PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective custody for “having
vs. been involved” in the killing of Lloyd Penacerrada.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR.,
CUSTODIO GONZALES JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA,
accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.
G. R. NO. 80762, March 19, 1990
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
At around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the
barangay captain of Barangay Tipac;a, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his
sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that
his wife has just killed their landlord, Lloyd Penacerrada, and thus would like
to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly
used in the killig and Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja
immedeiately ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to the police
authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. Upon reaching the Ajuy
Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on duty of the incident. That
same night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the
Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla
the group went to Paja’s residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja,
Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter’s residence at Sitio
Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly occurred. There they saw the
lifeless body of lloyd Penacerrada, clad only in an underwear, sprawled face
down inside the bedroom. The group stayed for about an hour during which
time Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started to make a rough
sketch thereof and the immediate proceedings.
The autopsy of Lloyd Penacerrada’s cadaver was performed at about 11:20
a.m. on February 22, 1981; and it has been ruled out that the cause of death
was due to massive haemorrhage due to multiple lacerated, stabbed, incised
and punctured wounds.
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto appeared before the
police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to
Augusto and Fausta Gonzales both entered into a plea of not guilty during the
arraignment on September 16, 1981. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria who
claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Penacerrada, presented himself
to Nanie Penacerrada, the victim’s widow, and volunteered to testify for the
prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case adding additional accused Custodio
Gonzales, Sr., Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida.
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Penacerrada in defense of her honor
as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in
the crime. Custodio Gonzales, Sr., accused-appellant, claimed that he was
asleep in his house which was located some one kilometer away from the scene
of the crime when the incident happened. He asserted that he only came to
know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his
house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him.
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony
of Huntoria. The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Custodio Gonzales Sr., shall be held criminally liable in relation
to the killing of Lloyd Penacerrada.
HELD:
NO. Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be
incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended, and (2) By any person
performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account
of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. Thus, one of the means
by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a felony in
which Article 3 of the RPC provides that “Acts and omissions punishable by law
are felonies (delitos). Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit
(dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the act is
performed with deliberate intent; and there Is fault when the wrongful act
results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.”
In the case at bar, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both
found, that the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd
Penacerrada, forsooth there is paucity as to what act was performed by the
appellant. It has been said that “act” as used in Article 3 of the RPC must be
understood as “any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the
external world.” There must be shown that an act committed by the appellant
which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced
death. However, Huntoria admitted that he did not see who “stabbed” or who
“hacked” the victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act was
performed by the appellant.
Therefore, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt and shall not be criminally liable to the killing of Lloyd Penacerrada.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEON CASTILLO, ET AL., accused. NENA TANALEGA RAYMUNDO, appellant.
C. A. NO. 227, February 1, 1946
DE HOYA, J.:
FACTS:
Mr. Silvino Belarmino presented for dispensation at the Escudero Drug Store
and bought one-third formula of the following prescription of Dr. Antonio G.
Sison, to wit:
Spartein sulphate 1.00
Phenobarbital 0.50
Cabromal 5.00
Mx. Div. et pone
in cap No. XV
Sig.: One capsule
Once a day
Dr. Leon Castillo and Mrs. Nena Tanalega Raymundo mutually helped each
other prepare and dispense the said prescription, but instead of mixing the
required proportion of Spartein Sulphate, through carelessness and reckless
imprudence, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, they mixed and compounded
in the formula a toxic dose of Strychnine Sulphate, which is a poisonous
substance, and as a result of such carelessness and imprudence. Mr. Belamirno,
upon taking one capsule of the medicine on the very same day, was poisoned
and would have died, had it not been for causes independent of the will of the
accused; that had the act committed by the accused been intentional it would
constitute the crime of frustrated murder.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna found that the accused is guilty of the
crime of frustrated homicide through reckless imprudence, and sentenced her
to suffer four (4) months of arresto mayor and to pay the costs of the
proceedings, at the same time acquitting her co-accused Dr. Leon Castillo.
However, the Court of Appeals found the defendant and appellant Nena
Tanalega of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and
sentenced her to pay two hundred pesos (P200) and to pay the costs. The
Court of Appeals deemed it unnecessary to pass upon the defense of
prescription urged by defendant and appellant, stating that the offense of
which she was found guilty and the penalty imposed upon her are correctional
in nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nena Tanalega Raymundo is criminally liable to the
prescription of wrong medicines to Mr. Silvino Belarmino.
HELD:
YES. Section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “Every
pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals,
medicines, and poisons he may sell or keep for sale; and it shall be unlawful for
any whomsoever to manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer any prescription,
drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name, direction,
pretense or to adulterate any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison so used, sold,
or offered for sale. Any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison shall be held to be
adulterated or deteriorated within the meaning of this section if it differs from
the standard of quality or purity given in the United States Pharmacopoeia.” A
violation of the said section 751 os punished in accordance with the provisions
of section 2676 which provides that “ Any person engaging in practice of
pharmacy in the Philippines contrary to any provision of the Pharmacy Law or
violating any provision of said law for which no specific penalty is provided
shall, for each offense, be punished by a fine not to exceed five hundred pesos,
or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of
the court.
The profession of pharmacy demands care and skill; and druggists must
exercise care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to
practical men. In other words, druggist must exercise the highest practical
degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards
consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may
not constanty be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly
poisons for harmless medicines.
In reality, for the fruggist, mistake is negligence and care is no defense. And in
Criminal Law, run the same rigorous rules. Apothecaries, or apothecaries
clerks, who are guilty of negligence in the sale of medicine when death ensues
in consequence, have been held guilty of manslaughter.
The Court declares that the preparation of one medicine for another, by a
pharmacy clerk, under a false name, whether it be through negligence, accident
or mistake, is punishable under the law. Therefore, Nena Raymundo is
criminally liable for giving a wrong medicine to Mr. Silvino Belarmino.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
H. R. No. 45186, September 30, 1936
DIAZ, J.:
FACTS:
At about 7 o’clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the
appellant’s neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas
from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was there
that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he
again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood
both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being
able to support herself. He ran to her aid, and, having noted that she was very
weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and placed
her in her own bed. Aguilar called Adriano Comcom , who lived nearby, to help
them, and later requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage
which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five
brazas when he saw the body of a newborn baby near a path adjoining the
thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom
informed Aguilar about what he found and asked the appellant whether the
baby is hers or not, in which the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o’clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr.
Emilio Nepomuceno went to the appellant’s house and found her lying in bed
and still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it were full of
blood. The physician declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and in
her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it
for purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom
she had therefore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of
another man with whom she had previously had amorous relations. He even
testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her child
when he went to her house at the time on the said above-stated.
The lower court held that the appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-
General does not agree, stating that the appellant may be guilty of abandoning
a minor under subsection 2 of Article 276 of the RPC, the abandonment having
resulted in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Josefina Bandian is criminally liable for the crime of infanticide.
