The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1993) Vol.

=I, Supplement

Derrida-Husserl-Freud:
The Trace of Transference
Rudolf Bernet
Husserl -Archives, Leu ven

Deconstruction is a mode of reading and writing which i n

its active form is a reply to Husserl’s complaints about the
passivity of reading and writing.’ It involves a philosophical
responsibility t h a t is a response to t h e appeal of a text. I n
Derrida’s early writings it is the metaphysics of presence that
is mainly at stake i n such a deconstruction. This notion of
presence is intimately linked with concepts such as origin,
(self-) consciousness, intuition, and present time. Husserl and
Freud have a common interest in the archeology of meaning
a n d propose a (different) explanation of t h e origin of con-
sciousness. Moving between Husserl and Freud, Derrida leaps
over the differences between Husserl and Freud and follows
the trace of “diffbrance” in Husserl’s transcendental conscious-
ness as well as in Freud’s unconscious. Consciousness and the
unconscious appear less different when “diffbrance” is shown
to articulate both Husserl’s account of temporality and re-pre-
sentation and Freud’s distinction between primary and second-
ary processes.
I n his Seminar on Transference, Lacan suggests t h a t psy-
choanalytic transference means speaking to somebody while
thinking of a third person who is the true addressee of what is
said. According to his interpretation of Plato’s Symposium,
Alcibiades addresses Socrates in order to seduce Agathon.* In
this paper I try to show t h a t Derrida discusses Husserl with
Freud in mind. Transference also means “passage,n and I shall
t r y to show t h a t “passage” is indeed a key term i n Derrida’s
reading of both Husserl and Freud. Husserl’s account of the
expression of a meaning a n d Freud’s theory concerning t h e
representation of the unconscious i n the manifest content of
the dream are examples of such a passage. Thwarting the to-
pology of metaphysical opposition, passage is a figure of
“diffbrance.” Eventually, this paper will deal with a third form
of transference, i.e., the form of transference involved in meta-
phor. Metaphors transfer meaning and play with t h e meta-
physical distinction between a proper a n d a n improper
meaning. Freud’s use of the metaphor of writing is taken seri-
ously by Derrida a n d becomes a n invitation to transfer t h e
meaning of writing to archi-writing. Freud’s unconscious as

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 Rudolf Bernet

well as Husserl’s re-presentational consciousness lend them-

selves to such an interpretation in terms of archi-writing.
The trace of transference in Derrida’s writings on Husserl
and Freud can best be followed by using two almost contempo-
raneous texts: Speech and Phenomena3 and “Freud and the
Scene of Writing.”4We will also take into account “To Specu-
’ ~ the “Introduction” t o Husserl’s On the
late On ‘ F r e ~ d ”and
Origin of Geometry.6 Le problbme de la genbse d a n s l a
philosophie de Husserl,’ however, falls outside of the scope of
this paper. The investigation of the transference between
Husserl and Freud does not allow for a proper discussion of ei-
detic and transcendental reduction, the genesis of the tran-
scendental subject, the distinction between empirical and
transcendental history and other similar issues extensively
dealt with in this first text by Derrida on Husserl. It is also
clear that in Le problbme de la gentse the third person in-
volved in Derrida’s discussion of Husserl was someone other
than Freud, i.e., HegeL8
The advantages of combining the discussion of Derrida’s
reading of Husserl with a consideration of Derrida’s texts on
Freud immediately appear when one compares Husserl’s no-
tion of “expression“ with Freud’s account of the dream.
In Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl, the expressive sign is
an external representative of an inner thought or meaning and
of the subject’s “will t o say.” The expression is therefore indeed
a matter of “transference” or transportation of a content of
thought into a word and also of an inner word or concept into
the world. This movement presupposes a topology that is es-
sentially determined by the metaphysical division and opposi-
tion between the purity of transcendental consciousness and
the impurity of the empirical world. According t o Derrida it is
the task of phenomenological reduction t o show how the word
and the world depend on transcendental consciousness and its
self-givenness. The transportation or “passage” involved in ex-
pression must therefore be conceived a s a one-directional
movement from a realm of originary being toward a realm of
derived or secondary being. This movement is governed by a
logic of representation that is more properly a “logic of substi-
tution.” According t o this logic, the expressive sign takes the
place of an intentional meaning that exists prior to and inde-
pendently of this sign. For Husserl, only the expressive sign is
a true sign because unlike other signs (such a s indicative
signs) it truthfully represents its meaning: nothing but its
meaning and its meaning in its ideal form of presence. The ex-
pressive sign is thus more than a faithful translation, it is the
first manifestation of a thought in a world to which it does not
originally belong.
This interpretation of Husserl’s essential distinction be-
tween expressive signs and indicative signs by Derrida in

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Speech and Phenomena is well known, and so is the critical re-

