, both of which relate to an object and in this way have both
been turned around upon the self.52
The similarity with the obsessional, who in therapy usually experiences sig-
nificant depressive episodes, should be resolved. Obsessionals do not become
manic-depressive psychotics, because the former are less regressed, less nar-
cissistic, and because they have stronger object relations.
At the beginning of this section Freud's formula for neurosis and psycho-
sis was given. It is here that it needs to be augmented to include the manic-
depressive psychosis as being, among other things, an ego/superego conflict
(CL). Freud himself stated this as follows:
For the moment, however, we can postulate that there must be diseases founded
on a conflict between ego and superego. Analysis gives us the right to infer that
melancholia is the model for this group, and then we should put in a claim for the
name of"narcissistic psychoneuroses" for these disorders. 53
Freud speculated t h a t this disorder may have organic contributing factors.

He asserted this strongly of the manic episodes, which he theorized were
brought about by the ego somehow temporarily eluding its oppressor, the su-
perego, and then expending a considerable amount of formerly "bound" en-
ergy. ~4 In essence the manic-depressive suffers with a more severe degree of
self-reproach rooted in identification with ambivalence t h a n the obsessional.
Unlike the paranoid, there are no significant repudiated homosexual trends
here. Again this appears also to fit in with concupiscence, because here an en-
tire psychic agent, the superego, has won the day over another, the ego.
Manic-depressive psychosis does feature impaired reality testing, weak ob-
ject relations, delusions, and hallucinations. In fact, it is not uncommon to dis-
cover here t h a t the meaning of a hallucination is defense against a relentlessly
cruel superego via externalization: the ego regresses back to even before the
parental figures were internalized, so as to elude the cruelty of the internal-
ized form. This is virtually a completely oral phenomenon. It may now appear
unlikely t h a t still worse things can befall a person, but schizophrenia is an
even worse disorder t h a t truly dates to the earliest oral stage.
Manic-depressive psychosis, seen as the terminal regression point back from
the Oedipal position, can be caused, in part, by the quality of the mother-child
relation. For example, insufficient consistency in mothering can pave the way
for identification with an ambivalently perceived object. The mothering per-
son's own difficulties, such as objective stress, objective or neurotic anxiety,
and the like, can be contributing factors. Note t h a t the ambivalence m a y occur
regressively in the presence of subsequent stress.
Freud felt that~the mother-child relation was decisive for all to follow but did
not postulate what his following eventually postulated of schizophrenia: exces-
sive oral frustration or glutting and/or excessively inconsistent mothering pre-
cipitate schizophrenia. The present tradition traces it to failures in the m u t u a l
cueing process between mother and child, where the mother, at bottom, fails
to invite the child forward securely and happily in response to its nonverbal
cues2 ~Freud's views of schizophrenia, which he preferred to call paraphrenia,
were limited to characterizations of what occurs within the schizophrenic. His
remarks often apply equally well to manic-depressive psychosis. ~ One char-
acterization for which this is true is his often quoted r e m a r k t h a t "in psychosis
the unconscious is conscious." This is an interesting observation, because he

also observed t h a t in children the division between conscious and unconscious
is not well defined.
This last comment on Freud still fits the original model: retreat all the way
to orality from the Oedipal position, however weakly maintained, has ensued.
As in all other disorders, repression has been resorted to but found wanting.
Regression has followed, in this case easily, because of the weakness of the per-
sonality's organization at the time when the phallic stage emerges, to the de-
gree t h a t it can. It is also concupiscence-like because once again one part of the
personality prevails against another where it should not. It is precisely be-
cause the unconscious tends to be conscious in psychosis t h a t Freud felt
psychotics could provide direct observation into psychic structure seen only
through the interpretation of dreams. Incidentally, hallucinations follow
the primary process as do dreams in normal people. In fact, Freud regarded
dreams as hallucinations in the sleeping state, so t h a t the suggested equiva-
lence is not surprising.
Freud made several differentiating comments on schizophrenia. In reference
to repression he said:
In schizophrenia, on the other hand, we have been obliged to assume that after
the process of repression the withdrawn libido does not seek a new object, but re-
treats into the ego; that is to say, that here the object-cathexes are given up and a
primitive objectless condition of narcissism is re-established. 57
The term "objectless" is important here. Elsewhere he developed at length

the concept of an "internal catastrophe" as characteristic of the acute state of
schizophrenia2 8 As stated above, the manic-depressive in the acute state
shares impaired reality testing, poor object relations, and hallucinations with
the schizophrenic. However, part of the internal catastrophe the schizophrenic
suffers is the dissolution of psychic representations of things, both within and
without. This is why the end of the world is such a common schizophrenic delu-
sion, usually with hallucinations. In both the manic-depressive and the schizo-
phrenic a hallucination is another variety of regression where a thought re-
gresses back to the sense perception t h a t originally was there when the
thought was formed (CL). It is the internal catastrophe, often now called disso-
lution of the self, which discriminates the schizophrenic from the manic-
depressive. 59
As before, schizophrenia begins with Oedipal repression followed by regres-
sion. Many other defenses are used by hysterics, obsessionals, paranoids, the
manic-depressive, and the schizophrenic; but repression and regression are de-
cisive, while the others are usually descriptive. I have attempted to present the
disorders as all satisfying a conflict model embedded in the id-ego-superego
context. I have also attempted to arrive at a point where schizophrenia pre-
sents itself, in a sense, as a pure state of concupiscence, because here the global
psychic undoing implies the achievement of innumerable local and conflicted
component victories.
It has probably been apparent that many of the measures Freud postulated
to be taken by the psyche in its defense lack wisdom. For example, how does it
come about that the child's perceptions are more important than the realities
to which they should correspond, and why should they differ pathogenically in
the first place? In the next section I will outline the many points at which I feel
that Freud's thinking was organized in the spirit of theological ignorance.
Freud and ignorance: Psychosexual development
The single most important organizer in Freud's thoughts, at the conscious