RULING:
NO. Under the law, infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable,
must be committed willfully or consciously, or at least it must be result of a
voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes
are committed through are committed through mere imprudence, the person
who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of
his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be
held liable.
In the present case, the act performed by the appellant in the morning in
question, by going in the thicket, according to her, to respond to call of nature,
notwithstanding the fact that she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her
child in the same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or
any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme
debility, she should not be blamed therefore because it all happened by mere
accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such
circumstances.
Therefore, the Court ruled that Josefina Bandian is not criminally liable of
infanticide.
THE UNITED STATES. Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
G. R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910
CARSON, J.:
FACTS:
One night, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant was suddenly awakened by
someone trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called
out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise
at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his
way into the room.
The room was very dark and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a
robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will
kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the
chair which had been placed against the door.
In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been
inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be
a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was
merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against
which it rested. 
eizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant
struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his
roommate, Pascual.
ISSUES:
1) Whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible, who, by
reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which
would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known
the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act 

2) Whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of
the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal
Code
HELD:
1) The Court holds that under such circumstances there is no criminal
liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact
was not due to negligence or bad faith. In broader terms, ignorance or
mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense
charged "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in
those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal
provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the
provisions of Article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him,
even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.
2) The definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely
contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an
essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of Article
1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is
an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence
of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching
liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts
done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act
committed is different from that which he intended to commit.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the
words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the
commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice
(criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal
liability on the actor.  then a kerosene lamp there was in the house and was not aware of the assault
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of
evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided
always there is no fault or negligence on his part. "The guilt of the accused
must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
In this case, the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow in the firm belief
that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief,
from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his
property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the
time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that
he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GENOVEVA APEGO, defendant-appellant.
H. R. No. 7929, November 8, 1912
TORRES, J.:
FACTS:
Upon the arrival of Maria Apego and her husband, Pio Bautista, at the stairs of
their house, and as Genoveva Apego did not reply to the call made to her from
the outside by her sister Maria, the said spouses went to the upper floor of the
house; Bautista led the way and, in order to enter, opened the outside door, a
sliding door, and as there was no light inside stumbled against Genoveva
Apego, who was sleeping near the said door, and touched her left arm;
thereupon, Genoveva awoke and believing, as she testified, that somebody was
trying to abuse her, seized the pocketknife aforementioned, asking at the same
time who was beside her, and as she did not receive a reply immediately, she
got up and struck the person before her a blow with the said knife; in the
meanwhile Maria Apego had separated from her husband to light a match and
made upon her husband by her sister, and only when the light had been lit did
she see her sister Genoveva in front of Bautista, who had already been
wounded and was in an attitude indicating that he was about to fall to the floor;
thereupon Genoveva went out of the house, calling for help, and ran to the
house of an aunt of hers where she was arrested by the policeman, Manuel
Peinado, to whom she then and there delivered the pocketknife with which she
had assaulted her brother-in-law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Genoveva Apego is criminally liable for the killing of Pio
Bautista, her brother-in-law.
RULING:
YES. The committed crime there was present the circumstance of incomplete
exemption from responsibility, as all the three requisites specified in subarticle
4 of Article 8 (12) of the RPC are not applicable. The criminal act is not
altogether excusable, on account of the lack of the second requisites.
In the present case, it can not be denied that, upon the defendant’s awakening,
startled at feeling somebody grasp her left arm and believing that an attempt
was being made against her honor, as she received no reply whatever to her
question as to who was beside her in the darkness of the house, she
understood that there was a positive unlawful aggression from which she had
to defend herself with the said pocketknife, and it is also undeniable that there
was no previous provocation on her part; but it is unquestionable that, in
making use of this deadly weapon, even in the defense of her person and rights,
by decidedly wounding him who had touched her or caught her arm, the
defendant exceeded her right of defense, since there was no real need of
wounding with the said weapon him who had merely caught her arm, and
perhaps did so to wake her, as she was asleep and had not replied to her
sister’s calls.
Therefore, Genoveva Apego is criminally liable for the killing of his brother-in-
law, Pio Bautista, with a mitigating circumstance under Article 11 (15) of the
RPC, in connection with Act No. 2142.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
G. R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943
MORAN, J.:
FACTS:
Mayor Guido through Provincial Inspector, Capt. Godofredo Monsod ordered
the arrest of escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas. Based on the information,
Balagtas was with Irene Monsod. a bailarina named then informed the
defendants and instructed them to arrest Balagtas, and if overpowered, they
were to follow the instructions in the telegram. Knowing a certain Irene,
Antonio Oanis went to the location of Irene at Rizal Street. In that place, they
asked Brigada Mallare to point out where the room of Irene was. They were
also informed by Mallare that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. When
they reached the room, seeing a man with his back towards the door, they
simultaneously and successively fired at him killing him. The man killed was
not Balagtas, but one Serapio Tecson.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendants are absolved from criminal liability for the death of
Serapio Tecson.
RULING:
NO. Appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488, to support
their theory of absolution from liability by reason of honest mistake of fact.
However, the maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this only applies when the
mistake is committed without carelessness or fault on the part of the offending
party. For this to apply, there is a mistake of fact committed without any fault
or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a
further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no
alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts
justified his act of killing. 
In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found
no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action.
The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and
opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could
even effect a bloodless arrest.  into the river and with the assistance of the other men recovered the body of
That being said, Oanis and Galanta are both liable for the murder of Tecson.
However, mitigating circumstance of incomplete requisites of performance of
duty are appreciated in their favor. Defendants had ample time and
opportunity to ascertain the victim’s identity since he was asleep. Mistake in
the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered reckless imprudence.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
A.H. BARNES, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 4774, November 18, 1908
TORRES, J.:
RECKLESS NEGLIGENCE. — When an act which causes injury to another
person is involuntary, free from malice or criminal intent, it does not constitute
a crime nor any other offense by reason of reckless negligence, inasmuch as
acts executed negligently are voluntary although done without malice or
criminal design.
FACTS:
At about 10 o’clock on the morning of the 15th of December, 1906, A. H.
Barnes, J. A. Ryan, and three Filipinos, one of whom was Pedro Leonardo, were
out duck shooting and went through the barrio of San Pablo, sitio of Muyot, in
the municipality of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; when they were about to return it
was noticed that there were ducks on an estero or stream; Barnes at once fired
his gun twice, the said Pedro Leonardo being near to him at the time; when
trying to reload the weapon, the cartridge would not, go in easily, and Barnes
had to force it by closing the breech of the gun which is automatic, pressing the
same upon his knee, at which moment the gun was discharged, Barnes being
still on his knees; when he rose to look for the ducks he saw the said Leonardo
sinking beneath the water, for which reason he left his gun on the ground and
told his friend Ryan that it looked as if the said individual was hurt; they went
Pedro Leonardo who was already dead; a surgeon who examined the body
found a gunshot wound in the back of the head; bones had been broken, and
the wound was of necessity a mortal one.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Barnes is criminally liable for the killing of Pedro Leonardo.
