NEGATION I N FREUD

J. BUELENS

I. In tro d u ctio n

A t first sig h t so lit t le attention has been paid in psychoana-

lysis, and specifically in Freud's wo rk, to the problem of nega-
tion that it seems h a rd ly wo rth wh ile to take it as a subject fo r
study. I f one decides t o do so, i t seems t o be lo g ica l t o ta ke
Freud's essay o f 1925 'Negation' (1925h) a s a sta rtin g point.
Judged b y the fact that Freud was n e a rly 70 years o ld wh e n
he wro t e th e essay, negation wo u ld b e a to p ic t o wh ic h h e
turned late in life and wh ich occupies little room in the to ta lity
of his writin g s: the whole essay amounts to a bare 5 pages.
This negative impression is moreover confirmed when lo o k-
ing u p i n Grinstein's 'In d e x o f psychoanalyticial writ in g s' (')
what can be found on the subject of negation: the o n ly co n tri-
butions one can fin d there are t wo texts in J. Lacan's 'Ecrits',
viz. J. Hyppolite's comment on Freud's essay and Lacan's o wn
comment on Hyppolite's comment (
2 seem to amount to ve ry much.
not
) !AndAyept, po na closer
r e n scru
t l ytin, y it is strange th a t an imp o rta n t
apsychoanalytical
l l writ in g o n h u ma n communication a n d spe-
tcificahlly oni negation
s as R. Spitz' ma jo r wo rk (') is not listed in
dGrinstein's
o in dee x s.v.s negation. Its t it le should speak fo r itse lf
and leave no doubt as to Spitz' intentions, wh e n he published
this b o o k. Mo re o ve r, i t mu st b e considered a s a n a d d itio n
— and indeed a most valuable one — to Freud's th e o ry on the
matter.
Therefore we have decided to writ e this analysis o f negation
in psychoanalysis, starting wit h Freud and finishing wit h Spitz.
Freud is not treated here, because he happens to be the founder
of psychoanalytic t h e o ry o r o u t o f sheer h e ro wo rsh ip , b u t
because negation had been mentioned in his wo rk several times
320 J . BUELENS

long before 1925 and, mo re essentially, because th e concept

of negation is q u ite imp o rta n t in Freud's theoretical fo rmu la -
tions. Mo re o ve r, Fre u d cla ims f o r h is psychological explana-
tion o f negation a g e n e ra l va lid it y. Therefore, t h e p re se n t
author thought it wo rth wh ile in the light of the in te rd iscip lin a ry
approach of this volume that scientists fro m other fields (logics,
linguistics, etc.) should consider the Freudian theory and argu-
ment.
Because o f the fa ct that negation fo rms an in trin sic p a rt o f
the g e n e ra l Fre u d ia n t h e o ry o f t h e p sych ica l apparatus i t
seems impossible to analyse the fo rme r with o u t saying some-
thing about the latter. Th is imp lie s that one has t o sta rt f ro m
the ve ry beginning, viz. f ro m Freud's f irst fo rmu la tio n s o f his
theory o f the human mind. Th e re is indeed a connection be-
tween the e a rly writin g s and the more mature: a rig h t under-
standing o f th e la t t e r i s d ifficu lt, i f n o t impossible, wit h o u t
knowledge of the former.

Negation in Freud.

1. Negation in the writin g s before 1925

The f irst theoretical writin g , in wh ich Freud expounded h is

ideas o n th e stru ctu re a n d th e fu n ctio n in g o f t h e p sych ica l
apparatus, is th e famous 'Project' o f 1895. I t wa s n o mo re t o
Freud than a wo rkin g paper and was not to be published u n til
some ten years after its author's death.
Nevertheless, i t contains t h e essence o f la t e r t h e o ry t o a
considerable extent. Freud wanted to be as exact as possible
in writ in g his Project; in fact he intended it as a physiological
psychology. Fo r this ve ry reason it seems to offer an excellent
point of departure for our analysis.
The p sych ica l apparatus has a stru ctu re a n d a d yn a mics:
these are the exact data from wh ich Freud starts his theoretical
construction. A s t o d yn a mics, t h e apparatus i s d riv e n b y
energy: exogenous and endogenous stimu li activate the appa-
ratus. A s to structure, Freud in this respect a fo llo we r of Me y-
 NE G A TI O N I N FRE UD 3 2 1