sponse to which it has given rise. Derrida has been criticized
for confusing Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology with
Cartesian dualism or, more convincingly, for subsuming all es-
sential (or transcendental) distinctions t h a t occur in Husserl
under the distinction between expressive and indicative signs.
Those who criticize Derrida i n t h e name. of a better under-
standing of Husserl should, however, not forget about the phe-
nomenological epoch6 (of which, by t h e way, Derrida h a s a
much deeper understanding than the eidetic and transcenden-
tal reduction). They should suspend their judgment until they
have considered the rest of Derrida’s argument, which is much
more subtle and difficult to understand. Derrida at first seems
to perform a mere reversal of Husserl’s priorities, but i t soon
appears that this is only a preparation for a further displace-
ment of his investigation to the nature of the sign.
Reversing Husserl’s account of the expressive sign, Derrida
wants to show that transcendental consciousness always needs
signs i n order to be present to itself. The self-presence of the
subject, rather than being the origin, comes about in a detour
and with delay. True signs are indicative rather than expres-
sive signs because it belongs to the essence of a sign to remain
different and distant from the signified. Since the signifier de-
pends on other signifiers when referring to the signified, the
logic of substitution is at a loss in both the relation between
signifier and signified, and i n t h e relation among different
signifiers. This results in a displacement of the problem where
original presence as such becomes a questionable notion: the
presence of a “transcendental signified” as well as t h e pres-
ence of t h e signifier becomes questionable. Transcendental
consciousness is neither fully present in itself nor in its repre-
sentation by means of a sign and the sign is present by giving
way to other signs, thus effacing itself. Derrida makes use of
the notions of “trace,” “(archi-) writing,” and “diff6rance” when
he tries to explain this flickering representation of a presence
t h a t is indefinitely deferred. He thereby invites u s to think
presence as a form of promise t h a t , while being born out of
representation, is at the same time removed from and deferred
by it.
A brief comparison with Derrida’s reading of Freud’s theory
of the dream can help u s to understand this better. This de-
tour and this transference of the problem might be the most
direct way into a discussion of Derrida’s contention t h a t the
voice of consciousness investigated by Husserl is inhabited by
the alterity of original inscriptions.
It is well known t h a t for Freud t h e dream is a m a t t e r of
both expression a n d language. The manifest content of t h e
dream expresses a n unconscious “thought” which is invested
by t h e energy of a n unconscious desire. J u s t as i n Husserl,

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this expression accomplishes a transportation of a meaning

from one location t o another, it is a transference from one re-
gion of being into another. The psycho-analytical distinction
between the unconscious thought of the dream and its precon-
scious content is no less metaphysical than the phenomenologi-
cal distinction between transcendental consciousness and the
empirical world. For Freud too, the unconscious meaning can
appear only when being transported into a domain that is for-
eign t o its true nature. The original meaning manifests itself
elsewhere and with delay; the primary processes of the uncon-
scious submit themselves t o the rules of the secondary pro-
cesses in order to allow for the manifestation of their (hidden)
meaning. Here again, the expression seems t o be governed by
a logic of substitution or “translati~n.”~
It is not surprising then that Derrida uses the same strat-
egy in his reading of Freud and of Husserl. He shows in par-
ticular t h a t in Freud the unconscious thought or meaning
depends as much on its expression in the manifest content of
the dream as consciousness depends on the unconscious. This
reversal leads t o a critique of the logic of substitution and con-
secutively to a displacement of the concepts of presence and
representation. Not only is the unconscious thought never
present in itself, it also is never fully present in its representa-
tion by means of the manifest content of the dream. The trans-
ference of a meaning from the unconscious to the preconscious
both leaps over the borders of the two different psychic sys-
tems and deepens the gap between them. Primary processes
and secondary processes neither coincide nor act quite inde-
pendently from each other. The manifest content of a dream is
governed by secondary processes as well as by primary pro-
cesses, and the distinction between unconscious representa-
tions of things and preconscious representations of words
becomes undecidable.
At this point, I am, however, less interested in working out
these similarities between Derrida’s reading of Husserl and of
Freud, than in investigating what they can contribute to a bet-
ter understanding of Derrida’s account of Husserl’s concept of
consciousness. The most striking feature of our comparison is
indeed that Husserl’s transcendental consciousness is put in
parallel with Freud’s unconscious. This unexpected parallelism
deserves to be explored further and my paper basically has no
other goal than t o indicate some directions for such an explora-
tion.
Unlike Husserl’s transcendental consciousness, Freud’s un-
conscious is directly associated with the use of signs and writ-
ing. The unconscious thought represented by a dream owes
much of its content to the regressive investment of mnemic-
traces. These are the most primitive and unchanging elements
in the unconscious. When referring t o these traces, Freud quite

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naturally uses scriptural metaphors such as “inscription,”

“transcription (Umschrift),” and “writing.” Derrida takes these
metaphors seriously and thereby also sheds light on Freud’s
metaphysics of presence. For Derrida, the metaphor of writing
is the most proper definition of the unconscious because t h e
unconscious is metaphorical and scriptural in its very nature,
i.e., its very being consists in being transported by means of
signs t h a t a r e more properly to be called “traces.” Since the
origin of the unconscious is located in traces, its very nature is
to be originally reproductive and repetitive. Its presence and
being is inseparable from processes of representation. These
unconscious traces exist only in the manifold and every trace
is caught and wrought with other traces in a web of condensa-
tions and displacements. Derrida calls this web “archi-writ-
ing”: it is a writing that produces the origin while reproducing
it and it is truly a writing i n t h a t unlike the voice it does not
lend itself to a logic of representative substitution. The writing
t h a t constitutes the preconscious or manifest content of the
dream is a non-phonetic writing that is a rewriting or a tran-
scription of the archi-writing of the unconscious. Thus, the un-
conscious and the preconscious result from writing rather than
being j u s t secondarily represented by it. Writing i s s h e e r
transference (Derrida says: “diffbrance”) in t h a t it circulates
between the unconscious and the preconscious without having
any location of i t s own. Instead of inhabiting any definitely
circumscribed (metaphysical) space, writing rather creates its
own space in its movement of “spacing (espacement).”
However sketchy this evocation of Derrida’s discussion of
Freud’s notion of t h e unconscious might be, it should not
sound too unfamiliar to the reader of Speech and Phenomena.
The main thesis of this text is precisely that the self-presence
of Husserl’s transcendental consciousness is inhabited by or,
rather, produced and deferred by traces at the same time. The
best illustration of such a trace which produces a presence
while manifesting its original loss and impossibility is the re-
tention of a present now-point in consciousness. I n Derrida’s
understanding, retention is not a process t h a t keeps a former
original present present despite its fading into the past. It is
rather the first givenness of a present now which can only ap-
pear with delay. A pure now, instead of being t h e “original
source-point” of the present (as Husserl claims), is something
impossible: it would lack all temporal qualification and dis-
tinctness. Retention is therefore indeed a “trace” or a n “origi-
nal supplement” t h a t produces with delay t h a t to which it is
said to be added. The trace is thus a form of original alterity
t h a t cannot be reduced because it is inseparably entangled
with the self-givenness of the present.
All this becomes clearer and more relevant when one con-
siders the self-givenness of the present that characterizes self-

