1. Oh v.
Court of Appeals WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused GUILTY of ten counts of violation of
Facts:
Petitioner purchased pieces of jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders,
Inc., a company engaged in jewelry trading.  Due to her failure to pay the
purchase price, Solid Gold filed civil cases[2] against her for specific
performance before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig.
On September 17, 1990, petitioner and Solid Gold... to a compromise
agreement to settle said civil cases
The compromise agreemen... provided that petitioner shall issue a total of
ninety-nine post-dated checks in the amount of P50,000.00 each, dated every
15th and 30th of the month starting October 1, 1990 and the balance of over P1
million to be paid in... lump sum on November 16, 1994 which is also the due
date of the 99th and last postdated check.  Petitioner issued ten checks at
P50,000.00 each, for a total of P500,000.00, drawn against her account at the
Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC), Grace
Park, Caloocan City Branch.  Novales then deposited each of the ten checks on
their respective due dates with the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). 
However, said checks were dishonored by EBC for the reason "Account
Closed."
Novales filed ten separate Informations, docketed as Criminal Cases... charging
petitioner with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law.
BP 22 and hereby sentences her to a penalty of one year imprisonment for each
count, or a total of ten years, to be served in accordance with the limitation
prescribed in par. 4, Article 70... of the Revised Penal Code and to indemnify
complainant the amount of the checks in their totality, or in the amount of
P500,000.00.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that:  the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged in the ten informations; it overlooked the
fact that no notice of dishonor had been given to the appellant as drawer of the
dishonored checks; it failed to... consider that the reason of "closed account" for
the dishonor of the ten checks in these cases is not the statutory cause to
warrant prosecution, much more a conviction, under B.P. Blg. 22; it failed to
consider that there is only one act which caused the offense, if any, and... not
ten separate cases; and it disregarded the definition of what a `check' is under
Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.[9]
Issues:
whether or not the appellate court erred in not granting retroactive effect to
Republic Act No. 7691[10] in view of Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)...
whether or not notice of... dishonor is dispensable in this case;
Ruling:
First issue Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not giving retroactive
effect to R.A. 7690 in view of Article 22 of the RPC.
penal laws are those which define crimes and provides for their punishment;
laws defining the jurisdiction of courts are substantive in nature and not
procedural... for they do not refer to the manner of trying cases but to the
authority of the courts to hear and decide certain and definite cases in the
various instances of which they are susceptible
R.A. No. 7691 is a substantive law and not a penal law
Art. 22 of the RPC finds no application to the case at bar... the RTC was vested
with jurisdiction to try petitioner's cases when the same were filed... in October
1992; at that time, R.A. No. 7691 was not yet effective... in so far as the
retroactive effect of R.A. No. 7691 is concerned, that same is limited only to
pending civil cases that have not reached pre-trial stage
A penal law, as defined by this Court, is an act of the legislature that prohibits
certain acts and establishes penalties for its violations.  It also defines crime,
treats of its nature and provides for its punishment.[15] R.A. No. 7691 does
not... prohibit certain acts or provides penalties for its violation; neither does it
treat of the nature of crimes and its punishment.  Consequently, R.A. No. 7691
is not a penal law, and therefore, Art. 22 of the RPC does not apply in the
present case.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  Petitioner Elvira Yu Oh is ACQUITTED of
the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on ten counts for insufficiency of
evidence.  were faces of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during
However, she is ordered to pay complainant Solid Gold International Traders,
Inc. the total amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) with
12% interest per annum from date of finality of herein judgment.
Principles:
B. P. Blg. 22, which took effect on April 24, 1979, provides the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year or by a
fine of not less than but not more then double the amount of the check which
fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both... such fine and imprisonment
at the discretion of the court.
R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on June 15, 1994, amended B.P. Blg. 129,... and
vested on the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
jurisdiction to try cases punishable by imprisonment of not more than six (6)
years.[16]  Since R.A.
No. 7691 vests jurisdiction on courts, it is apparent that said law is substantive.