nert, his Viennese teacher in psychiatry, distinguishes two sub-

systems: the p rima ry and the secondary system. Th e p rima ry
system is g ive n fro m the ve ry beginning (innate), i t functions
according to the re fle x model and tends to keep the psychical
apparatus fre e f ro m a n y energy. Wh e n th e apparatus i s st i-
mulated, the p rima ry system sees to it that incoming stimu li are
immediately discharged. I t can do so p e rfe ctly as f a r as e xo -
genous stimu li are concerned, but this does not apply to endo-
genous stimu li. In fact, the la tte r give rise to needs, wh ich can
only be eliminated by specific action.
The bitter experience of life (the constant flo w of endogenous
excitation) and the child's dependence on the outer wo rld f o r
the satisfaction o f his needs (the p o ssib ility o f performing the
specific action) necessitate the development of another system.
This secondary system inhibits the reflex action of the p rima ry
system. Indeed, the p rima ry system w i l l re a ct in e fficie n tly t o
the incoming stimu li (wishes) b y discharging energy at random.
This, h o we ve r, does n o t b rin g satisfaction, i f th e specific a c-
tion was not performed. E.g. if the wish f o r food is raised and
the ch ild hallucinates the wish object (the mother, the breast),
so th a t perceptual id e n t it y arises i n th e p sych ica l apparatus
between the wish and its object, th e p rima ry system w i l l d is-
charge energy. This discharge is inadequate, because there was
no real (objective) identity, but o n ly hallucinatory (subjective)
identity. Th e sp e cific a ct io n (n u t rit io n ) f a ile d t o co me a n d
the re su lt o f the a ctio n o f th e p rima ry system is unpleasure
(increase of the level of energy in the whole system) instead of
pleasure (decrease o f the le ve l o f energy in the system).
As th e p rima ry system alone proved to be unable t o g u a r-
antee a good functioning o f th e p sych ica l apparatus t h e se -
condary syste m (th in kin g , t h e Ego) mu s t b e inserted: i t n o
longer functions according to the reflex model, but accumulates
energy (fie ld model) t o regulate and co n tro l discharge in th e
whole apparatus. Th is syste m strive s a t thought id e n t it y in -
stead o f perceptual id e n t it y (p rima ry system).
In t h is v i e w o f t h e stru ctu re a n d t h e fu n ctio n in g o f t h e
psychical apparatus negation is already imbedded, i f not men-
tioned e xp licit ly. Indeed, t h e f irs t syste m, t h e unconscious,
322 J . BUELENS

according t o Freud's o wn wo rd s, ca n d o n o th in g b u t 'wish '.

By t h a t h e means t h a t t h e p ri ma ry syst e m i s e xclu sive ly
capable o f re co rd in g t h e in co me o f endogenous e xcit a t io n
(wishes) and its prompt discharge. I t is in fact directed b y the
pleasure principle, i.e. the tendency to keep the level of energy
in the system as lo w as possible. Th is implies that the p rima ry
process i n t h e syste m Ucs. ca n n o t negate: t h e re i s ju s t a
constant f l o w o f e n e rg y a n d negation, a cco rd in g t o Fre u d ,
precisely means th e b re a kin g through o f th is co n tin u ity, i.e.
the in h ib itio n o f the re fle x action o f the p rima ry process.
Negation is connected with the development of the secondary
system. Th is system w i l l be directed b y the re a lit y principle,
which means that it w i l l consider the requirements o f external
reality, though it should be added a t once that in the la st re -
source t h e re a lit y p rin cip le a lso serves a b e tte r fu n ctio n in g
of the pleasure principle. L e t us explain: wh e n the baby feels
hungry (accumulation o f endogenous e xcita tio n o f a specific
kind) th e p rima ry system w i l l re a ct a u to ma tica lly and t r y to
discharge th e energy. Th e baby w i l l c ry o r flounder. B y th is
action n o satisfaction is obtained, because endogenous e xcita -
tion can o n ly be discharged b y means o f specific action. Fo r
this specific action the baby is e n tire ly committed to the in te r-
vention of an adult person, in other terms to the external wo rld .
This imp lie s th a t the baby — and future man — w i l l have to
take external re a lity into account in order to satisfy his wishes
and needs; i f not, in t e rn a l tension w i l l b e risin g co n sta n tly
and man w i l l have to live in a situation, wh ich is incompatible
with the pleasure p rin cip le i.e. the ru lin g p rin cip le o f the p sy-
chical apparatus. For this reason a secondary system is needed:
it breaks w i t h t h e re f le x a ct io n o f th e p rima ry syste m a n d
makes the negation o f immediate g ra tifica tio n o f needs possi-
ble, Th e imme d ia te , b u t o f t e n inadequate, response o f t h e
p rima ry system is replaced by a reaction, wh ich enables a more
durable satisfaction, e ve n i f i t is n o t immediate. Th in kin g is
called i n and it has among it s functions t o d e n y some o f the
wishes and impulses of the p rima ry system.
To illustrate this line of thought I quote the following, rather
extensive, b u t ve ry revealing passage fro m 'The Interpretation
 NE G A TI O N I N FRE UD 3 2 3

