International Journal of Automation and Computing 2 (2006) 184-191

Quantified Risk Assessment for Plants Producing and

Storing Explosives
Ioannis A. Papazoglou∗ , Panagiotis Saravanos, Ieronymos Giakoumatos, Olga N. Aneziris
Systems Reliability and Industrial Safety Laboratory (SRISL), Institute of Nuclear Technology-Radiation Protection,
National Center for Scientific Research “Demokritos”, Aghia Paraskevi 15310, Greece

Abstract: This paper presents a methodology for risk assessment of plants producing and storing explosives. The major
procedural steps for quantified risk assessment (QRA) in explosive plants are the following: hazard identification, accident
sequence modeling, data acquisition, accident sequence quantification, consequence assessment and integration of results.
This methodology is demonstrated and applied in an explosive plant consisting of four separate units, which produce
detonating cord, nitroglycol, dynamites and ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO). A GIS platform is used for depicting
individual risk from explosions in this plant. Total individual risk is equal to 1.0 × 10−4 /y in a distance of 340m from the
center of the plant, and 1.0 × 10−6 /y in a distance of 390m from the center of the plant.

Keywords: Risk assessment, explosives, master logic diagram, hazard identification, QRA.

1 Introduction The second phase of the QRA aims at the estab-

Quantified risk assessment (QRA) has been widely
used for the last 20 years in the chemical industry and
particular in the major hazard facilities, which pose se-
rious threats to human health because of the possibility
of accidents. Nevertheless only few attempts for QRA
appear in case of plants producing or storing explosives
such as the one performed by Hauptmanns[1] .
In this paper a methodology for risk assessment for
installations handling explosive materials is proposed
and applied in an actual dynamite producing plant.
The methodology and procedures to be followed
for the qualification of the risk from installations han-
dling explosives can be distinguished into three major
phases, as it has been proposed in [2] for chemical in-
stallations:
1) Assessment of plant damage states and their fre-
quency of occurrence.
2) Assessment of consequences of explosives.
3) Risk integration.
The first phase of a QRA consists of analyzing the
installation to identify potential explosion initiators,
assessing the response of the plant to these initiators
and establish end damage states of the plant resulting
in the explosion of explosives. Furthermore, the fre-
quency with which the identified plant damage states
are expected to occur is estimated.
———————
Manuscript received September 25, 2005; revised February 15,
2006.
∗ Corresponding author. E-mail address:
yannisp@ipta.demokritos.gr
lishment of the consequences of the released hazardous
substances. This phase comprises the determination of
the release categories or quantities, location and type
of explosive material that can be involved in individ-
ual explosions, the determination of the extreme phe-
nomena following these explosions and quantification of
their intensity, and the quantification of the exposure
of potential receptors to these extreme phenomena.
The third phase of the QRA involves the integra-
tion of the results obtained in the first two phases in
quantitative measures risk, combining the frequencies
of the various accidents with the corresponding conse-
quences. Individual fatality risk is the particular risk
measure used in this study.
The paper is organized in four sections as follows:
an introduction is given in section 1; section 2 pro-
vides a short description of the installation; section
3 presents the assessment of plant-damage states and
their frequency of occurrence; section 4 outlines the
consequence assessment; finally; section 5 presents the
risk integration and the results for the analyzed instal-
lation.
2 Brief description of the installation
The reference plant consists of four units, which
produce nitroglycol, detonating cord, dynamites and
ANFO. A brief description of each unit is presented
here, while more details are provided in [3]. The gen-
eral outline of the plant is given in Fig. 1.
Production of Nitroglycol
The process for manufacturing nitroglycol is the
 I. A. Papazoglou et al./Quantified Risk Assessment for Plants Producing and Storing Explosives
injection type of Meissner process, where nitric acid
and oleum are used as nitric agent in a continuous and
cooled reactor. Nitroglycol produced in the reactor is
separated from spent acids in a stirred tank with cen-
trifugal separators, washed with water and stabilized
with sodium carbonate. Finally nytroglycol is sepa-
rated from water and transported to a stirred tank as
a stable emulsion.
Fig. 1 General outline of the plant
Production of Detonating Cord
Detonating cord consists of a PETN core (12 g/m)
with threads and a plastic coating around it. The main
phases for the production of the detonating cord are the
following: drying of PETN, manufacturing the cord in
a spinning machine and coating it with PVC.
Dynamite Production
Two kinds of dynamites are produced in the plant.
Gelatine dynamites containing 20-30% nitroglycol and
ammonites containing 5% nitroglycol and 70% ammo-
nium nitrate. The dynamite plant has one mixing unit
(Tellex) and three cartridging units (Rollex, LD-701,
Sleevex). Nitroglycol, ammonium nitrate and solid in-
gredients are weighted and transferred to the mixing
Tellex and when mixing has been performed, the mix-
ture is conveyed to the cartridging house. Cartridges
185
are packed and stored in lots of 25 kg.
ANFO Production
ANFO is a blasting agent (low explosive) and is
based on ammonium nitrate, fuel oil and additions. It
is produced by mixing fuel oil and ammonium nitrate
in a stirred mixer.
3 Assessment of plant-damage states
and their frequency of occurrence
In the first phase of a QRA the possible damage
states of the plant along with the accident sequences
that can cause them are determined. Next, the fre-
quency with which the occurrences of such states are
expected is assessed.
3.1 Hazard source identification
The main sources of potential explosive substances
are identified and the initiating events that can cause
such explosions are determined.
Explosive substances are encountered in the plant,
either as final products or as intermediate products.
All quantities higher than 5 kg have been identified.
The quantities of explosives manufactured or stored in
the plant are not constant, but vary with time. Explo-
sives are also conveyed within the plant, for example
between production unit and exit gate, therefore these
routes have been taken into consideration.
Three major categories of hazard sources are dis-
tinguished:
1) various storage buildings of explosives (dyna-
mites, detonating cord, liquid and dry PETN, nitro-
glycol, ANFO)
2) production units of ANFO, detonating cord,
PETN, nitroglycol and dynamites (unit Tellex, mix-
ing, Sleevex, LD- EX, Rollex), packaging of cartridges,
and
3) transfer routes of explosives from production to
storage magazines.
Table 1 presents the storage capacity of various
magazines, production units and transfer routes.
3.2 Accident sequence determination
A logic model for the installation is developed in
this step. The model includes each and every explosion
initiator and the response of the installation to these
initiators. Specific accident sequences are defined (in
models called event trees) which consist of an initiat-
ing event, specific system failures or successes and their
timing, and human responses. Accident sequences re-
sult in plant damage states, which are explosions of the
explosive substances.
186 International Journal of Automation and Computing 2 (2006) 184-191