[17]
In the case of Cang vs. Court of Appeals,[18]  this Court held that "jurisdiction
being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the
jurisdiction of... the court."... t a "law vesting additional jurisdiction in the court
cannot be given retroactive effect."[21]
2. US v. Go Chico (Mala in se)
FACTS:
On or about August 4, 1908, appellant Go Chico displayed on the window of his
store, No 89 Calle Rosario, medallions in form of small buttons, upon which
the late insurrection of the Philippine Islands to designate the identify those in
armed insurrection against the United States. Prior to the day aforementioned,
appellant had purchased the stock of goods in said store, of which the
medallions formed part, at a public sale made under authority of the sheriff of
the city of Manila. On August 4, appellant was arranging his stocks for the
purpose of displaying them to the public, placing them in his showcase and in
one ofthe windows of his store. The appellant states he was ignorant of the law
against the display of the medallions and adds that he had no corrupt intention.
He was charged in violation of Sec. 1 of Art. 1696 of the Philippine Commission
which provides:
 the United States” mean not only the identical flags actually used in the
Sec. 1 insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. The description refers not to a
– particular flag, but to a type of flag. The literal interpretation of a statute may
Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view lead to an absurdity, or evidently fail to give the real intent of the legislature.
on his own premise, or who shall expose, or cause to be exposed, to public
view, either on his own premises or elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem, or 3. Lim v. People (mala prohibita)
device used
during the late insurrection of the Philippine Islands to designate or identify FACTS:
those in armed rebellion against the United States, or any flag, banner, emblem,
or device used or adopted at any time by the public enemies of the United On August 25, 1990, petitioner bought various kinds of jewelry worth P300,
States in the Philippine islands for the purposes of public disorder or of 000.00 from Maria Antonia Seguan. She wrote out a check with the same
rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States in the amount, dated August 25, 1990, payable to “cash” drawn on Metrobank and
Philippine Islands, or any flag, emblem, or device of the Katipunan Society, or gave the check to Seguan.
which is commonly known as such, shall be punished by a fine not less than
500 pesos nor more than 5,000 pesos, or by imprisonment for not less than 3
The next day, petitioner again went to Seguan’s store and purchased jewelry
months nor more than 5 years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
valued at P241,668.00. Petitioner issued another check payable to “cash” dated
discretion of the court. Go Chico moved to acquit himself on the grounds that
August 16, 1990 drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P241,668.007 and sent
(1) criminal intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt upon the part of
the check to Seguan through a certain Aurelia Nadera. Seguan deposited the
the accused before being convicted and; (2) the prohibition of the law is
two checks with her bank. The checks were returned with a notice of dishonor.
directed against the use of the identical banners, devices, or emblems actually
Petitioner’s account in the bank from which the checks were drawn was closed.
used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the
Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two
United States.
dishonored checks, but she never did.
ISSUE:
WON intent is necessary in crimes punishable by special laws On June 5, 1991, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu filed with the RTC, Cebu
City, Branch 23, two informations against petitioner for violations of BP No. 22.
HELD:
NO. After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in the
In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have two cases convicting petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the same
acted with the criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory was dismissed by the CA in its October 15, 1996 Decision wherein it affirmed in
enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely toto the RTC’s Decision.
immaterial. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be
substantially worthless.The court ruled that the act alone, irrespective of its
motive, constitutes the crime. The words “used during the late insurrection in
the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against ISSUE:
Whether or not Lim violated B.P. No. 22.
RULING:
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are: “(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any
check to apply for account or for value; “(2) The knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and “(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.”
The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check
or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. And the accused
failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment
within five banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is malum prohibitum,
pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal
intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to
whom the check was issued, and the terms & conditions surrounding the
issuance of the checks, are irrelevant in determining culpability. Under BP No.
22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation,
or that there was damage. It was ruled in United States v. Go Chico, that in acts
mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, “has the law been violated?” When dealing
with acts mala prohibita –“it is not necessary that the appellant should have
acted with criminal intent. In many crimes, the intention of the person who
commits the crime is entirely immaterial…” This case is a perfect example of an
act mala prohibita. The first and last elements of the offense are admittedly
present. B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the
second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the
offense are present. If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. To escape
liability, she must prove that the second element was absent. Petitioner failed
to rebut this presumption and she failed to pay the amount of the checks or
make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from receipt of
notice of dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated. Hoc quidem per quam
durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so the
law is written. However, the penalty imposed on petitioner must be modified.
