CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW NOTES

 A RECIDIVIST is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously
convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code.

 For recidivism to exist, it is sufficient that the accused, on the date of his trial, shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title.

 A person shall be deemed to be HABITUAL DELINQUENT, if within a period of ten years from
the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical
injuries, robbery, theft, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third
time or oftener.

 For the existence of habitual delinquency, it is not enough that the accused shall have been
convicted of any of the crimes specified, and that the last conviction shall have taken place ten
(10) years before the commission of the last offense. It is necessary that the crimes previously
committed be prior to the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged a third
time or oftener.

 Recidivism, viewed as an aggravating circumstance, is not a factor or element which necessarily

forms an integral part of habitual delinquency.

 The difference between a recidivist and a habitual delinquent being established is the
APPLICATION FOR BAIL.

 Rule 114 Section 5, par.3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure applies, thus: “If the
penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: “That he is a recidivist, quasi-
recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance
of reiteration…”

PEOPLE VS. KYAMKO GR. 103805 May 17, 1993

 appellant Reynaldo Kyamko alias "Dodon" was charged with the crime of murder.
 On their way, they passed by a salakot store where they saw Epifanio Ferrer (victim) sleeping
while sitting down, with his head resting on his arm placed on top of the back of a chair.
Immediately thereafter, they saw appellant stab the victim, hitting the latter at the left side of
his neck. 
   its first witness, Eleuterio Rabor, had testified on direct examination, the prosecution filed a
Motion For Leave To Amend Information so as to allege that the appellant is a recidivist or "at
least a habitual delinquent" by virtue of two (2) prior final convictions.
 Appellant was convicted on 12 September 1988 for frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. TCS-
01 and for frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. TCS-445 by the court a quo.
 Appellant was convicted on 12 September 1988 for frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. TCS-
01 and for frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. TCS-445 by the court a quo.
 the trial court promulgated a judgment of conviction, finding the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Art. 248 and there being present the
aggravating circumstance or recidivism the accused having been previously convicted.
 Case is DISMISSED.
 There being a generic aggravating circumstance of recidivism, which is not offset by any
mitigating circumstance, the penalty for the crime for murder, which is reclusion temporal
maximum to death, should be applied in its maximum period. Since the 1987 Constitution
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, and in accordance with the rule laid down in
People vs. Muñoz,36 the penalty to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE VS. REYES GR. NO. L-21168 FEBRUARY 29, 1924 (FORGERY)
 The undersigned accuses Trinidad G. de Lara y Reyes (alias Trinidad de Lara y Reyes) of the
crime of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document.

 There is no evidence that any one saw the defendant forge either of the checks. Neither is
there any evidence of a confession or that the defendant was the person who applied for, and
obtained, the check book from the bank. But the evidence is conclusive that all three of the
checks were forgeries.

 The unexplained possession of recently stolen property is sufficient to sustain a conviction for
the crime of larceny.

 The fact that there was present the aggravating circumstance of the defendant's being a
recidivist without any mitigating circumstance, that the maximum period for the penalty
should be imposed

GR NO. 205698 (SYNDICATED ESTAFA)

PEOPLE VS. HADJI GR NO. L-12686 OCTOBER 24, 1963

 Kamlon Hadji, together with a number of other defendants, was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Sulu for different crimes in various cases, to wit: in Criminal Case No. 1162 for
rebellion; in Criminal Cases Nos. 1162-A to 1162-N and 1348 for multiple murder and multiple
 injuries; and in Criminal Case No. 1353, together with Ulloh Kaddam, et al., for kidnapping
with murder and attempted murder.

RULING:

 The rule obtaining in this jurisdiction allows for the treatment of the common offenses of
murder etc. as distinct and independent acts separable from sedition.

 In citing the cases of Hernandez and Geronimo, supra, it seems to Us that the herein defendant
missed a very significant point. When We held in those two cases that murder and other acts
of violence were absorbed by "rebellion," the common crimes alleged to have been committed
in furtherance of the rebellion were specifically charged in the information and, for that
reason, were consequently necessarily alleged to have been committed for political ends. In
the prosecution at bar, however, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, "the information
makes no allegation of political motivation, and the evidence is totally devoid of any such
motivation, for on the contrary, the proof adduced shows that the killing had no political or
social color, but purely motivated by personal vengeance."

PEOPLE VS. MIZPAH R. REYES GR NO. 74226-27 (FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT)

 The crime of falsification of a public document carries with it an imposable penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00 [Art.
172, Revised Penal Code (RPC)]. Being punishable by a correctional penalty, this crime
prescribes in ten (10) years [Art. 90, par. 3 (RPC)]. The ten (10) year prescriptive period
commences to run "from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents.”

