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A K Coomaraswmay Selectedlettersofanandak Coomaraswamy
A K Coomaraswmay Selectedlettersofanandak Coomaraswamy
Coomaraswamy
SELE C T E D LET T ER S OF
Ananda K. Coomaraswamy
Edited by
A l v in M o o r e , J r .
and
R am a P o o na m bulam C oom arasw am y
1. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy
at 52 years frontispiece
facing page
2. “Progress” by Denis Tegetmcier, in
Eric Gill, Unholy Trinity, London, Dent,
1942 32
3. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy at 58 years 108
4. An example o f Coom araswam y’s
manuscripts—letter to Eric Gill 208
5. Coom araswam y’s study in his home at
Needham, Massachusetts 258
6 . A room in N orm an Chapel,
Coom araswam y’s home at Broad
Cam pton, Gloucestershire, about. 1908 328
7. Albrecht Diirer’s ‘Virgin on the Crescent’
from his Life o f the Virgin (1511) 362
8 . Ananda K. Coomaraswamy at 70 years 440
FOREWORD
In the late half o f the nineteenth century and the early twentieth
century scholars from all parts o f the world were drawn to the
Asian heritage. Some excavated, others brought to light
primary textual material, and a third group dwelled upon
fundamental concepts, identified perennial sources, and created
bridges o f communication by juxtaposing diverse traditions.
They were the pathfinders: they drew attention to the unity and
wholeness o f life behind manifestation and process. Cutting
across sectarian concerns, religious dogma and conventional
notions o f the spiritual East and materialist West, o f monothe
ism and polytheism, they were responsible for laying the
foundations o f a new approach to Indian and Asian art. Their
work is o f contem porary relevance and validity for the East and
the West. Restless and unsatisfied with fragmentation, there is a
search for roots and comprehension, perception and experience
o f the whole. Seminars on renewal, regeneration and begin
nings have been held. The time is ripe to bring the work of
these early torch bearers to the attention o f future generations.
The name o f Ananda Kentish Coomaraswamy is foremost
among these pathfinders— for the expanse o f his grasp, the
depth o f his insights, and for their validity today.
To fulfil the need for renewed search for the whole, as also to
stimulate further work with this free and catholic approach
which is not imprisoned in the walls o f ideology, the Kala Kosa
Division o f the IGNCA has initiated a program me o f publica
tion o f works o f critical scholarship, reprints and translations.
The criterion o f identification is the value o f the w ork for its
cross-cultural perception, multi-disciplinary approach and in
accessibility for reasons o f language or on account o f being out
o f print.
The Collected Works o f A. K. Coomaraswamy, thematical
ly rearranged with the author’s own revisions, is central to the
IG N C A ’s third program m e in its division o f Textual Research
and Publication, Kala Kosa. The present volume of the Selected
Letters o f Ananda K. Coomaraswamy commences this series.
The IGNCA is grateful to D r Rama P. Coomaraswamy for
agreeing to allow the IGNCA to republish the collected works,
and for his generosity in relinquishing claims on royalties.
Alvin Moore, an old associate of Coomaraswamy, has pains
takingly edited the present volume along with D r Rama P.
Coomaraswamy. We are grateful to both of them. M r Keshav
Ram Iengar has to be thanked for his life-time devotion, his
interest, and his assistance in proof-reading and preparing the
index.
We also thank M r Jyotish Dutta Gupta for rendering
invaluable help in the production, M r K. L. Khosa for
designing the jacket and M r K. V. Srinivasan for ably assisting
in this project.
K apila V atsy ay an
I n d ir a G a n d h i N a t i o n a l C e ntre F o r T he A rts
IN T R O D U C T IO N
To STANLEY NOTT
Dear M r N ott:
. . . The problem o f the “spiritual East” versus the “material
West” is very easily mistaken. I have repeatedly emphasized that
it is only accidentally a geographic or racial problem. The real
clash is o f traditional with antitraditional concepts and cultures;
and that is unquestionably a clash o f spiritual and ideological
with material or sensate points o f view. Shall we or shall we not
delimit sacred and profane departments o f life? I, at any rate,
will not. I think if you consider Pallis’ Peaks and Lamas you will
see what I mean. I think it undeniable that the modern world
(which happens to be still a western world, however fast the
East is being westernized) is one o f “impoverished reality”, one
entleert o f meaning, or values. O ur contemporary trust in
Progress is a veritable fideism as naive as is to be found in any
past historical context.
Very sincerely,
To RICHARD ETINGHAUSEN
August 16, 1942
Dear Richard:
Very many thanks for your kind words. I am glad o f the last
sentence in the first paragraph. As you realize, I have never
tried to have a “style” but only to state things effectively—so
that I was very pleased, too, once when Eric Gill wrote to me:
“You hit bloody straight, bloody hard, and bloody often.”
I think our valuation o f “literature” (and o f art generally) is
now fetishistic, the symbol being more important to us than its
reference: this is just what the Sufi calls idolatry.
With best regards,
To SIDNEY HOOK
January 17, 1946
Dear Professor Hook:
M any thanks for your kind reply. You will realize, I hope,
that w hat I sent you was the copy o f a private letter, and that I
would have w ritten in a som ewhat different “tone” for
publication.
My main point was that the “mystics” (or, I would prefer to
say, “ metaphysicians”) insist upon the necessity o f moral
means if the amoral end is to be reached; hence theirs is a
practical way, though a contemplative end. I agree with them
(and you) that the end is logically indescribable, other than by
negations, o f which “ a-m oral” is but one.
To put it in another way, the end is not a value amongst
others, but that on which all values depend. If we have not the
concept o f an end beyond values (+ or —) we are in great
danger o f making our own relative values into absolutes.
As for H induism and Buddhism, Plato and St Thom as
Aquinas, you see differences where I see essentially sameness,
with differences mainly o f local color. However, for this
sameness I w ould go to Eckhart and such works as The Cloud of
Unknowing, Boehm e or Peter Sterry or Ficino rather than to
St Thom as (whose Summa belongs rather to the exoteric aspect
o f Christianity). I have done a good deal to illustrate what I call
essential “sameness” by correlation of cited contexts, in print,
and I have vastly m ore material collected, eg, my “ Recollec
tion, Indian and Platonic” , or “ ‘Spiritual Paternity’ and the
‘Puppet C om plex’ ” .
Very sincerely,
To MRS C. MORGAN
January 11, 1946
Dear Mrs Morgan:
Right now I cannot find time to go into the Huxley review at
length. Let us grant to Sidney Hook that Huxley fails to clarify
certain matters. But Hook, who makes this criticism, confuses
the matter by mistaking the situation itself. I am referring
particularly to the “moral” question which Hook not only
approaches as a moralist, but apparently in utter ignorance of
the traditional distinction of the moral means and the amoral
(not immoral!) end, that o f the active from the contemplative
life. The normal position is that morality is essential to the active
life and is prerequisite but only dispositive to the contemplative.
This is the way St Thomas Aquinas states it: cf The Book of
Privy Counselling, “ when thou comest by thyself, think not
what thou shalt do after, but forsake as well good thoughts as
evil.” Buddhism is notoriously a system in which great stress is
laid on ethics; and yet there, too, we find it repeatedly affirmed
that the end o f the road is beyond good and evil. Bondage (in the
Platonic sense o f “ subjection to oneself’) depends on ignor
ance, and hence it is only truth that can set you free; there can
be no salvation by works o f merit, but only by gnosis; but for
gnosis, mastery o f self is a prerequisite.
The point is that one cannot reach the end of the road without
“going straight”, and “ while wc are on the way, we are not
there.” The end o f the road, or as it is often spoken of, home,
means that there is no more tramping to be done: therefore the
words “ walking straight” or “ deviating” cease to have any
meaning for or application to one who has arrived and is at
home. Wc are told to “ perfect, even as . . .”, and as you will
rccognize, in whatever is pcrfcctcd there is no more perfecting
to be done. W hether or not perfection is attainable on earth we
need not ask; it represents, in any case, the “ ideal” , and even
St Augustine refused to deny the possibility.
Moralism, such as Sidney Hook’s is really an unconscious
form of Partipassianism—the doctrine that an infinite God is
nevertheless himself subject to affections and disaffections, and
only “good” in the human sense, which is one that implies at
the same time the possibility o f “not being good”.
I had only time to take up this one point: but generally, I
should say Sidney Hook does not know his stuff well enough
to criticize Huxley, even though and where the latter may need
it.
Very sincerely,
Mrs C. M organ, Cam bridge, Massachusetts.
Sidney Hook, Professor o f Philosophy, N ew York University.
The review referred to is in the Saturday Review, N ovem ber 3, 1945.
Book of Privy Counselling and The Cloud of Unknowing, sec Bibliography.
ANONYMOUS
Date uncertain
Dear M:
Your questions arc mostly about the how, and my answers
mostly about the what o f metaphysics.
What you mean by Metaphysics is not what I mean. College
“metaphysics” is hardly anything more than cpistemology.
Traditional metaphysics is a doctrine about possibility: possibi
lities o f being and not-bcing, o f finite and infinite; those o f
finite being arc embodied mosdy in what one calls ontology
and cosmology.
The traditional Metaphysics (Philosophia Perennis or Sanatana
Dharma) is not an omnium gatherum o f “what men have
believed”, nor is it a systematic “philosophy”; it is a consistent
and always self-consistent doctrine which can be recognized
always and everywhere and is quite independent o f any concept
of “progress” in material comfort or the accumulation of
empirical knowledge; neither opposed to nor to be confused
with either o f these. It is the meaning of a world which would
otherwise consist only o f experiences, “one damn thing after
another.” Without a principle to which all else is related, an end
to which all else can be ordered, our life is chaotic, and we do
not know how or for what to educate. A merely ethical trend is
only for our comfort and convenience but does not suffice for
illumination.
I can only, for the present, assert that the traditional
Metaphysics is as much a single and invariable science as
mathematics. The proof o f this can hardly be found w ithout the
discipline o f pursuing fundamental doctrines all over the world
and throughout the traditional literatures and arts. It is not a
matter o f opinions o f “thinkers” . One should rapidly acquire
the powers o f eliminating the negligible teachers, and that
includes nearly all modern “ thinkers” , the Deweys and Jungs,
etc, through w hom it is not w orth while to search for the few
bright ideas to be found here and there. One must be fastidious.
Why pay attention, as Plato says, to the “inferior philo
sophers” ?
The One Truth I am speaking o f is reflected in the various
religions, various just because “nothing can be known except in
the mode o f the know er” (St Thomas Aquinas). It is in the
same sense that the “Ways” appear to differ; this appearance
will diminish the further you pursue any one of them, in the
same way that the radii o f a circle approximate the nearer you
get to the center.
Metaphysics requires the most discriminating legal mental
ity.* When Eckhart says that man is necessary to G od’s
existence, this is not a boast but a simple logical statement. He
is not speaking o f the Godhead, but o f God as Lord (Jesus), and
merely pointing out that wc cannot speak o f a “lordship” in a
case where there are no “servants”; one implies the other. Just
as there is “no paternity w ithout filiation” ; a man is not a
“ father” unless he has a child. You w on’t catch Meister Eckhart
out as easily as all that!
The traditional Metaphysics does not deny the possible value
o f random “ mystical experience” , but is (like the Roman
Catholic Church) suspicious and critical o f it because o f its
passivity.*
Very sincerely,
* W hatever D r Coom arasw am y had in m ind in the use o f this term (and
som ething o f it will be inferred in the course o f these letters), it was not
Pharisaism of any kind: his own life and thought are ample proof of that. On
the other hand, among the ‘laymen’ who wrote to AKC, many were
lawyers, men trained in disciplined thinking, respect for evidence and in
some measure of discrimination and discernment.
* Although the copy of this letter available to the editors ends rather
abruptly, wc think it well worth inclusion because of its contcnt.
To ALBERT SCHWEITZER
February 7, 1946
Dear D r Schwcitzcr:
Although I have due respect for your fine work in Africa, I
have lately come across your book, Christianity and the Religions
o f the World, and would like to let you know that I regard it as a
fundamentally dishonest work. Buddhism is, no doubt, a
doctrine primarily for contemplatives; but you cannot mix up
Brahmanism in this respect with Buddhism, because Brahman
ism is a doctrine for both actives and contemplatives. What I
mean especially by “dishonest” is that, to suit your purposes,
you cite the Bhagavad Gita where Arjuna is told to fulfil his duty
as a soldier, w ithout citing the passage in which others are
likewise told to fulfil their vocations as means better than any
other o f fulfilling the commandment “Be ye perfect. . . . ”
This makes quite ridiculous your second paragraph on page
41. I am afraid that most Christians, for some reason obscure to
me, find it indispensable to exalt their own beliefs by giving a
perverted account o f those o f others, o f which, moreover, they
have only a second-hand knowledge derived from the writings
o f scholars who have been for the most part rationalists,
unacquainted with religious experience and unfamiliar with the
language o f theology. I recommend you spend as much time
searching the Scriptures of Brahmanism and Buddhism, in the
original languages, as you may have spent on the Scriptures of
Christianity in their original languages, before you say any
thing more about other religions.
Very truly yours,
Albert Schwcitzcr, German theologian, musicologist and medical mission-
ary, w idely influential in Protestant cirdcs in his time.
Christianity and the Religions o f the World, see Bibliography.
A lbert Schw eitzer Jubilee V olum e, a festschrift to which D r Coomaraswamy
contributed a profound study entitled ‘W hat is Civilization?’, for which see
B ibliography.
T o GEORGE SARTON
O ctober 7, 1943
D ear Sarton:
Thanks for Schweitzer, I’ll return it very soon. 1 have read
m ost o f it and it seems to me a strange mixture o f much doing
good and m uch m uddled thinking. I don’t think he grasps the
weltanschaung o f the ancient (European) world at all; and as for
the East, on page 178, line 1 “concern himself solely” and line
18 “ after living part o f his life in the normal way and founding a
fam ily” arc inconsistent.
I received the invitation to w rite for the festschrift, but am
asked for som ething “non-tcchnical” and after reading the
book, I too feel that the little symbological paper I had in mind
w ouldn’t interest Schweitzer him self at all. I’m seeing if I can’t
put together a little note on the intrinsic significance o f the
w ord “ civilization”.
Schw eitzer’s analysis o f colonisation and its effects is good
(and tragic), but he feels helpless* in the face o f “ world trade”
and has no fight in him . He rem inds me a little o f Kierkegaard,
w ith his groaning and grunting; and with all his defense of
“affirm ation” is not nearly as positive a person as, say, Eric
Gill, for w hose last collection o f cassys I am writing an
introduction.
With kindest regards,
T o MR MASCALL
Nobember 2, 1942
Dear M r Mascall:
Many thanks for your kind letter. I cannot agree that it is the
essence o f Christianity to be final and exclusive in any sense
except in the sense that any truth must be exclusive of error.
With that reservation, it can as much as Hinduism or Islam
claim to be final and conclusive.
Exclusive, as I said, presumes the existence o f error; but it
remains to be shown that the other religions are in error,
whether about m an’s last end or the nature of deity. I venture
that your knowledge o f these other religions is not profund:
knowledge o f them cannot be that if it is not based on texts in
the original, and on thinking and being in their terms. I do
actually think in both Eastern and Christian terms, Greek,
Latin, Sanskrit, Pali, and to some extent Persian and even
Chinese. I hardly ever deal with any specific doctrine (eg, that
o f the one essence and the two natures, or that o f the light of
lights, or “I will draw all men unto me”) with reference to one
tradition only, but cite from many sources. I doubt if there is
any point o f essential doctrine that could not be defended as
well from Indian as from Christian sources.
I presume that we are liberty, and even bound to use reason in
defense o f any true doctrine. It will be evident, however, that if
we are to discuss the possibility o f error in either one or both of
two given religions, it will be contrary to reason to assume that
one o f them can be made the standard o f judgem ent for both.
That would be to make an a priori judgem ent, and not an
investigation at all. A standard must be, by hypothesis,
superior to both the parties whose qualifications are under
consideration. One comes nearest to possession o f such a
standard in the body o f those doctrines that have been most
universally taught by the divine men of all times and peoples.
Anything for example, that is true for Plato (whom Eckhart
callcd “that great priest” , and in the same century that
Jtli —Moslem saint—had a vision of him “filling all space with
light”), the Gospels, Islam, Hinduism and Taoism, I am
prepared to regard as true, and rather for me to understand than
question. When we have in this way built up a standard o f the
most important speculative verities, we can proceed to judge of
other propositions, in case they arc less widely witnessed to, by
their consistency or inconsistency with what has been accepted.
In any case, let me say, speaking for Hindus as to Christians,
that even if you are not with us, we arc with you.
Very sincerely,
M r Mascall is not further identified, but may have been E. A. Mascall, the
prominent Anglican theologian and philosopher.
To SIGNOR GALVAO
Novem ber 15, 1940
Dear Signor Galvao:
It is a pleasure to receive your letter and to hear from an
unknown friend.
M. Rene Guenon had recovered his health last spring and
was again contributing to E T . The last num ber I received was
that o f May 1940. The last letter I received from him was
written in June and did not reach me until October!
I have no news o f M. Schuon. M. Preau had my ms (on the
“Symbolism of Archery”), intended for the 1940 Special No on
the “ Symbolism o f Games” , but I have heard nothing from
him since the occupation, and do not know if the publication of
E T can be continued. Yes, the participation o f civilians in
warfare is quite anti-traditional: it must be shocking to a true
soldier, for whom war is a vocation.
I send you one o f my publications here. With cordial
agreement,
Very sincerely,
Signor Galvao is a Brazilian correspondent o f Guenon and AKC.
Rene Guenon, see Bibliography.
Frithjof Schuon, sec Bibliography.
ET = Etudes Traditionnelles\ see Bibliography.
“Symbolism o f Archcry”, see Bibliography.
To SIGNOR GALVAO
October 10, 1941
My dear Signor Galvao:
I am happy to hear from you. Quand vous ecrivez: “Un
chretien, e’est-a-dire, un catholique”, je suis en parfait accord de vousl
In view o f the Pauline interdiction of the eating of meat offered
to idols, it might be considered irregular for a Catholic to eat
meat that has been sacrificed to what is (in his opinion) a false
god. However, where it is a question of accepting “hospital
ity” , one should ask no questions (Buddhist monks accept
whatever is given, even if meat: the responsibility for the
killing rests upon the donor). I cannot give an answer to the
question about the foundation stone.
I have heard from mutual friends that M. Guenon is well, but
I have heard nothing from him directly. The first o f the
translations (East and West, published by Luzac, London) has
just appeared. Another book I can recommend to you is Eric
Gill’s Autobiography, published by Devin-Adair, N ew York.
As for your pretre (sacerdota): it is quite permissible for any
Catholic to recognizc the truth of any particular doctrine taught
by a “pagan” philosopher. Indeed, St Thomas himself makes
use of the “ pagan philosophers” as sources of “intrinsic and
probable truth” . I have known two devout Catholics, a layman
and a learned nun who saw more than this. The former wrote
to me that he saw that Hinduism and Christianity amounted to
the same thing; while the nun said to me that “ I see that it is not
necessary for you to be a Catholic.” But this is unusual, and
with most o f my Catholic friends I go no further than to
discuss particular doctrines, in connection with which, as they
arc willing to recognizc, exegetical light may be throw n from
other than specifically Christian sources.
It is perhaps M. Cuttat, whom I recently had the pleasure to
meet, who proposes to publish in Spanish a journal somewhat
like Etudes Traditionnelles. I hope that your generosity and other
efforts will lead to success. Wc miss the appearance o f ET. For
myself, I am endeavoring to publish elsewhere. As you have
probably rccognizcd, I do not, like M. Guenon, repudiate the
“orientalists” altogether (however, I am fully aware of their
crimcs in the name o f “scholarship”) but endeavour to publish
what I have to say in the language o f “scholarship”: on the
whole I find a more open minded and rather receptive attitude
amongst my colleagues than might have been expected.
I hope to send you several papers, and also my forthcoming
book, Spiritual Authority arid Temporal Power in the Indian
Theory of Government during this winter.
I do not think it would be possible to obtain any numbers of
ET in the USA where it is very little known.
Yours very sincerely,
TO WALTER SHEWRING
March 4, 1936
Dear Walter Shewring:
Very many thanks for your kind letter. I am more than
appreciative of your corrections. I can only say that I am
conscious of fault in these matters. It is no cxcuse to say that
checking rcfcrcnccs and citations is to me a wearisome task. I
am sometimes oppressed by the amount of work to be done
and try to do too much too fast . . . in certain cases I have not
been able to see proofs. . . .
It is only in the period of the 5th-13th century a d that East
and West arc really of one heart and mind. A Catholic friend of
mine here, who has been writing articles on extremism—
urging a no compromise relationship between the Church and the
world—tells me that I (who am not formally a Christian) am
the only man who seems to see his point! What I am appalled
by is that even Catholics who have the truth if they would only
operate with it wholeheartedly, are nearly all tainted with
modernism.* I mean have reduced religion to faith and morals,
leaving speculation and factibilia to the profane and Mammon.
Christianity is nowadays presented in such a sentimental
fashion that one cannot wonder that the best o f the younger
generation revolt. The remedy is to present religion in the
intellectually difficult forms: present the challenge of a theology
and metaphysics that will require great effort to understand at
all____
One word about the errors. I would like to avoid them
altogether o f course. But one cannot take part in the struggle
for truth without getting hurt. There is a kind of “perfection
ism” which leads some scholars to publish nothing, because
they know that nothing can be perfect. I don’t respect this. Nor
do I care for any aspersions that may reflect upon me
personally. It is only “ for the good of the work to be done” that
one must be as careful as possible to protect oneself. . . . I am
so occupied with the task that 1 rarely have leisure to enjoy a
m oment o f personal realisation. It is a sort o f feeling that the
harvest is ripe and the time is short. However, I am well aware
that all haste is none the less an error. I expect to improve.
Affectionately,
*N ote that D r Coom araswam y recognized this deadly infection thirty years
before it was rcmanifested during and following the Second Vatican
Council.
Walter Shcwring, Assistant M aster at Amplcforth College, England, and
som etim e Charles Oldham Scholar at Corpus Christi College, O xford
University.
To WALTER SHEWRING
February 27, 1938
My dear Walter Shewring:
A very large num ber of Hindus, very many million
certainly, daily repeat from memory a part, or in some cases,
even the whole of the Bhagavad Gita. This recitation is a
chanting, and no one who has not heard Sanskrit poetry thus
recited, as well as understanding it, can really judge of it as
poetry. To me the language is both noble and profound. The
style is quite simple and w ithout ornament, like that o f the best
o f the Epic, and o f the Upanishads; it is not yet the ornamented
classic style o f the dramas. O n the whole I think the
judgem ents o f the professional scholars are to be discounted,
for many reasons. Personally, I should think a good compari
son, poetically, would be with the best o f the medieval Latin
hymns.
The trouble with almost all Sanskritists is that all they know
is the language. For the rest, they are inhibited in all sorts of
ways. Their attitude to Dionysius or Eckhart would be the
same as to the Bhagavad Gita or the Upanishads: they would say
“very interesting, and sometimes quite exalted in tone, but on
the whole irrational.” I do not sec how anyone who cannot
read John, or Dionysius, or much o f Philo or Hermes or
Plotinus with enthusiasm can read the Upanishads with
enthusiasm; and in fact, such introductions as men like Hume
write to their very imperfect translations are really quite naive.
It is no use to pretend that you can really know these things by
reading them as “literature”. That they are “literature” is the
accident, no doubt, but not their essence. . . . The so-called
“objectivity” o f science is very often nothing but a kind of
aloofness that defeats its own ends. Who can be said to have
understood Scripture or Plainsong whose eyes have never been
moistened by cither?
Affectionately,
ANONYMOUS
April 5, 1947
Dear Mr . . .
I had sent these cxccrpts on “grief” to Mrs M . . . instead of
to you direct, sincc you had not raised the question with me
directly. The actual words, “Every meeting is a meeting for the
first time, and every parting is forever” are mine, but not mine
as regards their meaning which depends on the quite universal
ly rccognized principle of uninterrupted change or flux;
nothing stops to be, but has “bccomc” something else before
you have had time to take hold o f it. This applies notably to the
psycho-physical personality or individuality which modem
psychologists and ancient philosophers alike are agreed is not
an entity but a postulate formed to facilitate easy reference to an
observed sequence o f events; those who attribute entity to
individuals arc “animists”, and also “polytheists” (sincc ‘I’ and
‘is’ arc expressions proper only to God). Duo sunt in homine;
which o f these two were you most attached to, the mortal or
the immortal?
Every heart-attracting face that thou beholdest,
The sky will soon remove it from before thy eyes;
Go, and give thy heart to One who, in the circle of
existence,
Has always remained with thee and will so continue
to be.
That Self is dearer than a son. . . . He who regards the
Self
as dear, what he holds dear is, verily, not perishable.
You speak o f your metaphysics as Western. You might Just
as well call your mathematics or chemistry Western. Such
distinctions cannot be made. The basic metaphysical
propositions— eg, nihil agit in seipsum — have nothing to do with
geography. Neither has the traditional doctrinc condemning
excessive grief for the dead, both for one’s own sake and
because such grief is an abuse o f the dead:
O who sits weeping on my grave,
And will not let me sleep?
The brief remainder of this letter is separately folded and
enclosed in order that you may, if you wish, destroy it unread; I
only say this because, if you do read it, you will not like it.
Biography is a rather ghoulish and dispicablc trade in any
case. If your son would have wished to have his private life
exhibited, he must have had a full measure of self conceit. If, as
I suppose, he would very much rather not be treated as Exhibit
A, then you are simply indulging your own masochistic delight
in your own misery, at his expense, and that o f any other
helpless human beings whose lives may have been intimately
involved with his. If such an unreserved biography as you
propose has never been done before, that may well be because
hitherto no one has been shameless enough to do such a thing.
It seems to me that neither your son nor his still living friends
will be able easily to forgive you, and I dare say, in turn, you
will not forgive me!
To S. DURAI RAJA SINGAM
May 1946
Dear Mr Durai Raja Singam:
In reply to your various letters, I enclose some information. I
must explain that I am not at all interested in biographical
matter relating to myself and that I consider the modem practice
of publishing details about the lives and personalities of well
known men is nothing but a vulgar catering to illegitimate
curiousity. So I could not think of spending my time, which is
very much occupied with more important tasks, in hunting up
such matter, most of which I have long forgotten; and I shall be
grateful if you will publish nothing but the barest facts about
myself. What you should deal with is the nature and tendency
of my work, and your book should be 95 per cent on this. I wish
to remain in the background, and shall not be grateful or
flattered by any details about myself or my life; all that is anicca,
and as the “wisdom of India” should have taught you,
“portraiture of human beings is asvarya.” All this is not a
matter of modesty, but of principle. For statements about the
nature and value of my work you might ask the secretary of the
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Society, Poona (India), and
Dr Murray Fowler, c/o G. and G. Mcrriam Co, Springfield,
Massachusetts (USA) to make some statement, as both are
familiar with it. I would not mind sending you press reviews of
my books, but it would take more time than I have to hunt
them up; I have no secretary who would do this sort of thing
for me!
Yours sincerely,
S. Durai Raja Singam was a retired tcacher in Malaysia w ho had written to
AKC for information in order to'w rite a biography, and w ho later published
in Malaysia a num ber o f w orks which provide a wealth o f biographical
information on him.
To MARCO PALLIS
August 20, 1944
Dear Marco:
1 am rather appalled by your suggestion o f my writing a book
o f the nature o f a critique o f Occidentalism for Indian readers.
It isn’t my primary function (dharma) to write “readable” books
or articles; this is just where my function differs from
Guenon’s. All my willing writing is addressed to the professors
and specialists, those who have undermined our sense of values
in recent times, but whose vaunted “scholarship” is really so
superficial. I feel that the rectification must be at the reputed
“top” and only so will find its way into the schools and text
books and encyclopaedias. In the long run the long piece on the
“Early Iconography o f Saggitarius”, on which I have been
engaged for over a year, with many interruptions, seems to me
more im portant than any direct additions to the “ literature of
indictm ent” .
When I go to India, it will be to drop writing, except perhaps
translation (of Upanishads, etc); my object in “retiring” being
to verify what I already “ know ” .
AKC
M arco Pallis, London, England, author o f Peaks and Lamas and other works
(see Bibliography) which have earned him a reputation as one o f the prem ier
interpreters o f Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan culture o f this century.
Rene Guenon, Cairo, Egypt, author o f many books and articles on
traditional doctrine and symbolism; and an early and powerful voice in
defense o f tradition and in criticism o f the m odern world.
U nfortunately, ‘Early Iconography o f Saggitarius’ was still incomplete at the
time o f D r Coom arasw am y’s death in 1947.
To HERMAN GOETZ
June 15, 1939
Dear D r Goetz:
There is one other point in your article that I might remark
upon. You connect my change of interest from art history to
metaphysics with age and no doubt that is in a measure true,
though I would perhaps rather say “m aturity” than “age”
However, I would also like to explain that this was also a
natural and necessary development arising from my former
work in which the iconographic interest prevails. I was no
longer satisfied with a merely descriptive iconography and had
to be able to explain the reasons o f the forms; and for this it was
necessary to go back to the Vcdas and to metaphysics in
general, for there lie the seminal reasons of iconographic
development. I could not, o f course, be satisfied with merely
“sociological” explanations since the forms o f the traditional
societies themselves can only be explained metaphysically.
With kindest regards,
To HERMAN GOETZ
January 17, 1947
Dear Dr Goetz:
Many thanks, in the first place, for writing an article for my
festschrift. Mr Iyer sent me a copy, and I took great pleasure in
reading it, and agree in the main, though perhaps not with
every word. I think credit is due to D r Kramrisch also for her
work on Deccan painting, in which she emphasizes the Gujarati
elements. Secondly, for your letter of 16th O ctober,-w hich
only just arrived! As to this letter: I think you still somewhat
misunderstand my position. I fully agree that the Kali Yuga is a
necessary phase o f the whole cycle, and I should no more think
it could be avoided than I could ask the silly question, “Why
did God allow evil in the world?” (one might as well ask for a
world w ithout ups and downs, past and future, as to ask for a
world w ithout good and evil). O n the other hand, I feel under
no obligation to acquiesce in or to praise what 1 judge to be evil,
or an evil time. Whatever the conditions, the individual has to
work out his own salvation; and cannot abandon judgem ent,
and be overcome by popular catchwords. I feel, therefore, at
liberty to describe the world as is, to mark its tendencies. I see
the worst, but I need not be a part of it, however much I must
be in it; I will only be a part of the better future you think of,
and o f which there are some signs, as there must be even now if
it is ever to become.
O ne of our very best men here recently remarked that this
“American world is not a civilization, but an ‘organized
barbarism’ I can agree; but what is more distressing is that of
all the hundreds o f Indian students who are now coming here,
the great majority are nothing but disorganized barbarians,
what you might call cultural illiterates. This produces a very
strange impression on the really cultured Americans. . . . The
modern young Indian (with exceptions) is in no position to
meet the really cultured and spiritual European. I feel an
interest, therefore, in the “ state of education” in India. I can’t
help feeling sorry for Nehru, who “ discovered India” so late;
and at Jinnah, who is not a Moslem in any but a political
sense. I regret the spread in India o f the class distinctions that
arc so characteristic o f the Western “democracies” . I would like
to see the caste system intensified, especially so as regards the
Brahmins, who should be demoted if they don’t fill the bill;
should be made Vaisyas if they go in for money-making, and
Sudras when they become engineers. This docs not mean that I
don’t think anyone should make money or engines, but that
those who do should rank accordingly; in which respect my
position is as much Platonic as Indian.
“ Down a steep place into the sea ”
MATTHEW V l l i : 3 1
"A s the tyrant delights when he can torment men, and spend their sweat in
show and luxury, in foolish strange attire and behaviour, and ape the fool;
so do also the devils in hell. . . He who sees a proud man sees . . . the devil’s
servant in this world; the devil does his work through him . . . He thinks
himself thereby fine and important, — and is thereby in the sight of God
only as a fool, who puts on strange clothing and takes to himself animal
forms"
j a c o s ie h m e n , Six Thtosophic Points,
V H 36 -8
"Th e idea of Progress arose in the eighteenth century from the belief that
man had waited long enough and that it was impossible to expect God to
do anything to alleviate his sufferings or bring about the triumph of good . . .
“ In material things there has been ‘progress’ ; there has been progress in
investigation, in the amount o f knowledge available, in the speed at which
we can move, in the rate of production o f goods, in centralization, in the
factorification of education, in the power and speed of destruction, in the
power of Mammon, in the loss o f individual freedom, in the number of
deaths on the road,in the decline of wisdom before theincreaseofknowledge,
in the decline o f true learning before the mere accumulation of facts and the
multiplication of philosophies, in the chaoe of our industrial, economic,
social and political order . . .
“ I f there has ever emerged an anti-Christ in history, it is ‘ the idea of
Progress' ”
F . W. B U CK LER
To HELEN CHAPIN
October 29, 1945
Dear Miss Chapin:
I have yours o f the 25th and 28th. In the first place, I did not
mean to say that you had sports for an ideal, ctc—that was part
of the general criticism of these “latter days” . As for caste, I
have to prepare a lecture on the “ Religious Basis o f Hindu
Social O rder” and will try to go into it there. For the rest, I am
only too well aware that “knowing all literature” can mean
nothing: and at best is only dispositive to liberation—though it is
that. However, it has been mainly “searching (these) scrip
tures” that has got me as far along as I am; effecting, that is to
say, a measure o f liberation from some things. I don’t think
you need w orry about the immorality of doing futile w ork for
a living—it’s just a condition imposed by the environment. I
am a “parasite” on industrialism, in just the same way, but
nevertheless this very situation gives me a position and means
to do something worthwhile, I think. Your idea of a Buddhist
cooperative seems good to me; and what you say of disposing
of your goods (“sell all that thou hast, and follow me”) seems
the right beginning. But I think you need a little time to
consolidate yourself. For another thing, also, to be of the
greatest value in such a community you need the resources
which would enable you to universalize, so to speak, the
orientals ^ith you—not that they have not in their own
background “enough for salvation”, but that they too are in
some danger o f the provincialism that is the outstanding quality
o f American culture— isolationist even intellectually!
Finally, if you thought it worthwhile to make the trip, would
you care to spend a week with us? We have no servant, but I am
sure you w ouldn’t mind doing your share of the rather light
housework that existence demands. My wife joins me in this
invitation.
Sincerely,
To PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD
August 29, 1935
Dear Professor Muirhead:
I am a good deal relieved by your very kind letter of August
14, for although I spent much time and thought on this articlc, I
still felt dissatisfied with it. What I wanted to bring out was the
metaphysical character o f Indian doctrinc, that it is not a
philosophy in the same sense in which this word can be used in
the plural; and that the metaphysics o f the universal and
unanimous tradition, or philosophia perennis, is the infallible
standard by which not only religions, but still more “ philo
sophies” and “sciences” m ust be “corrected” (correction du
savoir-penser) and interpreted.
N ow as to the abbreviation: it would be my wish in any case
to om it p 8, line 13 up to p 10, line 3 inclusive, and the
corresponding footnotes (ie, om it all discussion o f the Holy
Family, which I would prefer to take up again elsewhere, not as
I have done here neglecting the doctrinc o f the Eternal Birth
and “ divine nature by which the Father begats”, which
“nature” is in fact the M agna M ater, the mother o f eternity).
For the rest I am entirely at your disposal, and rely on you to
make such further excisions as you think best, w ithout sending
me the Ms, but only the proof in due course.
I may add that all my recent w ork has tended to show the Rig
Vcdic (therefore also of course, Upanishad and Brahmana) and
neo-Platonic traditions arc o f an identical import; w orking this
out mainly in connection with ontology and aesthetics, and de
divitiis nominibus. I am contributing an articlc on “ Vcdic
Excmplarism” to the James Haughton Woods Memorial Volume to
be published at Harvard University shortly. I have indeed one
Catholic friend who admits that he can no longer see any
difference between Christianity and Hinduism. I myself find
nothing unacceptable in any Catholic doctrinc, save that o f an
exclusive truth, which last is not, I believe, a matter o f faith (ie,
Catholicism assumes its own truth but does not deny truths
elsewhere merely because they occur elsewhere, although in
practice the individual Catholic docs tend to do this). I am not
at all interested in tracing possible “influences” o f one teaching
on another, for example whether or not Jesus or Plotinus may
or may not have visited India; the roots o f the great tradition
are very much older than either Christianity or the Vedas as we
have them, although from the standpoint o f content both may
be called eternal. I hope this may help to make my position
clearer, and may be o f help to you in editing my Ms. I owe you
many apologies for the troublesome work that must be
involved in this.
With renewed thanks,
Very sincerely,
To PROFESSOR H. G. RAWLINSON
no date given
M y dear Rawlinson:
It is a m atter oflittle interest to me whether Gautama or Jesus
“ lived” historically.* Gautama him self says “Those who see
me in the body or hear me in words, do not see or hear
Me. . . . He who sees the dhamma sees M e.” I do think it
necessary to have as a background a knowledge of metaphysics.
For a European this means an acquaintance with and verifica
tion o f the Gospels (at least John), Gnostic and Hermetic
literature, Plotinus, Dionysius, Eckhart, Dante. It is o f no use
to read these simply as literature; if one is not going to get
something out o f all this, why read at all? If I were not getting
solid food out o f scholarship, I would drop it tom orrow and
spend my days fishing and gardening.
Yours sincerely,
* The apparently inordinate character o f this rem ark can be seen in better
perspective if it is weighed against other AKC statements. For example,
com m enting in passing on the Gospel formula ‘. . . that it m ight be fulfilled
which was spoken by the prophets’, he says that this phrase simply asserts
the necessity o f an historical eventuation o f that which has been ordained by
Heaven, which is to say that possibilities o f manifestation m ust be
existentiated in their proper ‘cosmic m om ent’. For D r Coom arasw am y, the
metaphysical was so overwhelm ingly real that, by comparison, historical
facts seemed o f little importance. This perspective, obviously, is the very
antithesis o f the popular attitude that sees history as confirming everything.
even the metaphysical. The facts of history, however, and especially of
sacred history, arc symbolic in the highest degree without this in any way
compromising their prescriptive reality on their own level; were it not so,
history would be a meaningless chaos. Dr Coomaraswamy was no Docetist,
as the fundamental thrust of his writings dearly indicates, whatever may
have been the emphasis in a particular context.
H. G. Rawlinson, CIE, formerly with the Ceylon and Indian Education
Service, and an art historian.
Dhamma, a Pali word (Sanskrit equivalent, dharma) meaning “eternal law”;
an important concept in both Hinduism and Buddhism. Sec introductory
chapter, “The Buddhist Doctrine” in AKC and 1. B. Horner, The Living
Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha, London, 1948.
To MR WESLEY E. NEEDHAM
March 14, 1945
Dear M r Needham:
Many thanks. I’m afraid I feel that Theosophy is for the most
part a pseudo- or distorted philosophia perennis. The same
applies to m any “ brotherhood” m ovem ents. C f Rene
Guenon’s Le Theosophisme: historie d’une pseudo-religion (Didier
et Richard, Paris, 1921).* O n Guenon, see my articlc in Isis,
XXXIV, 1943. I think Plutarch is one o f the masters o f
Comparative Religion, and I have the highest regard for Philo.
Very sincerely,
* This and the other major works of Rene Guenon are listed in the
bibliographical section devoted to him.
Mr. Wesley E. Needham, West Haven, Connecticut, USA.
To GEORGE SARTON
August 13, 1939
My dear Sarton:
Herewith the review o f Radhakrishnan’s book. You will see
that it is, on the whole, a criticism, and perhaps you will not
“ like” it. H ow ever, it seems to me im portant to point out that
it is not really H induism , but a modern western interpretation
o f H induism , that he is w orking with; in some respects, indeed,
it seems to m e that he understands Christianity better than
H induism (we m ust rem em ber that the exegetes o f Christianity
have been Christians: the European exegetes o f Hinduism, for
the m ost part, neither Christians nor Hindus). It is curious that
Radhakrishnan has nothing to say about Islam which in so
m any respects can be regarded as a mediation between Eastern
and W estern approaches.
I have ju st received and am already [51V) with great
adm iration for the author’s position and practical wisdom,
Peaks and Lamas by M arco Pallis (Cassell, London and
T oronto); w ho is not merely an explorer, but whose purpose it
was “ to em bark on a genuine study at first hand o f the Tibetan
doctrines, for their ow n sake and not out o f mere scientific
curiosity” (p 120). You will read the book with great pleasure
and will, I am sure, wish to com m end it, especially as a model
o f method to be followed in scicntific investigations that require
intim ate relations with alien peoples. I remark especially the
concept o f Translation as interpreted on pp 80-81.
C an I have som e reprints o f the review?
W ith kind regards,
Very sinccrcly,
T o GEORGE SARTON
August 11, 1947
Dear Sarton:
N ikilananda, The Gospel o f Sri Ramakrishrta— an excellent and
com plete translation o f “ M ’s” record, a remarkable docu
m ent . . . I’ll lend you m y Ramakrishna if necessary, but look:
this is one o f the m ost im portant books in the field of religion
published in the USA in this century, and why not insist on the
library getting it?
AKC
To JOHN LAYARD
August 11, 1947
Dear D r Layard:
There is nothing better than the Vedanta—but I know o f no
Sri Ramana Maharshi living in Europe. I do not trust your
young Vedantists, nor any of the missionary Swamis; though
there may be exceptions, most o f them are far from solid. I
would not hastily let anyone o f them have the chance. . . . N ot
even Vivckananda, were he still alive. Were Ramakrishna
him self available, that would be another matter.
Sincerely,
To GRAHAM CAREY
April 5, 1943
Dear Carey:
I read your paper once over and think it good. It is necessary
but courageous to tackle the whole problem of superstitions
but difficult because each superstition presents a problem to our
understanding. I find that superstare has the primary meaning to
stand by, upon, or over, but also the meaning to survive. In the
latter sense superstition often coincides with tradition and
ought not necessarily to have a bad meaning at all. Even in the
first sense it should not necessarily have a bad meaning—one
can stand by o r take one’s stand upon a perfectly good theory.
So m any o f these w ords (eg, “ dogmatic”) have acquired a bad
meaning (a) because antitraditionalists despise the theory in
question and (b) because those w ho adhere to the theories
sometim es do so blindly and stupidly, ie, w ithout understand
ing. (I m et, by the w ay, som e followers o f Karl Barth, and was
shocked by their violence and conceit; they hold all Christian
mysticism in contem pt).
Very sincerely,
ANONYMOUS
Date not given
Hear. . .
Practically the whole o f our cultural inheritance assumes and
originally took shape for the sake o f a body o f beliefs now
classified as superstition. Superstition, taken in its etymological
significance, as the designation o f whatever ‘stands over’
(superstet) from a form er age is an admirable word, partly
synonym ous w ith tradition; wc have added to this essential
meaning, how ever, another and accidental connotation, that o f
“ mistaken belief” . W hatever we, with our knowledge o f
empirical facts, still do in the same way that primitive man did,
wc do not call a superstition, but a rational procedure, and wc
credit our prim itive ancestors accordingly with the beginning
o f scicncc; a second class o f things that wc still do, rather by
habit than deliberately, the laying o f foundation stones, for
example, wc do not call superstitions, only because it docs not
occur to us to do so. Whatever on the other hand we do not do
and think o f as irrational, particularly in the field o f rites, but
still see done by peasants or savages, or indeed by Roman
Catholics, H indus or Shamanists, wc call superstitions, mean
ing so far by “ w e” those o f us whose education has been
scientific, and for w hom whatever cannot be experimentally
verified and made use o f to predict events is not knowledge.
O n the other hand, we have inherited from the past an
enormous body o f works o f art, for example, to which we still
attach a very high value: we consider that a knowledge o f these
things belongs to the “higher things of life”, and do not call a
man “cultured” unless he is more or less aware o f them. At the
same time our anthropological and historically analytical
knowledge makes us very well aware that none of these
things— cathedrals, epics, liturgies for example— would not
have been what they arc, but for the “ superstitious” beliefs to
which their shapes conform; and to say that these things would
not have been what they are is the same as to say that they
would not have been at all and to recognize that we could not,
for example, have written the Volsung Saga, or the Mahabharata,
or the Odyssey, but only a psychological novel. We could not
have written Genesis or the in principio hymns o f the Rg Veda,
but only text-books of geology, astronomy and physics. To
deal with this situation we have devised an ingenious method of
saving face, preserving intact our faith in “progress” and
satisfaction in the values of our own civilization as disting
uished from the barbarism o f others. In the field of myth and
epic, for example, we assume a nucleus of historical fact to
which the imagination of the literary artist has added marvels in
order to enhance his effects. For ourselves, we have outgrown
the childish faith in the deus ex machina, who indeed often
“spoils” for us the humanistic values that the story has for us.
