A. Compulsory Heirs (Art. 887, as amended by Art.
176, Family Code)
Rosales v. Rosales, 148 SCRA
69, GR L-40789, 2/27/1987
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance
with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides
that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded
by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes
mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the
extent established by this Code.
HELD:
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The
entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to
inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the
right of representation. 
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the
deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or
widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a
parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as
regards the estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make
this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in
Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it
affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-
law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is
nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ...
(Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code
aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A careful
examination of the said Article confirms that the estate
contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The
estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate
proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales,

Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio, 43 SCRA
177, GR L-30977, 1/31/1972
the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra
V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the
inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article
981 of the Code.
Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she
has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her
husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right
to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as
it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death
that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded
from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed
from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between
spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of
legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the
plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On the point, Article 106
of the Civil Code provides: .
4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from
the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover,
provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the
innocent one shall be revoked by operation of law.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community
of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any
share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or
his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent
spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in
favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all
rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code
article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and
by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are
difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim
to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished"
after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court,
to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the
deceased party.
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice,
the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be
substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days,
or within such time as may be granted...
Baritua v. CA, 183 SCRA 565, GR
82233, 3/22/1990
Vizconde v. CA, 286 SCRA 217,
GR 118449, 2/11/1998
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only
when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the
other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs.
As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia
and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not
successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory
heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their
obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the
natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had
been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a
legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an
heir of the deceased spouse.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of
Bienvenido, seek relief and compensation from the petitioners.
While it may be true that the private respondents loaned to
Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and
shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price
and expenses are but money claims against the estate of their
deceased son. 16 These money claims are not the liabilities of the
petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the
agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with
Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as
well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a
matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the
petitioners.
Facts:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-
Vizconde had two children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioners
wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas
and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and
Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de
Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased
his parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their
four children.
Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land. Estrellita sold
the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad
Balictar. In June of the same year, Estrellita bought from
Premiere Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements using a
portion of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the
balance was deposited in a bank. Estrellita and her two
daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an
incident popularly known as the Vizconde Massacre. 
petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless,
petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate
of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of
Shares,5 with Rafael and Salud, Estrellitas parents. The extra-
judicial settlement provided for the division of the properties of
Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses
Rafael and Salud.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate,
Teresita instituted an intestate estate proceeding. Teresita
prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix of Rafaels estate.
Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of
Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother. Herein
private respondent Ramon filed an opposition 9 dated March 24,
1993, praying to be appointed instead as Salud and Ricardos
guardian. Barely three weeks passed, Ramon filed another
opposition10 alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the
Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not les than Six
Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder.
Ramon pleaded for courts intervention to determine the legality
and validity of the intervivos distribution made by deceased
Rafael to his children,11 Estrellita included.

On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. C-1699, entitled InMatter Of The Guardianship Of Salud
G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas and averred that their legitime
should come from the collation of all the properties distributed
to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. 12 Ramon stated that
herein petitioner is one of Rafaels children by right of
representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter
of Estrellita.

The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses

Vizconde were then financially incapable of having purchased or
acquired for a valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela
from the deceased Rafael Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses
Vizconde were then living with the deceased Rafael Nicolas in the
latters ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said
spouses were dependent for support on the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. And Lauro Vizconde left for the United States in,  de-
facto separation, from the family for sometime and returned to
the Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths of
Estrellita and her two daughters.

To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were

financially incapable to buy the property from the late Rafael
Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have been engaged in
business venture such as taxi business, canteen concessions and
garment manufacturing. However, no competent evidence has
been submitted to indubitably support the business undertakings
adverted to.
In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the
acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable
consideration.
 Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of
Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the subject property in
Paraaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of the said
transfer of property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of
Estrellita, is subject to collation.

Issue:
W/N The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of
petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-
law of Rafael, is one of Rafaels compulsory heirs.

Held:
First : The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of
petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-
law of Rafael, is one of Rafaels compulsory heirs. Article 887 of
the Civil Code is clear on this point:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate children and ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded
by those in Nos 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes
mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the
extent established by this Code.
With respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, petitioner who was not
even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person
or a stranger.29 As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the
intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or
allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the
said proceeding,30 which petitioner correctly argued in his
manifestation.31cräläwvirtualibräry