of Dreams': ' I t is t ru e that, so f a r as we kn o w, n o p sych ica l

apparatus exists wh ich possesses a p rima ry process o n ly and
that such an apparatus is t o th a t extent a theoretical fictio n .
But th is mu ch is a fact: th e p rima ry processes a re present in
the mental apparatus f ro m the first, wh ile it is o n ly during the
course o f lif e th a t the secondary processes unfold, and come
to in h ib it and o ve rla y the p rima ry ones; i t ma y even be th a t
their complete domination is n o t attained u n t il th e p rime o f
life. In consequence of the belated appearance of the secondary
processes, t h e co re o f o u r being, co n sistin g o f unconscious
wishful impulses, re ma in s inaccessible t o t h e understanding
and inhibition of the preconscious, the part played by the latter
is restricted once and fo r a ll to directing along the most expe-
dient paths th e wish f u l impulses th a t a rise f ro m t h e u n co n -
scious. These unconscious wishes exercise a compelling force
upon a ll la t e r mental trends, a fo rce wh ich those trends a re
obliged t o f a ll in wit h o r wh ich th e y ma y perhaps endeavour
to d ive rt and d ire ct t o h ig h e r aims. A f u rt h e r re su lt o f th e
belated appearance o f th e secondary process is t h a t a wid e
sphere o f mn e mic ma t e ria l i s inaccessible t o preconscious
cathexis.
Among these wish fu l impulses derived f ro m infancy, wh ich
can n e ith e r be destroyed o r inhibited, th e re a re some whose
fulfilment wo u ld be a contradiction o f the purposive ideas o f
secondary th in kin g . Th e fu lfilme n t o f these wishes wo u ld n o
longer generate a n affect o f pleasure b u t o f unpleasure, a n d
it is p re cise ly th is transformation o f affect wh ich constitutes
the essence o f wh a t we t e rm 'repression'. Th e problem o f re -
pression lie s in the question o f h o w i t is and o win g t o wh a t
motive forces that this transformation occurs (...). I t is enough
for us to be clear that a transformation o f this kin d does occur
in the course o f development and (...) th a t it is related to the
a ctivity of the secondary system' (
4 From the preceding we can already d ra w some p re limin a ry
).
conclusions regarding Freud's vie w on the psychical apparatus
and on negation:
1. The psychical apparatus has a double structure to wh ich
a double functioning corresponds. P rima rily, ma n is a being
324 J . BUELENS