We feel in much the same way about whatever seems to us
immoral or amoral in the text. In reading, we exercise an
unconscious censorship, discounting whatever seems to us
incredible, and also whatever seems to us inconvenient. Guided
by the psycho-analyst, we arc prepared to take the fairy-tale out
o f the hands o f children altogether; even the churchman, whose
job and business it is to expound the Gospel fairy-tales,
connives in this.
Having by means of these reservations made the epic safe for
democracy, we arc fully prepared to admit and admire its
“literary” values. In the same way, ignoring the reasons for
Egyptian, Greek or Medieval architecture, we are fully
prepared to recognize the “significance” of these aesthetic
facts . . . .
This was an incomplete hand-written letter found am ongst A K C’s other
letters. It was unsigned.
To ALFRED O. MENDEL
August 29, 1946
Dear D r Mendel:
“Tradition” has nothing to do with any “ages”, whether
“dark” , “primaeval” , or otherwise. Tradition represents doc
trines about first principles, which do not change; and
traditional institutions represent the application o f these princi
ples in particular environments and in this [way they] acquire a
certain contingency which docs not pertain to the principles
themselves. So, for example, as Guenon remarks on my Why
Exhibit Works o f Art?, pp 86-88:
une note repondant a un critique avait rcproche a l’autcur de
prcconiscr le ‘retour a un etat dcs choscs passes’, cclui du
moycn age, alors qu’il s’agissait cn realite d’un rctour
premiers principcs, comme si ces principes pouvait dependre
d’unc question d ’epoquc, et comme si leur vcrite n’etait pas
csscntiellement intcmporclle!
For an example o f how the w ord “tradition” can be misused,
see my correspondence with Ames printed in the current issue
of the Journal o f Aesthetics and Art Criticism. If it is so misused
very often (pejoratively) it is because under present conditions
of education, the “educated” are acquainted with “tradition”
only in its past aspects, if at all, and not with “the living
tradition” .
You may be right about “slants” in writing. I attach
importance to continuity (tendency to write successive words
without lifting the pen), and think this corresponds to the
faculty of reading sentences as a whole, rather than word by
word. This is often very conspicuous in Sanskrit, where the
crasis often results in the presentation of whole sentences in the
form o f one solid block.
Very sincerely,
T o KURT F. LEIDECKER
N ovem ber 16, 1941
Dear D r Lcidcckcr:
The least im portant thing about Guenon is his personality or
biography. I endose an articlc by Maclvcr, which please return
(also “The ‘E’ at Delphi” , which please keep). Guenon’s own
affiliations are essentially Arabic. He lies in retirement in Cairo:
he knows Greek, Arabic, Sanskrit. (His two books on
spiritualism and theosophy were clearances of the ground,
preparatory to his other work. Thus no one can suppose that in
his metaphysical work he is talking of any kind of occultism).
The fact is that he has the invisibility that is proper to the
complete philosopher: our teleology can only be fulfilled when
we really become no one. 1 shall do some of the words such as
caitya for you very shortly. A great deal of Guenon’s important
work appears in Etudes Traditionelles, during the last 10 years.
I question the importance of item 4 for your Dictionary. 1
think item 12 should be Terminology (class concepts and
“periods”). Item 9, add Exhibition. Item 17, I should say
sun-wheel (avoid constant repetition of the word symbol, and for
more precise indication).
1 may be doing “ Symbol” (in general) for Shipley, you want
only symbols (in particular).
Very sincerely,
To MR J. C. ABREU
October 7, 1946
Dear M r Abrcu:
In reply to your inquiry, I am in fundamental agreement
with M Rene Guenon; this might not exclude some divergence
on minor matters. His books arc in the process of translation;
four have already been published by Luzac (London). I
published an articlc on his w ork entitled “ Eastern Wisdom and
Western Knowledge” in Isis Vol XXXIV, 1943 and this articlc,
brought up to date (nearly) will be included in a volume o f
essays to be published by the Asia Press, NY, this fall, entitled
Am I M y Brother's Keeper? M y own bibliography is a long one;
there is a list o f the more im portant items printed in Psychiatry,
VI, 8, 1945.
Mr Guenon lives in Cairo, and is a member o f a Darwesh
order, the Shaikh ‘Abdu’l Wahid. Before that he lived and
wrote in Paris. 1 think any truly descriptive writing “ about the
end o f an age” m ust be “ bitter”; but I hardly think Guenon’s
own feeling is that, but his position would be that “ it must be
that offenses should comc, but woe unto them through whom
they comc” . He is an exponent o f the traditional “ Way” by
following which the individual can save him self by spiritual
implication from disintegration, whatever the external condi
tions may be.
Very sincerely,
To m . ren£ g u £n o n
April 12, 1946
My dear M. Guenon:
I agree with you as to the limit implied in Tagore’s writings.
But 1 do not see why you object to the equation ananda =
felicitas or delectatio. The root is nand, to take pleasure, with the
added self-referent prefix a. And apart from the ordinary
usages, one cannot ignore BU IV. 1.6, re Brahma: “What is Its
bliss (Ananda)?, verily, to the mind; it is by the mind that one
betakes oneself to the woman, a son o f his born o f her. This is
his bliss: the highest Brahma is the m ind.” Here manas (mind),
of course, is equal to the Greek nous, intellectus vel spiritus, and
the “ w om an” is Vac; the son is the concept, and ananda is the
divine delight in the conception and birth of the spoken Logos.
Ananda is the divine delight in what Eckhart calls “the act o f
fecundation latent in eternity.”
In connection with the question, Is the Buddhist reception
into the order o f Bhikkus an initiation? I am confirmed in
thinking so, since I now find further that the preliminary
shaving and lustration— de regie—is referred to as an abhiseka
and, further, that the accepted disciple becomes a “son o f the
Buddha” and is endowed with “ royalty” (adhipatya ). The
lustration corresponds to a baptism, which was certainly in
origin an initiation.
I also find an interesting correlation o f Buddhist ksana and
Sufi andar waqt—both “ moments” without duration, and the
only locus (loka ) o f real being as distinguished from “becom
ing” (ousia from genesis, essentia from esse). This moment is the
mukta’s “world in the yonder w orld” . It is this m oment that
every “ thing” ama sunistatai kai apoleipei (Plutarch, Moralia 392
C). The succession o f these “now s” makes what wc know as
duration but in reality, all these instants arc one.
Very sinccrcly,
To ren£ g u £n o n
April 17, 1947
My dear M. Guenon:
I have been reading your Grande Triade with great pleasure
and benefit. The following arc a few points that have occurred
to me: the character seems to have its exact equivalent in
the sign shown as fig 1 in my “ svayamatrnna” o f which I hope a
copy has already reached you.
The Buddhist term sappurisa ( = sat-purusa) seems to express
the idea o f I'homme veritable, while utiama-pumsa would
correspond to I’homme transcendent. Thus Dhammapada 54: sabba
disa sappurisampavati, omnes regiones vir probus perflat (Fausboll’s
translation). Also Uttama purisa is commonly an epithet o f
Buddha.
C f also: p 53, pouvoir du vajra, Hcraclcitus fr 38
p 119, on the “Triple pow er” , cf in my “ Spiritual Authority
and Temporal Power . . . . ” (especially as regards the Gnostic
formulation cited on p 44).
In several places you speak o f Providence and Destiny. In
English, I should prefer to speak o f Providence and Fate:
making Providcncc = Destiny. O ur Destiny is our destination;
fate arc the accidcnts that befall us en route, and that may help or
hinder, but cannot changc our ultimate destiny.
La Grande Triade seems to me an especially valuable treatise,
and I hope an English translation will appear soon.
M. Pallis and Rama are now in Kalimpong where the Lama
Wangyai met them on arrival. They spent 12 days in S India
and visited Sri Ramana Maharsi.
Rene Guenon, Cairo, Egypt.
La Grande Triade, Rcvuc dc la Tabic Ronde, Nancy, France; for other
editions, sec Bibliography.
“Svayamatrnna: Jatiua Coeli” , Zaimoxis, Paris, II, 1939, no 1.
‘Spiritual A uthority and Tem poral Power in the Indian Theory of
G overnm ent’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, N ew Haven, Connecti
cut, 1942.
Marco Pallis, London, England, see letter p 30.
Rama, A K C ’s son, Rama Poonam bulam Coom araswamy.
Lama Wangyal, cf Peaks and Lamas by Marco Pallis; for various editions, sec
Bibliography.
Sri Ramana Maharsi, South Indian Saint; cf letter, p. 39.
To GEORGE SARTON
April 29, 1947
My dear Sarton:
Many thanks for your letter. Guenon’s controversial
volumes are no doubt less interesting in some respects, but, it is
to be considered that he alone puts forward what is essentially
the Indian criticism o f the present situation. For this reason and
because o f their direct relation to your work, I send you these
two only. His others, expository works, eg, L ’Homme et son
devenir seloti le Vedanta, Les Etats multiple de I’etre, Le Symbolisme
de la croix, etc, are not only the best and clearest exposition of
Indian theory I know, but almost the only expositions of pure
metaphysics that have so far as I know appeared in these
days . . . .
I had the very great pleasure o f meeting Professor Buckler of
Obcrlin and hearing his address on “The Shah Nama and the
Geneologia Regni D ei ” (will appear in JAOS this year and should
interest you. His thesis being in part that the Shah Nama is an
epic o f the kingdom o f God on earth analagous to the Christus
saga underlying the Four Gospels—a point of view which I can
fully agree . . . .
Very sincerely,
PS: If you have not seen it, do see Grey Owl, Pilgrims o f the Wild
(Lovat, Dickson, London, 1934)—one o f the very best books
that has appeared for a long time.
George Sarton, Professor o f the history o f scicncc, Harvard University,
Cam bridge, Massachusetts, USA.
Rene Guenon, Cairo, Egypt; for his several book titles, sec Bibliography.
F. W. Buckler, departm ent o f church history. Graduate School o f Theology,
O berlin College, Obcrlin, O hio; author o f several papers that interested
AKC, such as that mentioned above and "Regnum et ecclesia”, Church History,
III, March 1934.
To MR S. C. LEE
March 20, 1947
Dear M r Lee:
I reply to yours o f March 8, and send you below the message
which would be the gist o f what I should have to say were I to
be present at your International Festival, for the success of
which you have my best wishes.
If men arc to live at peace with one another, they must learn
to understand and to think with one another. The primary
obstacle to such an understanding is, to quote Prof Burtt,
‘the complacent assumption that all tenable solutions o f all
real problems can or will be found in the Western tradition.’
This smug and pharaisaic complacency is one of the causes o f
war . . . the cause that philosophers arc primarily responsi
ble to remove.
The most dangerous form of this complacency is to be found
in the conviction that Christianity is not only true, but the
only true religion; for this leads to repeated attempts to
impose upon other peoples a ‘Christian civilization’, so-
called. It was o f this ‘civilization’ that Thomas Traherne
remarked that ‘verily, there is no savage nation under the sun
that is more absurdly barbarous than the Christian w orld’.
The opinion persists, however—it was recently enunciated
by no less an authority than the Professor o f Divinity in the
University o f Edinburgh— that ‘we Westerners owe (it to)
the peoples o f these missionary lands’ to destroy their
cultures and replace them with our own. And why? Because
these arc essentially religious, but not Christian cultures! For
so long as this point o f view governs the attitudes of the
Western people who call themselves ‘progressive’ towards
others whom they call ‘backward’—everyone will rccognizc at
once the portrait o f ‘the lion painted by him self—there will
be no ‘peace on earth’.
I trust you will be able to read this message to your audience.
I made a speech on these lines at Kenyon College last year and
the audience was most responsive. C f also my article in the
United Nations World, No 1, and the little book just published
by John Day (New York).
Yours very sincerely,
To STEPHEN HOBHOUSE
July 15, 1945
Dear M r Hobhouse:
Many thanks for your letter o f June 4. I certainly hope you
will be able to publish an American edition of William Law; I
think it would be widely read, especially by those who know
something o f John Woolman and his like, and that it would
have a good sale.
Regarding the second paragraph on p 309, I think that in the
note you might point out that the doctrinc which some
(amongst others, E. Lampert, more recently, in The Divine
Realm, 1944) reject is certainly Roman Catholic, see St Thomas
Aquinas, Sum Theol 1.45: Creatio, quae est emanatio totius esse, est
ex non ente, quod est nihil.
P 97: essentially a discussion of “ Platonic love” (an expression
first used by Marsilio Ficino, and made the basis o f the
fraternity o f his Academy), or as formulated in the Upanishads,
that all things whatever arc dear, not for their own sakes, but
for the sake of the Self, the immanent deity, Self-same in our
neighbour and ourselves. C f my “ Akimcanna : sclf-naughting” ,
in N ew Indian Antiquary, III, 1940. O ther refs: Hermes XIII.4,
“W ouldst that thou, too, hadst been loosed from thyself’;
Rumi, Mathnawi, 1.2449, ‘Were it not for the shakle, who
would say ‘I am I’?”; Maitri Upanishad VI.20, “ he who sees the
lightning flash o f the spiritual-Sclf is of him self bereft” , and
VI.28, “ If to son and wife and family he is attached, for him,
never at all” (like C hrist’s “ If any man would be my disciple,
let him hate his father and mother. . .yea, and his own self
also”). . . . [and cfthe] Skr ahamkara, the “ I-making concept”
And as I also wrote,
Contra Cartesium
That / can think is proof Thou art,
The only individ-uality from whose dividuality
My postulated individuality depends.
with reference, in part, to the expression o f the Bhagavad Gita:
“ undivided in things divided” .
The fundamental problem of war is in ourselves; actual war
is the external reflection o f the inner conflict of self with Self.
W hoever has made his peace with himself will be at peace with
all men.
The importance of occasional reference to the Oriental
parallels is especially great at present, because “peace” , with all
its implications is something in which the whole world must
cooperate, it cannot be imposed on the world by any part o f it;
and the basic doctrinal formulae represent the language of the
com m on universe o f discourse on that level of reference where
alone agreement can be reached on the first principles in
relation to which activities must be judged. Partly for this
reason (but also for clarification), in my own writing, I always
cite “ authority” from many different sources, as demonstration
o f an actual agreement that we often overlook.
I would be happy to receive any of the reprints of your
pamphlets that you speak of.
Stephen Hobhouse, Broxbourne, England, editor, Selected Mystical Writings
of William Law, London, 1940.
William Law, eighteenth century Anglican divine, non-juror, and spiritual
writer influenced by Jacob Boehme.
Following are several editorial notes relevant to the above letter, the first
from the New English Weekly, March 9, 1944, p 180:
Coom arasw am y contra Descartes forms an anthology o f angry and yet
deeply reflective comments, o f which the most striking is this brief poem
(vide supra). He him self thought the poem so concentrated that few could
grasp its meaning, and accordingly added a note when it was first
published: ‘The argum ent is not Cogito ergo sum, but Cogito ergo E S T —we
become, because He is’.
Elsewhere in his writings, he returned to Descartes’ famous axiom,
sometimes w ith irony, sometimes with comments developed from Indian
metaphysics: ‘“ Self is not an inference drawn from behaviour, but directly
know n in the experience ‘I’; this is a proposition quite different from
Decartes’ Cogito ergo sum, where the argum ent is based on behaviour and
leaves us still in an ego-centric predicam ent.” (Time and Eternity, Ascona,
Switzerland, 1947, p 23). O r again: Buddhist doctrine proceeds by
elimination. O ur own constitution and that o f the world is repeatedly
analyzed, and as each one o f the five physical and mental factors o f the
transient personality with which the ‘untaught m anyfolk’ identify
‘themselves’ is listed, the pronouncem ent follows, 'That is not my
self. . . . You will observe that among these childish mentalities who
identify themselves with their accidents, the Buddha would have included
Descartes, w ith his Cogito ergo sum (Hinduism and Buddhism, N ew York,
1943). Again: ‘The ego demonstrated by Descartes’ Cogito ergo sum (a
phrase that represents the nadir o f European metaphysics) is nothing but a
fatally determined process, and by no means our real Self ("Prana-citi”,
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1943, p 108).
And in a m anuscript note in the possession o f Rama P. Coom araswam y,
AKC wrote: ‘The traditional position is that God alone can properly say
‘I’. Descartes’ Cogito ergo sum is a circular argument, an ego subsisting in
both the subject and the predicate.’ See also the letter on pp 9-11.
To SIDNEY L. GULICK
May 6, 1943
Dear M r Gulick:
It is very likely true that further correspondence will not help
us much. However, I will say a few words on this matter of
“progress” . It is a question o f values; where you are thinking of
quantitative things, I am thinking in qualitative terms. No
doubt every modern schoolboy knows many facts o f which
Plato was unaware, and there is no harm in that, but rather
good, if good use is made of the knowledge. But the
knowledge itself docs not make the schoolboy any wiser than
Plato was. We have acquired material means far beyond our
capacity to use them wisely. These means look “good” to you,
partly becausc they imply power in the hands of those who
possess them; to the backward races, so called, they are known
almost only as powers of death-dealing.
You will probably cite advances in medical knowledge. It
would be strange indeed if a long period o f concentration on
scarch for improvement in means of physical well being had
produced no useful results. Still there is much to be said, and
that is said by doctors themselves, as to the balancc of good in
all this. For example, as to the distinction of curativc from
preventive medicine. Take modern dentistry: wonderful, no
doubt; yet search has shown that primitive people, not living
on our kinds of soft foods and white bread have almost always
no need for dentists, And once again, in the matter o f health
and disease, the so-called backward peoples are chiefly aware of
white men as bearers o f diseases— measles, influenza, veneral
diseases, tuberculosis, etc. In the matter of tuberculosis, in
particular, missionaries have a very special responsibility, in
that their failure to distinguish nudity from depravity has been
the chief cause o f the spread of this disease.
The late D r John Lodge, one o f the most highly educated and
cultivated Americans I have ever known, used to say to me:
“From the Stone Age until now, quelle degringoladeY' Let me
also quote from Werfel’s Forty Days (1934):
But we don’t want your reforms, your ‘progress’, your
business activity. We want to live in God, and to develop in
ourselves those powers which belong to Allah. D on’t you
know that all that which you call activity, advancement, is o f
the devil? Shall I prove it to you? You have made a few
superficial investigations into the essence of the chemical
elements. And what happens then?— when you act from
your imperfect knowledge, you manufacture the poison
gases, with which you wage your currish, cowardly wars.
And is it any different with your flying machines? You will
only use them to bomb whole cities to the ground.
Meanwhile they only serve to nourish usurers and profit-
makers, and enable them to plunder the poor as fast as
possible. Your whole devilish restlessness shows us plainly
that there is no ‘progressive activity’ not founded on
destruction and ruin. We would willingly have dispensed
with all your reforms and progress, all the blessings o f your
scientific culture, to have been allowed to go on living in our
old poverty and reverence. . . . You tell us our government
is guilty o f all this bloody injustice, but in truth, it is not our
governm ent, but yours. It went to school with you.
The Rev Edwin W. Smith (African missionary), as President
o f the Royal Anthropological Society, said in 1934:
Too often missionaries have regarded themselves as agents o f
European civilization and have thought it part o f their duty
to spread the use o f English language, English clothing,
English music—the whole gam ut o f our culture.
He quotes Charles Johnson o f Zululand:
The central idea was to prize individuals off the mass of the
national life. . . . African Society has a religious basis
. . . can you expect the edifice to stand if the foundation is
cut away? Is not the administration justified in decreeing that
the Africans are not to be Christianized because thereby they
are denationalized?
You are doubtless right in saying that I have “missed
som ething” in my understanding o f Christianity. I am sure I
have missed much in my understanding o f other confessions,
also. Is it not inevitable that we should all have “ missed
som ething’ until we reach the end of the road?
Very sincerely,
* O bviously, much has transpired since these remarks were written. The
Church has embraced so many aspects o f the modern world that she is no
longer herself. And the institution— save for a rem nant here and there— to
which even non-Catholics looked as a bastion o f sanity, is now perceived as
converging with a world in hastening decay— the world from which she
should offer the hope o f salvation.
M r Sidney L. Gulick lived in and wrote from Honolulu, Hawaii. He had
written a letter to Asia and the Americas in March, 1943, in which he
attem pted to distinguish the w ork o f missionaries from the devastating
effects o f western economic expansion.
To MR SIDNEY L. GULICK
July 21, 1943
Dear M r Gulick:
Many thanks for your letter of June 27. You ask why I stay in
the United States if I hold these views. 1 remain here because
my work lies here. One can make oneself at home anywhere;
one can live one’s own life; it is not compulsory to own a radio
or to read the magazines.
I have emphasized before that I am not contrasting West and
East as such, but modern anti-traditional, essentially irreligious
cultures with others. This point of view is one that is shared by
many Americans, who have spent all their lives here. 1 have
lived more than 25 years in Europe and as long in America and
so it is rather ironical to hope that I may yet see more and more
o f your better side; I think I am well aware of this side, though
it may be one that survives in spite o f rather than because o f
contem porary tendencies to stress the quantitative rather than
the qualitative aspects o f life.
Incidentally, in reading your letter to Asia . . . as printed, I
note you speak o f Sir Rabindranath. This is not good form, as
he repudiated the title many years ago, after the Amritsar
massacre.
It is o f course, a truism to observe that every people and
culture has both good and bad aspects. One does not therefore
have to assume a latitudinarian and uncritical attitude to this or
the other set o f conditions, however.
I wonder if you ever consider such books as Aldous Huxley’s
Ends and Means or Gerald Heard’s Man the Master ?
Very sincerely,
To MR SIDNEY L. GULICK
No day or m onth given, but the year was 1943
Dear Mr. Gulick:
Many thanks for your letter o f August 25. It is quite true
that, like Christianity, Buddhism stresses that it is man’s first
duty to w ork out his own salvation, and that the social
applications o f his religion are more obvious in Hinduism.
Nevertheless, consider such a dictum as the Buddha’s most
famous royal advocate, Asoka, [who] himself publically
repented o f his conquests and recorded this [repudiation] in his
lithic Edicts. You say Buddhism repudiates the “self’. This is a
vague statement, if we do not specify which o f our two selves
(duo sunt in homine, Aquinas, etc), the outer or the inner man, is
repudiated. The Buddha certainly never repudiated “selfs
immortal Self and Leader”; the “self’ that he repudiates is the
one that Christ requires us to “hate, if we would follow H im ” ,
or again “utterly deny” (Math xvi, 24). This latter expression is
very forceful and certainly o f more than ethical significance.
These dicta underlie, o f course, Eckhart’s “the soul must put
itself to death”, and so forth.
Finally, it is not safe to take your opinions regarding other
religions from current translations, even those of scholars; you
must have read the original texts.*
Very Sincerely,
To F. W. BUCKLER
Date uncertain
Dear Professor Buckler:
I’ve been reading your letter to Gulick and feel that I ought to
say that while 1 was talking primarily about the “ proselytising
fury” of the West, I would say the same regarding Christians as
such. I think in fact that a proselytising fury implies a state of
mind that would be disgraceful in anyone. Christians as such
should produce a Christian civilization and make that their
“witness” .
You would wish to change a religion w ithout destroying a
culture. Because our culture has been secularized it is natural for
us here to think that such a thing is possible. But in a social
order such as you have in India you can no more separate
religion from culture than soul from body. There, the divorce
of a profane from the sacrcd hardly exists. Hinduism penetrates
everything: one might say that the languages themselves are
calculated to embody religious ideas, and so you could not
substitute a new religion without substituting a new language
(which could only be a “basic” or “pidgin” English). The same
applies to all the music and literature and every way o f life. The
missionary is quite right, from his point of view, in opposing
and ignoring all these elements o f the Indian culture— he must
do so, if he is not to be defeated by the whole situation. Add to
this, o f course, that it is impossible for him not to be of his own
kind, and therefore impossible for him not to carry with him
the infection of modern life. The only large scale effect of
missionary activity in Asia, in other words, is not to convert,
but to secularize. You must resign yourself to the alternative: to
convert, you must destroy the culture, or if you do not destroy
the culture, then you cannot convert.
Sincerely,
Professor F. W. Buckler, departm ent o f church history, Graduate-School o f
Theology, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio.
Mr Sidney L. Gulick, as above.
To WALTER SHEWRING
Date uncertain
Dear Walter Shewring:
The following is by way of answer to other matters raised in
your letter. 1 have not used Senart very much, but should call
his translation good, though as in translating Plato, I hold that
no one whose mentality is “nominalist” can really know the
content o f “ realistic” texts. I like Teape’s Secret Lore of India
very well, though the versions are not literal, they are very
understanding. O f the Gita, Edwin Arnold is good, but I
generally work most with the Bhagavan Das and Besant
version (with w ord for word analysis) published by the
Theosophical Society. I don’t need to tell you that the greatest
scholars often betray their texts; for example, in the Laws of
Mann 2.201, Buhler renders that the man who blames his
teacher will become a donkey in his next life ; actually, the text
has becomes {present tense), and nothing whatever about the
“next life” ! I have often thought of translating the Gita, and
many other texts, but that is a very great task, for which
perhaps I’m hardly ready, and anyhow, I haven’t so far been
able to avoid the work o f the exegesis o f special problems. I
was very pleased that you could approve o f the “ Knots”; I have
thought o f that article as representative of what I am trying to
do; yet it is only a little part of what should be a whole book on
Atman, or even on the Sutratman alone.
About “tolerance” : I did not expect, of course, your full
agreement. I would like to write a volume of “ Extrinsic and
probable proofs” of the truth o f Christianity. I regard the
notion of a conversion from one form of belief to another as
analagous to change from one monastic order to another;
generally speaking, undesirable, but not forbidden, and
appropriate in individual cases (eg, Marco Pallis*). Hinduism,
like Judaism, is a non-proselytising religion. The Jew will say,
“ I cannot make you to have been bom o f Abraham, but
whatever you find true and good in my forms you can apply to
your o w n .” Buddhism , on the other hand, is proselytising in
the same sense as Philo; a making more easily available what is
universal apart from the special laws by which the particular
traditions are practiced. In Islam, it is fundamental that the
teachings o f all the Prophets are o f equal authority, but there is
the rather impressive argum ent that one ought to follow most
closely the teachings o f the Prophet o f the Age, in this case,
M uham m ed. However, I would not distinguish time and place
from this point o f view, and would interpret this also to mean
that the norm al course is to follow the Prophet o f one’s own
people, whose teachings are enunciated in the com mon terms
o f their ow n experience. O ne can regard the Eternal Avatara as
unique, but this does not mean that one must think of his
descent as having been a unique event.
O f course, apart from all this, I have no doubt we are fully
agreed as to all the reservations that should be imposed as a
matter o f duty to w hoever seeks to proselytise; I am referring
to the obligation to know and utilise the culture o f the people to
whom one speaks. This is recognized at least by some Jesuit
missionaries w ho in China, I understand, arc required to have
earned their living in a Chinese environment and to have
followed a Chinese trade, before they are allowed to preach.
The average Protestant missionary is an ignoramus, and docs
not even know enough to bring to such peoples as the Hindus
what w ould m ost attract and interest them in Christianity.
Further: to the point that to be a professing Christian is not
indispensable for salvation may be added the fact that it is
recognized that the non-Christians may have received the
“baptism o f the Spirit”, although not that of the water—and if I
understand the first chapter o f John rightly, the baptism of the
Spirit is superior.
M yths com m on to India and Greece— notably the dragon-
slaying (Hercules— M inurta— Indra) as now generally reeog-
nized (there is a big literature on the subject). Then, the whole
conception o f the Janua Coeli, o f which the doors are the
Symplegades, ie, enantiai, dvandvau, contraries: this is Indian,
Greek, European folklore; and above all, aboriginal American,
too!
N ext, I w ould think o f the whole concept o f the Water of
Life (of which the sourcc lies beyond the aforesaid contraries, in
the divine darkness), Indian, Persian, Sumarian, Greek, Norse
and the whole concept o f the Eucharist and transubstantian
connected therewith. Then also, o f course, many things which
are not so much myths as doctrines, eg, duo sunt itt homine
(Vedic, Platonic, Christian). Also the concept of the ideal
world, that o f the “world Picture” or speculum aeternum. I
understand Huxley is doing an anthology, but I very much
doubt that he is in a position to get at the fundamentals,
although with all their great limitations I think both he and
Heard arc not w ithout some virtue. Huxley, however, is rather
sentimental, and cannot accept that “ darker” side o f God which
Behmen, perhaps, understood better than most.
I have lately been reading with great interest Scholem’s Major
Trends in Jewish Mysticism where certain Hebrew-Indian para
llels are very striking, eg, Abulafia’s “Yoga”, the concept o f M i
(“ What?”) equivalent to the Sanskrit Kha (“What?”) as an
essential name o f God; the concept of transmigration (qilul =
Ar, tanasuh)— “all transmigrations are in the last resort only the
migrations o f the one soul whose exile atones for its fall”; that
every art o f man should be directed to the restoration o f all the
“scattered lights” (cf Bodhisattva concept); “in the beginning” ,
our in principio, arche, regarded as a “point” and identified with
the Fons vitae.
Regarding Eric’s letters, if you have in mind some archive in
which all would be gathered together, keep mine, otherwise
return them. I passed on your message to Graham Carey and
hope he will not delay to respond.
With kindest regards,
To ERIC GILL
June 14, 1934
My dear Gill:
I am very grateful to you for your kind letter, and delighted
by your appreciation. After all, there is nothing o f my ow n in
the book except the w ork o f putting things together, so there is
no reason w hy I should not myself think it im portant as regards
its matter. I have definitely come to a point at which I realise
that one’s own opinions or views so far as they are peculiar or
rebellious arc merely accidents o f one’s individuality and are
not properly to be regarded as a basis for comprehension or as a
guide to conduct. I am from my point of view entirely at one
with you in the matter o f religion, ie, as regards essentials, the
only im portant divergence being that for me the one great
tradition (or revelation) has had many developments, none o f
which can claim absolute perfection o f (dogmatic) expression
or absolute authority. That is, for me, the solar hero— the
Supernal Sun— is always the same Person, whether by name
Agni, Buddha, Jesus, Jason, Sigurd, Hercules, Horus, etc. O n
the whole I can go further in by means o f the Indian Tradition
than any other, but it can hardly be doubted that m y natural
growth, had 1 been entirely a product o f Europe and know n no
other tradition, would ere now have made me a Roman
[Catholic].
I am only too pleased you quote “The artist is not a special
kind o f man etc” It will interest you that only yesterday I had a
few words with one o f the Harvard professors in the Fine Arts
Department there and he said he was constantly citing these
very words in his lectures. Such things, and the review in the
Times, show at least that there does not prevail an entirely contra
point o f view and that we have friends “in the w orld” . I look
forward to your new book very much and I am very sure that it
will, as all your writings do, very wisely express from the
practical point o f view, the matter. You will understand o f
course that it is a matter o f definite policy on my part to work
within the academic and even the pedantic sphere; that is
analagous to the idea o f the reform of a school o f thought from
within, instead o f an attack from without . . . .
I remain ever cordially,
PS: Did I ever tell you that I know two brothers, Europeans,
both men o f prayer, one a Trappist monk, the other a leading
Moslem, and neither has any wish to “convert” the other?
To BERNARD KELLY
November 26, 1945
Dear Bernard Kelly:
Regarding “Extra Ecclesiam . . .” , 1 have before me a letter
from the Secretary o f the Archbishop of Boston (R C), in
which he says that his formula “is of course, one o f the most
knotty problems in all theology.”
Also in an article on the subjcct b yj. C. Fenton in the American
Ecclesiastical Review, CX, April 1944 (also from the R C point
o f view). The article is much too long to quote but it is stated at
one point that to be saved one must belong to the Church
formally “ or to the soul o f the Church, which is the invisible
and spiritual society composed exclusively of those who have
the virtue o f charity. N o such society, however, exists on
earth.” This last statement seems to me to beg the whole
question with which we arc concerned. Also, “ every man who
has charity, every man in the state of grace, every man who is
saved, is necessarily one who is, or who intends to become a
member of the Roman Catholic C hurch.” This seems to me
contrary to the commandment “Judge not” . I believe the
Christian has no right to ask whether anyone is or is not in a
state o f grace. (St Joan’s answer to the question was, “ If not, I
pray God that I may be, and if I am, I pray God keep me so”).
There is also the expression “baptism of the Spirit” which, I
understand docs not necessarily apply only to members o f the
Church who, as such, have rcccived also the baptism with
Water. Arc there specific limitations attached to the notion of
baptism by the Spirit? O n the face of it, one would presume
that such a baptism was o f almost infinite value and involved a
potentiality for salvation.
If it be said that to comc to Jesus Christ is a prerequisite for
salvation, then the question before us takes this form: arc we
certain that “Jesus” is the only name of the Son o f God? (here I
do not say “Jesus Christ” bccausc “Christ” is an epithet,
“anointed” and = Vcdic ghrta as applied to Agni, and such an
epithet is a recognition o f royalty rather than o f essence.) Agni,
the High Priest, is also Prajapati’s Son, and would not Prajapati
be a good name for Him exguo omins paternitas. . .nominatur (at
a ccrtain stage o f the ritual, the Sacrificers say: “We have
become the children o f Prajapati”).
It is quite likely you will not think it ncccssary or desirable to
raise the ultimate question of extra ecclesiam. . . in the present
and introductory Symposium, in which matters of full agree
ment are to be first considered. In any case, these arc ways in
which I have tried to consider the matter. Everything depends
finally on the interpretation of “ Ecclesia” and o f the “ Son of
G od”
Very sinccrcly,
Dona Luisa Coom arasw am y, wife o f AKC, in India at that tim e on a study
mission. Eric Gill, Ditchling, Sussex, England.
To WALTER SHEWRING
March 30, 1936
Dear Professor Shcwring:
Many thanks for your very kind letters, and the Golden
Epistle which I read with pleasure and profit. It will probably be
at least 3 years before I get to putting together a book on
Medieval Aesthetic (by the way, in the meantime I find that
Integritas is more nearly “precision” or “correctness” than
“ U nity”). I shall send you the other articles as they appear in
the Art Bulletin so that you will have plenty o f time to annotate
them. If you have time to do this for the first article in the
course o f a year from now that will be ample. I shall o f course
acknowledge your help when the time comes.
As to nature and grace, I think the distinction is present in
Indian thought. C f for example the discussion in Pope’s
Tiruvakakam (Oxford). In the older literature, too, we meet
with such expressions as “those whom He chooses” . Because
o f the strongly metaphysical bent o f Indian thought, however,
the emphasis is often more on necessitas infallibilitatis than on
Grace— “ask and ye shall receive”, with the idea that God cannot
but respond to the prepared soul. I do not for the present expect
to find complete acceptance o f other religions by Christians but
do cxpect, what there is even now no objection to, an
agreement with respect to individual doctrines, the enunciation
o f which is com m on to Catholicism and Hinduism; for
example, that o f the |one| essence and two natures, and apart
from the question o f total acceptance, it seems to me that the
Christian fidei defensor would be well advised to make use o f
such agreements as being what St Thomas calls “extrinsic and
probable proofs” , and have little doubt you would quite agree
with me thus far. Your poem on the picture is beautifully done.
I am happy to have introduced you to Guenon.
Very sincerely,
To BERNARD KELLY
November 14, 1946
Dear Bernard Kelly:
Just a line to say, when you review Figures of Thought, by all
means correct my error about Transubstantiation. I don’t need
to tell you that I don’t mean to play with any idea. I have taken
quasi in Eckhart, etc, to refer always to symbols, which,
however adequate, give us only an inkling of the realities they
represent. Also, 1 think there is still this much truth (and not an
unim portant truth) in what I was trying to say: viz, that we
ought really to transubstantiate, or what comes to the same,
sacrifice (make holy) everything, by “taking it out of its sense”
in our apprehension—or, if not, [we] arc living by “bread
alone” .
By the way, no one had ever remarked upon the repudiation
o f copyright in Figures. . . and in Why Exhibit. . . . I shouldn’t
mind if you do.
I’m grateful for your review of Religious Basis. . also,
G rigson’s o f Figures. . . in Spectator, October 25.
I suppose you got either from me or otherwise, Al-Ghazali’s
M ishkat (published by Royal Asiatic Soc, 1924); well worth
having— the Introduction also good. On the whole, how much
better Islam has fared than Hinduism in translation and
com ment by scholars! For example, Gairdner is very wary of
finding “ Pantheism” in Islam. By the way, as regards the
criterion as annunciated on top o f p 39, I usually think o f
pantheism as asserting God = All, but not also more than all,
not also transcendent; doesn’t that come to the same thing? At
the same time, another point: isn’t there a sense in which we
must be pantheists; vis, this, that the finite cannot be outside the
infintc, for were it so, the infinite would be bounded by what is
external to it? But what is “in” God is God; and in this sense it
would appear correct to say that all things, taken out o f their
sense, are God, for as ideas in the divine mind, they arc not
other than that mind. I think the right solution is “fused but not
confused” (Eckhart) and bhedabheda, “distinction without
difference” . Perhaps I said before, the best illustration is
afforded by her ray— identical with the centre when it goes
“in” and individual when it goes “out” . If there were confusion
absolute, the notion o f the liberated as “ movers-at-will”
(kamacarin) would surely be meaningless. So, as usual, the
correct position is one of a middle way between absolute
identity and complete distinction.
I know the “danger o f knowledge”; and that’s largely why
we mean to go to India ourselves; not that realisations are not
possible everywhere, but partly to make a more definite
transition; also; partly, o f course for other reasons.
I might appropriate to myself the last two sentences o f the
Mishkat. “ Shining surface” : is not this like the mass of rays that
conceals the sun so that we do not “see the wood for the trees” ?
N ot so much a wall created by our blindness as created for us
by his manifestation itself; to be penetrated, o f course.
However, the w ord “shining” is, I believe, only Edwin
Arnold’s own; it is rather the depth and stillness o f the open sea
that the texts themselves emphasize.
I note in The Life o f the Spirit (Nov 1946): “The incarna
tion. . . whose meaning is re-enacted in the life o f every
aiter-Christus.” In this sense I suppose St Paul (“ I live, yet not I
but Christ in me”) is an “aiter-Christus” ?
Affectionately,
PS: about “choosing” a tradition, I fully agree. It is rather the “ tradition”
that should choosc us, cither by the circumstances o f our birth or by a
subsequent personal illumination (cf St Paul’s).
Bernard Kelly, W indsor, England. Sec pp 20-1; Kelly was reviewing A KC’s
Figures of Speech or Figures of Thought? (London, 1946) and had some
disagreement about AK C’s discussion of Transubstantiation. Both this book
and A K C ’s Why Exhibit Works of Art? (London, 1943) bore the following
notice: “ N o rights reserved. Quotations o f reasonable length may be made
w ithout w ritten permission. ” The Religious Basis of the Forms of Indian Society;
Indian Culture and English Influence; East and West (all by AKC), N ew York,
1946.
Mishkat al-Anwar (The Niche for Lights), al- Ghazzali; translated by W .H .T.
Gairdner, Royal Asiatic Society M onographs, Vol XIX, London, 1924;
Pakistani edition 1973.
The Life of the Spirit, a review o f spirituality published by the Dominicans of
England, Oxford.
“ Pantheism, Indian and N eo-Platonic” , AKC, Journal of Indian History, Vol
XVI, 1937; French translation in Etudes Traditionnelles, XLIII, Paris, 1938.
To BERNARD KELLY
December 29, 1946
Dear Bernard Kelly:
About the Eucharist as a type of a transubstantiation that
ought to be realised in secular life: Eckhart (Evans I, 408,
Pfeiffer 593), “ Were anyone as well prepared for outer food as
for the Sacrament, he would receive God (therein) as much as
in the Sacrament (itself).” This is just what I wanted to say, I
think this is true.
About alter Christus, ibid p 592: “By living the life of Christ
rather than my own, so I have Christ as ‘me’ rather than
myself, and I am called ‘Christ! rather than John or Jacob or
Ulrich; and if this befalls out of time, then I am transformed
into G od.”
About extra ecclesiam nulla salus: the Papal Bull Unigenitus
against Jansenism amongst other things declared that the
proposition “ Grace is not given outside the Church” is untrue.
Karl Adam, The Spirit of Catholicism, 1929, says the Church
is the normal institute of grace, but the Grace o f Christ is not
hindered from visiting particular men without the mediation of
the Church; and those who arc thus visited by his Grace in this
immediate way belong to the invisible Church (this is what I
mean when I sometimes talk of the “ reunion of the Churches”
in the widest sense).
This material in the last two paragraphs above is taken from
Bevan, Christianity, H om e University Library, pp 194, 5.
Bevan, however, on p 215 says Christianity is either the one
religion for mankind, “or it is altogether nonsense”— which
seems to me to be a total non sequitur. “The Lord knoweth who
are his” (II Tim 2, 19); it is a presumption to think that we
know.
Kindest regards,
John Jospeh Stoudt, The Way to Christ, by Jacob Bochmc, N ew York, 1947.
JA O S = Journal o f the American Oriental Society. The J AOS article referred to
was his review o f John Clarke Archer’s The Sikhs in Relation to Hindus,
Moslems, Christians and Ahmadiyyas, in vol LXVII (1947, pp 67-30) o f this
journal.
John Layard’s The Lady of the Hare: a Study in the Healing Power of Dreams was
reviewed by AKC in Psychiatry, vol VIII (1945, part 4, pp 507-513). See also
A K C ’s “ O n Hares and Dream s”, in Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society,
vol X X X V II, no 1, 1947.
Jalal ud-D in Rum i, Sufi saint, founder o f a Sufi order, and one o f the greatest
if not the greatest o f Sufi mystical poets.
To FATHER GEORGE B. KENNARD, SJ
Octobcr 12, 1943
Dear Father Kcnnard:
Many thanks for your kind and long letter. I shall try to see
Father Johann’s article. I would say that many o f these things
arc matters o f fact. 1 agree that the West has something
“invaluable” to offer in Christianity, but the converse is no less
true.
As to the matters o f fact: you say or cite that India has to be
taught the way o f self-conquest, and also the doctrine o f creatio
ax nihilo. I do not know why this should be so, seeing that both
arc already integral parts o f Vedic philosopy. As to the first,
you will find some o f the material in the “ Akimcanna” paper I
am sending, and which I am sorry I must ask you to return, as I
have only a lending copy. As in Plato, with his mortal and
immortal soul, the Vedantic mortal self and its “immortal Self
and Leader” (= Plato’s Soul o f the soul) and St Paul’s Spirit as
distinguished from soul (Hcb iv, 12), the question is, which shall
rule, the better or the worse, superior or inferior. The most
direct statement about sc\{-conquest is, I think, that o f Bhagavad
Gita VI. 5,6:
Let him uplift self by Self, not let self sink down; for verily
Self is the friend o f the self, and also self s foe. Self is the
friend o f the self in his case whose self has been conquered
(jitah, the ordinary military term, as in jaya , victory), but acts
as the foe in hostile conflict with self undaunted.
Regarding creatio ex nihilo, I would have to write a longer
exposition, dealing with kha (chaos), akasa (light as quintess
ence), and the Gnostic topes; with reference also to Sum Theol
(Aquinas) 1.45.1: emanatio omnis entis ex non ente quod est nihil* (I
quote from memory); to the equation of God with nihil in Eckhart
and other mystics, it is obvious that the first cause o f “ things”
must be no thing; and the whole matter o f intelligible forms
and sensible phenomena in West and East sources; and also take
up the uses o f teino and its Sanskrit equivalent tan (extend),
together w ith the thrcad-spirit doctrine (cf in my “Literary
Symbolism” in the Dictionary of World Literature, 1943, where it
is briefly cited); and the use o f elko. In our theology God is the
Supreme Identity o f being-and-non-being (sadasat), and these
are his essence and his nature, which latter he separates from
him self as a mother o f whom to be born (of coursc, I could give
you all the references, but w on’t do that now). Hence the
precise statement o f Rgveda X.7214: “being is born of
non-being” . It is interesting, too, that just as our “nothing” is
also “evil”, viz, naught-y, so a-sat, non-being has also precisely
this value o f “naughty” in Sanskrit contexts. So too, the
process o f perfecting is a procedure from a “to-be-done” to a
“having-done-what-was-to-bc-done”, ie, potentiality to act.
We are thus dealing with a whole system of equivalent notions.
In my view, then, it is not so much a question of introducing
any new doctrinal truths to one another, as it is o f bringing
together the equivalent formulations and so establishing the
truth on the basis of both authorities. This I conceive to be the
proper work o f “comparative religion”, considered as a true
discipline and not mere satisfaction o f curiosity. The different
scriptures rather illuminate than correct one another.