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consciousness. In Modern Philosophy the self-consciousness of

the subject was believed to be the most original form of pres-
ence. The presence of other subjects, of ideal meanings, of
ideal and real objects, a n d of t h e empirical world was com-
pared with and derived from the full and immediate presence
of the subject to itself in a present moment. If, however, the
present self-presence of the subject is accomplished (or rather
deferred) by means of traces, then it involves a form of alterity
t h a t unlike the alterity of other subjects, objects of thought
and sensuous experience, and the empirical world cannot be
considered to be foreign and external to the subject. Derrida
even suggests that this alterity inherent in the self-presence of
the subject undermines the former distinction between inti-
mate and exterior forms of otherness. Once there is a n open-
ing i n t h e s k i n of t h e self-present subject, t h e separation
between the inner and the outer becomes less obvious. Here
again, one could draw a parallel with Freud’s presentation of
the “psychic apparatus” in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
Thus, nothing is simply and immediately present in a n in-
stantaneous now-point; the present now-point is “the blink of
an eye” as Derrida writes in Speech and Phenomena. The now-
point becomes visible only with delay, when it is represented
by a retentional trace. As a consequence, there is also no im-
mediate and instantaneous self-awareness of the subject. The
subject appears to itself in the form of what it has been and
what it is not any longer. Derrida says that its life appears in
the perspective of death. Retention then becomes a mark of
death in the self-presence of the subject rather than a promise
of eternal life. But, i t is still not quite clear what besides the
analogy with Freud allows Derrida to associate this reten-
tional trace in time-consciousness with writing. How does the
wound opened in the self-presence of the subject by retention
let writing enter into the intimacy of Husserl’s transcendental
consciousness? This question cannot be given a n answer un-
less we pay attention to t h e manner i n which Derrida dis-
places t h e issue of self-consciousness by introducing t h e
metaphor of the voice.
“The voice” is a Derridean metaphor: it has indeed a literal
and a figurative meaning, but it owes much of its force to the
fact t h a t Speech and Phenomena constantly zigzags between
the two. In the literal sense, the voice refers to speech and can
t h u s be opposed to writing. I n speech the speaker as well as
what he/she wants to say is immediately present i n what is
said. The givenness of the sign is contemporaneous with the
original production of t h e meaning; t h e sound is fused to-
gether with its sense. The spoken word is a n immaterial body
entirely animated by the spirit of its meaning, and this spirit
makes use of breath which is commonly associated with the
source of life. The spoken word is therefore a n expressive sign

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which unlike the indicative signs i n writing does not involve

the possible absence and death of the author, the search for a
missing meaning, and the deciphering of material-spatial in-
scriptions. But i t is only when the speaker hears himherself
speak that speech is apurely expressive sign. It is only for the
speaker t h a t there is a fusion between the meaning and the
sign and not for the other persons listening to h i s h e r speech.
The voice is purely expressive only when it listens to itself at
the very moment it speaks.
In its figurative meaning the “voice” thus becomes a meta-
phor for the form of pure self-consciousness that characterizes
Husserl’s transcendental subject. The voice is thus, at t h e
same time, a n oral discourse t h a t listens to its own speech as
well as the transcendental condition that makes this possible.
The voice becomes a metaphor for all forms of a pure self-af-
fection. If, however, there exists no such pure self-affection,
then instantaneous self-consciousness is not only affected by
blindness (“the blink of a n eye”) but also by muteness (“the
voice that keeps silence”). Derrida argues for the impossibility
of a pure self-affection in the voice by emphasizing that solilo-
quy still depends on a transindividual linguistic code, that its
ideal expressive signs cannot do without empirical tokens, and
t h a t Husserl’s examples taken from the moral sphere show
t h a t inner speech is in fact the interjection of the voice of a n
external authority ( t h e voice of t h e super-ego). Also, t h e
speaker that uses the personal pronoun “I”in order to refer to
himherself while speaking to himherself has already given
himherself over to a form of alterity. The personal pronoun “I”
can t h u s be compared with t h e retentional trace: they both
signify to the subject the impossibility of an original and total
self-possession. Therefore one can say that if the “voice” is the
metaphor for a n immediate and full self-possession of the sub-
ject, a n d if this self-possession proves to be impossible, then
writing cannot any longer be excluded from this voice. The op-
position between voice and writing fades away and the possi-
bility of a pure voice a n d consequently also t h e distinction
between “voice” i n i t s literal and figurative sense becomes
questionable.
What is then, more precisely, the meaning of this writing in
self-consciousness or of this self-consciousness coming out of
writing? What is the “writing” in the “voice”? Here again, one
must disentangle the metaphors without trying to translate
them entirely into literal language and thereby destroying
them. The meaning of the metaphor of a “written voice” cannot
be properly expressed in metaphysical language because. i t re-
fers to something metaphysics is unable to think: archi-writ-
ing and “diff6rance.” If one would say t h a t writing is j u s t a
metaphor for a self that is never immediately a n d fully
present to itself, then one would assume t h a t there exists a