level, is that man is a wish-driven entity. The discussion of CL conceptions
in Freud reduces to his discovery of a lack of sufficient synergy in wishes
pursuing their aims and objects. A careful review of this very idea, however,
reveals an implicit capacity for the wish to "know" its aim and object. That is,
some degree of discriminating or perceptive capacity must either be immanent
in the wish or at least coexistent with it, for otherwise it would be impossible
for the wish to tend toward an aim or object. This is a fundamental point at
which the introduction of theological ignorance as a lesser organizer in Freud's
thinking emerges. As with CL formulations, ignorance-like (IL) conceptions
are regarded as having been unconscious organizers in Freud's self-experience
during his psychoanalytic researches.
In using the term "ignorance," boundaries are being crossed, and therefore a
potential for confusion arises. Theological ignorance postulates, among other
things, a loss of some innate knowledge of our nature system. Philosophically,
knowledge is usually taken in the Thomistic sense of correspondence of a men-
tal content, an idea, to the essence of a thing itself where the thing is the object
of consideration. However, when the class of things is considered to be nature
including ourselves, a link to Freudian thought presents itself. In Freud's sys-
tem knowledge as conformity of mind to essence is an issue at the conscious
and unconscious levels and also with respect to things that are within and out-
side the self. To go a step further, IL formulations appear in Freud's thinking
as not only literal lack of knowledge, conscious or otherwise, but also as im-
plicit in inappropriate response. The latter position relies heavily on under-
standing the psychobiological concepts of affect and instinct.
The examples already given, which will be reviewed, reflect this, although I
chose to defer a discussion. In what follows I will forgo references except where
they are not redundant. I will repeat the prior format here of first reviewing
IL formulation in the psyche in general and then work backwards again from
hysteria to schizophrenia to disclose increasingly bizarre forms of IL thought.
Except where it appears to be not altogether obvious, I will not explicitly point
out the copresence of CL thought. However, I would like to refer back to the
phenomenon of the secondary gain of illness which, although it illustrates CL
thought, appears to illustrate IL thought better both in Freud and in the sub-
ject. Another of Freud's interpretations of the events of Genesis as a metaphor-
ical projection of unconscious mental life will, in my opinion, illustrate some of
the sense in which ignorance appears in his thought processes.
The tree of knowledge of good and evil is, from the outset, a sexual (erotic)
symbol. By its form it is suggestive of the sexual organs of both sexes, and as a
fruit-bearing entity it is symbolic of procreation. The fact t h a t it is forbidden is
t a k e n to represent the child's sense of guilt over his or her sexual inquiries and
sexual ambitions. The t h r e a t with death as punishment for transgression rep-
resents castration fear and fear of loss of love. Finally, the expulsion from
Eden represents not so much the fear of loss of love should these investigations
into forbidden sexual knowledge continue and be pursued, but more the guilt-
laden renunciation of the pursuit itself. Freud saw these events as taking place
with limited consciousness in children, usually in the phallic stage. It is impor-
t a n t to stress t h a t the inclination to fear castration and loss of love is not a con-
scious deduction but a spontaneous response to the situation, whether or not it
is aggravated by parental innuendo, verbal or otherwise. The model presented
is IL because-- at least in the healthy case which may be taken to approximate
parental love before a postulated F a l l - - t h e children are ill-advised to pre-
suppose t h a t their n a t u r a l propensities are so unwelcome and likely to incur
wrath or rejection. The biological inability for children to carry out the aim of
the knowledge they seek, were it to be obtained, dramatizes the inappropriate-
ness of thei r response to their inclinations.
Narcissism is a form 0 f Self-love which dates to the oral stage. No doubt
there is a healthy variety of self-love, but Freud saw man more as being
blinded by it. He advanced this position by delineating three historical blows
to man's narcissism. The first blow is the work of Copernicus, which assailed
the geocentric theory of the solar system. The second is the work of Darwin,
which theorizes t h a t m a n is not angelically above the animal kingdom but at
best the most evolved of animals, sharing much with them developmentally.
Freud termed these blows the cosmological and the biological respectively. As
for the third blow, I feel t h a t Freud's own words are best here:
9 . that mental processes are in themselves unconscious and only reach the
.
ego and come under its control through incomplete and untrustworthy percep-
tions-amounts to a statement that the ego is not master in its own house. To-
gether they represent the third wound inflicted on man's self-love, that which I
call the psychological oneY
Still in the oral stage, there is the over-determination of the primary process
and the pleasure principle. It is good to be able to generalize but not to assign
conviction to the absurd extremes of the primary process where, for example, a
horse is equated, unconsciously, with one's father, because both horse and fa-
ther, unlike the child, have larger penises and much greater strength21 Ex-
amples of hasty over-generalization are obvious in ordinary life. As for "Little
Hans," his psyche chose to preserve his loving relation to his father by displac-
ing his fear of him onto horses via the primary process. Actually the child
feared to go out into the street for fear that a horse would bite him, that is, cas-
tration anxiety. The child's father analyzed his son through a letter correspon-
dence with Freud. As for the pleasure principle, it is often enough observable
in adults who, for example, overeat for the pleasure of the moment, choosing to
ignore the potentially grave consequences of obesity and/or poor diet.
With the approach of anality the reality principle begins to form, a principle
that ought to moderate the pleasure principle and the primary process. It often
enough succeeds in doing this to a fair degree. But, if the Fall is assumed, w h y
must it be rediscovered in the first place? From the theological point of view it
seems that we should innately know better and not have to learn it labori-
ously. It seems reasonable to interpret the Genesis narrative this way.
Still in the anal stage, the child comes to form theories of the world which,
at bottom, are rooted in narcissistic projection. Animism refers to this epoch
where trees, flowers, statues, and so on are assumed to be personal entities like
the child itself (the cartoon industry capitalizes on this). Freud theorized t h a t
entire cultures are fixated at the level of animism and discussed this at length
in his anthropological work T o t e m a n d T a b o o 2 2 At this point Freud's theory
"that at bottom God is nothing other an exalted father" comes to mind as an
example of IL thinking2 3 However, it can also be seen as a theological in-
stance of drawing good from evil, and therefore I will defer discussing it to the
section where some Jungian explanations are offered.
Another fundamental principle that Freud felt is innate and present from
early life is the compulsion to repeat, which means just what it says. It is clear
that this can have adaptive value if appropriate responses are repeated in like
situations. However, neurotics routinely repeat their inappropriate behavior,
unconsciously, rather than correct it. Sometimes the repetition compul-
sion appears as no more than a mechanical automaton such as counting a fixed
sequence or, in the case of psychotics, repeating certain gestures again and
again. The classic instance of repetition compulsion occurs in psychoanalytic
therapy in the transference. Here the subject renews (repeats) with the person
of the analyst his or her unresolved and infantile relationship with his or h e r
parents. Among the goals of psychoanalytic therapy is the undoing of this rep-
etition. Undoing this repetition is essentially an effort at dissolving the sub-
ject's resistance, which reflects the subject's wish to cling to the psycho-
n e u r o s i s - - a poor decision albeit a difficult one for the subject not to m a k e (IL).
The transference of perception from parents to therapist also occurs outside of
therapy but not, in general, with the same intensity. This is clearly IL, because
the analyst and others are obviously not the subject's parents nor does the ep-
och of childhood exist anymore where these responses originated2 4
As for ignorance as absence of knowledge throughout the period of childhood

in general, Freud said the following:
Man seems not to have been endowed, or to have been endowed to only a very
small degree, with an instinctual recognition of the dangers that threaten him
from without. Small children are constantly doing things which endanger their
lives, and that is precisely why they cannot afford to be without a protecting
object2~
This applies up to and including the phallic stage.

Before reviewing the disorders in light of theological ignorance, I would like
to discuss briefly two general issues. The concept of defense (CL) is central to
Freud's thinking on the psychic disorders. The process of defense pits one part
of the psyche against another, with resulting loss of psychic capacity and struc-
ture. It is true that psychobiologically this is the best possible outcome the
child (or regressed person) is capable of. However, from the theological point of
view, was such optimal adaptation intended to be self-destructive (IL)? The
comments of reference 15 are important here. The second issue applies to the
female, whose psychosexual development Freud saw as more complex than the
male's. Freud felt that he did not advance as far in understanding the female's
psyche as the male's. The major point he makes is that the healthy develop-
ment of the capacity for heterosexual love is more difficult in females for two
reasons. Unlike the boy, the girl has to change the sex of her love object in ap-
proaching the Oedipal attachment from the mother to the father, the mother
being the first love object for both sexes. Also, in light of vaginal anaesthesia
and clitoral sensation in childhood the girl needs to change the site of her
erotic striving from her clitoris to (in part) the yet undiscovered vagina. In
Freud's theory the girl has IL tasks that the boy does not2 6 Incidentally,
Freud felt that man is less shocked by female homosexuality than male pre-
cisely because we all know unconsciously that the female's first love object is
homosexual, literally at the implied age-appropriate level of personality.
Freud and ignorance: The psychic disorders
In Freud's view all psychopathology is understandable from the Oedipus com-

plex backwards. In all instances symptoms are formed according to the pri-
mary process that governs dream formation. This is, in part, why Freud called
dreams the royal road to the unconscious. In the case of psychotics, where the
primary process d o m i n a t e s - - t h e unconscious is conscious--the equivalence of
the mechanisms of the dream formation and symptom formation is more ap-
parent (IL). This equivalence will not be explicitly outlined again but will, of
course, be implicit in all instances. Freud often noted that psychoneurotics
generalize (transference plus repetition compulsion) from Oedipal failure to