With reference to the Cross: consider the implications of
teino, with reference to the crucifixion as an extension. From
our point o f view, the Eternal Avatara (and o f course, we
should regard Christ as one of His epithets) is extended in
principio on the three dimensional cross o f the universe that he
“ fills”, that would be involved in the “eternal birth”, while the
historical crucifixion in the two dimensions would be the
necessary projection of the same “event” in a world of contraries
(enantiai, right and left, etc).
I am afraid I cannot, although your kind invitation is
attractive, now promise to write on any of the problems you
suggest, for the reason that I am “snowed under” by existing
com mitm ents and unfinished articles. Incidentally, in the first
issue o f the Bookman, I am disagreeing with Beardsley and
W imsatt’s statements on “Intention” in the Dictionary o f World
Literature, and maintaining that criticism must be based on the
ratio o f intention and result, the classical standard o f judge
ment, and I believe this will interest you.
I shall, in accord with what you say, expect return o f one
copy o f Why Exhibit. . .? presently. Most o f the English
reviewers either, as Catholics, agree with the general thesis, or
as aestheticians cannot bear to agree that art has any other
purpose than to produce sensations, or bring themselves to
have to think in the presence of a work o f art.
I have also written an introduction for Gill’s posthumous
essays.
With very kind regards,
* The passage from the Summa Theologiae (I-I.45.1, res) which AKC cited
from m em ory was presumably the following: Sicut igitur generatio hominis
est ex non enteguod est non homo, ita creatio, guae est emanatio totius esse, est ex non
ente guod est nihil.
Father George B. Kennard, S J, managing editor o f The Modem Schoolman: a
Quarterly Journal of Philosophy, published by St Louis University, St Louis,
M issouri, USA.
Father P. Johanns, ‘Introduction to the Vedanta’, Catholic Press, Ranchi,
India, 1943. ‘Akimcanna: Self-Naughting” , New Indian Antiquary, III (1940),
pp 1-16.
‘Kha and O ther W ords Denoting Zero in Connection with the Metaphysics
o f Space’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, VII (1934), pp 487-497.
‘Intention’, The American Bookman, I, 1, W inter 1944, pp 41-48.
Introduction, It All Goes Together, Selected Essays by Eric Gill, N ew York,
1944.
TO ADE DE BETHUNE
May 6, 1937
Dear Adc de Bcthune:
In the first place I enclose an extract from a letter from an
English Catholic o f considerable standing, though not a
professional theologian.
Secondly, I should like to say that I have not the slightest.
interest in trying to “placate” anyone, but only in the Truth,
which I regard as One. It would take too long to show here
how hard it would be to say what doctrines (Matters o f faith, as
distinguished from matters o f detail) arc not com mon to
Christianity and Hinduism (as well as other traditions, the
Islamic for example). As to reincarnation, the doctrine has been
profoundly misinterpreted, alike by scholars, Thcosophists,
and neo-Buddhists. O n the other hand, the doctrine about
what is under and what beyond the Sun is expounded in almost
identical terms in both traditions.
I often find m yself in the position o f a defender of Catholic
truth, and willingly enough; all the doctrines usually regarded
as difficult seem to me to both intelligible and to be represented
in Hinduism. On the other hand, though individual Protestants
may be truly religious, I cannot seriously equate Protestantism
with Christianity, and regard the Reformation as a Reforma
tion.
It is very easy to discover apparent contradictions between
Christianity and Hinduism, but it requires a very thorough
knowledge o f both and perhaps a faith in both, to discover
whether these apparent contradictions are real. The principal
difference in actual formulation is perhaps that Hinduism
strictly speaking deals almost exclusively with the Eternal
Birth, which in exoteric Christianity is, so to speak, only the
more im portant o f the two births, temporal and eternal.
In the last sentence I say “ strictly speaking” because in
Buddhism, which is an aspect of Hinduism, related to the
orthodox tradition somewhat as Protestantism is to Catholic
ism, the manifestation o f the Eternal Messiah (or as we express
it, Avatara) is given a temporal form. I may add that my faith in
the truth o f Christianity (“ faith” as defined by St Thomas)
would not in the least be affected by a positive disproof of the
historicity of the Christ, and I wonder if your friend could say
as much.
I send you separately a few other papers of mine, of which I
will ask you to return those on Exemplarism and on Rebirth
and Omniscience, as I have but few copies. I send also 3 copies of
“M an’s Last End” for which you can send me 34 cents in
stamps. I need hardly say that this paper, which was originally
a broadcast and will be printed in Asia for May, was necessarily
a very brief and undocumented statement; a summary, in fact,
of some material collected for a comparison o f Indian and
Christian concepts of deificatio. The other papers will suffice to
show that I have a background for what I say. I wonder indeed
if your friend has anything like a similar background from
which to speak o f “ what only a Christian believes” , ie, for
making statements as to what is not believed elsewhere. I often
wonder why so many Christians resent the very thought that
perhaps the truth has been known elsewhere, although express
ed in other idioms. Since for me there is in the last analysis only
one revealed tradition (of which the different forms are so
many dialects), it is for me a source o f interest and pleasure to
recognize the same truths differently expressed at different
times and by different peoples. C f p 331 of the Speculum article.
My article in the Art Bulletin, Vol. XVII (a translation and
discussion o f Ulrich Englcbcrti, De Pulchro), would probably
interest you.
Yours sincerely,
A de de B ethune, identified p 28. She had written to AKC about his article
‘The Indian Doctrine of Man’s Last End’, raising objections both on her
part and on the part of her (Protestant) friend about the correlation of
Hindu and Christian positions. The enclosed ‘cxtract’, mentioned in the first
paragraph, was from a letter by Eric Gill concerning the same article, and is
repeated here: . 1 am very glad to have it. It seems to me faultless,
though I suppose the pious practising Christian would feel that it left him
rather high and dry, as it leaves out (necessarily, from the point of view of
metaphysics) all the personal loving contact which he has with Christ as
man, brother, lover, bridegroom, friend. . . . I don't think there is anything
at all wrong with what you have written: I think it is all just true, but it is
written at a level removed from that of the ordinary consciousncss and. . .
‘Two Passages is Dante’s Paradiso', Speculum XI (1936), 327-328.
‘Mediaeval Acsthctic. I. Dionysius the Psucdo-Areopagite and Ulrich
Engelberti of Strassburg’, Art Bulletin, XVII (1935), Pt 1, 31-47.
In later years, Dr Coomaraswamy changcd his views on the orthodoxy of
Buddhism, and would no longer have referred to it as ‘Protestant’.
To PROFESSOR J. WACH
August 23, 1947
Dear Professor Wach:
1 read your paper in the July Journal of Religion with much
interest. For me, of course, theology is a “science” common to
all religions, and not the private property of any. In view of
Aquinas as cited in the enclosed, p 60, it would seem to me
virtually impossible for any Roman Catholic to maintain that
no non-Christian scripture can have been inspired. Indeed,
from the point of view of those who are opposed to all religion,
nothing could well be more laughable than for anyone to claim
that his religion alone has been “ revealed” . I hold with Blake
that “there is no natural religion” (which parallels your
citations from Newman and Soderblom). I am sending a copy
o f your paper to a R. C. friend of mine in England who is
devoting himself to a consideration o f this question: “What is
to be the attitude o f Roman Catholics to the Oriental religions
as now better known than heretofore?”; for which purpose he
has learnt Sanskrit himself. We are both agreed that neither of
us is in search o f a solution in terms of “latitudinarianism”.
Here I might also mention that I know two European brothers,
one a Trappist monk, the other a leading Moslem; both are
men o f prayer; neither has any wish to convert the other; and
know, too, o f a learned and aged nun who said to us: “I see
there is no ncccssity for you to be a Christian”. The Hindu
attitude might be expressed as follows: Hinduism “has outlived
the Christian propaganda o f modern times . . . . It is now able
to meet any of these world religions on equal terms as their
friend and ally in common cause” (Renaissance of Hinduism,
D. S. Sharma, 1944, p 70). I have myself often said to
Christians, “even if you arc not on our side, we are on yours.”
As regards the collation o f doctrines, Christian and non-
Christian, I think this task has so far only been begun. For
example, who has ever stressed the Buddhist “Whoever would
nurse me, let him nurse the sick” in relation to “In as much as
yc have done it unto one o f the least o f these . . . yc have done
it unto Me”? Even as regards pre-Christian Greek, compara
tively little has been done; mainly, I suppose, bccausc such
tasks arc distasteful to most Christians. O f course one finds a
similar attitude elsewhere also; there arc some Indians who
resent my own position, according to which there is nothing
unique in Indian religion, apart from its “local color”, ie,
historical expression in the language o f those whose religion it
has been (“nothing can be known except in the mode o f the
knowcr”). There are, indeed, two kinds o f persons; those who
take pleasure in recognizing identities o f doctrines, and those
who they offend (and who, as Schopenhauer long ago pointed
out, strive to show that when the same things arc said in as
nearly as possible the same way, the meaning is different);
In the case o f the Hindu-Moslcm problem in India (which is
now mainly a political rather than a religious matter), the
solution can only be found . . . starting from the position
unequivocally affirmed by Jahangir and Dara Shikosh that
“their Vedanta is the same as our Tasawwuf”. It is from men
like these (and like Plutarch) that we have to learn how to tackle
the problems o f “comparative religion”. By the way, I do not
think this is such an unfortunate term, because it is significant
that the word religion is used in the singular; comparative
religion and the history o f religion* are not quite the same
thing. The former, I think, can only be studied by men who arc
themselves religious.
Very sincerely,
PS: I can’t agree that we are saying the same things about Rum-i;
you said explicitly that he believed in reincarnation, and I
produced chapter and verse to show that he did not do so, in
the now commonly accepted animistic interpretation of the
word. N or can I agree with you than any Sufi (or Vedantist)
identified himself (Boehme’s “that which thou callcst ‘I’ or
‘m yself ”) with God; it is the immanent God in “us”, not “this
man, so-and-so”, that can be identified with God, and must be,
if there is to be any sense to the faith of those (like Cusa, and the
Greek O rthodox theologians) who consider man’s last end one
of thcosis by the elimination of omnis alteritatis et diversitatis.
Sinccrely,
To GERSHOM G. SCHOLEM
November 9, 1944
Dear Professor Scholcm:
I have been reading your Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism
with the greatest interest, and am only sorry I have been unable
to procure a copy here. If, by chance, it is still available in
Jerusalem, I should be very much obliged if you would direct
your bookseller to send me a copy, with the bill.
Tsimtsum seems to me to correspond exactly to William
Blake’s expression “contracted and identified into variety”.
Throughout I have been interested in the Indian parallels,
which I have long since learnt to expcct everywhere, since
metaphysics is one science, whatever the local coloring it takes
on. In this connection I am sending you a copy of my article on
“Recollection, Indian and Platonic” and Transmigration, in
which I touched on the treatment o f “recollection” by Jewish
writers. You will see that the (true) Indian doctrine of
transmigration is similar to that o f gilgul (= Ar tanassul). I am
dealing with the whole subject further in an article on
“Gradation and Evolution” which will appear in Isis.
G crshom G. Scholcm, professor o f Jewish mysticism, Hebrew University,
Jerusalem, and author o f Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, Jerusalem, 1941.
‘Recollection, Indian Platonic’ and ‘on the O ne and O nly Transm igrant’,
published as Supplements to the Journal of the American Oriental Society,
LXIV, 1944.
‘Gradation and Evolution’, Isis, X X X V , 1944.
To HELEN CHAPIN
Dcccmber 22, 1945
Dear Helen:
. . . I think you (like Aldous Huxley) arc much too much
afraid o f what you call “sugar”; and on the other hand, 1
suspcct some tracc o f “sugar” in your “love o f nature” . O f
coursc, wc all “love nature”; but we don’t have to go so far as
to exclaim that “only God can make a tree” , as if he was not
just as interested in making fleas. Blake was “afraid that
W ordsworth was fond o f nature”; and as Eckhart says, “to find
nature (ie, natura naturans) as she is herself, all her forms must be
shattered.”
I sec no sugar in Ramakrishna! Bhakti in the Bhagavad Gita is
“scrvice” (in the sense of giving to anyone what is their due,
service as a servant) or “attendance”, rather than “love”
literally. “ Platonic love” is not the love of others “for
themselves”, but o f what in them is divine, and as this is
identical with what in us is divine, is just as much self-love (ie,
love o f Self) as love o f others; the notion o f “I” and that of
“others” is (as in Buddhism) equally delusive, and what we
need is not “altruism ” but Self-love in the Aristotelian and in
the Scholastic sense.
Very sincerely,
To RUTH CAMPBELL
January 6, 1938
Dear Miss Campbell:
Many thanks for your kind letter and the careful attention you
have given my article. I should like to say first that your “office
dogs” missed the point as regards “transmigration” . What I
said was that reincarnation was not taught and represented an
impossibility. This does not exclude the validity of metemp
sychosis on the one hand (for which by the way, “Hermes”
uses migration, not (ram-migration) and of transmigration on
the other. I had thought I made it very clear that transmigration
has nothing to do with time or place, but takes place entirely
“within you” , and is from the periphery to the centre of being.
I believe this is made so clear in the article that only a re-reading
is required.
As to the “editorial” problem, how would it be to print the
first part in smaller type with a footnote to the effect that the
reader may prefer to read the second part first. I feel myself that
to scatter the first part through the second would too much
interrupt the sequence o f ideas; and that on the other hand it is
very necessary to in some way set aside our notions of
“philosophy” before we can begin to grasp the philosophia
perennis, the theme of which is rather pneumatological than
psychological, and gnostic rather than epistemological.
I might add that a “limitation by Christianity” would not
stand in the way of understanding, if this “Christianity” were a
real knowledge (of Christianity as understood by Dionysius,
Bonaventura, Thomas and Witelo, as well as Eckhart). My
experiences o f “ Christians” is that it is very rare to meet
w ith one w ho has any real conception o f what “ C hristianity”
means.
Perhaps you would let me know your view on these notes.
Ruth Campbell, assistant editor of The American Scholar (the Phi Beta Kappa
quarterly), New York, USA.
‘The Vedanta and the Western Tradition’, The American Scholar, VIII, 1939.
A nonymous
Date uncertain
Sir:
Apropos of your remarks on Reincarnation in your issue of
June 4, may I say that I am rather familiar with Plato, Plotinus,
Philo, Hermes, etc, and that my writings abound with citations
from these authors. I share the view of Rene Guenon that all
apparent references to reincarnation of the individual on this
earth arc to be understood metaphorically. This was also the
view of Hierocles, stated in his Commentary on the Golden Verses
of Pythagoras, V.53. Passages can be cited also from Christian
and Islamic authors which appear to enunciate a doctrine of
reincarnation, yet cannot and do not really do so.
An adequate treatment of the subjcct would take a large
book. It must first be realized that in the traditional philosophy
our everyday life is not a being but a becoming, a perpetual
dying and being reborn; that is one kind of “reincarnation”.
Then that from the same point of view a man is “reborn” in his
children, who will represent him when he himself has
transmigrated elsewhere. And finally, that both the Vedanta,
and in connection with the doctrinc o f “Recollection”, Plato
maintained that it is not the individual soul, but the Universal
Self that transmigrates, entering into every form of existence
whatever; in the words of Sankara, “Verily, there is none but
the Lord that transmigrates.” We cannot, in fact, even begin to
discuss the problem until wc have arrived at some understand
ing o f the question “Who and what am ‘I’?” Before we can ask
whether or not “we” reincarnate or transmigrate, we must
make it clear to which of the “two selves”, mortal or immortal,
that all traditions, whether Greek, Christian or Oriental assume
to coexist in “us”, we are referring. Most of the Indian texts
that seem to speak of a “reincarnation” are cither descriptive of
this present life, or any kind o f living, or rather of the Life that
is common to all things, and passes on from one to another
with absolute impartiality. That is not, of course, to deny that a
laity, taking for granted an identity o f the individual soul
throughout life, have never assumed that this “soul” or
“personality” reincarnates; we simply mean to say that-such a
point o f view is unorthodox, whether in West or East.
1 cannot, o f course, agree with you that East is East and West
is West, as was said by Kipling, of w hom the late F. W. Bain
remarked that “Hindu India was for him a book scaled with
seven seals.” There is, indeed, a gulf dividing what is
“m odern” from what is truly Oriental; but that is not a
geographical distinction, or one that could have been recog
nized before the fourteenth century. All that Kipling meant was
that he had never understood the East. May I commend to you
Rene Guenon’s East and West, and in particular the chapter
entitled “ Agreement on Principles” ? There are many different
ways o f saying the same thing, but [this] does not imply
contradictory truths. In your view, either the East or the West
must be all wrong; and that is only really true if we are
contrasting, not East and West, but the modern anti-traditional
world with the traditional cultures based on universal princi
ples.
AKC
To PROFESSOR E. R. DODDS
June 19, 1942
Dear Professor Dodds:
Many thanks for your letter o f May 8. I agree that Plato’s
“ mortal soul” cannot be reincarnated. His “imortal soul” is
essentially the “divine part” o f us. If this perpetually reincar
nates it is in its universal aspect and just in the sense that for the
Vedanta, “God is the only transmigrator, forsooth” (Sankara
on Brahma Sutra 1.1.5, and supported by innumerable texts).
HenGe Katha Upanishad speaks o f those who are liberated as
“ filled for embodiment in the worlds”— that would be in the
sense that for Plato “ Soul” (not a soul) “ governs all things” .
But the divine extension which is temporally determined by a
given individuality (by association with a mortal psycho
physical becoming) can be liberated from its necessitas coactionis
and then operates only according to necessitas injallibilitatis, ie,
its own nature as it is in itself.
If “w e” can identify our consciousness of being with it in this
free aspect, then “w e” are liberated from “reincarnation” in
any pejorative sense. And finally, this is the absolute liberation:
because the world process itself is part and parcel o f our way of
thinking and from the eternal and divine point o f view is not a
process but G od’s knowledge o f him self nowevcr and apart
from the time that is a factor in any concept o f re-incarnation.
I believe that this, and the related doctrine o f anamnesis are
two points in which the agreement o f Plato and Vedanta is most
fundamental. Anamnesis, furthermore, makes pronoia intelligi
ble; since it precisely an omnipresence o f “ soul” (ie, “spirit”) to
all things that implies omniscience or “Providence” (Skr,
prajna, equivalent o f pronoia etymologically and in meaning).
Sincerely,
To WESLEY E. NEEDHAM
May 20, 1945
Deat M r Needham:
Many thanks for letting me see the readings. I agree with the
translation, except I would say “ rite”, not “ceremony”. By no
means are all ceremonies rites, and while rites must be formal,
they need not be ceremonious. I made myself a copy, as the
transliteration will help with other Nepal texts.
I am afraid I distrust Theosophy as a whole, though in fact, I
had a high regard for Mrs Besant personally. The notion o f a
personal physical rebirth is not orthodox Brahmanism or
original Buddhism, since there is no psychic constant “I” that
could be reborn. I treat o f this briefly in my “ One and Only
Transm igrant” (JA O S Suppl 3, 1944, p 28), though a fuller
treatment is needed. All scholars are agreed that a doctrine o f
individual physical rebirth is not Vedic, and this fact alone
should give one pause. I agree that some have been led to
Eastern thought through meeting with Theosophy, but the
best o f these have realized that they must go to the sources
themselves sooner or later. I am sure you will not mind my
stating my exact position in the matter, even if you differ!
Very sincerely,
To BERNARD KELLY
February 10, 1947
Dear Bernard Kelly:
Yours o f 4.2.46 with two citations from Hinduism and
Buddhism. As regards “ the universal is real, the particular
unreal” , I don’t think we need have much trouble. I was
equating reality with being. So I mean what St Augustine
means when he says of created things that Te comparata nec
pulchra, nec bona, nec sunt. Such being as they have, such reality
therefore, is by participation, not of themselves. “Exis
tent” = ex alio sistens. Again Augustine (Conf VII. 11): esse
quidem, quoniam abs te sunt, non esse autem, quoniam id quod es non
sunt. M oreover, at least “in so far as men are sinners, they have
not being at all” (St Thom , Sum Theol 1.20.2 and 4). The
general principle I have in mind is that things that are always
changing (like body and soul), St Augustine, Sermo 241 2.2;
3.3, cf Conf 7.11: “that trully is, which doth immutably
remain”—it cannot be said o f them that they are.
Secondly, on the question whether the immortality o f a
created soul is conceivable. I had supposed that is an in
violable axiom, that “ whatever has a beginning must have an
end”, also that mutability and mortality are inseparable— “all
change is a dying” (Plato, Eckhart, etc). So we attribute
immutability, immortality, and no beginning to God. My
point in saying “impossible” would be that God cannot do
anything contrary to his own nature, and that to accuse Him (as
I should express it) o f making anything at a given time that
should not also end in time would amount to a kind of
blasphemy, based on a false interpretation o f the principle that
“all things arc possible with G od” , which possibility does not
actually include self-contradiction, such as would be involved
if, for example, wc thought o f Him as making things that have
been not have been.
If the “soul” (as St Augustine and the Buddha say) is
mutable, never selfsame from moment to moment, what can
one mean by “its” immortality? What is “it” ? Surely, like my
own personal name, only a w ord which conveniently summa
rizes a sequence o f changing behaviour and experiences. I have
always, o f course, in mind the trinity o f body, soul and spirit;
the latter is the Spirit o f God that becomes the spirit o f man (St
Thom Aquinas, sum Theol 1.38.2) which we “ give up when we
die” (as Ps 104, 29; Eccl 12, 7). When Jesus died he “gave up the
ghost” (John 19, 30), and so do other men (Acts V.5 etc). If,
then, we would be immortal, we must be born again o f the
Spirit, “and that which is born o f the Spirit is Spirit” (John III,
3—8, cf I C or VI, 17); in the meantime our continued existence
depends on the continued presence o f the Giver (St
Bonaventura I Sent d 37, p 1, al, conc). As in Prasna Upanishad
VI.3: it is a question o f “in w hom shall I be departing” (in
myself, or in the Self of the self, or Soul of the soul). I do not
need to tell you that psyche and psychikos are generally speaking
pejorative terms in the N ew Testament, or that the Word o f God
extends to “ the severing o f soul from Spirit” . I could quote
much more, but in sum I cannot see what authority there is for
the supposition that anything created can never cease‘to exist;
and if you could point to one, it would irrevocably show that
the truths o f reason and the truth o f Christian revelation can
never be reconciled, which for me would be a horrible
conclusion, since I hold that both are from Him.
Kindest regards,
To BERNARD KELLY
April 9, 1947
Dear Bernard Kelly:
. . . As regards “soul” , surely it will depend on which o f the
senses in which the w ord is used whether or not it be anathema
to deny its immortality. One cannot overlook that the W ord of
God “extends to the sundering o f soul from Spirit” (Heb
IV, 12). N ow , it is God “ who only hath im m ortality” (I Tim
VI, 16). Can, therefore, anything but “ the Spirit o f God (that)
dwellcth in you” (I C or III, 16) be immortal? This Spirit is the
Psychopomp; surely there is no hope o f immortality for the
soul as such, but only if she dies and is reborn in and o f the
Spirit? When St Paul says “ I live, yet not I, but Christ [liveth] in
m e” he is expressly denying himself, and one can associate “his”
im m ortality with the saying “no one hath ascended into
heaven, save he which came down from heaven, even the Son
o f (the) Man which is in heaven” . So, while there is a sense in
which one can speak o f m an’s “immortal soul” , I think that in
view o f the fact that men arc most unconscious o f the
ambiguity of the w ord psyche and still more unaware o f the
pejorative implications o f the w ord psychikos, and the fact that
in these days men are only too ready to be “lovers o f their own
selves” (II Tim 111, 2), it is much safer to think and speak of
our souls as mortal, and to think only of the “ghost” that we
“give up” at death as immortal. This Spirit is that in us which
knows, and cannot pass away. It is diversified by its accidents
(naturing) in Tom , Dick and Harry, but “ye are all one in
Christ” . The Spirit is not even hypothetically destructible.
I am so glad to know that after your 18 m onth’s “grind” you
are now really enjoying its fruits. It is, indeed, absolutely
indispensable to learn to think in Sanskrit to some extent, ie, to
be able to use certain terms directly, without putting them onto
English “equivalents”, no one o f which can communicate their
full content; and as soon as one can do this (however many
“aids” one still needs in continuous reading) one begins at once
to see a great deal that had otherwise been overlooked.
I have been losing time lately by a cold that saps one’s
energy; and besides that is seems impossible to cope with half
the things I ought to be doing.
Kindest regards,
ANONYMOUS
Date uncertain
Sir:
In the July issue of JP, p 371, Karl Schmidt referring to the
expression “master of m yself’ implies that this is an inexplicit
and indeterminate conception. It is, on the contrary, explicit in
the traditional philosophy that there are two in us, and what
they arc. I need only cite Plato, Republic 604D; IiCor IV, 16, is
quiforts est\ St Thomas Aquinas, Sum Theol II-II.26.4, in homitte
duo sunt, scilicet natura spiritualis et natura corporalis; and call to
mind the Indian (Brahmanical and Buddhist) doctrine o f the
two selves, mortal and immortal, that dwell together in us. In
all these literatures the natures and character o f the two selves
arc treated at great length, and the importance o f the resolution
of their inner conflict emphasized; no man being at pcace with
himself until an agreement has been readied as to which shall
rule. In this philosophy we are unfrec to the extent that our
willing is determined by the desires o f the outer man, and free
to the extent that the outer man has learnt to act, not for
himself, but as the agent o f the inner man, our real Self.
It is hardly true, then to propound that “The saying does not
comit itself* to the statement that there arc two in us, or
explain what these two are. Further, innumerable phrases still
current in English preserve the doctrine of the two selves; for
example, such as “self-control” , “self-composure” , “conscien
ce” , “self-possession” . It is in connection with “ self-
government” that Plato points out that there must be two in us;
since the same thing cannot function both actively and
passively at the same time and in the same connection.
Yours very truly,
The two passages that follow are taken from AKC’s manu
script notes or from other letters, and are included here for the
bearing they have on “ the two in us.”
We are never told that the mutable soul is immortal in the same
way that God is immortal, but only “in a certain way”
(secundum quemdam modum, St Augustine, Ep 166, 21-31).
Quomodo ? “in one way only, viz, by continuing to become;
since thus it can always leave behind it a new and other nature
to replace the old” Plato, Symposium, 207D). It is incorrect to
speak o f the soul indiscriminately as “im m ortal”, just as it is
incorrect to call anyone a genius; man has an immortal soul, as
he has a Genius, but the soul can only be immortalised by
returning to its source, that is to say by dying; and man
becomes a Genius only when he is no longer “him self’.
With respect to the word “soul” (psyche, anima, Heb nefes)
translated sometimes by “life” (Luke XIV, 26, “and hate not
his own life also”; John XII, 25: “Hatcth his own life in the
w orld”). Do not forget that this world usually denotes “the
animal sentient principle only” (Strong, Concordance, Gk
dictionary, p 79) and is sharply to be distinguished from the
“ Spirit” (pneuma ), spiritus, Heb ruah, as in Heb XIV, 12: “the
dividing asunder o f soul and spirit” . In place of the word
“spirit” can be used such expressions as “ Soul o f the soul” (so
Philo); the word “soul” is ambiguous, and before the usage
became precise we often find “soul” employed (as in Plato)
where “spirit” must be understood. In any case, one must
always consider the context; in general the Gospels are not at all
enthusiastic about the kind of soul that the psychologist is
concerned about, and Jung’s “ man in search of a soul” is
looking for something that the religions want to have done
with once and for all.
Father M artin D ’Arcy, S J, sometime master o f Cam pion Hall, O xford and
later head o f the Jesuits in England. In his day, he was one o f the more
popular ecclesiastical authors, and wrote The Mind and Heart of Love,
London, 1947. Paul L. Claudel, French poet and diplomat.
Rivolta contro il mondo moderno, Jacques Evola, 1934. This chapter was
translated by Zlata Llamas (Dona Luisa) Coom arawam y, A K C’s wife,
and published as ‘Man and W om an’ in The Visva-Bharati Quarterly, vol V, pt
iv, Feb-April 1940, w ith a brief introduction by AKC.
William o f St Thierry, The Golden Epistle of Abbot William of St Thierry,
translated by W alter Shewring, and published in 1930.
T o FATHER MARTIN C. D’ARCY, SJ
May 2, 1947
Dear Father D ’Arcy:
Many thanks for your kind letter in reply to mine. I read it
very carefully. As regards the main point, I cannot but retain
my strong objection to the use of established terms in new
senses; at the least, unless the writer makes it perfectly dear that
he knows what he is doing, and states in so many words that he
is using the terms in a new sense. Thus when Jung calls anima
the “soul-image” as envisioned by men and animus the
“soul-image” as envisaged by women, he has a right to express
his concept, but not the right to use these terms in a way that
distorts their well-known meanings, according to which—man
consisting of body, soul and spirit— anima is “soul” and animus
“spirit”.
When you say you were aware of this, but “could not
acccpt” the traditional usage, would it not have been better to
make this clear, instead of leaving the reader to wonder
whether or not you were aware—as Claudel, whom you seem
to quote with approval, certainly cannot have been. It seems to
me that if you are writing as a priest, you have no right to say
you “cannot accept” the terms o f traditional theology; that you
might do if writing as an independent psychologist, expressing
individual opinion. I am not a priest, still I will not take such
liberties; where there is a consensus o f doctrine on the part of
philosophers and theologians throughout many ccnturics, and
in the diverse traditions, I regard it as primary business to
understand, and in turn to write as an exegctc, concerned with
the transmission o f true doctrine. In any case, it is only when
one adheres to the precise meanings o f theological terms both
in East and West that one can make any valid or fruitful
comparisons.
I quoted Cicero, not as a primary source, but as illustrating
usage. In your reply, you do not take notice o f my further
citation of William o f Thierry, whose usage is the same and
whose expressions are animus vel spiritus, and mens vel spiritus.
When St Thomas Aquinas says that it is a man’s primary duty,
in charity, to love himself, ie, his Inner Man (or as Philo and
Plato would have said, the “Man in this man”), this is the same
as to say that the animus in cvcryman is the anima's true love:
therefore it was that I said that, if in Claudel’s (to me silly)
parable, anima is false to animus, she must be secretly loving the
world, ie, herself, and her “life in this w orld” (John XII, 25).
Philo’s psyche psyches, like the Islamic jan-i-jan, and the
Sanskrit atmano’tma (“self o f the self’, used in apposition to
netr = hegemonikon) is simply another equivalent of “ Spirit” ,
and has specific use when it is desired to avoid the ambiguity of
the word “soul” which (as you know) is used in various senses,
some pejorative. It seems to me that all these and other
technical terms as scintilla animae (funkelein, opiother, apospasma)
etc, have always been used clearly and intelligibly. At any rate, I
am accustomed to think in these terms, and in those of their
Indian and Islamic equivalents. Your own mentality is singular
ly acute, and when I spoke of “disappointment” it was because
I had expected from you a precise and understanding use of the
technical terms in which the great philosophers and theologians
have always thought. But when you say the “so-called
tradition is partly bogus” , these sound like the words of a
Protestant denouncing “ Papish m um cry” . You ask for the
benefit of the doubt, so in this case, I shall assume you did not
quite mean what the words seem to say.
As regards East and West generally: it is useless to make
comparisons or pass any judgem ents unless one knows both
traditions in their sources. Existing translations are of very
varying quality, and on the whole arc for the most part vitiated
by the fact o f having been made by rationalists, excellent
linguists, but themselves without religious experience and at
the same time quite ignorant of the proper Greek, Latin or
English equivalents of the metaphysical terms that occur in the
contexts from which they translate.
To control such versions one must have at least some
knowledge o f the languages involved, oneself. Nevertheless, it
has been a far too common practise of Christian writers to cite,
eg, Sanskrit terms such as nirvana or maya in distorted senses,
w ithout any knowledge of the etymology of the terms or the
contexts in which they arc used. Nirvana, for example, one finds
referred to as an “emptiness” or “ annihilation” (incidentally,
in this connection, Buddhaghosa reminds us that whenever
such a word as “em pty” occurs in a given context, we must ask
ourselves “empty of what?”—as if, too, there were no
Christian literature in which the Godhead is spoken o f as a
“desert”, or nihill). Nirvana, then, is spoken of as “annihila
tion”, regardless of the fact that it was a state realized by the
Buddha when a comparatively young man, and that he lived a
long, full and active life for very many years thereafter. If he
refused to define the nature o f the being or non-being after
death o f one who like himself had realized Nirvana in this life
(the word means literally “despiration” and implies what
Angelus Silesius meant by his “Stirb ehe du stirbst”, and
Muhammed by his “Die before you die”) it is because, as a
Christian might have expressed it, such are “dead and buried in
the Godhead”, or “their life is hid in God”; of Whom, in
accordance with the via negativa, nothing true can be said except
negatively. Nirva (the verb) corresponds to . . . the two
English senses of the expression “to be finished”, all perfection
involving a kind o f death, inasmuch as the attainment of being
implies the cessation of process o f becoming, and in the same
way that for one who is “all in fact” there is nothing more that
“need be done”. Further, Nirvana has applications even in
“secular” contexts: thus a woman’s marriage to an ideal
husband is referred to as a “ nirvana”; in this case, the “death” is
that of the maiden who is no more, ie, has “died” as such, when
she enters into the new state of being, that of woman and wife.
So too in the successive stages of the training of a royal stallion
(a common analogy of the training of a disciple), each is
referred to as a nirvana, until finally the colt is no more and the
stallion remains. I have given this example at length because it
very well illustrates the absolute necessity of knowing the
original sources if one is to cite the technical terms of another
religion than one’s own. I follow this rule myself, and hardly
ever quote translations (even of the New Testament) from
Greek without considering the original text and the usage of
the terms in question in other contexts.
As regards the svastika , I think it a pity that you quoted King
on the subject at all; it is a good thing that you did not use the
svastika as a symbol of “passive love”. Incidentally, his queer
spellings of Indian words (Saeti for Sakti, Vichnaivas for
Vaishnavas) are an indication of the vagueness of his scho
larship.
I shall send on your letter, or a copy, to my R. C. friend
whom I spoke of. He has learnt Sanskrit recently for the
purpose o f making more accurate correlation with Christian
doctrines, and tells me how much more he now finds in the
Bhagavad Gita than he has been able to get from any translation.
O n the whole, I am inclined to think that in the interests o f
truth (and that concerns us all, since “T ruth” has been a name
o f God alike in Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism)
one should refrain from making any, especially any pejorative
statements about “other religions” unless one knows their
literature almost as well as one knows those o f one’s own.
Very sincerely,
To BERNARD KELLY
April 9, 1947
Dear Bernard Kelly:
Ijust obtained a copy of D ’Arcy’s Mind and Heart of Love, and
must say that 1 find it disappointing, not to say even a little
“nasty”, as well as ignorant (not only of eastern matters) in a
way surprising indeed for a Jesuit. I say this more especially
with reference to Chapter vii, Animus and Anima; he begins
with a ridiculous parable from Claudel, who is nothing but a
pscudomystic and quite ignorant o f the traditional values of the
terms animus and anima, for which William o f St Thierry’s
Golden Epistle , 50, 51, is the best source. William says “For
while it is yet anima, it lightly bccomcth effeminate, even to
being fleshy; but animus vel spiritus hath no thoughts of
anything save of the manly and the spiritual”; and this mens vel
spiritus is precisely the imago Dei in us. Obviously then, the
animus is the “Soul of the soul”, the proper object of true Self
love as in St Thomas Aquinas, Sum Theol II-II.26.4: “a man,
out of charity, ought to love himself more than he loves any
other person . . . more than his neighbour”, and the tradition
of Self love running back to Aristotle, Plato and Euripides in
the West; and as in B U IV.5, for which there is a very close
parallel in Lysis 219D—220B. I do not know whether the actual
use of the terms anima and animus can be traccd further back
than Ciccro, De nat deorum III. 14.36 (cf Acad II.7.22, animus as
the seat o f “perceptions”, ie, scientific concepts). Jung, of
course uses the terms in a special way, not incorrect in itself,
but at the same time not in accordance with the traditional
meanings. D ’Arcy seems quite unaware of all this, and this
makes nonsense o f his deprecation of "wissenschaftliche distinc
tions”, p 16). In other words, he is not transmitting dogma, but
merely thinking sloppily.
Turning to our own affairs, as regards the Trinity: Eckhart
calls this an “arrangement” of God, and indeed I can only think
o f it as one o f many possible formulations o f “relations” in
God. M oreover, the doctrinc is strictly speaking smriti rather
than sruti. Also, I cannot quite see how the Unity of the Three
docs not, in a sense, make a fourth” , ie, a One as logically
transcending the Trinity with reference to which St Thomas
him self says “Wc cannot say ‘the only God’, because deity is
com mon to several” . I think the closest comparisons must be
based on M U IV.4,5 (Agni, Vayu, Aditya as forms o f Brahma
or Purusha).
Kindest regards,
To BERNARD KELLY
August 6, 1947
Dear Bernard Kelly:
Yours ofjuly 16:1 have had in mind to write on the “ Use and
Abuse o f the terms anima and animus”, but 1) I must not
undertake any new tasks, but conserve energy to finish one’s
begun (doctor’s orders!), and 2) I think you could do it better. I
think it would be useful to do this, rather than write a critique
of D ’Arcy in a more general way. But you would have to read
and refer to D ’Arcy’s Ch vii at least. I now add such references
as I have come across, under the two headings of use and absue:
USE: W of Thierry, Golden Epistle 50, 51, animus vel spiritus and
mens vel animus-, Augustine, De ordine 1.1.3, qui tamen ut se
noscat, magna opus habet consuetudine recendi a sensibus (corporali-
bus), to be added from the Retractio, et animum in seipsum
colligendi atque in seipso retinendi\ probably derived from Cicero,
Tusc 1.22.52, neque nos corpora sumus. Cum igiture nosce te dicit,
hoc dicit, nosce animum tuum: cf 5.13.38, humanus animus decerptus
ex mente divina\ Varro, Men 32, in reliquo corpore ab hoc fente
diffusa est anima, hinc animus ad intelligentiam tributus (cf pene
passages cited in Rgveda 10.90.1.. . .); Enneads 3.8.10; Ruys-
brock, Adornment of the Spiritual Marriage, c 35; Epictetus,
3.8.18; Shamsi-Tabriz, Ode XII in Nicholson, 1938; Philo,
Prov 1.336 . . .; Det 83 . . .; Fug 1.95f and 182; Enneads 6.8.9.
Accidius, Trag 296, sapimus animo, fruimur anima, sine animo,
anima est debilis; Epicurus, De rer nat, C 3: “N ow I say that
Mind (animus) and Soul (anima) are held in union one with the
other, and form of themselves a single nature, but that the
head, as it were, and Lord in the whole body is the counsel
(consilium) that we call Mind (animus) or Understanding
(mens). . . . The rest o f the Soul (anima), spread abroad
throughout the body, obeys and is moved at the will and
inclination o f the Understanding (mens)”; and notably Wilhelm,
Secret of the Golden Flower, p 73, “In the personal bodily
existence o f the individualities, a p ’o soul (or anima) and a hun
soul (or animus). All during the life o f the individual these two
are in conflict, each striving for mastery (psychomachy!). At
death they separate and go different ways (like nefes and ruah in
the Old Testament = psyche and pneuma in the New Testament,
eg, Heb IV, 12). The anima sinks to earth as kuei (“dust to
dust”), a ghost-being (psychic residue). The animus rises and
becomes shen, a revealing spirit o f God (daimon, yaksa). Shen
may in time return to Tao. . . .” Also Augustine, De ordine
2.34: animus will be offended by the eyes, if the latter are
attracted by falsity attractively presented. (A few o f the above
references arc merely taken from the Latin dictionary, but most
I have seen).
ABUSE: D ’Arcy, loccit; Jung, Psychological Types , 1923, p 595:
“ If, therefore, we speak of the anima o f a man, we must
logically speak of the animus o f a woman, if we arc to give the
soul o f a woman its right name”, and 596-7: “With men the
soul, ic, the atiima, is usually figured by the unconscious in the
person o f a woman; with women it is a man”; and “For a man,
a woman is best fitted to be the bearer o f his soul-image, by
virtue o f the womanly quality of his soul; similarly a man, in
the case of a w om an” (for him, also, persona = “outer attitude”
and “soul” = “inner attitude” !). Jung has a real idea to express,
eg, as of Beatrice as Dante’s “soul-image”—but his is a reckless
abuse o f terms; he does not realise that anima and animus are
“two in us” , is quiforis est and is qui intus est, whether “w e” are
“ men” or “w om en” ! Animus in Latin represents the daimon [?]
or pneuma [?], ic, conscientia that Socratcs and Aristotle called
infallible; the nous [?] within you. Homo vivitur ingenio, coetera
mortis sunt! So 1 charge you to write on anima and animus. (I
forgot to add, you will find the terms misused also by E. I.
Watkin— who ought to know better—in The Wind and the Rain,
3, 1947, pp 179-84, following D ’Arcy and Jung. If all these
errors are not pointed out soon, we shall never be able to catch
up with them). I should add also that while Jung almost always
“rejects metaphysics” and reduces it to “psychology”, in Two
Essays on Analytical Psychology, 1928, ch 4, p 268, Jung does
rightly use the terms Ego and Self, and the latter being
“unknowable” (in the sense that “the eye cannot sec itself”) and
in that passage is a metaphysician in spite of himself.
About purusa and prakrti = mayin and maya, these are for me
St Thomas Aquinas’ principium conjunctum from which the Son
proceeds— Nature being “that Nature by which the Father
begats” (Damascene, D efide orth 1.18, as in Sum Theol I-I.45.5):
*’I made myself a mother o f whom to be born. . . . That
nature, to wit, which created all others” (Augustine, Contra V
H aerV = De Trin XIV, 9) = Natura naturans, Creatrix Iniversa-
lis, Deus (sic, in Index to Turin 1932 cd of Sum Theol). C f
Pancavimsa Br VII.6.1 to 9 (in 6, “eldest son” = Agni, see JU B
2.25. Brhati = Vac = mother o f Brhat\ you will find this PBr
passage very interesting from the standpoint of “filial proces
sion” .
E x necessitate naturae = necessitas infallibilitatis, I presume; just
as it is nature (necessity) o f light to illuminate; it seems to be
erroneous to think o f such a “necessity” as any limitation of
“freedom” (what is “freedom” but to be free to act in
accordance with one’s own nature?).
Regarding proportion o f natura naturans to natura naturata: as
Guenon would word it, God in act implies the realisation of
infinite possibility (this would not include the creation of
non-entities like the “horns o f a harc“ or “son of a barren
w om an” , o f course, which would involve a violation o f natura
naturans); but infinite possibility has two aspects, including
both the possibilities o f manifestation, and things that arc not
possibilities o f manifestation (the latter = arcana, known to
Cherubim, but to us only by analogy at best). It would seem to
me that the proportion between the possibilities o f manifesta
tion and the actuality of all things in time and space would be
exact; if that were all, it would involve a kind of pantheism, but
that is not all.
I don’t seem to know Gabriel Thiery’s Eckhart. But I have 12
fasicules o f the magnificent Stuttgart edition, still in progress,
of all the Latin and German works of Eckhart; this is really a
splendid piece of work!
I do think the Thomist duo sunt in homine is to be taken
seriously, as referring to is qui foris est and is qui intus est; indeed,
without some such concept o f a duality the notion of a
psychomachy, internal conflict, would be meaningless. The
“two” would seem to be the trace o f the Divine Biunity of
Essence and Nature—one in Him but distinct in us. T ho\ as
Hermes says, “Not that the One is two, but that the two are
One”: which it is for us to restore and realise by resolution of
the conflict in conscnt o f wills.
This is all I can manage for today.
