PEOPLE VS CAOILE DOCTRINE:

For a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission
of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.

FACTS:

The evidence for the prosecution provides that victim AAA was raped on three instances by Moises
Caoile. The first one was when the accused invited [AAA] to go to the bamboo trees in their place.
Upon reaching thereat, the accused directed [AAA] to lie down on the ground. [AAA] followed the
instruction of the accused whom she called uncle Moises. The second one happened Four (4) days
thereafter while [AAA] was at the pumping well near their house and the accused invited her to
gather guavas at the mountain. The third one happened when the accused invited [AAA] to gather
santol fruits. [AAA] went with the accused, and once again the accused had carnal knowledge of
her.

On the other hand, the evidence for the defense provides that [AAA] was a frequent visitor in the
accused‘s house and during his so called alone moments that the accused courted [AAA]. Soon
thereafter, accused and [AAA] found themselves falling in love with one other. The accused did
not know that [AAA] was a demented person since she acted like a normal individual. In fact, she
went to a regular school and she finished her elementary education.

The incident was reported to the Rosario police station when [CCC], [AAA]‘s aunt, heard [AAA]
blurt out that she was abused by the accused. After executing the respective affidavits, [AAA]
was examined and it was found out that [AAA]‘s genitalia suffered a multiple hymenal laceration
which, at the time of the examination, was already healed. Claire Baliaga, a psychologist of the
Philippine Mental Health Association testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation on
[AAA] and discovered [AAA] had mental age of a seven-year, nine-month old child.

Accused-appellant Moises Caoile (Caoile), in two separate Amended Informations filed before the
RTC on January 5, 2006, was charged with two separate counts of Rape of a Demented Person
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code. Caoile pleaded not guilty to both
charges upon his arraignment and joint trial on the merits ensued. The defense moved that it be
allowed to have [AAA] be evaluated by a psychiatrist of its own choice who concluded that [AAA]
is suffering from Mild Mental Retardation.

RTC rendered a Joint Decision finding Caoile guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
rape. Caoile elevated the RTC ruling to the Court of Appeals, claiming that his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt by attacking the credibility of AAA and the methods used to
determine her mental state.The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC decision

ISSUE: W/N the mistake in the Amended Informations will exonerate Caoile vis-à-vis the crime
Caoile was actually convicted of considering that AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a
mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," and not one
who is "demented."

RULING:

Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides for two circumstances when
having carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered rape:

1. Paragraph 1(b): when the offended party is deprived of reason x x x; and

 2. Paragraph 1(d): when the offended party is x x x demented.16

Caoile was charged in the Amended Informations with rape of a demented person under paragraph
1(d). The term demented17 refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated
mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual‘s former intellectual level and often by
emotional apathy, madness, or insanity.18 On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under
paragraph 1(b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation.19

The mistake in the will not exonerate Caoile even though AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a
mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," and not one who is
"demented."

In the first place, he did not even raise this as an objection. More importantly, none of his rights,
particularly that of to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, was violated.
Although the Amended Informations stated that he was being charged with the crime of rape of a
demented person under paragraph 1(d), it also stated that his victim was "a person with a mental age of
seven (7) years old." Elucidating on the foregoing, this Court, in People v. Valdez,21 held:
For a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being
mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it
does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense
must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein
must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

AMPATUAN JR. vs. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA

FACTS:

In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with
multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. One Kenny Dalandag, was admitted into the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ and was later on listed as one of the prosecution witness. On
October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel request the inclusion of Dalandag in the information for
murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two
sworn declarations. Petitioner reiterated the request twice more on October 22, 2010 19 and November 2,
2010. But Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request.
Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila
seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases
undergoing trial in the QC RTC. The RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference and issued a pre-trial order.
The respondents questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus.
Petitioner opposed.
On June 27, 2011,33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777 dismissing the
petition for mandamus. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused for
multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ.

HELD:

No. The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal
power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of
the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the
public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom to charge, the
exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public
prosecutors.
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order
to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used
to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, 48or to compel the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion. 49

As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but
may not be compelled to act in a certain way such as to grant or deny such letter-request.

Metropolitan Bank v. Reynado GR No. 164538

Date: Aug 9, 2010

RULE 110
Doctrine:

1. Novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinguishment of
criminal liability.

2. Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a

preliminary investigation. By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed where respondent
has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion that is, when he has
exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

Facts:
 On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged respondents before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code.

• According to the audit officer of metrobank, Antonio Ivan S. Aguirre, the special audit conducted on
the cash and mending operations of its Port are branch uncovered fraudulent transactions perpetrated
by respondents in connivance with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal).
Respondents were the only voting members of the branchs credit committee authorized to extend
credit accommodation to clients up to P200,000.00. That through the so-called Bills Purchase
Transaction, Universal, which has a paid-up capital of only P125,000.00 and actual maintaining
balance of P5,000.00, was able to make withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.00 against uncleared
regional checks deposited in its account at petitioners Port Area branch. Consequently, Universal was
able to utilize petitioners funds even before the seven-day clearing period for regional checks expired;
that Universals withdrawals against uncleared regional check deposits were without prior approval of
petitioners head office; that the uncleared checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason Account Closed; and, that respondents acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence.

• In their defense, respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with Universal and
 claimed that they only intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and increase its deposit accounts
and daily transactions.

• Meanwhile, on February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement
whereby the latter acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in the total amount of
P50,990,976.27 as of February 4, 1997 and undertook to pay the same in bi-monthly amortizations in
the sum of P300,000.00 starting January 15, 1997, covered by postdated checks, plus balloon payment
of the remaining principal balance and interest and other charges, if any, on December 31, 2001.
• Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad (Prosecutor
Edad) in her Resolution dated July 10, 1997 found petitioners evidence insufficient to hold respondents
liable for estafa. Acccording to Edad: ―The execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement puts
complainant bank in estoppel to argue that the liability is criminal. Since the agreement was made
even before the filing of this case, the relations between the parties have changed, novation has set in
and prevented the incipience of any criminal liability on the part of respondents‖

• DOJ decreed that there is no Estafa in the case

• Petitioner persistently insists that the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal did
not absolve private respondents from criminal liability for estafa. Petitioner submits that the
settlement affects only the civil obligation of Universal but did not extinguish the criminal liability of
the respondents. Petitioner thus faults the CA in sustaining the DOJ which in turn affirmed the finding
of Prosecutor Edad for committing apparent error in the appreciation and the application of the law on
novation. By petitioners claim, citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tonda, the negotiations
pertain to and affect only the civil aspect of the case but do not preclude prosecution for the offense
already committed

Issue/s:
1. WON novation and undertaking to pay the amount embezzled do not extinguish criminal liability.

2. WON it is the duty of the public prosecutor to implead all persons who appear criminally liable for
the offense charged.

Held:

1. Novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinguishment of
criminal liability.

Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and
heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The civil law principle of relativity of contracts
provides that contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a
third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof.

In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that respondents are not parties to the agreement. The intention
of the parties thereto not to include them is evident either in the onerous or in the beneficent
provisions of said agreement. They are not assigns or heirs of either of the parties. Not being parties to
the agreement, respondents cannot take refuge therefrom to bar their anticipated trial for the crime
they committed. It may do well for respondents to remember that the criminal action commenced by
petitioner had its genesis from the alleged fraud, unfaithfulness, and abuse of confidence perpetrated
by them in relation to their positions as responsible bank officers. It did not arise from a contractual
dispute or matters strictly between petitioner and Universal. This being so, respondents cannot rely on
subject settlement agreement to preclude prosecution of the offense already committed to the end of
extinguishing their criminal liability or prevent the incipience of any liability that may arise from the
criminal offense. This only demonstrates that the execution of the agreement between petitioner and
Universal has no bearing on the innocence or guilt of the respondents.
2. Yes, it is the duty of the public prosecutor. In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor
determines whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause that the accused
is guilty thereof.The Secretary of Justice, however, may review or modify the resolution of the
prosecutor.

Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly
established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion that is, when he has exercised his
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law.

Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court mandates that all criminal actions must be commenced either
by complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons who appear
to be responsible therefor. Thus the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges
against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for the offense. The proper remedy under
the circumstances where persons who ought to be charged were not included in the complaint of the
private complainant is definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in the information. As
the OSG correctly suggested, the proper remedy should have been the inclusion of certain employees of
Universal who were found to have been in cahoots with respondents in defrauding petitioner. The DOJ,
therefore, cannot seriously argue that because the officers of Universal were not indicted, respondents
themselves should not likewise be charged. Their non-inclusion cannot be perversely used to justify
desistance by the public.

CALLO CLARIDAD VS ESTEBAN [G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013]

Doctrine:

The determination of probable cause to file a criminal complaint or information in court is

exclusively within the competence of the Executive Department, through the Secretary of Justice .
The courts cannot interfere in such determination, except upon a clear showing that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed, and that it was committed by the accused.

Facts:

The petitioner, Marie Callo-Claridad, is the mother of the late Cheasare Armani “Chase” Callo
Claridad, whose lifeless but bloodied body was discovered in the evening of February 27, 2007 between
vehicles parked at the carport of a residential house located at No.10 Cedar Place, Ferndale Homes,
Quezon City. Allegedly, Chase had been last seen alive with respondent Philip Ronald P. Esteban (Philip)
less than an hour before the discovery of his lifeless body.

It was around 7:50 p.m., SG Abelardo Sarmiento Jr., while patrolling around the village, noticed that the
side of the Honda Civic with plate JTG 333 had red streaks, which prompted him to move towards the
parked cars. He inspected the then empty vehicle and noticed that its radio was still turned on. He
checked the cars and discovered that the rear and side of the Honda Civic with plate CRD 999 were
smeared with blood. He saw on the passenger seat a cellular phone covered with blood. It was then that
he found the bloodied and lifeless body of Chase lying between the parallel cars. The body was naked
from the waist up, with a crumpled bloodied shirt on the chest, and with only the socks on.

The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City dismissed the complaint in its resolution dated
December 18, 2007.

The OCP observed that there was lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial evidence sufficient to
charge Philip with homicide, much less murder; that the circumstantial evidence could not link Philip
to the crime; that several possibilities would discount Philip’s presence at the time of the crime,
including the possibility that there were more than one suspect in the fatal stabbing of Chase; that
Philip was not shown to have any motive to kill Chase; that their common friends attested that the two
had no ill- feelings towards each other; that no sufficient evidence existed to charge Teodora with the
crime, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory; and that the allegation that Teodora could have
been the female person engaged in a discussion with a male person inside the car with plate JTG 333
was unreliable being mere hearsay.

The Secretary of Justice stated that the confluence of lack of an eyewitness, lack of motive,
insufficient circumstantial evidence, and the doubt as to the proper identification of Philip by the
witnesses resulted in the lack of probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with the crime alleged.
The Secretary of Justice held that the only circumstantial evidence connecting Philip to the crime was
the allegation that at between 7:00 to 7:30 o‘clock of the evening in question, Chase had boarded the
white Honda Civic car driven by Philip; that the witnesses’ positive identification of Philip as the
driver of the car was doubtful, however, considering that Philip did not alight from the car, the
windows of which were tinted; and that the rest of the circumstances were pure suspicions, and did
not indicate that Philip had been with Chase at the time of the commission of the crime.

Issue:

Whether the CA committed a reversible error in upholding the decision of the Secretary of Justice
finding that there was no probable cause to charge the respondents with murder for killing Chase Callo
Claridad.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denies the petition.

According to Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary investigation is “an
inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial.” The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, because it is yet to be followed by the
trial proper in a court of law. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties‘
evidence but for the presentation only of such evidence as may engender a well- founded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the offense. The role and object
of preliminary investigation were “to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive
prosecutions, and to protect him from open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive
prosecutions.‖

The determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of the public
prosecutor after conducting a preliminary investigation upon the complaint of an offended party.
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof. Probable cause, although it requires less than evidence justifying a conviction,
demands more than bare suspicion.

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
consistent with one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that a crime has been committed and that the respondents are probably
guilty thereof. The pieces of evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis that the respondents
were probably guilty of the crime and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they were
innocent, and with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient,
therefore, if: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The records show that the circumstantial evidence linking Philip to the killing of Chase derived from
the bare recollections of Ariane (sister of Chase), and of Guray and Corpus (respectively, the house
help and nanny in the household of a resident of the subdivision) about seeing Chase board the white
Honda Civic at
around 7:00 p.m. of February 27, 2007, and about Philip being the driver of the Honda Civic. But there
was nothing else after that, because the circumstances revealed by the other witnesses could not
even be regarded as circumstantial evidence against Philip. To be sure, some of the affidavits were
unsworn. The statements subscribed and sworn to before the officers of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) having the authority to administer oaths upon matters connected with the performance of their
official duties undeniably lacked the requisite certifications to the effect that such administering
officers had personally examined the affiants, and that such administering officers were satisfied that
the affiants had voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. The lack of the requisite
certifications from the affidavits of most of the other witnesses was in violation of Section 3, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides thusly:

Section 3. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in

the following manner: (a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and
shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well
as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such
number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file.
The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a
notary public, each of who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and
that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

The CA explained that the requirement for the certifications under the aforecited rule was
designed to avoid self-serving and unreliable evidence from being considered for purposes of
the preliminary investigation, the present rules for which do not require a confrontation
between the parties and their witnesses; hence, the certifications were mandatory.

The Court denies the petition for review on certiorari, and affirms the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

Jimenez vs. Sorongon, G.R. No. 178607, December 5, 2012

Doctrine:
In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. The
People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in
criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.

Facts:
On August 19, 2003, petitioner Jimenez, the President of Unland Shipping and Management Corporation,
filed a complaint- affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the
respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. The petitioner alleged that the
respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSI‘s articles of incorporation to secure a
license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA. The 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of information for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment against the
respondents. The City Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal
information with the RTC of Mandaluyong
City. Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004
resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to withdraw the information. The petitioner and respondents
Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition and comment to the opposition, respectively. RTC denied the
motion to withdraw information as it found the existence of probable cause to hold the respondents for
trial. Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the respondents.The RTC granted
respondent Alamil‘s motion for reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamil‘s motion for judicial
determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. It found that no evidence on record to
indicate that the respondents gave any false information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment
agency from the POEA. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable
cause to prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from
the RTC. On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for being a prohibited
pleading since the motion did not have the public prosecutor‘s conformity. Then petitioner appealed to
CA by way of certiorari but denied it.
Issue:
Whether or not CA committed a reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioner‘s petition for
certiorari for lack of legal personality.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
by the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to
be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the
defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible. Procedural law basically mandates that
all criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of a public prosecutor. In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the
OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of
the 1987 Administrative Code. This section explicitly provides: The People is the real party in interest in
a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or
in this Court.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the
main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, which is the existence of
probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended
party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This
involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November
23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.

People v Valdez
GR No.175602 January 18, 2012
DOCTRINE The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts and circumstances constituting the elements
of the crime charged is crucial in every criminal prosecution because of the ever-present obligation of
the State to duly inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation. A practical
consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability is to prohibit the introduction
or consideration against the accused of evidence that tends to establish that detail. The allegations in
the information are controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is a variance between the
offense charged in the information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included
in the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense proved. In that regard, an
offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form part of those constituting the latter.
FACTS On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 o‘clock in the evening, Estrella Sayson, was at the canteen
preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her second husband, Wilfredo Lladones, which was held
later in the evening. Estrella‘s family and other visitors ate and enjoyed themselves at the party. At
about 10:00 o‘clock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and
Edwin, who alighted from a motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked the jai
alai teller, Jonathan Rubio, to come out. Jonathan was then attending to customers who were buying jai
alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with them. Estrella saw Eduardo
and Edwin armed with guns. She tried to prevent Moises from going near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did
not heed his mother‘s warning. He went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force Jonathan to go
out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the accused-appellants threaten Moises with the words
―Gusto mo unahin na kita?‖ Moises replied ―huwag.‖ Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell
and was continuously fired upon even after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand immediately
approached the scene to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the left temporal
portion of his head and fell. Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the back while
running. Joselito fell on a burger machine. After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin
escaped from the scene of the crime. The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and
sentenced them to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
convictions.