3.2.1 Initiating events Table 2 List of initiating events for cartridging of

Accidental initiation of explosives is possible from a
number of stimuli, as reported in [4]. The most impor-
tant are the following: shock wave, mechanical, heat,
chemical instability/reactivity, electrical and electro-
magnetic energy. Fig. 2 presents a generic master logic
diagram for identifying causes of explosion, where ini-
tiating events reported in [5] have also been taken into
account. A list of initiating events has been produced
for each unit of hazard source and Table 2 presents such
a list for the unit producing cartridges of dynamite.
3.3 Accident sequence modelling
For each and every of the identified initiating events
safety barriers are in place to impede these events from
resulting into an immediate cause of detonation. These
safety barriers have been determined for all operating
phases of the installation. Next, models, event trees
have been developed to simulate the logical intercon-
nection of IEs and successes and failures of the safety
barriers into sequences. These sequences lead to either
successful prevention of an explosion or to an explosion.
dynamites
High level of dough in feeding hopper
Defects (Holes) in the wrapping plastic
Wrong cutting of cartridge
Inadvertent stop of conveyor
Foreign body in dough
Unexpected end of wire in cartridging machine
Blockage in the Packaging wire
Unexpected end of plastic film in cartridging machine
Friction from stirrer blades
Friction from failure of screw conveyor
Mechanical failure of stirred mixer
Delay in the feeding of cartridge from the feeding cone
Failure of blades
Failure of wagon brakes
Failure of sensors detecting blade position
Failure of sensors detecting end of wire in cartridging machine
Lightning
External fire
Static electricity owing to humans
Chemical decomposition
A typical event tree constructed for the initiating
event “high level of dough in feeding hopper” is pre-
sented in Fig. 3. If the level of dough is high in the
feeding hopper of the cartridging machine and either
the operator or the sensor detects this fault, then the

