People v.

Amodia
G.R. No. 173791 April 7, 2009

FACTS:
Pablo was one of the four assailants who, by their concerted efforts, killed
Felix Olandria (victim). Acting together, they hit him on the head and stabbed him.

The RTC convicted Pablo of murder after finding sufficient evidence of his
identity, role in the crime as principal by direct participation, and conspiracy
between him and the other accused who used their superior strength to weaken the
victim.

The CA affirmed Pablo's conviction. Pablo argues that granting that he was
a part of Damaso's group and that this group killed the victim, the prosecution
failed to prove the conspiracy among them; there was no evidence adduced to
establish how the incident that led to the stabbing began. Any doubt that he acted
as a principal should have been resolved in his favor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding the existence of conspiracy.

RULING:
No, the CA did not err.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It arises on the
very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and
forthwith decide to pursue it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence.

Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found; circumstantial evidence is often

resorted to in order to prove its existence. Absent of any direct proof, as in the
present case, conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when
such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest.

Although there was no evidence in the present case showing a prior

agreement among Pablo, Arnold, George, and Damaso, the following chain of
events however show their commonality of purpose in killing the victim: first, the
accused surrounded the victim on all sides: Damaso at the front, George at the
victim's rear, while Pablo and Arnold flanked the victim on each side; second,
Pablo then wrested the right arm of the victim and restrained his movement, while
Arnold did the same to the left arm of the victim; third, George then hit the victim's
head with a piece of wood; and fourth, Damaso stabbed the victim three times.

The existence of conspiracy among the four accused is clear; their acts were
aimed at the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing their

1
respective parts in the series of acts that, although appearing independent from one
another, indicated a concurrence of sentiment and intent to kill the victim.
Where there is conspiracy, a person may be convicted for the criminal act of
another. Where there is conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.

2
 People v. Go
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

FACTS:
Ma. Cecilia Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those
charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of
PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo
Enrile in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he
was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution
finding probable cause.

Respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the
ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also
contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer
with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public
officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may
not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

The SB, in its assailed Resolution, grants the Motion to Quash.

ISSUE:
Whether herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy
in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was
alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.

RULING:
Yes. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer
any public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A.
3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them
can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The
only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability.
His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of
Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly
violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of
Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he should have been
charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of

Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be
alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does

3
not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the
public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died,
the private person may be indicted alone.

The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the
conviction of the survivor or survivors. Thus, this Court held that:

x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot

conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more
persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy.
So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a
charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.

4
 People v. Feliciano Jr.
G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014

FACTS:
Leandro Lachica, Amel Fortes, Mervin Naralicio, Cristobal Gaston Jr, Felix
Tumaneng and Cesar Magborang Jr, all members of Sigma Rho Fraternity, while
they were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of UP
Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats
and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One
of them, Dennis Ventura, died from his injuries.
An information for murder was filed against several members of Scintilla
Juris Fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L.
Zingapan, Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Christoper L. Soliva, Reynaldo G.
Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano, Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert
Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the RTC of
Quezon City.
The trial court rendered its decision with the findings that Robert Michael
Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren
Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder
and were sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellants should be treated as co-conspirators.

RULING:
Yes.
Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the
accused, regardless of their degree of participation, thus: Once an express or
implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co- principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the
commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule
is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to
accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as
though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable
for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to
commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in
furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy."

The liabilities of the accused-appellants in this case arose from a single

incident wherein the accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead
pipes, all in agreement to do the highest amount of damage possible to the victims.
Some were able to run away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at the
hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the moment of
attack and that intent was shared by all of the accused- appellants alike when the
presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish

5
between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the
respective liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the
death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and whether there are qualifying,
aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.

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 People v. Estanly Octa,
G.R. 195196 July 13, 2015

FACTS:
The case stemmed from the kidnapping case which was rendered Octa guilty
of the crime charged. On the morning on September 25 2003, while Johnny Corpuz
and Mike Batuigas are on board in a Honda Civic travelling in Sampaloc, Manila,
some four-armed men blocked their way, successfully get inside their car.
Thereafter, the two were handcuffed, blindfolded, and even boxed while travelling.
When they reached the safehouse, the armed men called Johnny’s wife Ana
Marie to inform her that they are indeed kidnapped and asked for a ransom money,
which was started P20 Million but were reduced to P538,000. On September 30,
2003, Ana Marie was instructed to deliver the wrapped bundled ransom money to
the man wearing red cap, who was later on identified as Estanly Octa, the accused.
Thereafter, when the money was given, Johnny and Mike were released on
October 1 2003.

For the defense, his defense of denial and alibi is that he clings to the theory
that he himself was a victim of abduction.

RTC found Octa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping, and was
sentenced to suffer maximum prison term of reclusion perpetua. CA affirmed the
decision.

Octa contended that the trial court gravely erred in finding him to be a
conspirator to the crime charged. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, Octa was guilty of kidnapping as co-conspirator.

RULING:
Yes, Octa was guilty of kidnapping as co-conspirator.
The Supreme Court ruled that conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of
the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or
common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently
established. It must be shown that all participants performed specific acts with such
closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to commit
the felony.

Here in this case, the CA was correct when it stated that kidnapping was still
continuing when Octa received the ransom money, which was the money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person or
persons; or payment that releases from captivity. Based on the foregoing, Octa is
guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, since he have shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.

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8
 Macapagal-Arroyo v. People
G.R. 220598 July 19, 2016

FACTS:
On year 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts
Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit
whose charges were later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after their respective
demurrers to evidence were granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes who were at
large) for conspiracy to commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under
Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

During the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the
Philippines Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager, all public
officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking
undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,
connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate
and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or
total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, by raiding the public treasury.

Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective

petitions for bail which were denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the
evidence of guilt against them was strong.

After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas then
separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not
establish a case for plunder against them. The same were denied by the
Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient evidence to show that they had
conspired to commit plunder. After the respective motions for reconsideration
filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they
filed their respective petitions for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy
among Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Aguas, and Uriarte.

RULING:
No. The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of
conspiracy among Macapagal-Arroyo, Aguas and Uriarte.

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to

show was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on
the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement.
It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the
accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain
conspiracy.

9
 We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan to the
effect that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information
alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or
synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the
basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as
would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment
based on the same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the
information as to the allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the
identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080
as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer
was not only necessary because the law required such identification, but also
because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be
properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for. The main
purpose of requiring the various elements of the crime charged to be set out in the
information is to enable all the accused to suitably prepare their defense because
they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constituted
the offense charged. Despite the silence of the information on who the main
plunderer or the mastermind was, the Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in
its resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the mastermind despite the absence of
the specific allegation in the information to that effect. Even worse, there was no
evidence that substantiated such sweeping generalization.

In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer

should be fatal to the cause of the State against the petitioners for violating the
rights of each accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.

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G. Article 10 Suppletory Application of RPC to Special Penal Laws

Ladonga v. People
G.R. No. 141066 February 17, 2005
FACTS:
On May or June of the year 1990, spouses Adronico and Evangeline
Ladonga wrote and issued UCPB cheques worth (1) P 9,075.55; (2) P 12,730.00;
and (3) P 8,496.55. The value of the cheques amounted to P 30,302.1. These
cheques were issued to one Alfredo Oculam, a pawnshop owner who was well-
acquainted with the accused via a customer-business relationship.

Oculam states that in the year 1989, the spouses, who were regular
customers in his pawnshop, had obtained from him three (3) loans amounting to P
30,302.1, the same amount secured in the bouncing cheques.

The Ladonga spouses claim to have instructed Oculam to not encash said
cheques as they merely served as guarantees for their obligation to Oculam as the
accounts pertaining to the cheques were actually empty. Nevertheless, Oculam still
encashed the cheques and, to no one’s surprise, they bounced.

In the proceedings, the Ladonga spouses were found guilty and ordered to
pay a fine to compensate Oculam and to serve 1 year in incarceration for each of
the criminal cases, amounting to 3 years for each of them.

Adronico Ladonga managed to appeal for a probation while Evangeline

averred that she was not liable for conspiracy as she was not involved in the
issuing of the bouncing cheques.The Court of Appeals denied her petition, holding
that her lack of involvement in the issuance did not exculpate her from liability.

ISSUE:
Whether or not conspiracy is applicable in violations of BP Blg. 22 by
invoking the last sentence of Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING:
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly prescribe the suppletory application of the
provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22,
the general provisions of the Revised Penal Code that, by their nature, are
necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. The court cited the case of Yu
vs. People, where the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of
the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 were applied suppletorily.

The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is

analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S.
vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is
shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals.

11
 The Court in this case however ruled in favor of Evangeline Ladonga as the
prosecution failed to prove that she performed any overt act in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy.

12
 People v. Simon
G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Martin Simon was charged on November 10,1988 with a
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on
or about October 22, 1988, he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00, which
tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for
marijuana.

The trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant for a violation of

Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and
to pay the costs. However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 effective December 31, 1993. Thus, the
second paragraph of Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as now modified, provides that
if the quantity involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal depending upon the quantity.

Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams,
hence covered by the imposable range of penalties under the second paragraph of
Section 20, as now modified, the law provides that the penalty shall be taken from
said range "depending upon the quantity" of the drug involved in the case. The
penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of three
distinct penalties, that is, prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion
temporal. In such a situation, the Code provides that each one shall form a period,
with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most
severe as the maximum period.

ISSUE:
Whether or not in determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be
taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or absence of
mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability should
be taken into account.

RULING:
Yes. The Court is not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that,
in imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be
applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that
the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own
specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were
not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the
penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the
minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to
consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to

13
determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the
Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions
of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given
supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not
components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of
the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as
provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or
physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such
supplementary application.

The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in

and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken
from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with
its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to
said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional,
in its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and
absurd to posit otherwise.

For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision
correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of
the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating
circumstance.

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 People v. De los Reyes
G.R. No. 177357 October 17, 2012

FACTS:
Delos Reyes and Donel Go were charged with three (3) counts of rape and
two (2) counts of rape, respectively. The RTC rendered judgment finding Delos
Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt for three (3) counts of rape.

Delos Reyes interposed his appeal before the CA. Delos Reyes argues that
there were inconsistencies and improbabilities in the prosecution’s evidence which
vitiate its integrity. On the inconsistencies, he points out that the plaintiff’s
testimony in court is inconsistent with her sworn statement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court overlooked the inconsistencies on material points
of the statement and testimony of the plaintiff and the prosecution witness.

RULING:
No.

The rule is well-settled that when the decision hinges on the credibility of
the witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court’s observations and
conclusions deserve great respect and are accorded finality, unless the records
show facts or circumstances of material weight and substance that the lower court
overlooked, misunderstood or mis appreciated, and which, if properly considered,
would alter the result of the case. The court finds no reason to deviate from the
general rule under the proven circumstances of this case.

A candid narration by a rape victim deserves credence particularly where no

ill motive is attributed to the rape victim that would make her testify falsely against
the accused. For no woman in her right mind will admit to having been raped,
allow an examination of her most private parts and subject herself as well as her
family to the humiliation and shame concomitant with a rape prosecution, unless
the charges are true. Where an alleged rape victim says she was sexually abused,
she says almost all that is necessary to show that rape had been inflicted on her
person, provided her testimony meets the test of credibility.

On the inconsistencies between her oral testimony and her sworn statement,
raised by the accused, the Court sees them as minor and cannot be categorized as
prevarication, sufficient to render the case doubtful. On the contrary, these alleged
inconsistencies are signs that AAA was not rehearsed and that she was telling the
truth. Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor
details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their declaration, their
veracity or the weight of their testimony. They do not impair the credibility of the
witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and
positive identification of the assailants. Such inconsistency is insignificant and
cannot have any bearing on the essential fact testified to.