RULING:
NO. Article 568 of the said code, which reads as follows: "He who shall execute
through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a
grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum degree to prision correccional in its minimum degree, and with
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium degrees, if it shall constitute a less
grave crime" According to article 1 of the said code crimes or misdemeanors
are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law, once having been fully
demonstrated in this case that the third shot fired from the gun which the
accused Barnes had in his hands on the morning of the occurrence and which
caused the death of the said individual, was an entirely involuntary act, as it
has not been proven in any manner that he fired the weapon purposely in the
direction of the ducks, but that it went off at the moment when he pressed the
gun against his knee in order to force the cartridge into the chamber which
showed some kind of obstruction, and without aiming at the birds, or doing
something to cause the weapon to discharge, it follows that such act being an
involuntary one, should not be considered as constituting reckless negligence.
Therefore, the said death was not the result of a voluntary and criminal act, nor
of an omission or reckless negligence, but an involuntary act devoid of a
criminal character, that is a regrettable and unfortunate accident without any
effort of the will. Thus, Barnes is not criminally liable.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RESTITUTO FALLER, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-45964, April 25, 1939
AVANCENA, C.J.:
FACTS:
Restituto Faller was charged with the crime of damage caused to another’s
property maliciously and willfully. The Court of First Instance found that the
damage was not caused maliciously of and willfully, but through reckless
imprudence. Faller was sentenced under paragraph 3 of Article 365 of the RPC,
as principal in the crime of damage through reckless imprudence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI erred in sentencing the crime of Restituto Faller.
RULING:
The court has not committed this error. The appellant was convicted of the
same crime of damage to property with which he is charged. Reckless
imprudence is not a crime itself. It is simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability. The information alleges that the
appellant acted willfully, maliciously, unlawfully and criminally. Negligence
being a punishable criminal act when it results in a crime, the allegation in the
information that the appellant also committed the acts unlawfully and
criminally includes the charge that he acted with negligence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCEINO ACOSTA y RIVERA, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 40903, April 28, 1934
IMPERIAL, J.:
FACTS:
Between July 1933 and October 22, of the same year, in the City of Manila, the
accused, with force, intimidation and abuse of confidence, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Magdalena
Asegurado, a virgin over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age, and
as a consequence thereof, the said minor was infected with venereal diseases
and caused physical injuries which resulted in her death on October 22, 1933.
The defendant was suffering from gonorrhea and naturally he infected the
offended party. The offended party did not complain to her mother nor did she
suffer from the serious consequences of the infection until September when
she complained of intense pains in the abdomen.
The Trial Court convicted the defendant of the crimes of rape and homicide.
Taking into consideration the weight of the evidence and the fact that both
crimes, rape and homicide, were the result of a singular act, which is the sexual
intercourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proven facts should be considered as independent crimes
of rape and homicide, or as the complex crime of rape with homicide.
RULING:
The defendant shall be convicted with the complex crime of rape with
homicide. The penalty of reclusion temporal prescribed for both crimes should
be imposed in its maximum degree, and nocturnity and abuse of superior
strength should be taken into consideration as aggravating circumstances in
the commission of the crime. A mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong shall be taken into the consideration of the
defendant.
Therefore, the penalty for the crime shall be from twelve years of prision
mayor to twenty years of reclusion temporal.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GERARDO CORNEL, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-204, May 16, 1947
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Trinidad Coral personally saw appellant suddenly assault her deceased
husband, Francisco Burac, with a bolo as the latter was descending the stairs of
his house in the Barrio of San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay, at about 6 o’clock in the
afternoon of June 8, 1945. After Burac (then wounded in the forehead) fell, the
appellant threw a stone which hit Burac’s right clavicle, and the appellant
thereafter fled in the direction of his house.
Dr. Mariano Cruel, a government witness, described the wound on Burac’s
forehead as “an incised vertical wound extending from a little above the middle
of the eyebrows down to the lower root of the nose”, and cutting “the frontal
and the nasal bones also,” was produced not by a bolo but by an irregular and
hard object with a sharp edge such as a heavy piece of stone. It has been
certified by Cruel that Burac died “of tetanus secondary to the infected wound”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI erred in sentencing the defendant for the crime of
homicide, an indeterminate prison term ranging from 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
RULING:
YES. Appellant’s surmise that Fabian might not have died of tetanus because
there are other diseases sometimes exhibiting symptoms of tetanus cannot
prevail against the conclusion of Dr. Cruel.
Therefore, the appellant must be held responsible for the natural consequences
of his unlawful act.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN QUIANZON, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 42607, September 28, 1935
RECTO, J.:
FACTS:
Charged with and convicted of the crime of homicide in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six
years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen years, seven
months and one day of... reclusion temporal, as maximum, Juan Quianzon
appeals to this court for the review of the case.
On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of the soul of a deceased person
was being held in the house of Victorina Cacpal... municipality of Paoay, Ilocos
Norte. It was the second or third time that Aribuabo approached Quianzon with
the same purpose whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold of a
firebrand and applied it to the neck of the man who so pestered him. Aribuabo
died as a result of this wound.
Gregorio Dumlao, a barrio lieutenant, who, upon being informed of the
incident, forthwith conducted an investigation, questioned Aribuabo and the
latter told him that it was the accused who had wounded him. He likewise
questioned the accused and the latter, in turn, stated that he had wounded the
deceased with a bamboo spit. Upon being brought before Julian Llaguno, chief
of police of Paoay, for questioning, Quianzon confessed to Llaguno that he had
applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had later wounded him with a
bamboo spit. Before the chief of police could put this confession of Quianzon in
writing, the latter retracted, denying that he had wounded Aribuabo, for which
reason in the affidavit Exhibit B the fact of having applied a firebrand to
Aribuabo's neck appears admitted by Quianzon but not that of having wounded
the deceased with a bamboo spit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Juan Quianzon killed Aribuabo.
RULING:
Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction and of
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should be taken into
consideration in favor of the appellant, without any aggravating circumstances
adverse to him, we modify the appealed judgment by... sentencing him to an
indeterminate penalty with a minimum of four years of prision correctional
and a maximum of eight years of prision mayor, affirming it in all other
respects, with costs to said appellant.