seeing themselves as fated to failure at life. He also noted, as did m a n y before
him, t h a t neurotics tend to indulge in self-pity and to see themselves as vic-
tims of fate. There are elements of animism in the latter. These remarks apply
to varying degrees from hysteria down to schizophrenia, but they are most ob-
servable in hysteria and in the obsessional.
Freud almost made a major mistake in investigating hysteria by believing
the numerous tales of childhood seduction t h a t his hysterial patients reported
to him. He eventually regained his confidence by ascribing their tales to mix-
tures of reality and fantasy2 7 The resolution he discovered reflects the neu-
rotic's tendency to equate psychic reality with outer reality according to the
primary process (IL). In particular, he theorized t h a t the hysteric is, in gen-
eral, dominated by fantasies t h a t mask episodes of infantile masturbation
whose memory is repressed because of Oedipal anxiety. Note t h a t the fantasies
are usually conscious here.
The capacity for the psyche to exhibit poor judgment can be seen in cases of
anxiety hysteria with psychosomatic symptoms. Freud relates on hysterical
loss of vision:
The ego has lost control of the organ, which now becomes solely the instrument of
the repressed sexual impulse. It would appear as though repression on the part of
the ego had gone too far and poured away the baby with the bath-water, for the
ego now flatly refuses to see anything at all, since the sexual interests in looking
have so deeply involved the faculty of vision2 8
In the case of conversion hysteria p r o p e r - - h e r e anxiety is avoided via the

converted s y m p t o m - - F r e u d found t h a t the symptoms tend to be formed not
according to anatomy but rather according to the subject's idea of a n a t o m y
(IL)29 He reports instances of loss of motor control in the near part of a l i m b - -
say the upper a r m - - w h i l e preserving motor control at the distal p a r t - - s a y
the f i n g e r s - - w h i c h is anatomically impossible.
There is a strong relation between idea and symptom in general (mixed) hys-
terical symptoms. At bottom Freud often found that the child's idea of how con-
ception takes place accounted for the symptom. For example, hysterical vomit-
ing could be caused by the conjunction of Oedipal anxiety and the infantile
idea t h a t conception takes place by ingesting some substance. Similarly, con-
stipation could be rooted in the cloacal theory of birth (anal delivery). Note
t h a t the first example looks to undo the conception and the second to hide its
results. 7~In both instances the underlying idea is unconscious and dates back
to the phallic stage or possibly earlier.
The tendency to misperceive is a cousin of the symptoms formed according to
infantile theories. Freud postulated t h a t a great deal of obsessional suffering
was rooted in the unconscious confounding of rectum and vagina in both sexes.
In attempting to clarify how the unconscious can equate certain objects, espe-
cially feces and baby, he states:
I may hurriedly add, perhaps, that interest in the vagina, which awakens later, is
also essentially of anal-erotic origin. This is not to be wondered at, for the vagina
itself, to borrow an apt phrase from Lou Andreas-Salome (1916), is "taken on
lease" from the rectum . . . . 71
The presence of ignorance in these formulations is apparent. Less obvious

but equally psychogenic is the child's interpretation of witnessing its parents
during sexual intercourse. Here Freud divined t h a t children tend to see this as
a sadistic act inflicted by the father on the mother. Given anal fixation it is
easy to see how this can lead to male homosexuality. In his analysis of the
"Wolf Man" Freud felt t h a t the subject's seeing his parents in intercourse a
tergo was decisive in his (obsessional) disorder which featured recurring anxi-
ety dreams of wolves. 7'~This raises the intuitively acceptable but theoretically
difficult problem of how and why the child's perception is more important t h a n
the reality it should agree with. I will not discuss this, because it is a study in
its own right but appears to belong to the present discussion of IL thought in
Freud's theories.
Freud felt t h a t the obsessional disorder was the most promising one for psy-
choanalytic research, perhaps because he saw himself as obsessional. Anal
events and the associated ego structure are decisive here. Ambivalence in rela-
tions, and hence in thought, is a characteristic here, because the anal fixation
predates sexual identity and because both love and hatred are present in the
regressed position. Obsessionals routinely decide to resolve their ambivalent
trends by favoring one class of objects with the tender, positive trend and an-
other class with the hostile, negative trend without much regard for the appro-
priateness of this decision (IL). This creates problems with interpersonal rela-
tions, because obsessional rigidity coupled with ambivalence tends to frustrate
others (which always seems to confound obsessionals). The obsessional solu-
tion is to form loose attachments to people which can easily be displaced else-
where (IL).
In their mentality obsessionals are usually quite primitive at certain levels.
Obsessional symptoms, especially rituals, reveal a childhood residue of mag-
ical thinking. The objective of the rituals is to avoid anxiety (this is often con-
scious but of unknown origin to the subject) and to achieve absolute security.
For example, m a n y obsessionals have morning and evening rituals. By morn-
ing their bed must be arranged according to a set, magical pattern, all locks
m u s t be checked a certain number of times in a fixed way before leaving, and
so on. By night, for example, the locks must be rechecked, pilot lights on stoves
must be examined, teeth brushed in a certain way a fixed number of times, and
so on. If any of the magical rituals is improperly carried out, the whole ritual
must be performed again from the start. The rituals usually hide components
of the ambivalence. For example, compulsive checking of locks before leaving
(morning ritual) could be associatively linked with the idea of protecting a
loved one (the mother represented by the home), and the compulsive checking
of the stoves could represent certainty that hostile trends (fire destroys) to-
ward the same person are in check. It is also possible for the same ritual to rep-
resent the positive trend when done one way and the negative trend when done
another way (IL). There is obviously a superstitious undercurrent in the mag-
ical thinking and rituals of obsessionals.
There is a strong tendency for obsessionals to substitute thinking for feeling
and action, usually because of dread of their hostile impulses. Freud felt
that obsessionals, in their retreat from the Oedipus complex and associated
affectual and motor tendencies, resort to the sexualization of thought because
thinking precedes acting. In fact, he defined thought as experimental action. It
may sound strange that a person as given to the quest of rigid and absolute se-
curity with sexualized thought would also be highly inclined to doubt, but such
is the case. States of chronic doubt are defensive against ambivalence. At the
same time the relentless quest of absolute certainty magnifies every iota of
doubt into a probability, so that the pursuit of absolute certainty achieves its
opposite, namely, a doubt which is unconsciously defensive against ambiva-
lence (because it precludes sexually identified object choice and choice of posi-
tive or negative trend)Y ~
The convolved complexity of the obsessionals' ego-structure is exacerbated
by their regressive tendency to treat thought as action. Freud labeled this
form of magical thinking "the omnipotence of thought," because the subject
narcissistically reacts to his thoughts as if they were actions. 74Here the mere
thought of hostility provokes more guilt than its execution would in a healthier
person. Given all this complexity and self-torment, it is little wonder that
Freud said of this rigid and guilt-laden disorder:
Certainly this is a crazy illness. The most extravagant psychiatric imagination

would not, I think, have succeeded in constructing anything like it; and if one did
not see it before one every day one would never bring oneself to believe in it. 75
Projection is a common defense mechanism by which the psyche deludes it-

self into thinking that what it does not want to be true of itself will not be true
if it is ascribed to others. It is the psychic analogue of flight from external dan-
ger when the intrapsychic danger is "put outside." At the cost of some degree of
health, the psyche accepts its own maneuver and pretends that inside is out-
side (IL). This defense is employed to an extraordinary degree in paranoia.
Freud regarded this disorder as the result of a repudiated homosexual attach-
ment. He saw it as having four varieties, which he captured in a formula form
which, in my view, is quite reminiscent of theological ignorance. He stated his