Affectionately,
To BERNARD KELLY
August 29, 1947
Dear Bernard Kelly:
I suppose the “two in us” are respectively the substantial and
the actual forma of the soul, forma corresponding to eidos in
Phaedo 79, A & B, Timaeus 90 A. I feel quite proud to have you
ask me for a Thom istic reference! viz, Sum Theol II-II.26.4:
Repondeo dicendum guod in hominis duo sunt, scilicet natura
spiritualis et natura corporalis; the meaning is quite dear from the
rest o f the context, which deals with man’s first duty to love,
after God, seipsum secundum spiritualem naturam— Homo seipsum
magis ex charitate diligere tenetur, quam proximum being the same
as our modern “ Charity begins at hom e” (though we arc apt to
interpret this aphorism cynically!). Some o f the older references
for self-love = love of Self as distinguished from self, are:
Hermes Lib 4.6.B (cf Scott, Hermetica 2.145), Aristotle, Nich
Ethics 9.8 (cf Mag Mor II.xi,xiii,xiv). O n true Self-love, B U 4.5
(cf also 2.4) like Plato, Lysis 219D-220B!; “Platonic love” as
for Ficino (see Kristeller, pp 279-287), B U 1.4.8; cf Augustine
cited in Dent edition of Paradisco, p 384). Plato, Republic 621C,
Phaedo 115B (care for our Self = care for others), Laws 731E
and (a very impressive context) Euripides, Helen 999. C f
Context of Homer and Hesiod 320B. That there “ two in
us” = Plato Rep 604B . . . (f Phaedo 79 A,B; Timaeus 89D).
Why “ must be?”, because, to quote at greater length, “ where
there are two opposite impulses in a man at the same time about
the same thing, we say there must be two in us”; and similarly
436B, and many passages on internal conflict, eg, Rep 431 A,B,
439, 440, and notably Aristotle Met V .3.8-9 (1005B) “the most
certain o f all principles, that it is impossible for the same
property at once belong and not to belong to the same thing in
the same relation”— all resumed in St Aquinas Sum Theol
1.93.5: nil agit in seipsum.
“Charity begins at home"; note that what is said in the N ew
Testament about the indwelling Spirit (eg, I Cor 3, 16: to
pneuma tou theou oikei en hurnin is said of the immanent Daimon
in Platonic and other Greek sources (eg, Timaeus 90C. . . .
Many, many other references for to pneuma = Socratic
daimon = conscience.
In other words the whole problem is involved in the
psychomachy, and is only resolved when a man has made his
peace with him -Self (cf result in Homer-Hesiod 320B and
AA2.3.7). I have many pages o f references for “two in us”, and
for “psychom achy” !
Philo’s “ Soul o f the soul” in Heres 55 is the hegemonikon part,
the divine pneuma as distinguished from the “blood-soul”; and
O p if 66 = nous. Heres 55: “The word ‘soul’ is used in two
senses, with reference either to the soul as a whole or to its
dom inant part, which latter is, properly speaking, the ‘Soul of
the soul’ ” (= M U 6.7, atmano’tma netamrtakhya— netr being
precisely hegemonikos. In general, for the “two in us” : John
3,36, II C or 4, 16, SumTheol 1.75.4; C U 8.12; M U 3.2; J B 1.17
(idvyatma ), Hermes 1.15, and Ascl 1; Mark 8, 34; Prasna Up 6.3,
etc, etc.
Again, “Soul o f the soul” as hegemonikon = Dhammapada
380, atta hi attano natho atta higati . . ., cf ib 160 (in PTS Minor
Anthologies . . . I, p 124 and 56). Pali atta = Sanskrit atman.
Guillaume de Thierry, D e contemplando Dei 7.15: Tu te ipsum
amas in nobis, et nos in te, cum te per se amamus, et in terntum
tibi unimur, in quantum te amare meremus.
This is about all I can manage for now.
With kindest regards,
To DAVID WHITE
September 17, 1944
Dear M r White:
Practically the whole answer to the problem o f the “death of
the soul” is contained in the symbolism of sowing: “Except a
seed fall to the ground and die . . . ” It is the life o f the seed that
lives. Hence St Thomas also enunciates the law, “no creature
can attain a higher grade o f nature without ceasing to exist” ,
and Eckhart: “he would be what he should must cease from
being what he is” . To cease from any state o f being is to decease.
This death o f the soul should take place, if possible, before our
physical death. M uham m ed’s “die before you die” coincides
with Angelus Silesius Stirb, ehe du stirbst. Evidently St Paul had
so died (“ I live, yet not ‘I’ ”); as we should say, he was a
jivanmukta, a freedman here and now. Jacon Boehme: “Thus we
understand how a life perishes. . . . If it will not give itself up
to death, then it cannot attain any other world (ie, any other
state o f being).
The intellectual preparation for self-naughting will be the
easier if with Plato, Plutarch, Buddha, etc, we already realize
that our empirical “self’ cannot be thought o f as “real” because
o f its mutability; and so detach our sense of being from things
that are only our instruments or vehicles (physical sensibility,
mental consciousness based on observation, etc). When we
injure our body and say “I cut m yself’, but should say “ my
body was cut” only; to say “my feelings were hurt (by an
unkind word) is more correct than to say ‘7 was hurt” .
If the N ew Testament sometimes seems to speak o f saving
the “ soul” itself, you must always bear in mind the ambiguity
of the word, except where “soul of the soul”, “immortal soul”
or “spirit” are expressly contrasted with “soul” . In any
context, you must be clear which “soul” is used or meant.
All translations should be read with caution. I do not
recommend Yeats or Carus— “would you know the truths of
Jacob Behmen, you must stand where he stood” (William
Law)— applies, mutatis mutandis, to the understanding o f any
unfamiliar truths. By the way, there is a good edition o f much
o f Law by Hob-house (London . . . 1940). The best readily
available o f Dionysius is the volume by Rolt (Soc for the
Promotion of Christian Knowledge) which costs only 4sh. 6.
Law says: “You are under the power of no other enemy, are
held in no other captivity and want no other deliverance but
from the power o f your earthly self.” That “self’ is the “soul”
that Christ asks us to “hate” , and that Rumi consistently calls
the “dragon” , and Philo the “serpent” . This snake must shed
its skin, from which “it” (ie, what was real in “it”) emerges a
“new m an” , in a body of light—which is the true
“resurrection”—but never if it insists upon remaining “itself’.
All the wordings are more or less paradoxical; but it seems to
me not hard to grasp their meaning.
I liked your review well, and hope they will publish it.
Yours sincerely,
M other Agnes C. Ducey was an Ursaline nun o f the Convent o f the Sacred
Heart, St Joseph, M issouri, USA, who was praying earnestly that
D r Coom arasw am y m ight bccome a Roman Catholic.
To MR R. HOPE
April 8, 1946
Dear M r Hope:
O ur disagreement is largely about terms. I would not regard
“thinking”, if this means “contemplation” , a “moral act” ;
morality for Aquinas et al, pertains to the active life, not the
contemplative life. If “thinking” is “reasoning” , then it would
be an activity with “moral” implications.
That there is infinity in everything, I^agree; but this does not
mean that the thing itself can be described as infinite. The sands
o f the sea are not infinite in number, only indefinite; their
number can be estimated and such numbers arc dealt with by
statistics. Thus the opposites, o f which the walls o f Paradise are
built, are indefinitely numerous; but this wall is still a part of
finity through the limit o f space, and infinity lies beyond it. The
same infinity is, o f course, immanent in all things as well as
beyond them; but this immanence no more allows us to speak
of any thing as infinite than it allows us to equate “this man
So-and-so” with God; there is God in him, but he is not God,
and if deified by ablatio omnis alteritatis, then he is no longer
“this man So-and-so”.
When 1 seem definitely to disagree with you is in that I do not
believe in a moral or spiritual progress of mankind, but only for
individuals. It is still possible for individual consciousncss to
“unfold” even in this intellectually decadent age. What you call
Preparatory School Stage (historically) represents for me
something nearer to the Golden Age, intellectually and
spiritually. I have to use its language when I want to be precise.
It is only too true that we in the East are in danger o f
following in your footsteps.
Sinccrely,
Very sincerely,
To DR FRITZ MARTI
October 6, 1946
Dear D r Marti:
I do wish I had a better opportunity to talk with you at
Kenyon College. I hope we meet again.
In an old letter o f yours (1942) you ask if I would say that the
“various religions are mere contingent disguises of a pure
philosophical truth.” N ot exactly that: I would say “are
contingent adaptations o f a pure metaphysical truth” (primarily
experiential, ie, revealed). I think this follows almost inevitably
from the axiom “the mode o f knowledge follows the mode of
the nature of the knowcr.” (I certainly would not use the word
“mere”). For me una veritas in variis signis varie resplendet—ad
majorem gloriam Dei.
I was pleased by the reception of my discussion at Kenyon.
However, I think most of the audience was “liberal”. And my
interest is not in putting all religions on the same level by way
of latitudinarianism, but in a demonstration o f real equiva
lences; hence most o f my work deals with strictly orthodox
forms o f Christianity, and hence the manner in which 1
discussed the present problem by the words alter Christus.
Very sincerely,
To RICHARD GREGG
January 29, 1940
My dear Richard:
I have been reading some more of your book, which I do not
find easy. I am especially impressed by the citations from Peter
Stcrry— pure Vedanta! I shall get the book.
I am in full agreement on many points, necessarily so because
I live in a world in which not only words, but all things are felt
to be alive with meaning. A word without inherent meaning
would be “ mere noise”: a merely “decorative” and in
significant art, a dead superfluity. That people have begun to
think o f poetry as a matter o f sound only is sufficiently
symptomatic (of the cave dweller’s purely animal satisfaction
with the shadows on his wall). In our view, the Divine Liturgy
is explained as “like the fusion of sound with meaning” (in a
word, the Indian thinks o f words as sounds, written signs
being, if used at all, symbols o f the sounds rather than o f the
meanings). O u r present mentality is more and more contented
with w hat is a dead, inanimate, incloqucnt environment. (1
mean those “ to w hom such knowledge as is not empirical is
considered as meaningless.”) H ow it can be possible to go on
living in such an environm ent is strange; one must presume
that this is not living, but rather a mere existence or
vegetation.*
I agree that the antithesis o f realism and nominalism is
ultim ately resolved in the solipsism o f the “only seer” (in
whose vision w e individually participate only); what this seer
sees is itself, “the w orld picture painted by itself on the canvas
o f the Self (Sankara, like Peter Stcrry). The reality o f the picture
is that o f it’s maker, neither an independent reality (extreme
nom inalism ) nor an unreality (extreme realism).**
I do feel you should look into Indian Rhetoric, with its
discussion o f “ m eaning” (Skr artlia unites the senses “ meaning”
and “ value” and could often be rendered by iitleittio) on various
levels o f reference, eg, obvious, underlying, and ultimate
(anagogic); and its term s rasa (“ flavour”) and vyanjana (“sug
gestion” , “ overtone” , originally also “flavour”).
I think you arc in danger o f confusing the personal “how ” of
style with the necessary “ how ” . In a perfectly educated and
unanim ous society (tradition always envisages unanimity, as
docs also science on a lower level o f rcfcrencc) everyone would
say the same thing in the same way, the only way possible for
perfect expression in the currcnt language, whether Latin,
Sanskrit, Chinese or visually symbolic. The same thing cannot
be said perfectly in two different phrases, though both may refer
to the same thing and can be understood by whoever is capable
o f understanding. O ne’s ow n effort for clarity amounts to the
search for the one and only, once for all expression o f an idea.
In the same w ay when one feels that anything has been said
once for all, one prefers to quote, and not to paraphrase in
“one’s ow n w ords”— one must not confuse originality with
novelty, w hatever idea one has made one’s own can come out
from us as from an origo, regardless o f how many times it may
have com e forth from others or to what extent the supposedly
corresponding w ords or formula have become a cliche.
Very sincerely,
* D r Coom arasw am y frequently stated that modern man lives in a ‘world of
impoverished reality’, citing a phrase o f W ilbur Marshall Urban.
** O n solipsism, cf the ‘nonsense’ limerick below, which is really not all
nonsense:
There once was a man who said, “God
M ust find it exceedingly odd
If he finds that this tree continues to be
W hen there’s no one about in the Q uad.”
Dear Sir, your astonishment’s odd:
I am always about in the quad.
And that’s why the tree
Will continue to be,
Since observed by yours faithfully, God.
Richard Gregg,
Peter Sterry, Platonisl and Puritan, 1613-1672, A Selection from his writings
with a biographical and critical study by Vivian De Sola Pinto, 1934.
Ruth Nanda Anshcn was editor of the Scicncc and Culture series published by
Harper Brothers. She wished to use the sentence discussed here as a motto.
Synthesis = An Augustine Synthesis, Erich Przywara; see Bibliography.
(fr 5) refers to the fragment in H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, see
Bibliography.
To GEORGE SARTON
July 7, 1942
Dear Sarton:
You had originally asked for 5,000 words. If the enclosed is
under present conditions too long, you must try to cut it down.
I cut out much on page 3.
You may be interested to know that I’ve had considerable
correspondence with Jaeger lately. I find his belief in only one
civilization properly to be so called— viz Greek (expressed in
Paideia) rather disconcerting and nearly as dangerous as the
doctrine of one superior race.
Very sincerely,
George Sarton, professor of the history of science, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.
W erner Jaeger, classicist and professor at Harvard University; author of
Paideia, 1943.
To MR R. F. C. HULL
Date uncertain
Dear M r Hull;
Re Vedanta Sutra II.2.28;
In general one must take into account the proposition that
knowledge depends upon adequatio rei et intellectus.
Also that both Buddhists and Vedantists recognize a double
truth: one of opinion, convention, pragmatic, empirical; the
other of knowledge, ccrtainty, intellectual; ie, relative and
absolute.
N ow first, as to the “elephant” . The whole allusion is
contained in the words bravisi nir-ankusatvatte tundasya. Ankusa
= elephant goad, or any hook; tunda = beak, snout, trunk. The
phrase is a technicality, and is represented by Thibaut’s words,
“You can make what arbitrary statement you please” . M ore
literal, but less intelligible to a reader would be “You can say
what you like, but it’s all like guiding an elephant by its trunk
when you have no goad” . Thus the difference between Thibaut
and Deusscn is more apparent than real, and I think you might
stick to the former.
O f course, to me, the whole controversy is stupid, because
both arc agreed on the distinction of relative from real truth.
Neither is it the Buddhist position that vijnana is any more real
than any other of the five skandhas that constitute the life of the
empirical Ego that “is not my S elf’. But vijnana may stand for
the four components o f conscious existence, so that sa-vijnana
kaya = soul and body, “ soul” being the same as “empirical
Ego” . You ask if the Buddhist argument (4) is meant to be
fallacious; I think you might call it a “straw man”
In (9), “ the son of a barren m other” is a stock expression for
anything w ithout potentiality o f existence.
The argum ent in (11) is very interesting, because it is actually
the well known nil agit in seipsum, first enunciated in the West
by Plato. From it, it necessarily follows that duo sunt in homine.
It is also very interesting to find in the whole passage a
dcfcncc of the actuality of appearances, against the current
(erroneous) supposition that Vedanta denies the reality of the
world of appearances, as such. Even a mirage is a real
“mirage”. But obviously nothing that is an appearance can be
callcd “real” in the same sense as that which appears; no image
is as “real” as that o f which it is an image. The word
“phenomenon” itself has always an implied “o f something”;
the verb “appear” must have an implied subject.
The Buddhist agrumcnt in (12) seems to me fallacious; but
here, again, I think we arc dealing with a “straw man”.
However, taking it as it stands, the Vedantist reply in (17) is
very good.
The Vedantist “witness” is, o f course, the “only seer”, ie,
the Self (of the self) o f the Upanishads. Sankara always assumes
that the Buddhist denied this Self, which was not the case; it is
the Self in which the Buddha himself “takes refuge” and
commends others to do the same; it is callcd “Self, the Lord of
self’ in S n *
In your very last commcnt marked (14), I don’t see how both
subject and object can both be regarded as “self-proved”.
“Self-proved” can only refer to a pcrcipicnt, because it cannot
be known as an object to itself; the well known proposition that
“the eye cannot see itself’, though it proves itself by the act of
its perceiving—similarly in the case of the Self that one is, but
cannot know. Whatever can be known objectively cannot be my
Self.
Sinccrcly,
* C f Dhammapada 160: ‘The Self is Lord o f self; who else could be the Lord?’
M r R. F. C. Hull, Thaxted, Essex, England, was translating Georg M isch’s
Dcr Weg in die Philosophie (1926), which consisted o f many quotations from
the Hindu scriptures; M r Hull had written to AKC for help in clarifying
several points.
Sn, probably Sutta Nipata, an early Pali scripture.
To MR PAUL GRIFFITH
July 11, 1944
Dear Sir:
Thank you for your inquiry. I appreciate the importance of
public opinion and wish 1 could cooperate with you in this
most timely undertaking because India is the most misrepre
sented country in the world, and it is about time America’s
intelligence on the subject was no longer insulted.
A book like the Bhagavad Gita would be particularly difficult
to illustrate. A metaphysical treatise hardly lends itself to
illustration. In Indian copies, almost the only illustration ever
found is that o f the tnise eti scene, Arjuna in converse with Sri
Krishna; such illustrations arc of the type reproduced by L. D.
Barnett’s translation, published by Dent, which you could
easily find.
A brave attempt to illustrate the Mahabharata as a whole has
been made in the Poona edition, now in the course of
publication. A considerable part of this has appeared, and
copies are in numerous American libraries. To illustrate the
Mahabharata, easy as it would be (in a certain sense and
extremely difficult in another) [would be] really extraneous to
the content o f the Bhagavad Gita.
To illustrate the Bhagavad Gita and its whole background
would be possible, but an immense undertaking, and would
am ount to an illustration o f Indian culture generally, including
the m ythology. I am afraid my feeling is that it is an almost
impracticable scheme to propose one illustrated magazine article
on the subject. Nanda Lai Bose, whom you mention, is the
best, or one o f the best o f the modern Indian painters. If time
permits why not communicate with him at Santiniketan,
Bolpur, Bengal, British India, directly. I shall be very glad to
hear from you if I can be o f further use.
Yours very truly,
To F. S. C. NORTHROP
November 6, 1944
Dear Professor N orthrop:
I read with the deepest interest your brilliant paper in the
Hawaii Symposium. I entirely agree with you in this main
premise that Oriental philosophies start from an immediate
apprehension o f reality, and in their extension arc not proce
dures by abstraction, but statements about the reality in terms
o f analogy, for the sake of understanding and communication. I
am not at all sure, however, whether it is safe to use the word
“aesthetic” univocally for what is directly apprehended by the
sense organs, and what is immediately apprehended when the
direction o f vision is (as for Plato and the Upanishads)
“inverted” , so that it regards not the “seen” , but the “seer” . O f
course, wc do use a corresponding term, saks'at (“eye to eye”) in
the Upanishads, but there is a clearly understood hierachy o f
saksat, paroksa and saksat (visible, occult, visible), but it would
not be supposed by anyone that the two visions arc both a
m atter o f sensible perception. If there is one thing certain, it is
that the Brahman-Atman is not a knowablc object in the sense
that we know a blue area when wc see it.
My position is that o f the Oriental before the Western
influences (see your p. 21); in this connection, incidentally,
your w ords “not a M oslem” would only apply here if you
intend a strictly exoteric Islam; there can be no question but
that, as Jahangir remarked, “Your Vedanta is the same as our
Tasaw w uf” . In Jaisi or in Kabir, w hat is “H indu” and what is
“ M oslem ” ? in Rumi, too, w ho can distinguish the “ Neo-
Platonic” from the Hindu and Buddhist factors? C f also
Guenon who knows both Arabic and Sanskrit; his personal
affiliations are Islamic, but he prefers as a rule to expound the
philosophia perennis from Indian sources. 1 hold with Jcrcmias
that “ the various cultures are the dialects o f one and the same
universal language o f the spirit” , expounded semper, et ubique et
ab omnibus.
I fully agree with your depreciation of the translations by
“ mere linguists” ; I virtually never use a text w ithout having
consulted and considered its original Latin, Greek or Sanskrit,
and though I am more dependent in the case o f Persian, even
there I do w hat I can; the versions I use in print are usually my
ow n. W hat I have observed is that it is precisely the mere
linguists w ho m ost o f all emphasize the oppositions or
differences o f East and West; as Schopenhauer puts it, they
exhaust themselves in trying to show that even when the same
things are said, the w ords mean something different. O f
course, that is largely because the mere linguists, though
now adays they are m ostly rationalists (and at the same time the
veriest am ateurs in philosophy, as some even confess), inherit
(m ostly quite unconsciously) all sort o f Christian prejudices,
m oralistic and other. W hat has m ost impressed me is that East
and W est (and for that m atter, other “ dialects” , too, eg,
Am erican Indian) have been forever saying the same thing; and
that not only often in the same idiom, but so far as Greek and
Sanskrit are concerned, using cognate words, so that Sanskrit
could be rendered into Greek more directly and truly than into
any other language, though Latin also lends itself.
T o take a specific case or two: I would say that the
fundamental agreement of Plato with Vedanta is most conspi
cuous in their common doctrine of the “two selves” , mortal
and immortal, that dwell together in us; the doctrine of the
inner and outer man which survives in the Scholastic duo sunt in
homitie, and in countless phrases of our daily speech such as
“my better s e lf’. If, as you say, the Western “other se lf’ is
“postulated” , then it is no more than the empirical self or ego,
and hence the doubt about immortality. If the East has no such
doubts, it is because there, the “other self’ (identified with
Brahma, the ineffable) is apprehended immediately. But surely,
it is only for a “ m odern” that the “other self’ is a mere
postulate; Socrates’ daimoti was no postulate for him, but an
often very inconvenient “Duke” (hegemon, Skr Netr) “who
always holds me back from what T want to do” ; cf his words,
“ Socrates you may doubt, but not the truth” . Actually, our
own “ conscience” (= Socratic daimoti) as Apulcius first, I
believe, said; and = to the Scholastic synteresis, inwyt) is not a
postulate for us, but something immediately known.
It appears to me that the real postulates (and notably “I” as a
denotation o f our inconstant personality, which never stops to
be, as was equally explicitly remarked by Plato, Plutarch and
the Hindus and Buddhists) cannot be regarded as having any
more validity than attaches to the transient phenomena from
which they arc “abstracted” ; like the “laws o f science” , they
have only a convenient value, permitting men to make
predictions with a high, but never absolute, probability value.
To speak o f testing the truth of postulates by experiment is
only to argue in a circle; I do not sec how any theoria could be
proved or disproved experimentally, and, in fact, the Oriental
position would be that whatever is really true can never be
demonstrated, but only realized. What experiment proves
regarding a postulate is not its truth, but its utility, for the
particular end in view. That the postulates participate in the
transcience o f the phenomena from which they are abstracted,
moreover, appears in the fact that the postulates are always
changing, being discarded and replaced by others.
The unity o f eastern and western doctrines could be equally
well demonstrated from a monograph on the traditional
psychology, from equivalent iconographies, and in many other
ways. As I sec it, your basic “ opposition” o f East and West is
recognizable only if we set over against each other [the] modern
West and the surviving tradition of the East; for example,
Descartes’ cogito ergo sum is sheer pathos from an Oriental point
o f view, which would argue cogito ergo est, and in doing so
would be in word for word agreement with, for example,
Philo. I wonder, too, if in making the opposition, you are not
overlooking the whole Western via negativa : Dionysius, Eck
hart, The Cloud o f Unknowing, Cusa, and all that aspect o f
European culture which is a closed book to the modern man, so
much so that our Middle Ages arc every bit as “mysterious” to
him as the East itself—is it really two very different things that
both appear so strange?
To be sure, as you say, the postulations arc necessary for
modern technology. But is modern technology necessary for
man, I mean for the “ good life” and “felicity” ? The notion of
an everlasting raising of the standard of living, the perpetual
creation o f new wants (by advertisement, etc) is really in order
that someone may make money out of supplying them after
which they become “necessities”—has that any real connection
with the quality o f life? Is it not as much as to will and decree
that men shall never be content? The argument is still in a circle;
it is only after it has been assumed that modern technology is
necessary that it follows that we must “ postulate” . From what I
regard as the Christian and Oriental point o f view, all this
production for its own sake, and with it the postulates it
demands, are luxuries, rather than means to the good life.
Could one, in fact, think o f anything more “luxurious” than
the ego-postulate?
I think we arc dealing with fundamental problems, the
importance o f which cannot be exaggerated. I hope we shall
have the opportunity to talk them over again some day. I could
almost wish that there were an opportunity, too, to present
somewhere in print a rejoinder to your article on the above
lines.
With very kind regards,
To F. S. C. NORTHROP
Date uncertain
Dear Professor N orthrop:
Many thanks for your kind letter. My criticism rests upon
the fact that you speak o f “ the most profound and mature
insights” o f East and West and seem to ignore the break in
Western thought that takes place with the shift (ca 1200) from
realism to nominalism; one cannot “compare” East and West
unless one makes it clear what West one is thinking of—what I
assert is the identity of the “ most profound and mature
insights” , which were an essential part of Christianity once, but
arc ignored or even denied by the exoteric Christianity of
today, which virtually overlooks the Godhead altogether and
considers only God*. The “ Supreme Identity” is one essence
with two natures, human and inhuman, light and darkness,
mercy and majesty, God and Godhead, ie, humanly speaking,
good and evil. In other words also, finite and infinite; assuredly,
as for the Greeks, the infinite is from the point of view o f finite
beings, “evil” .
As I see it, neither civilization has anything to learn from the
other. How often I respond to Western inquirers by saying
“ Why seek wisdom in India? You have it all in the tradition of
your own which you have only forgotten. The value of the
Eastern tradition for you is not that of a difference, but that it
can remind you of what you have forgotten.”
N ow the East can differ from the West in its point of view, in
that the one can be Traditional and the other anti-traditional,
and here a mutual understanding is impossible. However, I
myself am so perpetually accustomed to thinking simul
taneously it terms of Eastern and Western tradition as to be able
to say that my perception o f their identity is immediate.
“ Why consider the inferior philosophers?”, as Plato says; and
that is why I can say that “the most profound and mature
insights” o f East and West arc the same, while if wc arc
thinking only of the modern West, I fully agree as to their
difference. To agree to differ is no solution. If you will not take
Plato, Plotinus, Cusa, Boehmc, Dante, etc, as representing the
“most profound and mature insights” o f the West, agreement
and cooperation will be ruled out, cxcept upon those lowest
levels o f refcrcncc on which there is always room to quarrel.
The notion o f a common humanity is not enough for peace;
for what is needed is our common divinity, and the recognition
that nothing is really “dear” but for the sake o f the immortal
principle that is one and the same in all men Platonic love as
understood by Ficino!
Jesus never emphasized the “ individual” value o f every soul,
but the universal value in every soul, a very different story.
Eckhart was right in saying that all scripture cries aloud for
freedom from self; and it is only to the extent that we practice
sclf-naughting, or at least acknowledge that “I” is a postulate
valid only for practical (and ultimately always “selfish”)
purposes and not a truth (as Plato, Plutarch, et al, very well
know), that we can approach the grounds of peace.
1 shall look forward to seeing you when opportunity affords,
and thanks for the invitation. I have much to talk over with
Goodcnough, too.
I’m just, as it happens, attending Dr Marquette’s lectures on
“Mysticism”. He also secs there the only practical solution.
PS: I think the problem of truth as something that can only
be rccognizcd but cannot be “proved” has a good deal to do
with the importance attached to faith (assent to a credible
proposition) in India as in the West. O f course, I distinguish
faith from “fidcism” which only amounts to credulity, as
exercised in connection with postulates, slogans and all kinds of
wishful thinking. C f Tripura Rahasya, Hemacuda Section, IX,
88: “That which is self-evident without the necessity to be
proved, is alone real; not so other things.” This is with
reference to the difference between understanding the universe
and understanding the “space” or continuum, identified with
Brahma— akasa, kha (and loka in its absolute sense).
Sincerely,
* And which is -seen currently to have less and less time for God,
preoccupied as it is with all manner of social questions.
F. S. C. N orthrop, as above.
Erwin R. G oodenough, professor o f the history o f religion, Yale Universi
ty, N ew Haven, Connecticut, USA.
To F. S. C. NORTHROP
June 5, 1946
Dear Prof Northrop:
I am delighted to receive your book and offer my congratula
tions; 1 have read considerable parts o f it, and in many passages
admire your penetration. I am still fully convinced that the
metaphysics o f East and West are essentially the same until the
time o f the Western deviation from the common norms,
beginning in the 14th century. I am a little surprised you do not
make any reference to Guenon who has treated these problems
at length. As to the identities: I would cite, for example, the
axiom that duo sunt in homine, one that becomes and one that is,
the former unreal because inconstant, the latter constant and
therefore real. It is interesting that the modern psychologists
(Jung, Hadley, Sullivan, Peirce, etc) have rediscovered the
unreality o f the empirical Ego; to realise which is the beginning
o f wisdom and the sine qua non for happiness.
N ow a few notes: p 13, on the testing o f theory by fact;
hypothesis by fact, no doubt, but surely not teoria by fact.
Hypothesis is the product o f thinking, reasoning; but theory is
just that which is seen, and for Plato, Aristotle and the East
alike, “ nous is infallible” . So fact cannot prove or disprove a
theory, but only illustrate it. Even so for Spinoza still, Veritas
norma sui et falsi est\ To propose to test theory by fact is simply
pragmatism.
Your recognition of the positive reality o f the “experience”
of Nirvana is admirable. However, it would not be correct to
identify Nirvana with the “ aesthetic continuum ” , ic, Ether; in
Buddhism, it is explicit that Nirvana lies beyond the experience
o f the sole reality o f the infinitely etherial realm, and beyond
the distinction of experience from in-experience. Necessarily
so, because “in” Nirvana there is no process while the
experience o f the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is still,
as such, something that “ takes place”, and an “ event”; the
bhavagga, “summit level o f becoming”, is still in the field of
becoming and even from these highest “heavens” there is still a
“further escape” .
P 359: It cannot be said that Hinayana Buddhism survives in
India. P 361, the Upanishads are only partly in verse; for
example, much o f the B U is in prose. Passim: I would not call
Nehru “cultivated”; he is very ignorant of Indian culture,
which he has only quite recently begun to study in English
translations! If one is discussing East and West it is never any
use to quote Westernized Orientals, whose point of view will
necessarily be that o f contemporary Europeans. Incidentally,
too, Jinnah is equally ignorant of things Islamic.
p 487: The Christian claim to “perfection” presents no
difficulty to an Oriental, who can readily grant it. It is merely
that the Christian denial of perfection to Oriental metaphysics
is an obstacle to Christian understanding, p 343: the Sea, for the
East, is not a symbol o f time, but of undifferentiated eternity.
As for Eckhart, Silesius, etc, the Sea is that in which the
“rivers” (streams o f consciousness, “individualities”) lose their
name and configuration, ie, their limitations—panta rei. To
Eckhart’s “plunge in” corresponds such Pali terms as nibban’o-
gadham, “the dive, or immergence, into N irvana.”
There arc many things in which I am in fullest agreement
with your interpretations; but I am still very sure that, as before
modern times, all your differentiations from the East will be
found to break down!
PS: Suppose we grant that at least the modern “western”
position is what you call “theoretical”, and the Eastern
[attitude] founded in an Erlebnis [experience]. This does not
mean that the “Eastern” position is “empirical” or “aesthetic”,
although it is o f a reality erlebt, not inferred. The great
“experiment” consists in the arrest of all aesthetic experience,
which can be only in terms o f subject and object. The Self can
no more know itself than the eye can sec itself.* It is only the
transient Ego that can be “know n” , like other natural
phenomena, external to Self. That the Self itself is unknowable,
otherwise than by negation o f whatever and all it is not,
coincides with Jung’s position (cf Two Essays in Analytical
Psychology, 1928, p 268, where he contrasts the known Ego
with the unknown Self); I mention him only because he is a
typically “W estern” mentality, whose “orientalism” is quite
spurious—he expressly “repudiates metaphysics”. All this
makes me very uncomfortable when you speak of ultimate
reality as “an aesthetically perceived continuum”; the very fact
of perceptibility rules anything out from ultimate reality, all
perception involving relations. In Buddhism, the “realm of
naught whatever” is only 6th in a hierarchy of eight states, all
regarded as “relative”; Nirvana is explicitly and emphatically
an “escape” from all these states.
Kindest regards,
*On the face of it, this sentence might be taken to imply some deficiency in
the Self, per impossible. God cannot be known as object; ‘only God can know
God”, as a Christian or other monotheist might say. Ontologically, God’s
knowledge of Himself is pcrfect and coincides with His Being. On the
supra-ontological level, that of the Godhead or Self, all distinctions, all
positive statements arc transcended by excess of meaning, and one can only
say ‘not this, not this’; hence, the ultimate necessity of a negative theology
and a via negativa which, however, in no sense imply privation in the
Supreme Principle.
F. S. C. Northrop, as above. In 1946, Prof Northrop published The Meeting
of East and West, a pioneering effort in the comparative analysis of cultures
and a book widely acclaimed in its time.
To F. S. C. NORTHROP
July 12, 1946
Dear Northrop:
Re atomism, in your book, pp 262-263: it is, o f course,
sufficiently obvious that the notions of “indivisibles with
magnitude” involves an antinomy. But that does not seem to be
what the old atomists postulated. Relying on data in Burnet,
Early Greek Philosophy, p 336, I note that the Greek atoms are
“mathematically” (ie, logically) but not “physically” (ie, really)
divisible. In other words, they have conceptual but not actual
extension. Now Aristotle himself has a doctrine of atomic time
(atomos nun), Physics IV, 13, 222 . . . , and this is the exact
equivalent o f the Buddhist doctrine of the ‘‘moment” (khana)
which has no duration but “in” which all accidents supervene,
and of which the succession never ceases. Similarly in the
Islamic doctrine of wagt, for which Macdonald inferred a
Buddhist origin; and the whole idea survives in the formula
“ God is creating the whole world now, this instant.”
Very well. It seems to me that we cannot but consider at the
same time m om ents-without-duration and points-without-
extcnsion. Are not the latter what the old “atoms” imply?
Remember that they arc “logically but not physically divisi
ble” ; so, like the “ m om ents” , they have content but are not
measurable. Thus the antinomy “indivisible magnitude” seems
to vanish; it docs not appear that a “ really-indivisible-
m agnitude” was ever asserted. The fact that we have now
“ split atom s” (theoretically into protons, etc, and also ex
perimentally) has no bearing on the problem; it only means that
what we called “atom s” were not really the same thing as the old
philosophical atoms, ie, “points” (Skr bindu— A V ) w ithout
extension though not w ithout content. The best illustration of
such a “ point” is afforded by the centre o f the circle which has
no extension and yet “in” which all radii coincide. This also
would lead us to a kind o f explanation of exemplarism (as I
showed in H JA S, I) and to Bonaventura’s image o f God as a
circle o f which the centre is everywhere and the circumference
nowhere.
M oreover, just as all “ m om ents” are in one sense the same
moment, so in one sense all atoms are the same atom (cf note 3
in Burnet i C); the atomic now being that which gives its
meaning to past and future (time flowing out o f eternity) and
the atomic point being that which gives its meaning to
extension (space deriving from the point as “size without size,
the principle o f size”).
PS: a minor point not connected with the above: p 273, second
and third lines o f middle paragraph—the first “formal” can be
taken strictu sensu, but surely the second “formal” should read:
“actual” .
Very sincerely,
F. S. C. N orthrop, as above.
Early Greek Philosophy, J. Burnet, London, 1930.
‘Vcdic Exemplarism’, AKC, in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, I, 1936.
To F. S. C. NORTHROP
July 25, 1946
Dear Northrop:
Your letter is o f great interest, and at the least I think that we
may overcome at least such disagreements as are based on the
particular terms employed.
You cite again the Roman Catholic attitude. Does their
“belief’ (opinion) in the exclusive perfection o f Christianity
make it true? They could assimilate Aristotle; now Aristotle is
so “Buddhist” (phrase for phrase in many cases) that some have
assumed (as I do not) “influence” . In other words, much that
Aquinas did get from Aristotle (and that is plenty) he might
have got from India, if the same kind of contacts had then been
available. Some o f my R.C. friends in England (one of whom
calls Sri Ramakrishna an alter Christus) are most seriously
considering, in view of the present contact, what ought to be
the future attitude o f R.C. Christianity to “Oriental studies” .
So that I don’t think my argument for real difference can be
based on the hitherto R.C. position.
I wonder if the “tasting o f the flower” is so very different
from “O, taste and see that the Lord is good”? Suppose I
modified one o f your sentences thus: “Whatever one has
misunderstanding between peoples . . . (it is always assumed
that there is) an underlying difference in their philosophy and
their religion”?
I read Jones’ review in the N . Y. Times Lit Sup* with inter
est. I think he hardly gets the meaning of your “aesthetic
continuum ” . But I must not go on now. Needless to say, there
is very much in your book that I greatly admire and fully agree
with, and our discussion of points o f disagreement in no way
diminishes that.
Very sincerely,
^Presumably the New York Times Book review, the Literary Supplement being
a weekly section o f the Times o f London.
F. S. C. N orthrop, as above.
To F. S. C. NORTHROP
July 28, 1946
Dear N orthrop:
I have no longer any strong objection to your phrase
“indeterminate aesthetic continuum ” , since although the East
like the West is always pointing out that “ the eye cannot see
itself’, still finds it unavoidable to use such expressions as
“seeing”, “tasting”, “know ing” , etc, with reference to the
ultimate reality, as regards the actual phrase “disinterested
aesthetic contemplation” (taken, of course, from current
Western usage) I have nearly always put it in quotes, and more
than once said that as it stands it represents an antinomy,
“ disinterested” and “aesthetic” being really incompatibles.
After all, as the primary application of language is to temporal
“ things” , one is obliged, as all expositors have recognized, to
use empirical analogies.
Christian Logos and Father correspond to Mitravarunau or
parapara Brahman — the “two natures” predicated by both West
and East. The Father is the “Godhead” . Eckhart’s “free as the
Godhead in its non-existence” is Nirvana, “the unborn,
unmade, unbecome, incomposite, which if it were not, there
would be no way o f escape from the born, made, composite. “I
do not see in what sense you can say that the Father “ transcends
Nirvana” unless you mean simply that the Christian regards it
for some reason as a preferable concept. One must not
overlook the Father’s “ impassibility” .
Again, “Logos” = sabda Brahman, Father = asabda Brah
man (sabada = sound, utterance: asabda = silent, unuttered.
Very sincerely,
F. S. C. N orthrop, as above.
To MR HUSZAR
August 8, 1947
Dear M r Huszar:
I read your paper with pleasure and am very glad you are
presenting it; and I like your choice of a spruchwort from Andre
Gidc. I have often referred to the provincial limitation of
Hutchins’ position, eg, in my speech at Kenyon College last
year and in A m I M y Brother’s Keeper? But these people arc
almost immovable, as I know from correspondence with and
protests made to the Dean of St John’s College and the Editor
o f the “ Great Books” . In contrast, my own habitual method is
to treat the terms o f the common universe of discourse in a
worldwide context; eg, my “Symplcgadcs” in Studies . . . of
fered in Homage to George Sarton . . . , 1947, and in Time and
Eternity, Ascona, Switzerland, 1947.
I know o f no better study o f the level at which international
contacts should be made than Marco Pallis’ Peaks and Lamas.
Very sincerely,
To WALLACE BROCKWAY
July 29, 1946
Dear M r Brockway:
In reply to yours of July 15, received today; I feel compelled
to say what I have often said before, that I am Tuly apallcd by
the provincialism which can [be seen] at St John’s College and
in your series o f “ Great Books” ; it is an aspect of the extremely
isolationist tendencies o f American education in practice at the
present day, despite all the lip-service to the “One W orld” idea.
I consider that for the kind o f education we are considering,
that to be cosmopolitan in the best sense o f the word it is
indispensable for the European to be acquainted with not only
the great books in spoken Western languages, and Latin and
Greek; but also with the great books o f the whole East; or if we
speak o f language (as distinct from the books to be known in
translation), then I would say that a European is not educated in
the full meaning o f the word if he cannot read both Latin and
Greek and at least one of the classical languages of the East,
Arabic, Sanskrit, or Chinese. Conversely, the time has come
for orientals to read Greek. That you ask me, supposedly an
Orientalist, to be o f any assistance in your immediate problem
illustrates what I am saying; such assistance from me is only
possible because I am familiar with the Western as well as the
Eastern traditions, or putting this in terms of languages,
because I do read Latin and Greek and the chief spoken
European languages.
I will consider whether there is anything further that I can
do. In the meantime, in the Bibliographies for Art, and for
Beauty, I suggest that my own books, The Transformation of
Nature in A rt (Harvard University Press, 1934), Why Exhibit
Works o f Art? (Luzac, London, 1943) and Figures of Speech or
Figures o f Thought? (Luzac, London, 1946)— which latter
includes long translations from St Thomas and Ulrich. There
are prescribed reading in some University courses. In the
preface to the last mentioned I wrote: “Whoever makes use of
these three books and of the sources referred to in them will
have a fairly complete view of the doctrine about art that the
greater part o f mankind has accepted from prehistoric times
until yesterday.”
I put forward no new theories of my own; but I do say that
without a knowledge of the material I deal with, the pathetic
fallacy in the teaching of art history is inevitable, and as
inevitable as it is rampant. I add that under the heading of
Nature should certainly be included R. C. Collingwood’s
Philosophy o f Nature. Re Art, see also the Bibliography in my
Why Exhibit Works o f A rt ? (Luzac, London, 1943, p 59). O ther
suggestions will come to mind, no doubt, but in the meanwhile
perhaps you will be kind enough to send on those above to M r
Bcrnick.
Very sincerely,
To ALDOUS HUXLEY
August 10, 1944
Dear M r Huxley:
Yours of August 4 reached me just after I had sent off to you
my little tract on “Recollection”, etc.
I do not understand what could be meant by becoming a
good Catholic “for the sake o f Christian bhakti”. Surely, one
only accepts a body o f doctrine (such as that of the philosophia
perennis) because o f its self authenticating intelligibility and
because it explains more things than are explained elsewhere. I
quite agree that as a rule (to which there are individual
exceptions) it is undesirable to exchange one religion for
another. Bhakti is a general proposition, not to be connected
exclusively with Christ or Krishna. The point is sine desiderio
mens non intelligit. This applies to an understanding of “ reality”
by whatever name we call “It” . Granted that jnana, karma and
bhakti (the latter being love or loyalty, but literally participation)
arc in a hierarchy; this does not mean that they are mutually
exclusive; even Sankaracarya “worshipped” . Which o f the
three must predominate is a question o f individual talent. All
arc legitimate, and all can be misused. Your own feeling about
Kali is, as I see it, a purely sentimental reaction, quite as
dangerous as any kind o f devotion, however “blind”; one who
“loves G od” really, loves Him “in His darkness and His light.”
I can’t agree that “art” is mysterious; it is no more
mysterious than anything else. Art is a kind o f knowledge
about how things, which it has been decided are desiderate, can
be made. It is mainly modern aesthetics that has throw n a veil
o f “ m ystery” over “art”, just as modern sentimentality has
made a fool o f prudence (so to speak), by treating it not as a
means to an end. The differentiation of styles is nothing but an
example o f the w orking of the principle that “nothing can be
known but in the mode o f the know cr.”
Your “Com m on Father” book, if it really deals with
dogmatic equivalents, and not merely with the general agree
ment that one must “be good, sweet child” , should be
valuable. I have myself collected an enormous amount of
“parallels” , and cited very many in my articles; in fact,
generally speaking, I dislike to expound any doctrine (such as
that o f the single essence and the two natures, or that o f lila or
any symbolism (such as that of “light” , or the “ chariot” , or the
“ Symplcgades”) from single sources only. There is, however,
the difficulty, that one cannot, generally speaking, trust
existing translations; and one docs not know enough languages
to be able to check on everything.
With kind regards,
* If this was true in 1944, it is a fortiori true today, after the more than sixty
year debacle that has followed.
Aldous Huxley, popular novelist whose fashionableness peaked between the
tw o W orld Wars. Later in his career he turned to non-fiction and w rote Grey
Eminence, The Perennial Philosophy, etc.
‘Recollection, Indian and Platonic’, published as a Supplement to the Journal
of the American Oriental Society, LXIV, no. 2, 1944.
To ALDOUS HUXLEY
September 28, 1944
Dear M r Huxley:
I should like to begin by making it very clear that I fully
agree with you that Charity (maitri, not karuna, however) is
indispensable for Enlightenment; nor am I any exception to the
rule that no one has ever hinted that because the end is beyond
good and evil, the means may be so. I further agree with the
“transcendent and im m anent” point of view, and with the
distinction o f God from Godhead, in nature but not in essence.
What I do not agree with is your apparent assumption that
practitioners o f human sacrifice arc necessarily “uncharitable” .