ISSUE PO2 Valdez contends that the State did not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

HELD The Court affirms the convictions, but holds PO2 Valdez guilty only of three counts of homicide
due to the failure of the informations to allege the facts and circumstances constituting treachery. It
cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the
complaint or information. In the case of People v Dimaano, for complaint or information to be
sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts
or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as
is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element
of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused
of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

FLEURDELIZ B. ORGANO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

and the JAIL WARDEN OF MANILA, respondents.

FACTS: (Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65) The accused, among others, being then
public officers and taking advantage of their official positions as employees of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue criminally amass and acquire funds belonging to the National Government
by opening an unauthorized bank account with the Landbank of the Philippines, West
Triangle Branch for and in behalf of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and deposit
therein money belonging to the government of the Philippines, consisting
of revenue tax payments then withdraw therefrom the sum of P193,565,079.64 between
November, 1996 to February, 1997, without proper authority, through checks made payable to
themselves and/or the sole proprietorship firms of the above-named private
persons, thereby succeeding in misappropriating, converting, misusing and/or malversing said public
funds tantamount to a raid on the public treasury, to their own personal gains, advantages and benefits,
to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforestated amount

PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS:
1. Lilia B. Organo filed a Motion to Quash Information for lack of jurisdiction
2. Respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused
3. Organo filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and /or Quash Warrant of Arrest Pending Resolution on the
Issue of Lack of Jurisdiction and Other Incidents.
4. respondent court denied Organo's motion.
5. Reason: accused movant is still a fugitive from justice and continues to evade arrest so that
jurisdiction over her person has not yet been acquired by this Court. Movant Organo should first
surrender and place her person under the jurisdiction of this Court before she may file any further
pleading with this Court.
6. Organo filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a case of plunder when none of the accused
occupy Salary Grade 27 or higher as provided under Republic Act No. 6758

HELD: No.

REASON:
- In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan
trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court,
as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
- RA 7080 was impliedly repealed by RA 8249, such that prosecutions for plunder are cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan only when the accused is a public official with Salary Grade 27 or higher.
- As a consequence of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original
jurisdiction in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended; R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. It retains only cases where the accused are those
enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above and, generally, national and local officials classified as
 Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A.
No. 6758)
- However, it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to or
in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A.

PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR Nos. 147706-07 - February 16, 2005

Doctrine:

 The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to include
the presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of both types of corporations within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. Had it
been otherwise, it could have simply made the necessary distinction. But it did not.

Facts:

 Summary: Petitioner, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), takes the
affirmative position in this petition for certiorari. Respondent Efren L. Alas and respondent court
contends otherwise.
 Nov. 17, 1999 – Filing of Information: The Office of the Ombudsman filed two separate
informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) with
the Sandiganbayan against respondent Alas.
 The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous advertising contracts entered into by Alas, in
his capacity as President and Chief Operating Officer of the Philippines Postal Savings Bank
(PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which purportedly caused damage and prejudice
to the government.
 Oct. 30, 2002 – Motion to Quash the Information: Respondent Alas filed a motion to quash the
information for lack of jurisdiction, which motion was vehemently opposed by the prosecution.
 After considering the arguments of both parties, the respondent court ruled that PPSB was a
private corporation and that its officers, particularly herein respondent Alas, did not fall under
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.
 Dissatisfied, the People, through the OSP, filed this petition for certiorari.

Sandiganbayan‘s Ruling and Respondent Alas‘ Contention reiterating the ruling of the former:

 The records disclosed that while PPSB is a subsidiary of the Philippines Postal Corporation
(PHILPOST), which is a government owned corporation, the same is not created by special law
(original charter). It was organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 68 – which is a General Legislation).
 It was registered in the SEC. Under its Articles of Incorporation, the purpose for which said entity
is formed was primarily for business, x x x likewise its 7 secondary purposes points that it exists
for business.
 Thus, its officers and employees are not covered by the GSIS and are under the SSS law, and
actions for reinstatement and backwages are not within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission but by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
 According to jurisprudence, ―The test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled
corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government
corporation created by special charter are subject to its provision while those incorporated under
the general corporation law are not within its coverage.

Prosecution‘s Contention:
 The PPSB was a GOCC as the term was defined under Section 2 (13) of the Administrative Code of
1987. LIKEWISE, in further defining the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan RA 8249 did not make a
distinction as to the manner of creation of the GOCCs for their officers to fall under its
 jurisdiction. Hence, being the President and COO of the PPSB at the time of commission of the
crimes charged, respondent Alas came under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the same officers in GOCCs organized and
incorporated under the Corporation Code in view of the delimitation provided for in Article IX-B Section
2(1) of the Constitution which states that:

―The Civil Service Commission embraces all branches, subdivisions, and instrumentalities, and
agencies of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters.

Held:

We find merit in the petition.

It should be pointed out however, that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is separate and
distinct from the Civil Service Commission. The same is governed by Article XI, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution (not Article IX-B Section 2(1) of the Constitution) which provides that‖

―x x x the present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to

function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law‖.

This provision, in effect, retained the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court as defined under Art.
XIII, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which mandated its creation, thus:

―Sec 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as

Sandiganbyan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt
practices and such other offense committed by public officers and employees, including those in
government- owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by
law.‖
On March 30, 1995, Congress, pursuant to its authority vested under the 1987 Constitution,
enacted RA 7975 maintaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of GOCCs without distinction whatsoever. Thereafter, on Feb. 5, 1997,
Congress enacted RA 8249 which preserved the subject provision mentioned.
The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to include
the presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of both types of corporations within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. Had it been otherwise, it could
have simply made the necessary distinction. But it did not.

In Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, this Court, already mindful of the pertinent provisions of the 1987
Constitution, ruled that the concerned officers of GOCCs, whether created by special law or formed
under the Corporation Code, come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for purposes of the
provisions of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

For indeed, a GOCC can conceivably create as many subsidiaries under the Corporation Code as it
might wish, use public funds, disclaim public accountability and escape the liabilities and responsibilities
provided by law. By including the concerned officers of GOCCs organized and incorporated under the
Corporation Code within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the legislature evidently seeks to avoid
just that.

Petition of prosecution GRANTED. Decision of respondent Sandiganbayan REVERSED and SET

ASIDE.

PEOPLE V. YPARRAGUIRE
Doctrine:

The offended party can initiate a prosecution for rape even if she is a minor, unless she is incompetent
or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority.

The complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding, it is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction
in the court to try the case. The courts jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.

A plea for forgiveness may be considered analogous to an attempt to compromise, which offer of
compromise by the appellant may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt pursuant to
Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence.

Facts:

On March 24, 1994, at about 11:00 oclock in the evening, while complainant Charmelita D. Ruina, an
invalid and mentally retarded, was on her bed at the store of her mother at the Public Market at
Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, where she and her mother lived, accused Elmer Yparraguirre alias "Lalo"
entered her room, the door of which was not locked because her mother went to the store of her elder
sister. Upon getting inside, he undressed himself and approached the Complainant who was apparently
awake. He caressed her and sucked her breasts. She shouted for help but nobody came to rescue her,
perhaps because it was late already in the evening and her voice was not loud enough to be heard at
the distance as, in fact, it could be heard at only about three to five meters away x x x. Accused told
her to keep
quiet and when she put up some limpy resistance, he boxed her. He then removed her panty went on top
of her and inserted his manhood into her most private part. She felt pain. After raping her, he left her
room. Soon her mother, Sanselas Leongas Ruina, arrived. She reported to her the incident. The following
morning, accused went back to the store and apologized for what he did and promised not to do it again.
But his plea would not mollify Sanselas. She took the complainant to the Madrid (Surigao del Sur) District
Hospital for physical examination. Dr. Carlo P. Altrecha recorded the following findings in the Medical
Certificate that he issued on March 26, 1994

Issue:
Whether the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was signed and
filed by the chief of police and not by the complainant.

