ALICIA LAUREL vs FERDINAND VARDELEON Moreover, in coming to court that day, Laurel and the

G.R. No. 202967 | August 05, 2015 substitute counsel were acting in the honest belief that
SECOND DIVISION, J. Del Castillo trial cannot proceed on account of pending incidents
Digest by: Shekinah Mae Fortuna which the trial court has failed to resolve.

FACTS Moreover, since Laurel and Vardeleon agreed to the

three settings during pre-trial, then Laurel should have
On July 23, 2004, Alicia Y. Laurel filed a Complaint for been given three opportunities to present her case,
recovery of possession and ownership and/or quieting and not merely two.
of title against Ferdinand M. Vardeleon.
Besides, the delay or failure to prosecute
In a July 6, 2005 Pre-Trial Order, Laurel was contemplated under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997
scheduled to present her evidence on three separate Rules must be for an "unreasonable length of time."
dates: September 7, 2005; October 12, 2005; and
November 23, 2005. In Laurel’s case, the continuance she sought was not
for an unreasonable length of time. It was within the
During the scheduled October 12, 2005 hearing, period expected by and made known to the defendant
Laurel was present, together with substitute counsel and the trial court during pre-trial.
Atty. Roy Villa and her first witness. Laurel moved in
open court to postpone trial on the ground that there
are pending motions that have to be resolved, and that
the substitute lawyer had yet to confer with the
witness, since her true counsel, Atty. De la Vega - who
originally interviewed the witness - was not present.
The case was dismissed on the ground of failure to
prosecute on Laurel's part, pursuant to Section 3, Rule
17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Laurel appealed to the CA. She claimed that RTC

should not have dismissed her case since she still had
one more scheduled hearing – November 23, 2005, for
the presentation of evidence. CA affirmed RTC ruling.

ISSUE:

WON the complaint of Laurel should be dismissed due

to failure to prosecute?

RULING: NO.

This Court has said that "the fundamental test for

failure to prosecute (non prosequitur) is whether, under
the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want
of due diligence in failing to proceed with
reasonable promptitude. There must be
unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to
prosecute.

The Court declares that the trial court erred in

dismissing Civil Case No. 7249, and the appellate
court should not have affirmed such dismissal. Laurel's
actuations indicate that she was not at all unwilling
to prosecute her case; nor can it be said that - as
the trial court puts it - she "refused" to present her
evidence. Far from these, she was indeed more than
eager to see her case through. When she instituted
Civil Case No. 7249 in 2004, Laurel was already
eighty-one (81) years of age. Yet, despite her
advanced age, the record indicates that Laurel
attended the scheduled hearing of October 12, 2005,
together with her counsel and the first witness - only
that lawyer who attended was a mere proxy, and not
Laurel's true counsel who previously conferred with the
witness.