I am aware that that would be a Buddhist point of view. That it
would also be a Christian point o f view is metaphysically
explicable by the fact that in the particular Christian formula
tion, the sacrifice has been made once for all; that is why, while
it is necessary for Moslems to make all killing o f animals for
food a sacrificial rite (the same for the Jews), this is not
necessary for Christians. In the same way, I would not at all
agree that the w arrior’s dharma is necessarily “uncharitable” or,
for that matter, the hunter’s; these ways would be uncharitable
if followed by a Brahman, but not if followed by a Ksatriya. It is
all a matter o f “convenience” (in the technical sense o f the
word). At the same time I need hardly say that the fact that we
are too compassionate to practice human sacrifice, or some
times even to hunt, makes all the more contemptible our
reckless disregard o f the value of human life (I am referring to
the industrial system in which things arc more highly valued
than the men who produce them) and our willingness to
vivisect animals to save our own skins, as we imagine. I should
say that the Aztec was truer to his Way than we are to ours.
I do not approach the great tradition, as you seem to do, to
pick and choose in them what seems to me to be “right” ; all
coercion repels me, but who am I to pass judgem ent upon those
who must use force, and are only at fault if they do so
incorrcctly? N o Way can be judged in isolation without regard
to the environm ent it presupposes. O n this point there is a very
good Indian story o f a Brahman who maintained the service of
a Siva Lingam, to which he made offerings only o f flowers,
water and chant. It was in the deep woods. One day a hunter,
who filled with devotion likewise, had in his own way placed
on the Lingam pieces o f raw flesh of his prey. The Brahman
was infuriated, abused the hunter, and threw away his
offerings. Suddenly Siva appeared, and graciously accepting
the hunter’s, offering, pointed out to the Brahman that the
hunter’s devotion had been no less than his own, and that he,
the Brahman, had given way to anger. We cannot judge of
what is “ right” for others, but only of what is right for us.
I am going to quote again from the friend from whom I have
quoted before regarding your position:
O ne part o f him wishes to be free, but the other part insists
on making a num ber o f reservations. . . . One hoped that
Grey Eminence marked a more serious step in the direction of
seeking a guru. It is apparent that what he needs most o f all is
an element o f bhakti for the simple reason that though he does
genuinely hanker after the truth and a unified existence, he
fears to trust himself boldly into the hands of his aspiration; it
is indeed ‘abandonment’ that is still most lacking in his
attempt, due to regret at having to give up so much that is
taken for granted in the modern world . . . hence the
electicism which seeks to express itself in anthologies—one
can be almost sure that though the quotations he will select
will be fine in themselves, the choice will be influenced
unduly by private preferences and dislikes. For instance,
texts enjoining an attitude o f ahimsa are more likely to be
snapped up voraciously while the complementary texts
connected with, say, jihad are as likely to be rejected as being
uninspired; so also the traditions in which non-violence plays
a great part such as the Gospels or Buddhism, will appeal to
him, but he will find it difficult to sympathize impartially
with w arrior or hunting cultures. . . . He also continues to
trust far too much to his powers o f extracting the meaning of
doctrines through a mere reading of texts. It is quite true, as
Guenon said somewhere, that he who knows can often detect
the real sense of a text even under the disguise of modern
distortions; but this is quite impossible for one who trusts to
his academic training alone.
I shall send you shortly a paper of Schuon’s on the Three
Margas and am only sorry I have no copy of his important
article on Sacrifice that I can send. I hope you duly received
“ O n the One and Only Transm igrant” (which is mainly
apropos o f immanence).
Very sincerely,
To ALDOUS HUXLEY
August 29, 1944
Dear M r Huxley:
My adherence to the Traditional Philosophy is because it
explains more in every field o f thought than do any o f our
systemic philosophies; it can, indeed, explain everything, or
account for everything, to the extent that explanations are
logically possible. In the various religions this philosophy is
translated into the modes of the knowers.
Let us take it for granted that “good”— or rather, “correct”
conduct is essential to Wayfaring; and also that evil is a
“ non-entity”— as our word naught-y, German untat, and
Sanskrit a-sat (as evil) imply, the suppositio being that ens et
bonum convertuntur. I still maintain that your attitude, in
wanting to have a “good” God, and therefore finding the
problem o f evil so difficult, is sentimental. But Wayfaring- is
one thing, and the Goal another. The Buddha and Meister
Eckhart (among others) are in absolute agreement that the Goal
is beyond good and evil; cf Dhammapada 412 (he is a monk,
indeed, who has abandoned good and evil); and cf Dante, Purg
18.67-69, “ those who in their reasoning went to the founda
tions beheld this interior freedom, therefore they left moralita to
the w orld”; and Rumi (Nicholson’s translation, Ode VIII, “to
the man o f God, right and w rong are alike”). The problem of
good and evil, in other words, pertains to the “ active life”
alone. In our correspondence I have ventured to assume we
were discussing rather the truth itself than its application.
The supreme example of bringing good out o f evil is that of
creatio ex nihilo. Here the nihil is potentiality, possibility (always
evil when contrasted with being in act) but also that without
which no “act” could be, since the impossible never happens.
One must bear in mind that all these technical terms have a
double application; thus non-being as privation of being is evil,
but a non-being that implied only freedom from the limitation
o f being in any mode is not an evil, and we find Meister
Eckhart using the words “free as the God-head in its
non-existence” . The God of the traditional doctrines is the
“ Supreme Identity” o f God and Godhead, Essence and Nature,
Being and Non-being, Light and Darkness, Sacerdotium and
Regnum. In creation and under the Sun these potentially
distinguishable contraries interact, and a world composite from
them is brought into being ex principio conjuncto. So (as explicit
in Islam), Heaven and Hell arc the reflections o f the divine
Mercy and Majesty, Love and Wrath, Spirit and Law. Both are
the same “ fire” ; but as Boehme so often says, whether of
Heaven or Hell depending upon ourselves, whether we are or
are not “salamanders” . We have not, then, known or loved
God “ as He is in H im self’, but only an aspect o f God, unless
both in his light and darkness.
On the doctrine of sacrifice, I recommend Frithjof Schuon’s
discussion in Etudes Traditionnelles.
I am a “humanitarian” (an anti-vivisectionist, for example),
but I do not feel a horror o f animal or even human sacrifice; I
recognize, o f course, that it may not be “convenient” (becom
ing, right, proper) for us to practice either. At the same time, I
very strongly suspect that this is not a matter of our superior
virtue, and that all we have done is to secularize sacrifice (of
animals in the laboratory; and of men in the financial-
commercial state, in the factory, or on the battle field).
Regarding art, I do not myself see that Mayan art is devoid of
sensuality. As for stylistic permanence or change: one must, of
course, distinguish style from iconography; the latter can
persist indefinitely, and even long after.its reasons are no longer
understood, the former always changes, so that even in what
seem to be the most static cultures, works of art can be closely
dated on stylistic grounds, if we know enough. There is no
inherent necessity for iconographic change, because the forms
may be correct; accordingly in a living tradition one expects
Plato’s “new songs, but not new kinds of music”. It is our
sensitive rather than our intellectual nature that demands
novelties; for the intellect, originality is all that is required.
You still did not let me know whether you received from
Marco Pallis his book, which he had sent you; I would like to
be able to inform him, as he wanted to send you another copy if
the first had gone astray.
Very sincerely,
To GERALD VANN, OP
February 26, 1947
Dear Gerald Vann, OP:
I agree with you (in current Blackfriars) that Huxley’s
philosophia perennis is “ transitional” . I myself have collected
much more, and I think much more impressive material, for
the most part directly from Latin, Greek, Sanskrit, Pali and
other sources.
But you say Christian “ self-naughting” is in order to be
reborn; but that the Eastern is not so. Who told you this about
the East? Do you know the texts at first hand? If not, have you
any right at all to make such statements?
As to Tat Tvam Asi, there is an extensive Indian literature by
authoritative exegetes discussing at length the meaning o f each
o f these words. Arc you familiar with it?
A Roman Catholic friend o f mine is devoting at least ten
years to self preparation for writing on what is to be the attitude
o f Roman Catholics to Eastern religions as now better
understood than formerly. For this purpose, in addition to the
Latin and Greek he already knows, he has learned Sanskrit.
I consider it morally irresponsible to make statements
(especially negative ones) about any “other” religion o f which
one docs not have at least some firsthand knowledge. For
example, to know anything seriously about Hinduism or
Buddhism, you must have “searched their scriptures” as
Christians do their Bible, not to mention the great com mentar
ies in both cases.
Very sincerely,
The Dhammapada is perhaps the most popular element of the Pali canon. It
consists of 423 verses, forms part of the Sutta-pitaka, and dates from well
before the beginning of the Christian era. Many translations are available.
To HELEN CHAPIN
January 16, 1946
Dear Helen:
No time to answer at length at present as I have to prepare
lectures for fixed dates. But about the unreality o f evil: this
follows from the accepted axiom ens at bonum convertuntur. That
is also why our English word naught-y means bad, just as
Sanskrit a-sat, “not-being”, also is equivalent to “evil”. It
implies that all sins are sins of ommission, not acts, but things
not-done (Skr atertam), a point of view exactly preserved in
German untat, crime. Or as in the case of darkness and
light—darkness is not a positive principle, but only the absence of
light: or as" a lie is not a "false fact” but simply a not-fact or an
un-truth. You’ll soon get used to seeing this!
As to your possessions, o f course, the best is [to] get them
where they can be used and appreciated.
Congratulations on the prospect of going to the East!
Very sincerely,
Helen Chapin, Bryn M awr College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
To MISS JENKS
November 18, 1945
Dear Miss Jenks:
About negation: in the first place, as Sankaracarya says,
“ Whenever we deny something unreal, it is with reference to
something real” (examples: independence; im-mortality; a-
pathetic, ie, not pathetic; im-passible; in-effable— all of which
are positive concepts, and unlike the denials o f value implied by
such other expressions as un-stable, un-worthy, un-clean,
where it is a matter o f real “ privation” : one must not be
deceived by the merely grammatical likeness o f the terms). O n
the general subject o f “significant negation” see Wilbur Urban,
The Intelligible World (N Y, 1929, pp 452-53). If God is
ineffable, in-finite, these denials that anything ultimately true
can be said o f Him, and o f spatial /imitation, are not derogatory!
Hence there has always been recognized in Christian exegesis,
as well as elsewhere, the necessity for the two viae, of
“affirmation” and of “denial”, to be followed in sequential
order.
From the point of view of the active life, our ex-istence is
important; but from that of the contemplative life (which I need
hardly say is, from the Christian and whole traditional point of
view the ultimately superior life, though both are necessary and
right, here and now), in the words of Christ, “Let him deny
himself’ (Mark VIII 13, 14; cf The Cloud of Unknowing, chap
44: “All men have matter of sorrow: but most specially he
fecleth matter o f sorrow that wotteth and feeleth that he is. . . .
This sorrow, when it is had, cleancth the soul, not only of sin,
but also of pain. . .and . . . able to receive that joy, the which
rceveth from a man all witting and feeling of his being”)—that
he may affirm Me, for whosoever shall deny Me. . . . ”
(Matthew X, 34-39). St Paul had denied himself, and affirmed
Christ, when he said “I live, not I, but Christ in me.” That is
what a Hindu means by “liberation” (moksa). In this connec
tion, by the way, you asked me about catharsis (purgation); I
would say that the Hindu concept, which is expressed in terms
of cleansing or washing (cf, “Lord, if Thou wilt, Thou canst
make me clean”) corresponds much more to Plato’s than to
Aristotle’s katharsis; Plato’s definition being “separation o f the
soul from the body as far as that is possible”; and Aristotle’s, I
confess, a little dubious to me for it seems to imply not much
more than “having a good cry, and feeling better”.
Regarding Buddhism (Hinayana), negative propositions
predominate because the doctrine is essentially monastic,
whereas Hinduism embraces both the “ordinary” and the
“extraordinary” norms of existence, and is both affirmative
and negative accordingly. Thus (early) Buddhism is not strictly
comparable in all respects cither to the Hinduism from which it
developed, or with Christianity; that is, not strictly comparable
in total scope. Since it considers only man’s last end.
For negation in Western religious tradition (disregarding the
similar formulae in Islam and Hinduism just now) cf: “My
kingdom is not of this world”; “and if any man thinketh that he
knoweth anything, he knoweth nothing yet as he ought to
know” (I Cor VIII, 2); “Thou of whpm no words can tell,
whom only silence can declare” (Hermetica I, 17); “Knowest
thou of Him anything? He is no such thing” (Eckhart); God
himself does not know what He is, because He is not any what”
(Erigena); “ If anyone in seeing God conceivcs something in his
mind, this is not God, but one o f G od’s effects” (Aquinas, Sum
Theol III. 92, 1 ad 4); “To know God as He is, we must be
absolutely free from know ing” (Eckhart, o f Cusa’s Docta
ignorantia, a good illustration o f the ambiguity of symbols,
“ignorance” bearing here its “good” sense). Much more of the
like could be cited from Dante. I do not understand how
anyone can claim to be a Christian who resents the idea of a
kingdom not o f this world; and it seems to me “heretical” (ie,
“not knowing what is true, but thinking what one likes to
think” , ic, wishfully) to reject the Christian tradition o f the via
negativa, and at the same time for a Christian disingeniously to
cavil at the use o f the same method (metodos, procedure) in
Islam and other religions. Finally, the greater part o f the
criticisms that Christians commonly make o f other religions
are based on imperfect, ie, second hand knowledge, and to a
certain extent therefore are intellectually dishonest. In fact, they
know Christianity positively, and the others only “negative
ly” . U nder these circumstances, silence would be “golden” .
H ow many European scholars arc reasonably equipped— I refer
to a knowledge of, at least, either Arabic, Sanskrit, or
Chinese— or failing that, then at least long and intimate
personal association with the followers of other religions.
C f . . . Sir George Birdwood in Sva (Oxford, 1919, pp 17-
23), ending: “Henceforth I knew that there were not many
gods o f human worship, but one God only, who was
polyonym ous and polymorphous, being figured and named
according to the variety o f the outward conditions o f things,
ever changing and everywhere different, and unceasingly
modifying our inward conceptions of them ”— reminding one
of Philo’s words: “But, if He exists whom with one accord all
Greeks and Barbarians acknowledge together. . . . ” (Spec II,
165) thus ascribing monotheism to all pagans as Goodenough
comments. I might add, compare the history of religious
persecution in Europe with the almost total abscnse . . .
[there-of] in India where there was, of course, plenty of
religious controversy.
In an orthodox Indian family, it can quite easily happen that
different members o f the family may choose “ different Gods” ,
ic, different aspects o f God, differently named, and no one
thinks this strange. I . . . think it a state o f spiritual infancy to
claim exclusive truth for one’s own religion (which one has
usually inherited willy-nilly, being “born” a little Catholic, a
little Protestant, a little Jew, or a little Muslim); one has only
the right to feel that “my religion is true”, not that yours is
untrue. All this does n o t. . . exclude the possibility of heresy,
which may arise in any religious context; the reasonable thing is
for those who are interested in the truth . . . to discuss the
truth of particular doctrines, about which agreement
can . . . generally be reached. I . . . hardly ever set out to
explain a particular doctrine from the point o f view o f one
tradition only, but cite authorities from many ages and sources;
by “particular doctrines”, I mean, of course, such as that of the
“one essence and two natures, and many others about which
there is, in fact, universal agreement.
Very sincerely,
To ERIC GILL
March 6, 1934
Dear Eric:
I was glad to have yours o f February 16. I hear from Carey
that there is still a possibility of your coming over; if so, I hope
you will manage to spend a week with us.
Yes, I think the ideas of “personality” and “void” can be
reconciled—somewhat as the affirmative and negative theology
can be. One might begin with “no one can be my disciple who
does not hate animam suam”, and St Paul’s “I live, yet not I, but
Christ in me”, and “the word o f God . . . extends to the
sundering o f soul and spirit”, going on to the Thomist
“memory belongs to the sensitive faculty” and “only the
intellectual virtues (ie, “spiritual”) survive”, and to The Cloud
of Unknowing: “the greatest sorrow that a man can feel is to
realise that he is”, and Eckhart’s “the soul must put herself to
death” as “the kingdom o f God is for none but the thoroughly
dead”, and other such passages showing that the Christian
should not be unduly alarmed at the use of the negative
phraseologies in, eg, Buddhism. Then one could take Diony
sius’ Divine Darkness— Dark by “excess of Light” , and his and
the Thomist non-being, and the idea of God as nothing, nihil, ie,
no one thing or aggregate of things, “ void of thingness” ; as
Erigena states, “God himself does not know what He is,
because He is not any ‘w hat’ ” .
From the other side one could take the negative terms and
dem onstrate their unlimited content (which can be illus
trated by 0 equals 1 minus 1; 2 minus 2, etc, the plus and minus
numbers corresponding to all the “ pairs o f opposities” which
determine our human experience.
The “individualism” o f the current philosophy of life is
equally un-Christian and un-Buddhist—to cling to the “ I” in
this sense is to cling to a bad master and to forget the Master in
whose service alone there is perfect freedom. Every degree of
freedom is a degree of emancipation from the psycho-physical
ego, a degree in the realisation o f the spiritual person— who, the
more it approaches the likeness of God (by ablatio omnis
alteritatis, Cusa) can best be described, like Him, only in
negative terms!
Much love from Ananda,
Eric Gill, identified on p 82; see also the opening lines o f the Introduction.
Carey, i.e. Graham Carey; see p 43
To MR F. A. CUTTAT
April 8, 1943
My dear M. Cuttat:
It was a pleasure to receive your very kind letter, and I am
happy to know that my papers reached, and interested, you.
As to tamas: I am glad that we are agreed that prakriti cannot
be equated with rajas. For the rest, I think you are right in
saying that the gunas must be analogically represented in diuinis,
and that by inversion tamas would be the highest. It should be,
in fact, the “Divine Darkness” of Dionysius, and the object of
the contemplatio in caligine. We have an exact parallel in
“non-being” , which is “evil” as that which has not yet come
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D ear M:
All religions arc agreed that the goal lies beyond logical
th o u g h t, beyond good and evil, beyond consciousness, and all
pairs o f contraries. T he W ay is another m atter; on the W ay one
m ust use means; notably m eans o f th o u g h t and discrim ination,
valuation, etc. In other w ords, use the ordinary instrum ents o f
tho u g h t, ie, sym bols, verbal or visual. T he alternative w ould
be n o t to speak o f G od at all, but only o f w hat wc call facts or
sensations. T he nam es o f G od vary according to the aspect or
activity considered, eg, C reator, Father, Light.
All religions assum e one essence and tw o natures, o f w hich
there is the Suprem e Identity, w ith o u t com position. T he
natures are personal and im personal, im m ortal and m ortal,
infinite and finite, justice and love, royal and sacerdotal,
transcendent and im m anent, etc.
Such arc o u r im ages; by their means one advances on the
Way. Iconoclasm presupposes iconography; it is m ere vanity
for those w ho have n o t used their im ages until they have no
m ore use for them . T h at involves total sclf-naughting; and few
have seen G od w ith o u t im age. W e have, therefore, the via
affirmativa, o r tau g h t w ay; and the via negativa , o r u n taught w ay
in w hich he is grasped w ith o u t attributes; and these distinctions
are com m on to all theologies. T he last step, no doubt, is one o f
docta ignorantia; that does n o t m ean that there is any m erit in the
indocta ignorantia o f those w ho refuse to step at all.
In y o u r paragraph 2, w hat you refer to is n o t “ th e” m ystical
experience, b u t the stages o f it. T he highest level o f reference
w e can grasp from below seems to us like the goal; b u t it is only
a tem p o rary goal; the ladder is very long and has m any rungs
(stepping stones o f our dead selves). Y et the W ay is n o t
infinitely long; it is only incalculably long; and at the sam e tim e
so sh o rt that it can be crossed in a second, if all is ripe for that.
Yes, any “ m ystical” experience rem ains for ever afterw ard a
“ p o in ter” .
It is absurd to ask sim ultaneously for know ledge and for the
m ethod o f obtaining it (A ristotle, M et II.2.3). T ry never
questioning the tru th o f scripture and m yth, etc— regard it as
yo u r business sim ply to understand it. In that w ay you will find
that you are getting som ew here, and before you k n o w it,
actually you w ill have som e degree o f know ledge. Y ou will not
reject the m eans until you k n o w all that there is to be know n.
T hat is the sine qua non for “ u n k n o w in g ” .
T he best E uropean teacher is M eister Eckhart; suprem ely
exact.
B uddhism and H induism (essentially the same) are n o t easy
to understand from published accounts by rationalist scholars
untrained in theology. B oth require use o f the texts. H ow ever,
there are no doctrines peculiar to any one body o f doctrine; any
real “ m atter o f faith” can be supported from m any different
sources.
An “ evo lu tio n ” in m etaphysics is im possible; b u t one can
learn n o t to think for oneself (ie, as one likes). In m athem atics
one does n o t have private opinions about the sum o f tw o and
tw o; and so in this other universal science.
Further, on w h y w orship must be symbolic — figurative— see
St T hom as A quinas, Sum Theol I— II. 101.2. T he use o f sym bols
pertains to the via affirmativa, and includes all nam es given to
G od. T hey can only be dispensed w ith gradually in the via
negativa leading to direct vision without means. T hose w ho try to
dispense w ith sym bols before they have attained to the beatific
vision are prem ature iconoclasts.
Sym bols are, strictly speaking, supports o f contemplation. This
is w h y St C lem en t says, “ the parabolic style o f scripture is o f
the greatest an tiq u ity ” , and w hy D ante says “ and therefore
do th the scripture condescend to yo u r capacity, assigning foot
and hand to G od, w ith other m eaning” (Paradiso IV, 43. f.). In
the anim al life (empirical life guided by estim ative know ledge)
w e value things as they are in them selves; otherw ise, for w hat
they are in intellect, “ taken o u t o f their sense” as E ckhart puts
it. Life is em pirical to the extent that we are unable to refer o u r
actions to their principles. W hen w e do so, how ever, then the
things are the “ sym bols” o f the principles. A life w ith
com m unication based entirely on signs, and entirely lacking in
sym bolism , is a purely anim al life. A “ C o m p reh en so r” m ay to
all appearances do the same thing as other m en, but for him sub
specie aetemitatis. Sym bolism bridges the schism o f sacred and
profane and that is w hy m eaningless art is fetishim s o r idolatry.
O n a som ew hat low er plane, w e cannot talk higher m athem a
tics w ith o u t using sym bols. O ne cannot reduce everything to a
vocabulary o f 500 w ords. T o k now w ith o u t im ages is to be in
the state w here contemplatio supercedes consideratio, for as
A ristotle says “ the soul never thinks w ith o u t a m ental pic
ture . . . even w hen one thinks speculatively, one m ust have
som e m ental picture o f w hich to th in k ” (De anima III, 7.8).
T his state o f kno w in g w ith o u t im ages is the last stage o f yoga,
samadhi, w hich etym ologically = synthesis.
Sincerely,
T o E.R. G O O D E N O U G H
D ate uncertain
D ear Professor G oodenough:
. . . I think that we have to be very careful n o t to forget that
the sym bol o f any im m aterial thing is necessarily in itself
concrete, and n o t to fall into such blunders as M aine’s in his
intro d u ctio n to M arcus A urelius. We have all the sam e
problem s in India, w here the theology has been so hopelessly
confused by scholars w h o take term s such as vayu (“ w in d ” , b u t
really “ Gale o f the S pirit” ) literally and n o t as a referent. Philo
h im self is often w arning us against such errors (eg, C o n f 133),
against w hich all the “ laws o f allegory” m ilitate, w hile in India
w e have equal ridicule for those w ho “ m istake the finger
for that at w hich it p o in ts.”
I have o f course, been able to m ake only a partial
concordance o f P h ilo ’s ideas for myself, b u t it is fairly th o ro u g h
for m y purposes; I am using him largely in a study and
com parison o f G reek w ith Sanskrit Akasa in the respective
texts. O n e w o u ld be hard p u t to it really to distinguish P hilo’s
form s o f th o u g h t from Indian.
Sincerely,
T o GRAH AM CAREY
N o v em b er 25, 1943
D ear G raham :
W hat the secular m ind does is to assert that w c (sym bolists)
are reading m eaning into things that originally had none: o u r
assertion is that they arc reading o u t the m eanings. T he p ro o f
o f o u r contention lies in the perfection, consistency and universality
o f the pattern in w hich these m eanings arc united.
Alw ays m ost cordially,
Ulich, H einrich G ottlob R obert, at the tim e o f this letter was professor and
chairm an o f th e d ep artm en t o f education at H arv ard U n iv ersity , C am b rid g e,
M assachusetts, U SA . As the b o o k that occasioned this A K C letter is n o t
nam ed in the letter, w e can only conjecture th at it m ay have been D r U lic h ’s
Fundamentals o f Democratic Education, w hich w as published in 1940.
R ene G uenon, C airo, E gypt.
L evy-B ruhl, Lucien (d 1939), early social an th ro p o lo g ist and philosopher,
w ro te w idely on the behavior and th inking o f prim itiv e m an, th o u g h
w ith o u t ever h aving lived o r w o rk ed am ong such people.
‘Recollection, Indian and Platonic’ and ‘O n the O n e and O n ly T ra n sm ig
ra n t’, published as supplem ent 3 to the Journal o f the American Oriental Society,
vol L X IV , no 2, 1944.
T o GRAHAM CAREY
July 29, 1944
D ear G raham :
►
T o GR AH AM CAREY
D ecem ber 8, 1943
D ear G raham C arey:
I’ve been expecting to hear from you about N ew p o rt, as I’d
like to com e if it’s n o t too arduous.
I ju s t discovered w hy a m an carries his bride across the
threshold o f the new hom e: briefly, the new hom e is
assim ilated to Paradise, the husband acts as psychopomp, and there
is the prayer addressed to the jo in ts o f the d oor o f the “ divine”
house, “ D o n o t h u rt h er” . O n e has to f l y th ro u g h the Janua
Coeli and the nearest to that in form al sym bolism is to be carried
th ro u g h — you can easily see w hy it is “ unlucky” if the husband
stum bles.
K indest regards,
T o CARL SCHUSTER
D ecem ber 9, 1931
D ear D r Schuster:
B oth y our papers interest me greatly. Y ou are doing
invaluable and necessary w o rk in recognizing the universal
sym bolic m otifs scattered so abundantly th ro u g h Chinese
peasant art. O n chess in its “ cosm ic” aspect, c f references given
by O tto Rank in A rt and Artist. B ut is not yo u r gam e rather
“ race gam e” than chess proper? For sim ilar gam es in C eylon, cf
Parker, Ancient Ceylon. Shoulder flames are, I am sure, to be
distinguished from polycephalic representations, inasm uch as
the flames do n o t im ply other “ persons” o f the person
represented. O n tejas, see Vogel, “ H et Sanskrit W oord tejas” ,
M ed Kon A ka d Wetenschapen, Afd Lettarkund, 1930; c f m y
“ Early Indian Iconography, I: Indra” in Eastern A rt. Shoulder
flames are represented in various divine and royal effigies on
K usan coins, see Boston M useum Catalog o f Indian Coins, G reek
and Indo-Scythian, eg, pi xxviii, 26. T he shoulder flames o f a
B uddha occur typically in connection w ith the “ double
m iracle” (a solar m anifestation) in w hich there are m anifested
stream s o f w ater from the feet and flames from the shoulders,
c f W eldschm 'idt in O z N F, VI, p 4, etc, and Foucher, L ’A rt
greco-bouddhique. For further data on shoulder flames I am
sending you o u r M useum Bulletin for A ugust 1927, see pp 53,
54. B ut I really d o n ’t think the problem is closely related to
y o u r present enquiry; and it is ju s t as im portant to exclude w hat
is irrelevant to a specific problem as to include w hat is relevant.
O n the Sunbird in Indian sym bolism , it w ould be easy to
w rite a book. H entze has m ade sound rem arks on the Sunbird
in C hinese art; see m y “ N o te on the A svam edha” , Archiv
Oriental ni, VII, o f w hich I send you a reprint, see p 316, note 1.
T he eagle, phoenix, garuda, hamsa, o r by w hatever nam e we
use, is tw o headed in the sam e sense as any other Janus type. I
presum e the Sunbird m ay also be represented as the bearer-
across (the “ sea” ) o f other beings, ie, like Pegasus, as the
vehicle o f salvation, and in this case perhaps any additional
heads in general (and this includes the special case o f the Janus
types) represent the persons o f the D eity (we have representa
tions o f the C hristian T rin ity o f this type). O n sunbirds and
other solar m otifs, c f also Roes, Greek Geometric A rt, its
Symbolism and Origin (O xford).
I am sorry I cannot do m ore in a letter. I hope you will be
here again som e day.
W ith very kind regards,
Y ours sincerely,
T o JOSEPH SHIPLEY
July 12, 1945
D ear Shipley:
V ery m any thanks for yo u r fascinating volum e; as you
k n o w , I am deeply interested in w ord-m eanings; and it
frequently happens that the m eaning I need to use is “ obsolete”
o r “ rare” rather than the current sense.
I feel m ost o f the pieces are too short. A good piece m ight
have been done, s v, wit, on the distinction betw een gnoscere
from vitere, know ledge from w isdom , w ith other parallels. S v
element: from far back, both in Greece and India, the elem ents
are five, the quinta essentia being ether (this is a subject I have
done considerable research on); the four are only the'm aterial
elements, the latter corresponds to “soul” . S v fairy, fata, is surely
plural, fates. S v angel, it w ould have been useful to point o u t
that Satan is still an “ angel” , and o u r use o f “ angelic” to m ean
“ sw eet and g o o d ” is rather insufficiently based. Som e o f the
unfallen angels are pretty fierce. Also I w o u ld have m entioned
that “ angels” correspond to the gods (other than God) o f pagan
m ythologies. (Philo equates “ angel” w ith G reek here and
daimon.) S v idiot, virtually “ one w ho thinks for h im se lf’. S v
nest, the Skr is nida; there is no nidd — probably the second d is a
m isprint for a.
Also fa k ir (lit, “ p o o r” , designation o f Islam ic ascetics), no
connection w ith “ faker” (as you say). Y ou have fakvir; it is,
how ever, w ro n g to add v after the g. . . .
V ery sincerely,
*H ere actually y o u get the above and below rath er than rig h t and left
relatio n .— A K C ’s note.
A lfred O . M endel, identified on p 45.
U lich, H cinrich G ottlob R obert, professor and chairm an o f the departm ent o f
ed u catio n at H arv ard U n iv ersity , C am b rid g e, M assachusetts, U SA .
T o J O H N LAYARD
N o v em b er 26, 1945
Dear John Layard:
Jo h n Layard, identified on p 42
T h is w as a postcard, w ith o u t salutation and unsigned.
T o J O H N LAYARD
N o v em b er 24, 1945
D ear Jo h n Layard:
V ery m any thanks for yo u r letter and the reprints, o f w hich
“ the Incest T a b o o ” and the “ P oltergeist” articles particularly
interested m e. Y our letter raises so m any points that I wish,
indeed, w e could m eet; b u t it is som e thirty years since I was in
England and I hardly expect ever to be there again; our plan is
to retire to the H im alayas som e four years hence. Y ou ask
about people o f m y kind in England: I w ould suggest M arco
Pallis (13 F ulw ood Park, Liverpool), author o f Peaks and Lamas,
w hich you m ay have read. Rene G uenon is in C airo; b u t I think
his last book, La Regne de la quantite, w ould interest you.
R egarding m y o w n w ritings, I w ould like to trouble you to let
m e k n o w w h at I have sent you already and especially w hether
you received “ Spiritual P atern ity ” (Psychiatry, 1945). W hat o f
m ine is available in print can best be found at Luzac in London;
they publish m y W hy E xhibit Works o f A r t ? and will be issuing a
com panion volum e alm ost im m ediately, Figures o f Speech or
Figures o f Thought ?, and I think you m ight find both o f these
useful, especially the latter. Y ou probably do k n o w N . K.
,C haw ick’s Poetry and Prophecy, and also Paul Radin, Primitive
M an as Philosopher; the m ention o f these tw o books rem inds m e
to say that w here I am a little inclined to differ from you is that I
very m uch d o u b t that the raison d ’etre o f taboos, etc, was
“ u n k n o w n to the conscious m inds o f the earliest cultures” ; it
m uch rather seems to me that these m eanings have been
forgotten since, by degrees; this will apply also to archetypal
sym bols generally. In o th er w ords, I do n o t believe in the
validity o f the application o f the notion o f evolution to the ideas
o f m etaphysics.
I fully agree to yo u r com m ents re S e lf (the Socratic daimon,
Logos; H eracleitus’ Common Reason, etc). H ow ever, the dis
tinction o f Self from self, le soi from le moi, is n o t m ine; it has
long been necessitated by the exact equivalence o f such
expression as atamano’tma (“ the A tm an o f the A tm a n ” ), to such
as P h ilo ’s “ a spirit guide, m unificent, to lead us th ro u g h life’s
m ysteries” (Menander, fr 549K— F. G. A llison’s translation).
T he realisation that duo sunt in homine is alm ost universal and
o u r evcrday language bears innum erable traces o f it, for
instance w hen w e speak o f “ forgetting o n e se lf’ in explanation
o f som e erro r com m itted. So we have th ro u g h o u t literature the
contrasted notions o f “ self-love” (w rong) and “ Self-love”
(good). I have lots o f references to Self-love from U panishads,
St T hom as, Ficino, but n o t under m y hand at the m om ent.
H ow ever, see Brhadarnyaka Up 1.4.8, and II.4; Ficino in
K risteller pp 279, 287; St T hom as, Sum Theol II—II.26.4; Scott,
Hermetica 11.145 on the true Aristotelian.
O n caste, I have ju s t finished a lecture, and will send you a
copy w hen available. T he best book is H ocart’s Les Castes. For
“ externalisation o f psychological functions in term s o f the
stru ctu re o f society” , see Plato, Republic 441; “ the same castes
(=jati) are to be found in the city and in the soul o f each o f u s.”
A bout circles and straight lines: A Jerem ias, D er Antichrist in
Geschichte und Gegenwart, 1930, p 4: D er Abendlander denkt
linienhaft in die Fem e, darum mechanish, areligeos,faustish . . . das
Morgenland und die Bibel denken nicht linienhaft, sondern seitraum-
lich, spiralish, kreislaufig. Das Welgeschen geht in Spiralen, die sich
bis in die Vollendung fortsetzen.
V ery sincerely,
T o J O H N LAYARD
A ugust 11, 1947
M y dear D r Layard:
I m u st say that y o u r letter bo th surprised and saddened me,
in fact it b ro u g h t tears to m y eyes. Yours is a personal instance
o f the state o f the w hole m odern w orld o f im poverished reality.
I find m y o w n w ay slow ly, but always surely; surely,
because it has been charted, and all one has to do is follow up
the tracks o f those w ho have reached the end o f the road. By
“ the W ay” , I m ean o f course that o f self-denial and o f
Self-realisation— denial prim arily in the ontological sense rather
than in the m oral sense, w hich last can only be safely supported
w hen it has been realised that it cannot be said o f the E go that it
is, b u t only that “ it” becom e; w hich is the teaching n o t only o f
all traditional philosophers, East and West, but also that o f
m odern psychologists, eg, H adley and Sullivan.
T he w ay o f healing is one o f integration; resolution o f the
psychom achy; m aking peace w ith one’s Self; su werden as du
bist. All this can be found in all the great religious contexts. In a
forthcom ing article (containing references on “ being at w ar
w ith o n e’s S e lf’) I have argued that Satan is the E go, C hrist (or
how ever the im m anent deity be called) the H ero, and the battle
“ w ithin y o u ” , to be finished only w hen it has been decidcd (in
P lato’s w ords) “ w hich shall rule, the better or the w o rse” ; a
battle that St Paul had w on w hen he could say “ I live, yet not I,
bu t C h rist in m e” . T he nature o f the resultant peace is
w onderfully stated in Aitareya Aranyaka II.3.7, “ T his self (Ego)
lends itself to that Self, and that Self to this self; they coalescc
(or, are w edded). W ith the one aspect (rupa , “ fo rm ” ) he is
united w ith y onder w orld, and w ith the other aspcct he is
united w ith this w o rld .”
I do n o t agree that there has been any m istake in y our work ; it
has healed others, and delayed at the same tim e the com ing on
o f y o u r o w n crisis. N either w ere you w ro n g to publish it.
M uch in the Stone M en, “ H are” and “ Incest” has positive value
for others; and you should realise that m isunderstandings and
m is-interpretation are inevitable, and ignore them . It is only
y o u r present condition that m akes you turn against the m ost
solid g ro u n d you have been standing on.
B ut you caught the very sickness you w ere treating. Y ou did
no t have the art o f self-insulation, or detachm ent; you did not,
so to speak, shake the effluvium from your fingers after laying
on y o u r hands. If you d o n ’t do that, you m ay still cure the
victim , b u t at the price o f taking on his burden, w hich is neither
necessary n o r is it right, since it is for you to rem ain intact in
o rder that you m ay cure others. O n ly the well can cure the sick,
and it is u tterly true that “ charity begins at h o m e” ; you cannot
love others- w ith o u t first loving your Self, w hich is n o t only
yours, b u t that o f all beings.
N o w cut yo u r losses. Repentence and rem orse are tw o
different things. “ R epentence” (metanoia ), is literally and
properly a “ change o f m in d ” , as if from sickness to health. T he
past is no m ore relevant. Y ou have been a m artyr to
psychology. B ut there is no rew ard for such a m artyrdom ;
forget it. Learn the traditional psychology and Der Weg sum Selbst
(this last is an allusion n o t m erely to the V edanta, but to
Z im m e r’s w o rk , published by the R ascher-V erlag in Z urich,
and that I think you o u ght to read). T here is nothing better
than V edanta, b u t I k n o w o f no Sri Ram ana M aharsi living in
E urope. I do n o t tru st y our young English V edantist, n o r any
o f the m issionary Swam is; th ough there m ay be exceptions,
m ost o f them are far from solid. I w ould n o t hastily let any one
o f them have a chance to becom e for you another “ false guide” .
N o t even V ivckananda, w ere he still alive. W ere R am akrishna
h im self available, that w ould be another m atter.
B ut there are o th er w ays, in som e respects for a E uropean
easier. It was em phasized in India by Jahangir and by D ara
Shikuh that the M uslim T asaw w uf (Sufism) and the H indu
V edanta “ are the sam e” . Y ou say “ the w ritten w o rd ” is o f little
use to you and that you need som e personal contact. A nd it is
true that everyone needs to find their G uru. A t the sam e tim e it
is certainly vain to search for one; the right answ ers will com e
w hen w e are ready and com petent to ask the right questions,
and n o t before; and so w ith the G uru. T here is a necessary
“ intellectual preparation” . T h at is w hy, in spite o f your
rejection o f the w ritten w ord, I feel you m ay perhaps n o t have
found the w ritten w ords you need, and w hy I suggest that you
lay aside the sources you arc m ost familiar w ith and plunge into
a study o f the traditional sources— Greek, Islamic, and Indian
and Chinese. T ry to build up yo u r physical strength, and at the
sam e tim e to undertake to spend at least tw o years in m aking
yo u rself fam iliar w ith Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, H erm es,
D ionysius, E ckhart, B oehm e, the B rahm anas, U panishads and
the Gita, and the Sufis, especially Sham s-i-T abriz, Jalal u d ’D in
R um i, Ibn al-A rabi, A ttar (for the latter begin w ith Fitzgerald’s
version o f the Bird Parliament, a w o rk o f infinitely m ore
im portance and greater beauty than his O m a r K hayyam ).
O v erco m e the idea that you, Jo h n Layard, are the “ d o e r” and
lay the burden on the O n e w h o bears it easily. For in the w ords
o f A pollonious o f T yana (w hose Vita by Philostratus you
should read by all means) in his Ep 58 to Valerius (striken by
the loss o f his son, a loss by death, but quite analagous to yo u r
o w n loss that I asked you to “ cu t” ), w h o m he exhorts in part as
follows:
W hy, then, has erro r passed unrefuted on such a scale? T he
reason is that som e opine that w hat they suffer they
themselves have brought about, not understanding that one
who is ‘bom o f parents’ was no more generated by his
parents than is what grows on earth a growth o f earth, or that
the passion o f phenomenal beings is not that o f each, but that
o f One in everyeach. And this One cannot be rightly spoken
o f except we name it the First Essence. For this alone is both
the agent and the patient making Itself all things unto all and
throughout all— God Eternal, the idiosyncrasy of whose
Essence is wronged when it is detracted from by names and
masks. But that is the lesser evil; the greater is that anyone
should wail when God is born out o f the man [this refers to
the son’s death when he gave up the (holy) Ghost, and the
Spirit returned to God who gave it] by what is only a change
o f place and not o f nature. The truth is that you ought not to
lament a death as it affects yourself, but honor and revere it.
And the best and fitting honor is to remit to God that which
was born here, yourself continuing to rule as before over the
human beings entrusted to your care.
T h u s A p o llo n iu s offers to Valerius “ the consolation o f
P h ilo so p h y ” (o f B oethius), o r rather, m etaphysics. W hatever
can be lost w as nev er really yours. O n e m ust consider on w hat
basis “ th in g s” (people, ideas, causes, all that one can be
“ attached” to o r w ish to “ serve” ) arc really dear to us; o f
Brhadaranyaka U p 1.4.8. (“ O f one w ho speaks o f anything but
the Self as ‘d e a r’, one should say ‘H e will lose w hat he holds
d e a r.’ ” ); and ibid 2.4 and 4.5 (“ n o t for the sake o f others are
others ‘d ear’, b u t for the sake o f the S e lf’.); and Plato, Lysis
2 1 9 -2 2 9 (“ the one First ‘dear’, for the sake o f w hich all other
things can be said to be ‘dear’ ” .); viz, their and our Self. I think
you have been to o m uch attached to the idea o f servicc to be
rendered to others, over-lo o k in g that the very notion o f “ self
and o th e rs” is a part o f the great delusion. N o th in g is m ore
dangerous than “ altru ism ” , for it is only the correlative o f
“ e g o ism ” . Y ou can only “ love thy neighbour as th y s e lf’ w hen
you have realised that w hat he is, you are, n o t w hat he calls
“ h im s e lf ’, n o t “ w h at th o u callcst ‘I’ or ‘m y self ” , but “ That
art th o u ” w hich underlies the nam es and masks o f “ neighbour”
and “ s e l f ’.
Y ou m ay have o u tg ro w n the tem porary form o f European
civilization that has w ounded you, and in w hich you recognize
y o u r o w n destruction; and o f w hich Picasso’s Guernica is a
realistic picture. M oreover, it has done w ith you. I think you
are no longer o f it; n o t a U topist, w ho can believe in salvation
by plans alone, w ith o u t a change o f heart. I said above that
there w ere m ore w ays than those you have already follow ed,
and you have also em phasized that you need personal help. I
send you the follow ing nam es in Europe. . . .
All this in o rder that you m ay in the end be able to retu rn to
y our o w n w o rk — to heautou prattein kata phusin — b u t “ o th er
wise m inded than n o w ” , ie, m ay “ return to the cave” to play
y o u r part in the w orld w ith o u t letting it involve you.
Please let m e hear from you again soon. 1 do not think you
should try to com e to the U SA . I have not reached the end o f
the road m yself, and am only yo u r fellow -traveller, th ough
possibly better equipped w ith road-m aps. I hope that w hat I
have said m ay be o f som e assistance; do n o t hesitate to w rite
further if there is anything you think I can do m ore.
W ith kindest regards and sym pathy,
T o FATHER H. C. E. ZACHARIAS
A ugust 12, 1935
D ear Father Zacharias:
V ery m any thanks for your kind letter and rem iniscence. I
am entitled to assum e that you depreciate the constant use o f
“ em anation” in the D om inican Fathers’ version o f T hom as
A quinas’ Sum m a Theologica.
I m ust also premise that wc have, as it were by hypothesis,
tw o different preoccupations (1 do not, o f course, m ean whole
preoccupation): you to establish n o t only the tru th , b u t at the
same tim e the exclusive tru th o f the C hristian tradition, and I
(w ho if required to profess, am a H indu rather than a C hristian,
although I can in fact accept and defend every C atholic doctrine
except this one o f exclusive truth) to dem onstrate the tru th o f
bo th traditions, to expound w hat is for m e the faith, n o t a faith.
Is this “ exclusive tru th ” , I w onder, really a m atter o f faith? As
to that, I am n o t inform ed. In any case, I think the C atholic
student o f H indu doctrine should ask h im self w hether, if it
could be proved (such things cannot, o f course, be “ p ro v ed ” in
the ordinary sense o f the w ord) that H indu tradition is also a
divine revelation, and therefore also infallible, he w ould feel that
his ow n faith was shaken o r destroyed; an affirm ative answ er
w ould surely by shocking.