In Vaca v. Court of Appeals [298 SCRA 658 (1998)], it was held that in
determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The
philosophy is to redeem valuable human material, and to prevent unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the
protection of the social order. The prison sentence imposed on petitioners is
deleted, and imposed on them only a fine double the amount of the check
issued. Consequently, the prison sentences imposed on petitioner are deleted.
The two fines imposed for each violation, each amounting to P200,000.00 are
appropriate and sufficient. The award of moral damages and order to pay
attorney’s fees are deleted for lack of sufficient basis.
4. People v. Lacerna (mala prohibita)
Subject:
Exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest; Search of luggage inside a
vehicle
requires existence of probable cause; Consented search valid if intelligently
made; To be punishable, to “give away” a prohibited drug should be with the
intent to transfer ownership; Elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs;
Criminal intent need not be proved in prosecution ofacts mala prohibita ;
Intent to perpetrate the act, not intent to commit the crime necessary
inprosecution of acts prohibited by special laws.
Facts:
Noriel and Marlon Lacerna were inside a taxi when the group of Police Officer
Carlito Valenzuela of the Western Police District signaled the taxi driver to park
by the side of the road in lieu of a police checkpoint. P03 Valenzuela asked
permission to search the vehicle. The officers went about searching the
luggages in the vehicle. They found 18 blocks wrapped in newspaper with a
distinct smell of marijuana emanating from it. When the package was opened,
P03 Valenzuela saw dried marijuana leaves. According to Noriel and Marlon,
the bag was a “padala” of their uncle. Marlon admitted that he was the one who
gave the 18 bundle blocks of marijuana to his cousin Noriel as the latter seated
at rear of the taxi with it. He however denied knowledge of the contents of the
package. Marlon was charged before the RTC for “giving away” marijuana to
another. Noriel on the other hand was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
The court noticed that Noriel manifested “probinsyano” traits and was, thus,
unlikely to have dealt in prohibited drugs. Marlon objected on the RTC’s
decision, stating that the lower court erred in saying that the act of “giving
away to another” is not defined under R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act.
He also said that he was not aware of the contents of the plastic bag given to
him by his uncle. Marlon also raised that his right against warrantless arrest
and seizure was violated.
Held:
Exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest
1. Five generally accepted exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest
have been judicially
formulated as follows:
(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest
(2) search of moving vehicles
(3) seizure in plain view,
(4) customs searches,
(5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable
search and
seizure.
2. Search and seizure relevant to moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of
the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances. In such
cases, however, the search and seizure may be made only upon probable cause,
i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains an item, article or object
which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. Military or police
checkpoints have also been declared to be not illegal per se as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is merely visual. Search of luggage inside a vehicle
requires existence of probable cause.
3. In this case, the taxi was validly stopped at the police checkpoint. Such
search however is limited to visual inspections without occupants being
subjected to a physical or body searches. A search of a luggage inside the
vehicle should require the existence of probable cause.
4. In several decisions, there was probable cause in the following instances:
(a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag
carried by the accused
(b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to
have been acting suspiciously
(c) where the accused fled when accosted by policemen
(d) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched
by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused
would transport a large quantity of marijuana
(e) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of
intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent
or spy one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to
which the accused belonged that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs
into the country.
5. Probable cause in this case is not evident. The mere act of slouching in the
seat when the taxi passed along P03 Valenzuela’s checkpoint does not
constitute probable cause to justify search and seizure. Consented search valid
if intelligently made.
6. Aniag, Jr. vs. COMELEC outlawed a search based on an implied acquiescence,
because such acquiescence was not consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty, but was merely passive conformity to the search given
under intimidating and coercive circumstances.
7. In this case, Marlon was "urbanized in mannerism and speech" when he
expressly said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing
to hide and had done nothing wrong. This declaration is a confirmation of his
intelligent and voluntary acquiescence to the search. The marijuana bricks
were, therefore, obtained legally through a valid search and seizure, thus
admissible. To be punishable, to “give away” a prohibited drug should be with
the intent to transfer ownership.