position as follows:
Now it might be supposed that a proposition consisting of three terms, such as "I
love him," could only be contradicted in three different ways. The delusion ofjeal-
ousy contradicts the subject, delusions of persecution contradict the verb, and ero-
tomania contradicts the object. But in fact a fourth kind of contradiction is possi-
ble, namely, one which contradicts the proposition as a whole: "I do not love at
all--I do not love any one." And since, after all, one's libido must go somewhere,
this proposition seems to be the psychological equivalent of the proposition: "I
love only myself.'76
The projective defense of the paranoid takes one of four forms of denial of the
phrase "I love him" (male paranoid):
1. "I hate him," where the paranoid's unconscious t orm ent over homosex-
ual longing is projected onto the other as persecutor;
2. "I love her," where a heterosexual choice is made (because the other per-
son is delusionally seen as first loving the paranoid) to defend against
the homosexual trend via erotomania as proof to the contrary;
3. "She loves him," where a female is chosen for the projection of the homo-
sexual a t t a c h m e n t onto a third other, this variety of paranoia being
characterized by delusions of jealousy; and
4. "I do not love at a l l - - I do not love any one," which is, of course, the sad
but familiar megalomania.
Projective denial by all means with the occasional exception of (2) features
the usual symptoms of persecution. Freud's model for the female paranoid is
analogous. I feel t h a t the IL content here calls for no comment.
In both depressive psychosis and schizophrenia hallucinations are used de-
fensively. The psychic principle is highly regressive and primitive: to relieve
the t r a u m a t i c stress of a frustrated wish by presenting to the psyche the image
of a memo r y t h a t once fullfilled it or the image of a scenario t h a t could fulfill it.
Equivalently, the hallucination is a wish perceived as fulfilled by its recollec-
tion or review. Externalizing the superego in depressive psychosis illustrates
this. End-of-the-world hallucinations satisfy the wish t h a t it is not the self
which is ending but the non-self. The use of narcissistic self-deceit seems alto-
g eth er obvious here.
F r eu d differed with his contemporaries on the role of psychotic delusions.
Unlike them, he saw delusions as efforts at recovery r a t h e r t h a n as announc-
ing the illness. In the case of the schizophrenic or the depressive psychotic
whose acute episode approaches the "internal catastrophe" of the former,
F r e u d said of the formation of delusions:
Anthony F, Badalamenti 53
The delusion-formation, which we take to be a pathological product, is in reality

an attempt at recovery, a process of reconstruction. Such a reconstruction after
the catastrophe is more or less successful, but never wholly so. . . . 77
The delusion does not agree with reality; otherwise it would not be a delu-
sion; and therefore this attempt at recovery chooses to ignore some of it. For
this reason it recalls theological ignorance. Again, this can be viewed psycho-
biologically as a best possible effort, but the issue is t h a t the best possible solu-
tion can do no more t h a n to ignore some of reality.
It may appear t h a t fully psychotic delusions are different from paranoid de-
lusions. This is not so. The paranoid is also trying to fashion the world accord-
ing to his own model, but his ego structure is not as regressively impoverished
as the depressive psychotic's and the schizophrenic's.
This concludes my effort to justify the position t h a t concupiscence and igno-
rance, sometimes individually and at other times jointly, appear as organizers
in Freud's psychoanalytic thoughts. If it is assumed t h a t there is, so to speak,
some theology in his psychology, then it is natural to ask why and to seek a
plausible explanation. The final section of this paper attempts to construct an
explanation with a J u n g i a n archetypal approach.
A Jungian explanation
Perhaps there is more of theology in Freudian thought t h a n suggested by this

paper. To motivate this more general claim, some accounting should be given
for the presence in Freud's thoughts of organizers reminiscent of the Fall of
man. An explanation is already at hand in Jung's concept of the archetypes.
J u n g often compared the archetypes to primordial images, ineffable in and of
themselves, but inferable from the final form they give to perceptions, whether
arising from within or without. Note t h a t inner perceptions often refer here to
psychic processes, conscious or unconscious. J u n g often analogized the arche-
type as a concept to the crystal structure i m m a n e n t in a liquid solution, be-
cause the forces t h a t beget the crystal-to-be from the material in solution can-
not be seen, although the end product can be. There is some accuracy in
comparing Jung's archetypal concept to organizers in embryology. In general,
however, J u n g used archetypal formulations within and across somatic and
psychic boundaries and included in his notion of psyche those potentials usu-
ally understood by the word "soul." This is not the case with Freud.
It is clear t h a t the present a r g u m e n t seeks to account for the presence of
theological (Fall of man) organizers in Freud's ideas by proposing an archetyp-
al explanation to the effect t h a t both Freud and, historically, theologians pro-
jected some of the archetype of the self into their formulations. 78 A subtle
point presents itself here, for in which context are archetypes to be under-
stood? On the n a t u r a l plane alone they are as defined: primordial images
which offer their adaptive service to man as a function of the events of the age
in which they are observed. From the point of view of theological ignorance
and a theory of fallen man, however, the archetypes could be understood in the
wider sense of an intuitive and residual awareness of knowledge which was
once innate, among other things. Given that the content of knowledge was lost,
it m a y be wondered if a residual form (archetype) of what accomodates that
k n o w l e d g e - - p e r h a p s via preternatural g i f t s - - h a s not lingered.
The position just stated would apply as is to knowledge of the nature system.
However, what of the archetype of the self in light of the Fall? Can it not be
considered that the archetype of the self was itself altered by the Fall, thus im-
plying that self-referent--that is, psychological--formulations therefore pro-
ject the wound of the Fall into the very formulation process itself?. If this were
maintained, then it would inevitably follow that Freud's thinking, restricted
as it is to the natural plane, reflects the projection of the archetype of the
wounded or fallen self onto that plane, while the theologian's thoughts project
it onto a wider context.
There is more suggestive evidence of theological thought in Freud than
given in this paper; but before discussing it, I would like to review briefly some
of the posit:.ve elements of Freud's thinking and to suggest why they have
some implicit positive theological content. The meaning of positive will define
itself along the way. Freud felt that man is innately bisexual, and that, of
course, includes bisexual erotic interest, but not only such interest. He also
m e a n t that each person has a natural tendency for love, affection, and solici-
tude which can and should reach out to either sex, a thought that is next of kin
to brotherly love.
The ideal, and somewhat realized, outcome of Freud's psychotherapy is self-
mastery. He argued that in the neurotic state certain impulses, usually antiso-
cial or otherwise objectionable, are automatically (unconsciously) barred from
integration into the personality. Freud's goal in therapy was not to make such
impulses and tendencies conscious for acting out, but rather to make them con-
scious in order to enable the conscious choosing to censure them and so permit
their use and integration elsewhere. For this reason, Freud has often been
called a moralist. 79
Freud also felt that he recognized strong self-healing tendencies in the psy-
che. In responding to the criticism that psychoanalysis fails to reconstruct the
personality, he put forth the thought that psychosynthesis takes place sponta-
neously and healthily once the neurotic impediments, usually defenses, are
analytically removed by making them conscious. 8~Perhaps the most optimis-
tic thought in Freud's theories is the concept of sublimation, which, strictly
speaking, is not a defense but is a cousin of Jung's concept of transformation
and perhaps also of actual grace. As a mechanism, it refers to the changing of
an instinctual aim from a personally or socially objectionable one to an accept-
able one. It is a movement from the lower to the higher. The concept has obvi-
ous roots in Darwin's concept of evolution, which is implicit in much of Freud's
thought. In the context of moving from thoughts on grace to thoughts on subli-