15
H. Article 11 Justifying Circumstances Relate to: R.A. 9262, Anti-Violence
against Women and Children Act-the defense of Battered Woman Syndrome

People v. Genosa
G.R. 135981 January 15, 2004

FACTS:
The case was filed against Marivic Genosa for the crime of parricide for
killing her husband, Ben Genosa.

The court finds the following as the facts of the case:

Marivic and Ben were married and would quarrel often and their fights
would become violent. One reason was because of Marivic being crazy about
Ben’s recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant testified that during her
marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but that Ben would
always follow her and they would reconcile.

Then, on November 15, 1995, Marivic attacked and wounded his husband
which led to his death. According to her, there was no provocation on her part
when she arrived home that night and it all came from her husband. Frightened that
her husband would hurt her, and that she would fail to deliver her baby, she
attacked her husband by shooting him with a gun while he was asleep.

Genosa, after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be

suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-
defense admitted the killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the crime of
parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was
attacked while asleep.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that in any event, the existence of the syndrome in
a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her
abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.

In claiming self-defense of battered woman syndrome while new in

Philippine jurisprudence, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the
justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and
controlled over a period of time."

A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly

subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to
coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights.
Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with
men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must
go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an

16
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in
the situation, she is defined as a battered woman."
Here in this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the defense fell short of
proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic. No doubt there were acute battering incidents.
The circumstances in their relationship fail to describe the tension-building phase
of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of
this stage.

However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome.
In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the
past, she had gone through a similar pattern.

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 Sabang v. People
G.R. No. 168818 March 9, 2007

FACTS:
There was a drinking spree on the eve of the fiesta in Liloan, Ormoc City, an
intoxicated Nicanor Butad uttered the ominous words "I will shoot you" to Randy
Sabang, to the horror of young Sabang's father, Nilo, and the other onlookers.
Within moments, Butad himself lay dead from four gunshot wounds on his body.
Nilo Sabang, petitioner herein, who was charged with and later convicted for the
homicide, admits to the killing of Butad, but claims that the shooting was
accidental and done as a means of defending his son.

By the time Butad had joined what was to be his last drinking spree, he was
already in a belligerent mood. Earlier that afternoon, he had been chasing after
Ramil Perez when the latter demanded payment for a bet Butad had lost over a
cockfight. A certain Sombilon testified that when Butad told Randy Sabang, "I will
shoot you," the deceased already had his revolver aimed at Randy.

In this Petition, petitioner prays for his acquittal contending that he acted in
defense of his son, a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code. He claims that Butad’s act of aiming a gun at his son while uttering the
words "I will shoot you" was an aggression of the most imminent kind which
prompted him to try to wrestle the gun from Butad leading to the accidental firing
of the fatal shots.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s insistence on the justifying circumstance of defense of
relative deserves merit.

RULING:
No. In order to successfully claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the
accused must prove the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the person killed or injured; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) the person
defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant, should any
provocation been given by the relative attacked. Unlawful aggression is a primary
and indispensable requisite without which defense of relative, whether complete or
otherwise, cannot be validly invoked.

Unlawful aggression must be clearly established by the evidence. In this

case, there is a divergence in the testimonies of the prosecution and defense
witnesses as to whether Butad aimed a gun at petitioner’s son as he uttered the
words "I will shoot you." With this conflict emerges the question of whether
petitioner sensed an imminent threat to his son’s life. Payud unequivocally testified
that petitioner even dismissed Butad’s utterance saying, "Just try to shoot my child
because I’ll never fight for him because he is a spoiled brat." This indicates to us
that petitioner did not consider Butad’s words a threat at all.

18
 Furthermore, the presence of four (4) gunshot wounds on Butad’s body
negates the claim that the killing was justified but instead indicates a determined
effort to kill him. Even assuming that it was Butad who initiated the attack, the fact
that petitioner was able to wrest the gun from him signifies that the aggression
which Butad had started already ceased. Petitioner became the unlawful
aggressorwhen he continued to shoot Butad even as he already lay defenseless on
the ground.

19
 People v. Campos
G.R. No. 176061 July 4, 2011

FACTS:
At around [8:00] o’clock one the evening, prosecution eyewitness Lester
Huck Baldivino (Lester) was tending his sari-sari store near his when [the victim]
Romeo Abad (Romeo), his maternal uncle, came to buy cigarettes and candies.
Lester was about to call it a night and was already preparing to close his store, but
Romeo lit up a cigarette and started to converse with him.

Romeo was jesting about Lester’s skin rashes, as the latter was applying
medicine on his irritated skin. They were in this bantering mood, when Lester, who
was facing the highway, suddenly heard footsteps and immediately saw Danny
Boy Acabo (Acabo) running towards his uncle’s direction, closely followed by
Bingky Campos (Campos). Before Lester can utter a word of warning, Danny
swiftly stabbed Romeo at the lower right side of the latter’s abdomen with a
"plamingko" while Bingky stood nearby. Immediately after stabbing Romeo,
Danny and Bingky fled. Lester was shocked but darted out of his store to apply
pressure on Romeo’s wound when he heard the latter cry out for help. Lester told
Romeo to hang on and ran inside his house to call his mother and Romeo’s son and
told them to prepare the car. Romeo was brought to the Holy Child Hospital where
he died.

Danny categorically admits that he stabbed Romeo. However, he boldly

claims that he did it in self defense. He avers that on that fateful night, he and
Bingky were attacked along the way home by four unknown persons for no
apparent reason. He observed that one of the men was pulling an object from his
waistband which he thought was a bladed weapon so he drew his own knife and
thrust it at the man rushing at him, hitting the latter on the right side of his body.
His reaction, he asserts, was defensive arising from a prior act of aggression and
provocation by the victim and his companions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-defense is attendant.

RULING:
The essential elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, which
the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence are: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed by the accused to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused defending himself. The first
element of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-
defense unless there was unlawful aggression from the person injured or killed by
the accused; for otherwise, there is nothing to prevent or repel.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing narration, there is no mention at all

that Romeo was among the four persons who allegedly attacked Danny and
Bingky. Likewise, there is nothing in the narration which evinces unlawful
aggression from Romeo. Danny’s testimony shows that there was only an attempt,

20
not by Romeo but by Jaime and Iko, to attack him. Following his version, Danny
then became the aggressor and not the victim. Even if the version of Danny is
given a semblance of truth, that there was an attempt to hurt him, though
intimidating, the same cannot be said to pose danger to his life and limb. This
conclusion was drawn from the fact that no bladed weapon was found at the
alleged scene of the crime and nobody testified about it. For unlawful aggression to
be appreciated, there must be an "actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or
imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude" and the
accused must present proof of positively strong act of real aggression. For this
reason, Danny’s observation that one of the men was pulling an object from his
waist is not a convincing proof of unlawful aggression.

Moreover, as testified to by the attending physician Dr. Yee, Romeo

sustained a stab wound causing injuries on his liver, gall bladder, duodenum and
the pancreas which resulted to massive blood loss. He eventually died of multiple
vital organ failure. Clearly the wound inflicted by Danny on Romeo indicate a
determined effort to kill and not merely to defend. As has been repeatedly ruled,
the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim disprove a
plea of self-defense.

Furthermore, Danny’s actuation in not reporting the incident immediately to

the authorities cannot take out his case within the ambit of the Court’s
jurisprudential doctrine that the flight of an accused discloses a guilty conscience.
The justifying circumstance of self-defense may not survive in the face of
appellant’s flight from the scene of the crime coupled with his failure to promptly
inform the authorities about the incident

21
 Manaban v. CA
G.R. No. 150723 July 11, 2006

FACTS:
Joselito Bautista, a father and a member of the UP Police Force, took his
daughter, Frinzi, who complained of difficulty in breathing, to the UP Health
Center. There, the doctors prescribed certain medicines to be purchased. Needing
money therefore, Joselito Bautista, who had taken alcoholic drinks earlier,
proceeded to the BPI to withdraw some money from its ATM.

Upon arrival at the bank, Bautista proceeded to the ATM booth but because
he could not effectively withdraw money, he started kicking and pounding on the
machine. For said reason, the bank security guard, Ramonito Manaban, approached
and asked him what the problem was. Bautista complained that his ATM was
retrieved by the machine and that no money came out of it. After Manaban had
checked the receipt, he informed Bautista that the Personal Identification Number
(PIN) entered was wrong and advised him to just return the next morning. This
angered Bautista all the more and resumed pounding on the machine. Manaban
then urged him to calm down and referred him to their customer service over the
phone. Still not mollified, Bautista continued raging and striking the machine.
When Manaban could no longer pacify him, he fired a warning shot. That diverted
the attention of Bautista. Instead of venting his ire against the machine, he
confronted Manaban. After some exchange of words, a shot rang out fatally hitting
Bautista.

Manaban was charged with the crime of murder.

The trial court held that the defense failed to establish self-defense as a
justifying circumstance. According to the trial court, unlawful aggression, which is
the most essential element to support the theory of self-defense, was lacking in this
case.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Respondent Court gravely erred in ignoring petitioner’s self-
defense.

RULING:
No. Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the three
requisites to prove self-defense as a justifying circumstance which may exempt an
accused from criminal liability are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the
person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite of
self-defense. Self-defense is founded on the necessity on the part of the person
being attacked to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. Thus, without prior
unlawful and unprovoked attack by the victim, there can be no complete or
incomplete self-defense.

In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. First,
Bautista was shot at the back as evidenced by the point of entry of the bullet.

22
Second, when Bautista was shot, his gun was still inside a locked holster and
tucked in his right waist. Third, when Bautista turned his back at Manaban,
Manaban was already pointing his service firearm at Bautista. These circumstances
clearly belie Manaban’s claim of unlawful aggression on Bautista's part.

Aggression presupposes that the person attacked must face a real threat to
his life and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not imaginary.
Absent such actual or imminent peril to one’s life or limb, there is nothing to repel
and there is no justification for taking the life or inflicting injuries on another.

23
 Mamangun v. People
G.R. No. 149152 February 2, 2007

FACTS:
At about 8:00 in the evening, in Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan, a
certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting “Magnanakaw.. Magnanakaw”.
Several residents responded and chased the suspect who entered the yard of
Antonio Abacan and proceeded to the rooftop.

The desk officer of the Meycauayan PNP Police Station, upon receiving a
telephone call that a robbery-holdup was in progress, immediately dispatched to
the scene the crew of Patrol Car composed of Team Leader SPO1 Legaspi with
PO2 Aminas and herein petitioner PO2 Rufino Mamangun. The three policemen
including Mamangun each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop.
There, they saw a man whom they thought was the robbery suspect. At that
instance, petitioner Mamangun, who was walking ahead of the group, fired his
handgun once, hitting the man. The man turned out to be Gener Contreras who was
not the robbery suspect. Contreras died from the gunshot wound.

According to Ayson, the lone witness for prosecution, he accompanied the

three policemen to the rooftop of Abacan’s House. That when Mamangun pointed
his pistol at the man, who instantly exclaimed, “Hindi ako, hindi ako!”. Before
Ayson could say anything, Mamangun fired his gun, hitting the man who turned
out to be Contreras.

The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner Mamangun

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide attended by an
incomplete justifying circumstance of having acted in the performance of his duty
as a policeman.

Petitioner appeals alleging that it was justified under paragraph 5, Article 11

of the Revised Penal Code, which would have absolved him from criminal liability
on the basis that the shooting was done in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 11, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code applies to the
petitioner.

RULING:
No. The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5,
Article II, of the Revised Penal Code may be invoked only after the defense
successfully proves that: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty; and
(2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the
due performance or lawful exercise of such duty.

Concededly, the first requisite is present in this case. Petitioner, a police

officer, was responding to a robbery-hold up incident. His presence at the suits of
the crime was in accordance with the performance of his duty. However, proof that

24
the shooting and ultimate death of Contreras was a necessary consequence of the
due performance of his duty as a policeman is essential to exempt him from
criminal liability.