8. As distinguished from "delivery," which is an incident of sale, "giving away"
is a disposition other than a sale. It is, therefore, an act short of a sale which
involves no consideration. The prohibited drug becomes an item or
merchandise presented as a gift or premium (giveaway), where ownership is
transferred.
9. By merely handing the plastic bag to Noriel, Marlon cannot be punished for
giving away marijuana as a gift or premium to another. Intent to transfer
ownership should be proven. Elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs.
10. The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows:
(a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug
(b) such possession is not authorized by law
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.
11. Evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that Marlon was in
possession of the plastic bag containing the prohibited drugs without the
requisite authority. He cannot deny knowledge of the package as its smell is
pervasive. Criminal intent need not be proved in prosecution of acts mala
prohibita.
12. Criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts mala
prohibita. The prohibited act is so injurious to the public welfare that,
regardless of the person's intent, it is the crime itself. Intent to perpetrate the
act, not intent to commit the crime necessary in prosecution of acts prohibited
by special laws.
13. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be
distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime;
but if he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of
things, the crime itself, then he can be held liable for the malum prohibitum.
14. The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in
those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done.
Thus in illegal possession of prohibited drugs, the prosecution is thus not
excused from proving that the act was done “freely and consciously”, which is
an essential element of the crime.
15. In this case, Marlon failed to overcome the presumption of his knowledge of
the contents of the package. He was thus held liable for illegal possession of
prohibited drugs.
6. Garcia v. Court of Appeals (Lack of intent as a defense in mala
prohibita)
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed an Affidavit of Complaint with the Q.C.
Prosecutor’s Office, charging his wife, private respondent Adela Teodora P.
Santos with Bigamy.
In the RTC trial, it was mentioned that the accused was previously married
with Reynaldo Quiroca, and without the said marriage having been dissolved,
subsequently contracted the second marriage with the petitioner.
Private respondent filed a Motion to Quash alleging prescription of the offense
as ground. She contended that by the petitioner’s admissions in his testimony
in a Civil Case and in his complaint filed with the Civil Service Commission, the
petitioner discovered the offense as early as 1974. Pursuant then to Art 91 of
the RPC, the period of prescription of the offense started to run therefrom.
Thus, the offense charged prescribed in 1989, or 15 years after its discovery by
the petitioner.
The CA, although gave credence to the respondent’s evidence and recognized
that the 15 year prescriptive period had certainly lapsed. However, the quashal
of an information based on prescription could only be invoked before or after
arraignment and even on appeal.
Hence, this appeal to remand the case in the RTC for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the Trial
Court’s order granting the motion to quash the information for bigamy based
on prescription.
HELD:
The petitioner’s contention that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the
information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 which states that the crime was
discovered in 1989, is palpably unmeritorious. Even People v. Alaga,  which he
cites, mentions the exceptions to the rule as provided in paragraphs (f) and (h)
of Section 2, and Sections 4 and 5 of the old Rule 117, viz., (a) extinction of
criminal liability, and (b) double jeopardy. His additional claim that the
exception of extinction can no longer be raised due to the implied repeal of the
former Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court occasioned by its non-
reproduction after its revision, is equally without merit. No repeal, express or
implied, of the said Section 4 ever took place. While there is no provision in the
new Rule 117 that prescribes the contents of a motion to quash based on
extinction of criminal liability, Section 2 thereof encapsulizes the former
Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the old Rule 117. The said Section 2 reads as follows:
Sec. 2. Foms and contents. — The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by
the accused or his counsel. It shall specify distinctly the factual and legal
grounds therefor and the court shall consider no grounds other than those
stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. (3a, 4a, 5a).
It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and
legal grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are
retained as among the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new
Rule 117, it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be
introduced to grove such grounds. As a matter of fact, inquiry into such facts
may be allowed where the ground invoked is that the allegations in the
information do not constitute the offense charged. Thus, in People v. De la
Rosa, SC stated:
As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations
of the information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that
matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth
and veracity are hypothetically admitted. However, as held in the case of
People vs. Navarro, 75 Phil. 516, additional facts not alleged in the information,
but admitted or not denied by the prosecution may be invoked in support of
the motion to quash.