 The public document allegedly falsified was a notarized deed of sale registered on May 26,
1961 with the Register of Deeds in the name of the accused, private respondent herein,
Mizpah R. Reyes.

 ISSUE: whether the crime has prescribed which hinges on whether or not its discovery may be
deemed to have taken place from the time the document was registered with the Register of
Deeds, consistent with the rule on constructive notice.

TAMARGO VS ANTIPORDA GR NO. 177727 JANUARY 10, 2010

PEOPLE VS OLVIS GR NO. 71092 SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 (MURDER; ACQUITTAL)

  No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged
by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the dead 16 trainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.

 But the accused-appellants were denied their right to counsel not once, but twice. We refer to
the forced re-enactment of the crime the three accused were made to perform shortly after
their apprehension. Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come
within the ban against self- incrimination. An act, whether testimonial or passive, that would
amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution.

 By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a

person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.

 The records will disclose that the deceased suffered twelve assorted wounds caused by a sharp
instrument. The assault severed his right hand and left his head almost separated from his
body. This indicates a serious intent to kill, rather than self-defense.

 n the absence of any other proof, the severity and number of wounds sustained by the
deceased are not, by themselves, sufficient proof to warrant the appreciation of the generic
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

PEOPLE VS PAMON GR NO. 102005 JANUARY 25, 1993 (MURDER; ACQUITTAL)

 FACTS: In the morning of July 26, 1985, Robert Te drove his 3/4-ton cargo truck from his
residence in Sta. Filomena to Sindutan, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte to buy copra. While
they were negotiating a road in Lipakan, the truck got stuck in the mud. While in that
position, a man approached Robert Te and shot him on the bridge of his nose. The latter
died instantly. Another shot was fired and Cesar Siga was hit. Thereafter, the truck was
burned by another man. The gunman escaped and boarded the last truck which was the
one owned by Gerson Dulang.

 A confession constitutes an evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong

presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to
a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience.

 This presumption of spontaneity and voluntariness stands unless the defense proves
otherwise. A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was
given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward of leniency.
 In the case at bar, Fortunato Pamon had several chances to deny the voluntariness of his
Confession. First, when he and Atty. Rubencio Ligorio conferred; second, when he
subscribed the Confession before Judge Vicente Aseniero on March 20, 1987; and third,
when he was before the investigating officer on March 23, 1987. In the last instance,
instead of repudiating his Confession, he reaffirmed it.

 lower court did not err in convicting accused Fortunato Pamon of murder. Likewise, the
trial court committed no error in holding that Fortunato Pamon was validly arrested since
he himself admitted that he was taken into custody by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued
by a judge who convicted him in an earlier murder case.

 However, although We sustain the trial court's conviction of Fortunato Pamon, We are
constrained to disagree with the trial court's conviction of Gerson Dulang. The
prosecution failed to meet this quantum of proof with respect to Gerson Dulang. Apart
from the extrajudicial Confession of Fortunato Pamon, there is no other evidence linking
Gerson Dulang to the crime except the testimonies of the widow of Robert Te and of the
latter's employees.

 The case of People vs. Plaza is instructive. The ruling of the Court is quoted, thus:

In short, the extra-judicial confessions/statements of the Napal brothers are

inadmissible against Plaza first, because as earlier stated they lack the indispensable
requisite of corroboration by other evidence and, second, because during the trial the
Napal brothers not only denied that their co-accused Plaza participated in the killing of
Luna but went on to repudiate their statements as having been extracted from them
through the use of force, violation [sic] and intimidation.

 RES INTER ALIOS ACTA ALTERI NOCERI NON DEBET. The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is
binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. This is so
because the co-accused has no opportunity to cross-examine the confessant and thus,
as against him, the confession is hearsay.

 The same situation obtains in this case. The Confession was repudiated by Fortunato
Pamon during the trial. Consequently, it did not become a judicial admission which would
have been admissible against all those implicated.27 Moreover, We also want to point out
that Fortunato Pamon had no personal knowledge of Gerson Dulang's participation. He
only heard from alias "Dodo" that Gerson Dulang hired him to kill Robert Te. Thus, the
confession of Fortunato Pamon vis-a-vis Gerson Dulang was, as the appellant called it,
double hearsay.
  The decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED, We hereby AFFIRM the conviction of
accused Fortunato Pamon and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the conviction of Gerson Dulang
on reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE VS VILLAMAR GR. NO. 121175 NOVEMBER 4, 1998 ( GRAVE COERCION)

 Marilyn Villamar was charged with the crime of illegal detention and frustrated murder.
On February 11, 1993, Villamar went to the house of the private offended party Cortez
and inquired if the latter was interested in adopting her daughter, explaining that her
offer was due her husband's hasty departure. Unable to refuse, Cortez accepted the offer
and immediately prepared a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to formalize the adoption.
Unfortunately, on June 5, 1993, Villamar, apparently regretting her decision, went to the
house of Cortez and decided to take her daughter back. This sudden reversal was, of
course, not taken lightly by Cortez, who vehemently refused to relinquish custody of the
girl to Villamar.