Table 1 Storage capacity of various magazines, production units and transfer routes
Build.# Explosive Type Mass (kg) in Build.# Explosive Mass (kg) in Route Transfer route/ Mass (kg)
storage Type production Explosive type in transit
6 Dynamites 14700 12 Det. Cord 400 68-2 Dynamites a) 1400
7 Dynamites 14700 13 Det. Cord 400 b) 4000
8 Dynamite 8150 14 Det. Cord 400 2-GATE Dynamites a) 1400+5600
15 Det. Cord 5000 25 Det. Cord 400 +ANFO b) 4000+16000
26 Dry PETN 400 45 Dynamite 400
23 Dry PETN 400 46 Dynamite 400
44 Nitroglycol 1500 60 Dynamite 400
50 Fuses 200 61 Dynamite 400
56 Dynamites 12400 67 Dynamite 400
58 Dynamites 12400 68 Dynamite 400
2 ANFO 400

Fig. 2 Master logic diagram for causes of explosion

 I. A. Papazoglou et al./Quantified Risk Assessment for Plants Producing and Storing Explosives
feeding stops and the sequence is characterized as safe.
An explosion will occur if both operator and sensor fail
to detect the situation, owing to the resulting suppres-
sion and friction of the dough.
Fig. 3 Event tree for the initiating event “high level of
dough in feeding Hopper”
Accident sequences are next grouped into plant
damage states. A plant damage state uniquely char-
acterizes the installation with respect to the extreme
phenomenon that may follow the damage. In the case
of explosives a damage state determines the location,
quantity and type of explosive substance involved in an
explosion, along with the type of structure that may
surround the explosive mass.
In the analyzed installation, the explosion of the
quantities of explosive substances identified as haz-
ardous also constitutes a potential damage state for the
installation. There are as many plant damage states as
substantial quantities of explosive material shown in
Table 1, since each entry in Table 1 differs from the
other in at least one of the characteristics of a damage
state, namely quantity, type of material, location and
surrounding structure.
Explosives are transferred from the production
units to the main gate of the plant. Two transfer routes
have been considered, as presented in Table 1.
One route is taken from the dynamite production
to the ANFO production and a second is taken from
the ANFO production to the main gate. In the first
route, only dynamites are transferred, while in the sec-
ond both dynamites and ANFO. The quantity of explo-
sives in each load varies, according to the production
planning of the plant. Two cases have been considered
for both routes as follows: a) 1400 kg of dynamites are
transferred from their production unit (#68) to the
ANFO production unit (#2) where 5600 kg of ANFO
are added to the same load b) 4000 kg of dynamites
are transferred from unit #68 to unit #2, where 16000
kg of ANFO are added to the load. The first transfer
occurs three times per day, while the second once per
month.
3.4 Accident sequence quantification and
187
frequency assessment plant-damage states
Determination of the frequency of the various plant
damage states has been done in two ways.
First all the event trees developed in the previ-
ous phase have been quantified through the use of
generic frequencies, hardware failure probabilities and
human error probabilities. Specific installation data
was not available. Once this was completed frequencies
of plant-damage states were determined by adding the
frequencies of the corresponding accident sequences.
Perusal of the identified accident sequences and their
respective frequencies identified areas where potential
improvements were possible, as for example, by adding
an automated control system or changing the proce-
dures.
Since the installation had access to the accident
records of similar installations worldwide and for a
substantial number of years, a simple statistical es-
timation of the frequency of explosion has been per-
formed for each plant-damage state, for each location
of the installation where explosive material is stored
or processed. The frequencies of explosion in various
units of the plant are the presented in Table 3. Only
accidents involving similar installations have been con-
sidered. They were based on a collective operating ex-
perience of about 700 plant years covering a period of
ten years prior to the time of the analysis. For assess-
ing the frequency of explosion in a) the production of
ANFO, b) the storage phase of all materials, and c)
the transportation of explosives, the ten year calcula-
tion base was not adequate as there were no accidents
in this period. Consequently, the data basis had been
expanded to 40 years prior to the time of the analysis
even though the types of explosive materials methods
and condition of storage had not been the same for this
extended period of time.
Table 3 Frequency of explosion in units of the
installation (year−1 )
Dynamite Mixing (Bldg. 45) 6.0×10−3
Dynamite Cartridging ( Bldg. 46, 60 & 61) 1.1×10−2
Packing of dynamites (Bldg. 67 & 68) 5.0×10−3
Drying of PETN (Bldg. 23) 4.0×10−3
Spinning of PETN (Bldg. 13 &14) 3.0×10−3
Coating Detonating Cord with PVC (12 & 25) 6.0×10−3
ANFO production (Bldg. 2) 9.0×10−4
Dynamite or Detonating Cord Storage
(Bldg. 6, 7, 8, 15, 26, 50, 56, 58) 4.5×10−4
Storing of Nitroglycol (Bldg. 44) 3.0×10−3
Transportation of explosives 2.0×10−3
Comparison of the event tree quantification with
the statistically derived frequencies of explosion indi-
cated that the two independent calculations were in
good agreement. For example, quantification of all the
188 International Journal of Automation and Computing 2 (2006) 184-191