In Criminal Case No. 92-27272, the trial court, without objection on the part of
the prosecution, allowed the private respondent to offer evidence in support of
her claim that the crime had prescribed. Consequently, the trial court, upon
indubitable proof of prescription, correctly granted the motion to quash. It
would have been, to quote De la Rosa, “pure technicality for the court to close
its eyes to [the fact of prescription) and still give due course to the prosecution
of the case” — a technicality which would have meant loss of valuable time of
the court and the parties.
7. Ysidoro v. People (lack of intent in mala prohibita)
Facts:
This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food inte
nded for those suffering from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of reconsiderati
on projects affecting the homes of victims of calamities.
Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in it
s storeroom. And since she had already distributed food to the mother voluntee public policy, order, and convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined 
rs, what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries. by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or 
not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is complet
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Munic ely irrelevant.
ipal Mayor, to seek his approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro a
pproved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and t 8. US v. Pablo (Power to define and punish crimes)
wo boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.
FACTS
She also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines  In compliance to an order from his chief, Andres Pablo, a policeman of the
for Local Government Units governed the distribution of SFP goods. Thus, Ysid municipality of Balanga, went to the barrio of Tuyo to raid a jueteng game; but
oro committed technical malversation when he approved the distribution of SF before the said officer arrived there the players left and ran away. He was able
P goods to the CSAP beneficiaries. to recover on his arrival a low table, a tambiolo (receptacle) and 37 bolas
(balls). Said officer also saw the men Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo left
The evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte  but only Francisco Dato was arrested. This information was contained in his
enacted Resolution 00-133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001. Thi report to his chief who immediately filed a complaint in the court of justice of
s appropriation was based on the executive budget which allocated P100,000.0 the peace against Rodrigo, Malicsi, and Dato for illegal gambling in violation of
0 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery  Municipal Ordinance No. 5.
of Social Services which covers the CSAP housing projects.

The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public property to a pubic purpo
se other than that for which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation
RULING:
Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes t
he act of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particu
lar public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, me
aning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal  pesos.
offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of 
Pablo testified under oath that on a particular date he and a companion raided
a jueteng game, that when they arrived in the place they saw Dato and a low
table that made them suspect that a jueteng game was being held; that they did
find a tambiolo and 37 bolas, but that they did not see Rodrigo and Malicsi on
the scene nor did they see them scamper; and that only after the incident that
they learned of Rodrigo and Malicsi as being the ringleaders of the said jueteng
game according to a source. This testimony was acted upon by the court
acquitting the defendants Rodrigo and Malicsi and sentenced only Dato.
The provincial fiscal investigated further on the case and found out that before
the case came to trial in the justice of the peace court, the policeman Pablo had
conference with the accused Malicsi and Rodrigo and agreed that he would
exclude the involvement of the two in the case in exchange of a bribe of fifteen

Because of this development, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance charging Andres Pablo with the crime of perjury in violation of
section 3 of Act No. 1697 declaring that he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
affirmed and swore under oath in legal form before the justice of the peace
during the hearing of the case of Rodrigo and Malicsi for violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 5 of the municipality of Balanga when he excluded the two
accused from involvement in the incident despite being utterly false and
material to the decision of the case.
When the court found him guilty and sentenced to suffer two years
imprisonment, a fine of P100, and disqualification to hold public office as well
as from testifying in Philippine courts, he appealed for such judgment.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of the crime of perjury or of false
testimony under Art. 318 to 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD
Yes. The respondent is guilty of such crime under Article 318 to 324 of the
Penal Code since such Articles are not expressly repealed by the
Administrative code when it repealed Act No. 1697.
Law 11, Title 2, Book 3, of the Novisima Recopilacion states that, “All laws… not
expressly repealed by other subsequent laws, must be literally obeyed and the
excuse that they are not in use cannot avail.”