that strive s f o r pleasure, that does not accept a postponement

of the satisfaction of his wishes and needs, that does not kn o w
negation. Su ch a being, h o we ve r, i s u n a b le t o s u rv iv e i n
(Western) so cia l re a lity. Therefore, ma n mu st — in o rd e r t o
survive i n o u r cu ltu re — develop another system: h e mu st
adapt to re a lity i.e. he must think and negate.
The secondary system is genetically younger, but it adds the
essentially human dimension t o th e apparatus. I t raises ma n
from an automatic being, reacting mechanically and reflexively,
to the le ve l o f a being, able to t h in k and t o consider the con-
crete possibilities of a given situation.
2. Dreams and neurotic symptoms belong t o the d o ma in o f
p rima ry function. 'Dreaming is a piece o f infantile mental lif e
that has been superseded', Fre u d t e lls u s. A n d h e goes o n :
'These methods o f wo rkin g on the p a rt o f the psychical appa-
ratus, wh ich are n o rma lly suppressed in wa kin g hours, become
current o n ce mo re i n psychosis a n d t h e n re ve a l t h e ir i n -
capacity f o r sa tisfyin g o u r needs i n re la tio n t o th e e xte rn a l
wo rld ' (
5apparatus regulated b y the pleasure p rin cip le but dreaming is
)innocent,
. because o f the fa ct th a t d u rin g sleep access t o mo -
tBilitoy is
t impossible.
h If o u r vie w on negation in Freud is co rre ct this imp lie s that
pnegation
h wo u ld not e xist in dreams, dreams being a modus o f
the
e np rima ry functioning of the psychical apparatus. And indeed,
oin 'Th
m e Interpretation o f Dreams* we come across these lines:
e n wa y in wh ich dreams treat the category o f contraries and
'The
acontradictories is h ig h ly remarkable. I t is simp ly disregarded.
a'No' seems n o t to e xist so fa r as dreams are concerned. Th e y
rshow a p a rt icu la r preference f o r co mb in in g co n tra rie s in t o
ea u n it y o r f o r representing th e m as one and th e same thing.
tDreams feel themselves a t lib e rty, moreover, to represent a n y
helement b y it s wish f u l co n tra ry; so th a t th e re is n o w a y o f
edeciding a t a f irst glance whether a n y element that admits o f
ea contrary is present in the dream-thoughts as a positive o r as
xa negative' (').
p Ontogenetically negation should be absent in the young child
ras long as it behaves according to the pleasure principle. In the
e
s
s
i
o
n
o
f
 NEG ATI O N I N FRE UD 3 2 5

'Formulations o n t h e t w o p rin cip le s o f me n t a l fu n ctio n in g '

(1911b) t h is v ie w seems t o b e imp lie d : t h e pleasure-ego ca n
nothing but wish, o n ly when the reality-ego is developed one
can strive fo r u t ilit y and consider the requirements o f re a lity.
Phylogenetically Freud thinks that it must be possible to find
correlates f o r th is phenomenon; i t is we ll-kn o wn th a t Fre u d
always was an adept o f Haeckers biogenetic la w. His interest
for linguistics helped h im here, f o r he thought to have found
correlates in the development o f language. In 1909 Freud read
the essay 'On the antithetical sense o f p rima l words' (1884) b y
the German linguist K. Abel. Imme d ia te ly afterwards he wro te
his o wn comment, bearing the same title (1910c). I n this paper
he starts f ro m the observation he a lre a d y made in Th e In te r-
pretation of Dreams', viz, that interpreters of dreams have held
since a n tiq u ity th a t ce rta in representations i n dreams me a n t
exactly t h e ir opposite. I n A b e l's e ssa y t h e re i s a s t rik in g
simila rity between t h e situ a tio n i n d re a ms a n d t h a t i n t h e
oldest known languages. Here as we ll we have the phenomenon
that a considerable n u mb e r o f wo rd s e xists wh ic h c a rry a
double a n d a n tith e tica l meaning. Examples a re g ive n f ro m
Egyptian, Indo-Germanic and Arabian.
In t h e f ra me wo rk o f a n in te rd iscip lin a ry approach o f t h e
concept o f negation it deserves to be mentioned that A b e l in
his paper quotes th e English philosopher, A . Bain. H e re fe rs
to th e f o llo win g passage f ro m h is 'L o g ic' (1870, I , 54): 'Th e
essential re la t ivit y of a ll knowledge, thought o r consciousness
cannot but show itse lf in language. I f everything that we can
kn o w is vie we d as a transition fro m something else, e ve ry ex-
perience mu st h a ve t wo sides; a n d e ith e r e ve ry name mu st
have a double meaning, o r else f o r e ve ry meaning there must
be t wo names'. Fre u d h imse lf uses t h is quotation (
7 considers it as a support fro m the philosophical side fo r his
he
), b e c ao f uthe
hypothesis s double
e meaning o f some representations in
dreams.
He concludes his short paper with the fo llo win g words: 'An d
we psychiatrists cannot escape the suspicion that we should be
better at understanding and translating the language o f dreams
if we knew more about the development of language' (
8
). F r e u d
326 J . BUELENS

obviously th in ks o f the development o f language as a macro-

cultural phenomenon, b u t to o u r min d and in the lig h t o f the
study o f negation we can render h is wo rd s as fo llo ws: i f we
knew mo re about th e genesis o f language i n t h e c h ild t h is
could th ro w some lig h t on the problem wh ich preoccupies us.
It is obvious that R. Spitz, whose contribution to negation will
be considered later, has taken such a surmise as h is sta rtin g
point.