Held:

The contention has no merit. Pursuant to the Section 5, Rule 110 provision, the offended party can
initiate a prosecution for rape even if she is a minor, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so
upon grounds other than her minority. Although the victim in this case is no longer a minor, it is
undisputed that she is a mental retardate and suffering from physical deformity. No woman would come
out in the open, inform the authorities of the injustice done to her, make a statement of what had
happened unless her purpose is to redress the wrong done against her honor. Once the violation of the
law becomes known through a direct original participation initiated by the victim, the requirements of
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to the effect that the offense of rape "shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents," are satisfied. Said
provision is not determinative of the jurisdiction of courts over the private offenses because the same is
governed by the Judiciary law, not the Revised Penal Code which deals with the definition of felonies
and their punishment. Stated differently, the complaint required in Article 344 is but a condition
precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. Such
condition was imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to
suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. [4] The complaint
simply starts the prosecutory proceeding but does not confer jurisdiction on the court to try the case [5]
because the overriding consideration in determining whether the condition precedent in Article 344 has
been complied with is the intent of the aggrieved party to seek judicial redress for the affront
committed.[6]
 Article 344 was not enacted for the specific purpose of benefitting the accused. When it
is said that the requirement in Article 344 (that there should be a complaint of the
offended party or her relatives) is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint
that starts the prosecutory proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction
in the court to try the case. The courts jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.

Doctrine: Rule 110 – Prosecution of Offenses

Title: PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA, 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:
1. On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and the respondent to the case, and
Erich Geiling, a German national, were married at Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding
against Pilapil in Germany in January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before RTC of Manila in January 23, 1983 where it is still
pending as a civil case.
2. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was granted
to petitioner.
3. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still
married to respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia and Jesus Chua
sometime in 1982 and 1983 respectively.
4. The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer
her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon.
5. Respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment but before such scheduled date,
petitioner moved for the suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987, respondent judge
denied he motion to quash and also directed the arraignment of both accused.
6. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt and fined.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent‘s adultery charges against the petitioner is still valid
given the fact that both had been divorced prior to the filing of charges.

RATIO:

The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the
complaint should only be the offended spouse. The fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country in 1983, is admitted. According to Article 15 of the Civil Code, with relation to
the status of Filipino citizens both here and abroad, since the legal separation of the petitioner and
respondent has been finalized through the courts in Germany and the RTC inManila, the marriage of the
couple were already finished, thus giving no merit to the charges the respondent filed against the
petitioner. Private respondent, being no longer married to petitioner holds no legal merit to commence
the adultery case asthe offended spouse at the time he filed suit in 1986. The temporary restraining
order issued in this case was made permanent.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87- 52435 for lack of jurisdiction.
The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent. SO
ORDERED.

People v. Mariano
G.R. No. L-47437 September 29, 1983 Doctrine:
  It is not sanctioned by Section 4 of Rule 110 nor by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code whose
provisions do not categorically specify that the father has the preferential right to file the
complaint for seduction, abduction, rape or abusos deshonestos. It is noteworthy that ‗the father
and mother jointly exercise parental authority over their legitimate children who are not
emancipated.‘ It is their duty to represent their emancipated children in all actions which may
redound to their benefit
 "Under the circumstances, the complaint filed by the mother was a sufficient compliance with
Article 344 and Section 4 of Rule 110. It conferred jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The
father‘s passivity should not preclude the mother from securing redress for the outrage
committed against her daughter."
Facts:
 Socorro Soria, a demented woman of 24 years, had been confined as a mental patient at the
National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Manila, since February 26, 1971 up to May 3, 1974 when
she was transferred to the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital in Pili, Camarines Sur for
further treatment.
 On May 26, 1975, her parents brought her home to Burabod, Daet, Camarines Norte, to be
treated by the appellant, known in the locality as a faith healer or "spiritista." chanrobles.com.ph
: virtual law library
 In the afternoon of September 25, 1976, appellant went to the residence of the Sorias to treat
Socorro. After securing some "salonpas" from Mrs. Maria Soria, mother of Socorro, he entered the
room of his patient, and locked the door.
 Mrs. Soria proceeded to the room and when she noted that the door was indeed locked from
inside, she and Elizabeth peeped through a small aperture and saw the appellant on top of
Socorro in the act of sexual intercourse.
 When Mrs. Soria confronted him, appellant expressed his willingness to be Socorro‘s husband and
promise to construct an annex to his house where he would keep Socorro as his wife.
 On September 27, 1976, a verified complaint for rape, signed by Mrs. Maria Soria, was filed
against appellant before the Municipal Court of Daet, Camarines Norte. on the basis thereof, an
information was filed before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte.
 It is settled in this jurisdiction that an accused who has carnal knowledge with a mentally
retarded or demented woman is guilty of rape the reason being that she is incapable of giving
rational consent to the sexual intercourse.
 Appellant further argues that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because
the victim‘s mother had no right or authority to file a complaint for rape inasmuch as the father
was still living. He invokes the following provisions of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
Issue: WON the victim‘s mother had no right or authority to file a complaint for rape inasmuch as the
father was still living. He invokes the following provisions of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

Held: No. The mother had authority under Sec. 4 Rule 110.

Appellant‘s contention is . . . based on a dubious technicality. If sustained, it might defeat the ends of
justice. It is not sanctioned
by section 4 of Rule 110 nor by article 344 of the Revised Penal Code whose provisions do not
categorically specify that the father has the preferential right to file the complaint for seduction,
abduction, rape or abusos deshonestos. It is noteworthy that ‗the father and mother jointly exercise
parental authority over their legitimate children who are not emancipated‘. It is their duty to represent
their emancipated children in all actions which may redound to their benefit‘[Arts. 311 and 316, Civil
Code].

Under the circumstances the complaint filed by the mother was a sufficient compliance with article 344
and section 4 of Rule 110. It conferred jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The father‘s passivity
should not preclude the mother from securing redress for the outrage committed against her daughter."

Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, People of the Philippines and Office of the Ombudsman
GR No. 148965 February 26, 2002

Doctrine: The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as
a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar / When conspiracy is
charged as a crime (e.g. conspiracy to commit treason) Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure governs.
Facts: November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against then president Joseph
Estrada, five criminal complaints against the former president and members of his family, his associates,
friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the ombudsman.
The ombudsman found probable cause and filed with the Sandiganbayan several complaints against the
former president and other respondents therein. One of the informations was the crime of plunder under
RA 7080 and among those respondents was Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.

The arraignment was set and no bail for petitioner‘s provisional liberty was fixed. Jinggoy filed a
motion to Quash or Suspend the amended information on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law is
unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. The ombudsman opposed the motion.
The court issued a warrant of arrest. Thereafter, Jinggoy and his co0accused were placed in custody of
the law.

Jinggoy filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on
trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling
and not in a series or combination of overt or criminal acts as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the Amended
Information and be discharged from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be
allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by respondent court. The court denied the motions for
lack of merit. Jinggoy moved for reconsideration of the resolution but respondent court denied the
motion and proceeded to arraign Jinggoy. Jinggoy refused to make his plea prompting the court to
enter a plea of not guilty for him. Hence, this petition. Jinggoy claims that Sandiganbayan acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction

Issues:
(1)WON R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to Jinggoy, and denying him the
equal protection of the laws;
(2)WON the penalty for Jinggoy should be other than reclusion perpetua or death
(3)WON the court erred in sustaining the charge against Jinggoy for alleged offenses, and with alleged
conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum
that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process;
(4) WON the conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the information as provided for in Sec. 6 Rule 110 of
the Revised rules of Criminal Procedure

Held: The petition was dismissed.

(1) Jinggoy‘s contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched
on the premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which
cannot constitute plunder. Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph
(a) of the Amended Information which is of receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several
instances, money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift,
share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x. In this sub-paragraph (a), Jinggoy,
in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money
from illegal gambling amounting to P545 million. Contrary to petitioners posture, the allegation is that
he received or collected money from illegal gambling on several instances. The phrase on several
instances means Jinggoy committed the predicate act in series.

(2) Jinggoy is under the impression that: (1) he is charged with only one act or offense and (2) he has
not conspired with the other accused named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of the Amended Information,
ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A. No.
7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is. Jinggoy,
however, overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have
conspired with former President Estrada in committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation
consists in the commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information. If these allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no
different from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other.

(3) In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In
the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonalityto help the
former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the
Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The
gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection
money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each
accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from
such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is
that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.

(4) Conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be
alleged as constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the
sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The complaint or information to be sufficient must
state the name of the accused, designate the offense given by statute, state the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, the name of the offended
party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was
committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be
made in order to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name
given by statute or by reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. The information
must also state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable
the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be
stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of
alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the
accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
However, The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not
charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar.
There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the
gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal
liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co- principals regardless of
the degree of their participation in the crime.
 Following the stream of the Supreme Court‟s jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy
as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word
conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by
allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to
competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.