Said articles of the Penal Code are in force and are properly applicable to
crimes of false testimony. In the present case, the proven evidence showed that
Andres Pablo falsely testified before the court by perverting the truth in favor
of the alleged gamblers, Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo and in receiving
bribe from the said accused which aggravated the crime – proof showed he
received P15 in order that he exclude the two ringleaders in his sworn
testimony. The court held that, “ … in the commission of the crime of false
testimony, there concurred the aggravating circumstance of price or reward,
No. 3 of article 10 of the Code, with no mitigating circumstance to offset the
effects of the said aggravating one; wherefore the defendant has incurred the
maximum period of the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree to
prision correccional in its medium degree, and a fine.”
9. People v. Santiago (Power to define and punish crimes)
FACTS:
The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an hour on a
highway 6 meter wide, notwithstanding the fact that he had to pass a narrow
space between a wagon standing on one side of the road and a heap of stones
on the
other side where the were two young boys, the appellant did not take the
precaution required by the circumstances by slowing his machine, and did not
proceed with the vigilant care that under the circumstances an ordinary
prudent man
would take in order to avoid possible accidents that might occur, as
unfortunately did occur, as his automobile ran over the boy Porfirio Parondo
who was instantly killed as the result of the accident. was prosecuted for the
crime of homicide by reckless negligence and was sentenced to suffer one year
and one day of prision correccional, and to pay the costs of the trial.
ISSUES:
Whether or Not the court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked jurisdiction
over the person of the accused and over the subject matter of the complaint.
HELD:
No, The right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty
which resides in the federal government, but for the purpose of punishing
crimes, this power is delegated to subordinate government subdivisions such
as territories. This delegation may be either express as in the case of the
Several States of the Union and incorporated territories, like Puerto Rico and
Hawaii or implied as in the case of Philippines, which is an organized territory
though not incorporated with the Union.
10. People v. Villaraza (Ex post facto law)
Facts:
On December 3, 1975 an assistant city fiscal charged Caesar Puerto with estafa
in the city court of Cagayan de Oro City for having issued on October 16, 1974
two bouncing checks for the total sum of P4,966.63 (Criminal Case No. 32140).
City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order dated March 31, 1976 noted that
the accused had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation.
he Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City Branch VIII,
in its order of February 3, 1977 returned the case to the city court because in
its opinion the case falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts...
and, the city court, as the first court which took cognizance of the case, should
try it.
the... respondent city judge in his order of April 21, 1977 directed the re-
elevation of the case.
Issues:
His view is that the case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance because estafa committed by the... accused is punishable
by prision mayor medium under Presidential Decree No. 818 which took effect
on October 22, 1975 and which amended article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
We hold that the case was properly filed with the city court which has original
jurisdiction over it.
The city court has original jurisdiction over the case because the penultimate
paragraph of section 87 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by Republic Acts Nos.
2613 and 3828, provides that "judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction
as the Court of First Instance to try... parties charged with an offense
committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided
by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more
than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both".
the order of the Court of First Instance, returning the case to the city court, is
affirmed and the two orders of the respondent city judge, elevating the case to
the Court of First Instance, are set aside. The city court is directed to try the...
case.
Principles:
The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one day to ten years,
imposed by Presidential Decree No. 818, applies only to swindling by means of
issuing bouncing checks which was committed on or after October 22, 1975.
11. People v. Livera (Jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of
AFP in violation of military law and public law)
Facts:
Felipe A. Livera was a provincial disbursing officer of the Constabulary in
Roblon. As finance and accountable officer, he took charge of paying the
salaries and subsistence of the PC officers and enlisted men of that region. On
July 22, 1948, he came to Manila carrying some money, and, having secured a
Treasury Warrant from the finance officer at Camp Crame for more than
P8,000, he cashed the same. In November, 1948, an examination of his
accounts was conducted by Major Emilio Baldia, Chief of the Cash Examination
and Inspection Branch of the Finance Service, who found him with a net
shortage of P9,597 unaccounted for. Days afterwards, a board of officers was
created formally to investigate the appellant. That board found him
accountable for P9,597, and recommended his prosecution before the civil
courts for malversation of public funds. In Felipe
Livera’s defense,
 he admitted his financial liability but asserted that he had lost the money in
Manila on his way to North Harbor to board a vessel for Romblon. Counsel for
the appellant also contends that the CFI of Romblon had no jurisdiction over
the case, arguing that that the alleged crime of malversation of public funds
occurred during the incumbency of the accused as an officer of the Philippine
Contabulary, and questions the constitutionality of Art. 217 of the RPC.