2. Negation (1925h)

So, we have come to the specific essay wh ich Freud devoted

to negation in 1925. To begin wit h let us state that Freud, a t the
time n e a rly 70 ye a rs o ld , wa s s t ill i n f u ll possession o f h is
creative power, but that on the other hand he had b y the time
formulated a ll h is essential ideas (in clu d in g th e famous a n d
much discussed death instinct). We shall t ry to f o llo w Freud's
line o f thought as clo se ly as possible: t h e w o rk consists o f
only 5 printed pages and is v e ry condensed. I n J. Hyp p o lite 's
words 'ce texte est d'une structure absolument extraordinaire,
et a u fo n d extraordinairement énigmatique' ( ' t h i s t e x t i s
of a n a b so lu te ly e xtra o rd in a ry stru ctu re a n d fu n d a me n ta lly
extremely enigmatic'). O n l y a thorough a n a lysis o f th e t e xt
will a llo w the reader to evaluate Hyppolite's assertion.
Freud sta rts f ro m clin ica l observation. I n t h e course o f a
psychoanalytical session if often happens that patients present
their associations i n the f o llo win g fo rm: ' N o w yo u ' ll t h in k I
mean to say something insulting, but re a lly I've no such inten-
tion'. Freud explains this as a repudiation of an association b y
means o f projection. O r the patient says: 'Y o u a sk wh o t h is
person in the dream can be. I t is not my mother.' Upon wh ich
the a n a lyst emends to : 'S o i t is y o u r mother'. H e considers
only the subject-matter o f the association and disregards th e
negation.
An easy wa y to obtain access to the unconscious repressed
material is, according to Freud, b y putting the question: 'Wh a t
would you consider the most u n like ly imaginable thing in that
situation ? Wh a t do yo u th in k was furthest fro m yo u r min d a t
 NE G A TI O N I N FRE UD 3 2 7

the time ?' If the patient falls into the trap and gives an answer,
then the analyst nearly always has found what he was lo o kin g
for.
From these examples Freud concludes th a t a repressed re -
presentation o r idea can make it s wa y in to consciousness o n
condition th a t i t is negated b y consciousness. 'Ne g a tio n is a
wa y o f ta kin g cognizance o f wh a t is repressed; indeed i t is
already a lif t in g o f the repression, though not, o f course, a n
acceptance of what is repressed' (
1 If we consider this definition — o r rather circu mscrip tio n —
" ) .negation in the lig h t o f e a rlie r formulations, we obtain the
of
fo llo win g results. Negation belongs t o th e secondary system,
the repressed to the p rima ry. The repressed keeps on exerting
its permanent influence f ro m the unconscious upon conscious-
ness. Th is influence can o n ly be annihilated — and th is is the
purpose o f psychoanalytical th e ra p y — b y incorporating th e
repressed i n consciousness. B y negating t h e co n te xt o f t h e
repressed th e censorship o f the preconscious (th e censorship
between the systems unconscious and conscious) i s avoided:
the repressed is as matter of fact ra tio n a lly negated, i.e. its true
meaning is made innocent b y and f o r th e secondary system,
so th a t consciousness can take cognizance o f it, b u t must not
accept i t i n it s re a l meaning. O n th e co g n itive le ve l th in g s
are thus p u t rig h t, b u t not o n the affective le ve l : in o rd e r t o
obtain fu ll acceptance and possible elimination of the repressed
other conditions (transference) have to be fu lfille d . This, h o w-
ever, is a topic wh ich need not be dealt wit h in this study.
Freud continues a s f o llo ws: negation causes a separation
between t h e in te lle ctu a l a n d t h e a ffe ctive process (th e re i s
indeed intellectual cognizance of the repressed, but no affective
experience o f it : i t is n o t live d th ro u g h again). Th e a n a lyst
often reaches a fu rth e r stage wit h the patient: he succeeds in
convincing the patient o f the fact that negation is o n ly a wa y
of taking cognizance o f the repressed. So, the patient f u lly ac-
cepts th e in te lle ctu a l meaning o f th e repressed ma te ria l, b u t
this does n o t imp ly that repression is therefore eliminated, as
the other le ve l — the affective — must be reached to obtain
that result.
328 J . BUELENS