The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of
evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation;
of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of
sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. A statement of this evidence is not necessary in
the information. In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in
general terms how the accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the words in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused. Following the ruling in People v. Quitlong, these words are
sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in committing the crime of
plunder.

Enrile vs. People

Facts:
Year 2014, Sen. Enrile was charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan for their alleged involvement
in the diversion and misuse of appropriation under the PDAF. When his warrant was issued, Sen. Enrile
voluntarily surrendered to the CIDG and was later confined and detained at the PNP General Hospital, he
then filed a motion to fix bail where he argued that:

1. He should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right;

2. Although charged with plunder his penalty would only be reclusion temporal considering that there
are two mitigating circumstances, his voluntary surrender and that he is already at the age of 90;
3. That he is not a flight risk and his medical condition must be seriously considered.
The Sandiganbayan however, denied his motion on the grounds that:

1. He is charged with a capital offense;

2. That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of his bail because the prosecution have not
yet presented its evidences.
Sen. Enrile then filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:  
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for denying his motion to fix bail?

Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail and
unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s fragile health and advanced age. Bail is a matter right and is
safeguarded by the constitution, its purpose is to ensure the personal appearance of the accused during
trial or whenever the court requires and at the same time recognizing the guarantee of due process which
is the presumption of his innocence until proven guilty. The Supreme Court further explained that Bail for
the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged should be allowed independently of
the merits charged, provided his continued incarceration is injurious to his health and endanger his life.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen. Enrile be granted the right to bail it will enable
him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and attended, which will then enable him to
attend trial therefore achieving the true purpose of bail.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RENATO alias BONG TORRECAMPO and RENE
TORRECAMPO, appellants.
Doctrines:
- Circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for purposes of conviction must have the following
elements: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proved; and, (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.
- Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
Sec. 8. Designation of the Offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and
the qual ifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
- Aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying or generic, must be alleged in the information before
they can be considered by the court. These new provisions apply even if the crime was committed prior
to their effectivity since they are favorable to the accused, as in this case.

Facts:
Jovito Caspillo was found stabbed and decapitated in his rented room. For his death, brothers Renato
alias Bong and Rene Torrecampo were charged before the RTC of Las Pinas with murder. The above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating with one, Nora Torrecampo whose present whereabouts
still unknown, they stabbed Caspillo in the different part(s) of his body and even cut off his head with a
bladed weapon.

Jovito was a tenant of the Escosio family. He shared a room with his brother Randy and first cousins
Nora and Karen Torrecampo. The Escosios occupied the other room of the house. Erlinda Escosio
testified that on November 11, 1994, she was seated at the door of their room removing lice from the
hair of her daughter when she saw Nora and Renato pass by. They were followed by Rene Torrecampo.
All three (3) went to the room of Jovito. A while later, Erlinda heard a weepy Nora pleading to get into
Jovitos room where the loud noise of the radio could be heard. Some minutes after, she saw Nora and
appellant Renato come out of the room. Appellant Renato dragged Nora to the direction of
Sampaguita Compound. Appellant Rene left the room after them. He was carrying a bag.

Erlinda continued that after the departure of appellants and Nora, she walked to the toilet and noticed
blood at the door of Jovito. Curious, she peeped inside and was shocked by the sight of a body
drenched in blood with its head severed from the neck. It was Jovito. Terrified, she called for her
neighbors and the barangay tanods. People milled to the crime scene until the authorities arrived. She
felt that appellants were the culprits. She explained that the main door is the only way in and out of the
house. Either way, one would have to pass by their room to get to Jovitos. On subject date and time,
she only saw appellants and Nora go in and come out of the scene of the crime. At the police station,
she identified both appellants.

According to Cherry Francisco, a neighbor who lives in front of the house of the Escosios, she was eating
breakfast with her family when she heard noises coming from the room of Jovito. She went out to
investigate and noticed Nora beating at the door crying out, Bakit ninyo siya pinatay? The door was
suddenly opened and someone grabbed Nora by the hair and pulled her inside the room.

Rene Torrecampo testified in his defense. He averred that on November 11, 1994, he left for work and
arrived at LFS Engineering an hour later as indicated in the office logbook. He claimed that he found out
about Jovitos death only during his coffee break when Renato‘s wife telephoned them about it.
According to him, they left for Laong immediately after getting permission from their employer
Lamberto Samonte. On their way home, Rene and Karen stopped by the latters place primarily to find
out what happened to Jovito and incidentally to get some of her things. The room was a mess and Jovito
was nowhere to be found. Rene added that at work the next day he read in Abante that his
brother Renato was being tagged as the principal suspect in the killing. Hence, he and his brother
immediately requested their employer Lamberto Samonte to accompany them to the Las Pinas Police
Station to surrender. The police took them to the Office of then Municipal Mayor Ben Casimiro where
they were presented to the media. An investigation ensued. Appellants were detained and ultimately
charged for the murder of Jovito. Renato Torrecampo basically related a similar story. Together with his
brother, he asked their employer to escort him to the police station to clear his name. However, they
were detained instead and threatened into admitting the commission of the crime. They insisted that
they had no knowledge thereof and explained that they were at their place of work when it happened.
The police did not believe them. Forthwith, they were charged with murder.

The defense likewise offered in evidence the testimonies of SPO1 Benjamin Javier, Edgardo Gremio and
SPO4 Esmeraldo Lucena. SPO1 Javier of the Las Pinas Police Criminal Investigation Division was assigned
to investigate the death of Jovito. He said that he found the dead body of Jovito in his small rented
room, which was adjacent to the room of the owner of the two (2)-bedroom house. The rooms were
separated by a plywood wall. He placed the time of death at 10:30 A.M. based on his interview of
Erlinda Escosio. He took down the statement of Erlinda on November 12, 1994. He believed her story
and submitted a report on his findings.
Edgardo Gremio and SPO4 Esmeraldo Lucena gave corroborative testimonies. Gremio testified that he is
a member of the Barangay Police Force in Laong Street, Barangay Almanza Uno, Las Pinas.

On the basis of circumstantial evidence, the court a quo found Renato and Rene Torrecampo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced them to death. It likewise ordered them to solidarily
pay the heirs of the victim Jovito Caspillo P100,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of life; P35,014.00 in
actual damages for the wake, funeral and burial expenses; and, the costs of the suit. Hence, this
automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659.

In convicting appellants, the trial court relied on the following circumstances: (a) at about 9:00 A.M. on
November 11, 1994, Erlinda saw Jovito very much alive; (b) after an hour, Erlinda saw appellant Renato
and his sister Nora pass by, followed shortly by appellant Rene; (c) Erlinda heard a commotion inside the
room of Jovito and after a few minutes saw appellants emerging from the room with Nora in tow; (d)
Cherry heard a loud banging from the room of Jovito so she went outside and saw Nora frantically
pounding at the door, then Nora was pulled inside the room; (e) after thirty (30) minutes, Cherry
witnessed a seemingly weak Nora being assisted by appellant Renato coming out of the room; and, (f)
Cherry likewise observed appellant Rene leaving the room with his hands and clothes covered with
blood.

Circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for purposes of conviction must have the following
elements: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proved; and, (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.

In the instant case, the circumstances enumerated by the trial court establish an unbroken chain of
events showing the complicity of appellants and no other in the killing of victim Jovito Caspillo. Indeed,
the case of the prosecution is woven principally around the testimonies of witnesses Erlinda Escosio and
Cherry Francisco whose testimonies were sufficiently tested and found credible on the crucible of cross-
examination. Notably, as correctly observed by the court a quo, appellants failed to demonstrate ill
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify against them. Absent any evidence showing
any reason or motive for the witnesses to prevaricate, the logical conclusion is that no such improper
motive exists, and their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.

Issue: W/N the decision of the trial court is not supported and contrary to the evidence adduced during
trial

Ruling: No. The Court rejected this contention.