mation, it may be suggested t h a t as sublimation effects healing, so evolution,
in general, may be reparative in the nature system. It is perhaps equally likely
in the realm of theological speculation t h a t evolution is a part of the mecha-
nism of creation, but the self-healing powers in m a n suggest t h a t their ana-
logues in the nature system--self-organizing t e n d e n c i e s - - a r e corrective and
not just teleological.
For the sake of perspective on the above and on what follows, I feel t h a t the
attitudes of Freud and J u n g should be briefly reviewed to clarify how the con-
cept of archetype is used, or not used, as appropriate. Freud is generally seen
as having had a tragic view of life. J u n g is usually seen as more optimistic, and
I agree. But on the issue of theology he tends to surface as either an adversary
or as a champion. I believe t h a t the reason for intemperate response to J u n g is
t h a t he can be selectively read to advantage. His archetypal thinking, proba-
bly his greatest contribution and a product of genius, crosses all boundaries of
h u m a n experience and is therefore wider t h a n Freud's psychobiological model.
This has theological appeal. However, J u n g himself considers God to be the
psyche's highest psychological value and an archetype, and he never clarifies
his own religious feelings. In his controversial work, A n s w e r to Job, 81 he
openly expresses rage for the travails of Job. He further invites theological ex-
clusion with his rejection of the principle ofprivatio boni and claims t h a t evil is
an entity and force of its own. I state these things to clarify this paper's import,
because for me Freud and J u n g are neither champions nor adversaries but
men of great gifts, some of whose thoughts contribute to a more complete psy-
chological model of man. For me Freud is vertical and specific, and J u n g is hor-
izontal and general.
With this context in mind I would like to return to Freud's idea "that at bot-
tom God is nothing other t h a n an exalted father." Freud was referring here to
the individual's neurotic quest for the security of childhood, whether or not
t h a t security actually existed or is a fantasy compensating for its historical ab-
sence. As stated earlier, I doubt t h a t Freud was an atheist. Whatever his pri-
vate religious experience really was, Freud was not attempting to reduce
personal experience to nothing but the infantile seach for the all-caring
father. Part of the psychological reality is t h a t children r o u t i n e l y - - a n d
h e a l t h i l y - - f o r m their first conception of God with their parents as a model,
usually with father emphasis. They are simply not yet able to abstract the idea
of a spiritual entity without visible form. This is probably why so m a n y adult
atheists feature rage toward their parents--especially the f a t h e r - - f o r frus-
trations in childhood care. Summing up these thoughts suggests a n a t u r a l
bridge from Freud's cynical description of neurotic faith to a wider concept of
mature faith by noting t h a t the child's exaltation of the father, or parents, is
only the first level of conceptualization of divinity. It is just as i m m a t u r e a
stage of faith as infantile sexuality is an immature stage of reproductive ca-
pacity. If the infantile model of divinity persists in the unconscious into the
a d u l t state, neurosis is indicated. B u t the s i m u l t a n e o u s coexistence of a m o r e

s p i r i t u a l God i m a g e a n d of f a i t h itself is not t h e n precluded b u t m a y be, to use
a t u r n of words, clouded. I n t h e model of the Fall, can it not be t h a t p a r t of the
p a t h of r e g a i n i n g at-one-ness is first to equate, on t h e n a t u r a l plane, f a t h e r im-
age a n d God i m a g e a n d to m a t u r e later to a God i m a g e w h i c h sheds the attrib-
utes of t h e f a t h e r ?
T h e r e are more h i n t s of a n a r c h e t y p a l conception of the Fall w i t h i n the self
in F r e u d ' s theories, m o s t of w h i c h arise in w h a t he r e g a r d e d as his m o r e specu-
lative ideas. To e m p h a s i z e t h e significance of his speculations, I wish to quote
two p a s s a g e s from F r e u d w h i c h I believe s u g g e s t a r c h e t y p a l s t i r r i n g in him:
In other words, we have once more come unawares upon the riddle which has so
often confronted us: whence does neurosis c o m e - - w h a t is its ultimate, its own pe-
culiar raison d'etre? After tens of years of psychoanalytic labours, we are as much
in the dark about this problem as we were at the start . . . . 82
A n d in discussing biological, phylogenetic, a n d psychological factors c a u s i n g

neurosis, he states:
The third, psychological, factor resides in a defect in our mental apparatus which
has to do precisely with its differentiation into an id and an ego . . . . 8~
F r e u d ' s later, speculative t h o u g h t s are s t r a n g e l y a k i n to the theology of the

Fall. I c a n n o t c o h e r e n t l y clarify this w i t h o u t a g a i n l e t t i n g F r e u d speak for
h i m s e l f first. I n Beyond the Pleasure Principle he states:
It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an

earlier state of things . . . . 84
As for the r e s t o r a t i v e aims of the instincts (death a n d Eros) he states:
On the basis of theoretical considerations, supported by biology, we put forward

the hypothesis of a death instinct, the task of which is to lead organic life back
into the inanimate state; on the other hand, we supposed that Eros, by bringing
about a more and more far-reaching combination of the particles into which living
substance is dispersed, aims at complicating life and at the same time, of course,
at preserving it. Acting in this way, both the instincts would be conservative in
the strictest sense of the word, since both would be endeavoring to re-establish a
state of things that was disturbed by the emergence of life. The emergence of life
would thus be the cause of the continuance of life and also at the time of the striv-
ing towards death; and life itself would be a conflict and compromise between
these two trends. 85
Note t h a t in the case of the d e a t h instinct the prior state the instinct aims
for is t h e r e t u r n to the i n a n i m a t e state. Yet in a r g u i n g his case for the Eros or
life i n s t i n c t s , h e f a i l s to i d e n t i f y t h e p r i o r s t a t e t o w a r d w h i c h t h e y t e n d . I n
p o i n t of fact, h e a d m i t s t h i s d i f f i c u l t y i n h i s l a t e r w o r k , N e w I n t r o d u c t o r y L e c -
t u r e s on P s y c h o a n a l y s i s , w h e r e h e s t a t e s :
The question, too, of whether the conservative character m a y not belong to all in-
stincts without exception, whether the erotic instincts as well m a y not be seeking
to b r i n g back a n earlier state of t h i n g s when they strive to b r i n g about a syn-
thesis of living t h i n g s into greater u n i t i e s - - t h i s question, too, we m u s t leave
unanswered, s6
All these t h o u g h t s can be r e v i e w e d w i t h a n eye on theology by g i v i n g a final

quotation from Freud:
Hence the psychoanalytic school could v e n t u r e on the assertion t h a t at bottom no