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 Rudolf Bernet

form of proper writing t h e s o r t one finds i n texts a n d one

would thereby turn the text into a metaphysical entity or re-
gion to be studied in what Husserl called a “material ontol-
ogy.” Derrida tries, quite to the contrary, to think of a form of
writing that would not be the opposite of speech or “voice” but
would rather inhabit it while, however, not letting itself be ap-
propriated by it. It is a writing within the voice, but not a pho-
netic writing; i t is neither inside nor outside of consciousness
because consciousness does not exist prior to writing and be-
cause writing effaces the borders of consciousness.
Having briefly explained how Freud’s unconscious comes out
of a n archi-writing that transgresses the separation between
the unconscious and the preconscious by creating a space and
a temporality of its own, it remains to be shown how a similar
strategy is indeed at work i n Derrida’s reading of Husserl.
That brings me back to my contention t h a t Speech and Phe-
nomena attempts a new understanding of transcendental con-
sciousness rather than its destruction. Along with traces and
writing, the analysis of reproduction, repetition, and imagina-
tion plays a major role in this endeavor. According to Derrida,
what these phenomena have in common is t h a t they a r e gov-
erned by a logic of original supplementation t h a t crosses out
t h e metaphysical opposition between original presence a n d
secondary representation, between perception and memory, be-
tween reality and fiction, between things and words.
Even those who agree with Heidegger’s contention t h a t
Husserl has not made enough effort to think the being of con-
sciousness must concede that he has at least made clear what
this consciousness achieves, i.e., making present or presen-
cing. According to Husserl the most original and best form of
such a presencing is to be found i n perception or intuition.
Husserl calls this original form of presencing “presentation”
(Gegenwartigung) and distinguishes it from “re-presentation”
Nergegenwiirtigung). Remembering and empathy are forms of
such a re-presentation, but also imagination and all forms of
reproduction and repetition. As the term already suggests, “re-
presentations” are founded on presentations, they are different
manners of repeating or reproducing a former presentation.
(This does not mean, however, that all founded acts are re-pre-
sentations and that presentations must be simple acts with a n
immediate a n d direct access to t h e i r object. Husserl’s
“categorial intuition” would be a n example of a founded act of
presentation t h a t achieves a n original presence of something
that cannot be directly perceived).
Derrida’s deconstruction of Husserl’s concept of conscious-
ness proceeds, once again, by reversal and displacement. He
reverses the hierarchical order that considers re-presentations
to be modifications of presentations by showing t h a t many
(all?) forms of presentation depend on former a c t s of re-

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presentation. This can best be illustrated through Husserl’s

analysis of the constitution of ideal objects. The presence of
ideal objects depends on acts of imaginative variation, i.e.,
acts of imagination and repetition which are acts of re-presen-
tation. Since for Husserl the presence of ideal objects is pres-
ence a t its best, Derrida draws t h e conclusion t h a t
phenomenological presence always and in general depends on
re-presentation. The self-presence of the transcendental sub-
ject should be no exception to this (deconstructive) principle.
Derrida’s displacement of t h e Husserlian distinction be-
tween presence and re-presentation is based on a modified ac-
count of re-presentation. For Derrida, re-presentation involves
a process of indicative signification, i.e., the presence of signs
that must be understood as traces belonging to the context of
a n archi-writing. Derrida therefore must show t h a t the pres-
ence of ideal objects as well as the self-presence of the tran-
scendental subject necessarily depend on a form of re-
presentation that is characteristic of traces. As far as ideal ob-
jects are concerned, this presents no difficulty since Husserl
had himself emphasized i n On the Origin o f Geometry a n d
elsewhere the importance of writing for the constitution and
preservation of ideal objects. Husserl’s description of this writ-
ing is similar to Derrida’s understanding of archi-writing since
it is a writing that substitutes itself for the loss of a n original
meaning. Derrida also encounters no difficulties when he has
to show that the self-presence of the subject depends on traces,
since he understands retention to be such a trace. If retention
is a trace, t h e n it is also a re-presentation i n t h e new,
Derridean sense of the term.
I t goes without saying that Husserl himself would not have
agreed with this identification of retention and re-presenta-
tion, since he never quite went so far as to consider retention
to be a trace, i.e., t h e original supplement of a n impossible
now-point. He was also unwilling to diminish the importance
of the distinction between retention and memory, insisting on
the fact that only the latter could properly be called a form of
re-presentation. It is thus not enough to point to the fact that
Husserl and Derrida have a different understanding of re-pre-
sentation in order to save Derrida from the criticisms to which
his identification of retention with a form of (Derridean) re-
presentation has given rise. The difference between Derrida’s
and Husserl’s account of retention cannot (and should not) be
done away with, for it relates to the question of whether it
makes sense to consider retention to be form of trace. How-
ever, Derrida’s account of the self-consciousness of the subject
i n terms of archi-writing does not solely rest on his theory of
retention. The thesis of the impossibility of pure and simple
self-presence of the subject is corroborated by Derrida’s de-
scription of several other forms of indirect presence which,