Principles:
The defense of the accused consisted simply in denying that he had wounded
the deceased and that he had confessed his guilt to the witnesses Bagabay,
Dumlao and Llaguno. But such denial cannot prevail against the adverse
testimony of these three veracious and disinterested... witnesses, all the more
because neither the accused nor any other witness for the defense has stated
or insinuated that another person, not the accused, might be the author of the
wound which resulted in Aribuabo's death, and because it is admitted by the
defense that it was the... accused, whom Aribuabo had been pestering with
request for food, who attacked the latter, burning his neck with a firebrand,
after which Aribuabo appeared wounded in the abdomen, without the accused
and the witnesses for the defense explaining how and by whom the aggression
had... been made.
It is contended by the defense that even granting that it was the accused who
inflicted the wound which resulted in Aribuabo's death, he should not be
convicted of homicide but only of serious physical injuries because said wound
was not necessarily fatal and the deceased would... have survived it had he not
twice removed the drainage which Dr. Mendoza had placed to control or isolate
the infection. This contention is without merit., According to the physician who
examined and attended him, the "wound of the deceased was very serious and
it was difficult... to determine whether he could survive or not." It was a wound
in the abdomen which occasionally results in traumatic peritonitis. The
infection was caused by the fecal matter from the large intestine which had
been perforated. The possibility, admitted by said physician, that... the patient
might" have survived said wound had he not removed the drainage, does not
mean that that act of the patient was the real cause of his death. Even without
said act the fatal consequence could have followed, and the fact that the patient
had so acted in a paroxysm of... pain does not alter the juridical consequences
of the punishable act of the accused.
"One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of
homicide if the injury contributes mediately or immediately to the death of
such other. The fact that other causes contribute to the death does not relieve
the actor of responsibility
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision of April 3, 1879, said in a case similar
to the present, the following:
"Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his act and... in this
case the physical condition and temperament of the of fended party nowise
lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of
the means employed, but by the result actually produced; and as the wound
which the appellant inflicted upon the... deceased was the cause which
determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is
evident that the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc."
"While the courts may have vacilated from time to time it may be taken to be
the settled rule of the common law that one who inflicts an injury on another
will be held responsible for his death, although it may appear that the deceased
might have recovered if he had... taken proper care of himself, or submitted to a
surgical operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the
wound and contributed to the death, or that death was immediately caused by
a surgical operation rendered necessary by the condition of the wound. The...
principle on which this rule is founded is one of universal application, and lies
at the foundation of all criminal jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to be
held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural consequences of his
own acts.
If a person inflicts a... wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put
life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this felonious and
wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that
other causes co-operated in producing the fatal result.
Amid the... conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant
upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many
cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and
thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the... highest crime
might escape conviction and punishment."
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELICIANO DIVINO, defendant-appellant.
GR. No. 4490, December 4, 1908
ARRELANO, C.J.:
MALPRACTICE; NEGLIGENCE; CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. - One who, not
being a regular practitioner, undertakes to render medical assistance to
another person, is liable for any injuries resulting from such treatment, and the
fact that he acted in good faith and according to the best of his ability does not
relieve him from responsibility, although his ignorance may be considered as a
mitigating circumstance. (Article 568, RPC)
FACTS:
The CFI convicted Feliciano Divino for the crime of lesiones graves and was
sentenced to two years and eleven months and suspension from public office.
A girl named Alfonsa, about 13 years of age when the incident happened, was a
servant for Feliciano Divino and his family. Her feet were the focus in this case
because it is said that Feliciano burned her feet, in a very unorthodox and
harmful way in a sense, by setting her feet on fire after applying petroleum to it
and tying her down to the floor. He argued in the Court that when Alfonsa came
to their home, her body was full of scars and ulcers, and that the ulcer in her
body, through his efforts, was cured, except those on her feet. He tried many
times to cure her feet but failed because the girl would always walk barefoot
outside and that she would run whenever she was being cured because of the
pain being inflicted in the process. On the day of the incident, Feliciano said to
have tied her up so she won’t run during the process and then left her feet
burning for about an hour and then afterwards locked her up. He argued that
the ulcer was getting worse and smelled quite offensively.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Feliciano Divino can be acquitted because he argued that he
acted in good faith and did not mean any harm to the girl, except to help her get
cured.
RULING:
Medical arguments were brought in the light of the decision and that a doctor
clearly identified that the scars on Alfonsa’s feet were indeed because of burns
and that the became worse on account of Feliciano’s efforts to cure them.
Certainly it was found certain that the acts of the guilty person do not seem to
have been intended to cause an evil, but rather as a remedy. However, Article
568 of the RPC clearly states that a person that undertakes medical assistance
to another person is liable for any injuries resulting from such treatment, and
that the fact that he acted in good faith and according to the best of his
circumstance. In lieu, the Court reversed the ruling of the CFI and sentenced
Divino to simple imprudence to the penalty of four months and suspension
from office and right to suffrage and to pay the costs of both instances.
 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VALERIO MENDIETA, defendant-appellant.
GR. No. L-11000, March 14, 1916
JOHNSON, J.:
FACTS:
On or about the 22nd of February 1914 in Cauayan, Isabela, the accused, Valerio
Mendieta, did, willfully, unlawfully, treacherously and criminally assault Pedro
Acierto with a lance which caused him a serious wound in the left side, as a
result Pedro Acierto died.
The defendant makes a feeble effort to show that what he caused to Pedro
Acierto was because he is defending himself. He also attempted to show that
the supposed blow was intended for Hilario Lauigan instead of Acierto.
The CFI found the defendant guilty of the crime of assassination, with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, with the mitigating circumstance of
having executed the crime in vindication of an offense committed against him
by one Hilario Lauigan, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of
seventeen years four months and one day of cadena temporal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Valerio Mendieta is criminally liable for the killing of Pedro
Acierta.
RULING:
YES. No offense had been offered by Pedro Acierto to the defendant, neither did
he offer any resistance to the attack of the defendant upon him. In fact the
record shows that Pedro did not know that he was being pursued by the
defendant at the time the mortal wound was inflicted. The contention of the
defendant that he intended to injure Hilario Lauigan instead of Pedro Acierto is
in no way could be considered as a relief from his criminal act. That he made a
mistake in killing one man instead of another, when it is proved that he acted
maliciously and willfully, cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility.
Neither the Court believe that the fact that he made a mistake in the killing the
wrong man should be considered as a mitigatig circumstance.
Therefore, Valerio Mendieta is criminally liable for killing Pedro Acierto.
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GR. No. 72964, January 7, 1988
GUTIERREZ, JR. J.:
FACTS:
Doctrine: Proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.
FACTS: Marcelino Javier opened the irrigation of a canal by means of cutting
grass which caused the flooding of the storage area of the petitioner. Petitioner
got angry and demanded Javier to pay for the soaked palay. Javier refused and
a quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo and hacked Javier
hitting him on the right hand and left leg. Javier went to the hospital for the
treatment of the wounds. Two weeks after, Javier returned to his farm and
tended to his tobacco plants.
Then, on a fateful day of November 14, Javier was rushed to the hospital.