 First. Appellants submit that the trial court should have completely rejected both oral and written
accounts of prosecution witness Erlinda Escosio considering that her in-court testimony is contrary to
her sworn statement. Clearly, reference is made on what Erlinda did not mention in her sworn
statement. This is not an inconsistency but merely an incompleteness of narration. Sworn statements,
being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for various reasons,
sometimes from partial suggestion or for want of suggestion and inquiries. There is no rule of evidence
to the effect that omission of certain particulars in a sworn statement would estop an affiant from
making an elaboration thereof or from correcting inaccuracies during the trial.
Second. To merit belief, alibi and denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability. The
records reveal that appellants employer only substantiated their claim that they left LFS Engineering at
10:00 A.M. on that ill-fated day. No clear and convincing evidence was adduced to establish that it was
physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Indeed, they
admitted leaving LFS Engineering to go to the locus criminis though they claimed to have arrived there
only at 11:00 A.M. Their testimony cannot prevail over the positive identification of Erlinda and Cherry,
who are disinterested witnesses.

Third. It may be in keeping with human experience for anyone including appellants to wash the blood
away from their clothes and body after committing a crime. However, it is also natural for them to act
with haste so they could immediately leave the crime scene and avoid suspicion. It is thus not incredible
that the hurried and haphazard attempt to remove the bloodstains left the herein appellants with some
traces of blood still visible to the naked eyes of witnesses Erlinda and Cherry.
Fourth. The court in criminal prosecution is always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable and in
harmony with the usual course of human experience and not by mere surmises.
Fifth. Appellants also assail the denial by the trial court of their motion for an ocular inspection of the
crime scene. They suggest that had it been granted, the accuracy or inexactitude of the description by
SPO1 Javier could have been established. The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the ocular
inspection would have been an exercise in futility for the reason that the house had then long been
renovated.

The Information alleged the circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength and/or evident
premeditation, and charged the crime of murder. The circumstances that qualify the killing to murder
must be proved indubitably as the killing itself. The prosecution failed to prove these circumstances.
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor. This assumes a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor
and selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The evidence does not show
that appellants took advantage of their number in order to overpower the victim. The evidence
against appellants is merely circumstantial.
Nor was evident premeditation proved. There is no proof in the instant case of (a) the time when
appellants determined to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that they clung to
their determination to commit the crime; and, (c) the lapse of sufficient period of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime, to allow appellants to reflect upon the consequences of
their act. Hence, this circumstance cannot likewise be appreciated.

The Solicitor General submits that treachery should be appreciated against the appellants as Jovito was
asleep when killed. He contends that while treachery was not alleged in the Information, it could be
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. The Court however did not agreed with this.
Erlinda testified that Jovito was asleep prior to the arrival of appellants but she did not say that he was
still sleeping when the attack commenced. Even assuming that treachery was proved, it could not be
considered a generic aggravating circumstance. Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide: Sec. 8. Designation of the Offense. The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
 circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

Clearly, under the aforesaid provisions, aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying or generic, must
be alleged in the information before they can be considered by the court. These new provisions
apply even if the crime was committed prior to their effectivity since they are favorable to the accused,
as in this case. Appellants cannot invoke the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For
voluntary surrender to be considered, it must be shown that: (1) the offender was not actually arrested;
(2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or to an agent of that person; and, (3) his surrender
was voluntary. The records disclose that appellants voluntarily presented themselves to the Las Pinas
Police Department to clear their name.

Prescinding from these premises, the Court held that the decision of the trial court finding appellants
Torrecampos guilty of murder and imposing upon them the penalty of death is MODIFIED; they are
instead found guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

People vs Jugueta

―As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is
defective.‖

FACTS:
That on or about 9:00 o‘clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya,
Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery,
with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of
Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts,
but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or
accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina,
his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and
who are minors, were not hit.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes
Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto,
namely, Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds.
Finding appellant‘s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the
trial court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other
assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double
Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the information is valid
HELD:
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show
that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the
victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same
vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted
Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply
with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must
charge only one offense.
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the
quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same.
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information
but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are
charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.

MATALAM vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 165751 Doctrine:

SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

But if amended in substance, the accused is entitled to another preliminary investigation,

unless the amended charge is related to or is included in the original charge.

Facts:
An information dated 15 November 2004 was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner
Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib
A. Bajunaid, Ansari M. Lawi, Muslimin Unga and Naimah Unte with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, for their alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims
of Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Esmael A. Ebrahim, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan,
Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil. The accusatory portion of the information reads:
On 14 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.

After the reinvestigation, the public prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Exept Datu Guimid Matalam.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the amended information charges an entirely new
cause of action. The corpus delicti of the amended information is no longer his alleged refusal to pay
the backwages ordered by the Civil Service Commission, but the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal
dismissal from the service of the complaining witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not Matalam was deprived of due process of law when the Sandiganbayan admitted
the Amneded Information without conducting another or new preliminary investigation.

Ruling:

Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons
in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended
party. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the
accused

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
The following have been held to be merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations which
relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an
amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment
which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; (5) an amendment that merely
adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material
facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original
information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment has been said to be whether a
defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made,
and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the
one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the
crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the
accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of
substance.

In the case at bar, the amendment was indeed substantial. According to Retired Senior Associate
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, before the plea is taken, the information may be amended in
substance and/or form, without leave of court; but if amended in substance, the accused is
entitled to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended charge is related to or is
included in the original charge.

If the amended information contains a charge related to or is included in the original information, a
new preliminary investigation is not required.
 If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the amended charge, his right will
definitely be prejudiced because he will be denied his right to present evidence to show or rebut
evidence regarding the element of evident bad faith and manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He
will be denied due process.
A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and
substantive right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation
would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to due process.
As to statement of the court a quo that the conduct of another preliminary investigation would be
merely a waste of time, it must be emphasized that though the conduct thereof will hold back the
progress of the case, the same is necessary in order that the accused may be afforded his right to a
preliminary investigation. The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation should never be
compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency.

PEOPLE VS TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA DOCTRINE:

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, 18 provides that an amendment after the plea of the accused
is permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and such amendment is not
prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had
already been arraigned. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.

FACTS:

Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua- Kho. On February 12, 2001, at the
condominium of Sua-Kho, the housemaid heard her employer screaming, and she saw the accused
stabbing her with their kitchen knife. She tried to stop the accused, shouting "Kuya Bert!", but the latter
continued to stab Atty. Sua-Kho. The victim was brought to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital,
where doctors tried to revive her, but failed. The accused, meanwhile, fled, using the victim‘s car. He
was arrested soon afterwards in Calapan, Mindoro, while on his way to his home province.

Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder in an amended Information. In
the amended Information, it states that the accused, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation,
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua on the different parts of her body with the use of a
deadly weapon, thereby inflicting upon said Evelyn Kho y Sua stab wounds, which directly caused her
death; that the act was committed inside the dwelling of Evelyn Kho y Sua and with insult or in
disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or sex.

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued where the accused raised
the defense of self- defense. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City rendered judgment finding Elberto
Tubongbanua y Pahilanga GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the severe penalty of death by lethal injection. The
case was elevated to the Supreme Court because the penalty imposed was death. However, the case
was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modifications the decision of
the trial court.

The Court of Appeals disregarded appellant‘s claim of self defense for lack of evidence and for being
incredible considering the number and location of wounds sustained by the victim and his flight from the
crime scene. However, the appellate court found that evident premeditation was adequately established
which qualified the killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated abuse of superior strength as an
aggravating circumstance. As regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to the
rank, sex and age of the victim, the Court of Appeals noted that these circumstances were included
as amendments to the information after the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence. As
such, the same should not be allowed because it will prejudice the rights of the appellant.
 ISSUE: W/N the CA err in not allowing the amendments in the information regarding the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age or sex

RULING: YES. We agree with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that appellant‘s
claim of self-defense is self- serving hence should not be given credence. We find, however, that the
Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the amendments in the information regarding the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age or sex. Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, 18 provides that an amendment after the plea of the accused is
permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and such amendment is not
prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had
already been arraigned. 19

In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 20

we had the occasion to distinguish between substantial and formal
amendments:

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the
following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate
only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an
amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution‟s theory of the case so as
to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right
to invoke prescription.

