Santiago, Josel V.

I.

Doctrine:
Under the Maura Law, section 21, A term of one year, without grace, is
granted in order to perfect the information referred to in Articles 19 and 20.
After the expiration of this period, the right of the cultivators and
possessors to obtain a gratuitous title shall be extinguished; the full ownership
of the land shag be restored to the State, or in a proper case to the community
of neighbors, and the said possessors and cultivators or their predecessors in
interest by a universal title shall only be entitled to the right of redemption, if the
land had been sold within the five years subsequent to the lapse of the period.

Ernesto Balbin vs. Pedro Medalla, G.R. No. L-46410, October 30, 1981, (De
Castro, J.)

Facts:
On June 19, 1962, private respondents bought a parcel of agricultural
land from the heirs of Juan Ladao situated at Occidental, Mindoro which they
eventually sought for the application for registration of title. However, it was
opposed by the petitioners on the ground that they were previously issued
Original Certificates of title through either Homestead or Free Patent grants. The
CFI of Occidental Mindoro ruled in favor of the respondents since there exists a
registered possessory information in the name of Ladao from whom respondents
bought the said land. For the reason of the private respondents’ reservation to
file a separate action for the cancellation of the original certificates of title issued
to petitioners therein, the land registration court abstained from ruling on the
petitioner’s opposition. This prompted the petitioners to assail the validity of the
registration claiming that it was beyond the period of one year from April 17,
1894 to April 17, 1895, as allegedly required by the Maura Law being that of 38
days late from the last day of the one-year period so required.

Issue:
Is the possessory information of Juan Ladao valid?

Ruling:
Yes, the possessory information of Juan Ladao is valid.
According to the Supreme Court, Section 21 of the Maura Law invoked by
petitioners themselves does not speak of registration, but merely perfection of
information title, which, as already discuss may be done by instituting possessory
information proceedings within the said one-year period fixed by the
aforementioned Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, possibly ending in the
registration of the title, depending on the evidence presented.
 In the case at bar, it is admitted and uncontroverted that there exists
an informacion posesoria registered on May 25, 1895 in the name of Juan Ladao.
This registration of the informacion posesoria must have followed as the result or
outcome of a possessory information proceeding instituted by the late Juan
Ladao in accordance with Section 19 of the said Royal Decree of February 13,
1894, and commenced within the one year period, pursuant to Section 21 of the
same decree. Otherwise, if this were not so, no registration of the
said informacion posesoria might have been effected in the Registry of Deeds of
the Province of Occidental Mindoro, for if the registration thereof on May 25,
1895 was violative of the decree, for being beyond the one-year period from April
17, 1894 to April 17, 1895, the Register of Deeds would certainly not have
performed an illegal act.
 II.

Doctrine:
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations
or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant. (Sec. 2, Art. XII,
1987 Constitution)

Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

Facts:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that
these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.

Issue:
Are certain provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

Ruling:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining
the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over
the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural
resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted
by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources
are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the
lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs
by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of
any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession
by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and
does not include the right to alienate the same.
 III.

Doctrine:
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have
not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

Secretary of DENR vs. Yap, G.R. No. 173775, 8 October 2008, (Reyes, R.T., J.)

Facts:
The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC Kalibo’s decision to grant the petition
for declaratory relief filed by Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al. to have a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes for the land
they have been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over
their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on
them. Later in 2006, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying
Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable).

Issue:
Are the Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal
obstacle for respondents to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay
Island?

Ruling:
The SC ruled against Yap et al. and Sacay et al.
Yes, because the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation
No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural
land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and,
applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property. The Regalian
Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with
the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired from
the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of
the inalienable public domain.
 Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on
the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must
fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable
land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land
Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and
disposable. Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the
land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of
lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
The private claimants cannot apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were
classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first
element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands
in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
 Generally, under Regalian Doctrine, private title to land must be traced
to some grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the
American Colonial Government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic.
In a broad sense, the term refers to royal rights, or those rights to which the King
has by virtue of his prerogatives. The theory of jure regalia was therefore nothing
more than a natural fruit of conquest. Furthermore, it doesn’t negate native title
in pursuance to what has been held in Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR as per Justice
Kapunan’s words, Regalian theory doesn’t negate the native title to lands held in
private ownership since time immemorial, adverting to the landmark case of
CARINO V. LOCAL GOVERNMENT, where the US SC through Holmes held: “xxx
the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will
be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land.”