I am aware that the problem involved is that o f pantheism . It
w ould take too long to w rite fully on this subject, w hich I hope
to do elsewhere; I will only say that w e repudiate w h at from
our point o f view is strictly nothing b u t the accusation o f
pantheism levelled at H indu doctrine, and as an accusation
com parable to the Islamic denunciation o f C hristianity as
polytheistic, a position w hich m ight seem to be su pported by
such w ords as those o f Sum Theol I q 31, a 2: “ W e do n o t say the
only G od, for deity is com m on to several.” C f also note 42 in
m y N ew Approach to the Vedas, and Pulby, “ N o te sur le
pantheism c” in Le Voile d ’lsis, no. 186
With these prem ises, I will say that it is true that srj im plies a
“ pouring o u t” o r perhaps “ osm osis” . A fter creatures have been
thus poured out (srj) the deity in num erous Br passages is spoken
o f as “ em ptied out like a leathern w ater b a g .” Y et he survives.
A lternatively, he is “ cut to pieces” o r “ th o u g h t into m any
parts” (R V) one becom ing m any in this w ay, w hich m ay be
represented either as a voluntary or as an im posed passion, ju s t
as the C rucifixion is both o f these at the sam e tim e. In any case,
the deity has to be put together again, w hich is done
sym bolically in the ritual; w hich in ultim ate significance I
should be understood to mean . . . a reduction o f the arms o f the
cross to their p oint o f intersection. T he notion o f a “ rcintegra-
tio n ” (samskr) to be accom plished ritually could be said to have
a pantheistic look.
But: you m ust be fully aw are h ow dangerous it is to take into
consideration one part o f a doctrine, excluding the w hole
context. It is repeatedly affirm ed (RV and AV) that “ only a
fourth part o f him bccom es (abhavat) here” , “ three fourths
rem ain w ith in ” (nihita guha = ab intra). D istinctions are
repeatedly draw n betw een w hat o f him is finite and explicit,
and w hat infinie and untold (parimita, nirukta, and their
opposites); eg, rites w ith spoken w ords having to do w ith the
finite, ritual w ith o u t w ords and orationes secretae (w hen manasa
stuvante) w ith the infinite. T here are also the explicit statem ents
(AV and U ps) that w hen plenum is taken from plenum ,
plenum rem ains.
N o w , as to m aterial cause in C hristian form ulation. St
T hom as speaks o f “ n atu re” as rem ote from G od b u t yet
“ retaining” a certain likeness. Likeness to what? Surely to natura
naturans, Creatrix, Deus, the “ w isd o m ” that in Proverbs was
w ith G od in all his w ork. If nature w ere absolutely rem ote from
G od, that w ould lim it his infinity. T o put the m atter in another
w ay, take the doctrine o f the tw o births o f C hrist, tem poral and
eternal (Vedic and Indian parallels are plenty). T here m ust be in
som e sense a m other in bo th cases, since the birth is always a
vital operation. In the case o f the eternal birth (that o f w h o m
w e should em ploy the expression “ Eternal A vatar” as distinct
from other avatarana), is n o t the “ m o th er” the divine nature,
no t distinguished from that divine essence, these being one in
H im ? In this sense, it seems to me that C hristian doctrine
assum ed in G od a m aterial cause in principe, w hich only
becom es a m aterial cause rem ote from H im in fact; in other
w ords, secundum rationem intelligendi sive dicendi, w hen the
creation takes place and the divine m anner o f k n ow ing is
replaced for all beings in m ultiplicity by the subject and object
or dual m anner o f know ing, w hich determ ines inevitably the
kind o f language in w hich eternal truths are w orded. Is n o t this
latter m anner o f k n ow ing on o u r part really the ocassion o f the
crucifixion in its eternal aspect? T ruely, w e k n o w not w hat we
do, and need to be forgiven! It does n o t alter the m atter if w e
say ex nihilo fit , for w hat is nihil b u t potentiality as distinguished
from act? If then he is “ em ptied o u t” , o r as E ckhart puts it,
“ gives the w hole o f w hat he can afford” , w hat does this m ean
except the sam e as to say that he is w holly in act? By infallible
necessity he gives w h at o f h im self can be given, viz, the Son,
the Light; w h at he cannot give being the G od-head, the divine
darkness, his inifinity.
Hence if srj be strictly “ em anate” (and it seems to m e
“ ex-press” is only a m ore active w o rd for w hat is in any case as
it w ere a fontality), it represents at the worst an im perfect choice
o f w ords, as in the D om inican Fathers’ Summa Theologica. B ut
taking into consideration the explicit character o f Vcdic
E xem plarism (“ th o u art the om n ifo rm lig h t” , jo ytir visvarupam;
“ integral m ultiplicity” , visvam ekam; “ om nifo rm likeness o f a
thousand” , sahasrasya pratimam visvarupam, etc) 1 should say that
srsti is the sam e as “ fontal ray in g ” (D ionysius), the act o f being,
com plete in itself, although to o u r tem poral spatial understand
ing appearing to go o u tw ard from itself. C f “ H e proccedeth
forem ost w hile yet rem aining in his g ro u n d ” (anu agram carati
kseti budlunah, RV III, 55.6).
Tam sending you a couple o f recent papers, one on Scholastic
A esthetic w hich I am sure you will be interested in. I w o u ld
send som e others on Vcdic Exem plarism , Vcdic m onotheism ,
etc, later as they appear, if you w ould care to receive them .
M eanw hile, w ith cordial greetings,
Very sincerely,
T o H. C. E. ZAC HARIAS
A ugust 18, 1935
D ear Father Zacharias:
T he following continues m y previous letter. It w ould not, you
see, occur to us to have to defend the H indu doctrine against an
assum ption o f pantheism , any m ore than it w ould naturally
occur to a C hristian to have to defend C hristianity against a
charge o f polytheism . N evertheless, the defence can be m ade in
cither case. In addition to the previously cited passages I com e
across the follow ing, w hich th ro w light on w hat was under
stood to be m eant by srj. In Bhagavad Gita, V. 14, nakartatvam
tie karmani srjati. M ore cogent, Mundaka Up, 1.7, yatha urnanabhi
srjate ghrnate. . .tatha aksarat sambhavati iha visvam, w here
aksarat, “ from him that does n o t flow ” , “ from the non
proceeding” leaves no m eaning possible for srjate ghrnate b u t
that o f “seems to w ith d ra w ” , (ghrnate is o f coursc literally
“ dessicates” , one m ight say that as fontal, the deity is here
envisaged as Parjanya, as inflow ing or indraw ing, as Susna).
T h ere is again B haskara’s exposition o f m athem atical infinity as
comparable to that o f deity in that it is neither increased n o r
dim inished by w hatever is added to o r taken from it,
impassissima verba : “ju s t as in the U n m o v ed Infinite (anante
‘cyute) there is no m odification (vikarah) w hen hosts o f beings
are em anated o r w ith d ra w n ” (syal laya-srsti-kale ‘nante’ cyute
bhutaganesu yadvat). A fter all, w hat w e w ant to get at is w hat
H indus understand by srj, and here it is as always in such cases
largely a m atter o f crede ut intelligas follow ed by intellige ut
credas. Philology is n o t enough, the w o rd m ust live in you. As
an outsider, you naturally claim a right o f “ free exam ination” ,
as do Protestants w ith regard to the teachings o f the C hurch,
yet h ow ever learned they m ay be, they m ay have missed the
essential. Y ou have a right to “ free exam ination” , o r at any rate
assum e the right; so I do n o t ask you to agree w ith me. B ut I do
ask you to ask youself faithfully the prelim inary question,
w h eth er you w ould be disappointed if you becam e convinced
that pantheism is n o t to be found in H induism . If the answ er
w ere “ yes” , could you still claim to be able to m ake a perfectly
unbiased ju d g em en t?
I m ig h t add that a very usual C hristian criticism o f H induism
is based on the “ pure illusion” interpretation o f the M aya
doctrine. In this case, if there is no real w orld, it cannot at the
sam e tim e be argued that an origin o f this non-existant w orld
from its source im plies a m ateriality in that source. I should
not, how ever, m yself resort to this counter-argum ent, as I
understand the true and original m eaning o f maya to be natura
naturans, as the “ means w h ereb y ” the essence is m anifested.
V ery sincerely,
H . C . E. Zacharias, as above.
E d ito rs’ note: the follow ing fo o tn o te, taken from A K C ’s published w ritings,
explains the difference betw een natura naturata and natura naturans.
“ A lth o u g h St T h o m a s is speaking here w ith special reference to the art o f
m edicine, in w hich m eans are em p lo y ed , it is n o t these natural things that
effect the cure, b u t rath er N atu re herself, ‘o p eratin g ’ th ro u g h them ; ju s t as it
is n o t the tools, b u t their o p erato r that m akes the w o rk o f art. ‘N atu ral things
depend on the divine intellect, as d o things m ade by art u p o n a h u m an
intellect’ (Sum Theol I, q 17, 1 C). T h e ‘N a tu re ’, then, th at all art ‘im itates’ in
o p eratio n is n o t the objective w o rld itself, o u r en v iro n m en t, natura naturata,
b u t natura naturans, Creatrix Universalis, Deus, ‘that nature, to w it, w hich
created all o th e rs’ ” (St A ugustine, D e Trinitate X IV . 9).
T o H. C. E. ZACHARIAS
O cto b er 1, 1935
D ear D r Zacharias:
V ery m any thanks for yo u r letter. I am very glad to sec that
w e have grounds for agreem ent on m any m atters. T he
tradition o f a prim ordial revelation received by “ A dam ” (our
M anu ) especially constitutes a point o f departure from w hich
can be discussed the relative positions o f the now separately
m aintained traditions. I do n o t agree that the Vcdic tradition
embodies a large am ount o f irrelevant matter, but rather that it
preserves m ore o f the prim ordial doctrine than is to be found
elsewhere, th o u g h I w ould agree that the w hole o f the
prim ordial doctrine underlies and is im plicit in every branch.
So far from finding any inconsistencies in the Vedic tradition, it
is precisely its extraordinary consistency that is the source o f its
convincing charm (I use this expression bearing in m ind that
Scholastic and Indian aesthetic consider beauty as related rather
to cognition than feeling).
N o w , as to m aterial cause: there cannot have such a
confusion o f the “ subtle” (suksma) w ith the im m aterial as you
suggest. For the expression suksma and sthula refer only to sarira;
w hile the deity is ou tw ard ly sariravat (incarnate), he is inw ardly
asarira, discarnate. A confusion o f suksma w ith asarlra w ould be
inconccivablc. As to the deity being “ all act” , yes if by deity w e
m ean strictly speaking “ G o d ” . B ut if w e consider the m ore
penetrating theology in w hich a distinction is draw n betw een
“ G o d ” and “ G odhead” , n otw ithstanding that both conjointly
form a Suprem e Identity (Skr, tad ekam, satasat, etc), then it is to
be rem em bered that He is both eternal w o rk and eternal rest.
T h at H e does not proceed from potentiality to act (as we do) is
true, because His act o f being is not in tim e; nevertheless as
G odhead H e is all potentiality and as G od all act. It is in this
sense that I spoke o f the “ M aterial” because being represented
in H im in principe, the G odhead representing in fact that nihil
ou t o f w hich the w orld was made, that divine darkness that is
interpenetrated by the creative light o f the Supernal Sun. Vedic
tradition does not, I think, em ploy any category exactly
corresponding to the expression “ spirit and m a tter” , b u t rather
those o f “ body, soul and sp irit” (rupa, nama, atman). “ M at
te r” , in oth er w ords, is a phenomenon, rather than a thing.
N o th in g is m ore constant in Vedic tradition than the insistence
on this, that in so far as H e reveals him self phenom enally (in
phenom enal sym bols, in the theophany, by the traces o f his
footprints, etc), all o f these form s are im posed by the
w orshipper, and are n o t intrinsic o r specific to him self, w ho
lends H im self nevertheless to every im agery in w hich H e is
imagined. In other w ords, the “ material” cause is not in the
sam e sense as the oth er causes, a real cause, b u t sim ply the
possibility o f m anifesting form . T hus I have never said, n o r has
Indian tradition tau g h t that there exists in H im a m aterial cause
in any concrete sense, b u t m erely that there lies in H im all
possibility; w e say that in H im all is act ju s t because apart from
tim e H e realises all this possibility, whereas w e develop only
som e o f these potentialities at any one tim e and in the course o f
a process in w hich effect seems to succeed cause. T he above
rem arks apply also to w hat you say about passivity in H im ;
insofar as H e is “ self-intent” , that self w hich H e regards m ust
be called in relation to that self which regards. T he G odhead is
passive in relation to God, th o u g h both are a Suprem e Identity,
viz, the identity o f w hat T hom as calls a “ conjoint principle” . If
there w ere n o t bo th an active and a passive relation conceivable
w ithin this identity o f conjoint principles, it w ould be
im possible to speak as T hom as does, o f the act o f fecundation
latent in eternity as being a “ vital operation” . In other w ords,
the divine nature is the eternal M other o f the m anifested Son,
ju st as M ary is the tem poral m other. Being Father-M other
(essence-nature), either designation is that o f the First Principle.
It is very interesting that the doctrine o f the tw o Theotokoi
w hich is thus present in C hristianity (and sym bolized in the
C o ronation o f the Virgin) should be so definitely and clearly
developed in the Vedic tradition, and even exactly preserved in
the heterodox systems o f Buddhism and Jainism. There could
hardly be a better illustration o f the strict o rth o d o x y o f both
traditions.*
As regards T hom as**, I m ay add that already am ong the
Scholastics, he is evidently o f a rationalistic tendency. M y ow n
C hristianity w ould tend rather to be A ugustinian (C hristian
Platonism ), [that of] Erigena [and] Eckhart. It seems to m e that
it is significant that the full endorsem ent o f T hom as to o k place
only in the latter part o f the 19th century. W hen the C hurch at
that tim e realised the need o f a retu rn to the M iddle Ages, was
it n o t perhaps the case that T hom as, represented, so to speak,
all that could be endured? I by no means intend to say that I
have n o t m yself a trem endous adm iration for and appreciation
o f T hom as, b u t that while I find in him rather a com m entary to
be used, a rational exposition, I find in E ckhart a far m ore
biting truth, irresistible in quite a different way. N o t that they
teach different things, but that their em phasis is different, and
E ckhart com es nearer to the Indian and m y ow n w ay o f seeing
God.
W ith m ost kind regards,
V ery sincerely,
H. C . E. Zacharias, as above.
♦ T h e co n trad ictio n in these last tw o sentences m ay w ell have been
inad v erten t. In any event, in his later years A K C definitely held that
B u d d h ism w as an o rth o d o x trad itio n and believed in the o rth o d o x y even o f
Jain ism . H e and M arco Pallis w ere instrum ental in g ettin g Rene G u en o n to
accept the o rth o d o x y o f the form er, w hich w as b o m fro m H in d u ism in w ays
analogous to the birth o f C hristianity from Judaism . Jainism w ould seem
m o re p ro b lem atic at first glance. B u t on e m ust consider the great an tiquity
o f Jainism : Jain legends, eg, m ake o f their tw en ty -seco n d (o f tw en ty -fo u r)
Tirthankara (one w h o overcom es) a co n tem p o rary o f K rishna w hich im plies
th a t Jainism w as an already venerable trad itio n at the tim e o f the w ar w hich
figures in the Mahabharata. B y the canons o f m o d e m h isto ry , Jainism can be
traced back at least as far as the th ird century B C . T his great an tiq u ity , the
fact th at Jains still fo rm a viable co m m u n ity in India, and the b road
co ncordance o f Jain doctrine w ith th at o f H in d u ism and B ud d h ism all p o in t
to the o rth o d o x y o f Jainism .
** T h e T h o m a s in question is o f course, St T h o m a s A quinas (circa
1225-1275) m a jo r intellectual figure in w estern C h ristian ity and the ‘A ngelic
D o c to r’ o f R o m an C atholicism .
T o PROFESSOR KU RT V O N FRITZ
N o v em b er 7, 1945
M any thanks for y our response. R egarding its second
paragraph, the sense o f num erous presences is perhaps m ore
em phatic in Greece, b u t certainly n o t absent in India (eg,
th u n d er as the voice o f the Gods). I think it w ould be true in
India to say that the notion o f union is w ith the im personal, and
that o f association w ith the personal aspect o f diety— b u t these
tw o aspects m erge into one another, as being the tw o natures o f
a single essence.
AKC
P o stcard to th e above.
T o DR J. N. FA RQUHAR
February 1, 1928
D ear D r Farquhar:
I am o f course in general agreem ent w ith y our view
expressed on the origin o f im age w orship in the last J R A S,
except as regards the statement that a m onotheist cannot be an
“ id o lato r” . O n the purely sym bolic value o f im ages (ie,
non-fetishistic), there is an interesting passage in Divyavadana,
C hap LX X V II, w here M ara im personates B uddha and U p -
agupta w orships the form thus produced, explaining that he is
n o t w orshipping M ara but the teacher w ho has departed “ju st
as people venerating earthen im ages o f gods do n o t revere the
clay, but the im m ortal ones represented by th e m .”
M y views w ere actually based n o t on the tradition, b u t on
the art itself and the literature. You will find a great deal o f
m aterial bearing on the subject in the tw o papers o f m ine about
to appear: “ O rig in o f the B uddha Im age” , A rt Bulletin, vol IX,
pt iv, 1927; “ Yaksas” , Smithsonian Miscellaneous Publications,
L X X X , no 6, W ashington, D. C ., 1928.
Also sec in C harpentier, J, “ U ber den B egriff und die
E tym ologie von Puja”, in Festgabe Hermann Jacobi, B onn, 1926;
and in Louis de La Vallee-Poussin, . . . Indo-Europeens et
Indo-Iraniens: I’Inde jusque vers 300 av J - C , Paris, 1924,
pp 314ff.
V ery sincerely,
T o PROFESSOR B. FARRINGTON
O cto b er 8, 1945
D ear Professor Farrington:
M any thanks for w riting in reply to m y note. W hat I m eant
was, that to explain physis in term s o f techniques has been the
universal procedure. A nd in reply to the further objection, I
m eant to suggest that w hat m ight have been described as
“ physical” [in] pre-Socratic th o u g h t is really “ theological”
th o u g h t, since the “ natu re” they w ere trying to explain was n o t
o u r natura naturata b u t natura naturans, creatrix universalis, Deus,
and that to do this is to im ply that nature herself operates per
artem et ex voluntate, ie, that she is a “ P erson” .
For the rest, I find it very difficult to see uniqueness in any
local thought; only local colour. 1 have often asserted that there
is nothing peculiar to “ Indian th o u g h t” , and could support this
by innum erable parallels. In fact, I try never to expound any
doctrine from only a single source. I cannot, indeed, conceive
o f any valid private axiom s. If by any chance Psychiatry is
available there, you m ight care to look at m y article in VIII, 3
(the last part published, Sept 1945).
Very sincerely,
AN O N Y M O U S
Uncertain date
Sir;
It is stated th a t “ naturalists m aintain that ‘reliable
know ledge is publically verifiable.’ ” This position M r Sheldon
very properly opposes; it is in fact, unintelligible. T he proper
form o f such a statem ent w ould be: “ reliable know ledge is
repeatedly verifiable.” This is A ristotle’s proposition that
“ know ledge (episteme) is o f that w hich is always o r usually so,
never o f exceptions” (M et VI, 2.12 & 1, 813); and a particularly
interesting application can be m ade to the problem o f the
“ historicity” o f an “ incarnation” o r “ descent” (avatarana)\ for
exam ple, the historicity o f Jesus will be autom atically excluded
from the dom ain o f reliable know ledge and intelligibility if it is
no t also assum ed that there have been other such descents.
T he supernaturalist maintains not only that the reality o f the
D ivine Being has been repeatedly verified, but that it can be
repeatedly verified, viz, by anyone w ho is w illing to pursue the
“ W ays” that have been charted by every great metaphysical
teacher; and that it is ju st as “ unscientific” for one w ho has n o t
made the experim ent to deny the validity o f the experience as it
w ould be unscientific for anyone to deny that hydrogen and
oxygen can be com bined to produce w ater, if he is unw illing to
m ake the experim ent, em ploying the necessary m ethod. T he
laym an w ho will not experim ent, and will n o t believe the w ord
o f those w ho have experim ented, m ay say that he is not
interested in the subject, b u t he has no right to deny that the
thing can be done; the scientist is in precisely the same position
w ith respect to the vision o f G od.*
It is also stated that the naturalist’s horror supertiaturae is n o t a
capricious rejection o f w ell-established beliefs “ like the belief in
g h o sts” . This is naive indeed. For ghosts, if anything, arc
phenom ena, and as such a proper subjcct o f scientific investiga
tion; only because o f their elusiveness, ghosts pertain to the
realm o f “ occultism ” . B ut it is precisely in occultism that the
supernaturalist is least o f all interested (cf Rene G uenon,
L ’Erreur spirite, Paris, 1923 and 1930 [and 1952 and 1977]). T he
m etaphysician, indeed, is astounded that so m any scientists
should have become “spiritualists” and should have attached so
m uch im portance to the survival o f those very personalities
w hich he— the m etaphysician in this m atter agreeing w ith the
m aterialist— regards as nothing but “ becom ings” or processes
(“ behaviours” ), and not as real beings or in any possible w ay
im m ortal.
Finally it should be overlooked that “ supernatural” no m ore
implies “ u n natural” than “ supcrcsscntial” means “ unessen
tial” . T he w hole question depends, in part, upon w hat we
m ean by “ n atu re” ; generally speaking, the m aterialist and the
supernaturalist m ean tw o very different things, o f w hich one is
not a “ th in g ” at all. T he m odern naturalist limits him self to the
study o f natura naturata, ie, phenom ena; the interest o f the
theologian is in natura naturans, creatrix universalis, Deus, not so
m uch in appearances as in that which appears. As for
“ m iracles” : the m etaphysician will agree w ith the scientist that
“ the im possible can never happen” . O rientals take it for
granted that the pow er to w ork “ w onders” can be acquired if
the proper means arc pursued; b u t he does not attach to such
perform ances any spiritual significance**. For him , the possi
bility o f w o rk in g w onders (w onderful only because o f their
rarity, and in the sam e w ay that m athem atical genius is
w onderful) is inherent in the natural order o f things; b u t the
m odern scientist, if confronted w ith an irrefutable “ m iracle”
w ould have to abandon his faith in order!
I have never been able to see any meaning in the “ conflict o f
science w ith religion” ; those w ho take part in the quarrel are
always mistaking each others’ positions, and beating the air.
Sincerely,
T o GEORGE SARTON
N o v em b er 3, 1944
M y dear Sarton:
I am hoping that yo u r tolerance m ay extend to an acceptance
o f the enclosed continuation o f m y earlier article. Personally, I
cannot b u t think that to k n o w precisely w h at ideas o f an
evolution w ere held prior to the form ulation o f m odern ideas o f
m utation, and are by som e still held side by side w ith these
m odern ideas, pertains to the history o f know ledge: and that if
the scientist and m etaphysician could learn to think once m ore
in one another’s dialects, this w ould not only have a trem endous
h um an value, b u t w ould avoid a great deal o f the w asted
m otion that n o w goes on.
W ith kindest regards,
G eorge Sarton, professor o f the h isto ry o f science, H arv ard U n iv ersity .
‘G radation and E volution, II’, Isis, X X X V III, 1947.
T o GEORGE SARTON
June 21, 1943
M y dear Sarton:
M any thanks for your “ answ ers” . I can agree w ith nearly
everything. T he m isfortune is that while “science” deals w ith
facts and n o t w ith values, there has been a tendency to think o f
these m easurable facts as the only realities— hcncc the necessity
expressed in yo u r last sentence.
W here 1 m ost radically agree is as to cogito ergo sum w hich 1
have long regarded as an expression o f the bottom level o f
E uropean intelligence. “ T h o u g h t” is som ething that w c m ay
direct, not w hat w c are. I do not credit Dcscartcs w ith a
distinction betw een the tw o egos im plied (1) in cogito and the
other in sum — if one did credit him w ith that, then one could
acccpt the statem ent in the sense that the phenom enon or
m anifestation (thinking) m ust im ply an underlying reality. In
any case, the m ost essential ego (in sum) is the one that “ no
longer thinks, but perfectly contem plates the tru th ” . T hinking
is a dialctic— a valuable tool, but only a tool.
I agree both that scientia sine amore est— non sapientia, sed nihil,
and similarly ars sine amore is not sophia, but m ere techne. These
propositions arc implied in the Scholastic operates per intellectum et
in volunate.
K indest regards,
T o GRORGE SARTON
M arch 11, 1942
D ear D r Sarton:
I am sending you “ A tm ayaja ” , parts o f w hich m ay interest
you. I was told o f your lccture this m orning and apropos o f the
reference to Plato, w hen you said that the scientist’s faith in
k now ledge as a panacea was an inheritance from Plato. Is not
this overlooking that w hat our scientist m eans by “ k n ow ledge”
and w hat Plato m eant by “ k n ow ledge” are tw o very different
things? C f Alcibiades 1.130 E & F; Protagoras 357 E, 356 C;
Phaedrus T i l E.
Best regards,
T o GEORGE SARTON
U ndated
PS: Sim ilarly in India, eg: “ T he w orld is guarded by
‘k n ow ledge’ ” . B ut the w ord here (Aitareya Aranyaka 11.6) is
prajna = pronoia = providence = B rahm a, not the em pirical
“ k n o w led g e” w hich the scientist makes a panacea.
G eo rg e Sarton, as above.
T o GEORGE SARTON
O cto b er 29, 1942
M iliton M ayer on the “ illiteracy” o f scientists in Common Sense
for N o v em b er m ig h t interest you. It was som ew hat the same
point, the illiteracy o f the anthropologists, that I m eant to bring
o u t in the Psychiatry article (current issue).
T o J. E. LODGE
N o v em b er 7, 1932
M y dear Lodge:
M any thanks for your letter. We do n o t find Indian texts
saying that the w orld “ is maya”, b u t that the w orld is
moha-kalila. In the sam e w ay I was trying to distinguish m agic
as m eans from the w o rk o f m agic as production. I was not
intending to b ring in the identity o f spectator and perform er,
b u t m eant to retain their “ rational”— n o t “ real”— distinction.
B ut even so, does n o t (or did not) the spectator think o f the
magician as m aking use o f magic? A nd w hen the spectator does
call the trick “ m agic” , is n o t this always a conscious or
unconscious ellipse for “ w o rk o f m agic” ?
Very sincerely,
T o E. F. C. HULL
A ugust 20, 1946
D ear M r Hull:
Y ours o f A ugust 12: in the first place, I agree in general w ith
the tendency o f yo u r rem arks on translation. Secondly, for the
B uddhist material, I recom m end that you get the help o f M iss
I. B. H orner, Secretary o f the Pali T ex t Society (30 D aw son
Place, L ondon W2), w ith w h o m as a m atter o f fact I am already
collaborating in a book consisting o f a selection o f the B u d d h a’s
logoi, new ly translated; and in any case translations o f all the
B uddhist m aterial are available in the publications o f the Pali
T ex t Society itself, th ough it w ould be better to have them
revised, so that I w ould rely on D r H orner, w ho is a m ost
com petent scholar in this field. T hirdly, I tru st you will n o t
repeat M isch’s barbarous spellings o f Indian nam es b u t adhere
to the international rules (as to w hich, also, D r H orner w ould
be able to aid you). Fourthly, I am n ow 69 and have m ore than
enough w o rk in hand to last me another 25 years, if that w ere
available, and I have to refuse all sorts o f invitations to
undertake anything else. Y eats’ version o f the U panishads is
negligible; he knew no Sanskrit and his assistant knew no
English o f the kind required; I regard such undertakings as
im pertinent. H u m e ’s Thirteen Principle Upanishads is by no
m eans consistently reliable, all scholars are agreed. In m y
opinion the versions in W. R. T eape’s Secret Lore o f India are the
truest; b u t they are hardly as literal as you m ay require. O f the
Bhagavad Gita, there m ust be over 20 versions in English; the
best are, in one kind, E dw in A rn o ld ’s, and in another, that by
B hagavan Das and A nnie Besant. In all m atters o f procuring
books, Luzac (46 G reat Russell Street, L ondon W. C. 1) w ould
be y o u r best source.
, I do think that 1 am perhaps as com petent as anyone you
could find to provide you w ith versions o f texts from the
U panishads. For the texts from the SBE volum es X X X IV (and
X X X V III), I think you m ig h t take T h ib au t’s existing versions
as they stand, not that they arc incapable o f im provem ent
altogether, b u t he is a good scholar and the versions arc for the
m ost part excellent. This leaves m e som ew hat tem pted to try
and do the pieces from B G and the U panishads, I should not
w ant to do the Sam khya texts w ith w hich I am less familiar;
and the B G and the U panishads arc daily reading for me. If
you are n o t in too great a h u rry I m ight agree to “ help” to this
extent.
Re the spellings: it w ould be desirable for yo u r printer to be
equipped w ith the diacritical m arks and, as I said, to adhere to
the form s on w hich there is international agreem ent (these can
be seen, for exam ple, in the Journal o f the Royal Asiatic Society,
74 G rosvnor St, London). Such spellings as Vinaja (side by side
w ith N ikaya) are absurd; they should be Vinaya and N ika ya .
Njaja should be N yaya; Tschandooja should be Chadogya\
Brihadaranjaka should be Brhadaratiyaka\ and so on.*
Even to do w hat I offer, I should be glad to have the original
book. 1 presum e the publisher w ould be w illing to make som e
paym ent for the w ork, and that I should ultim ately receive a
copy o f the volum e as translated.
Very sinccrcly,
T o R. F. C. HULL
A ugust 30, 1946
D ear M r Hull:
I have yours o f the 24th. 1 m eant to say that I w ould do the
few picccs from the Bhagavad Gita also, so please send list o f
these. It is still m y intention to do the U panishad picccs before
C hristm as, but I have no free tim e before m id-O ctober.
Teape. is obtainable from Blackwell, O x fo rd , and also, I
think, from H effcr, C am bridge, but try Blackwell first (7/6
w ith the Supplem ent). Teape is unquestionably literary. I d o n ’t
agree that Yeats is so consistently.
As regards the tw o Rgveda hym ns: I have a learned friend
here w h o is m aking the RV his life w ork, and is th oroughly
com petent both from the linguistic and the literary point o f
view. If you will w rite to him directly (D r M urray Fowler, c/o
P ro f B. R ow land, 154 B rattle St, C am bridge, M assachusetts,
U SA) m erely explaining that they are for a translation o f
M isch’s book and that you are w riting at m y suggestion, I am
sure he could do them for you w ithin a m onth.
Incidentally, o f course, D cusscn’s Sechszig Upanishads w ould
be available in any good library, and so w ould Teape be, eg, at
the Royal Asiatic Society (w here you could m ention m y nam e
by w ay o f introduction, th ough it is hardly needed). There,
also, you could use all the Pali T ex t Society volum es (their ow n
stock was destroyed by a bom b).
T he N idanakathd passage Miss H orner could do, or you can
take it from Rhys D avids’ Buddhist Stories, L ondon, T rubner,
1880.
In case you cannot use all the proper diacritics, the tw o
im p o rtan t points w ould be to spell correctly and to distinguish
the short and long vow els (a and a, etc). In this case it w ould be
perm issible to use sh for s, b u t it w ould still be desirable to
distinguish s, and I think m ost printers could do this.
Very sincerely,
R. F. C . H ull, as above.
T o R. F. C. HULL
A ugust 30, 1946
D ear M r Hull:
I was tem pted to do a specim en for you from K U . In citing
from the U panishads, I find I hardly ever m ake an identical
version; in any case, I w o rk directly from the text, choosing
w ords very carefully and bearing in m ind the m any parallel
passages. I have tried to translate for those w ho will n o t have
the background o f com parative know ledge. B ut it m ust be
realized that to get the full content o f a text a C o m m en tary is
often really needed. For exam ple, in K U 15, the “Jaw s o f
d eath ” are one form o f the Sym plegades, Janua Coeli; in IV. 1,
the “ inverted version” (for w hich Plato has num erous parallels)
corresponds to the “ instaring” o f W estern mystics; in III.9 ff, o f
course, there is nothing unique in the use o f the “ chariot”
sym bolism , m ore fam iliar in Platonic contexts— and always a
form ula becom es the m ore com prehensible the m ore one
becom es aw are o f its universality. B ut I suppose that M isch
points all this out, at least in the present contexts it is his affair
to have done so.
I d o n ’t expect to do m ore until, as I said, m id-O ctober; the
difficulties arc n o t in the Sanskrit, but in finding the right
w ords w ith w hich to carry over as m uch as possible o f the
m eaning w ith o u t obscurity. In III. 13, I used “ oblate” , bccausc
the original verb th ro u g h o u t (sam) is literally to “ sacrifice” ,
“ give the quietus” , and this is lost for all but philologists; if one
speaks o f the “ peaceful S e lf’, w here “ dedicated” or “ im m o
lated” w ould be nearer, the “ Self o f the s e lf ’ or “ selfless S e lf’ is
m eant. N evertheless, I think “ oblate” is too recondite for
present purposes, so I w ould render K U IV. 13:
S tillin g in th e m in d all s p c c c h , th e k n o w le d g e .
s h o u ld still th e m in d its e lf in th e g n o s tic s e lf (th e re a so n )
T h e G n o s tic is th e G re a t, a n d th e G re a t s e lf is th e
S e lf at p ea ce.
(3) K n o w t h o u th a t th e S p irit is th e r id e r in th e “ c h a r io t” ,
th e “’c h a r io t” , th e b o d y :
K n o w th a t R e a s o n is its fe llo w , M in d it is th a t h o ld s
th e re in s.
(4) T h e p o w e r s o f th e s o u l arc th e s te e d s , as th e y sa y ; th e
o b je c ts o f p e r c e p tio n , th e ir p a s tu re .
T h e S p irit c o m b in e d w ith th e m in d a n d its p o w e r s ,
m e n o f d is c e r n m e n t te r m “ th e e x p e r im e n t” .
( N B : It is a p ity th a t w e h a v e n o w o r d c o r r e s p o n d in g to “ f r u i t i o n ”
a n d m e a n in g “ o n e w h o h a s f r u itio n o f ’.)
K a th a . . . III.9 - 1 5 :
(9) H e , in d e e d , w h o s e d is c e r n m e n t is th a t o f th e f e llo w - r id e r ,
o n e w h o s e m in d h as th e re in s in h a n d —
H e r e a c h e d th e e n d o f th e tra c k , th e p la ce o f V is h n u ’s
u lti m a t e s trid e .
(10) A b o v e th e p o w e r s o f th e s o u l are th e ir a im s , a b o v e
th e s e a im s is th e m in d ,
A b o v e th e m in d , th e re a s o n , a n d a b o v e th e re a s o n
th e G r e a t S e lf (o r S p irit)
(11) A b o v e th e G re a t is th e U n re v e a le d , a n d th e re a b o v e
th e P e rs o n ,
B e y o n d w h o m th e re is n a u g h t w h a te v e r : th a t is th e g o a l-p o s t,
th a t th e e n d o f th e tra c k .
(12) T h e lig h t o f th e S p irit b y all th in g s h id d e n is n o t
a p p a r e n t.
Y e t it is se e n b y th e s h a rp a n d s u b tle e y e o f re a s o n ,
b y s u b tle se ers,
(13) O b la t in g s p e e c h in th e m in d , th e k n o w le d g a b le m a n s h o u ld
th e n o b la te th e m in d in th e g n o s tic s e lf (th e re a s o n ),
T h e g n o s tic in th e G re a t, a n d th e G re a t S e lf in th e O b la te
Self.
(14) S ta n d u p ! A w a k e ! W in y e w o r t h s , a n d u n d e r s ta n d th e m —
T h e s h a rp e n e d e d g e o f a r a z o r, h a r d to o v e rp a s s , a d iffic u lt
p a th — w o r d o f th e p o e ts , th is.
(15) S o u n d le s s , u n to u c h a b le , u n s h a p e n , u n c h a n g in g , y es, a n d
ta s te le s s , e te rn a l, sc e n tle ss to o ,
W i th o u t b e g in n in g o r e n d , b e y o n d th e G re a t, im m o v a b le —
w h e r e o n in te n t, o n e e v a d e s th e ja w s o f d e a th .
Katha . . . IV . 1, 2:
(1) T h e S e lf -s u b s is te n t p ie rc e d th e o rific e s o u tw a r d s , th e re fo r e
it is th a t o n e lo o k s f o r th , n o t at th e S e lf w ith in :
Y e t th e C o n t e m p l a tiv e , s e e k in g th e U n d y in g , w ith in v e rte d
v is io n , s a w H im self.
(2) C h i ld r e n a re th e y th a t f o llo w a fte r e x te rn a l lo v e s , th e y w a lk
in to th e w id e s p re a d s n a re o f d e a th ;
B u t th e C o n t e m p l a tiv e s , k n o w in g th e U n d y in g , lo o k n o t fo r
t h ’im m o v a b le a m o n g s t th in g s m o b ile h ere .
Katha . . . V .8 - 1 2 :
(8) H e w h o w a k e s in th e m th a t sle e p , th e P e rs o n w h o fa s h io n s
m a n if o ld lo v e s ,
H e in d e e d is th e B r ig h t O n e , th a t is B ra h m a , ca llcd th e
U n d y in g ;
O n w h o m th e w o rld s d e p e n d ; that n o o n e s o e v e r tr a n s c e n d s —
T h is v e rily , is T h a t.
(9) A s it_ is o n e F ire th a t in d w e lls th e w o r ld , a n d a s s u m e s th e
s e m b la n c e o f e v e ry a p p e a ra n c e ,
S o th e I n n e r S e lf o f all b e in g s a s s u m e s th e s e m b la n c e
o f e v e r y a p p e a ra n c e , a n d is y e t a p a rt f ro m all.
(10) A t it is th e o n e G a le th a t in d w e lls th e w o r ld , a n d a s s u m e s
th e s e m b la n c e o f e v e ry a p p e a ra n c e ,
S o th e o n e I n n e r S e lf o f all b e in g s a s s u m e s th e s e m b la n c e
o f e v e r y a p p e a ra n c e , a n d is y e t a p a rt f ro m all.
(11) A s th e S u n , th e w h o le w o r l d ’s e y e , is u n s ta in e d b y th e
o u t w a r d fa u lts o f w h a t h e sees,
S o th e I n n e r S e lf o f all b e in g s is u n s ta in e d b y th e ills
o f th e w o r l d , b e in g a p a rt f ro m th e m .
(12) T h e I n n e r S e lf o f all b e in g s , w h o m a k e s h is o n e f o r m to b e
m any,
T h o s e w h o p e rc e iv e H im w ith in th e m , th e se , th e C o n t e m p l a -
tiv e s , t h e ir s ’ a n d n o n e o t h e r s ’ is e v e r la s tin g fe lic ity .
K a th a . . . V I. 12, 13:
(12) N e it h e r b y w o r d s n o r b y th e m in d , n o r b y v is io n ca n H e
be know n;
H o w c a n H e b e k n o w n b u t b y s a y in g th a t “ H E IS ” ?
(13) H e c a n in d e e d b e k n o w n b y th e th o u g h t “ H E IS ” , a n d b y th e
t r u t h o f b o th h is n a tu re s ;
F o r w h o m H e is k n o w n b y th e t h o u g h t “ H E IS ” , th e n H is
tr u e n a t u r e p r e s e n ts itself.
T o R. F. C. HULL
Septem ber 26, 1946
D ear M r Hull:
B rahm a and B rahm an are both legitim ate, but I prefer the
nom inative form , Brahm a: the im p o rtan t distinction is from
the m asculine Brahm a.
For G reek, C o rn fo rd is, o f course, all right; Jo w e tt is
perfectly acceptable, b u t has a slightly V ictorian flavour. In
general I use the Loeb Library versions, w hich are not always
perfect, b u t good on the w hole. I also use the Loeb Library
version o f A ristotle. T he title o f j. B u rn et’s book is Early Greek
Philosophy. In the case o f any difficulty it should be easy to get
the advice o f som e G reek scholar in England.
In general, Sutras arc texts; Karkias rather o f the nature o f
com m entaries, in verse.
I shall be glad to read the B rahm an-A tm an passages you refer
to. T h e only translation o f Vacaspati M isra’s Sam khya-Tattva-
Kaum udi I k n o w o f is that by G anganatha Jha, B om bay
Theosophical Society Publishing Fund, 1986; you could p ro b
ably find a copy at the Royal Asiatic Society or at the British
M useum . T here is also a G erm an version by G arbo in A bh
Bayerischen A k a d Wiss Phil K l, 19.3 (1892). For Vijnana Bhiksu,
s e e j. R. Ballantyne, Sam khya Aphorisms o f Kapila in T ru b n c r’s
O riental Series (1885). For N arayana T irtha (sic) see S. C.
Banerji, Sam khya Philosophy, C alcutta, 1898. For Sankhya
books in greater detail, see list in the U n io n List . . . (Am erican
O riental Series, N o 7, 1935, N os 2513ff.
I am using a b o rro w ed typew riter, excuse results.
V ery sincerely,
R. F. C . H ull, as above.
T o R. F. C. HULL
O cto b er 18, 1946
D ear M r H ull:
In the first place, I am sending you m y RV X .90.1 w hich
m ay give you som e help on the general psychological
background.
2) Y our passage, “ This is perfect . . . (Yeats p 159): the
reference is to B U 5.1. T he w o rd he renders by “ perfect” is
piirnam, w hich m eans “ plerom a” , or as H um e has it, “ fulness” ;
“ perfect” m ay be true, b u t it is n o t the m eaning o f the text.
R oot in piirnam is pr, “ fill” , sam e root as in “ plerom a” .
3) I shall m ake som e necessary spelling corrections on the
Ms; notably, Y ajnavalkya for Yadnavalkya th roughout.
4) As regards your main question, I shall append m y
proposed translation o f B U IV. 1.2. “ N o t beyond o u r k en ” in
the original is literally aparoksa, “ n o t o u t o f sight” , “ eye to eye”
ie, “ face to face” , coram\ c f in m y RV paper, note 12, esp Taitt
Up 1.12, w here pratyaksam = sdksat {pratyaksam , literally,
“ against the eye”— hence “ eye to eye” ). Such im m ediate vision
applies in the first place to the perception o f ordinary “ objects”
and contrasts w ith paroksam, “ out o f sig h t” (the w ord aksa,
“ eye” , being present in all three w ords), w hich last applies to
all that has to do w ith the (invisible) Gods, w ho arc said to be
priva, “ fond of, or w onted to, the ob-scure” , C f C hapter V o f
m y Transformation o f Nature in A rt.
N o w the translation:
“ T hen U , the son o f C akra, asked him: ‘Y ajnavalkya’, he
said, ‘d em onstrate (or m ake know n) to m e the B[rahm a].
B rahm a face to face, n o t o u t o f sight (saksat-aparoksat)” . “ H e is
yo u r Self that is w ithin all th in g s.” “ B ut, Y ajnavalkya, w hich
‘s e lf is it that is ‘in all th in g s’?” “ T h at w hich breathes together
w ith the breath (prana) is both yourself and all-w ithin. T h at
w hich breathes (or expires w hen you expire) out w ith yo u r
breathing o u t (apdtta) is yo u r Self and all-w ithin. T h at w hich
distributively breathes w ith your distributive breath (vyana) is
yo u r Self and all-w ithin. T h at w hich breathes w ith your
distributive breath (vyana) is your Self and all-w ithin. T h at
w hich breathes upw ard (or aspires) w ith y our breathing
u p w ard (udana) is y our Self and all-w ith in .’
Yajna is perfectly correct; the B rahm a is m anifested only by
its vital functions (prana , often explicitly = ayus, “ life” ); all the
vital and sensitive functions o f the psyche are extensions o f the
Spirit, Self, or Soul o f the soul, thought o f as seated at the centre
o f our being and in all beings. In the next part, U objects that Y
has only referred to various aspects o f the G, ju st as if one were
asked w hat an animal is, and told only “ for example, cows and
horses”— which answer docs not tell us w hat an animal as such is.
Y explains that the B o f A is n o t an object that can be k n o w n by
a subject. . . . So, 2) U , the son o f C, said “ you have expressed
it, as one m ight say yonder cow , or yonder horse. (Again, I
ask), dem onstrate to m e the B[rahm an], n o t o u t o f sight— w ho
is the Self w ithin all th in g s.” (Y repeats) “ H e is your Self, the
all-w ithin. Y ou cannot see the seer o f seeing, o r hear the hearer
o f hearing, o r think the thinker o f thought, o r discrim inate the
discrim inator. For He is yo u r Self, the all-w ithin; all else is a
m ise ry .” “ T hereat, U , son o f C, desisted.”