The fu n ctio n o f in te lle ctu a l ju d g e me n t re a lly is , a cco rd -

ing t o Freud, t o a f f irm o r to negate th e content o f thoughts.
His preceding remarks have therefore le d h im to the psycho-
logical o rig in o f this function. To negate something in judge-
ment fundamentally means: 'Th is is something wh ich I wo u ld
prefer t o repress'. Th e negative ju d g me n t is t h e in te lle ctu a l
substitute fo r repression. Wit h the help o f the symbol o f nega-
tion, th in kin g frees itse lf f ro m the restrictions p u t upon i t b y
repression and enriches itse lf wit h contents that are indispens-
able fo r its proper functioning. In this vie w negation is o f vita l
importance for proper thinking.
The function of judgment has two kinds of decisions to make:
first, i t has to decide whether o r not an attribute is possessed
by a thing; second, i t asserts o r disputes th a t a presentation
exists in reality.
The attribute, o ve r wh ich i t has t o decide, ma y o rig in a lly
have been good o r bad, h a rmfu l o r useful. I n the language o f
the oldest, o ra l instinctual impulses this means: 'Th is I wa n t to
eat o r to sp it o u t' o r, mo re generally, ' I wa n t t o incorporate
this o r to exclude it'. Fo r the o rig in a l pleasure-ego e ve ryth in g
that is inside it is good, the external wo rld is bad: in tro je ctio n
and ejection are its fundamental modes o f reaction.
As t o the second task o f the fu n ctio n o f the judgment, th e
decision o ve r the existence in re a lity, Fre u d th in ks th a t t h is
belongs to the domain of the reality-ego, wh ich developed from
the o rig in a l pleasure-ego b y means o f re a lit y testing. I t n o w
has to be decided whether something is inside the ego o r not
(whereas i n t h e preceding case t h e d e cisio n wa s a b o u t i n -
corporation into o r exclusion fro m the ego). So, it is once more
a question o f 'in te rn a l' o r 'external'. Th e unreal, t h e re p re -
sented, t h e su b je ctive i s o n l y in sid e t h e ego; t h e re a l, t h e
objective is also present outside the ego. I t is not o n ly imp o r-
tant to the ego t o kn o w i f something (e.g. an o b je ct o f satis-
faction) is good o r bad, b u t also i f i t is re a lly present in th e
external world.
The p o in t Freud t rie s t o ma ke here is perhaps elucidated,
when we consider h is v ie w th a t a ll presentations ste m f ro m
perception, are in fact repetitions of perceptions. O rig in a lly the
 NEG ATI O N I N FREUD 3 2 9

existence o f a presentation therefore guarantees th e existence

of an observation and of an object itself. On ly later the problem
arises t o distinguish an observation f ro m a presentation. Th is
is achieved by a specific property of thinking, viz. reproduction.
By means o f reproduction i t becomes possible t o re ca ll wh a t
was o n ce perceived, s o t h a t t h e n e ce ssity a rise s t o d ist in -
guish t h is presentation f ro m re a l perception. Re a lit y te stin g
for t h is reason resides i n t h e a b ilit y t o re f in d a n o b je ct i n
reality.
Freud concludes h is essay in th e fo llo win g wa y: ju d g me n t
is an intellectual action deciding o ve r the choice o f mo to r ac-
tion; i t constitutes a tra n sitio n between thought a n d action.
Orig in a lly it is nothing but the fu rth e r development of the p u r-
pose o f the pleasure p rin cip le (incorporation in to o r exclusion
from th e ego). Th e p o la rit y o f ju d g me n t (assertion-negation)
seems to coincide wit h the p o la rity of the instincts: the asser-
tion (th e unification) belongs t o t h e Eros, t h e negation (th e
exclusion) belongs t o th e destructive o r death instinct.
Judgment can o n ly f u lf il it s function b y the creation o f the
negation symbol. This indeed grants to thinking a certain degree
of independence f ro m the consequences o f repression and so,
from the constraint o f the pleasure p rin cip le . To h is v ie w o f
negation fits, according to Freud, the fact that one never meets
in analysis a n o f ro m the unconscious and that the recognition
of the unconscious by the ego is expressed in a negative formu-
lation. Th e f in a l sentence o f 'Ne g a tio n ' states: 'Th e re i s n o
stronger evidence that we have been successful in our effort to
uncover th e unconscious th a n wh e n th e p a tie n t reacts t o i t
with wo rd s ' I d id n 't t h in k that', o r ' I d id n 't (e ve r) t h in k o f
that" (" ).