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 Rudolf Bernet

without any doubt, a r e genuine re-presentations for Husserl

as well.
For Derrida, the presence of ideal objects and the self-pres-
ence of the transcendental subject are both the result of pro-
cesses of re-presentation. If transcendental consciousness is
said to be a matter of presencing, and if presence depends on
re-presentation, then it follows t h a t Husserl’s consciousness,
far from being originally present, comes out of re-presentation
or, better, is a process of re-presentation. The intuition of
presence of ideal objects as well as of the transcendental sub-
ject itself is conditioned by re-presentation. That is to say, in
Husserl’s terminology, perception comes out of repetition,
memory, and imagination. There is no pure perception or intu-
ition and, as a consequence, the opposition between presenta-
tion and re-presentation, between perception on the one hand
and repetition, memory, and imagination on the other, fades
away. Derrida makes Husserl say what Freud has explicitly
stated throughout his entire work, from the Projectlo up to the
Note on the Mystic Writing-Pad. I1
For Freud, impressions lead to a perception only when they
are invested with the energy of a n unconscious desire. Percep-
tion a s the characteristic achievement of consciousness in-
volves, thus, a n original synthesis between consciousness and
t h e unconscious, r a t h e r t h a n being a n immediate intuitive
presencing of a n object. As the metaphor of the Mystic Writ-
ing-Pad suggests, perception results from the coincidence of
different forms of traces. That is to say, the mechanisms active
in perception do not essentially differ from the mechanisms of
remembering and of the dream. For Freud, these experiences
all imply a combination of or, rather, a compromise between
primary and secondary processes, and hence they are situated
i n between the unconscious and consciousness. It is clear, for
instance, t h a t t h e manifest content of t h e dream d r a w s
heavily on memories i n t h e double form of unconscious
mnemic-traces and pre-conscious residues from the day. On
the other hand, conscious memories have much i n common
with dreams since they involve traces of repressed desires.
Both memories and dreams have to cope also with the resis-
tance due to repression and they are, therefore, i n need of in-
terpretation. These family resemblances between memory and
dreams also apply to perceptions t h a t depend on memorial
traces and, consequently, always involve some repetition of
former experiences. The present now that appears in a percep-
tion is always accompanied by the past. This original contami-
nation of perception by memory is clearly shown from the fact
t h a t what appears as a perception might actually be a re-
pressed memory (in the experience of “d6ja-vu”), and t h a t a
memory might actually be a disguised form of perception (in
the case of screen-memories).

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 Denida-Husserl-Freud

For Freud, memory is thus the common matrix of percep-

tions, phantasies, and dreams. At first sight, this Freudian
memory seems to be a “re-presentation” i n Husserl’s sense as
well as Derrida’s. It is the reproduction of a former experience
and i t is also the result of a process of archi-writing that com-
bines manifold memorial traces. On a second look, however,
t h i s Freudian memory is only a re-presentation i n t h e
Derridean sense, i.e., a reproduction of a perception t h a t has
never been fully present, since it results from the combination
of traces. One wonders, however, with what right Derrida can
claim that this Freudian account of perception and memory is
also t h e hidden face of t h e phenomena of perception a n d
memory as Husserl understands them? In my opinion, there
a r e a t least two arguments i n favor of t h i s interpretation.
First, as has already been shown, the perception or intuition
of ideal objects and of the subject by itself indeed involves re-
presentation in the form of imagination and retention. Second,
Husserl’s understanding of memory as a form of re-presenta-
tive reproduction cannot properly account for forgetting and
especially for a forgetting t h a t takes place while one remem-
bers. Even when showing how retentions lose their vividness,
and how one memory can be confused with another one or can
be completed (Ausmalung) by fantasies, Husserl still does not
explain how and especially why we forget. When Freud says
that memory is an overcoming of repression and when Derrida
considers memory to be a figure of archi-writing, then, quite to
t h e contrary, forgetting a n d effacing become essential mo-
ments of remembering. Instead of taking forgetting to be a n
unfortunate accident of remembering, Freud and Derrida un-
derstand remembering on the very basis of forgetting, just as
Heidegger does. Admittedly, this is not what Husserl said, but
it is a convincing supplement a n d a good reason to t a k e
memory to be a re-presentation in the Derridean sense.
The shadow of Freud i n Derrida’s reading of Husserl also
becomes apparent in the way Speech and Phenomena empha-
sizes the issues of repetition and imagination. Derrida is not
the only one to consider Freud’s theories on repetition as some
of the most fundamental, but also the most sophisticated and
puzzling issues in psychoanalysis. Repetition plays a central
role in that extremely important process of psychic life Freud
calls “facilitation (Bahnung).” Repetition protects psychic life
by deferring threatening investments. At the same time, how-
ever, repetition appears in Beyond the Principle of Pleasure to
be a demonic and uncontrolled force that threatens life and is
therefore understood to be a n expression of “thanatos.” Most
importantly, repetition forms the basis for differentiation and
symbolization as is best illustrated by the “Fort Da” game of
Freud’s grandson. Repetition is also omnipresent in psycho-
analytic treatment and especially in the transference between

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the patient and hidher analyst. One can understand Derrida’s