 Thereupon, a scuffle ensued between the two, during which Villamar managed to hit
Cortez with a chisel on the head rendering the latter weak and immobilized, after which
she threatened her with a pair of scissors. Villamar was demanding that Cortez reveal
where the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was located. Meanwhile attracted by the commotion, a
curious crowd was already gathering outside the Cortez residence. Sensing imminent
danger, Villamar demanded money and a get-away vehicle to extricate herself from her
predicament. However, on her way to the car, a melee ensued resulting in her immediate
arrest by the responding policemen.

 The focal point of Villamar's thesis is that she cannot be guilty of serious illegal detention
since she had no intention to deprive or detain Cortez of her liberty.

kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code

(a) the offender is a private individual

(b) kidnaps or detains another that will deprive the victim of his liberty
(c) the act of detention is illegal and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the
following circumstances are present - the detention lasts for more than five (5) days; it
is committed by simulating a public authority, serious physical injuries are inflicted or
threats to kill are made and the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer.
It is important that indubitable proof be presented that the actual intent of the
malefactor was to deprive the offended party of his/her liberty,[4] and not when such
 restraint of liberty was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offender
 Villamar had no intention to kidnap or deprive Cortez of her personal liberty. The
actuation of Villamar appear to be more of a product of a mother's desperation and
distraught mind when her plea for the return of her child was refused by Cortez,
unmindful of the consequences which her reckless outburst would cause to the latter.

 In other words, what actually transpired was the rage of a woman scorned. The
undeniable fact that the purpose of Villamar was to seek the return of her child was never
assailed by the prosecution. Until the defendant's purpose to detain the offended party is
shown, a prosecution for illegal detention will not prosper.

 Under the law, as presently worded, it is essential that the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. In the instant case, there is no showing
whatsoever that Villamar wanted to extort money from Cortez prior to their
confrontation.

 When accused-appellant coerced Cortez to reveal the whereabouts of the "Sinumpaang

Salaysay" for the purpose of destroying the same, the act merely constituted grave
coercion

Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code: grave coercion has three elements:

(a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by
law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong;

(b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force
or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over
the will of the offended party; and

(c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so;
in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise
of any lawful right.

 While Villamar did compel Cortez to do something against the latter's will, it must be
stressed that the same cannot be categorized as an act of illegal detention. Still, when
Villamar was erroneously charged for illegal detention, such oversight will not preclude a
guilty verdict for the crime of grave coercion.
  In People v. Astorga, we ruled that the offense of grave coercion is necessarily included in
illegal detention; as such, an information for illegal detention will not bar the accused
from being convicted of grave coercion, instead of the original charge.

 Appellant is convicted only for grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6) months of
arresto mayor. Unless she is being held for some other lawful cause, her immediate
RELEASE is hereby ordered, considering that she has served beyond the maximum penalty
imposed by law.

GELIG VS. PEOPLE GR NO. 173150 JULY 28, 2010

 On June 6, 1982, an Information was filed charging Lydia with Direct Assault with
Unintentional Abortion. That on the 17th day of July, 1981 at around 10:00 o'clock in the
morning, at Barangay Nailon, Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, employ force and seriously
intimidate one Gemma B. Micarsos a public classroom teacher of Nailon Elementary
School while in the performance of official duties and functions as such which acts
consequently caused the unintentional abortion upon the person of the said Gemma S.
Micarsos.

 the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the complex crime of direct assault
with unintentional abortion.

Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force
or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of
rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in
authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of
such performance.

 It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public
order that may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the
purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.

 The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of
assault. Its elements are:
 1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.

2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.

3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in
the actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past
performance of official duties.

4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his
agent in the exercise of his duties.

5. That there is no public uprising.

 On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of
her official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking
after the needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was
assigned.

 Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority
expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code.

 Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority - Who shall be
deemed as such. -
In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors,
and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private
schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their
professional duties or on the occasion of such performance shall be deemed
persons in authority. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 873, approved June
12, 1985).