We see no plausible basis to depart from the Sandiganbayan’s finding that

there was no reason for the petitioner to shoot Contreras. The latter was unarmed
and had already uttered, “Hindi po ako, Hindi po ako” before the petitioner fatally
shot him on the left arm.

The decision of the Sandiganbayan is Affirmed.

25
 Medina, Jr. v. People
G.R. No. 161308 January 15, 2014

FACTS:
The case concerns the fatal stabbing of Lino Mulinyawe, which was
preceded by a fight during a basketball game between Ross Mulinyawe, Lino’s
son, and Ronald Medina, the younger brother of Ricardo and Randolf.

In that fight, Ross was rushed to the hospital. His father, Lino learned that
his son sustained a head injury, he went to the Medina’s house with his drinking
buddies. Lino brought a bread knife with him, but his companions were unarmed.

Along the way, Lino encountered Randolf so he confronted the latter about
the fight, which then resulted in a heated argument. Lino lashed out and gripped
Randolf’s hand, his drinking buddies helped him punch Randolf on the face.

Arriving at the scene, Ricardo saw what was happening, and confronted
Lino. A commotion ensued between them. Ricardo went to his house to get a
kitchen knife. Once outside, Ricardo then stabbed Lino on the left side of his chest,
which resulted in Lino falling face down on the ground. Lino died due to the stab
wound on his chest.

The RTC convicted Ricardo Medina of homicide, but acquitted Randolf

Medina.

The CA affirmed RTC’s judgment. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or note Ricardo Medina is guilty of homicide, thus, self-defense of a
relative is not available?

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that for a self-defense to consider, the following
requisites of defense of a relative must concur: (a) unlawful aggression by the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
aggression; and (c) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that
the person making the defense took no part in the provocation.

Like in self-defense, it is the accused who carries the burden to prove

convincingly the attendance and concurrence of these requisites because his
invocation of this defense amounts to an admission of having inflicted the fatal
injury on the victim.

Here, the Court was not persuaded by the defense of Ricardo invoking as
such. As Ricardo states that his immediate impulse upon seeing Randolf being
attacked by Lino with a knife was to get his own weapon and to aid in the defense
of Randolf. However, this argument was inconsistent with his declaration at the
trial that Lino’s fatal wound was self-inflicted. This defense is incongruent with

26
human experience, and his act presupposes direct responsibility for inflicting the
mortal wound.
Based on the foregoing and failure to prove the requisites of the defense of a
relative, the Supreme Court finds Ricardo as the perpetrator of the unlawful killing
of the Lino.

27
 Velasquez v. People
G.R. No. 195021 March 15, 2017

FACTS:
One evening, Velasquez while armed with stones and wooden poles,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, maul and hit Jesus del Mundo inflicting upon
him injuries in the vital parts of his body, the said accused having thus commenced
a felony directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which
could have produced the crime of Murder but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of some causes or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance to
his damage and prejudice.

The accused invoke the first and second justifying circumstances under
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code reiterating that it was Jesus, who was
supposedly inebriated, vented his ire upon Nicolas and the other accused, as well
as on Mercedes. The accused thus responded and countered Jesus' attacks, leading
to his injuries. Petitioners Nicolas Velasquez and Victor Velasquez, along with
four others -Felix Caballeda, Jojo Del Mundo, Sonny Boy Velasquez, and Ampong
Ocumen - were charged with attempted murder under Article 248, in relation to
Article 6, of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners may be held criminally liable for the physical harm
inflicted on Jesus Del Mundo.

RULING:
Yes. A person invoking self-defense or defense of a relative admits to
having inflicted harm upon another person - a potential criminal act under Title
Eight (Crimes Against Persons) of the Revised Penal Code. However, he or she
makes the additional, defensive contention that even as he or she may have
inflicted harm, he or she nevertheless incurred no criminal liability as the looming
danger upon his or her own person (or that of his or her relative) justified the
infliction of protective harm to an erstwhile aggressor. The accused's admission
enables the prosecution to dispense with discharging its burden of proving that the
accused performed acts, which would otherwise be the basis of criminal liability.

All that remains to be established is whether the accused were justified in

acting as he or she did. To this end, the accused's case must rise on its own merits:
It is settled that when an accused admits harming the victim but invokes self-
defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his
plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would
follow from his admission that he harmed the victim. Self-defense cannot be
justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent
evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-
defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense

28
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution.

29
 People v. Fontanilla
G.R. 177743 January 25, 2012

FACTS:
Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan,
La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of
wood called bellang. Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him
again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a
third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais,
shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-
in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival.

At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the
incident, he had been standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a
nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach. Although he
had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him with his fists,
striking him with straight blows. Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with
both his legs. He had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with
which he had hit the right side of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall face
down to the ground. He had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais
was no longer moving. The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE:
What is the standard of proof required in order for self-defense to be
appreciated?

RULING:
In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no
unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is
unavailing, for there is nothing to repel.

By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal

injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a
prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on
the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having
thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear
the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court,
and he would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by
sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden by relying on the
strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak,
would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the
burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the
end of the proceedings.

30
 Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that,
one, Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two,
Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s head with a stone, causing the mortal injury,
was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victim’s
fistic attack and kicks.

31
 Palaganas v. People
G.R. No. 165483 September 12, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner and his older brother, Ferdinand Z. Palaganas, were charged under
four (4) separate Informations for two (2) counts of Frustrated Murder, one (1)
count of Murder, and one (1) count for Violation of COMELEC Resolution No.
2958 relative to Article 22, Section 261, of the Omnibus Election Code.

The trial court rendered its Decision finding petitioner guilty only of the
crime of Homicide and two (2) counts of Frustrated Homicide.

Corollarily, it also stated that petitioner cannot successfully invoke self-

defense since there was no actual or imminent danger to his life at the time he and
Ferdinand saw the Ferrer brothers outside the videoke bar. It noted that when
petitioner and Ferdinand saw the Ferrer brothers outside the videoke bar, the latter
were not carrying any weapon. Petitioner then was free to run or take cover when
the Ferrer brothers started pelting them with stones. Petitioner, however, opted to
shoot the Ferrer brothers. It also stated that the use by petitioner of a gun was not a
reasonable means to prevent the attack of the Ferrer brothers since the latter were
only equipped with stones, and that the gun was deadlier compared to stones.
Moreover, it also found that petitioner used an unlicensed firearm in shooting the
Ferrer brothers.

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the assailed RTC

Decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in not acquitting accused-appellant on the
ground of lawful self-defense.

RULING:
No, the CA did not err. As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression
refers to an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate
manner, which places the defendant's life in actual peril. It is an act positively
strong showing the wrongful intent of the aggressor and not merely a threatening
or intimidating attitude. It is also described as a sudden and unprovoked attack of
immediate and imminent kind to the life, safety or rights of the person attacked.

In the case at bar, it is clear that there was no unlawful aggression on the part
of the Ferrer brothers that justified the act of petitioner in shooting them. There
were no actual or imminent danger to the lives of petitioner and Ferdinand when
they proceeded and arrived at the videoke bar and saw thereat the Ferrer brothers.
It appears that the Ferrer brothers then were merely standing outside the videoke
bar and were not carrying any weapon when the petitioner arrived with his brother
Ferdinand and started firing his gun.

Assuming, arguendo, that the Ferrer brothers had provoked the petitioner to
shoot them by pelting the latter with stones, the shooting of the Ferrer brothers is

32
still unjustified. When the Ferrer brothers started throwing stones, petitioner was
not in a state of actual or imminent danger considering the wide distance (4-5
meters) of the latter from the location of the former.

The second element of self-defense requires that the means employed by the
person defending himself must be reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression of the victim. The reasonableness of the means employed may
take into account the weapons, the physical condition of the parties and other
circumstances showing that there is a rational equivalence between the means of
attack and the defense. In the case at bar, the petitioner's act of shooting the Ferrer
brothers was not a reasonable and necessary means of repelling the aggression
allegedly initiated by the Ferrer brothers. As aptly stated by the trial court,
petitioner's gun was far deadlier compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer
brothers.

33
 People v. Sevilano
G.R. No. 200300 February 9, 2015

FACTS:
Jose Palavorin, Carmelita Cardona and Pablo Maddauin, were seated having
their usual chit-chat at the vacant lot at 4th Street Guadal Canal, Sta. Mesa, Manila.
While conversing, they saw Oscar Sevillano coming towards their direction who
appeared to be drunk. Without warning, Sevillano pulled out a knife from his waist
and stabbed the victim Pablo Maddauin on the chest. Thereafter, the victim was
brought to the UE Medical Center, but unfortunately, he died that same day.

Sevillano denied the accusations against him. He interposed self-defense to

absolve himself from criminal liability. He averred that he went to the vacant lot
where the victim and his friends usually hang-out to feed his chicken. While
thereat, the victim, walk towards him and stepped on his injured foot. While he
was on his knees because of his pain, he saw the victim draw a knife. As he and the
victim grappled for the knife, the latter was accidentally stabbed. He became
apprehensive of the victim’s relative to such extent that he fled the scene and hid to
as far as Bulacan where he was eventually apprehended.

The trial court found Sevilla guilty of murder for the death of Pablo
Maddauin. Sevillamo is now before the CA to insist that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt and that the lower courts erred in rejecting his claim of
self-defense and convicting him of murder instead of homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused acted in self-defense.

RULING:
No, the accused did not act under self-defense.

By invoking self-defense, appellant in effect, admits to having inflicted the

stab wounds which killed the victim. The burden was, therefore, shifted on him to
prove that the killing was done in self-defense.

Under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the following elements must be
present in order that a plea of self-defense may be validly considered in absolving
a person from criminal liability: First. Unlawful Aggression; Second. Reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Appellant’s version that it was the victim who was armed with a knife and
threatened to stab him was found by the lower court to be untenable. Assuming
arguendo that there was indeed unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the
imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment appellant was able to
wrestle the knife from him. Thus, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to
speak of that would justify the need for him to kill the victim or the former
aggressor. The Court has ruled that if an accused still persists in attacking his
adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The

34
fact that the victim suffered many stab wounds in the body that caused his demise,
and the nature and location of the wound also belies and negates the claim of self-
defense. It demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.

35
 People v. Olarbe
G.R. No. 227421 July 23, 2018

FACTS:
On the night of the incident, Rodolfo Olarbe (Olarbe) and his wife were
sleeping in their house in Luisiana, Laguna. Suddenly, they were awakened by the
sound of a gunshot and shouting from Romeo Arca (Arca) who appeared to be
drunk. He was holding a rifle when he entered the house and aimed the gun at
them. In the midst of the confusion, Olarbe was able to get the gun and shoot Arca
causing the latter to lean sidewards. Nevertheless, Arca managed to get his bolo
from his waist and continued to attack. Olarbe grabbed the bolo and he instantly
hacked Arca causing his death. After the incident, Olarbe voluntarily surrendered
to the police authorities.

Olarbe was charged with the crime of murder. He raised the justifying
circumstances of self-defense and defense of stranger but these pleas were denied
by the RTC of Laguna which convicted him guilty of the crime charged. It held
that the initial unlawful aggression by Arca had ceased when Olarbe shot him in
the head and caused him to lean sideward. It disbelieved Olarbe’s insistence that
Arca had still been able to grab his bolo and assault Olarbe’s common-law spouse.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Olarbe finding that the factual
findings of the RTC were consistent with the evidence on record and accorded with
human experience.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it was erroneous to reject Olarbe’s pleas of self-defense and
defense of stranger?

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that for a person to exonerate himself on the
ground of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code, he must establish the
following facts: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Olarbe
also invoked the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger. In both of these
circumstances, the indispensable requisite for either is unlawful aggression
mounted by the victim against the accused or the stranger. Without such unlawful
aggression, the accused is not entitled to the justifying circumstance.