fascination for such a concept with a meaning t h a t is funda-
mentally undecidable and undecidably fundamental. It is
linked with both deferring and differing, with death and life,
with the direct abreaction of a n unpleasant tension and with
the preservation of desire by means of a detour. It is one of the
major figures in which the hidden work of “diffkrance” becomes
manifest and it involves archi-writing.
Derrida sometimes calls this repetition differential
“iterability.” He finds this iterability at work in Husserl’s ac-
count of expressions, of the givenness of ideal objects, and of
the self-presence of the transcendental subject. It is a form of
repetition that preserves identity and presence by altering and
deferring them. Already, in his early text devoted t o On the
Origin of Geometry, Derrida had underscored Husserl’s insight
that repetition and especially repetition in writing is respon-
sible for both t h e preservation and t h e loss of a n original
meaning. Speech and Phenomena repeats this statement while
adopting a Freudian terminology and identifying the loss of an
original meaning with death. Derrida is thus led t o make a dis-
tinction between two different forms of death. There is a form
of death involved in difference, delay, and the indicative sign,
but there is also a death due t o the coincidence and fusion be-
tween meaning and its expression. The death Husserl fears-
distance, difference, delay, dependence on indicative signs and
writing-becomes in a Freudian perspective a condition of life.
In this new perspective, the adequate expression of a meaning
(the fusion between signifier and signified) is the death of lan-
guage, the identical repetition of an ideal object is the death of
historical transmission, and the coincidence of the transcenden-
t a l subject with its own representation leads t o blindness,
muteness, and the death of subjective life. Language, historical
intersubjective exchanges, and the transcendental subject have
a symbolic life that is born out of a differential iterability that
postpones all forms of absolute presence.
J u s t a s with Freud’s theory of repetition, his account of
imagination has also left clearly recognizable traces i n
Derrida’s reading of Husserl in Speech and Phenomena. For
Freud, imagination is linked with “fantasies” or as we now say:
“phantasms” which are a n essential ingredient of experiences
such a s memories, day- and night-dreams, sexual desire, and
artistic creation.12Phantasms can be both conscious and uncon-
scious, and they are interwoven with each other in a web such
that conscious phantasms are often originary supplements of
unconscious phantasms. As Freud’s text “A Child is Being
Beaten”13shows, phantasms are mainly visual representations
of both the object and the subject of desire. Phantasms mediate
the relation between the unconscious and consciousness as well
as between desire and reality by forming a screen or a scenery

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t h a t allows for a passage while maintaining the separation

between what stands before and behind the screen. Insofar as
they attempt to protect the subject from a direct confrontation
with the brute reality of drives and with a hostile and mean-
ingless external reality, they have much in common with rep-
etition. Like repetition, phantasms articulate the life of desire
by deferring all forms of a n immediate and fully intuitive
presence. They participate i n both primary a n d secondary
processes; they bind the drives but still do not subjugate them
to the demands of a n external reality. They conduct desire
through paths of detour and thereby allow for i t s survival.
Anticipating the fixation of desire in real objects, phantasms
preserve desire from a deadly exhaustion of unbound move-
ments, but without submitting it yet to the obligation for it to
compromise with the limits of reality.
This Freudian theory concerning the mediating function of
imagination and its association with repetition plays a crucial
role in Derrida’s reading of Husserl. Derrida is mainly inter-
ested in the function of imagination in Husserl’s account of
the constitution of ideal objects and in Husserl’s description of
a soliloquy t h a t uses merely imagined words. Not surpris-
ingly, he understands imagination to be the main form of a re-
presentation in the Derridean sense. He thus does not want
to play fiction off of reality; rather, he wants to show their en-
tanglement by taking advantage of Husserl’s association of
imagination with the “modification of neutrality.”
When Husserl says that the constitution of a n ideal object
is accomplished through “imaginary variation,” he explicitly
acknowledges t h a t there is a n originary association between
repetition (“variation”) and imagination. That ideal objects
are grasped through imagination does not, however, mean for
Husserl that they are fictional objects. Rather they are objects
for which the difference between reality and fiction becomes
irrelevant. Derrida is eager to subscribe to this metaphysical
neutrality, even if in a movement that has become familiar to
us he wants to show t h a t the ideal object, being neither real
nor fictional, is also both real and fictional. He attempts to
demonstrate this undecidability or “diffbrance” in the relation
between reality and fiction by paying attention to language,
a n d i n particular to t h e language of soliloquy. I n order to
show this undecidability, one can begin by pointing out the
fact t h a t Husserl’s description of soliloquy is an example of a
theoretical fiction t h a t is supposed to prove t h e reality of
purely expressive signs. Second, one can underscore Husserl’s
remark t h a t in soliloquy we can make do with merely imag-
ined signs. Third, one can try to show that even merely imag-
ined ideal expressive signs still depend on empirical tokens to
become present. The imagined ideal words of a soliloquy are
thus neither real nor fictional, but are equally ideal and real.

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The philosophical stakes involved in this Derridean reading

of Husserl’s concept of imagination are very similar t o those
present in his discussion of repetition. It is therefore no sur-
prise that Speech and Phenomena, in a Freudian spirit, usu-
ally links the issues of imagination and repetition. They are
both re-presentations in the Derridean sense and, therefore,
what they have in common is that they undermine “essential
distinctions” such as the one between expression and indica-
tion, and also those between identity and alterity, ideality and
reality, t r u t h and fiction, life and death, and of course be-
tween philosophy and literature a s well. They are also used
by Derrida to demonstrate that there is no origin that would
be simple and pure, autonomous and fully present, identical
to itself and nevertheless the source of a historical develop-
ment. Being re-presentations in the Derridean sense, imagi-
nation and repetition a r e “originary supplements” t h a t
produce the origin t o which they are said t o be added and
that substitute themselves for the retreat of the origin.
Imagination creates a fictional world and it uses its libera-
tion from the constraints of reality t o tell the truth about the
real world. It establishes a distance from reality without de-
serting it and, thus, creates a new space between reality and
fiction. This intermediary space of imagination crosses the
borders of the metaphysical space and thereby also sheds new
light on the presuppositions of the Husserlian understanding
of language and truth. Imagination inaugurates a conception
of language and truth where the idea of a correspondence be-
tween word and thing, between language and reality loses its
normative value. Following Freud and Heidegger, Derrida
sees in imagination the common root of thought and poetry.
This does not mean, however, that the difference between re-
ality and fiction or between philosophy and literature would
be totally erased, or suspended by a dialectical synthesis. One
cannot do without these distinctions, but one must question
and displace them. Language has always been the movement
already of such a displacement or transference. It therefore
requires the effort of a “double reading” that Derrida practices
with brio and that most of his critics seem to ignore.
What does this insistence on differential iterability, on a
delay of presence, on re-presentational traces, on linguistic
transference, and on imaginative transgression, entail for a
phenomenological concept of the consciousness of a subject? I
shall briefly attend t o these consequences by referring t o
three aspects of subjectivity where Derrida’s reading of Freud
bears its most fruitful results: temporality, spatiality, and the
double life of the subject.
Freud’s “Note on the Mystic Writing-Pad” insists on a dis-
continuity in the consciousness of time that is due to the peri-
odical character of perception, i.e., t o t h e investment of