Issue/s:
1. W/N the CFI of Romblon has jurisdiction over the case
2. 2. W/N Art. 217 is unconstitutional
Held:
1. No merit. The civil courts and courts-martial have concurrent jurisdiction
over offenses committed by a member of the Armed Forces in violation of
military law and the public law. The first court to take cognizance of the case
does so to the exclusion of the other. The accused-appellant having been first
tried and convicted of the crime by the Court of First Instance of Romblon he
cannot now claim that the criminal action should have been brought before a
court-martial.
2. No merit. There is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law
providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary
presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting
what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence.
Wherefore, as this appellant is guilty of malversation of public funds and as the
penalty imposed on him accords with the law, we hereby affirm the judgment
with costs against him. So ordered.
12. Gonzales v. Abaya (Jurisdiction over offenses committed by members
of AFP in violation of military law and public law)
FACTS:
Some armed members of the AFP had abandoned their designated places of
assignment with an aim to destabilize the government.
Thereafter, they entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments in Makati City, led by Navy Lt. Triplanes, disarmed the security
guards, and planted explosive devices around the building.
DOJ filed with RTC of Makati City an Information for coup d’etat against those
soldiers while respondent General Abaya issued a Letter Order creating a Pre-
Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the
military tribunal charges for violations of the Articles of War     
The Pre-Trial Investigation Panel recommended that, following the "doctrine
of absorption," those charged with coup d’etat before the RTC should not be
charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
RTC then issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court martial
against the accused…are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of  coup d’etat."
In the meantime, the AFP approved the recommendation that those
involved be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96
(conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War. The
AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer
to the charge but instead they filed with this Court the instant Petition for
Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them
with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War maintaining that since the
RTC has made a determination in its Order that the offense for violation of
Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the
crime of coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not those charged with coup d’etat before RTC shall be charged
before military tribunal for violation of Articles of War. (YES)
HELD:
1) As to the jurisdiction of the court
GENERAL RULE: Members of the AFP and other persons
subject to military law who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup
d’etat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be
tried by the proper civil court.  7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses,
EXCEPTION: Where the civil court, before arraignment, has
determined the offense to be service-connected, then
the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial.  13. US v. Bull (Jurisdiction over offenses committed in the high seas)
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: Where the President of
the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before
arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the
proper civil court.
It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the
alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and
the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and
disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing of
their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of
the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the
same (under Art. 96 of Articles of War) – dismissal from the service –imposable
only by the military court.
The RTC, in making the declaration that Art 96 of Articles of War as “not sevice-
connected, but rather absorbed and in furthenance of the crime of coup
d’etat”, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial
the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." It is only the
Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or
officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so.
Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void. 
2) As to the Doctrine of Absorption of Crimes
Moreover, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law
and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here
where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if
the trial court has jurisdiction over both offences. Here, Section 1 of R.A.
including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of
crimes is not applicable to this case.
Facts:
On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals
named Stanford commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila,
Philippines. It was found that said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674
heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and proper suitable
means for securing the animals which resulted for most of the animals to get
hurt and others to have died while in transit.
This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the
Philippine Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be filed
because neither was it said that the court sitting where the animals were
disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not licensed
under Philippine laws, like the ships involved.