The Supreme Court ruled that Olarbe's account of what did happen on that
fateful night was highly plausible. At the minimum, the details and sequence of the
events therein described conformed to human experience and the natural course of
things. Armed with both the gun and the bolo, Acra not only disturbed Olarbe's
peace but physically invaded the sanctity of latter's home at midnight. Given that
the aggression by Arca was unprovoked on the part of Olarbe, and with no other
person disputing the latter's account, we should easily see and understand why
Olarbe would feel that his and his common law spouse's lives had been put in
extreme peril.

36
 In addition, Olarbe’s voluntary surrendering and reporting himself to the
police authorities manifested legitimate self-defense and as of his wife and his
innocence.

37
 Dela Cruz v. People
G.R. No. 189405 November 19, 2014

FACTS:
The prosecution version of facts, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, petitioner
went to the office in Makati City. When petitioner was already inside the building,
he went to the work station of the deceased victim, Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales,
who, by the configuration of the eye witness Antonette Managbanag’s sketch, was
seated fronting his computer terminal, with his back towards the aisle. As
petitioner approached Jeffrey from the back, petitioner was already holding a gun
pointed at the back of Jeffrey’s head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect
the hand of petitioner holding the gun, and a short struggle for the possession of
the gun ensued thereafter. Petitioner won the struggle and remained in possession
of the said gun. Petitioner then pointed the gun at Jeffrey’s face, pulled the trigger
four (4) times, the fourth shot finally discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the
forehead, eventually killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the
office.

The defense recounted a different version of the facts.

Petitioner claimed that, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, more or less,

petitioner, together with his children, went the workplace of his wife, Darlene Dela
Cruz.Before entering the Robinson’s Summit Building, petitioner underwent the
regular security check-up/procedures. He was frisked by the guards-on-duty
manning the main entrance. However, as Darlene was then not on her table,
petitioner approached a certain man and asked the latter as to the possible
whereabouts of Darlene. The person whom petitioner had talked to was the
deceased-victim, Jeffrey. Shocked by the words and reaction of Jeffrey, petitioner
tried to inquire from Jeffrey who he was. But Jeffrey suddenly cursed petitioner.
Then, Jeffrey suddenly picked up something in his chair which happened to be a
gun and pointed the same at petitioner’s face followed by a clicking sound. The
gun, however, did not fire. Seeing imminent danger to his life,petitioner grappled
with Jeffrey for the possession of the gun.While grappling, the gunclicked for two
(2) to three (3) more times. Again, the gun did not fire.

Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and tried to run away
to avoid any further confrontation with the latter. Acting instinctively, petitioner
parried the attack while still holding the gun. While in the act of parrying, the gun
accidentally fired due to the reasonable force and contact that his parrying hand
had made with the fire extinguisher and the single bullet discharged hit the
forehead of Jeffrey, which caused the latter to fall on the floor and die.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the elements of self-defense exist to exculpate petitioner from the
criminal liability for Homicide.

RULING:
No. The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means

38
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lackof sufficient provocation
on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. In other words, there must have
been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused,
who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing
reasonable means to resist the attack.

Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any

criminal liability, it is well settled that when he invokes the same, it becomes
incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed
acted in defense of himself. The burden of proving that the killing was justified and
that he incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts upon him. As such, he must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution for, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved
after the accused himself has admitted the killing.

It is worthy to note that the question of whether petitioner acted in self-

defense is essentially a question of fact. It is the peculiar province of the trial court
to determine the credibility of witnesses and related questions of fact because of its
superior advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of witnesses while
testifying. This being so and in the absence of a showing that the CA and the RTC
failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of such weight and substance that would
have merited petitioner's acquittal, this Court finds no compelling reason to disturb
the ruling of the CA that petitioner did not act in self-defense.

39
 People v. Delima
G.R. L-18660 December 22, 1922

FACTS:
Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence.
Some days afterwards the policeman Felipe Delima, who was looking for
him, found him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of
bamboo in the shape of a lance, and demanded his surrender.

The fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged it,
and to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did not hit him. The
criminal ran away, without parting with his weapon. The peace officer went after
him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and killing him.

The policeman was tried and convicted for homicide and sentenced to
reclusion temporal and the accessory penalties. He appeals from that judgment
which must be reversed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Felipe, the policeman, committed a crime?

RULING:
That killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under
the obligation to surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his sentence,
to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which compelled
the policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which, although it proved to be
fatal, was justified by the circumstances.

Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code being considered, Felipe Delima
committed no crime, and he is hereby acquitted with the costs de oficio. So
ordered.

40
 Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 103501-03 February 17,1997

FACTS:
Accused Luis A. Tabuena was a public officer, being then the General
Manager of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA).

Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to
the president's office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do
it." About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private
secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 reiterating
in black and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President Marcos'
verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Dabao and Peralta,
caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three withdrawals.
The P55 million was delivered to the President's Office thru Mrs. Gimenez, in
obedience to the Presidential directive.

There were three criminal cases filed since the total amount of P55 Million
was taken on three separate dates. Tabuena appears as the principal accused — he
being charged in all three cases.

Through their separate petitions for review, Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M.
Peralta appeal the Sandiganbayan decision as well the Resolution denying
reconsideration, convicting them of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tabuena is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "any person
who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose."

RULING:
Yes. Tabuena is entitled to the said justifying circumstance.

Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what
the MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had
to obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise
is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior —
the former being then the President of the Republic who unquestionably exercised
control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. In other words,
Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-government agency affairs and
transactions, such as for instance, directing payment of liability of one entity to
another and the manner in which it should be carried out. And as a recipient of
such kind of a directive coming from the highest official of the land no less, good
faith should be read on Tabuena's compliance, without hesitation nor any question,
with the MARCOS Memorandum.

Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person

who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose."

41
The subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And
so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as
it has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one government agency
(MIAA) to another (PNCC).

42
I. Article 12 Exempting CircumstancesRelate to: R.A. 9344 as amended-The
Juvenile Justice & Welfare Act

People v. Malicdem
G.R. No. 184601 November 12, 2012

FACTS:
According to the testimonies of Bernardo and Joel, they met with Wilson
near the artesian well. While they were seated on the septic tank, appellant Marcial
Malicdem arrived asking if they knew the whereabouts of his godson, Rogelio
Molina. They answered in negative. They noticed that appellant was reeking of
alcohol and was drunk. As they stood to leave, appellant suddenly embraced
Wilson and lunged a six-inch knife to the left part of his chest. When appellant
moved to strike again, Wilson was able to deflect this blow which resulted to a cut
on his right arm. Intending to help his friend, Bernardo was hit by the knife in his
stomach. In the course of aiding Wilson, Joel boxed the appellant. During the
brawl, Francisco Molina, Rogelio’s father, arrived at the scene, but was stabbed in
the stomach by appellant. Appellant then ran away. Afterward, Joel brought
Wilson aboard a police patrol car to the Medical Center where Wilson was
declared dead on arrival.

An information for the crime of murder was filed against appellant. The
RTC found appellant Malicdem guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of
Murder. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused can invoke self-defense which would warrant his
acquittal.

RULING:
No. The Court agreed that the death of Wilson at the hands of appellant was
not occasioned by self-defense. For this Court to consider self- defense as a
justifying circumstance, appellant has to prove the following essential elements:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self- defense. The Court has
repeatedly stated that a person who invokes self- defense has the burden to prove
all the aforesaid elements. The Court also considers unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim as the most important of these elements. Thus, unlawful
aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded,
whether complete or incomplete. Two kinds of Unlawful Aggression: (a) actual or
material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or
material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a
weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to
cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending
or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor
must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like
aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a
motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere

43
threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a
revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to
throw a pot.

44
 Verdadero v. People
G.R. No. 216021 March 2, 2016
FACTS:
The case stemmed after a confrontation with Verdadero in a complaint filed
by Maynard Plata together with his father Romeo and his companion Ronnie
Elaydo, when the three men made their way home but took a stop at a drugstore
because Maynard intended to buy some supplies there when Romeo at the store
near the drugstore, was stabbed by Verdadero.

At that moment, Maynard tried to help his father but Verdadero tried to
attack him. As a response, Maynard tried to defend himself with as tool, which he
used to hit Verdadero in the chest. Meanwhile, Ronnie ran toward the police
station to seek for assistance. After arriving at the scene, the responding police
officer arrested Verdadero. While Maynard and Ronnie rush Romeo to a clinic,
where he soon died of cardiopulmonary arrest.

During the trial, Verdadero pleaded guilty and invoke his defense of
insanity. He admitted that he was not in the proper state of mind during that
faithful night. As early as 1999, he was brought to the Psychiatric Department of
CVMC for treatment. Then he was diagnosed of depression and schizophrenia on
the subsequent years. He also suffered a relapse in 2009, and became an in and out
patient from his confinement in 2009 until the stabbing events.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the exempting circumstance of imbecility or insanity under Article
12, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval can be appreciated in this
case?

RULING:
Yes, it can be appreciated in this case. The Supreme Court ruled that
according to Revised Penal Code Article 12 Paragraph 1- An imbecile or insane
person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval is exempted from criminal
liability. It must be pointed out that there must be a complete deprivation of
intelligence or that there be total deprivation of the freedom of will at the
commission of the felony to be exempted. Thus, mere abnormality of mental
faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his
act.

Here, Verdadero is already diagnosed of schizophrenia, a chronic mental

disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and
often accompanied by hallucination and delusion. Worth emphasizing that heal
ready suffered from this mental disorder before the commission of the felony, and
suffered a relapse during that year. Thus, he is afforded of reservation if he did it in
a lucid interval during the commission of the felony. From the facts given, it can be
said that this exempting circumstance can be appreciated in this case.

In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does not

totally free him from the responsibilities and consequences of his acts. Instead of
incarceration, Verdadero is to be confined in an institution where his mental

45
condition may be addressed so that he may again function as a member of society.
He shall remain confined therein until his attending physicians give a favorable
recommendation for his release.

46
 People v. Haloc
G.R. No. 227312 September 5, 2018

FACTS:
Jessie Haloc , then fifty-one years old, was apprehended by barangay
officials after he hacked Allan de la Cruz, nine years and his brother Arnel, four
years old, inside the de la Cruz's yard at Barangay Union, Gubat, Sorsogon on June
22, 2008 at around 12 noon. Arnel died as a result of the hacking blow to his neck,
while Allan sustained injuries on his upper arm.

The accused, who was armed with a 24-inch bolo, went to the dela Cruzes'
and attempted to strike the victims' father, Ambrosio who was able to escape.
Unfortunately, Ambrosio's five sons were following him. Jessie took his ire on
Ambrosio's children, hacking Allan on the arm and taking Arnel and cutting his
neck, severing the jugular veins and nearly decapitating his head resulting to
Arnel's immediate death. The accused-appellant, assisted by the Public Attorney's
Office did not submit any counter- affidavit. On June 22, 2008, an Information was
filed charging accused-appellant of Attempted Murder for attacking, assaulting and
hacking one Allan de la Cruz, a 9 year old minor, hitting the victim on his right
arm, thus accused commences the commission of Murder directly by overt acts but
was not able to perform all the acts of execution which would have produce the
crime of Murder by reason of causes or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, the said Allan de la Cruz was brought to a hospital and was
given medical assistance which prevented his death.

On September 3, 2008, the original date for the accused's arraignment, the
PAO manifested that he could not effectively interview the accused as he seemed
to be mentally unfit. The PAO asked that the accused be first subjected to
psychiatric evaluation which the trial court granted. On July 7, 2010, the Head of
the Department of Psychiatry of Bicol Medical Center, Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur
submitted a report stating that the accused is already fit for trial.