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impressions by the unconscious. Derrida emphasizes that this

discontinuity allows u s to understand the appearing of con-
sciousness along with its possible effacement. Subject to re-
pression (and periods of sleep), consciousness can forget itself
and can forget the world. However, this effacement of con-
sciousness cannot be a complete disappearing: it still mani-
fests itself under the ambiguous form of traces. These traces
are actually responsible for both the effacement and the ap-
pearing of consciousness. The conscious subject is, therefore,
truly a phenomenon that can appear and disappear instead of
being an enduring monadological substance. I t is also not any
longer a n absolute origin that makes things appear, since its
own appearance a n d disappearance depends on a web of
traces and archi-writing. Instead of being the source and ori-
gin of all meaning, its own meaning appears indirectly, dis-
continuously, and with delay. Born out of the hidden labor of
traces, the subject cannot be present otherwise t h a n in the
form of a Derridean re-presentation. Self-consciousness thus
involves delay and alterity. The subject does not come out of
itself, life is given to i t and is taken away from it. To be alive
for the subject means to attempt to appropriate a life t h a t
can never be fully grasped. This appropriation from a dis-
tance of what h a s never been entirely present is t h e t r u e
meaning of re-presentation. This self-re-presentation of a
subjective life that comes out of traces is also the response to
an appeal and a gift, the author of which remains foreign and
absent.
This Derridean subject with its flickering temporality and
its postmature (instead of premature) life does not fit into
any form of metaphysical space either. I t is no pure interior-
ity because it is the appropriation of traces and the response
to a n appeal. I t also is no pure exteriority because it is given
a life and a consciousness of its own. Born out of traces, the
subject is caught i n t h e i r space a n d as Derrida p u t s it i n
their spacing (espacement). This spacing is a movement of a
transference that, however, does not go from one spatial loca-
tion to another. Using a Freudian terminology, one can say
that this transference follows the path of earlier facilitations
between traces. Unlike Husserl who considers consciousness
to constitute a “region” of its own, Freud locates it in a no-
man’s-land between the borders of the unconscious and exter-
nal reality. Consciousness comes out of spacing and “spacing”
is j u s t another word for re-presentation i n t h e Derridean
sense. This is also to say t h a t spacing cannot be separated
from temporalization. Re-presentational consciousness is the
experience of distancing and deferring. Consciousness is thus
always otherwise and elsewhere. I t is a movement of re-pre-
sentation and transgression, and imagination (rather t h a n
perception) can, thus, be said to constitute its very essence.

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 Rudolf Bernet

Appropriating a life born out of traces a n d re-presenting

t h i s life t o itself while remaining caught i n t h e spacing of
traces, the life of the subject t u r n s into a double life. Freud
provides u s with several accounts of t h i s double life. He
shows, for example, t h a t t h e becoming conscious of uncon-
scious representations does not suspend the action of the pri-
mary processes. Even conscious experiences a n d linguistic
utterances remain subject to condensation and displacement
as the analyses contained in Psychopathology of Everyday Life
abundantly demonstrate. Other texts such as the “Note on the
Mystic Writing-Pad” relate this double life to the distinction
between memory and perception. The psychic apparatus must
retain all past experiences and at the same time remain open
to ever new experiences. I t supports the heavy load of all its
past experiences and it, nevertheless, meets the world with a
virginal face. In a n unfinished manuscript on “Splitting of the
Ego in the Process of Defence” Freud mentions a “rift” (Riss)
in the subject “which never hea1s.”14This rift or cut is due to
t h e following: t h e ego recognizes something a s inextricably
linked to itself (Freud gives the example of castration-fear)
without t h e ego being i n a position to appropriate it. When
Freud here points to “the synthetic function of the ego” and its
“extraordinary importance,” i t is quite clear t h a t this unity of
the ego is not something that precedes the splitting. It is first
through the experience of t h e dividedness of one’s own self
t h a t the synthetic unity of the ego becomes of a n “extraordi-
nary importance.” The dividedness of t h e subject is a wound
t h a t never heals. The ego does not invalidate dividedness, it
only prevents a psychotic falling-apart of the subject.
Derrida’s reading of Husserl discovers a similar dividedness
and double life i n transcendental consciousness. One could
mention Husserl’s distinction between a hyletic and a n inten-
tional life, b u t Derrida’s favorite example is of course t h e
dividedness of the transcendental subject between experiences
of presentation (Gegenwartigung) and re-presentation (Verge-
genwtirtigung). On Derrida’s interpretation, neither one of the
two can be simply reduced to t h e other. Even if re-presenta-
tion produces presentation, it is a differential iteration t h a t
remains oriented toward the idea and the ideal of presence.
The life of re-presentation in the Derridean sense is thus not
totally incompatible with Husserl’s conception of the teleology
of transcendental life. Husserl and Derrida both understand
life as a movement of differentiation t h a t is governed by the
anticipation of a n impossible goal. It does not come as a sur-
prise, then, t h a t Derrida h a s treated Husserl’s “Idea i n t h e
Kantian sense” with care and not without sympathy. Husserl’s
account of t h e teleology of transcendental life is not only a
profound insight into the finitude of the subject, it is also a
new meditation on a n origin that is effective by being deferred