Issue:
Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board
a foreign ship while inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace
the entrance of Manila Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters and thus, the
laws of the Philippines shall apply. A crime committed on board a Norwegian
merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is within the jurisdiction of the
courts of the Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during the time the
ship was within the territorial waters - regardless of the fact that the same
conditions existed when the ship settled from the foreign port and while it was
on the high seas,
In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced
to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
14. US v. Look Chaw (Contraband on board a foreign vessel landed on
Philippine soil)
FACTS:
Ø  Upon arrival of steamship Erroll of English nationality, that it came from
Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila
and Cebu, 2 sacks of opium where found during the inspection and search
of the cargo. 
o   Smaller sack of opium on the cabin near the saloon
o   larger sack in the hold
o   Later on, there was also 4 cans of opium found on the part of the
ship where the firemen habitually sleep
§  the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the
instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were
permitted to retain certain amounts of opium, always
provided it should not be taken shore so it was returned
Ø  2 charges were filed against Look Chaw at the Court of First Instance of
Cebu:
o   unlawful possession of opium
o   unlawful sale of opium
Ø  Look Chaw admitted that he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong
with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz,
and that, as his hold had already been searched several times for opium, he
ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack.
Ø  The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had
been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu. The court
sentenced him to5 years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with
additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvencyxxx  It further
ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular Government.
ISSUE: W/N the Philippine court has jurisdiction.

HELD:  YES. Modified by reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to
six months and P1,000
·         GR: mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does NOT constitute a crime
triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered
as an extension of its own nationality
·         EX: when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in
the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil,
thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land with respect to
which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime, only the court established in that said place itself had
competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international
treaty.
15. People v. Bandian (Article 3)
FACTS:
At About 7 in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentine Aguilar, the apellant’s
neighbor, saw the appelant go to the thicket about four or five brazas from her
house, apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was there that the
people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he then
again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood
both in front and back, stagerring and visibly showing signs of not being able to
support herself. He ran to her aid and having noted that she was very weak and
dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and placed her in her
bed.
Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what had happened
to her, the appellant answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone
with the appellant in such circumstances, Aguilar called Adriano Comcom who
lived nearby to be there and help him and the appellant. He asked Comcom to
take bamboo leaves to stop the hemhorrage which had come upon the
appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body
of newborn baby near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had
gone a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and the latter told
him to bring the body to the appellant’s house. Upon being askes whether the
babywhich was shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the
affirmative.
In the afternoon of the said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the
sanitary division went to the appellant’s house and found her still lying in bed
still bleeding. In his opinion, the physician declared that the appellant gave
birth in her house, and afterwhich, he threw the child into the thicket to kill it
for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with
whom she was married to, because the child was not his but with another man
with whom she had previously has amorous relations. Nepomuceno testified
that the appellant admitted killing her child.
ISSUE:
What was the crime committed by appellant?
 
RULING:
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant , in causing her child’s
death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully,
consciously, or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it
to death , because her affair with a former lover, Luis Kirol took place three
years before the incident. The husband of the appellant testified at the trial
affirming the belief that the child was his.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable must be committed
willfully and consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary,
conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes are
committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under
said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental facilities, or
must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.
The law exempts from criminal liability any person who acts under the
circumstances in which the appellant acted in this case, by giving birth to a
child in the thicket and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any
other cause than that she was overcome by severe dizziness and extreme
debility, with no fault or intention on her part. She has in her favor the fourth
and the seventh exempting circumstances.
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and
granting that the appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the
thicket and that she later failed to take her child therefrom, having been so
prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be
held that… under such circumstances, appellant has the fourth and seventh
exempting circumstances of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code in her favor.
16. People v. Oanis (Article 3 and mitigating circumstances)
FACTS:
Ø  Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the
following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas
with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain
Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given
four men.
Ø  The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise
called by the Provincial Inspector.
Ø  Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing
a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were,
simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber
revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already
wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the
defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it
turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious
criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named
Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
Ø  According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at
the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida
indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of
Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room.
ISSUE: W/N they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus
caused to Tecson
HELD: appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating
circumstance
YES.
Ø  ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness
Ø  appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants
had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable
effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.
Ø  "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest,
and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is
necessary for his detention."
Ø  a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses
unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest
Ø  The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the
killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the
injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice.
Ø  2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
A. offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right-present
 B. injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.-
not present

Ø  According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by 1 or

2 degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.