On July 22, 2010, the accused was arraigned and he pleaded "not guilty" to
both charges. Invoking insanity, the order of trial was reversed and the accused-
appellant was first to present evidence. Dr. Imelda Escuadra, a psychiatrist,
testified that the accused was brought to Don Susano Memorial Mental Hospital in
Cadlan on August 22, 2003 and on July 16, 2007. Although she was not the one
who treated the accused, she confirmed that the accused was a patient of the
hospital based on their records. Dr. Benedicto Aguirre, now deceased, was the one
who personally treated the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense of insanity should have been appreciated as an
exempting circumstance.

RULING:
Yes. There is no denying that the crimes committed by the accused-
appellant were murder and attempted murder.

47
 The authorship of the crimes by the accused-appellant became undisputed
because he himself admitted assaulting the victims. Also undisputed were that
Arnel had died from the hacking assault by the accused-appellant, as evidenced by
his death certificate, and that both victims were minors below 10 years old, as
stipulated during the pre-trial.

Insanity is one of the recognized exempting circumstances under Article 12

of the Revised Penal Code. In his attempt to escape criminal responsibility, the
accused-appellant submits that he was entitled to the benefit of the exempting
circumstance of insanity. He alleges that he was insane at the time of his lethal
assaults, and, therefore, he should not be criminally responsible for the death and
injuries he had inflicted.

The defense of insanity rests on the test of cognition on the part of the
accused. Insanity, to be exempting, requires the complete deprivation of
intelligence, not only of the will, in committing the criminal act. Mere abnormality
of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be so
insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent. He must be deprived of
reason, and must be shown to have acted without the least discernment because
there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of
freedom of the will. Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances
fairly throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged
person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct inconsistent with his
previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident
bargains.

Based on the foregoing, the accused-appellant did not establish the

exempting circumstance of insanity. His mental condition at the time of the
commission of the felonies he was charged with and found guilty of was not shown
to be so severe that it had completely deprived him of reason or intelligence when
he committed the felonies charged. Based on the records, he had been administered
medication to cure his mental illness, but there was no showing that he suffered
from complete deprivation of intelligence. On the contrary, the medical
professionals presented during the trial conceded that he had been treated only to
control his mental condition.

In view of all the foregoing, the accused-appellant's actions and actuations

prior to, simultaneously with and in the aftermath of the lethal assaults did not
support his defense of insanity. This, coupled with the presumption of law in favor
of sanity, now warrants the affirmance of his convictions, for he had not been
legally insane when he committed the felonies. Neither should his mental condition
be considered as a mitigating circumstance. As we have noted, the Defense
presented no evidence to show that his condition had diminished the exercise of his
will power.
SC affirms the decision of CA finding accused Jessie Haloc y Codon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Attempted Murder and Murder without accepting
insanity as an exempting nor mitigating circumstance.

48
49
 People v. Castillo
G.R. No. 172695 June 29, 2007

FACTS:
Consorcia Antiporta Castillo, died violently in the evening of November 5,
1993. The cause of her death was massive hemorrhage due to "laceration of the
jugular vein of her neck". According to Dr. Solita P. Plastina, Municipal Health
Officer of Calamba, Laguna, who conducted the autopsy on the victim's body, the
fatal weapon could have been a "pointed instrument like a nail".

There is no dispute likewise that the accused shot with a dart from a rubber
sling, his wife hitting her at the neck and causing her instantaneous death. The
letters written by the accused from his detention cell addressed to his mother-in-
law, to his father-in-law, and lastly, the victim's sister, speak so eloquently of
someone who accepts the fault for the early demise of the victim. Asking
forgiveness from the close relatives of the victim is a clear admission of authorship
of the fatal act.

In the same letters, the accused raised as an issue his lack of intent to do the
fatal harm to his wife. This is the same issue to be resolved by this Court. Whether
or not the fatal injury sustained by the victim was accidental.

Guillermo Antiporta, father of the victim, narrated in Court that in the

evening of November 5, 1993, between 9:00 o'clock to 10:00 o'clock, the accused
came home drunk and was in an angry mood. The accused kicked the door and
table, and then threw the electric fan away. He was prevailed upon by Guillermo to
take a rest. But the accused did not heed the advice of Guillermo as he took instead
his sling and arrow from the house ceiling where he was keeping them. Dejectedly,
Guillermo transferred to the adjacent house of her x x x daughter [in-law] Yolanda.
From there, Guillermo heard the victim crying and, afterwards, shouting at the
accused. Guillermo concernedly ordered Yolanda to see what was happening
inside the house of Consorcia, and Yolanda obeyed. On her way, Yolanda met the
accused carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia. Guillermo, the accused, and
Yolanda brought Consorcia to the hospital but to no avail.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the killing was accidental and therefore, the appellant should be
exempt from criminal liability?

RULING:
There is no merit in appellant's contention that assuming he was the one who
killed his wife, the same was accidental and not intentional. The exempting
circumstance of accident is not applicable in the instant case. Article 12, par. 4 of
the Revised Penal Code, provides:

ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are
exempt from criminal liability:
xxxx

50
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury
by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with
clear and convincing evidence.The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden
of proof. The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.

By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and

arrow be considered as performing a "lawful act." Thus, on this ground alone,
appellant's defense of accident must be struck down because he was performing an
unlawful act during the incident. As correctly found by the trial court:

Mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law. In

penalizing the act, the legislator took into consideration that the deadly weapon
was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict injury, mostly fatal, upon other
persons. Let it be stressed that this crude weapon can not attain the standards as an
instrument for archery competitions. To sustain the accused's assertion that he was
practicing the use of said weapon at the time of the incident is patently absurd. The
defense even failed to rebut Guillermo Antiporta's testimony that the accused was
keeping said sling and arrow inside his house.

Furthermore, by claiming that the killing was by accident, appellant has the
burden of proof of establishing the presence of any circumstance which may
relieve him of responsibility, and to prove justification he must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be
weak, it can not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing.Other
than his claim that the killing was accidental, appellant failed to adduce any
evidence to prove the same.

51
 People v. Isla
G.R. No. 199875 November 21, 2012

FACTS:
On July 25, 1997, two separate Informations for Frustrated Murder and Rape
were filed before the RTC against Edwin Isla. According to AAAs account, on
July 21, 1997, at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, she noticed that accused
Edwin Isla (Isla) was standing by the door of her kitchen. After fifteen (15)
minutes, she was startled when he suddenly poked a knife on her neck, pulled her
inside the bedroom and raped her.

She also informed the trial court that during the whole ordeal, her children
were present and witnessed everything. When Isla stood up after raping her, she
noticed that the knife he was holding was already bloodstained. At this point, she
found out that she was stabbed with the knife. She tried to take hold of the knife
while shouting for help. In response, Isla struck her the second time, this time,
under her lower left breast. She also sustained a wound on her palm while trying to
disarm him.

In a little while, a neighbor came knocking at the door and was able to see
AAAs condition. She was taken to the East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) for
medical attention and was confined there for five (5) days.

The RTC convicted Isla of the crimes of rape and frustrated murder.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in not finding that the accused-
appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the offense.

RULING:
No. Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides for one of the
circumstances which will exempt one from criminal liability which is when the
perpetrator of the act was an imbecile or insane, unless the latter has acted during a
lucid interval. This circumstance, however, is not easily available to an accused as
a successful defense. Insanity is the exception rather than the rule in the human
condition. Under Article 800 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that every
human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears
the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. It is in the nature of
confession and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity admits to have committed
the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of insanity. The testimony
or proof of an accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately
preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is
charged. ½ll

As observed by the CA, the mental examination on Isla taken four to six
years after the incident happened in July 1997, in effect, showed that it could not
be concluded with certainty that he was suffering from such psychosis immediately
before or simultaneous to the commission of the crimes. ‚rνll

52
 This Court also agrees with the observation of the RTC as affirmed by the
CA that Isla acted with discernment as can be deduced from his acts before, during
and after the commission of the crimes with which he was charged. The RTC
wrote:

The overt acts committed by the accused are attributed to a criminal mind,
not a lunatic. There is no indication whatsoever that he was completely deprived of
reason or discernment and freedom of will when he stood for a while by the door
of complainants house, then entered it, toyed with a disconnected telephone set,
and cunningly poked a knife at complainants neck and dragged her inside the room
where he raped her. The fact that he first discreetly closed the door and the window
before he approached and poked a knife at complainant, then, as he laid on top of
her, ordered her to undress, kissed her breast, separated apart her legs with his own
legs, and satisfied his lust, all the while holding a knife with his right hand poked
at complainants body, are calculated means to ensure consummation of his lewd
design. These are by no means the workings of an imbecile, but by one engulfed by
lust.

53
 People v. Domingo
G.R. No. 184343 March 2, 2009

FACTS:
Complainant Raquel Indon testified that she and her minor children Melissa,
Michelle, Marvin and Jeffer were sleeping inside their house in Bulacan, when she
was awakened by the sound of appellant Jesus Domingo kicking their door open.
She narrated that she immediately recognized the accused, who was armed with a
screwdriver and a kitchen knife. The appellant cut the cord of the mosquito net and
repeatedly stabbed her and hit her right arm three times. She tried to escape from
the room, she then grabbed her son Marvin and ran towards the gate. However,
before reaching the gate, she fell down and the appellant stabbed her right leg. The
appellant then proceeded to stab Marvin who died as a result of the injuries.
Appellant then turn towards Raquel’s two daughters Michelle and Melissa. Melissa
died due to the stab wounds inflicted by appellant, while Michelle was able to hide.

In his defense, appellant testified that prior to the incident, he was in good
terms with the Indon family and that he had no record of mental illness. However,
he went to East Avenue Medical Center for medical check-up and he was advised
to have an operation. He suffered from sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and
nervousness. Occasionally, a voice would tell him to kill. He averred that when he
regained his memory, one week has already passed since the incidents, and he was
already detained. He only came to know the incidents from his sister and his
children who visited him.

The RTC held the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide,
frustrated homicide and attempted homicide. The trial court found the appellant’s
defense of insanity unmeritorious, since what was presented was proof of
appellant’s mental disorder that existed five years after the incident, but not at the
time the crimes were committed. The CA affirmed finding appellant guilty.

Appellant asserts that he was insane or completely deprived of intelligence

during the commission of the alleged crimes and therefore should be exempted
from criminal liability in accordance with Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability on the ground of
insanity.

RULING:
No. The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the
law presumes that all acts are voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts
are done unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a crime who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving beyond reasonable
doubt that he or she was insane immediately before or at the moment the crime was
committed.

Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while

committing the act; i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without

54
the least discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or
there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his
acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full
and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts.

Even assuming that appellant’s testimony is credible, his sleeplessness, lack

of appetite, nervousness and his hearing imaginary voices, while suggestive of an
abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will or an
absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not
exclude imputability. The popular conception of the word "crazy" is used to
describe a person or an act unnatural or out of ordinary. Testimony that a person
acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the commission of the crime does
not conclusively prove that he is legally insane and will not grant him or her
absolution.

55
 People v. Buado, Jr.
G.R. No. 170634 January 8, 2013

FACTS:
This case tells the revolting story of a lecherous father who made two of his
very young daughters his sex slaves for several years right in the family home. The
trial court convicted him and prescribed the death penalty for each of the two
counts of rape. There would be no hesitation to affirm the penalty, but the
intervening passage of the law prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty now
spares him from the supreme penalty.

The accused raped AAA. Thereafter, AAA told her mother about the
incident that she was raped by the accused several times started when she was a
grade 1 up to grade 4 at the time of the complaint. AAA manifested that she did
not reported the incident because of fear from the accused, her father.

The rape of BBB happened when AAA and her mother did not want to
return home after the incident. The incident was reported to her older sister DDD,
which was reported to their mother.

Thereafter, a case of rape was filed against the father.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to prove the special qualifying circumstances of
relationship and minority is fatal in imposing the death penalty upon the accused-
appellant ?

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, the death penalty is imposed if the rape is committed with the attendance of
any "aggravating/ qualifying circumstances." One of such "aggravating/qualifying
circumstances" is "when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim." Both minority and actual relationship must be alleged and proved;
otherwise, conviction for rape in its qualified form will be barred.