Doctors findings showed that he was suffering from tetanus infection. The next
day, Javier died.
RTC and CA found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
Petitioner raised the case to the SC arguing that the cause of the death of Javier
was due to his own negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Urbano’s action was the proximate cause of the death of
Javier.
RULING: NO. Pursuant to this provision “an accused is criminally responsible
for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom. The rule is that the death of the victim must
be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him
by the accused
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of
Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no
tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two
weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare
hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier’s death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22
days before he died. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of
his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation
the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
CA’s decision was SET ASIDE and petioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of
homicide.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANASTASIO MAISA, defendant-appellant.
GR. No. L-3728, September 25, 1907
ARELLANO, C.J.:
FACTS:
It was proven in this case that while Anastasio Maisa and Jose Machon were
engaged in a fight, Isaac Monrayo tried to separate them and gave Maisa a oush
which caused the latter to fall to the ground, and on getting up Maisa struck
Monrayo in the face, hitting him in the right eye, which became completely
disable. The accused alleged that the blow was aimed at Machon, and not at
Monrayo. Although the wrongful act be committed against a person other than
the one whom it was intended to injure, this fact does not excuse the offender
from criminal liability for the voluntary commission of a wrongful act or
misdemeanor, according to paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Anastasio Maisa is criminally liable for the killing of Isaac
Monrayo.
RULING:
YES. Anastasio Maisa is crimially liable.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL BALMORES y CAYA, defendant-appellant.
GR. No. L-1896, February 16, 1950
OZAETA, J.:
FACTS:
Balmores is being prosecuted for the crime of estafa through falsification of a
security. It is alleged that Balmores tore off the bottom (cross wise) of a
genuine 1/8 unit Phil Charity Sweepstakes Ticket. This way, the real number
on such ticket was removed and that by substituting and using an ink Balmores
allegedly wrote 07400 instead which is actually the winning number. (the
removal of the bottom portion and writing in ink the number was pleaded
guilty to by Balmores)Balmores presented the ticket as genuine to the PCSO so
he could claim the money. However, he was not able toperform all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of estafa through falsification of a
security because Bayani Miler, the employee to whom the ticket was presented,
immediately discovered the falsification and caused Balmores’ apprehension.
(in short, no exchange of money and ticket took place)
ISSUE:
(real issue is actually whether there was estafa)
As to the impossible crime part: since the falsification of the ticket was so
obvious, is the consummation of the crime actually impossible?
Digester’s explanation: the ticket was obviously falsified (as in very patent on its
face na spurious siya) hence, it is argued that impossible naman maconsummate
yung crime of estafa since nobody will give the money in exchange for the ticket
(kasi nga obvious na fake ---as what happened in the case).So question is, do we
have an impossible crime here?
HELD:
NO. IMPOSSIBLE CRIME PART: the recklessness and clumsiness of Balmores in
falsifying the ticket did not make the crime impossible under Art.4 Par.2.
Examples of impossible crimes are as follows: trying to kill another by putting
an arsenic substance in the latter’s soup but it turns out the substance was just
common salt; or when one tries to murder a corpse. In this case, even if the
ticket was patently falsified on its face, it cannot be said that it was impossible
to consummate the crime of estafa thru falsification.
OTHER MATTERS: It is argued that for the June 29, 1947 draw (which is the
date when the winning number of 07400 was drawn) there could’ve been no
genuine 1/8 unit PCSO ticket because the PCSO issued only ¼ units for each
ticket. Also, it was not shown that the number removed from the ticket is not
the same as that written in ink.
The court will not take judicial notice of the fact that only ¼ units of tickets has
been issued because it is not of common knowledge. Besides, if it were true
that no 1/8 units were issued, then it only supports the prosecution’s theory
that balmores’ ticket was spurious. Note that in this case, Balmores pleaded
guilty to removing the true and unidentified number of the ticket and
substituting in ink a new figure. There would’ve been no need for such removal
and substitution if the original number was the same as that written in ink.
(note: in this case, SC said Balmores is merely guilty of an attempt to commit
estafa. But since what is involved here is falsification of a government
obligation ---sweepstake ticket ---he still has to suffer the fully brunt of the
penalty of the law).
PARAS’ DISSENT: There was an impossible crime. The falsification was
inherently inadequate and is certainly to be detected. In short, Balmores could
not have succeeded in chasing the ticket. In fact, the matter of falsification was
immediately detected by Miler.Also the fact that only 1/4units of the ticket was
actually issued could’ve proved in court (thus taken judicial notice of) if only
Balmores had counsel to assist him. (Balmores is actually an illiterate and
during the entire proceeding from the lower court, he waived his right to be
assisted by counsel)

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
GR. No. 103119, October 21, 1992
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the
Court of Appealsaffirmingin totothe judgment of the RTC, finding him guilty of
the crime of attempted murder.
Sulpicio Intod and 3 other men went to Salvador Mandaya’s house to ask him
to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. The group had a
meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that
Mandaya should accompany the 4 men otherwise he would also be killed. At
10:00 p.m. of that same day, Intod and companions, all armed with firearms
arrived at Palangpangan’s house. Thereafter, petitioner fired at the said room.
It turned out the Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then
occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the
accused fired. No one was hit by the gunfire.
The RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Intod seeks a modification of
the judgment on the ground that he is only liable for an impossible crime Art.
4(2). Intod contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night
he and his companions riddled it with bulletsmade the crime inherently
impossible. On the other hand, Respondent (People of the Phil) argues that the
crime was not impossible instead the facts were sufficient to constitute an
attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent likewise
alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition,
respondent pointed out that the crime of murder was not consummated, not
because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC),
but due to a cause of accident otherthat petitioner’s and his co-accused’s own
spontaneous desistance (Art. 3). Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at
that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible.
ISSUE: WON he is liable for attempted murder?
RULING:
NO. Only impossible crime. Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovationof the
Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code
where:”. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced,
that the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed,
employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality,
and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically
possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the courts
did not hold him criminally liable.”
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected.The RPC, inspired
by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability,and now
penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or
carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony
against person or against property.The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish
such criminal tendencies.Article 4(2) provides and punishes an impossible
crime—an act which, were it not aimed at something quite impossible or
carried out with means which prove inadequate would constitute a felony
against person or family. For this provision to apply, there must be either (1)
legal responsibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended
act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if completed, would
not amount to a crime. Thus, legal impossibility would apply to those
circumstances where: (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an
act in violation of the law; (2) there is no intention to perform the physical act;
(3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4)the
consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to actor
or beyond control prevent consummation of intended crime. Factual
impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crimecould
have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed
them to be, it is no defense that in reality, the crime was impossible of
commission. Legal impossibility on the other hand is a defense which can be
invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt.