T he u nknow ability o f the Self is often insisted upon— as also
by Ju n g , w ho points o u t that only the Ego can be k now n
objectively; the eye cannot see itself, and so it is w ith the
universal Subject. I have read Sankara’s com m entary and m ade
m y version as literal as possible, w ith o u t thinking o f anything
that M isch says.
I d o n ’t see that M isch is far o ff the m ark, b u t he does seem to
attribute to U w hat is really Y ’s doctrine (and the com m on
one), viz, that the functions o f life are the m anifestations o f B,
and it is this m istake (w hich I think you should regard as a
lapsus linguae to be corrected) that m akes M isch’s account
confusing to me. M oreover, I w ould n o t say “ was reduced to
the identification o f the various vital functions” ; B is manifested
in these functions, n o t “ reduced” to them . For this epiphany
otherw ise form ulated, see Kaush Up II. 12.13 (H um e, pp 316,
317) and cf B U 1.5.21 (ibid, p 91). Perhaps you had best let me
know how far all this meets your difficulty, before I try to go
into it any further, if needed. In any case, I shall regard the
translation o f B U 4.1.2 as done. I m ight add that the “ B reath”
(pratja) is repeatedly a trem endous concept, not merely a flatus,
bu t an im m an en t principle equated w ith the Sun, Self, B rahm a,
Indra, etc. O n the “ B reaths” , see also note 29, 2nd para, in m y
RV paper.
V ery sincerely,
R. F. C . H ull, as above.
‘R V X. 90.1: aty atisthad dasangulam', Journal o f the American Oriental Society,
L X V I, 1946, n o 2.
Kaush U P = Kaushitaki Upanishad
B U = Brhddaranyaka Upanishad
T o MISS I. B. HORN ER
14 M ay 1947
D ear M iss H orner:
Brahma-khetta, c f Buddha-khetta, Vism 414; also, Vism 220
punna-khetta=brahma-khetta. In Stt 524 T think brahma-
khetta=brahma-loka as distinct from Indra-loka, and perhaps
w e should understand B rahm a. T h e khetta-jina is one w h o is
no lo n g er concerned w ith any “ fields” , having m astered and
done w ith all. Khetta-bandhana is attached to o r connection w ith
any “ field” znd^sam yoga; to see this read B G 13.26. All three
fields are spheres o f samsara, and the khetta-jina is one w h o has
done [w ith] th em all, and has m ade the uttara-tiissaranam. Is this
adequate?
Thag 533, taya, m u st be ablative o r instr., neither o f w hich
seem s to ju stify “ in ” , so I w ould think “ for thee” better than
“ in thee” . O f course, saccanamo, as elsewhere, is “ w hose nam e
is T ru th ” , not “ in very T ru th ” , for w hich one w ould expect
sim ply saccam at the beginning o f the sentence, ju s t as satyam is
used to m ean “ verily” .
By the w ay, J IV. 127, attanam attano is interesting, and m ust
m ean “ Self o f the s e lf ’, as in M U 6.7, atmano’tma.
I w o u ld ’n t like “ used u p ” for nibbuto. O ne good sense w ould
be “ d o w sed ” . By the w ay, c f Oratio ad Graecos..., “ O teaching
that quenches the fire w ithin the so u l.”
K indest regards,
To MISS I. B. HORNER
Date uncertain
D ear M iss H orner:
Re sclf-naughting: this is the same as Self- realisation.
A bhinibbut’atto (= abhinibbout’ attana atta) b u t the atta referred to
is n o t the same! In fact, nibbuto applies only to self and vimutto to
Self. If the B[uddha] is nibbuto this does not m ean that he is
extinguished, b u t that he is abhinibbut’ atto, one in w h o m self has
been totally extinguished; he is therefore sitibhuto.
“ H e that w ould save his soul, let him lose it.” “ H e w ho
w ould follow me, denegat seipsum ” (not an ethical b u t an
ontological dem and). “ All scripture cries aloud for freedom
from self.” So in Islam, as G od says to the m an at the door,
“ W h o ’s there?” “ I” . “ Begone. N o room for tw o h ere.” All this
is quite universal and not in the least peculiar to B uddhism .
D 11.120 katam me saranam attano\ this atta certainly n o t the
maranadhammo atto (M. I. 167), only the form er is the saruppam
attano o f Sn 368. T he great erro r is to see attam anattani, “ Self in
w h at-is-not-S elf” , (N B: I am very careful w ith m y s and S), eg,
in the sabbe dhamma anatta. . .
AKC
M iss I. B. H o rn e r, as above.
T o MISS I. B. HORNER
June 24, 1946
D ear M iss H orner:
Appamada: lit, absence o f infatuation, intoxication (mad),
pride, etc, im plies diligence, no doubt, but diligence is hardly a
translation, is it? Y ours o f June 21. I’m glad we agree on several
points. I think w e had better keep ariyan — “ w o rth y ” w ould be
good in itself, but w ould not convey w hat is needed. R egarding
samaya and asamaya , I’m very sure that yo u r “ unstable” and
“ stable” arc good in them selves (w hether o r n o t in every
context): this w ould fit in very well w ith khana, w here alone
true thiti can be found— khana, strictly speaking is that in w hich
a thing is in-stant, eg, as arahat paramgato thale titthati.
AKC,
T o MISS I. B. HORN ER
July 2, 1946
D ear M iss H orner:
I have yours o f 9th and 20th and an undated one w ith
“ H ouseholders” . I’m in such a position, too, that I can hardly
find another m inute to give! A nyhow , final decisions on
renderings m ust be yours: it is good that we are agreed on
m any o f them , eg, metta, love. T o be sure Bhagavata is a w o rd
co m m o n to o th er religions, especially early Vaisnavism con
tem p o rary w ith the great Nikayas — and this too m ust be taken
into consideration in connection w ith the great im portance
attached to bhatti = bhakti in the sense o f devoted service;
“ beneficent” o r “ generous” seems to be the real m eaning o f
Bhagavat — o r “ w ealthy dispenser” . Perhaps you are rig h t in
retaining “ lo rd ” , though it is a paraphrase rather than a
translation. . . Viriyavada seems to m e that “ D octrine o f ener
g y ” im p ly in g (as often stated in oth er w ords) that “ m anly
effort m u st be m ade” . Kammavada, “ doctrinc that there is an
o u g h t to be d o n e .” Sanditthika and ditth’ eva dhamme seem to me
bo th = “ here and n o w ”— o r one m ig h t differentiate by saying
“ im m ed iate” for the first. I do think it im p o rtan t to render
khana by “ m o m e n t” o r “ instant” .
(Incidentally, M acdonald in h is, w riting on the Islamic
doctrine o f the moment suggests a B uddhist origin for it; b u t I
find m o re G reek sources also, than he does.)
Pamada is som ething like “ elevation” in the w ay one can call
a d ru n k person “ elevated” , b u t probably “ tem perance” and
“ intem perance” are the best w ords to use. It is a pity that there
is no literal opposite o f “ infatuation” .
T he w hole problem o f nirvana, etc, is very hard: one should
always bear in m ind the desirability o f using renderings that are
n o t incom patible w ith the p u tting o u t o f a fire, w hich was
certainly the d o m inant content for a B uddhist.
C ertainly, -jo and -nimmito are m ore o r less equivalent term s:
one = genitus, the other = factus; bo th apply to production.
Perhaps “ fo rm ed ” w ould be best for -nimmito — “ form ed b y ” ,
o r ev en .“ m oulcd b y ” ; -jo, m ore literally, “ begotten o f ’. T he
idea that the pupil is reborn o f his teacher is com m on. Viraga:
I’m w illing to accept “ aversion” . Skr vairaga is really contemptus
mundi. For gocara, “ field” w ould do for psychological contexts.
Ajjhattam and paccattam seem to m e nearly the same: perhaps
“ in w ard ly ” rather than “ subjectively” w hich has a slightly
different value— o r as you say “ personally” , w ith application to
one’s own experience. . . .
A riya is difficult unless one says ju s t “ A ryan” , b u t that
w o u ld need reservations; w hen E ckhart says “ th e fastidious soul
can rest on noth in g that has nam e” , that is the m eaning— the
no tio n is o f an elite. . . .
I agree to de- (or dis-) becom ing for vibhava\ b u t it is difficult,
too, because de-becom ing (ent werden) is elsew here the great
desideratum , to have ceased to becom e = nibbana\ therefore,
vibhava really im plies, I think, “ b ecom ing-other”— the tw o
together = equal “ becom ing (thus) or n o t becom ing (thus).”
T h at is all I can do now!
AKC
M iss I. B. H o rn e r, as above.
T o MISS I. B. HORN ER
July 26, 1946
D ear M iss H orner:
For nibbanam and the verb, I w ould n o t object to “ quen
ching” (as in Vism 306, o f the fire o f anger); this w ould
correlate well w ith “ cooling” for sitibhava. In fact, parinibbuto
sitibhuto as “ quenched and coolcd” seems pretty good.
AKC
M iss I. B. H o rn e r, as above.
T o GEORGE SARTON
N o v em b er 9, 1944
D ear Sarton:
I enclose som e A ddenda for “ G radation and E volution II” .
As to the critique o f N o rth ru p ’s article, I found it better, and
even necessary, to rew rite the letter in the form o f a review in
w hich I also briefly allude to the oth er parts o f the book in
w hich his essay appears. I’ll send this to you soon, and then you
can pass it on.
C ordially,
PS: I ju st received E d g crto n ’s Bhagavad Gita (H O S 38 & 39). I
am rather appalled by the spectacle o f a scholar w ho confesses
ignorance o f and lack o f interest in m etaphysics, and yet
undertakes such a task. H ow ever good his scholarship, he has
hardly any m ore understanding o f w hat is being talked about
than W hitney o f the Atharva Veda. It is w orks like these that
have led som e Indian scholars to speak o f European scholarship
<t Ml
as a crim e !
T o GEORGE SARTON
N ovem ber 4, (year uncertain)
M y dear Sarton:
A propos o f o u r discussion o f spoken languages. C f Keith in
Aitareya Aranyaka, O x fo rd , 1909, p 196, no 19. Sanskrit can
only have been a vernacular very long ago (say before 800
B C). Later, the educated classes used a P rakrit for every day
purposes, th ough still understanding Sanskrit, w hich was
partially understood even by peasants (as now ). Sanskrit is still
sufficiently w idely k now n that som e European scholars travell
ing in India could use it as a lingua franca. I take it m odern Greek
is nearer to ancient G reek than H indi is to Sanskrit.
AKC
M rs C . M o rg an , C am b rid g e, M assachusetts, U SA .
T o MURRAY FOWLER
M arch 4, 1944
D ear M urray:
I read y our review w ith pleasure. I can only prom ise to think
about the “ lo v e” and “ ethic” problem . O ne w ould have to start
from the question, w hat is the true object o f love? O ne could
show that the U panishads, A ristotle and Aquinas agree that it is
o u r “ S e lf ’ (if w c k now “ w hich s e lf ’); and that the same is
im plicit in “ Inasm uch as ye have done it unto these, ye have
done it un to M e” . A ltruism , the love o f “ others” as such is as
m uch as the hatred o f “ oth ers” a delusion. Even if we subm it to
this delusion o f “ oth ers” , o u r love for them should be founded
in o u r love o f the O ne.
As for “ ethics” , one w ould have to show that, as for Plato,
there is no real distinction o f “ ethics” from “ politics” .
As for the other point, sannyasa: this corresponds to the
Pauline distinction o f liberty from law. I think I m ade it clear
th at a com plete socicty m ust recognize that the fin a l end o f
the individual is one o f deliverance from his obligations;
although an end that can only be approached by a fulfilm ent o f
them . C f E dgerton in JA O S 62.152, recognizing the ordinary
and the extraordinary norm s. T he very concepts o f finite and
infinite necessitate both. . . .
Kindest regards,
T o GEORGE SARTON
February 6, 1945
D ear Sarton:
I did n o t k n o w o f D atta’s change o f life (w hich is one w ay o f
referring to that kind o f retirem ent). T he w o rd Saha m ust have
been either sadhu o r sannyasin (the form er literally “ hitting the
m a rk ” , the latter “ giving u p ” , ie, surrendering all duties and
rights). T his represents the “ 4th stage” or the norm al Indian
schem a o f life (and also corresponds to Plato’s concept o f m an ’s
latter days, Rep 498, C, D . . .). Sannyasin is pretty near to
w hat E ckhart calls a “ truly po o r m an” . O n th e ghats at Benares
you will find am ongst others, university graduates and
cx-m illionaires, n ow “ truly po o r m en” ow ning nothing. By
the w ay, too, there arc 4 A m erican sadhus in India; m y wife
knew one o f them and he was a good friend o f o u r b o y ’s. . . .
As a rule, the funeral rites arc perform ed for a m an w ho
becom es a sannyasin\ he becom es in fact w hat R um i calls a
“ dead m an w alk in g ” ; c f Angelus Silcsius, stirb ehe du stirbst. We
ourselves, in fact, in a few years m ore, plan to return to India to
approxim ate, as far as it is practicable for us, to this ideal. In
India, one does n o t look forw ard to an old age o f econom ic
independence b u t to one o f independence o f econom ics. T here
are m any hum b u g s in India, b u t as one sadhu said to m y wife, as
long as there arc even 2 real sadhus in 100, so long there will be
an India.
D id I com m end to you M . B eck’s “ Science in E ducation” in
Modern Schoolman, Jan 1945?
I have a n u m b e r o f things in the press that will interest you. I
am still w o rk in g on the “ Early Iconography o f Sagittarius” ,
b u t am alm ost bogged dow n in the mass o f m aterial (cherubs,
centuars, Janua Coeli, Rape o f Soma, etc); and on the concept
o f E ther in the G reek and Sanskrit sources.
Perhaps w e shall see you at the Pelliot tea to m o rro w .
K indest regards,
PS: Still, I feel the point about dogm a is im portant, and that
conduct should be first a m atter o f order and secondly a m atter o f
the will (will follow ing the intellect).
T o GEORGE SARTON
O cto b er 14, 1938
D ear Sarton:
M any thanks for your interesting leaflets. I only rather
dem u r to the idea o f “ individual conscience” , since I cannot but
regard the “ conscience” (the w ord o f course originally m eant
“ consciousness” , an awareness) as “ im personal”— in the sense
that the “ active intellect” is for som e Schoolm en im personal
and that Synteresis is im personal and the Vedic “ Inner
C o n tro lle r” , the Platonic and neo-Platonic hegemon, viz, the
Spirit o f G od w ithin you.
F urther, I believe good will can only be [universalized]*
insofar as the good will is m ade to rest on strictly intellectual
(m etaphysical) sanctions, so conduct is regulated by know ledge
rather than by opinion-feeling. A consent o f East and W est can
only proceed from this highest g round and m ust first o f all (as
G uenon says) therefore be the w o rk o f an elite.
Very sincerely,
K indest regards,
G e o rg e S a rto n , as o n p. 274.
T o MEYER SCHAPIRO
M ay 2, 1932
D ear Professor Schapiro:
O n rereading yo u r letter it occurs to m e to add one thing to
m ine. You speak o f the values o f contem plation being detached
from those o f daily use. T o m y m ind, speculation about a kind
o f tru th conccivcd to exist in vacuo is nothing b u t “ curiosity” ;
m oreover, it goes for me that the ultim ate tru th is precisely and
by definition that w hich cannot be know n. H ow ever, so far as
the best sort o f relative tru th goes, and apart from m y ow n
views, I w ould say that in India we have no philosophy pursued
as such for its o w n sake, for the sole purpose o f constructing a
n etw o rk o f w o rd s that shall be as far as possible unassailable.
Indians have som etim es said w ith perfect justice that European
students cannot understand Indian philosophy (or as it o u ght
rather to be called, metaphysics) because they do n o t live it.
Indian m etaphysics is in origin a means to pow er, in develop
m ent becom ing means to the summum bonum; it is never an end
in itself. O n this sec G uenon, L ’Hom me et son devenir selon le
Vedanta (Paris, 1924 [and num erous subsequent editions]). So
w e shall n o t get anyw here as to understanding the East if we
start from an idea o f contemplation as a thing in and for its ow n
sake; it is a means to becom ing w hat w e are, b u t there are other
means co n co m m ittan t and inseparable. O f course, in saying
“ m eans” , I speak em pirically— there arc no means to enlighten
m ent (perfection), to a thing o f w hich w e are already possessed,
bu t only m eans to the destruction o f our unaw areness o f it,
w hich unaw areness is o u r “ im perfection” .
V ery sincerely,
To T R EE S (A BRITISH JO U R N A L )
1945— date n o t specified further
M r Finlay son’s Providential Order o f Fairplay
T o MR H. G. D. FINLAYSON
July 14, 1944
D ear M r Finlayson:
M any thanks for your letter and enclosures. So far as I can
tell from this rather b rie f m aterial, I am fully in agreem ent w ith
you on the “ p rovident m inim um o f decency” . R egarding “ I
A M ” , a good deal depends on all that w e understand by this.
B ut by yo u r equation o f the individual spiritual life w ith the
cultivation o f o u r “ better s e lf ’, I presum e w e see together. In
m y article “ Sir G aw ain . . . ” in Speculum (Jan 1944), I pointed
o u t that the true argum ent is n o t Cogito ergo sum, but Cogito ergo
Est. H ow ever, I d o n ’t see m y w ay at present to w rite anything
specifically on the “ m in im u m ” .
R egarding “ cosm ic stricture” , I think Przyluski, La Participa
tion m ig h t interest you. O n the other hand, also G iono, Letters
aux paysans.
V ery sincerely,
H . G. D . Finlayson, as above.
“ Sir G aw ain and the G reen K night: Indra and N am u c i” , Speculum, X IX ,
1944.
J. P rzyluski, La Participation.
Jean Giona, Lettre aux paysans.
T o MR H. G. D. FINLAYSON
D ate uncertain, b u t presum ably autum n 1944
D ear M r Finlayson:
M any thanks for yours o f A ugust 22 (m y 67th birthday). I
certainly do n o t see anything in your “ m in im u m ” as defined in
y o u r “ S tatem ent o f account” . W hat you call the “ charitable
poise” seems to m e m uch m ore actual in other religions than in
C hristianity, w ith its Extra ecclesium nulla salus; although, o f
course, this form ula is n o t to be taken literally, C hristian
theology recognizing a “ baptism o f the spirit” as well as the
“ baptism o f w ater” . I d o n ’t think you need be afraid o f any
spread o f interest in C om parative Religion, b u t only o f a
w ro n g approach to the subject. T he fact o f the universal
enunciation o f the fundam ental doctrines, often in alm ost the
sam e idiom s, is actually very im pressive; this universality
deriving from the Perennial Philosophy on which all religions
ultim ately rest. I think the recent paper on “ T he O n ly
T ra n sm ig ra n t” w ould interest you as it deals w ith the divine
im m anance as the only real basis o f agreem ent
V ery sincerely,
H. G. D . Finlayson, as above.
“ O n the O n e and O n ly T ra n sm ig ra n t” , Journal o f the American Oriental
Society, LX IV , S upplem ent 3, 1944.
T o H. G. D. FINLAYSON
N o v em b er 2, 1944
D ear M r Finlayson:
I think you w ould be interested in P ro f F. W. B uckler’s
w ritin g on the K ingdom o f G od on E arth and the direct
developm ent o f this subject from the doctrine o f kingship,
apart from w hich the notion o f the K ingdom on E arth cannot be
understood. O f these w ritings, the m ost easily available is the
Epiphany o f the Cross (Hcffcr, C am bridge, England).
Regarding tolerance and charity, John I w ould seem to
su p p o rt that the “ baptism o f the spirit” is superior to “ the
baptism o f w a te r” , as one w ould naturally suppose. T he latter
is equivalent to initiatory rebirth and has its equivalents in the
initiations o f o th er religions, eg, the Upanayana by w hich the
B rahm an by birth becom es a B rahm an in fact.
V ery sincerely,
H. G. D. Finlayson, as above.
F. W. B uckler, c f page 72.
T o H. G. D. FINLAYSON
D ecem ber 22, 1944
D ear M r Finlayson:
Very sincerely,
H. G. D . Finlayson, as above.
‘O n the O n e and O n ly T ra n sm ig ra n t’, see previous letter.
T o HO RA CE M. KALLEN
D ecem ber 7, 1943
D ear P ro f Kallcn:
I w rite to thank you for sending m e the Jefferson paper.
T here is very m uch in his notions about art w ith w hich I
heartily agree, especially as sum m arised in the beginning o f
your section VI.
O n the other hand, naturally, I do n o t agree w ith your
interpretation and estim ate o f feudal, ie, vocational, societies,
for I hold w ith those w ho believe that “ the need for a
restoration o f the cthics o f vocation has becom e the central
problem o f society” . I will only go into this for a m o m en t in
conncction w ith art. In the vocational societies it is n o t only
held that to heautou prattein kata phusin is o f the very essence o f
justice (dikaiosune , rendered in the N ew T estam ent by “ rig h t
eousness” ) b u t o u r conception o f fine o r useless art, and o f
“ connoisscurship” as a luxury arc unknow n; all art is for use,
and to be ju d g ed by its utility (not, o f course, in the narrow
“ utilitarian” sense, b u t w ith reference to the needs o f the w hole
m an). Y our inference that the artist is only a ijieans to the
co n su m er’s ends is perfectly correct, but does not involve w hat
you infer. O ne can best grasp the relations if wc consider first
the case in w hich the artist is w orking for himself, eg, building
his o w n house; in this case it is evident that the artist as such is
“ m eans” to the m an as such. T here is no difference in principle
w hen artist [and consum er] arc tw o different persons; h ow can
the m aker be other than “ m eans” to the user? T he user (patron,
consum er) is the “ first and last cause” o f the w ork; it is done for
him and directed to him ; all other causes, including the efficient
cause, arc by hypothesis “ m eans” to this “ en d ” . T he balance
here is “ corrected” in various ways. In the first place, in such
societies, the artist is n o t a special kind o f m an, but every m an is
a special kind o f artist; hence, while A is “ m eans” to B, in one
relation, B is means to A in another. M em bers o f a vocational
society, in oth er w ords, provide for one an o th er’s needs, and
each in turn does a service to the other. T here is nothing
w hatever degrading in this “ servility” . In the second place, in
such societies the “ fractioning o f the hum an faculty” involved
in our mcchanical and industrialised m ethods o f production has
n o t arisen; the artist is still an individual responsible for the
product, either individually or through his guild. His w o rk is
never, therefore, entirely “ servile” (using the w o rd n ow in its
m ore technical sense), but bo th free and servile; free inasm uch
as he w orks by art, and servile inasm uch as he w orks by hand.
It is in our socicty, preem inently, that “ excellence in the liberal
arts is the stu ff o f h o n o u r in the eyes o f m en and that w orkm en
are not capable o f this excellence or ever w o rth y o f such
h o n o u r.”
C ordially
H. M . Kallcn, N e w Y ork, U SA .
T o H. M. KALLEN
D ecem ber 9, 1943
D ear Professor Kallcn:
M any thanks for your kind note. I d o n ’t, how ever, agree
w ith your interpretation o f the “ record” . As I see it, m en have
never been less “ free” (except, o f course, to w o rk o r starve)
than here and now . T he notion o f a hierarchy o f functions I
accept. B ut “ despising the w orker and treating him as a tool o f
the consum er” is not attributed to C hristian doctrine, b u t to
the abandonm ent o f the C hristian doctrine against usury and
the accom panying gradual industrialization substitution o f
factory for w orkshop, etc. Exactly the same process can be
w atched today w herever industrial m ethods im pinge upon
vocational societies; the responsible w orkm an is reduced to a
producer o f raw materials. T he w orkm an to be “ despised” (or,
I w ould rather say, “ pitied” ) is one w hose production is for the
needs o f the body alone, and not for the needs o f the soul
together and sim ultaneously (Plato’s dem and, and according to
the anthropologists, the condition that existed in savage
societies). Also, there is a great deal o f difference betw een being
the “ to o l” o f the consum er, and the “ servant” o f the consum er;
one involves degradation, not the other.
Very sincerely,
H . M . Kallcn, as above.
T o BERNARD KELLY
D ate uncertain, b u t 1943 o r la te r
D ear M r Kelly:
It is n o t very easy to give a b rief and at the sam e tim e
adequate answ er to y o u r question. I w ould say that from the
Indian point o f view , Laborare est orare; and that the em phasis
laid upon perfection in doing-and-m aking (karma) in term s o f
vocation, by w hich at the same tim e the m an perfects b o th his
w o rk and him self, is very strong. T he Bhagavad Gita defines
Y oga as “ skill in w o rk s” (here “ skill” is w isdom , ju s t as G reek
sophia was originally “ skill” ). Furtherm ore, o f the H indu term s
for Sacrifice, karma (action) is precisely a doing in the sense o f
sacra facere. This establishes the n o rm o f all activity; as I have
tried to indicate in Hinduism and Buddhism, the requirem ents
o f divine service and the satisfaction o f hum an needs are
inseparable.
A gain, there is no liberation b u t for those w ho are “ all in act”
(krtakrtyah , “ having done w hat there was to be done” ). I think
it is difficult for the m odern W estern m ind, w hich does n o t
m erely and properly recognize the validity o f bo th the active
and contem plative lives, b u t reverses their hierarchy (setting
M artha above M ary), to realise that alike in C hristianity and
H induism , there is recognized a double norm , an ordinary and
an extraordinary n orm . W e have n o t only to live this life well,
b u t also to prepare for another. T here are n o t only “ values” ,
b u t also an ultim ate “ w o rth ” beyond all contraries.
W e shall die; and it is the C hristian (T hom ist, etc) doctrine
that it is the “ intellectual virtues” that will survive. In the
H indu schem e o flife there are recognized four “ stations” (<isra-
ma), those (1) o f studentship, (2) m arriage, procreation and
vocational occupation, (3) retirem ent, and (4) total renunciation
(sannyasa) o f all rights and duties (w hich are handed over,
naturally and ritually, to one’s dcscendcnts, in w hom our
“ character” is reborn and w ho take our place in the w orld o f
rights and duties, o f w hich the incum bency is thus hereditary).
T here is also recognized the possibility o f the special vocation
by w hich one m ay be im periously sum m oned to a total
renunciation o f status and obligations at any age; and how ever
stro n g the H indu em phasis upon social rcsposibility m ay be,
the presence in the w o rld o f those w ho, at least in old age, have
laid d o w n their burden, is a perpetual w itness to the reality o f
the w o rth that transcends all virtues and vices. A society that
m ade a final end o flife itself w ould be m aterialistic indeed; that
w o u ld be to substitute an ideal o f m ere prosperity and
“ progress” for the kingdom o f heaven [which on earth] can
only be realised . . . “ w ithin y o u ” .
T o abandon o n e’s vocational activity is not essential to
perfection (the “ unified state” ). T he ideal is to “ act w ith o u t
acting” ; this is like an actor w ho plays his part perfectly, b u t is
n o t involved in it; and w ho is, therefore, the unm oved
spectator o f his o w n “ fate” , at the sam e tim e that this destiny is
enacted by his o w n tem p o rary psycho-physical vehicle. It is in
these term s that an Indian “ U to p ia ” is conceived.
Y ou will find, I think, this philosophy o f life explicitly
enough expounded in the Bhagavad Gita (esp III, 15—35 and
X V III, 45-49); and the extent to w hich this com pendium o f
Vedic tradition underlies and informs H indu society could
hardly be exaggerated.
I tru st you will find at least a partial answ er in the above; o r if
not, please w rite further.
V ery sincerely,
T o GEORGE SARTON
M arch 25, 1939
D ear D r Sarton:
You probably know and m ust have reviewed F. M. Lund, A d
Quadratum, L ondon, 1921. It seems to me a quite rem arkable
w ork. If by any chance you have n o t dealt w ith it, it seems to
m e it w ould be good to have an article on this and G hyka’s Le
Nombre d ’O r (m any editions, eg, Paris, 1931) together. N o t o f
course a jo b I could do, th ough there is m uch m aterial in b o th
o f deepest interest for me. As I have often said, “ pririiitive”
m an knew n o th in g o f a possible divorce o f function and
m eaning: all his inventions were applied meaning.
Very sincerely,
ANONYMOUS
D ate uncertain
Sir:
T he effect o f o u r civilization and o f industrialism upon any
traditional society is to destroy the basis o f hereditary vocation
on w hich such societies are based: and we m ay say that thus to
rob the m an o f his vocation, even th ough it be done in the nam e
o f “ lib erty ” , is to rob the m an o f his “ living” , n o t only in an
econom ic sense, b u t in the sense that “ m an does not live by
bread alone” : since it is precisely in such societies that the
professions them selves and for the very reason that the
vocation is in every sense o f the w o rd natural, provide the solid
basis o f initiatory teaching.
Sincerely,
T o DR ROBERT ULICH
A ugust 24, 1942
D ear D r Ulich:
I think one o f the best points m ade in yo u r book is the
statem ent that “ all good teaching consists in changing passivity
into activity” . For is it n o t the w hole nature o f progress to
progress from potentiality to act? G od is “ all in act” . M oreover
it is consistent w ith the Platonic and Indian doctrine that all
learning is a recollection; a picture o f a lesson based on this
assum ption is given follow ing [ie, in^or according to] M eno.
I often feel that one cannot teach any understanding directly,
but only break down misunderstanding: in other w ords, dialectical
procedure. T he B uddhist texts often describe a fine serm on as
like bringing a lam p into a dark room . T he destruction o f
som ething enables us to see for ourselves w hat was already
there.
Very sincerely,
T o PROFESSOR L A N G D O N W ARNER
April 13, 1932
M y dear L angdon W arner:
M any thanks for your letter. I am sorry indeed nothing can
be done in the case o f Aga O glu, w ho w ould be such a great
addition to o u r forces— b u t is useless to grieve over a thing
w hich cannot be am ended, after one has done everything
possible.
A propos o f o u r conversation, I reflect that I cannot really
agree w ith the idea that it is good to say to students “ bring your
ow n standards” . It is the beginning o f w isdom to realise that all
standards are relative, and w hy n o t let them face this fact at
once? In m y N Y lectures, beginning w ith a few w ords as to
the “ value o f o u r discipline” , I suggested that if this fact w ere
learnt from the course, it w ould be o f m ore value to the student
than any o f the facts o f the art history that he m ight acquire
from it. I tell them that art is n o t a universal language; “ pure
aesthetic experience” is im m utable and universal, indeed
inscrutable, b u t no one is com petent to enjoy aesthetic
experience until all his objections (based on his ow n standards,
for exam ple) and curiosities have been allayed. So I set m yself
to rem ove these barriers, thinking that it depends then entirely
on the student’s ow n nature, when he is in a position to possess
the art, o r at the very least to take it for granted, w hether o r not
he can enjoy aesthetic experience. O therw ise, 1 tell them , in
m erely liking and disliking any w ork they are doing no m ore
than gaining one m ore new sensation; than which it w ould be
b etter n o t to go abroad, mais cultiver son jardin. All this m ay be
hard sledding for the average student, but the m ore you ask the
m ore you get, and I do not believe in com prom ise. I k now you
will be shocked.
Very sincerely,
T o STUART CHASE
3 February 1941
D ear M r Chase:
I was m uch interested in yo u r article in the February Reader’s
Digest, w hich I saw by chance. It affords another instance o f the
rediscovery o f a principle that has always been know n
traditionally. Plato (Republic 395 B, 500 D) points o u t that the
practice o f an art and the w age-earning capacity o r business
instinct are tw o different things, so that “ a m an does not earn
w ages by his a rt” as such, but accidentally. He says that “ m ore
things are produced, and better and m ore easily, w hen one m an
perform s one kind o f w o rk in accordance with his own nature,
opportunely and at leisure from other cares” (ibidem 370 C, cf
374 B, C , 347 E, 406 C, etc); and this “ doing o f one’s o w n
w o rk ” is his type o f “ju stice” (ibidem 433 B, 443 C). St.
T hom as Aquinas says that the w orkm an is “ inclined by justice
to do his w o rk faithfully” (Sum Theol I-II 57.3 ad 2) and that he
is “ only concerned w ith the good o f the w o rk to be d o n e”
(ididem 1.91'.3). I have m yself pointed out in print, as did also
Eric Gill, that under norm al (vocational) conditions the m an at
w o rk is doing what he likes best and w ould rather do than even
play. T he fact that under a system o f production for profit, in
w hich the w o rk m an is no longer a responsible m aker b u t only a
tool him self, a system in w hich livelihood is earned not in the
course o f follow ing a vocation, but in a jo b to w hich one is
forced by need and to w hich one could never be “ callcd” by
anyone b u t a “ m anufacturer” , the traditional axiom that
“ pleasure perfects the o peration” can no longer apply. I will n o t
lengthen o u t this letter by citing O riental sources, b u t only say
that I have m y self em ployed hereditary craftsm en in the East to
m ake a certain nu m b er o f objects for me, being paid by the day
w hile the w o rk was going on. These m en w ere so m uch
interested in and fond o f their w ork and appreciation o f it that
they could n o t be dissuaded from w orking at it by candlelight
at night, although this obviously reduced the total o f m oney
they w o u ld be able to earn from me. I m ay add that m y ow n
w o rk is also m y vocation, and that “ hours o f labor” mean
n o th in g to me; I should be very angry if asked to w o rk only so
m any hours per w eek. B ut this is the exception under m odern
conditions, th o u g h it was once the rule. I believe it is only
w hen p roduction is prim arily for use and not prim arily for
profit that on the one hand the w orkm an is free and happy, and
on the oth er produces objects o f such quality as can rightly be
desired by the consum er. It is only because industrialism
reverses these conditions, and n o t because machines o f any kind
are bad in them selves, that people have becom e accustom ed to
expect “ a rt” only in m useum s, and nothing b u t utility
elsew here.*
V ery sincerely,
S tu art C hase grad u ated from H arv ard in 1910 and w o rk ed as an accountant
at th e Federal T rad e C o m m issio n before becom ing a freelance w riter. T he
article in q u estion w as ‘W hat M akes the W o rk er Like to W ork?’, Reader’s
Digest, F ebruary 1941. M r C hase w as later associated w ith the art and
arch eo lo g y d ep a rtm en t at D a rtm o u th C ollege, H anover, N ew H am pshire,
U SA .
* M achines m u st be distinguished fro m tools. T h e latter are unquestionably
legitim ate, b u t i f the fo rm er arc n o t ‘bad in them selves’ it m ust nevertheless
be recognized that from a traditional perspective som ething like an
‘occasion o f sin ’ in d u b itab ly attaches to them
T o STUART CHASE
February 11, 1941
D ear M r Chase:
T hanks for y o u r letter. T he problem you raise seems to m e
to be one o f values, and closely bound up w ith the alternatives,
p roduction for use o r production for profit. It is significant that
“ m anufacture” has come to mean not the actual maker o f
anything, b u t essentially a big salesman. I am n o t going to deny
the “ benefits o f quantity p ro d u ctio n ” , b u t to m ake som e
reservations.
I think it is o u r great m istake to tend to identify civilisation
and standards o f living w ith quantity o f w ants and their
satisfaction. Vast quantities o f things arc n ow made, w hich are
ju s t w hat Plato w ould have described as “ n o t such as free m en
really need” . Som e o f these things have only com e to seem to
be necessities because o f the excessive degree o f m en ’s
separation from the soil on w hich he ultim ately depends.
O th ers w hich provide us w ith am usem ent and “ distraction” in
m any cases seem to be necessities only for the very reason that
w e are n o t deriving adequate pleasure (the traditional “ pleasure
that perfects the o p eratio n ” ) from our w ork. O thers are m ade
only to sell. A nd in any case there is som e natural antithesis
betw een quantity and quality.
N o w the events o f the last th irty years have m ade us a little
less confident that o u r “ progress” has been altogether in the
right direction; w c are n o t altogether unw illing to m ake
revaluations. T h e sam e problem com es up in our educational
program m es. If w e are to have any standards by w hich to ju d g e
means to living, must wc not somehow once more come to kind o f
agreem ent ab o u t the purpose o f life and hence w hat w e o u ght
to m ean by “ standard o f living” , or in traditional term s, “ the
good life” ?
Means arc not and m ust not be confused with ends: they arc
m eans to ends. In any case, it seems obvious that the kind o f
m en w e produce is m ore im p o rtan t than the quantity o f things
they can possess*; and that the kind o f m en wc produce is very
closely bound up w ith the kind o f things they m ake, and the
quality o f these things them selves, w hich they use and by
w hich they cannot b u t be influenced.
T he basic requirem ent, is, then, an establishm ent o f and
som e agreem ent about real values. T he result w ould be, n o t
necessarily an abolition o f all quantity production, b u t certainly
a reduction in the am o u n t o f it. This alone w ould som ew hat
sim plify the problem , w hich turns fundam entally upon the
question, w hat are the things that o u ght to be m ade o r w h at are
the things that free m en o u g h t to possess? (I am not, o f course,
referring to a m erely political freedom , w hich as w e k n o w does
n o t secure to the w o rk er the op p o rtu n ity to be happy in his
w ork; it has in fact often been the case, historically, that slaves
have been able to be happy at their w o rk in a w ay that o u r
politically free “ w age-slaves” cannot be). I am far from
denying that som e things can be beautifully m ade by the use o f
m achines, w hen these are essentially tools in the hands o f
intelligent and responsible w orkm en; b u t w ould say that it
seems to m e that it is n o t p roper for free m en (in the full sense
o f the w ords) either to m ake o r to use things w hich are n o t bo th
beautiful and adapted to good use, pulcher et aptus; that only
those things that are bo th useful are really (ie, “ form ally rig h t” )
as Plato says “ W holesom e” ; and that it is from this point o f
view, and considering m en first and things second, that we
have to approach this problem .
I am sending you a recent pam phlet. If you are ever in
B oston, perhaps you will find tim e to drop in at the M useum
w here I am daily except on Saturdays.
V ery sincerely,
Sir:
C aptain Ludovici and others have referred to the decline in
the birthrate as representing a loss o f the sense o f responsibility
to society. M ay it n o t be that this loss o f the sense o f
responsibility is bound up w ith and cannot be considered apart
from o th er and even m ore fundam ental im poverishm ents? I
mean, in particular, that the decline in the birthrate may be
largely a function o r sy m p to m o f the loss o f the sense o f
vocation, metier, ministerium.
For Plato and the Vedic tradition, all m en are born in
debt— to their ancestors, to w h o m they ow e the existing
am enities o f the environm ent into w hich they arc born; and the
m ain reason for having children is that they m ay in their turn
assum e the specific functions that w ere fulfilled by their
fathers before them. The vocation is an incumbency; and it is
proverbial that everyone is in love w ith his o w n family “ trad e”
(tread, w alk, w ay). B ut w ho n o w takes, o r can take this kind o f
pride in his “ o w n w o rk ” , or desires above all things to be w hat
his father was? For the vast m ajority o f men are no longer
responsible artists, having a calling, but only cam their living
by labouring at jo y s to w hich no one but the industrial system ,
or m ore abstractly, “ econom ic determ ination” , has sum m oned
them ? If ever once again the concept o f vocational responsibility
can be restored— if ever the m iner’s union, for exam ple, comes
to regard it as their first responsibility to keep hom e fires
b urning— then, w hen the stability o f society itself is thus
ensured, responsibility will also be felt again, to procreate in
that others m ay carry on o u r tasks.
AKC
Sir:
M r R eckitt’s discussion o f the “ Ivory Shelter” in yo u r issue
o f N o v 2 raises w hat can only be a problem in a functionally
unorganized and “ atom ic” society, in w hich there are no longer
professions or vocations, no longer metiers, b u t only jo b s and
occupations, and w here, therefore, the “ artist” can be regarded
as a special kind o f man. In a traditional social order, every m an
w ho m akes o r orders anything is an artist: the forging o f
w eapons is an art, w ar is an art, and painting and sculpture are
no m ore arts than either o f these. T here arises then no question
betw een m an and artist as to w ho shall fight; the question arises
only as betw een different kinds o f artist, all o f w hich kinds m ay
be equally essential to “ good use” and, therefore, to the “ good
life” that w e have in view w hen w e think o f civilisation as a
“ g o o d ” . In an [traditionally] organized society it is everym an’s
first du ty to practice his o w n vocation; w hich, in as m uch as
vocation corresponds to nature, is also his best means o f
w o rk in g o u t his o w n salvation; m an’s first duty socially thus
coinciding w ith his first duty from the religious point o f view.
It is then, the du ty only o f the professional soldier, or in
other w ords o f the m em bers o f the ruling (kshatrya, ritterlich)
class, to fight; it is neither for the priest, the trader, n o r for the
“ artist” (the m aker o f anything “ by a rt” ) to fight. If at the
present day it is— even for w om en and children— to fight
(w om en over 50 have been denied U .S . citizenship because
they w o u ld n o t prom ise to bear arm s in defense o f their
country) this can only m ean that the com m unity is in extremis,
w here m ere existence and “ bread alone” are at stake. T he fact is
that those w ho aspire to “ em pire” (in the m odern connotation
o f the term ) cannot also afford a culture, o r even an agriculture:
w e do n o t sufficiently realise that the “ civilisation” that m en are
supposed to be fighting for is already a m useum piece. If at the
present day w e are not shocked by this last consequence o f
individualism and laissez faire, a consequence that violates the
nature o f every m an w ho is not a soldier born and bred, it is
because w e are inured to m em bership in industrial societies that
are n o t organic structures but atom ic aggregates o f servile units
that can be p u t to any task that m ay be required o f them by a
deified “ n atio n ” : the individual, w ho was n o t “ free” before the
w ar, b u t already part o f a “ system ” , is n o t n ow “ free” to stand
alo o f from it.
AKC
T o THE N A T I O N , N E W YORK
January 30, 1943
D ear Sirs;
D r N eib u h r, in his review o f S hridharni’s Warning to the West
in T he N ation o f January 2, speaks o f the Indian caste system as
“ the m ost rigid form o f class snobbishness in h isto ry ” . O ne
could n o t have a better illustration o f the fallacy o f claim ing
that the form o f o ne’s ow n go v ern m en t” is best, n o t only for
him self, b u t also for the rest o f m ankind” (Franz Boas, cited in
the sam e issue). In the first place, it m ay be observed that no
snobbishness can exist w here there is no social am bition:
Indians do not, like Am ericans, have to keep up w ith the
Joneses. A nd let m e add that the form o f his social o rder is the
last thing that could occur to an Indian to apologize for, w hen
he com pares it w ith the inform ality o f W estern proletarian
industrialism s. I say “ Industrialism s” rather than “ dem ocra
cies” because in these so-called self-governing societies the
Indian [can see] nothing that can be com pared w ith the really
dem ocratic character o f the internal self-governm ent o f his ow n
castes or guilds and his o w n village com m unities.
It has been very truly pointed out by A. M. H ocart, author
o f Les Castes (Paris, 1938), probably the best book in the subject
available that “ hereditary service is quite incom patible w ith our
industrialism , and that is w hy it is always painted in such dark
co lo rs.” M r H ocart also points o u t that w e m ust n o t be
frightened by the connotations o f the E uropean w ords that are
used to translate Indian term s. T he caste system , he says, is not
one o f oppression, “ but, on the contrary, m ay be m uch less
oppressive than o u r industrial sy stem .” ’T he m em bers o f the
m ost m enial castes are chargcd w ith certain functions; b u t there
is no one w ho can compel them to perform them , otherw ise
than by the em ploym ent o f a proper etiquette, addressing them
w ith requests arc treating them w ith respect.
T raditional societies o f the Indian type are based on vocation.
T he vocation is sacrcd, and one’s descendents in due course
take o n e’s place in the fram ew ork o f socicty for the fulfilm ent
o f w hat is strictly speaking a m inistration (it was cxactly for
the same reason that Plato held that w e ow e it to society to
beget successors). If the Indian has no children, this can be
rem edied by adoption; but if one’s children adopt another
profession than their father’s, that is the end o f the “ fam ily” as
such; its h o n o u r is no m ore, and that holds as m uch for the
highest as for the low est.
AKC
T h is letter ends rath er ab ru p tly , b u t it is all that is available to the editors and
w e believe it m akes the essential p o in t clearly enough.
T o D O N A LUISA C O O M A RA SW A M Y
A ugust 11, 1935
Darling:
. . . I did receive, value and answ er your letter about the
Vidyapati experience: 1 rem arked on yo u r having been able to
retain it after elim ination o f the personal elem ent. I do not
k n o w about kudra as Krishna's ego. B ut Indra’s position in R V
already— n o t all the tim e, b u t in m any places— represents the
revolt o f the tem poral p o w er (ksatra) against the spiritual pow er
(brahma), although the legitim acy o f ksatra depends entirely on
brahma consecration (rajasiiya). T he dual Indragni gives you the
2 operating in one— the prim ordial condition: Indra, to w h o m
A gni entrusts the vajra, the true relationship w hen the functions
are separated. W hen Indra asserts his independence, being
carricd aw ay by pride (abhimana) the real deviation begins.