Here in this case, during the trial, however, the Prosecution adduced no
evidence to establish her minority save her testimony and that of her mother’s. In
the absence of proof of AAA’s minority in accordance with the guidelines set in
People v. Pruna, the Supreme Court concur with the CA’s conclusion that he could
not be properly found guilty of qualified rape. Indeed, his substantial right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him would be nullified
otherwise. Accordingly, the CA correctly prescribed reclusion perpetua as the
penalty.

On the other hand, the rape of BBB as minor and her being the daughter of
the accused were sufficiently stated in the amended information. In fact, even the
accused himself admitted his legitimate paternity of BBB. Considering that the

56
Prosecution duly proved BBB’s minority and her relationship with the accused, the
CA correctly affirmed the penalty of death meted by the RTC.

With the intervening passage on June 24, 2006 of Republic Act No. 9346,
however, the imposition of the death penalty has become prohibited. The
retroactive application of the prohibition against the death penalty must be made
here because it is favorable to the accused. Nonetheless, he shall not be eligible for
parole, because Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 expressly provides that
persons "whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this
Act" shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence
Law), as amended.

57
 People v. Ventura, Sr.
G.R. No. 205230 March 12, 2014

FACTS:
The prosecution’s version of facts, at about 2:00 a.m., BBB had just came
from a wake and was passing by the bakery of Ventura’s son when she saw
Ventura, naked from waist down, on top of a woman on a bench in front of the
bakery. BBB coughed to get their attention and Ventura immediately stood up, put
on his pants and entered his house. BBB then realized that the woman was her
niece, AAA, who was then only 17 years old, unschooled and has a mental
disability. She then held AAA’s hands and brought her home. Thereafter, BBB
confronted AAA who confessed that she was already impregnated by Ventura and
admitted that the latter was sexually abusing her. Upon learning this, BBB sought
help from the employer of AAA’s sister who accompanied them to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) to file a complaint against Ventura.

AAA narrated that she was near the bakery of Ventura’s son when Ventura
asked her to lie down on the bench. Ventura undressed her, went on top of her, and
inserted his penis inside her vagina. After succeeding in having carnal knowledge
of her, Ventura threatened AAA by poking a knife at her while instructing her not
to tell anyone about the incident. She was then forced by Ventura to accompany
him in selling pandesal until the early morning, and she could not escape him
because he was holding her hands and would not let her go. AAA said that Ventura
would give her clothes and money every time he would rape her and instructed her
not to tell anyone of the sexual assaults.

For his part, Ventura denied the charge against him and invoked the defense
of alibi alleging that he did not rape AAA on March 24, 2005 as he did not leave
his home because he was busy making bread for their bakery with his children, and
it was already 10:00 a.m. when he was able to leave their bakery. He also admitted
having knowledge that AAA has a mental defect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of Ventura for the crime of Rape charged has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

Yes, all that needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the
rapist and his victim, and the latter’s mental retardation. This Court has repeatedly
held that "mental retardation can be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical
evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial
court." The trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses’ testimonies is
accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on its
part, it having had the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial
evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses. The rule finds an even more
stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the appellate court.

58
 In the present case, the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is,
indeed, a mental retardate through the testimony of BBB and the medico legal
officer, and the trial court’s observation. It is also worthy to note that the defense
did not dispute but even admitted the fact that AAA is suffering from mental
retardation. Though AAA proceeded with much difficulty in describing the sexual
abuse made on her, no convincing reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure
from the findings of the trial court with respect to the assessment of her testimony,
the same being straightforward, candid, and worthy of belief. This Court is also
convinced that AAA has no ill-motive to manufacture such a tale if it were not
true.

In impugning AAA’s accusation of rape against him, Ventura interposed the

defense of denial and alibi. As can be gleaned from the records of this case,
Ventura’s argument centered only on the fact that it was impossible for him to rape
AAA on the said date and time of the incident because he was busy making bread
at their bakery, and the only time he left their house was at 10:00 a.m. Even
assuming that he worked inside their bakery the whole day, it was not impossible
for him to commit the crime because the rape took place on the bench located just
in front of their bakery.

The fact that no consummated rape happened on March 24, 2005 based on
the testimonies of BBB and the medico legal officer, as well as the absence of
lacerations on AAA’s vagina, pointed to by Ventura cannot work in his favor. The
absence of hymenal lacerations on AAA’s vagina upon medical examination does
not negate the fact of rape. A freshly broken hymen is not also an essential element
of rape. In the context it is used in the RPC, carnal knowledge does not necessarily
require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured.

The trial court had observed that Ventura’s actions were detested by his
family because despite having a large kin, none of them testified for Ventura’s
defense or did anything to support his case. They did not even bother to visit him
while he was in jail.

59
 People v. Jumawan
G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

FACTS:
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married on October 18, 1975.
They lived together since then and raised their four (4) children as they put up
several businesses over the years. On 16 October 1998, KKK prepared the
matrimonial bed but did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant. Instead, she
stayed on the cot. The accused-appellant asked her why she stayed there, to which
KKK replied that she was not feeling well. Her reasons did not appease him and he
got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall
causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell,
took her pillow and transferred to the bed. Accused-appellant then lay beside KKK
and expressed his desire to copulate. The latter politely declined. The accused-
appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides.
KKK refused to bend her legs, but the accused-appellant was successful in lifting
her duster and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was doing so, KKK was
desperately shouting, “Don’t do that to me, I am not feeling well.” This alarmed
MMM, their daughter, who heard her mother’s cries. MMM went to her parents’
room and asked her father why her mother was crying. Her father rebuked MMM
and said that it was a family trouble. Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on
top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and asked:
"Ma, why are you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama
why is it that her underwear is torn?”

When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her
mother get up in order to bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her
tom underwear and covered herself with a blanket. However, their breakout from
the room was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-appellant
blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK
to "Stay here, you sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie,
allow me to go out." He then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back.
Determined to get away, MMM leaned against door and embraced her mother
tightly as they pushed their way out.

In their bedroom, KKK confessed to her daughters that accused-appellant

tried to have sex with her despite her not feeling well. Accused-appellant’s
aggression continued the night after. He noticed that KKK was about to sleep in
their daughters’ room and inquired as to why. KKK replied that she preferred to
sleep with their children. He returned 15 minutes later and when KKK still refused
to go with him, he became infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and attempted to
carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here? Lets go to
our bedroom." When she defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to
tear apart. At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because we
are in front of you." The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the
accused-appellant who yelled, "Even in front of you, I can have sex with your
mother because I'm the head of the family." He then ordered his daughters to leave
the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and went to the staircase where they

60
subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother resonate with the creaking
bed.
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant
forcibly pulled KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged,
"Don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do
what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex." After removing his own short
pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted her and forced
himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and
briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered: "It’s
nice, that is what you deserve because you are a flirt or fond of sex." He then
retreated to the masters' bedroom.

Accused-appellant argues that since he and KKK are husband and wife with
mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing
physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used
upon KKK such as bruises.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the fact that accused-appellant and KKK are husband and wife
would absolve the former from the two rape charges against him.

RULING:
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied
consent theory evolved have already been superseded by modem global principles
on the equality of rights between men and women and respect for human dignity
established in various international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The
Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the
traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is
needed to achieve full equality between them.

One of such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic

notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary
rights over his wife's body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy
with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.

It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to love one another but
this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are
both spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by
force or coercion. A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a
husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same
right to control her own body, as does an unmarried woman. She can give or
withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot
unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.

61
 People v. Marzan
G.R. No. 207397 September 24, 2018

FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged in two separate Informations for murder and
frustrated murder. The prosecution presented their witnesses, with their testimonies
summarized as follows:

Erlinda saw accused-appellant enter the house of her bedridden father,

Apolonio, while uttering “agda kalaban ko” (I have an enemy). Not long after,
Erlinda heard her father screaming “apay Aping?” (why Aping?) and “uston
Aping!” (enough Aping). Thereafter, Erlinda saw accused-appellant emerge from
her father’s house wearing a blood-stained shirt and holding a bladed instrument
dripping with blood.

Lolita also saw accused-appellant come out from Apolonio’s house holding
a blood-stained weapon. Out of fear, however, Lolita hid herself in the comfort
room.

Bernardo tried to placate accused-appellant but the latter furiously said, “you
are also one of them” and stabbed Bernardo in the stomach. The defense claimed
accused-appellant was insane at the time of the incident.

The RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of murder with respect to the killing of Apolonio.

The CA sustained the RTC in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and frustrated homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in disregarding the accused-appellant’s plea
of insanity.

RULING:
No. Even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the accused is true,
[accused-appellant’s] abnormal behavior immediately prior [to] the stabbing
incident and at the time of the incident, while suggestive of an aberrant behavior[,]
cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to
discern. On the contrary, accused was even sane enough to help his mother to stand
up after falling on the ground seated her in front of a house and surrender himself
and his bolo to the responding policemen.

Like the RTC, the CA found the defense of insanity as unavailing in this
case, viz:

In questioning the propriety of the [RTC Decision], accused-appellant relied

heavily on the finds of Dr. Roxas of the NCMH that he was suffering from
psychosis classified as schizophrenia.

62
 We are not convinced. It is settled that the moral and legal presumption is
always in favor of soundness of mind; that freedom and intelligence constitute the
normal condition of a person. Otherwise state, the law presumes all acts to be
voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously.
Therefore, whoever invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its
existence. In short, to be entitled to this exempting circumstance under Article 12
of the RPC, the defense must prove that the accused was deprived of intelligence
immediately prior [to] or at the time of the commission of the crime.

A careful scrutiny of the applicable law and jurisprudential rule on the

matter reveals that for insanity to be appreciated in favor of the accused, there must
be complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is
deprived of reason or there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total
deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability.

Clearly, schizophrenia does not fall within the stringent standard

contemplated by law as an exempting circumstance. In fact, even accused
appellant's psychological report supports this conclusion. The findings evidently
show that accused-appellant's alleged sickness is merely temporary and occurs
only intermittently.

63
 People v. Sarcia
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009

FACTS:
Sometime in 1996, AAA, a five-year-old was together with her cousin
playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo. Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited
AAA to go with him to the backyard, which she agreed. Unknown to appellant,
AAA’s cousin followed them. Upon reaching the place, appellant removed AAA’s
shorts and underwear. He also removed his trousers and bried. Thereafter, he
ordered AAA to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and inserted his
penis into AAA’s private organ. Appellant made an up-and-down movement.

AAA’s father filed a complaint for acts of lasciviousness against herein

accused-appellant Richard Sarcia.

The trial court rendered its decision finding the accused-appellant guilty of
the crime of rape.

When the accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he
was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by
the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place “in any month and date of
the year 1996.” Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time
when he committed the rape, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed
on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In asserting the attendance of the
mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused, it being more beneficial to the latter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Juvenile Justice Welfare Act (JJWA) or R.A. 9344 applies in
suspending the sentence of the accused.

RULING:
No.
Section 38 and 40 of the JJWA to the suspension of sentence is now moot
and academic in this case. The Court ruled that despite being a heinous crime, the
accused can still be given a suspension of sentence under sec 38 of the JJWA.
However, while Sec 38 of RA 9344 (Juvenile Justice Welfare Act) provides that
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law
is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his or her
guilt, Sec 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said
child reaches the maximum age of 21.

During the trial, the accused was already 31 years old, and the judgment of
the RTC had been promulgated before the JJWA was passed. Thus, the application
for the suspension of sentence is moot and academic.

Accused is entitled to appropriate disposition under sec 51 of the JJWA,

which provides for the confinement of convicted children in agricultural camps and
other training facilities.