The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which
rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment and under Article
4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make theact an
impossible crime.To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was
Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening
cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in
Article 4, which makesa person criminally liable for an act "which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility
of its accomplishment …”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIA ORIFON, defendant-appellant.
GR. No. L-36173, November 25, 1932
BUTTE, J.:
FACTS:
Maria Orifon was sentenced to cadena perpetua for the murder of her father.
She pleaded guilty to the charge at the preliminary investigation but on the
arraignment upon the information filed in the CFI she pleaded not guilty. The
principal evidence against the accused consisted of her confession which she
wrote out in her own handwriting and in her own dialect (Ilocano).
No objection was made by her counsel to the admission of the said confession
by her counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty imposed for the sentence Maria Orifon is excessive.
RULING:
YES. In view of the horrible wrong which this young woman suffered at the
hands of her father and of the obviously depressed state of mind and body
which she must have suffered when she premeditated the act of madness and
revenge for which she is now condemned under the letter of law to suffer life
imprisonment, the court, invoking the provisions of Article 5, second
paragraph of the RPC, submits to the Chief Executive through the Department
of Justice, its sincere opinion that the penalty imposed in this case (and the law
does not permit any lower penalty) is a clearly excessive penalty, having regard
to the condition of the accuse and the circumstances which impelled her to
commit the crime for which she stands convicted.
However, the law does not allow the Court for any alternative to lower the
penalty. Therefore, Maria Orifon is criminally liable for killing his father.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS and THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners,
vs.
ANG CHO KIO @ ANG MING HUY and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
GR. No. L-30001, June 23, 1970
ZALDIVAR, J.:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
FACTS:
Ang Cho Kio was convicted of various offenses and was granted conditional
pardon in 1959. He was never to return to the Philippines. In violation of his
pardon, he returned in 1966 under the name "Ang Ming Huy". However, he was
identified by an inspector of the Immigration Bureau. Thus, he was arrested.
The Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, ordered him
recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence that
were imposed on him, for having violated the conditioned of his pardon.
He filed a petition for habeas corpus which the CFI of Rizal denied. The CA
affirmed the decision but made a recommendation that Ang may be allowed to
leave the country on the first available transportation abroad.
The Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration praying for the
deletion of the recommendation. The Solicitor General maintains that the
recommendation is not a part of the decision and was uncalled for; that it gives
the decision a political complexion, because courts are not empowered to make
such a recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the exercise of
judicial powers. He also contends that allowing convicted aliens to leave the
country is an act of the state exercises solely in the discretion of the Chief
Executive. It is urged that the act of sending an undesirable alien out of the
country is political in character, and the courts should not interfere with, nor
attempt to influence, the political acts of the President.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals was proper.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals can make recommendations.
RULING:
1. No. The case before the CA was for habeas corpus. The only question to be
resolved by the CA was whether, or not, the CFI of Rizal, had rightly dismissed
the petition of Ang Cho Kio for habeas corpus. The CA was not called upon to
review any sentence imposed upon Ang Cho Kio. The sentence against him had
long become final, and, in fact, he was pardoned. The majority opinion should
have been limited to the affirmance of the decision of the lower court, and no
more.
2. The recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction are limited to
those expressly provided in the law — and such law is the provision of Section
5 of the Revised Penal Code as follows:
Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may
deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by
law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act
should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending
the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of
the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of
a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the
degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.
Certainly, the recommendation in the majority opinion of the special division of
the CA, now in question, is not authorized under the aforequoted provision of
Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA was not called upon to review any
sentence that was imposed on Ang Cho Kio. It was simply called upon to
determine whether Ang Cho Kio was illegally confined, or not, in the insular
penitentiary under the Director of Prisons.
It was improper for the CA justices to make a recommendation that would
suggest a modification or a correction of the act of the Chief Executive. The
matter of whether an alien who violated the laws in this country may remain or
be deported is a political question that should be left entirely to the Chief
Executive to decide. Under the principle of separation of powers, it is not
within the province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or express a
suggestion, that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of the action of the
Chief Executive on matters purely political in nature.
After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but
only in the interpretation and application of the law. We believe that judges
should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their decisions which
may only reflect unfavorably upon their competence and the propriety of their
judicial actuations.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AURELIO LAMAHANG, defendant-appellant.
GR. No. L-43530, August 3, 1935
RECTO, J.:
FACTS:
Lamahang was caught by a policeman the act of making an opening with an
iron baron the wall of a store of cheap goods. The accused had only succeeded
in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the
policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under
custody. The lower court found him guilty of attempted robbery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Aurelio Lamahang is guilty of attempted robbery.
RULING:
NO. He is guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling. The attempt to commit an
offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a
particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the
offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as
its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from
the standpoint of the Penal Code.
There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to
enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence, passing through the opening which
he had started to makeon the wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to
the timely arrival of the police, did not develop beyond the first steps of its
execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction,
that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is
necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural
relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its
consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined andpunished by
the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to
its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated
by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of
force or violence another person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to
commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take
possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to
another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such
purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred.
In offenses not consummated, as the material damage is wanting, the nature of
the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same
must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio).-Acts
susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the
culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and
cannot furnish grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated crimes.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PROTASIO EDUAVE, defendant-appellant.
GR. No. L-12155, February 2, 1917
MORELAND, J.:
FACTS:
Defendant was charged of the crime of rape resulting to the pregnancy of Ms. X
who happens to be the daughter of his paramour. Incensed, defendant rushed
to the girl and struck here from behind, in part at least, with a sharp bolo
producing a frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to the side 8 1/2
inches long and 2 inches deep severing all of the muscles and tissues of that
part. There was no question that defendant was guilty. The only dilemma is the
precise crime of which he should be convicted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused should be convicted of frustrated murder.
RULING:
YES. The accused should be convicted of frustrated murder.
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless do
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the prepetrator.
(See Art 3, Revised Penal Code)
The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is
that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or
agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment
all of the acts have been performed which should result in the consummated
crime. While in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not
arrive at the point of performing all the acts which should produce the crime.
In case of an attempt, the offender never passes the subjective phase of the
offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of
outside causes before the subjective phase is passed.
In case of frustrated crimes, the subjective phase is completely passed.
Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he
was passing throught he subjective phase. The crime, however, is not
consummated by reason of the causes independent of the will of the offender.
He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as
a consequence it was due to something beyond his control.
ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
GR. No. 160188, June 21, 2007
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
Valenzuela and Calderon were charged in an information with the crime of
theft. The two were sighted outside the Super Sale Club (a supermarket within
SM North EDSA) by security guard Lago. Valenzuela, wearing a Receiving
Dispatching Unit ID, was seen hauling a push cart with cases of Tide (twice)
and unloading these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was
waiting. Valenzuela then called a cab and the two loaded the cartoons of Tide
and boarded the vehicle. Lago tried to stop them by asking for a receipt, but the
two reacted by fleeing on foot, prompting Lago to fire a warning shot.
Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended and 4 cases of Tide Ultramatic, 1
case of Ultra 25 grams and 3 cases of detergent were recovered.
Valenzuela and Calderon pleaded not guilty on arraignment and claimed to be
innocent bystanders. According to Calderon, he went to the said supermarket
with his neighbor Rosulada to withdraw from his ATM. Due to the long queue,
they decided to buy snacks and went outside after hearing a gunshot. Suddenly,
they were grabbed by a security guard. As for Valenzuela, he and his cousin
Gregorio were walking in the parking lot to ride a tricycle when they saw Lago
fire a shot. People started running and he was apprehended by Lago. During
Valenzuela’s cross-examination, he admitted that he had been employed as a
“bundler” of GMS Marketing, “assigned at the supermarket” though not at SM.
RTC: Valenzuela and Calderon guilty of consummated theft. The RTC found
credible the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and established the
convictions on the positive identification of the accused as perpetrators of the
crime.
Only Valenzuela filed a brief with CA, causing the dismissal of Calderon’s
appeal. Valenzuela argued in CA that he should only be convicted of frustrated
theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position
to freely dispose of the articles stolen. CA: affirmed RTC (consummated theft).
Valenzuela filed Petition for Review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely
frustrated?
RULING:
Consummated. Theft is already “produced” upon the “taking of personal
property of another without the latter’s consent.” There is no frustrated theft.
Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a “subjective phase,” or that
portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which
begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender
which, with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. After that
point has been breached, the subjective phase ends and the objective phase
begins. It has been held that if the offender never passes the subjective phase of
the offense, the crime is merely attempted. On the other hand, the subjective
phase is completely passed in case of frustrated crimes, for in such instances,
subjectively the crime is complete.
Truly, an easy distinction lies between consummated and frustrated felonies
on one hand, and attempted felonies on the other. So long as the offender fails
to complete all the acts of execution despite commencing the commission of a
felony, the crime is undoubtedly in the attempted stage. Whether a crime is
frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession that all of the acts
of execution have been performed by the offender.The critical distinction
instead is whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of
execution. The determination of whether the felony was “produced” after all
the acts of execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory
definition of the felony. It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the
elements of each crime under the Revised Penal Code, while the elements in
turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying
criminal intent. there is only one operative act of execution by the actor
involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another. It is also clear
from the provision that in order that such taking may be qualified as theft,
there must further be present the descriptive circumstances that the taking
was with intent to gain; without force upon things or violence against or
intimidation of persons; and it was without the consent of the owner of the
property.
As applied to the present case, the moment Valenzuela obtained physical
possession of the cases of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such
seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed without need to inflict violence
or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and accomplished
without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, Valenzuela forfeited the
extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have afforded
him. The theft would have been frustrated only, once the acts committed by
petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a consequence, “do not
produce [such theft] by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.” There are clearly two determinative factors to consider: that the
felony is not “produced,” and that such failure is due to causes independent of
the will of the perpetrator. The second factor ultimately depends on the
evidence at hand in each particular case. The first, however, relies primarily on
a doctrinal definition attaching to the individual felonies in the Revised Penal
Code as to when a particular felony is “not produced,” despite the commission
of all the acts of execution.
So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is
necessary to inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft “produced.” Parsing
through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one
apparent answer provided in the language of the law —that theft is already
“produced” upon the “tak[ing of] personal property of another without the
latter’s consent.”
The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a
constitutive element of the crime of theft.It finds no support or extension in
Article 308, whether as a descriptive or operative element of theft or as the
mens rea or actus reus of the felony. To restate what this Court has repeatedly
held: the elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that
said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to
gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that
the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation
of persons or force upon things.
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in
the frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced?
There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced
when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with
intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of
the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for
theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the
deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of
execution.
We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was
completed in this case. With intent to gain, heacquired physical possession of
the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able
to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto
a taxicab.
Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is
deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing,
even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
Insofar as we consider the present question, “unlawful taking” is most material
in this respect.Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal
property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage.
At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense
could only be attempted theft, if at all.
With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be
attempted or consummated. The presumed inability of the offenders to freely
dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners have
already been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the
taking. There is no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows
that the “free disposition of the items stolen” is in any way determinative of
whether the crime of theft has been produced.
JOSE “JINGGOY” E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
GR. No. 148965, February 26, 2002
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
As an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Estrada, five
criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family,
his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the Ombudsman. One of
the charges was for plunder and among the respondents was petitioner Jinggoy
Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Estrada filed several motions (motion to quash and suspend, very urgent
omnibus motion) which were all denied.
Estrada claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in: 1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 as applied to him was in denial of his
right to the equal protection of the laws; 2) not holding that the Plunder Law
does not provide complete and sufficient standards; 3) sustaining the charge
against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with
which and with whom he is not even remotely connected -contrary to the
dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious -results in the denial of
substantive due process;
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not in sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged
offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not
even remotely connected -contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is
personal, not vicarious -resulted in the denial of substantive due process;
2. Whether or not the allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is
too general.
RULING:
1. NO. The allegations in the Amended Information,it is clear that all the
accused named thru their individual acts,conspired with former President
Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Informationis
worded,however, it is not certain whether the accused conspired with each
otherto enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth.
In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy
entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the
second paragraph of the Amended Information but onlyfor the predicate acts
he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former
President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more
than P4 billion.
There is no denying the fact that the plunder of an entire nation resulting in
material damage to the national economy is made up of a complex and
manifold network of crimes.In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties
may be united by a common purpose.In the case at bar, the different accused
and their different criminal acts have a commonality to help the former
President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a)
to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each
accused in the conspiracy. Thegravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore,
isnotthat each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal
gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that
each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation
and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched
himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks;rather, it is that each of them, by
their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for
former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction,the presence of several accused in multiple
conspiracies commonly involves two structures: (1) the so-called wheel or
circle conspiracy, in which there isa single person or group (the hub) dealing
individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes); and (2)
the chain conspiracy, in which there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations
between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then
retailer and consumer.From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at
bar appears similar to a wheel conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada
while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the
common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
2. NO. he requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when
conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of
committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its
particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of
the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the
criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them
answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in
the crime.[49 The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant
will be equally responsible for the acts of others,[50 for the act of one is the act
of all.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in
general terms how the accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the
words in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused. These words are
sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in
committing the crime of plunder.
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
GR. No. 200748, July 23, 2014
SERENO, C.J.:
FACTS:
Complainants alleged that a certain Ariel Escobedo was picked up by several
unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs.