Some conclusions and problems wit h reference to negation

in Fre u d

1. Fro m the v e ry f e w examples o f cases o f negation wh ich

Freud offers fro m psychoanalytical practice we can derive that
he o n ly considers negation of intellectual contents. His th e o ry
330 J . BUELENS

of negation (negation constitutes a p o ssib ility t o ta ke co g n i-

zance of repressed material) imp lie s that negation is related to
repressed material. We th in k that it is going too fa r to d e rive
from th is th a t Freud's explanation wo u ld co ve r a l l kin d s o f
negation. I t seems t o b e i n lin e w i t h Freud's tre n d t o q u ick
generalisation (
explanation
12 fo r e ve ry negation, whereas he o n ly deals wit h a
specific
) t h aform t of it.
h Fore th is reason it wo u ld be useful to come to an agreement
first
g i about v ethe different types o f negation. O n ly a fte r h a vin g
done
s so we can proceed to study fo r wh ich fo rm o r forms the
Freudian
t h theory could bring an explanation.
e 2. Th e Freudian v i e w o f negation i s genetic. Ne g a tio n i s
introduced
i m p art a specific mo me n t o f the in d ivid u a l's develop-
ment.
e s Freud s i d id not study this topic e mp irica lly, b u t Spitz has
tried
o nto f ill i n the gap b y h is investigations. We sh a ll t u rn to
his
o wo rk in this field later.
f 3. Fo r Freud negation is th e expression o f a d yn a mic co n -
flict.
o Assertion
f wo u ld be a phenomenon belonging to the Eros,
the
f libidinal,
e unifying instinct; negation is considered as the ex-
pression
r i o f the destructive o r death instinct, is expulsive. I t is
quite
n imp
g o ssib le t o g o in t o t h e p ro b le ms a n d crit icisms o f
Freud's
a death in stin ct in the scope o f this paper. Let it suffice
to
n state that the acceptance o f Freud's th e o ry of instincts does
not constitute a necessary condition fo r the acceptance o f his
vie w o f negation. We have shown th a t h is ma in ideas o n the
problem o f negation we re a lre a d y formulated lo n g before h e
phrased h is t h e o ry o f instincts. I t seems lo g ica l t h a t Fre u d
afterwards t rie d t o integrate h is v ie ws o f negation in t o h is
views of instincts, but they are b y no means inseparably linked
together.
It, however, wo u ld be useful to investigate to some detail the
relation between negation (o r certain fo rms o f it) and repres-
sion, as this relation is fundamental to Freudian theory. It could
for instance b e checked i n published psychoanalytical in t e r-
views and/or i n o th e r ma te ria l, i f th is re la tio n re a lly exists.
It is clear that in such an analysis the problems of interpretation
would be considerable.
 NEG ATI O N I N FRE UD 3 3 1

4. I n his essay o f 1925 Fru d has introduced several innova-

tions compared to his e a rlie r theories. A t f irst negation was a
tool b y wh ich th in kin g te mp o ra rily could deny satisfaction to
unconscious wishes. In 1925 things become more complicated:
negation is a co g n itive act, b y wh ich a ju d g me n t i s passed
over presentations (t h e ir existence, t h e ir usefulness f o r t h e
ego).
Thus, negation gets a double function in Freud's theory:
a. socio-moral, because i t w i l l h a ve t o se e t o i t wh a t i s
acceptable to the ego and wh a t is not. The ego, as emanation
of social re a lit y decides b y means o f negation wh ich uncon-
scious wish f u l impulses a re acceptable t o consciousness;
b. epistemological, because negation w i l l decide wh a t b e -
longs t o o b je ctive re a lit y a n d wh a t t o subjective, o n ce t h e
reality-ego has developed. We t h in k that we have thus g ive n
the essential ideas o f Freud on negation. We do not doubt that
his vie ws are open to criticism o r further investigation, but we
believe o n th e o th e r hand th a t t h e y o fte n o f f e r unexpected
perspectives.

(
Univ
1 . Press, 1956-66, 9 vols.
()
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G
New )R York , Int. Univ . Press, 1957.
2
)L
(A)
I SE. V , 603-4. SE. Th e Standard Edit ion o f t he Complet e Ps y c hologic al
Work A
S
N s of Sigmund Freud, ed. by J. STRACHEY, London, Hogarth, 1955, 24 vols.
(P
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