64
 People v. Mantalaba
G.R. No. 186227 July 20, 2011

FACTS:
A buy-bust operation had been held in Butuan City by the Task Force
Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) after it has received a report
that Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was selling shabu. After a buy-bust operation,
two informations was filed against Mantalaba which was later on consolidated.
Mantalaba pleaded not guilty.

RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was penalized of
reclusion perpetua to death and fine of 500k for selling shabu and (2) for illegally
possessing shabu, Mantalaba was penalized, in application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum and 8 yrs as maximum of prision
mayor and fine of 300k. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Thus, the
present appeal.

Mantalaba on his defense argue that the lower court gravely erred in
convicting him and that there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the
poser-buyer during the buy-bust operation. He also claims that the chain of custody
of the seized shabu was not established.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there should be a suspension of sentence by reason of minority?

RULING:
Yes.
It can be noted that Mantalaba was minor during the buy-bust operation but
was of legal age during the promulgation of the decision. It must be noted that RA
9344 took effect after the promulgation of the RTC's decision against Mantalaba.
The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with PD 603 (Child and
Youth Welfare Code) and Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law that were
applicable at the time of the promulgation of the judgment.

It may be argued that the Mantalaba should have been entitled to a

suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for
its retroactive application. However, as ruled in People vs Sarcia, suspension of
sentence can still be applied but NOT when the offender upon the promulgation of
judgment is 21 yrs old. or older. Mantalaba is now 21 yrs old, therefore his
suspension of sentence is already moot and academic.

Nevertheless, the Mantalaba shall be entitled to appropriate disposition

under Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of
convicted children.

65
 US v. Tanedo
G.R. L-5418 February 12, 1910

FACTS:
The accused, Cecilio Tanedo, was charged of the crime of murder but he
pleaded for accidental killing.The accused was an owner of the land. One morning,
he went to work on a dam on his land together with his laborers. He took with him
a shotgun and a few shells, with the intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set
his laborers at work. And so, he met the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle,
had been living in a small shack during the rice harvesting season. The accused
asked the uncle of the deceased where he could find a good place in which to hunt
wild chickens. Although the accused directed his question to the uncle inside of the
shack, the deceased answered the question and pointed out in a general way a
portion of the forest near the edge of which stood the shack.

Here, there is a conflict on whether the deceased and the accused invited
each other mutually to hunt wild chickens or the deceased remained where he was.
At any rate the accused went into the forest with his gun. What took place there is
unknown to anybody except the accused.

As per the accused, when he arrived at the forest and saw a wild chicken and
shot it. After the shot, he heard a human cry. He picked up the chicken and went
near the place where he heard the noise, and saw that he had wounded a man. He
went back toward the dam to tell one of his laborer about the occurrence. They
went to the place where the body of the deceased lay and removed it to a place in
the cogon grass where it would not be easily observed. Later that evening the
accused and the laborer went together to dispose of the body finally.

Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by a gunshot
wound. Chicken feathers were found in considerable quantities at the point where
the chicken was shot and where the accident occurred.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is entitled of the exempting circumstance of accident
and hence must be acquitted.

RULING:
Yes, the accused is entitled of the exempting circumstance of accident.

Under the law, any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care,
causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. When the
accused, under the plea of accidental killing, offers testimony tending to prove the
substance of his plea, the burden is upon the State to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the killing was intentional.

In this case, there is no question that the accused was engaged in the
performance of a lawful act when the accident occurred. He was not negligent or at
fault, because the deceased was not in the direction at which the accused fired his
gun. It was not foreseeable that the slug would recoil after hitting the wild chicken.

66
Further, there is no evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of
the deceased.

Hence, the accused is entitled of the exempting circumstance of accident and

must be acquitted.

67
 People v. Del Rosario
G.R. No. 127755 April 14, 1999

FACTS:
Accused Joselito del Rosario, a tricycle driver, had an arrangement with the
suspect named ‘Boy’ Santo to transport him to the Cockpit at the Blas Edward
Coliseum. However, despite the arrangement, the suspect ordered him to fetch the
two other suspects in front of the parking lot of Merced Drugstore. This is the
moment where Virginia Bernas, the victim, was robbed and assaulted by one of the
suspects. Upon seeing this, Joselita attempted to escape and seek help however, he
was stopped by ‘Boy’ Santos and ordered him around by pointing his gun at him.
Thereafter, the assailants also threatened that if ever he told to the authorities what
happened, they will also kill his family.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Joselito del Rosario y Pascual can invoke an exempting
circumstance under Article 12 (6).

RULING:
Yes. Provided that he was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when
he was prevented at the gunpoint by his co-accused from leaving the crime scene
during the perpetration of the crime, being only forced to help them escape after
the commission establishes the fact that he was not able to act with freedom. At
that time, the fear was also present and his fear of body harm that could be inflicted
to him is also greater or at least equal to that committed. Therefore, he acted under
the compulsion of an irresistible force pursuant to Article 12(6) of the Revised
Penal Code making him exempted from criminal liability.

68
 People v. Bandian
G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936

FACTS:
Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket
about four or five brazas from her house. A few minutes later, he again saw her
emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and
back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself.
Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them.
Comcom saw the body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where
the appellant had gone a few moments before. Upon being asked whether the baby
which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the
affirmative.

Upon being notified, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, went to the appellant's house
and found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and
beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said
facts, the physician in question declared that the appellant gave birth in her house
and in her own bed; that birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had
theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of another man.
He testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her child.

The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr.
Nepomuceno whose testimony was not corroborated but, on the contrary, was
contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by the appellant, as will
be stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower court furthermore held, that
the appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, maintains that
the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of
article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted in the
death of the minor allegedly abandoned.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of infanticide or of abandonment of a minor.

RULING:
No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be
committed wilfully or consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary,
conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed
through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said
circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be
conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.

The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her
child's death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so
wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to
expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown
to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the incident. The
appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.

69
 This illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness
as well as the hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the
circumstances that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and
therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties
usually attending such event; and the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol — a
mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day — is uneducated and could
supplant with what she had read or learned from books what experience itself
could teach her, undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware of her
childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her
debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or insuperable to
constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to
take her child from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it
abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.

The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into
the thicket, according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact
that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a
wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it,
not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by
strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it
all happened by mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves
under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).

70
 People v. Gunda
G.R. No. 195525 February 5, 2014

FACTS:
The victim Eladio Globio, Sr. and his son Eladio Jr., were walking along a
trail at Barangay Cabay, Eastern Samar. Suddenly, when Eladio was about 10
meters ahead of his father, the latter was waylaid by appellant Wilfredo Gunda and
his unidentified companions. The John Does held the victim’s arms whereupon
appellant stabbed him several times. Fearing for his life, Eladio Jr. fled. The
unidentified assailants pursued him. Fortunately, he was able to outrun them and
was able to reach their house. They then reported the incident to the police
authorities who eventually arrested the appellant.

An information was filed charging the appellant and the John Does with the
crime of murder.

The RTC rendered its decision finding appellant guilty as charged. The CA
rendered its decision and affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA is correct in not considering as a generic circumstance and
also conspiracy as not a qualifying nor an aggravating circumstance.

RULING:
Yes.
Based on the above, we find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of
the trial court as affirmed by the CA, that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder. Two prosecution witnesses positively identified him
as the person who waylaid the victim, and with the help of his conspirators,
stabbed the victim several times. According to the post-mortem findings, the
victim suffered 12 stab wounds which cause his death. There is also no doubt in
our mind that the attack on the victim was attended by treachery. The victim was
unarmed and had no inkling of the impending attack on his person. In fact, he was
just his way home together with his son Eladio Jr. The victim was attacked by
appellant from behind with a blow to his head with a wooden pole. The cohorts
then held the victim’s arms rendering him helpless and immobile. In such position,
there is no opportunity for the victim to escape or even offer a feeble resistance.
Appellant then delivered the coup de grace by stabbing the victim multiple times.
Undoubtedly, treachery qualified the killing to murder. “There is a treachery when
the offender commits a crime against the person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure it’s
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.” As regards conspiracy, the CA correctly ruled that it is not a
circumstance which would aggravate or qualify the crime.

Under Article 248 under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. There being no other aggravating circumstance other
than qualifying circumstance or treachery, the CA correctly held that the proper
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two invisible penalties.

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“It must be emphasized, however, that appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant
to section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that ‘persons convicted to
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduce to
reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.”

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J. Article 13 Mitigating Circumstances

Bongalon v. People
G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013

FACTS:
On May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother,
both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in
Legazpi City;
Allegedly, the two brothers harmed the daughter of Bongalon. The latter
confronted the two and called them names like “strangers” and “animals”.
Moreover, Bongalon struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson
on the face; and he then went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela
Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on
him;

Thereafter, Rolando, father of Jayson, later went to police station to report

the incident and Jayson, then, also underwent medical treatment at a hospital which
examined and issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered
contusions.

A case for child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610, was
filed against Bongalon. Bongalon denied having physically abused or maltreated
Jayson. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight,
insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters.
The RTC ruled against Bongalon which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bongalon is entitled to mitigating circumstances as he had merely
acted to protect her daughters, thus, not guilty of the crime charge?

RULING:
Yes. Bongalon is entitled to mitigating circumstances thus Bongalon is not
guilty of child abuse.

The Supreme Court ruled that inflicting physical injuries on a minor is not a
“child abuse”. Further, it was ruled that not every instant of laying of the hands on
a child constitutes a crime of child abuse under Sec. 10(9) of RA 7610, only when
the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the
accused to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child
as a human being should be punished as a child abuse, otherwise, it is punished
under Revised Penal Code. Furthermore, it is not trite to remind that under the
well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of the
petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible
circumstances in his favor.

Hence in this case, the accused is not guilty of “child abuse” but only slight
physical injuries under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code.

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74
 People v. Ignas
412 SCRA 311 September 30, 2003

FACTS:
In the amended decision dated June 2, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 8, found appellant June Ignas guilty of murder
aggravated especially by the use of an unlicensed firearm. Initially, Ignas was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, after the
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, the penalty was upgraded to death
by lethal injection. The victim was Nemesio Lopate, a man who was revealed to be
the paramour of his wife.

Prosecution witnesses Annie Bayanes and Marlon Manis claimed to have

seen the gunman’s profile and identified the gunman as June Ignas, based on his
gait and build. Mona Barredo, another prosecution witness, testified that the
appellant came to her residence at Pico, La Trinidad, and asked her to dispose of
the handgun’s empty shells out the window. Barredos complied because of
nervousness. The police investigators later recovered the spent gun shells from
Barredos’ sweet potato garden. When the appellant was brought in for questioning,
he admitted to prosecution witnesses, Julio Bayacsan, his friend, Pauline Gumpic,
the victim’s sister, and SPO4 Arthur Bomagao, that he had shot and killed
Nemesio. However, he later on denied these statements and claimed that he was
baking bread in Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya when the crime had occurred. This alibi
was corroborated by Ben Anoma, his business partner.

The appellant was found guilty of murder. Both prosecution and defense
filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The prosecution sought the
imposition of the death penalty while the defense sought acquittal on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Whether there are mitigating circumstances, which could modify the penalty?

RULING:
NO. Appellant, firstly contends that assuming without admitting that he is
guilty, the lower court should have considered at least the mitigating circumstance
of immediate vindication of a grave offense as well as that of passion and
obfuscation. Secondly, appellant points out that the trial court failed to consider
his voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.

According to the OSG, for the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a

grave offense to apply, the vindication must be immediate. This view is not
entirely accurate. The word immediate in the English text is not the correct
translation of the controlling Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code, which uses
the word proxima. The Spanish text, on this point, allows a lapse of time between
the grave offense and the actual vindication. Thus, in an earlier case involving the
infidelity of a wife, the killing of her paramour prompted proximately though not
immediately by the desire to avenge the wrong done, was considered an
extenuating circumstance in favor of the accused. The time elapsed between the

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offense and the suspected cause for vindication, however, involved only hours and
minutes, not days. Hence, we agree with the Solicitor General that the lapse of two
(2) weeks between his discovery of his wife’s infidelity and the killing of her
supposed paramour could no longer be considered proximate. The passage of a
fortnight is more than sufficient time for appellant to have recovered his
composure and assuaged the unease in his mind. The established rule is that there
can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had
sufficient time to recover his serenity. Thus, in this case, we hold that the
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be
considered in appellants favor.