accident sequences (from the event trees) leading to a
detonation in the building where the detonating cord is
covered with PVC gave a total frequency of explosion
9×10−3 /year. This compares very well with the statis-
tically derived frequency of 6×10−3/year. Given that
the event trees have been quantified using generic data
from all types of industries that might not be applica-
ble in this type of installation, the statistically derived
frequencies of Table 3 were eventually used in the qual-
ification of risk.
The frequency of explosion of all transfer routes has
been estimated to be 2.0×10−3/year. In this plant
there are two kinds of transfers, those with high fre-
quency, three times per day, consisting of 7000 kg of
explosives (1400 kg dynamites+5600 kg ANFO) and
those with low frequency, once per moth, consisting
of 20000 kg of explosives (4000kg dynamites+16000
kg ANFO). Therefore the following frequencies of ex-
plosion have been considered a) 1.9×10−3/year, con-
sisting of 1400 kg dynamites+5600 kg ANFO b)
1.0×10−4/year, consisting of 4000 kg dynamites+16000
kg ANFO.
It has been considered that an explosion might oc-
cur at various points of the transfer routes. The fre-
quency of explosion at each point is equal to the fre-
quency of explosion divided by the number of points.
Ten possible explosion points have been considered in
the first route (from the dynamite production unit to
the ANFO production unit, #68→#2) and five pos-
sible explosion points in the second route (from the
ANFO production unit to the gate, #2→gate). There-
fore the following explosions have been considered:
1) 10 explosion points in the first route with fre-
quency 1.27×10−4/year and mass 1400 kg dynamite
2) 5 explosion points in the second route with fre-
quency 1.27×10−4/year and mass 1400 kg dynamite
and 5600 kg ANFO
3) 10 explosion points in the first route with fre-
quency 6.67×10−6/year and mass 4000 kg dynamite
4) 5 explosion points in the second route with fre-
quency 6.67×10−6/year and mass 4000 kg dynamite
and 16000 kg ANFO
In general consequences from major accidents in-
volving hazardous materials can be quantified in four
of major steps:
4.1 Determination of release categories of
explosives
A release category for explosives defines all neces-
sary conditions that uniquely determine the level of
overpressure at each point in the area around the explo-
sive source. In this case, each plant damage state corre-
sponds to a single release category. The location, quan-
tity and the type of the explosive material uniquely de-
termine the extreme phenomenon, overpressure, at any
point in the surrounding space. The release categories
are provided given in Table 1.
4.2 Estimation of peak overpressure
In this step, a model for simulating the peak over-
pressure resulting from the released explosive material
and the associated physical phenomenon is established.
Next the peak overpressure is calculated.
Overpressure by an explosion of explosives at dis-
tance R is given by the following equation[6]
P = [1 − (C1 + C2 )]k 1/n [R/W 1/3 ]−1/n (1)
where
P is overpressure in bar
R is the distance from the explosion in m
W is the TNT equivalent mass in kg, which is equal
to
∆He
W =m
∆HT N T
m mass of explosive
∆HT N T , ∆He : heat of explosion for TNT and the
particular explosive
C1 = 0.3 if the explosives are protected with barri-
cades
C2 = 0.3 if the receptor is protected with barricades
C1 = C2 = 0 if there are no protection barricades
Parameters k, n depend on the produced overpres-
sure and are given in the following table[6] :