one believes in his own death, or to put the same t h i n g i n a n o t h e r way, i n the u n -
conscious every one of us is convinced of his own immortality27
I t c a n n o w b e s p e c u l a t e d t h a t F r e u d ' s d e a t h i n s t i n c t s c o r r e s p o n d to t h e
w o u n d to h u m a n n a t u r e c a u s e d b y t h e loss of i m p a s s i b i l i t y , w h i c h i m p l i e s m o r -
t a l i t y . T h e p o s i t i o n t h a t o u r u n c o n s c i o u s is c o n v i n c e d of i t s i m m o r t a l i t y , w h i l e
p e r c e i v a b l e a s r a n k n a r c i s s i s m , c o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d a n a r c h e t y p a l r e s i d u e of
the self as it was before the Fall. F i n a l l y , the u n i d e n t i f i e d prior state t o w a r d
w h i c h E r o s t e n d s w o u l d b e t h a t of E d e n i n w h i c h life w a s u n e n d i n g .
References
1. St. Augustine's writings do not, in general, proceed in a clear, linear style but tend to migrate
about central themes. For this reason, the reader who is unfamiliar with Augustinian thought
might first want to read works on him rather than by him. A good primer is Gilson, E., The
Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine. Vintage, 1976. Another good introduction is Copleston,
F., A History of Philosophy, volume 2, part 1. New York, Image, 1982. An elementary but
quite lucid and comprehensive presentation of the concept of the Fall is developed in Sheed,
F.J., Theology and Sanity. New York, Sheed and Ward, 1946.
2. St. Thomas's writing is clear enough to recommend original references. His classic work is, of
course, the Summa Theologica which was written for the faithful. Another original, equally
classic reference is his Summa Contra Gentiles, which was written for a broader audience.
Both works reveal strong Aristotelean influence. In fact, St. Thomas so admired Aristotle that
he often refers to him as the stagirite (because Aristotle was born in Stagira, Thrace). An in-
troduction to St. Thomas may be found in Copleston, op. cit., volume 2, part 2.
3. See Gilson, op. cit.
4. See St. Thomas, op. cit. There is still debate over whether concupiscence is no more than the
state of human nature without the aid of preternatural gifts versus concupiscence as a damage
to human nature even in the absence of such gifts. Resolution of this issue has no bearing here,
because Freud's thoughts will be presented essentially as instances of concupiscence and/or ig-
norance as defined. These remarks on debate and its relevance to this paper also apply to the
notion of original sin as possibly having affected our material universe. The terms "material
universe" and "nature system" are used interchangeably here, depending on emphasis, the
former stressing totality and the latter mechanism.
5. The beatific vision refers to the direct and immediate participation of man in the life of God.
Theologically it is at the very center of what constitutes heaven. Teleologically, it is the high-
est final cause (purpose) of man. Other, lesser, final causes would be to procreate, to complete
the universe, and so on. A standard scriptural reference for heaven as the happiness of the be-
atific vision is I Corinthians 13:6, which reads: "Now we are seeing a dim reflection in a mir-
ror, but then we shall be seeing face to face. The knowledge t h a t I have now is imperfect; but
then I shall know as fully as I am known." Jerusalem Bible. New York, Doubleday and Com-
pany, 1966, New Testament, p. 305.
6. The biographical details of this process are presented in Jones, E., The Life and Works of
Sigmund Freud. New York, Basic Books, 1961, and in Roazen, P., Freud and His Followers.
New York, Meridian, 1974. The actual evolution of psychoanalytic theory per se from Freud's
viewpoint can be found in Bonaparte, A.; Freud, A.; and Kris, E., eds., The Origins of Psycho-
analysis (Letters to Wilhelm Fliess). New York, Basic Books, 1977.
7. Freud often compared philosophy and religion, including his own Judaic tradition, to paranoid
delusions and obsessive/compulsive symptoms respectively. This is clearly presented in Freud,
S., Totem and Taboo (1913). New York, Norton and Company, 1950, p. 73. In The New Intro-
ductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (included in The Complete Introductory Lectures on Psy-
choanalysis. New York, Norton, 1966), he refers to religion as the enemy of science, p. 624. In
the Jones biography, op. cir., p. 472, he (Freud) states with reference to philosophy: "The only
feeling of satisfaction they give me is t h a t I take no part in this pitiable waste of intellectual
powers. Philosophers no doubt believe t h a t in such studies they are contributing to the
development of h u m a n thought, but every time there is a psychological or even a
psychopathological problem behind them."
8. This point is well developed in Bettelheim, B., Freud and Man's Soul. New York, Knopf, 1983.
The author also discusses Freud's linguistic usage and perspective in considerable detail. The
lighter, more h u m a n side of Freud also surfaces in this work.
9. The Life and Works of Sigmund Freud, op. cit.
10. J u n g notes in Critique in Psychoanalysis. Princeton, New Jersey, Bollingen, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1975, p. 236, t h a t C.G. Carus and Eduard yon H a r t m a n n postulated the uncon-
scious before Freud. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche both gave characterizations of the uncon-
scious which bear striking resemblance to Freud's. These efforts were independent of Freud's.
Freud discussed Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in On the History of the Psychoanalytic Move-
ment (1914). New York, Norton, 1966, p. 15, and also in A n Autobiographical Study (1925).
New York, Norton, 1963, p. 114.
11. See the G e r m a n to English part ofBetteridge, H.T., ed., T h e N e w Cassell's German Dictionary.
New York, F u n k & Wagnalls, 1965, p. 477. Freud's use of"der Trieb" in the impulsive sense
h a s been repeatedly noted in the literature.
12. This is discussed in many places by Freud. A lucid account is given in Freud's workBeyond the
Pleasure Principle (1920). New York, Norton, 1961, pp. 4 5 - 4 6 . It also arises in The New Intro-
ductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. op. cit., p. 559.
13. As presented in Rank, O., The Trauma of Birth. Vienna, 1924.
14. Rank regarded b i r t h as a primal t r a u m a antecedent to and prototypic of all subsequent anxi-
ety. His major work in this is The Trauma of Birth, o19. cit.
15. The same can be said of the zygote at the moment of conception. By the time b i r t h takes place,
certain obvious psychosexual and psychosomatic goals have been realized including the
new capacity for extrauterine life. T h a t these and all other goals may be realized subopti-
mally should be noted but not labored. Suffice it to say t h a t suboptimality can be resolved via
the Freudian psychobiological point of view or the theological Fall of m a n point of view or both.
For ease of reading and economy of presentation, I will leave the more t r a n s p a r e n t implica-
tions to their own resolution. Subsequent references to this footnote will address the second
h a l f of its content, t h a t is, the implications of resolving conceptual difficulties from the Freu-
dian, the theological, or mixed points of view. Surprisingly, the two "opposed" views are usu-
ally compatible and imply like resolutions on different levels.
16. The reflex referred to is the rooting reflex. It is a feedback-regulated reflex which the infant
uses to locate the nipple. It is known to arise early in intrauterine life. The concept is nicely
detailed in Spitz, R., No and Yes. New York, International Universities Press, 1957. The au-
thor notes t h a t as early as 1922 Minkowski showed the reflex to exist within three months of
conception (p. 20).
17. Note here t h a t the action of sucking itself reveals the action of an aggressive instinct (elemen-
tary motor mastery as the end result of rooting).
18. Freud used the term only several times in his writings. It seems t h a t his tradition has chosen
not to note it or to consider its relation to the nursing process seen as mutual c u e i n g - - a n d
satisfaction--between mother and child. See, for example, Freud, "Analysis of a Phobia in a
Five Year Old Boy" (1909). In Sigmund Freud Collected Papers, volume 3. New York, Basic
Books, 1959, p. 253.
19. It may appear t h a t the oral erotic instinct is extraneous to the h u n g e r instinct. Much could be
said about it, but the one salient point here is t h a t it serves to over-determine the satisfaction
of h u n g e r and the establishment of the infant's relation to the mother. The t r e a t m e n t of the
pleasure principle, to follow, will subsume this sexual (erotic) instinct.
20. Freud, "Formulations Regarding the Two Principles of Mental Functioning" (1911), Sigmund
Freud Collected Papers, volume 4, op. cit., p. 14.
21. A n Outline of Psychoanalysis (1939). New York, Norton, 1969, p. 25.
22. The Interpretation of Dreams (1900). New York, Modern Library, 1950.
23. From Freud's metapsychological paper "The Unconscious" (1915), Sigmund Freud Collected
Papers, op. cir., volume 4, pp. 119-120.
24. New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, op. cit., pp. 537-538.
25. This paper addresses Freud's thinking, not the outcome of the subsequent reviews of it. This is
relevant because some (especially M. Klein) postulate t h a t the superego begins to form at the
earliest oral stage. The theme of this paper is unaffected by what degree of validity Klein's
concept may have.
26. It is worth noting t h a t the mouth and the anus are not only opposite extremes of an aperture
through the body but they can also exchange functions to a limited degree: expulsion from the
mouth and intake from the anus are both possible, though certainly not major functions for
t h e i r respective sites. Embryologically the mouth and anus are equivalent as descendants
of a common i n t r a u t e r i n e tissue structure. These parallels are made more s t r i k i n g - - a n d
r e l e v a n t - - b y noting t h a t while the mouth opens and closes via jaws, the anus does likewise
via sphincter muscles.
27. Freud, A n Outline of Psychoanalysis, op. cir., p. 11. The reference to libido is Freud's parlance
for sexual energy.
28. _ _ , The New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 563.
29. _ _ , Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1909). New York, Norton, 1977, p. 44.
30. _ _ , Totem and Taboo, op. cit. p. 88.
31. _ _ , Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex (1905). New York, Nervous and Mental