The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such
amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be
equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the
accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if
the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. 21
The insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to
rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment. These amendments do
not have the effect of charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of murder as
contained in the original information. They relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of
appellant. 22 Besides, appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account
of rank, age or sex. 23 Without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. 24

There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home. Appellant could have killed her elsewhere
but he decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we appreciate the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling. However, it was not convincingly shown that appellant deliberately intended to offend or
disregard the respect due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. Sua- Kho.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y
Pahilanga isfound GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER qualified by evident premeditation and
with the attendant aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength and dwelling,
with no mitigating circumstances.

Ricarze vs. CA

Facts:
Ricarze was employed as a collector-messenger by City Service Corporation, a domestic corporation
engaged in messengerial services assigned to the main office of Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati
City. task was to collect... checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. He also delivered
invoices to Caltex's customers.
Caltex, through its Banking and Insurance Department Manager Ramon Romano, filed a criminal complaint
against petitioner before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents. it was discovered that unknown to the department, a company check, Check No.
74001 dated October 13, 1997 in the amount of P5,790,570.25 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, had been
cleared through PCIB on October 15, 1997. An investigation also revealed that two other checks (Check
Nos. 73999 and 74000) were also missing and that in Check No. 74001, his signature and... that of another
signatory, Victor S. Goquinco, were forgeries. Another check, Check No. 72922 dated September 15, 1997
in the amount of P1,790,757.25 likewise payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, was also cleared through the same
bank on September 24, 1997; this check was likewise not... issued by Caltex, and the signatures appearing
thereon had also been forged. Upon verification, it was uncovered that Check Nos. 74001 and 72922 were
deposited at the Banco de Oro's SM Makati Branch under Savings Account No. S/A 2004-0047245-7, in the
name of a regular customer... of Caltex, Dante R. Gutierrez.
Gutierrez, however, disowned the savings account as well as his signatures on the dorsal portions thereof.
He also denied having withdrawn any amount from said savings account... savings account had actually
been opened by petitioner; the... forged checks were deposited and endorsed by him under Gutierrez's
name. A bank teller from the Banco de Oro, Winnie P. Donable Dela Cruz, positively identified petitioner
as the person who opened the savings account using Gutierrez's name.
PCIB credited the amount of P581,229.00 to Caltex, However, the City Prosecutor of Makati City was not
informed of this development. After the requisite preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor filed two
(2) Informations for... estafa through falsification of commercial documents on June 29, 1998... against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati24th day of September 1997 , 15th day of
October 1997
Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded not guilty... prosecution presented its
witnesses, after which the Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offices (SRMO) as... private
prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of Evidence.[Petitioner opposed the pleading, contending that the private
complainant was represented by the ACCRA Law Offices and the Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial,
and it was only after the prosecution... had rested its case that SRMO entered its appearance as private
prosecutor]
Since the ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had not withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no
personality to appear as private prosecutor
Under the Informations, the private... complainant is Caltex and not PCIB
Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the private complainant
to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced
Informations can no longer be amended because he had already been arraigned under the... original
Informations.
amendments of the Informations to substitute PCIB as the offended party for Caltex would place him in
double jeopardy.
PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended that the PCIB had re-credited the amount to
Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to the rights and interests of
Caltex as private complainant.
PCIB, through SRMO, averred that as provided in Section 2, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the erroneous designation of the name of the offended party is a mere formal defect which
can be cured by inserting the name of the offended party in... the Information. To support its claim, PCIB
cited the ruling of this Court in Sayson v. People.
RTC issued an Order granting the motion of the private prosecutor for the substitution of PCIB as private
complainant for Caltex.  It however denied petitioner's motion to have the formal offer of evidence of
SRMO expunged... motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied... appellate court rendered judgment
dismissing the petition.
Petitioner argues that the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant at this late stage of the
trial is prejudicial to his defense. He argues that the substitution is tantamount to a substantial
amendment of the Informations which is prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110
Issues:
SUBSTITUTION OF PCIBANK WILL SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER HENCE, IT IS
PROHIBITED BY SEC. 14 OF RULE 110.
THERE IS NO VALID SUBROGATION BETWEEN CALTEX AND PCIBANK. ASSUMING THERE IS, THE CIVIL CASE
SHOULD BE DISMISSED TO PROSECUTE.
Ruling:
Under Section 5, Rule 110[20] of the Revised Rules of Rules, all criminal actions covered by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor... the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted, and the
offended party has not waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted...
the civil action prior to the criminal action, the prosecution of the action (including the civil) remains
under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is a public function
Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,... the offended party may intervene in the
criminal action personally or by counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his
interests... multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the
criminal action, the two actions are merged into... one composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil... the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained
Article
104 of the Revised Penal Code
Restitution;
Reparation of the damage caused;
Indemnification for consequential damages.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states
A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be
made... with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information
may be made without leave of court.  After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made
but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of... the accused.  After arraignment, a
substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.
substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative
of the jurisdiction of the court
All other matters are merely of form.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any
evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the... one form as in the
other.  An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein
does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment... substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial
amendment... substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor did it result in
any prejudice to petitioner... documentary evidence in the form of the... forged checks remained the
same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any
surprise by virtue of the substitution
Petitioner's argument on subrogation is misplaced. The Court agrees with respondent PCIB's comment that
petitioner failed to make a distinction between legal and conventional subrogation. Subrogation is the
transfer of all the rights of the creditor to a third person
Legal subrogation is that which takes place without agreement but by operation of law
Conventional subrogation, on the other hand, is that which takes place by agreement of the parties.
petitioner's acquiescence is not necessary for subrogation to... take place because the instant case is one
of legal subrogation that occurs by operation of law, and without need of the debtor's knowledge.
being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB, through counsel, has the right to intervene in the
proceedings, and under substantive laws is entitled to restitution of its properties or funds, reparation, or
indemnification.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of... the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the
offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.
Section 12 of the same Rule provides... omplaint or information must state the name and surname of the
person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed... in case of offenses against
property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as
the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be... properly identified:
In case of offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended... party is not absolutely
indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly
identified... when an offense shall have been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to
Identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same
is a... mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the defendan... petition
is DENIED.

SOBERANO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 154629 Date: October 5, 2005

Rule 110 Doctrine:

Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

"However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons
in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended
party.

"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in
double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
Facts:

• In November 2000, the prominent public relations practitioner, Salvador Bubby Dacer, together with
his driver, Emmanuel Corbito, was abducted along Zobel Roxas St. in the City of Manila. Their charred
remains, consisting of burnt bones, metal dental plates and a ring, were later found in Barangay Buna
Lejos, Indang, Cavite. They were positively identified by their dentists and by forensic pathologists
from the University of the Philippines. Both victims were killed by strangulation.

• An information was filed by the panel of prosecutors with RTC , Manila charging a number of accused
some of whom are public officers of double murder.

• On 23 May 2001, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information which was granted and
the Amended Information was admitted by the trial court. The new information included now the
allegation that: (the previous info did not assert that the victims were abducted)

xxx abduct SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL CORBITO at the corner of Osmea
Highway (formerly South Super Highway) and Zobel Roxas Street in Manila, and later brought
them to Indang, Cavite, xxx

• On 18 June 2001, one of the accused, P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation
asserting that he was mistakenly identified as a participant in the double murder. He stressed that it
was not him but a certain SPO3 Allan Cadenilla Villanueva who was previously identified by several
witnesses as one of the culprits. This was granted by the trial court.

• A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information dated 17 September 2001 was filed by the
prosecution. The Amended Information —

(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Lopez and Glen Dumlao as they
are now witnesses for the State;
(2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva; and
(3) charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao II and P/Sr.
Supt. Teofilo Via.

• Accused Soberano, Torres, Escalante, Purificacion, Renato and Jovencio Malabanan opposed the
Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information in an Opposition14 dated 28 September
2001. They prayed that the Motion to Admit Amended Information and the discharge of accused
Dumlao, Diloy and the brothers Lopez be denied. In its Order dated 01 October 2001, the trial court
denied the Motion to Admit Amended Information. The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied in an Order15 dated 24 October 2001. On 16 November 2001, the prosecution
moved in open court to inhibit Judge Ponferrada from hearing the case. Acting on this motion, Judge
Ponferrada, on 22 November 2001, ordered that the case be re-raffled. The case was re-raffled to
Branch 18, RTC, Manila, presided by Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio. On 04 January 2002, the prosecution
filed a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
before the Supreme Court praying that the Orders of then Judge Ponferrada dated 01 and 24 October
2001 be annulled and set aside and that Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio of Branch 18 be restrained, in the
meantime, from proceeding with the case in accordance with said orders. In a Resolution16 dated
21 January 2002, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.