Table 4 Parameters k, n of overpressure formula

4 Consequence assessment
p (bar)
n k
From To
Following an explosion, undesirable consequences
0.010133 0.1013253 0.83 2.9
on health and the environment can be caused via four 0.101325 0.5066267 0.69 4.1
mechanisms: 0.506627 3.0397601 0.52 4.6
a) Overpressure (shock wave) 3.03976 100 0.33 3.85
b) Projectile ejection
Characteristic values of an explosion are the peak
c) Thermal radiation overpressure and its duration, which is the time period
d) Ground motion. required to reduce overpressure to atmospheric.
In this paper only consequences of the overpressure
are presented. 4.3 Estimation of impulse
 I. A. Papazoglou et al./Quantified Risk Assessment for Plants Producing and Storing Explosives
Two parameters affect the measure of the conse-
quences of an explosion: the peak overpressure and the
impulse. The impulse Is is given by the following equa-
tion: Z
Is = [(P (t) − P0 )]dt (2)
td
where td is the duration of the shock wave, the time
period where the pressure is greater than the at-
mospheric Po , (P (t) > Po ) as calculated by the fol-
lowing equations[7]
td = 10.23W 1/3/Ps1/2 if Ps < 70bar
1/3
td = 20.77W /Ps2/3 if Ps > 70bar
where
W is the TNT equivalent mass in kg
Ps : peak overpressure in bar.
td : duration of the shock wave in millisec
The impulse is then approximated to
1
Id = td · Ps
2
where
Is : impulse
Ps : peak overpressure
td : duration of the shock wave
Alternatively, the impulse can be directly estimated
by parametric equations given in [8] and [9].
4.4 Dose from overpressure
The integrated, over time, exposure of an individ-
ual to the extreme phenomenon generated by the over-
pressure determines the “dose” the individual receives
and consequently the severity of the consequences. Any
emergency response plan or other mitigation action is
taken into account at this point.
There are two kinds of blast effects to humans, ei-
ther direct injury to the eardrum and the lung or in-
direct effects owing to fragments, whole body displace-
ment or building damage as described in greater detail
in [10]. In case of building damage it is assumed that
people inside the buildings will not survive. In this pa-
per the calculated consequences are due to the whole
body displacement.
The dose depends on the two characteristics of
shock wave, peak overpressure and impulse and also
on the type of injury. For whole body displacement, a
dose is given from the following equation[10] :
7.28 × 103 1.3 × 109
D(x, y) = + (6)
Ps Ps Is
where
D(x, y): dose at point (x, y)
Ps : peak overpressure in Pa.
189
Is : impulse in Pa s
4.5 Dose response
The probit equation in case of explosion is the fol-
lowing:
Po = Probit = a + b ∗ ln{D} (7)
where the values of a, b depend on the type of injury
and for whole body displacement are a = 5, b = −2.44,
D is the received dose estimated from equation (6) and
(3) Po is the probability of fatality.
(4)
4.6 Risk integration
Integration of the results obtained so far, that is,
combining the frequencies of the various accidents with
the corresponding consequences, results in the quantifi-
cation of risk. Individual fatality risk is a risk measure
usually used to quantify risk.
(5) 4.6.1 Individual risk
Individual fatality risk is defined as the “frequency
(probability per unit of time) that an individual at a
specific location (x,y) relative to the installation(s) will
die as a result of an accident in the installation”. It is
usually expressed per unit of time (e.g. per year) of
installation operation. Individual fatality risk is calcu-
lated as follows.
Let
i be an index, spanning the space of the initiating
events. That is, of those events that have the potential
to initiate an accident sequence. (i = 1, · · · , I)
k be an index spanning the space of the possible
plant damage states of an installation. (k = 1, · · · , K).
r be an index spanning the space of the possi-
ble release categories of an explosive substance. (r =
1, · · · , R)
fi be the frequency of the ith initiating event.
pki be the conditional probability that the ith ini-
tiating event will lead to the kth plant damage state.
fk be the frequency of the kth plant damage state.
It follows that
X
I
fk = fi pki . (8)
i=1
In this study the frequencies of plant damage states
have been estimated directly from historical data (see
Table 3)
Furthermore, let
fr be the frequency of the rth release category, and
prk be the conditional probability that the kth plant
190 International Journal of Automation and Computing 2 (2006) 184-191