Disease Publishing Company, 1930, p. 28.
32. Ibid. p. 87.
33. Ibid. p. 51.
34. Freud, Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 45.
35. ., Beyond the Pleasure Principle, o19.cit., p. 4.
36 . . . . . . . . , "Formulations Regarding the Two Principles of Mental Functioning", op. cit., p. 14.
37. _ _ , The Ego and the Id (1923). New York, Norton, 1962, p. 15.
38. The phenomenon of the psychopath is no exception, for here the price of absence of guilt is a bi-
zarre distortion of intended psychosexual development. This will be clarified briefly at a l a t e r
point.
39. Freud, The Ego and the Id, op. cit., pp. 3 8 - 3 9 .
40. Freud usually dated the oral stage from b i r t h to, say, the end of the first year of life, the anal
stage from one year to perhaps two years or later, and the phallic stage as from, say, two years
to about four or five. He emphasized variability and was not at all rigid in time benchmarks.
41. "The Infantile Genital Organization of Libido" (1923), Sigmund Freud Collected Papers, vol-
ume 2, op. cit., p. 245.
42. I believe t h a t the insufficiency of the energic point of view is rooted in two factors: (1) Freud's
own unresolved difficulties with aggression (he regarded himself as a n obsessional, a disorder
which he himself stated features difficulties with anal-sadistic rage); and (2) Freud h a d little
facility with physics or mathematics which would have enabled h i m to t h i n k more clearly in
t e r m s of energy. Freud used the phrase "economic point of view" to describe psychoanalysis of
psychic energy, even though his use of the term "energy" is underdefined.
43. Freud, S., "Neurosis and Psychosis" (1924), Sigmund Freud Collected Papers, volume 2, op.
cit., p. 251.
44. See, for example, "Some Character Types Met With in Psychoanalytic Work" (1915), Sigmund
Freud Collected Papers, volume 4, op. cir., where he states: "Psychoanalytic work has fur-
nished us with the rule t h a t people fall ill of a neurosis as a result of frustration," p. 323.
45. Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, (1916). In The Complete Lectures on Psycho-
analysis, op. cit., p. 207.
46. _ _ , A n Outline of Psychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 49. Freud quoted Diderot in the original
French. I have inserted the translation given in footnote 2 of t h a t work.
47. In light of this paper's theme, the relationship of familial values to superego formation is not
detailed. However, it seems t h a t the relationship between the two via internalization is clear
as it stands. Freud felt t h a t not only is the superego phylogenetic as a structure, but t h a t even
some of its content is phylogenetic. This allusion to a n innate sense of guilt is strikingly simi-
lar to the concept of the transmission of original sin. Freud made frequent references, in his
anthropological writings, to the concept of original sin (e.g., Totem and Taboo, op. cir., p. 153),
but there is no evidence of his consciously adapting the associated theological context and its
implications as organizers of his thoughts. The evidence is to the contrary in t h a t his approach
was empirical and psychobiological with implicit contempt for philosophy and religion, both of
which he regarded as neurotic manifestations.
48. Freud considered this at length as early as 1893 in "Some Points in a Comparative Study of
Organic and Hysterical Paralyses." In S igmund Freud Collected Papers, volume 1, op. cit., pp.
42-58.
49. Freud felt t h a t m a n is constitutionally bisexual and that, therefore, homosexuality is patho-
logical only when it is present where the ambient culture censures it. Anal regression is a nec-
essary but not sufficient precondition for the disorder.
50. Freud, S., Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood (1910). New York, Norton, 1964,
p. 55.
51. _ _ , Totem and Taboo, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
52. _ _ , "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917). In Sigmund Freud Collected Papers, volume
4, op. cit., pp. 161-162.
53. _ _ , "Neurosis and Psychosis," op. cit., p. 253.
54. The concept is presented in Freud's paper "Mourning and Melancholia," op. cit., p. 165.
55. This is discussed thoroughly in Nie-Pao, Ping, Schizophrenic Disorders. New York, Interna-
tional Universities Press, 1979.
56. It is well known t h a t Freud did far more work with neurotics, for whom he felt the prognosis
was better, t h a n with psychotics. It is also well known t h a t he did not like to work with psy-
chotics, presumably because of their poor prospects.
57. Freud, "The Unconscious," op. cit., p. 128.
58. This is given somewhat continuously in Freud's "Psychoanalytic Notes Upon a n Autobio-
graphical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)" (1911), Sigmund Freud Col-
lected Papers, volume 3, o19. cit., pp. 387-470. The case discussed is t h a t of Dr. Schreber (Doc-
tor of Law). At t h a t time paranoia and schizophrenia were not clearly delimited. To m a n y they
still are not. However, Freud was definitely describing a schizophrenic regression in a subject
who was paranoid.
59. P a r t of the catastrophe includes elements common to the neuroses but on a more general scale.
Instinctual defusion is a n example (CL). Freud had other things in mind when using the term
internal catastrophe which are not cited here. One such thing, of partial relevance, is the re-
gression of libido back to the ego (in all psychoses). Its relevance is rooted in lower ego func-
tions seizing what belongs, in health, to higher ego functions. It is for this reason t h a t he chose
to call the psychoses narcissistic psychoneuroses and objectless. It is this regression in love ca-
pacity which accounts for the striking withdrawal and self-absorption seen in psychosis. How-
ever, it is the fragmentation of object r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s - - a n d implied psychic structure, mostly
in the e g o - - w h i c h discriminates the schizophrenic from the manic-depressive.
60. The n a r r a t i v e on Copernicus and Darwin appears in Freud's paper "One of the Difficulties of
Psychoanalysis" (1917). In Sigmund Freud Collected Papers, volume 4, op. cit., pp. 351-353.
61. This is the actual symptomatology of the "Little Hans" case which Freud presented in "Analy-
sis of a Phobia in a Five Year Old Boy," op. cit.
62. Freud, Totem and Taboo, op. cit.
63. Ibid., p. 147. The same s t a t e m e n t appears repeatedly in Freud's controversial work, The Fu-
ture of an Illusion (1927). New York, Anchor, 1964.
64. The concept of the compulsion to repeat is developed in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, op. cit.
In particular, see p. 30 for a terse presentation of the concept. Freud titled the work as he did
because it is often unpleasurable things which are repeated.
65. Freud, S., Inhibitions, Symptoms andAnxiety (1926). New York, Norton, 1977, p. 94.
66. These concepts are sketched in Freud's paper "Female Sexuality" (1931). In Sigmund Freud
Collected Papers, volume 5, op. cir., pp. 252-272.
67. Freud describes his disorientation a t this time (the 1890s) in On the History of the Psychoana-
lytic Movement, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
68. Freud, "Psychogenic Disturbance of Vision According to Psychoanalytic Conceptions" (1910).
In SigmundFreud Collected Papers, volume 2, op. cit., p. 110.
69. The concept is presented in "Some points in a Comparative Study of Organic and Hysterical
Paralyses," op. cit. This is an early paper of Freud, b u t he did not change his views on the etiol-
ogy of conversion hysteria.
70. The various and often fantastic ideas of how children t h i n k conception and b i r t h take place are
detailed in Freud's "Sexual Theories of Children" (1908). In Sigmund Freud Collected Papers,
volume 2, op. cit., pp. 59-75.
71. Freud, The New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 565.
72. The details are found in Freud's "From the History of a n Infantile Neurosis" (1918). In Sig-
round Freud Collected Papers, volume 3, op. cit., pp. 473-605. This case is often called "The
Wolf Man."
73. Freud gives a particularly lucid account of these ideas at the end of his paper "Notes upon a
Case of Obsessional Neurosis" (1909). In Sigmund Freud Collected Papers, volume 4, op. cit.,
pp. 372-383. The full case (pp. 293-383) is usually known as "The Rat Man" because of the
subject's history and dread.
74. The phrase, together with animism and magic, is discussed at length in Chapter III of Freud's
Totem and Taboo, o19.cit., pp. 7 5 - 9 9 .
75. Freud, The New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, (1916), op. cit., p. 259.
76. ., "Psychoanalytic Notes Upon a n Autobiographical Account of a Case of P a r a n o i a
(Dementia Paranoides)," op. cir., p. 451.
77. Ibid., p. 457. This is an often-quoted passage of Freud and is usually t a k e n as a seminal in-
sight into schizophrenia.
78. J u n g devoted his work Aion. Princeton, New Jersey, Bollingen, Princeton University Press,
1979, to a study of the self as a n archetype. Interestingly, he presents there the idea of Christ
as a symbol of the self. More compellingly in the context of the Fall and concupiscence is the
following thought of J u n g t a k e n from Aion: "As a result of this 'anamnesis' the original state
of one-ness with the God-image is restored. It brings about a n integration, a bridging of the
split in the personality caused by the instincts striving apart in different and mutually contra-
dictory directions," p. 40.
79. These thoughts are reminiscent of Pauline scripture, especially Romans 7 : 2 3 - 2 4 ("I can see
t h a t my body follows a different law t h a t battles against the law which reason dictates. This is
w h a t makes me a prisoner of t h a t law of sin which lives inside my body.") and I Corinthians
9:27 ("I t r e a t my body hard and make it obey..."). Jerusalem Bible, o19.cit., p. 278 and p. 300,
of the New Testament, respectively.
80. Freud discussed this at length in "Turning in the Ways of Psychoanalytic Therapy" (1919). In
Sigmund Freud Collected Papers, volume 2, op. cit., p. 394.
81. J u n g , C.G., Answers to Job. Princeton, New Jersey, Bollingen, Princeton University Press,
1973.
82. Freud, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, op. cir., p. 75.
83. Ibid., p. 81.
84. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, op. cit., p. 30.
85. ., The Ego and the Id, op. cit., p. 30.
86. , The New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, op. cit., pp. 571-572.
87. ., "Thoughts for the Times on W a r and Death" (1915). In Sigmund Freud Collected
Papers, volume 4, op. cit., p. 305.