Issue/s:
WON the Court a quo erred in allowing the discharge of accused Diloy and the Lopez brothers

Held:

No the court did not erred in allowing the discharge of accused Diloy and the Lopez brothers

Section 14, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
reads –

"Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

"However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons
in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended
party.

"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the
trial."

Applying the import of the afore-quoted Section 14, Rule 110, it appears that the Amended Information
sought to be admitted by the petitioner finds sufficient support therein, considering, firstly, that there
has been no arraignment yet. Secondly, when respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA granted the
motion for reinvestigation in the Order dated July 04, 2001, there was in effect a prior leave of court
given to the State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice to conduct the same, substantially
complying with such requirement under the second paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110. After all, a leave
of court is defined a "permission obtained from a court to take some action which, without such
permission, would not be allowable: as, to sue a receiver, to file an amended pleading, to plead several
pleas."

n the case of People v. Montesa, Jr., the Supreme Court‘s pertinent ruling, which We now reiterate,
finds application in the case at bench, i.e., where a judge grants a motion for reinvestigation [as in this
case], he is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to
consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and to determine whether the information it
has filed should stand, and that the final disposition on the reinvestigation should be the sole and only
valid basis for the judge‘s final action with respect to the reinvestigation.

Thus, in accord with the aforesaid Montesa, Jr. ruling, respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA‘s
"sole and only basis" for the inclusion (or exclusion, for that matter) of the
additional accused should be the final disposition on the reinvestigation conducted by the State
Prosecutors of the Department of Justices.

There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved here is primary an amendment of an
information to exclude some accused and that the same is made before plea. Thus, at the very least,
Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable which means that the amendment should be made only upon motion
by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. What seems to complicate
the situation is that the exclusion of the accused is specifically sought for the purpose of discharging
them as witnesses for the State. The consequential question is, should the requirements for discharge of
an accused as state witness as set forth in Section 17, Rule 119 be made as additional requirements
(i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 17, Rule 119) or should only one provision apply as ruled by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 or Section 17, Rule 119)?

An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one of the accused must be
made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court in
compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the
exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal force when the exclusion is sought on the
usual ground of lack of probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as state witness, as in
this case, or on some other ground.
 At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for the prosecution to
present evidence and the sworn statement of each state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge
do not yet come into play. This is because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the
determination of who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function, not a
judicial one.29 The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose
principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component
of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests
the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge,
the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.30
By virtue of the trial court having granted the prosecution‘s motion for reinvestigation, the former is
deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government.31 Having
brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion -- wide
and far reaching – regarding the disposition thereof.

Pacoy vs. Cajigal

Facts:
On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner committed as
follows:
That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and... feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita
with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his
body which caused his instantaneous death.
With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not
guilty to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial conference and trial on October 8,
2002.[5]
However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order,[6]
likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information
to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of... disregard of rank alleged in the Information which
public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.
Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word "Homicide" and
instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The
accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original
Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the victim's name from "Escuita" to
"Escueta."[7]
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be re-
arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be
placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been... terminated without his express
consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended
Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.[
Petitioner alleged that in the Information for Homicide, he was validly indicted and... arraigned before a
competent court, and the case was terminated without his express consent; that when the case for
Homicide was terminated without his express consent, the subsequent filing of the Information for Murder
in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy.
In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code shows that "disregard of rank" is merely a generic mitigating[14] circumstance
which should not elevate the classification of... the crime of homicide to murder.
Issues:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION AND
VIOLATED THE LAW IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WHICH WAS
ALREADY TERMINATED.[
Ruling:
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in amending the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge in
the Information for Homicide. The argument of petitioner --
Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already terminated without his express
consent, he cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder which involve the same offense. The
petitioner argued that the termination of the information for
Homicide without his express consent is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to charge him again, this time
for Murder, is tantamount to placing the petitioner in Double Jeopardy.[... is not plausible. Petitioner
confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court, to wit --
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave... of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the... accused would not be placed
thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the
trial.
with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it becomes manifest at any
time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the accused
cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other... offense necessarily included therein, the
accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall
commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the
proper... information.
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second
paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made
before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:
Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a
substantial change from the original charge;
Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of
information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed;
Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the
retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is
entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information;... and
An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments
to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made... over the objection of the accused, for
if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other
hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which
does not include or is not... necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim
double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section
14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where
the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which... necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise,
where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged,
a substitution is in order
In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal
amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in Teehankee.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only change
made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with
the crossing out of word "Homicide" and its replacement by the word
"Murder." There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for Murder are
exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for
Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt.
Escueta without any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and
preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that "disrespect on account of rank" qualified the crime
to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance,[23] we do not find that he
committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the... amendment of the Information after petitioner
had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal
and did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner
Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the charge from
Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide. Petitioner's claim that the
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his Motion to
Quash the Amended Information for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy is not meritorious.
there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to
the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that bars further
prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof; or
prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is... necessarily included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information
Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or unconditional dismissal
which terminates the case.[27] And for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have
the effect of acquittal.
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely ordered the
amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the
same original information that was amended by merely crossing out the word
"Homicide" and writing the word "Murder," instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the
homicide case.
A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge granted petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but on his realization that
"disregard of rank" is a generic aggravating circumstance which does not... qualify the killing of the victim
to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the original Information for Homicide. The
requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second is not present,
considering that petitioner was... neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent
Judge.

Crespo vs. Mogul, G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987

Doctrine:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends
upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the
direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.

Facts:
 On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena
City.
 When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the
ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information.
 In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the
motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but
the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the
matter to the appellate court.
 A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed
by the accused in the Court of Appeals. In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals
restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders
of the Court.
 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given
due course.
 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and
perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the
accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for
review.
 On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the
fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused.
 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10,
1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr.
In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto.
 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment, stating that ―the
motion‘s trust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not
before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only
disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court‘s independence and
integrity.‖
 The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of
Appeals.
 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the
threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision
of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of
 January 23, 1979.
 A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of
February 19, 1980.
 Hence this petition for review of said decision. Petitioner and private respondent filed their
respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that
the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be
ordered to dismiss the information.
Issue:
Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant
the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.

Ruling:
Yes. The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition
of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of
the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best
and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when
the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.

Fronda-Baggao v People
GR No.151785 December 10, 2007

DOCTRINE Petitioner contends that the amendment of the four Informations for illegal recruitment into
a single Information for illegal recruitment in large scale violates her substantial rights as this would
deprive her of the right to bail which she already availed of. Such contention is misplaced. Obviously,
petitioner relies on Section 14 of the same Rule 110 which provides that after the plea and during the
trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. As stated earlier, petitioner has not yet been arraigned.
Hence, she cannot invoke the said provision.

FACTS Sometime in 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor of Abra filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
1, Bangued, four separate Informations for illegal recruitment against Susan Fronda-Baggao, petitioner,
and Lawrence Lee. Petitioner eluded arrest for more than a decade; hence, the cases against her were
archived. On July 25, 1999, petitioner was finally arrested. On July 26, 1999, the prosecutor filed with
the trial court a motion to amend the Informations. He prayed that the four separate Informations for
illegal recruitment be amended so that there would only be one Information for illegal recruitment in
large scale. On the same day, the trial court denied the motion for lack of merit. On August 6, 1999,
the prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order dated January 26, 2000, the trial court
granted the motion and admitted the Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.
ISSUE W/NOT the four Informations for illegal recruitment could be amended and lumped into one
Information for illegal recruitment in large scale.
HELD YES. As provided under Section 14 of Rule 110:

Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea
and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be
done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. However, any amendment
before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from
the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and
copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. If it
appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging
the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at
the trial. (Emphasis ours)

A careful scrutiny of the above Rule shows that although it uses the singular word complaint or
information, it does not mean that two or more complaints or Informations cannot be amended into only
one Information. Surely, such could not have been intended by this Court. Otherwise, there can be an
absurd situation whereby two or more complaints or Informations could no longer be amended into one
or more Informations. On this point, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court is relevant, thus:
SEC. 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.