damage state will lead to the rth release category with Frequencies fi , conditional probabilities pki , and
frequencies fk are calculated in the first phase of the
X
R
analysis or are directly estimated (fk ) from past oper-
prk = 1.
r=1
ating experience.
Frequencies fr include all possible uncertainties in
It follows that the parameters that determine the level of an adverse
X
K X
K X
I
effect at a location (x, y) and at time t; consequences
fr = fk prk = prk fi pki . (9) cr (x, y, t), doses dr (x, y), and probability pr (x, y) are
k=1 k=1 i=1
calculated during the consequences estimation phase.
In this study each damage state can lead on to only
one type of explosion, hence fr = fk for each k 5 Risk integration and conclusions
Next let
Individual risk from all the units of the facility and
cr (x, y, t) be the intensity of the adverse effect, over-
all the transfer routes has been estimated. A GIS plat-
pressure, at point (x, y) and instant of time t, given
form has been used for presenting individual risk and
that release category r has occurred. Here cr (x, y, t) is
all relevant plant information such as: a) buildings and
equivalent to P (x, y, Ps , t) where P is the time depen-
magazines (storage warehouses), b) barricades of mag-
dent overpressure at point (x, y) and Ps its maximum
azines and other buildings, c) transfer routes within the
value.
plant, d) quantities of explosives manufactured, stored
dr (x, y) be the level of adverse exposure, thus the in-
and transported within the plant and their variability,
tegrated over time exposure to the adverse effect. This
e) frequency of explosion for each hazardous source, f)
quantity is commonly referred to as “dose” and it is
individual risk resulting from explosion of static explo-
calculated by
Z T sives, g) individual risk resulting from transfer of ex-
dr (x, y) = f {cr (x, y, t)}dt (10) plosions within the plant, and g) total individual risk
0 resulting from all possible explosions. Fig. 4 presents
total individual risk from the explosive plant. Risk is
where f {cr } is a substance dependent function.
In this application the dose for each plant-damage
state is determined as described in section 4.4. Here
the dose at a point (x, y) depends only on the distance
R between the source of the explosion and the point
(x, y) in question.
pd be the conditional probability of fatality given
that one individual is exposed to a level {d} of the
adverse effect of the hazardous material; it is usually
calculated through the so called “probit functions”[8] .
It follows that the quantity pr (x, y), the condi-
tional probability of fatality for an individual at loca-
tion (x, y) given release category r, can be calculated
form the doses as follows:
Release
Category
Explosion Dose Probit
r −→ cr (x, y, t) −→ dr (x, y) −→ pr (x, y). (11)

If IR(x, y) is the frequency of fatality for an indi-

vidual at location (x, y) (individual risk) it follows that
X
R
IR(x, y) = pr (x, y)fr (12)
r=1
where summation over r includes all possible release
categories R.
This paper presents the results when the whole-
body displacement consequences are considered (see Fig. 4 Total individual risk from explosive plant
sections 4.4 and 4.5).
 I. A. Papazoglou et al./Quantified Risk Assessment for Plants Producing and Storing Explosives
equal to 1.0×10−3/y in a distance of 270m from the
center of the plant, 1.0×10−4/y in a distance of 340m
from the center of the plant, 1.0×10−5/y in a distance
of 360m, 1.0×10−6/y in a distance of 390m from the
center of the plant.
The GIS platform is very useful for risk calculations,
since individual risk can be calculated and depicted in
case storage capacities of magazines alter, or transfer
routes of explosives are modified.
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191
Ioannis A. Papazoglou is a Re-
search Director at the National Center
for Scientific Research “Demokritos”.
He holds a diploma in Electrical &
Mechanical Engineering from National
Technical University of Athens Greece
in 1972 and M.Sc and Ph.D. degrees
from MIT, USA. in 1977. His research
interests include reliability analysis of
large systems, decision analysis, risk
assessment & management of technol-
ogical systems. He is currently chairman of the European Safety
and Reliability Association.
Panagiotis Saravanos graduated fr-
om National Technical University of
Athens, Greece and received his M.Sc
degree in Process Engineering from
Nottingham University, UK, and also
a M.Sc degree in Environmental Engi-
neering from EAEME, Italy. His re-
search interests include process con-
trol, DSC, instumentation, and process
design-integration.
Ieronymos Giakoumatos graduated
from National Technical University of
Athens, Greece in 1984. He is cur-
rently safety manager engineer at the
LNG terminal of DEPA SA. (Pub-
lic Gas Corporation of Greece). His
research interests include explosives
safety and LNG safety.
Olga Aneziris graduated from Na-
tional Technical University of Athens,
Greece in 1986 and received her Ph.D
degree from Technical University of
Athens in 1999. She is a researcher
at the National Center for Scientific
Research “Demokritos”. Her research
interests include reliability analysis of
large systems, decision analysis, risk
assessment & management of techno-
logical systems.