The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave

offense and passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if they
arise from the same facts or motive.

In other words, if appellant attacked his victim in proximate vindication of a

grave offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath that passion and
obfuscation also blinded him. Moreover, for passion and obfuscation to be well
founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act which
produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime
by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his
moral equanimity. To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which spanned the
discovery of his wife’s extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover was
sufficient time for appellant to reflect and cool off.

Appellant further argues that the lower court erred in failing to consider
voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. On this point, the following
requirements must be satisfied: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2)
the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was
voluntary. Records show, however, that leaflets and posters were circulated for
information to bring the killer of Nemesio to justice. A team of police investigators
from La Trinidad, Benguet then went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya to invite appellant
for questioning. Only then did he return to Benguet. But he denied the charge of
killing the victim. Clearly, appellants claimed surrender was neither spontaneous
nor voluntary.

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 Guillermo v. People
G.R. No. 153287 January 20, 2009

FACTS:
The prosecution charged the petitioner, Arnaldo Socias, et al. with the crime
of homicide, causing the death of Winnie Alon.

The petitioner testified that in the afternoon of July 21, 1996, he was at the
restaurant, together with Arnel Socias, drinking beer. Alon, et al. arrived at the
restaurant and requested to join the petitioner in their table. Alon then had an
altercation with Arnel Socias regarding "labtik". Alon got angry and told him that
he has long been in the chain saw business but "you’re stupid" (gago ka). Socias
responded: "If the wood is crooked and you would deviate from line, you’re
stupid."

Alon was so furious and grabbed Socias by the collar. While the petitioner
was pacifying the two, Alon struck him with a beer bottle. He was hit at the right
top of his head thrice. He stood up and boxed Winnie who again picked up a bottle,
break it against the wall, and struck him with the broken bottle. He stepped back,
pulled his knife, and stabbed him three (3) times but cannot remember what part of
his body was hit by his successive stabs.

The RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime of homicide, attended by a

special or privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete justification.

The petitioner appealed to the CA whose decision is now assailed in the

present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in failing to recognize the
existence of all the elements of self-defense.

RULING:
No. The third element - the reasonableness of the means to repel the
aggression - is the critical element that the lower courts found lacking in the
petitioner's case. Generally, reasonableness is a function of the nature or severity of
the attack or aggression confronting the accused, the means employed to repel this
attack, the surrounding circumstances of the attack such as its place and occasion,
the weapons used, and the physical condition of the parties - which, when viewed
as material considerations, must show rational equivalence between the attack and
the defense.

Several reasons militate against our acceptance of the petitioner's version

and interpretation of events. First, there is intrinsic disproportion between a
Batangas knife and a broken beer bottle. Second, physical evidence shows that the
petitioner suffered only one contusion hematoma at the parietal area above the left
ear. Third, the victim, Vicente, and Eddie, were already drunk when they arrived at
the restaurant before the fatal fight. This state of intoxication, while not critically
material to the stabbing that transpired, is still material for purposes of defining its

77
surrounding circumstances, particularly the fact that a broken beer bottle might not
have been a potent weapon in the hands of a drunk wielder. Fourth, and as the CA
aptly observed as well, the knife wounds were all aimed at vital parts of the body,
thus pointing against a conclusion that the petitioner was simply warding off
broken beer bottle thrusts and used his knife as a means commensurate to the
thrusts he avoided. The depth of these wounds shows the force exerted in the
petitioner's thrusts while the locations are indicative that the thrusts were all meant
to kill, not merely to disable the victim and thereby avoid his drunken thrusts.
Fifth, in appreciating the facts, the RTC and the CA were one in the conclusion to
disbelieve the petitioner's allegation of complete self-defense.

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 Nizurtado v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 107383 December 7, 1994

FACTS:
Felix Nizurtado was a public officer, having been the Barangay Captain of
Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila, from 1983 to 1988; in that capacity, he
received and later encashed a check for P10,000.00, specifically intended by way
of a loan to the barangay for its livelihood program; and the funds had come from
the Ministry of Human Settlements, the Metro Manila Commission and "Kilusang
Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran."

Petitioner was able to encash the check on 18 October 1988 on the basis of a
resolution of the Barangay Council, submitted to the KKK Secretariat, to the effect
that a livelihood project, i.e., "T-shirt manufacturing," had already been identified
by the council. The money, however, instead of its being used for the project, was
later lent to, along with petitioner, the members of the Barangay Council

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed.

RULING:
Yes. The petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed. (Art. 13, par. 3, Revised Penal Code), entitling him to three distinct
mitigating circumstances. Voluntary surrender (Art. 13, par. 7, Revised Penal
Code), therefore, may thus be treated as a modifying circumstance independent and
apart from restitution of the questioned funds by petitioner (Art. 13, par. 10,
Revised Penal Code).

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 People v. Gelaver
G.R. No. 95357 June 9, 1933

FACTS:
A case of parricide was filed against Eduardo Gelaver for stabbing Victoria
Gelaver, which was resulted to the latter’s death.

Trial ensued. Appellant further testified that on March 24, 1988, after he was
informed by his daughter that his wife and paramour were living at a house in front
of the Sto. Niño Catholic Church, appellant immediately repaired to that place.
Upon entering the house, he saw his wife lying on her back and her paramour on
top of her, having sexual intercourse.

Appellant Eduardo Gelaver admitted killing his wife but claimed that he did
so after catching her having carnal act with her paramour. It was the victim who
received the stab intended for the paramour. As to why he continued to stab his
wife, appellant said that his mind had been "dimmed" or overpowered by passion
and obfuscation by the sight of his wife having carnal act with her paramour.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is entitled to mitigating circumstances of passion or
obfuscation?

RULING:
No. He is not entitled.
The Supreme Court ruled that implicit in the exceptional circumstances
provided by Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code is that the death caused must be
the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon
his spouse in the act of infidelity (People v. Abarca, 153 SCRA 735 [1987]). In this
case, appellant wants this Court to believe that he caught his wife and her
paramour in sexual intercourse. However, his testimony is tainted with
inconsistencies which leads Us to believe otherwise.

Further, the trial court erred in finding the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation "as a result of his (appellant's) wife leaving
their home and their children." (Rollo, p. 28) Before this circumstance may be
taken into consideration, it is necessary to establish the existence of an unlawful
act sufficient to produce such a condition of mind. The act producing the
obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might have recovered his
equanimity. (I Revised Penal Code, Aquino, 1987 ed., p. 267) The crime was
committed almost a year after the victim had abandoned the conjugal dwelling

Appellant's failure to inform the police that he killed his wife when he saw
her having sexual intercourse with her paramour, devastated in one fell swoop
whatever credibility could possibly be accorded to his version of the incident

Therefore, he is guilty of killing his wife and not entitled for the mitigating
circumstances of passion or obfuscation

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 Andrada v. People
G.R. No. 135222 March 4, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner Peter Andrada was charged with frustrated murder for attacking
Arsenio Ugerio while the latter was seating and finishing his meal in a restaurant.
Petitioner ran away after hacking the victim on the head with a bolo. The victim
was brought to a hospital. Petitioner was arrested in a waiting shed along the road.

During arraignment, petitioner with the assistance of counsel de parte,

pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The hearing of the case ensued. The trial
court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision and modified
the imposable penalty because it found that petitioner is entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority as he was only 17 years, 9 months and 20 days
old at the time of the incident. CA denied the MR.

Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC claiming

that its constitutional right to due process was violated because of his counsel’s
gross incompetence or gross negligence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.

RULING:
No. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the surrender must be
spontaneous, made in such a manner that it shows the interest of the accused to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his
guilt or wishes to save them the trouble and expenses that would be necessarily
incurred in his search and capture. Here, the surrender was not spontaneous.

The petitioner, after attacking the victim, ran away. He was apprehended by
responding police officers in the waiting shed at the corner of Cambas Road and
Magsaysay Avenue.

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 Manaban v. CA
G.R. No. 150723 July 11, 2006

FACTS:
On October 11, 1996, at around 1:25 o’clock in the morning, Joselito
Bautista, a father and a member of the UP Police Force, took his daughter, Frinzi,
who complained of difficulty in breathing, to the UP Health Center. There, the
doctors prescribed certain medicines to be purchased. Needing money therefore,
Joselito Bautista, who had taken alcoholic drinks earlier, proceeded to the BPI
Kalayaan Branch to withdraw some money from its Automated Teller Machine
(ATM).

Upon arrival at the bank, Bautista proceeded to the ATM booth but because
he could not effectively withdraw money, he started kicking and pounding on the
machine. For said reason, the bank security guard, Ramonito Manaban, approached
and asked him what the problem was. Bautista complained that his ATM was
retrieved by the machine and that no money came out of it. After Manaban had
checked the receipt, he informed Bautista that the Personal Identification Number
(PIN) entered was wrong and advised him to just return the next morning. This
angered Bautista all the more and resumed pounding on the machine. Manaban
then urged him to calm down and referred him to their customer service over the
phone. Still not mollified, Bautista continued raging and striking the machine.
When Manaban could no longer pacify him, he fired a warning shot. That diverted
the attention of Bautista. Instead of venting his ire against the machine, he
confronted Manaban. After some exchange of words, a shot rang out fatally hitting
Bautista.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
obfuscation are present

RULING:
Manaban surrendered his service firearm and voluntarily went with the
police to the police station for investigation. Thus, Manaban is entitled to the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

On obfuscation, we find that the facts of the case do not entitle Manaban to
such mitigating circumstances. The threat was only in the mind of Manaban and is
mere speculation which is not sufficient to produce obfuscation which is
mitigating.41 Besides, the threat or danger was not grave or serious considering
that Manaban had the advantage over Bautista because Manaban was already
pointing his firearm at Bautista when the latter turned his back. The defense failed
to establish by clear and convincing evidence the cause that allegedly produced
obfuscation.

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 Mariano v. People
G.R. No. 178145 July 7, 2014

FACTS:

The case stemmed when Mariano overtook De Leon’s pickup and almost
bumped that latter’s car.

After the first incident with Mariano, De Leon decided to go to his mother’s
house to pick up some items. He parked his car in front of his mother’s house and
alighted the car. However, he was bumped by a moving vehicle and thrown 4
meters away and lost consciousness. The vehicle was identified as the same pickup
being driven by Mariano. De Leon was brought to the hospital in Bustos, Bulacan
and was later on transferred in St. Luke’s Medical Center in QC. Subsequently,
Mariano went to Camp Alejo S. Santos in Malolos to surrender and report the
incident.

Mariano was charged with frustrated homicide. The RTC found him guilty
of the crime charged. The CA modified his conviction to Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries and failed to consider the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be

considered in the case.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender cannot be appreciated in this case. Under Article 365 (5), it expressly
states that in the imposition of the penalties, the courts shall have their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Art. 64 of the RPC.

The SC explained that the rationale behind the law is that the carelessness,
imprudence, or negligence may vary from one situation to another, in nature,
extent, and resulting consequences, and in order that there may be a fair and just
application of the penalty, the courts must have ample discretion in its imposition,
without being bound by what we may call the mathematical formula provided for
in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.

On the basis of this, the trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of
Article 64 in the instant case even if appellant had two mitigating circumstances in
his favor with no aggravating circumstance to offset them.

Verily, anyone judicially declared guilty of any crime must be duly punished
in accordance with the law defining the crime and prescribing the punishment. The
imposition of the correct penalty on the offender is the essence of due process of
law.

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