Badalamenti1988 Article FreudAndTheFallOfMan

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Badalamenti1988 Article FreudAndTheFallOfMan

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Journal of Religion and Health, Vol. 27, No.

The Fall of man is a theological concept. It is perhaps surprising to suggest

23 9 1988 Institutes of Religion and Health

his inferences in a way t h a t is reminiscent of the Fall of man. I am stressing

Freud's chosen profession was t h a t of a physician specializing in nervous disor-

al sense when he disclaimed belief in a creator. To substantiate this belief I

It is probably accurate to define psyche here as an alloy of the restriction of

Freud and concupiscence: Psychosexual development

As Freud's thinking matured, he increasingly viewed biological man as a

The sovereign tendency obeyed by these primary processes is easy of recog-

The words "condensation" and "displacement" are descriptors of w h a t F r e u d

I n t h e above "Ucs" a n d "Cs" denote, as systems, the unconscious and t h e con-

It is the dark, inaccessible part of our personality; what little we know of it we

Some of the above n a r r a t i v e from Freud will a g a i n be referred to when dis-

t e r m s , n a r c i s s i s m should yield to object love, a n d significant failures to do so a r e

N o t e t h a t F r e u d refers to t h e n e w l y a r i s i n g instincts as sadistic a n d destruc-

F r o m Freud's perspective it is evident t h a t he r e g a r d e d a n a l i t y as i d - a d d i t i v e

9 9 . they represent the converted expression of impulses which in a broader sense

Finally, in t h e middle of t h e s a m e w o r k he states:

We know that the pleasure principle is proper to a primary method of working on

E a r l i e r in his life F r e u d s i m i l a r l y stated:

C l e a r l y t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e r e a l i t y principle as a n ego function p r e s u p -

plicit reference to conflict in ontogenesis, again recalling concupiscence. It

Freud is here emphasising the harshness of the superego as a reactive event

t r e n d - - a teleological goal in Freud's v i e w - - w h i c h should see convergence.

I stated.., that "often or perhaps regularly, complete object-choice is established

Primacy of the genitals here implies t h a t sexual and aggressive instincts

Freud and concupiscence: The psychic disorders

In reviewing Freud's theory of psychosexual staging I moved forward in

f e m a l e - - i n an object relation, prior efforts not having this character because

This formula will be augmented later in discussing manic-depressive psy-

In fact, the avoidance of affect is a central feature of this disorder which

Besides ambivalence and defusion, the major corruption of psychic life

Freud speculated t h a t this disorder may have organic contributing factors.

the unconscious is conscious." This is an interesting observation, because he

The term "objectless" is important here. Elsewhere he developed at length

Freud and ignorance: Psychosexual development

The single most important organizer in Freud's thoughts, at the conscious

As for ignorance as absence of knowledge throughout the period of childhood

This applies up to and including the phallic stage.

Freud and ignorance: The psychic disorders

In Freud's view all psychopathology is understandable from the Oedipus com-

generalize (transference plus repetition compulsion) from Oedipal failure to

In the case of conversion hysteria p r o p e r - - h e r e anxiety is avoided via the

The presence of ignorance in these formulations is apparent. Less obvious

Certainly this is a crazy illness. The most extravagant psychiatric imagination

Projection is a common defense mechanism by which the psyche deludes it-

which, in my view, is quite reminiscent of theological ignorance. He stated his

The delusion-formation, which we take to be a pathological product, is in reality

Perhaps there is more of theology in Freudian thought t h a n suggested by this

thought. In the context of moving from thoughts on grace to thoughts on subli-

a d u l t state, neurosis is indicated. B u t the s i m u l t a n e o u s coexistence of a m o r e

A n d in discussing biological, phylogenetic, a n d psychological factors c a u s i n g

F r e u d ' s later, speculative t h o u g h t s are s t r a n g e l y a k i n to the theology of the

It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an

As for the r e s t o r a t i v e aims of the instincts (death a n d Eros) he states:

On the basis of theoretical considerations, supported by biology, we put forward

All these t h o u g h t s can be r e v i e w e d w i t h a n eye on theology by g i v i n g a final

Hence the psychoanalytic school could v e n t u r e on the assertion t h a t at bottom no

You might also like