Complainants were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Station. They
met “James” at the Police Station, who demanded from them P100,000.00
which was later lowered to P40,000.00, in exchange for the release of Ariel.  on his right side. Nacnac was armed with a M-16 armalite. At the heat of the
The accused was nabbed after an entrapment operation was conducted. The
accused was later brought to the forensic laboratory where he was required to
submit his urine for drug testing. The test yielded a positive result for presence
of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.
HELD:
NO. The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or
arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of the law.
The drug test was in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination. It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have
his urine extracted and tested for drugs. 
SPO2 LOLITO T. NACNAC , petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
GR. No. 191913, March 21, 2012
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
One evening in February 2003, Police Officer Lolito Nacnac had an argument
with Police Officer Doddie Espejo within the premises of the Dingras Police
Station in Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Espejo, who had a history of workplace
violence, was then drunk and was armed with a calibre .45 tucked in his holster
argument, Espejo acted as if to draw his gun. This prompted Nacnac to fire a
warning shot. Undaunted, Espejo still drew his gun and Nacnac shot Espejo on
the head which resulted in Espejo’s death. Nacnac was charged with the death
of Espejo. Nacnac invoked self-defense. He was convicted by the trial court as
the latter was not convinced that there was unlawful aggression on the part of
Espejo to justify self-defense on the part of Nacnac.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is unlawful aggression on the part of Espejo.
RULING: YES. Ordinarily, the cocking of a rifle (gun) without aiming the
firearm at any particular target is not sufficient to conclude that one’s life was
in imminent danger. Hence, a threat, even if made with a weapon, or the belief
that a person was about to be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary that the
intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by some external acts
showing the commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression.
But this case is different because Espejo was a trained police officer. Espejo
was inebriated and had disobeyed a lawful order from Nacnac who was his
superior. A warning shot fired by Nacnac was left unheeded as Espejo reached
for his own firearm and pointed it at Nacnac. Nacnac was, therefore, justified in
defending himself from an inebriated and disobedient colleague. A police
officer is trained to shoot quickly and accurately. A police officer cannot earn
his badge unless he can prove to his trainors that he can shoot out of the
holster quickly and accurately. Given this factual backdrop, there is reasonable
basis to presume that the appellant indeed felt his life was actually threatened.
Facing an armed police officer like himself, who at that time, was standing a
mere five meters from Nacnac, Nacnac knew that he has to be quick on the
draw. It is worth emphasizing that Espejo, being a policeman himself, is
presumed to be quick in firing.
evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot and spray with bullets the jeep driven by
Lorenzo de Leon resulting in the deaths of Vicente de Leon, Aldren de Leon 1
and Guillermo Tapiador and the wounding with serious gunshot injuries of
Racquel Agbuya, Catalina de Leon, Gregoria de Leon and Lorenzo de Leon. The
accused having performed all the acts of execution which would produced (sic)
the crime of Murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrators and that is
due to the able and (sic) medical attendance extended to the said victims which
prevented their death to the damage and prejudice of the victims and the heirs
of the deceased victims.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, The RTC convicted Zacarias Castillo with 3 counts of murder and 4 counts of
vs. frustrated murder.
MANUEL GUTIERREZ (at large); JUANCHO GUTIERREZ (at large); ESTING
CARIO (at large) and ZACARIAS CASTILLO, defendant-appellant.
GR. No. 137610-11, February 6, 2002
PUNO, J.:

FACTS:
Several men did not live to see daylight at the break of dawn on January 8,
1992. Still several others suffered in the darkness of their fear and coldness of
their pain as they bled. In a rough and deserted road, the accused peppered the
victims' vehicle and bodies with bullets in a matter of minutes.

On March 23, 1992, an information was filed against the accused Manuel
Gutierrez, Juancho Gutierrez, Esting Cario and Zacarias Castillo for the crime of
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder.

That on or about the 8 th day of January 1992, in the morning, in barangay

Sanlibo, municipality of Bayambang, province of Pangasinan, New (sic)
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, confederating and conspiring together and mutually
aiding one another, armed with high-caliber firearms, with treachery and
1ISSUE:
Whether or not Zacarios Castillo is one of the conspirators in ambushing the jeep driven by Lorenzo de Leon.

RULING:
YES. There was conspiracy among the accused is unmistakable. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
perpetrators before, during, and after the crime, which indicate a common design, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments.24 In the case at bar, the prosecution witnesses saw the four accused in the vicinity of
the crime scene, they (the accused) carried firearms and fired at them, the police recovered empty shells
matching these firearms at the scene of the crime after the firing took place, and all the accused ran towards the
mango trees going to Malicer after the attack. The four accused clearly conspired. When conspiracy is shown, the
act of one is the act of all the conspirators. 25 It is of no import therefore who delivered the fatal shots and the
shots resulting in the injury of the victims as the act of one of the accused is the act of all.

The attack was undoubtedly treacherous. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an
unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the crime, depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or
repel the aggression, thus insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on
the part of the victim. 26 Needless to say, the unsuspecting victims in the jeep driven by Lorenzo de Leon were
taken by surprise and had no means to defend themselves. They were simply on their way to attend a hearing in
another town in Pangasinan and had no inkling that such a gruesome attack would befall them at the break of
dawn.

Anent the accused's defense of alibi, suffice it to say that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and easily
fabricated, particularly when it is corroborated by relatives and friends of the accused as in the case at bar. 27
While the defense presented a voucher showing that the accused Castillo worked and was paid for his work at
the Landhaus Property and Development Corporation on the day the crime was committed or on January 8,
1992, such voucher was not identified by the person who issued it, and therefore has no probative value for
being hearsay.28 We note, too, that the accused failed to present his time record despite the opportunity to do so.
The accused Castillo's defense of alibi cannot prevail over the prosecution witnesses' positive testimonies
detailing how they were attacked by the four accused on that fateful day of January 8, 1992. 29crä lä wvirtualibrä ry

We now come to the characterization of the crimes for which the trial court convicted the accused Castillo. The
trial court found the accused Castillo guilty of three counts of murder and four counts of frustrated murder.
While the information charged the accused with the complex crime of multiple murder with multiple frustrated
murder, we agree with the trial court that he should be held guilty of three separate counts of murder in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 30 We, however, find that the trial court erred in convicting the accused
Castillo of four counts of frustrated murder as the evidence on record shows that only Catalina de Leon's gunshot
wounds could have been fatal were it not for the timely medical treatment she received. For this, the accused is
guilty of one count of frustrated murder. As there is a dearth of evidence that Gregoria de Leon, Lorenzo de Leon,
and Racquel Agbuya sustained fatal wounds, it cannot be said that the accused performed the last act necessary
to produce the consummated crime of murder. While the accused may have had the intent to kill these three
victims as manifested by their use of deadly weapons in their attack, the absence of evidence that they sustained
fatal wounds compels us to convict the accused of three counts of attempted murder.