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and by inviting the subject t o submit t o an endless task. The

double life of the transcendental subject, thus, also comes from
the fact that the subject is divided between the finitude of its
existence on the one hand and its being addressed by the idea
of the infinite on the other. This double life is a t the same
time a survival that escapes a double form of death, namely
the fusion with oneself and the fusion with the other.
In this paper I have tried to show that Derrida’s reading of
Husserl in Speech and Phenomena is highly marked by his
reading of Freud. The deconstruction of the essential distinc-
tions between expressive and indicative signs, the critical ac-
count of a “voice” that hears itself speak, the demonstration of
an unavoidable contamination of self-consciousness by re-pre-
sentation, the analysis of memory, repetition, and imagination,
all bear evidence of this Freudian spirit. This investigation
has also led to the surprising conclusion that Freud’s concept
of the unconscious and Husserl’s concept of transcendental
consciousness have much in common, especially their impossi-
bility t o be immediately and directly present. It makes, thus,
little sense to say that Derrida criticizes Husserl’s conscious-
ness in the name of Freud’s unconscious; there is room for a
new Husserlian elaboration of Freud’s speculations on the na-
ture of a divided self. Freud’s claim that the unconscious is the
true origin of consciousness is no less problematic than
Husserl’s notion of an original and simple now-point of con-
sciousness where all processes of constitution would begin.
Derrida thus deconstructs both Husserl and Freud in order
t o show that their understanding of consciousness and of the
unconscious is still open t o interrogation. By interrogating
Husserl’s analysis of the relation between presentation and re-
presentation and questioning Freud’s metaphysical division
between the locations of the unconscious and the preconscious,
Derrida invites us not t o take the difference between con-
sciousness and the unconscious for granted. He shows in par-
ticular that this difference is undermined by a “diffbrance”
that is at work in both Husserl’s transcendental consciousness
and in Freud’s unconscious. Husserl’s re-presentations and
Freud’s unconscious desires must be understood in the lan-
guage of traces and archi-writing. Freud himself never went
quite as far as this and Husserl was more than reluctant t o
accept anything of this sort. It thus goes without saying that
the transference established by Derrida between Husserl and
Freud is still open for a further “perlaboration.” It remains t o
be shown how Freud can help us to understand the effacement
of transcendental consciousness better and its need for protec-
tion. On the other hand, it also remains t o be shown how
Husserl can contribute to a better understanding of the re-pre-
sentational character of the unconscious and its inscription in
the life of a “psyche.”

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 Rudolf Bernet

Edmund Husserl, “The Origin of Geometry,” in The Crisis of Euro-

pean Sciences and Tkanscendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970),360ff.
Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 8,ed. Jacques-
Main Miller, trans. John Forrester (New York: W. W. Norton, 19911,210;
L.e skminaire, livre VZZZ:Le transfert (1960-61),(Paris: Seuil, 1975).
Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena. And Other Essays on
Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwest-
ern University Press, 1973).
Jacques Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” in Writing and
Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
19781,196-231.
Jacques Derrida, “To Speculate On ‘Freud’,”in The Post Card: From
Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Chicago Uni-
versity Press, 19871,257-409.
Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Zntro-
duction, trans. John P. Leavey (Stony Brook: Nicholas Hays, 1978).
Jacques Derrida, Le problhme de la genese duns la philosophie de
Husserl (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990).
In this paper I shall also refrain from quoting Derrida or even indi-
cating with any precision the texts and pages where the arguments I
am examining are developed. Proceeding toward a systematic recon-
struction of Derrida’s reading of Husserl and Freud, I think there is no
need for such a tedious multiplication of footnotes. As a ftrther excuse, I
might also point to the fact that I have already provided a closer read-
ing of the same texts by Derrida elsewhere: Rudolf Bernet, “Is the
Present ever Present? Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Presence”
in Husserl and Contemporary Thought. Research in Phenomenology, vol
XI1 (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1982), 85-11 2; Rudolf
Bernet, “Presence and Absence of Meaning. Husserl and Derrida on the
Crisis of (the) Present Time” in Phenomenology of Temporality: Time
and Language (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987),33-64;
Rudolf Bernet, “On Derrida’s ‘Introduction’to Husserl’s ‘Origin of Geom-
etry’” in H. J . Silverman, ed., Derrida and Deconstruction. Continental
Philosophy ZZ (New York-London: Routledge, 19891,139-153,234-235;
Rudolf Bernet, “Derrida et la voix de son maitre” in Revue philosophique
de la France et de l’ktranger, 1990/2 (avril-juin) (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1990),147-166.
Cf. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (1900),S.E. IV-V,
esp. chap. VI and VII.
loSigmund Freud, “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1895),S.E. I,
283-397.
Sigmund Freud, “Note on the Mystic Writing-Pad” (19251,S.E. XM,
225232.
l2 Cf., Rudolf Bernet, “Imagination et fantasme” in J. Florence et al.,
Psychanalyse. L’homme et ses destins (Louvain-Paris: Pecters, 1993),
191-206.
l 3 Sigmund Freud, “A Child is Being Beaten,” S.E. M I , 175-204.
l4 Sigmund Freud, “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence,”
S.E. XXIII, 276.

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