B. Legitime (Arts. 886)

1. Legitime of Compulsory Heirs (Arts. 888-907)

2. Computation for the Determination of Legitime & Distribution of the Estate (Arts. 908-914)
Pagkatipunan v. IAC, 198 SCRA
719, GR 70722, 7/3/1991
Doctrine:
As already said, no conclusion as to the legal share due to the
compulsory heirs can be reached in this case without (1)
determining first the net value of the estate of Jose Velasquez,
Sr.; (2) collating all the donations  inter vivos in favor of some of
the heirs; and (3) ascertaining the legitime of the compulsory
heirs.
Facts:
decision of the Court of First Instance
he entire house and lot on West Avenue, Quezon City, shall be
divided as follows:
One-half value of said house and lot to defendant-appellant
Canuta Pagkatipunan and her 13 co-defendants-appellants
children (now petitioners) to the extent of their respective
proportional contributions as stated above; and
The other one-half value of the said house and lot goes to the
second conjugal partnership of the deceased husband and his
second spouse Canuta Pagkatipunan to be partitioned one-fourth
to Canuta Pagkatipunan and the other one-fourth appertaining to
the deceased Jose Velasquez, Sr. to be divided equally among his
18 heirs as follows:
1/18 undivided portion to Canuta Pagkatipunan;
1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiff-appellee Lourdes
Velasquez;
1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs-appellees Edgardo, Lolita,
Minerva, Cynthia, and Jennifer, all surnamed Velasquez;
1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs-appellee Teresa Magtibay
and her children, Ricardo, Lourdes, Celia and Aida, all surnamed
Velasquez;
1/1 8 undivided portion to the plaintiffs-appellees Cesar, Adolfo,
Evelyn, Angelita, Ruben, and Carmencita, all surnamed Gonzales;
1/18 undivided portion to each of the 13 defendants-appellants
Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon,
Manuel, Julio, Elena, Patricia, Victoria, and Carlos, all surnamed
Velasquez.
The principal litigants in this case are the successors- in-interest
of Jose Velasquez, Sr. who died intestate on February 24, 1961.
Petitioner Canuta Pagkatipunan is the surviving spouse of Jose
Velasquez, Sr. and the other 13 petitioners are their children.
On the other hand, the private respondents are the descendants
of Jose Velasquez, Sr. with his first wife Victorina Real who died in
1920 at Santa Cruz, Laguna. Private respondents Jose Velasquez,
Jr. (substituted after his death during the pendency of this suit by
his surviving spouse Teresa Magtibay and their children Ricardo,
Lourdes, Celia and Aida), and Lourdes Velasquez are two of the
five children of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. The other
three, Amelia, Guillermo and Lutgarda, all surnamed Velasquez,
all died before the commencement of this case. Amelia
Velasquez died without any issue. Guillermo Velasquez was
survived by private respondents Edgardo, Lolita, Minerva,
Cynthia and Jennifer, all surnamed Velasquez, his children, forced
heirs and lawful successors-in-interest. Lutgarda Velasquez was
survived by private respondents Cesar, Adolfo, Evelyn, Amelita,
Ruben and Carmencita, all surnamed Gonzales, likewise her
children, forced heirs and successors-in-interest.
It appears that after the death of Victorina Real in 1920, no
dissolution of the first conjugal property has been made.
Consequently, Jose Velasquez, Sr. enjoyed full possession, use,
usufruct and administration of the whole conjugal property of
the first marriage.
In 1930, Jose Velasquez, Sr. took Canuta Pagkatipunan as his
second wife although they cohabited as early as 1921, when she
was 16, soon after his first wife's death. From this marriage, the
other 13 co-petitioners were born. Neither had there been any
liquidation of the second conjugal partnership after the death of
Jose Velasquez, Sr. in 1961. This situation gave rise to the
controversies in the instant case spawned by the parties'
conflicting claims from both sides of the two marriages.
After the death of Jose Velasquez, Sr. the full possession of said
property was acquired by Canuta Pagkatipunan. On March 4,
1967, she sold the same property to the spouses Moises Santos
and Magdalena Pagkatipunan, her brother-in-law and sister,
respectively (they were previously impleaded in the trial court as
party-defendants). Subsequently, Tax Declaration No. 4843 was
issued in the names of the said spouses who later resold the
same property to Canuta Pagkatipunan.

Held:
the trial court failed to consider among others, the following
provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left
at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all
debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the
will.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the
value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation,
at the time he made them.
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any

Rules on Collation (Arts. 1061-
1077)
De Roma v. CA, 152 SCRA 205,
GR L-46903, 7/23/1987
property or right which he may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of
the partition.
Article 909 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 909. Donations given to children shall be charged to their
legitime.
Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that part of the
estate of which the testator could have disposed by his last
will.1âwphi1
Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the disposable
portion, they shall be reduced according to the rules established
by this Code.
Civil Case No. SC-894 is hereby remanded to the Regional Trial
Court of Laguna, for further proceedings and the same Court is
directed to:
a) follow the procedure for partition herein prescribed;
b) expand the scope of the trial to cover other possible illegal
dispositions of the first conjugal partnership properties not only
by Canuta Pagkatipunan but also by the other heirs as can be
shown in the records;
c) include the one-fourth (1/4) share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. in the
residential house in Quezon City with his conjugal share under his
first marriage, if any, to determine his net estate at the time of
his death.
Doctrines:
1. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily
exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under
Article 1061.
2. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed
plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule
announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is
categorical enough.
Facts:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay
de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30,
1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as
guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in
due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by
Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated
by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been
included.

Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no
obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such
collation and the donation was not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the decedent
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of
the partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory
heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the
donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation
should be reduced as inofficious.

Issue:
whether these lands are subject to collation. 

Held:
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the
above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the
donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the
phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing
muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should
not be construed as an express prohibition against collation. 6 The
fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt
the subject thereof from the collation required under Article
1061.

Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under

the clear language of Article 1062.1awphil The suggestion that
there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated
were imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate
merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here,
nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious The sole
issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to
collate, and we see none.
Arellano v. Pascual, 638 SCRA
826, GR 189776, 12/15/2010
Vizconde v. CA (prev. assigned)
Imperial v. CA, 316 SCRA 393,
GR 112483, 10/8/1999
DOCTRINE:
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other
forced heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an
ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they
received from him, so that the division may be made according to
law and the will of the testator. 24 Collation is only required of
compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and
involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous
title during the lifetime of the decedent. 25 The purpose for it is
presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in
interest in making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced
heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share
in the estate, and that the predecessors will is to treat all his heirs
equally, in the absence of any expression to the
contrary.26 Collation does not impose any lien on the property or
the subject matter of collationable donation. What is brought to
collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value
of such property at the time it was donated, 27 the rationale being
that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership
upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any
deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or
donee.28