H istorically, this is the Ksatra asserting itself, retaining a
Luciferian grandeur, but the m ovem ent ultim ately becom es
Satanic. H istorically, the ksatra revolt is indicated in the
B uddhist period and results in heterodoxy. W hat has taken
place in the W est (and is taking place in the East also) is ju s t the
inevitable subsequent revolt o f the econom ic ( vaisya ) pow er
against the ksatra, and finally the revolt o f the sudras, resulting
no longer even heterodoxy, b u t a com pletely antitraditional
attitude and disorder. It is the last stage o f the K ali Yuga. These
stages m ove w ith accelerated rapidity tow ards the close. T hey
should be follow ed by “ a new heaven and a new earth” , ie, a
restoration o f spirituality. T he transition is always dark and
catastrophic. T he present crisis is m ore acute and w orld w ide
than any w e k n o w in history: w hat is to follow should be
therefore a very great revolution in character, a real Menschen-
erneurung. I have no d o u b t that the identification o f Indra w ith
Lucifcr-Satan is sound. Satan in this sense is the Prince o f the
W orld— n o t to be confused w ith the Pow er o f D arkness that is
the ab intra (guhya ) aspect o f the Light. T he “ back” o f G od is
indeed “ hell” for those w ho “ fall”— as Satan falls, b u t as you
will see, it is n o t really Satan’s home, but a condition that he falls
into ; Satan’s hom e is in heaven, as Lucifer, as you see in the
identifications o f Indra w ith the Sun and his frequent control o f
the Solar W heel. . . .
T o return to the futility o f certain ones— it is a part o f the
general delusion, the attem p t to com prom ise; one m ust be
rigidly o rth o d o x o r else im pure. M y objection to m ost
C hristians is n o t b ig o try b u t that they com prom ise w ith
m odernism . I think consistently highly o f G uenon. Speaking o f
the desirability o f a return (for Europe) to C hristianity, he
rem arks that “ if this could be, the m odern world would
automatically disappear.” Also very good, that w hile from the
eternal p oint o f view it is inevitable that all possibilities, even
evil ones, should be w orked out, in tim e, eg, in and especially
as n o w at the end o f the K ali Yuga, the text applies “ It m ust be
that offenses will com e, b u t w oe unto them th ro u g h w h o m
they com e. . . . ”
T he one thing lacking in the organisation o f life is rta. W hat
rta m eans is the m etaphysical pattern, the divine art. Som e day I
shall try to show h ow the w hole dom estic and m arital pattern
in India follow s a purely m etaphysical plan, as it was in the
beginning (agre). Especially as regards pardah*, exogam y, etc.
T he husband is always A ryan, the m other non-A ryan, respec
tively D eva and Asura, pow ers o f Light and Darkness; in other
w ords, the m aternal possibility, the pow er that enables things
to be (as distinguished from the pow er that m akes them be) is
always a priori in the darkness, and o f the darkness, and “ has
never seen the Sun n o r felt the w in d ” , in other w ords, is behind
the curtain (o f the sky), that is to say Pardah.
Therefore Pardah, as that reflection o f the divine pattern, m ay
be reflected on earth. It is as usual nothing b u t man that m akes
people rebel at such things, ju s t “ I” .
As regards the lack o f profound persons in India also: in any
case there is still there a solid mass o f conservative peasants
w hose m entality is alm ost unspoiled, and this is a great reserve
force. Also there are m ore o f the “ o rth o d o x ” than one
sees— the better they are, the less visible. I think in tim e you
will recognize m ore such people. A nyhow , it is useless to spend
tim e considering the defects o f the “ educated” , they are lost,
and th a t’s that; only the positive w ork is really w o rth while.
AKC
T o J O H N J. H O N I G M A N N
O cto b er 17, 1946
D ear M r H onigm ann:
I greatly appreciate yo u r noticc o f m y Religious Basis . . . in
Psychiatry. I should like to say, how ever, that you did n o t quite
“ g e t” the concept o f freedom that I tried to explain. I w ould
adm it that a m an feels free to the extent that he is in harm ony
w ith the culture in w hich he participates, and that the elite are
the m ost responsible bearers o f the accepted values. B ut this is
only a relative freedom , from w hich the really freem an only
escapes w hen he adopts the “ extraordinary” means.
In any case, it is the m em bers o f the “ elite” w ho have the
least freedom “ to do w hat they like” , and that is w hy I said
A m ericans w ould choose (if a caste system w ere im posed upon
them ) to be Sudras o r “ outcastes” .
As to another point: there is no question o f w anting to
“ co n v ert” the W est to Indian ways o f thinking as such; I have
often em phasized that. T he question is, “ w hat are the basic
prem ises o f the W estern w o rld ” , that you speak of? I am not
sure that these are the ideas o f “ free enterprise” , etc, etc, that
happen to be fashionable at the m om ent. I am not sure that
oth er ideas such as that o f “ju s t price” are n o t really m ore basic
even to W estern society; and all I w ould hope for is a return to
w h at I think o f as the really “ basic prem ises” o f W estern
culture, m o st o f w hich seem to be ignored at the present day.
T o that I w ould add that w hat I think o f as the basic prem ises o f
the W est are n o t so far from those o f the East; hence there could
be a rapproachm ent w ith o u t anything in the nature o f “ a
conversion im p o se d .”
Very sincerely,
T o PROFESSOR W ES T O N LA BARRE
O cto b er 30, 1945
D ear Professor La Barre:
W hile I agree w ith m any points m ade in yo u r A ugust
Psychiatry article (notably the last sentence o f the second
paragraph in w hich respect, I think, Pearl Buck often offends) I
do n o t think the first sentence o f yo u r note 63* can be
substantiated; cf, for exam ple Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 1.4.14:
“ T his is w h at makes the Regnum (ruling caste) the Regnum, viz,
Justice (dharma . . ., Chinese /«); wherefore there is nothing that
surpasses Justice, and so a weak m an as regards one stronger
than h im se lf puts his tru st in Justice, ju s t as one m ig h t in the
K in g .” In the O riental concept o f m onarchy the king, o f
course, is expected to be the em bodim ent o fjustice; hence, as in
this n ex t text, it is taken for granted that to appeal to Justice is
the sam e thing as the appeal to Caesar. M oreover, as the
Arthasastra says, “ the w hole o f the science o f governm ent
depends u p o n a victory over the pow ers o f perception and
action” (cf m y Spiritual A uthority and Temporal Power . . .,
1942, p 36).
In view o f the fact that you are intending to analyse Indian
character in a future article, I am rather disturbed by yo u r notes
26 and 29, w hich seem to show no know ledge o f Indian
theology o r sociology o th er than m ight be expected from the
m ost prejudiced missionaries. In particular, “Ju g g ern ath ” , ie,
Jagannath, “ L ord o f the W orld” , is n o t a “ m o th e r” , b u t one o f
the nam es o f Vishnu, as Solar R ex M undi\ to w h o m no hum an
o r other b loody sacrifices are ever m ade. Again, w hat you call
“ p u n ishm ent by caste” corresponds to o u r legal disbarm ent or
w ithdraw al o f license to practice in the case o f law yers or
doctors w ho offend professional ethics. I do venture to hope
that before com m ittin g yo u rself on the subject o f caste you will
at least have read w hat has been said on the subject by such m en
as Sir G eorge B ird w o o d (in Industrial Arts in India, and Sva) and
A. M . H o cart (Les Castes)', as the latter rem arks, pp 70, 237,
238:
N o u s devons ne pas etre egares par les equivalents europeen
p o u r des m ots indiens. . . . nous savons que l’histoire de ce
system c n ’cst pas l’histoirc d ’une oppression absolue, mais
q u ’au contraire il peut etre beaucoup m oins oppressif que
n otre system e industriel. . . . Le service hereditaire est to u t a
fait incom patible avec l’industrialism e actuel et c’est p o u r-
quoi il est peint sous des coleurs aussi som bre.
It is, in fact, precisely from the axiology underlying caste
system s, ie, vocationally integrated social orders, that one can
best criticize the im m orality o f industrial exploitation. I venture
to hope that you will also consult a few such w orks as Sister
N iv ed ita’s Web o f Indian Life and Kali the Mother; Bhagavan
D as’ Science o f Social Organization; The Cultural Heritage o f India ;
and the late Professor Z im m e r’s forthcom ing book, before
going on to analyse a “ character” w ith w hich you seem to be so
little acquainted. I am sure you will pardon me for speaking so
frankly on a m atter o f such im portance.
V ery sincerely,
A ugust 2, 1935
D ear Professor Furfey:
I found yo u r F orw ard to Sociology and read it w ith pleasure
and interest. It is about tim e to realise that science was m ade for
m an, n o t m an for science. I look forw ard to anything further
you m ay find in St T hom as on intuitive know ledge. H ow ever,
I think it is n o t— at least generally speaking— sufficient to rely
on such intuition as one m ay oneself be capable of, m erely, but
that w e have also the guidance o f Revelation— I refer o f course
to universal revelation and n o t exclusively to its form ulation in
any one religion. Society can only be, let us say, a success
insofar as it conform s to the pattern in principio\ and this
dem ands at least a know ledge o f the doctrine o f hierarchy. A nd
h o w can one properly com prehend the true relation o f C hurch
and State, Spiritual and tem poral pow er, w ith o u t a realisation
that these are again in principio functions o f one perfect
consciousness, the eternal A vatar being bo th Priest and King
(w hich is also T h o m ist doctrine).
V ery sincerely,
T o THE NA TIO N
M ay 29, 1945
D ear Sirs:
In yo u r M ay 26 issue, p 604, M r H ook attributes to Plato the
doctrine that “ expert know ledge alone gives the right to rule” .
This is m isleading, sincc w hat Plato had in m ind was
som ething very different from w hat w e mean w hen we speak
o f “ g o vernm ent by experts” . His doctrine is that only w isdom
and the love o f w isdom qualify for rule, and at the same tim e
im pose upon those w ho are thus qualified a duty to participate
in public life, for w hich they will have*no natural taste. In the
Law s, Book III, he defines as ignorant those w ho are
unam enable to reason and are ruled by their likes and dislikes;
and they are “ ig n o ran t” , “ even though they be expert
calculators, and trained in all m anner o f accom plishm ents” ; it is
to the wise w ho live reasonably and harm oniously, that the
go v ern m en t should be entrusted, even if they arc illiterate and
unlearned w orkm en. His distinction o f the ignorant from the
expert is as betw een those w ho hate and those w ho love w hat
they ju d g e to be good and fair. Protagoras speaks sim ilarly,
3 22-3.
In the sam e issue, p 603, Miss M arshall quotes w ith approval
D r N o m ad on the camel and the eye o f needle. O ne w ould like
to k n o w in w hat authoritative version o f the Greek Gospels the
w o rd was kamilos: n o t only is it kamelos in the O x fo rd edition o f
the text that was follow ed by the Revisers o f the A uthorized
V ersion, and in the O x fo rd text o f the Four Gospels published
in 1932, b u t also in the Jam es Strong Exhaustive Concordance.
Jalalu’d din R um i, w ho both knew camels and was fam iliar also
w ith the traditional m eaning o f “ threading the eye o f the
needle” , w rites: “ T he eye o f the needle is not suitable for the
cam el” (M athnaw i , 1.83). T he camel has been, in fact, a
recognized sym bol o f the carnal as distinguished from the
spiritual self; and w c have the related figure in M atthew , o f
“swallowing a cam el.” While it is true that “ rope” w ould also
have m ade good (and traditional) sense, it appears from Liddell
and Scott (w ho can cite only tw o references to the w ord
kamilos, neither o f them Biblical) that “ rope has been th o u g h t
by som e a m ore likely figure than a cam el” , and it seems to me
that M r N o m ad , too, is only voicing an opinion, and that he
has no right to laugh at the translators, w ho w ere not m en o f
the s o r t'th a t m ake “ boners” .
A KC
T o SIDNEY H O O K
U ndated
D ear Professor H ook:
I send you the copy o f a letter [above] sent to the Nation
w hich I daresay they m ay n o t find room for. H ow ever, I am
sure you will adm it the justice o f m y criticism .
V ery sincerely,
T o SIDNEY H O O K
June 6, 1945
D ear Professor H ook:
M any thanks for your letter. W e clearly disagree. H ow ever, I
w o u ld say that the w hole m atter is for Plato n o t so m uch a
m atter o f right to rule as o f duty. T o philosophers generally,
governm ental activity is distasteful, and should be exercised
precisely by those w ho are not interested in pow er. G overn
m ent, as distinguished from tyranny, is a m atter o f Justice, or
P roportionate Equality. In Protagoras, 3 2 2 -3 , it is pointed out
that w hile the special know ledges and vocations pertain to the
relatively few specialists in their fields, the sense o fju stice, etc,
is n o t peculiar to the few, b u t com m on to all regardless o f their
vocation, and therefore that all m ay be consulted in civic
m atters. All, that is, w ho aren’t “ ig n o ran t” in the sense o f the
Laws passage to which I previously referred. I think these
passages are absolutely relevant to the present discussion.
Philo follow s Plato in saying that philosophers should be
kings, o r kings philosophers. Philo, o f course, m aintains that
“ d em ocfacy” , as distinguished from “ m ob rule” , is the best
constitution. B ut neither Plato n o r Philo is thinking o f
“ philo so p h y ” as a speciality in o u r academic sense, b u t o f
som ething that is quite as m uch a w ay o f life as a w ay o f
know ing. In m ost traditional societies philosophy, in their
sense, is actually widely distributed and com m on to all classes.
O n the o th er hand, o u r form o f governm ent here is not in fact a
dem ocracy at all in P hilo’s sense, b u t represents a balance o f
p o w er reached as betw een com peting interests; and so
approaches the classical definition o f tyranny, viz, g overnm ent
by a ruler in his o w n interest. T o be disinterested is the prim ary
qualification. As the Indian books on g o vernm ent m aintain,
“ T he w hole o f this science has to do w ith the victory over the
pow ers o f sensation and action” , ie, w ith self-control as the
p rim ary condition o f authority.
Y ours very sincerely,
Sidney H o o k , as above.
Sir:
Y ou gave currency (Jan 23, p 154) to M r C ham berlain’s
recent statem ent in Harper’s that “ personal autocracy” is typical
o f Asiatic states. I have spent the greater part o f the last tw o
years on a study o f the Indian theory o f governm ent; the theory
is essentially the sam e as the Platonic and C hinese theories, and
is in fact the only theory o f governm ent that could be set up on
the basis o f the philosophia perennis. I can say positively that the
Indian kingship, although divinely sanctioned (it w ould be truer
to say because divinely sanctioned), im plied anything b u t a
“ personal autocracy” . T he last thing expected o f the Indian
king was to “ do as he liked” ; he had to do w hat was “ co rrect”
and according to the “ scicnce” o f governm ent. T he R egnum is
the agent o f the Saccrdotum , and it is the k in g ’s business to do
w hat the philosopher know s o u g h t to be done; m ight, in other
w ords, is to be the servant o f right.
T he traditional theory o f governm ent is certainly n o t one o f a
go v ern m en t by all the people, but it is a theory o f governm ent
in accordance w ith justice, and fo r all the people. T he distinc
tions betw een m onarchy and tyranny are sharply draw n; the
m onarch governs by divine right and w ith the consent o f the
people; the ty ran t is asserting his ow n will and opinions, to
w hich the people are forcibly subjected. Wc need hardly say
that there is noth in g royal about a totalitarian despotism ; the
tyrant, indeed, is generally a plebian himself.
AKC
T o THE NEW ENGLISH WEEKLY, LONDON
N ovem ber 1946
Sir:
I fully agree w ith your review er, Paul D errick (N E W, O ct
10) that “ betw een the idea o f popular sovereignty and the idea
o f natural law, there can be no com prom ise” , and w ith the
views cited from D r M cC abe and Philip M urray. B ut I m ust
point o u t that he is w rong in saying that “ the doctrine o f the
divine right o f m ajorities has m uch in com m on w ith the
doctrine o f the divine right o f kings, and w ith such ideas as that
o f the historic mission o f the G erm an race.” In the first place
there is no such thing as a “ doctrine” o f the divine right o f
m ajorities, but only an opinion held by m any that it is right and
proper for a m ajority to im pose its will on a m inority; and this
view is entertained by m any for w hom the notion o f a divine
right has no m eaning w hatever. In the second place, the
doctrine o f a divine right o f kings is not, historically speaking, a
doctrine that kings, as such, arc divinely sanctioned to do w hat
they like. It is, strictly speaking, a doctrine o f the vicc-royalty
on behalf o f the K ing o f kings. As R um i says in so m any
w ords: “ K ings arc the theatre for the m anifestation o f G o d ’s
kingship” (M athnaw i 6.3174); w hile the classical definition o f a
tyrant is a “ king governing in his ow n interests.” T he king is
the m ediator o f the N atural Law and by all means subject to it
him self. As an U panishad expresses it: “ T he Law (dharma) is
that by w hich the ruler is a ruler, and so there is nothing higher
than the Law. H ence a weak m an can control a strong one by
the Law, as if by a k in g ” (B U 1.4, 14). An anonym ous fifteenth
century English w riter rem arks that “ the Law is the highest
inheritance o f the king by which he and all his subjects shall be
ruled. A nd if there w ere no Law, there w ould be no king and no
inheritance.” M ore recently G. Every, w riting in Purpose
(A pril-Junc 1939) rem arked that “ an aristocracy functioning as
such m ust have a standard o f responsibility outside o f its ow n
and its leader’s w ill.” As for the G erm ans: there is a sense in
w hich every race and every individual has a “ historic m ission” ,
or, in o th er w ords, divinely sanctioned rights and responsibili
ties.; w here the G erm ans erred was in assum ing that they had a
divine sanction to play the tyrant, as defined above.
Furtherm ore, the traditional doctrine o f m onarchy is insepar
able from that o f vocation, w hich involves, as M r Derrick
know s, all m e n ’s “ right (and duty) to participate as responsible
agents in the w ork o f the w o rld ”— as “ co-w orkers” w ith God.
E very m an in his calling participates “ in the m ystery o f the
vice-rcgcncy (khilafah , Caliphate) w hich was conferred on man
alone” , as a “ tru st” (amanah ). A nd finally, as Professor Buckler
has so often pointed out— see The Epiphany o f the Cross
(C am bridge, 1938)— the analogy o f the “ kingdom o f G od on
earth ” cannot be understood unless the political theory on
w hich the analogy rests has first been understood. W hoever has
m isunderstood the political analogy o f earthly kingdom s and
their righteousness, cannot have grasped the m eaning o f “ the
kin g d o m o f G od and its righteousness” , a m eaning “ w hich
depends fo r its revelation on the inner m eaning o f eastern
kingship” , as B uckler points o u t in his chapter on “ T he
O riental D esp o t” . All these considerations rather su p p o rt than
invalidate M r D errick’s general position, and I think he m ay
find them acceptable.
AKC
T o W ILLIAM R OT HE NS TEIN
June 25, 1910
D ear Rothenstein:
T hank you for yo u r letters and understanding w ords. I am
touched by the real sym pathy betw een us. By the w ay, it seems
that you did n o t realise m y wife is w ith me! If, as som e have
suggested, I should be accused o f o r even im prisoned for
sedition on account o f that book, I k now that you and others
will do som ething to point o u t that such w o rk does m ake for
real unity and that I m ight be m ore useful out o f prison than in.
I fully enter into w hat you say. I w ant to serve n o t m erely
India, but hum anity, and to be as absolutely universal as
possible— like the avalokitesvara. M y o w n life ju s t n ow seems
tangled. I do tru st this m ay never h u rt the w ork.
Y ours,
R othenstein, Sir W illiam , critic, one tim e head o f the R oyal C ollege o f A rt,
leading figure in art circlcs and friend o f C o o m arasw am y .
T o ARTHU R SIBLY
D ecem ber 6, 1945
D ear A rth u r Sibly;
A propos o f y our reference to India, in your last letter. I fully
understand that it is very difficult for you to realise that an
Englishm an west o f Suez and the same man cast o f Suez arc
m orally tw o different beings; this applies, o f course, not
necessarily to actual physical position, but w ith reference to
that to w hich the m ind is directed at a given time. H alf
consciously, even K ipling understood this w hen he said that
there are no ten com m andm ents East o f Suez. N o do u b t he
th o u g h t he was speaking o f the “ lesser breeds w ith o u t the
law ” ! but very little psychoanalysis w ould rem ind one that il
pittore pinge se stesso.
I am sending you tw o books, respectively by a Chinaman and
an Englishman, but only as a man that you can form a “ju s t”
opinion (as an Englishm an, your opinion will be “ English” ). Is
it too m uch to ask that you read these books only as a m an,
forgetting that you arc an Englishm an? For your hum anity
transcends your nationality.
W ith kind regards,
T o ARTHUR SIBLY
N ovem ber 14, 1931
M y dear A rth u r Sibly:
I can’t help w riting you again about India, because your
point o f view expressed in the last Star (p 53) is so typically
heartless and self-satisfied. Q u ite apart from the fact that in
India w e always have hundreds o f m en im prisoned w ith o u t
charge or trial, and such men can be held for 5 years w ith o u t
trial (your father’s history lessons taught me w hat to think o f
such things as this!), I m ust m ention that I have never m et any
Indian (and you will realise that I know m any w ho are your or
m y equals or superiors, intellectually and morally) w ho
believed in “ British ju stice” . Really, a fact like this ought to
m ake you think seriously. W hat do you think the English are? I
have no m ore anti-English feeling than G andhi has, but it
seems equally ridiculous to suppose they are angels from
heaven, capable o f governing a w hole country entirely alien in
civilisation, from a distance and w ith perfect justice, regardless
o f the fact that justice w ould often be against their ow n interest.
In fact, I have often said that one o f the strongest reasons
against E n g lan d ’s governing India is the profound moral injury
it does to E ngland. D o you realise how you speak like a visitor
from M ars? W hereas in fact you are “ the m an in possession” . It
w ould be funny if it w ere not so tragic.
W ith kind regards,
T o ARTHU R SIBLY
January 12, 1932
D ear A rth u r Sibly:
T hanks for y o u r reply to m y letter, w hich I k now was rather
forcible in expression. In discussing justice I had reference (a) to
the general situation, including for exam ple the failure and even
obstruction o f justice that followed the A m ritsar massacre,
[and] (b) to justice as rendered in courts in cases betw een
Indians and the go v ern m en t or European individuals. (N o
Englishm an has ever been sentenced to death for the m u rd er o f
an Indian, I believe. Lord C urzon lost his V iceroyalty on trying
to do justice in a case o f this kind.) I am ready to adm it that in
som e cases an English m agistrate ju d g in g betw een tw o Indian
litigants m ay n o t only be perfectly ju st, b u t m ore ju s t than an
Indian ju d g e m ight always be in these circum stances. B ut this is
only a particular case o f w h at w ould be generally true: for
exam ple, a Swiss ju d g e m ight deal better w ith a poaching case
than could an English squire on the bench. Still this w ould be
no arg u m en t for go v ern m en t o f England by Switzerland.
I notice that English papers are filled w ith propaganda to
“ B uy B ritish ” . T he corresponding propaganda in India has
been m ade a felony by one o f the recent arbitrary ordinances.
T his kind o f thing is part o f w hat I refer to as the injurious
effect o f the present situation on English m orality. Still, I am
sure it is painful to m en like L ord W illingdon to be forced,
w h eth er by orders from England o r by conviction o f a u ty , to
resort to m ethods o f repression w hich can only be described as
lawless: which in other countries, or in an India w ithout ideas
like those o f G andhi, could only provoke a civil war. It seems
to m e that E nglishm en, even die-hards, m ust feel a certain
sense o f sham e in using force to coerce a disarm ed people.
W ith kind regards,
T o A RTHUR SIBLY
January 18, 1932
D ear A rth u r Sibly:
I w o u ld add: a b o d y o f nine has been condem ned to 4 years
im p riso n m en t for picketing. O n e o f the recent ordinances
perm its a police m agistrate to condem n to death in absentia a
m an unrepresented by a law yer and w ith o u t appeal. C an you
w o n d er that T he Nation here recently had an article entitled
“ Has B ritain G one M ad?” I am not solely concerned about
India: I am appalled at the m oral depths to w hich E ngland can
descend, inasm uch as things are being done by Englishm en like
yourself, for exam ple, normally o f high m oral principle and
respect for law.
V ery sincerely,
Sir:
T h e present co-operation o f Indian w ith English forces on
the E uropean battlefield is an unprecedented event. As n o t even
a w ar can be productive o f unm ixedly evil results— such is the
fundam ental goodw ill o f m an— w e m ay, perhaps, put the fact
o f this co-operation on the credit side. B ut let us, at the same
tim e, consider som e o f its larger im plications.
I am n o t one o f those w ho think that India owes a debt o f
gratitude to E ngland. W here Englishm en have served o r do
serve the interests o f India to the best o f their ability in their
lifew ork, they do no m ore than their sim ple duty, w hether w e
regard this as responsibility voluntarily assum ed, o r as that o f a
servant paid w ith Indian m oney. In the cold light o f reason, it is
after all from the latter standpoint that m ost A nglo-Indians
have to be ju d g ed . In m any cases, perhaps in m ost cases, the
sam e w o rk m ig h t have been done as well by Indians: and even
if less efficiently, none the less better done by Indians, since
efficiency is n o t the last w o rd in hum an values. Passing over
elem ents o f evident injustice, such as the A rm s and Press Acts,
the C o tto n Excise and D eportations w ith o u t Trial, I see in the
ordinary operations o f G overnm ent few causes for gratitude: so
far as “ P rogress” is concerned, to have done less w ould have
been crim inal, to have done m ore w ould n o t have been
astonishing.
W hen w e consider the so-called English Education that has
been “ given” to India— largely developed in the M acaulayan
spirit o f those w ho think that a single shelf o f a good E uropean
library is w o rth all the literature o f India, Arabia and
Persia— and n ow essentially a m atter o f vested interests for
English publishers, the closely preserved Im perial E ducation
Service, and M issionaries— w hen we rem em ber the largely
political purposes and bias o f all this education, its needless
secularisation, and that it has discontented the Indians w ith all
that was dearest and best in their hom e life, and [w hen we]
perceive in w hat countless ways it has broken the threads o f
traditional culture— then w e are apt to feel som ething less than
gratitude. C om pared w ith all this, the social ostracism o f
Indians in India, o f w hich w e hear m uch, is a small m atter. N o r
can we well forget that if G erm an culture is to be sw ept aw ay,
we have som ething to lose that has done more than English
scholarship has done to m ake the culture o f the East fam iliar to
Europe.
B ut if I say that India has few causes to be grateful to the
English, that is n o t to say she should n o t be friendly. In m ost o f
the deeper issues o f life India has m ore to give than to receive,
and her g ro w in g consciousness o f this fact is a m ore secure
bond than any considerations o f self-interest. Perhaps there are
no tw o races that m ore than the Indians and the English stand
in need o f each o th e r’s com plim entary qualities; broadly
speaking, the English needing our long view, and w e their
practical view o f life. T hus, there can never be too m uch good
feeling betw een the English and the Indians, n o r refutation too
often m ade o f K ipling’s dividing banalities. Yet, I m arvel at the
generosity o f Princes w ho offer sum s for the prosecution o f a
E uropean w ar, o f w hich sum s several exceed the total am ount
w e have been laboriously collecting for m any years for the
Benares H indu U niversity that is a necessity for o u r national
consciousness.
It is hoped by all idealists that one good result o f the present
w ar, if success is achieved by the Allies, will be a reordering o f
the m ap o f E urope on the basis o f N ationality. At this m om ent
even Im perial B ritain is in love w ith N ationalism , and
autocratic Russia has pledged au tonom y to Poland. M ost
Englishm en w ould like to see K iao-chan restored to C hina, and
w ould be glad for Persia to recover her full independence, alike
from Russian and English interference. W hat will E ngland do
for India? W ill she do as m uch as Russia has prom ised to
Poland?
T he present Polish policy, according to a published m ani
festo, is one o f neutrality, so far as this is in the pow er o f
individuals. T h e Poles cannot sym pathize w ith G erm any, or
Austria, o r even Russia, b u t rather w ish that each o f the Pow ers
m ay be so w eakened as to m ake possible ultim ate guarantees
o f Polish independence. Some such view as this w ould be m ine
for India, and for the Pow ers o f Asia generally. H ad India been
ready to create o r to re-establish her ow n spiritual and political
sovereignty in this m om ent o f E uropean weakness, every
idealist m ust have rejoiced. B ut India is still increasingly
dom inated by E uropean ideals, and these often o f fifty years
ago rather than o f today. H er m ost advanced reform ers— w ith
exception o f a few “ E xtrem ists” , and T olstoyans like M r
G andhi— are typical Early Victorians. T he tim e has n o t yet
com e, th o u g h perhaps its seeds have been sow n, w hen the
Indian consciousness could so far recover its equipoise as to
require expression in term s o f im m ediate political self
dom inion. O ne could w ish it otherw ise, b u t it is a fact beyond
denial that India has yet to go through the E uropean experience
w ith Industrialism before she can becom e free in any sense
w o rth the nam e; her ultim ate freedom has to be w on in m ental
w arfare, and not in rebellion. H aving regard, then, to the
circum stances o f o u r day, and rem em bering that tim e and
desire arc equally needful for all fruitions, w e can feel that the
present Indian co-operation and its w elcom e acceptance m ay
have, and, indeed m ust have, great and good results, beyond
those o f the im m ediate conflicts. It is som ething gained, that
East and W est will fight together against the ideals o f
m ilitarism , though, perhaps, few o f the fighting Indians view
the m atter in this light. At any rate, we can sym pathize w ith the
English in their w ar for the Transvaal. It is som ething that the
C anadians (w ho have show n them selves so eager to exclude
every Indian im m igrant from Canada) “ should offer praise and
gratitude for the action o f India, w hich places that great
co m m u n ity in the post o f duty and h o n o u r and will m ake it to
live in h isto ry ” ( Toronto Star): notw ithstanding, it m ay
som ew hat am use us that this should be regarded as the
guarantee o f o u r “ place in h isto ry ”—-just as Japan was first
considered civilized w hen she achieved m ilitary success against
the Russians!
For all these and kindred reasons neither the national idealist,
n o r the hater o f w ar as w ar, need regret that in this w ar English
and Indians are fighting side by side. O n ly let the Indians— as
distinct from their ow n autocracies and from the English
bureaucracy— rem em ber the days to com e. For the G erm ans
are not the only, though they m ay be the m ost extrem e,
m ilitarists in Europe: and after the w ar is ended, there yet
remains the unceasing, and, in the long run, more cruel w ar o f
Industrialism . W hen hum anity has solved that problem , and
m ade that peace— w hich can n e v e r.b e till East and W est
consciously co-operate in social evolution, n o r before the
religious aspect o f life is considered side by side w ith the
material— there m ay be peace indeed.
AKC
T o PHILIP MAIRET
M arch 6, 1946
D ear Pam:
Entre nous and n o t for publication: In so m any o f your
editorials you say so m any wise things that it shocks m e to
w hat an extent you can at other times be confused. I’m
referring n o w to y o u r rem arks about India in the issue o f Feb 7.
D o you know , m y wife (w ho has lived tw o years in India as a
student, lived as Indians live, spoke H indi and learned Sanskrit)
laughed out loud when she read it? M y prim ary interest is not, as
you k n o w , political, so I will dismiss that aspect by rem arking
that som eone asked m e recently if I did not think there w ould
be great disorder if the English quit, to w hich I replied: “ Little
doubt; it m ight be alm ost as bad as it is n o w ” . As regards the
English “ conscience” , that is sim ply pour rire to us; no Indian
today regards an E nglishm an’s w o rd as even w o rth the paper it
m ay be w ritten on. R ight o r w rong, these are the facts. O n the
o ther hand, you adm it another fact: that the Indians are
unanim ous in saying “ quit India” . If the Englishm an rem ains,
it is an illustration o f the fact that outside England, he is
denatured; at hom e, the E nglishm an is a gentlem an, one o f the
m ost ch'arming in the w orld; east o f Suez, som ething m ore like
a bounder. D o gentlem en rem ain w here they are n o t w anted,
n o t trusted, and frankly disliked?
W hat you go on to say about H induism and Indian society
m ig h t have been w ritten by any B aptist m issionary. It is
precisely from the standpoint o f the m oral principles that
underlie the form s o f Indian society that those o f us w ho are not
yet W esternized and m odernized, not yet m echanized or
industrialized, can and do criticize the im m orality o f m o d em
W estern societies, w ith their “ free enterprise” , w hich we call
the “ law o f the sharks” . I have in the press a lecture on The
Religious Basis o f the Forms o f Indian Society w hich I gave this
year by request o f a S tudent’s Religious A ssociation at
M ichigan U niversity recently, and will send it on as soon as it is
available. M eanw hile, for an English and C hristian estim ate o f
the castc system do see Sir G eorge B irdw ood, Sva, 1915,
pp 8 3-88. Y ou ow e it to yourself to do this. I wish, at the same
tim e, you could read M uehl’s article on the fam ine in the
Jan u ary issue o f A sia and the Americas: and tw o articles by tw o
other A m ericans, called “ C olonial Report: First-hand O bserva
tio n s” , in Harpers, M arch 1946. “ Q u it . . . India, Java,
A nnam ,— Asia” ; that is the only thing one can, if one has any
h u m anity left, say to all Europeans. I’m only am azed that you
can take up the subject so superficially and quite evidently w ith
so little know ledge o f the cultural situation, and in particular
and obviously so little (if any?) know ledge o f “ H in d u ism ” .
Since you k n o w h o w m uch I respect and agree w ith m uch o f
yo u r w ork, I am sure you will feel you had rather I spoke
frankly as above, than not.
V ery sincerely,
T o T H E N E W ENGLISH WEEKLY L O N D O N
A ugust 20, 1942
Sir:
From the standpoint o f the purposes for w hich the Allies are
supposed to be fighting, the g overnm ent o f India by B ritain is
an anom aly. Indians have been asked to fight for a freedom that
docs n o t include their o w n freedom . T he Allies have n o t w on
the w hole-hearted co-operation o f even those Asiatics w ho are
fighting on their side; n o r will they until they include in their
p ro g ram w h at still rem ains o f a Japanese slogan, “ Asia for the
Asiatics” , m aking it very clear that that includes India for the
Indians. A pologists o f B ritish rule have lately argued that the
Indians have been and w ould be far better o ff under British than
u nder Japanese rule. Indians agree. T h at is to say, that o f tw o
evils, they prefer the lesser evil. B ut such a choice scarcely
m akes for enthusiasm . T he Allies can count far m ore on the fact
that the Indians arc w hole-heartedly pro-C hinese than upon
their “ lo y alty ” to England; so long as the Allies are true to
C hina, the Indians will be on their side for that reason alone,
but not because they are “ pro -B ritish ” ; they are prim arily
pro-Indian.
If the recent negotiations broke dow n, w hatever the im m edi
ate o r nom inal reasons m ay have been, the ultim ate reason is
that it was only too obvious that the British offers (even if a
British prom ise could have been trusted) did n o t proceed from
any change o f heart on the British part; no such offers w ould
ever have been m ade if B ritain had n o t needed India’s aid.
A ctually, noth in g can be offered effectively by England that
does n o t im ply and confess a conviction o f past sins. T he
British arc hum an beings and Gandhi still believes in “ the
possibility o f hum an beings m aking an upw ard g ro w th .” T he
tim e for such an up w ard g ro w th is now . Short o f that, the
struggle will go on until the inevitable conclusion follows:
inevitable, because w hatever the outcom e o f the present w ar, it
is clear that the days o f E uropean exploitation o f Asia are over.
T o free India from B ritain is pre-requisite to saving India from
Japan; to hold on grim ly to the “ brightest jew el in the British
cro w n ” m ay m ean losing it— to Japan.
B ound up w ith the political problem , but ultim ately far m ore
im portant, is that o f the “ cultural relations” to be established in a
w orld conditioned by Allied victory and organized on the basis
o f universal and co-operative self-determ ination. In that future
w orld all m en will o f necessity and to an ever increasing extent
have to live together. T he m ere industrialisation o f Asia will
only set new rivalries in m otion, and perhaps result in a new
and m ore terrible w ar, econom ic if not m ilitary. M uch rather
m ust the nations be united in the endeavour to liberate m ankind
from the evils o f industrialism , from purely m onetary valua
tions, and from the endeavour to live by bread alone, o f w hich
the consequences are before our eyes.
In o th er w ords, if there is to be peace, the relations o f
E uropeans w ith Asiatics m ust be hum anised; and since the
Europeans arc the interlopers, that is primarily a problem for
them . T he cultural relations, so-called, o f Europeans w ith
Asiatics have been until now almost exclusively commercial, or
only o f E uropean m asters w ith Asiatic servants. “ E ducated”
E uropeans in general and A m ericans in particular arc abysm ally
and incredibly ignorant o f Asiatic culture. T he tim e is com ing
w hen it will n o t be held that a m an is m aster o f hum anistic
studies m erely because he know s Greek; such a m aster will
have to be fam iliar also w ith the literature o f at least one o f the
three great classical languages o f Asia: Arabic, Sanskrit or
Chinese. M utual understanding and respect can only be
founded in an agreem ent on principles going deep enough to
result in the recognition o f the inevitability o f great differences
in the m anner o f their application.
T he greatest obstacle to such an agreem ent on principles are
(sic) to be found in w hat Rene G uenon has so aptly term ed the
“ proselytising fu ry ” o f Europeans (and Am ericans). Actually,
the belief that there is b u t a single type o f culture w o rth y to be
so called, and the conviction that it is o n e’s du ty to im pose this
culture upon others for their o w n good, if not at the point o f
the bayonet, at least by a resort to all the resources o f prestige
and m oney pow er, is hardly less dangerous or destructive than
the belief in the existence o f a naturally superior race, to w hich
all others o u g h t to be subordinated for its ow n good and theirs.
By “ proselytising fu ry ” neither I nor G uenon have in m ind
by any m eans exclusively or even chiefly the activity o f
religious m issionaries, harm ful as these have often been. In this
connection, how ever, w e m ust observe that a procedure based
upon the conviction that o u r o w n religion is the only true or
revealed religion, and n o t one am ongst other religions based
upon a T ru th in w hich all participate, not m erely violates the
principle that truths can only be stated and k n o w n in
accordance w ith the m ode o f the know er, but can have results
quite as terrible as those that follow from the belief in a single
superior race or superior culture; every student o f the history o f
religious persecutions know s this. T he proselytising fury is far
from being a purely religious phenom ena. We see it quite as
clearly in the field o f “ education” , and in the often frankly
expressed w ish and endeavour to im pose a purely “ scientific
hu m an ism ” upon the w hole w orld, and in the distinction
com m only m ade betw een the “ advanced” or “ progressive”
peoples (ourselves) and the “ backw ard” races (others). All that
m ust be o u tg ro w n ; or shall w e never g ro w up, never learn to
m ix w ith m en o f other races on equal term s, b u t always rem ain
cultural provincials? As things n ow stand, w e cannot be too
grateful that m illions o f “ illiterate” Indian peasants and w om en
w ho cannot read o u r new spapers and magazines b u t are as
fam iliar w ith their ow n great Epics as Am ericans arc w ith
m ovie stars and baseball heroes, are still practically untouched
by any m odern influence. O u r first duty to these innocents (in
the highest sense o f the w ord) is not to teach them o u r w ay o f
living (in view o f o u r present disillusionm ent, h ow could we
have the face to do that?) b u t sim ply to protect them from
industrial exploitation, w hether by foreigners, or Indians.
Education can w ait until w e have educated ourselves; diseduca-
tion is far w orse than none, for a culture that has survived for
millenia can be destroyed in a generation w ith the best
intentions. T here arc probably n o t a dozen Englishm en
qualified to pronounce on any problem having to do w ith
hum anistic studies in India.
I have already m ade this article too long. W hat I w ant to
em phasize is that the European, for his ow n and all m an’s sake
in the future w orld, m ust n o t only cease to harm and exploit
the other peoples o f the w orld, but also give up the cherished
and flattering belief that he can do them good in any other w ay
than by being good himself; and that that is the first thing to be
understood w henever the question o f British rule in India is
discussed.
AKC
Sir:
D r A nanda K C o o m arasw am y ’s article is so full o f question-
begging statem ents that it w ould occupy too m uch o f your
space to deal w ith them adequately. I w ould, how ever, like to
put the follow ing three questions to him:
1) W hen he speaks o f the Indian outlook, culture, civilisa
tion, etc, does he refer to that o f the C aste-H indus, o r the
“ Scheduled” Castes, o r the M oslem s, Sikhs, C hristians (some
o f the latter dating from A postolic times)?
2) D oes he consider that the standard o f adm inistration and
justice in India before the British came w ere as high as those
since achieved?
3) W hy is he so anxious to uphold the fallacy (as blatant as
that o f “ racialism ” ) o f som e insurm ountable barrier betw een
the outlo o k o f “ E uropean” and “ Asiatic” , w hich C hristianity
and Islam (them selves largely “ A siatic” religions) set o u t to
o v erth ro w m any centuries ago?
A. S. E lw ell-Sutton
N o v em b er 12, 1942
Sir:
W ith reference to M r E lw ell-S utton’s questions o f Septem
ber 3rd: I need n o t say m uch about N o. 3, as the E d ito r has
answ ered adequately on m y behalf. I do oppose the typically
m odern anti-traditional civilisation and culture, w ith its
im p o v erish m en t o f reality (cf Iredell Jenkins in the Journal o f
Philosophy, Septem ber 24, 1942) and abstraction o f m eaning
from life (cf A ldous H uxley, Ways and Means, p 270ff) to the
traditional and norm al civilisations and cultures o f w hich
Indian can be cited as the— or a— type. O n the other hand, m y
w ritings are packed w ith references to the identities o f Indian,
Platonic, C hristian and other like w ays o f thinking; it is very
rarely that I cite a doctrine (eg, that o f the “ Single Essence and
T w o N atures)” , or duo sunt in homitie) from one source alone.
Further, I w ould refer M r E lw ell-Sutton to the chapter,
“ A greem ent on Principles” in Rene G uenon’s East and West. As
to N o 2, I should like to take this op p o rtu n ity to endorse and
em phasize M r H e ro n ’s dictum (N e w English Weekly, Septem ber
10, 1942, p 171) that “ system s o f governm ent should be
extensions o f the peoples concerned” , and to quote P lato’s well
kn o w n definition o f “ju stice” as the condition in w hich “ every
m an can fulfil his o w n natural vocation” , a condition w hich it
has been the purpose and function o f the caste system to
provide. O n the other hand, education in India, so far as
Englishm en have controlled the expenditure o f Indian m oney
for educational purposes, has been consistently directed to the
form ation o f a class o f persons “ Indian in blood and colour, but
English in tastes, in opinion, in m orals and in intellect” (Lord
B entinck, see Cambridge History o f India, VI, p 111); and this
education, as Sir G eorge B ird w ood w rote in 1880, “ has
b ro u g h t discontent into every family so far as its baneful
influences have reached” . Lord B entinck even attem pted “ to
stop the printing o f Arabic and Sanskrit books . . . and to
abolish the M uham m edan Madrassa . . . and the C alcutta
Sanskrit C ollege” (ib). N either can we pretend that the
econom ic relations betw een England and India have ever yet
approached “ju stice” . In any case, the concept o f “ju stice”
covers far m ore than the m erely im partial adm inistration o f
laws, especially w hen the said laws have n o t been m ade by
those to w h o m they arc applied, b u t by the foreign adm inistra
to r him self, w ho com bines in him self executive and judical
pow ers. It is, indeed, quite possible and even probable that a
well paid foreigner can be m ore im partial than any native in the
trial o f cases in which his own interests are not concerned. T hus, if
the C hinese w ere rulers o f England, it w ould be quite likely
that a C hinese m agistrate w ould pronounce a m ore ju st
decision in a case betw een a poacher and a squire than w ould
the English magistrate be disposed to reach; yet we should not
regard that fact as an argum ent for the governm ent o f England
by C hinam en. A nd w hat o f the cases, civil or crim inal, in
which the interests o f Englishmen and Chinese conflicted? The
sam e w ould be likely to happen that has always happened w hen
it is a question o f an E nglishm an versus Indian. Everyone
know s into w hat terrible trouble Lord C urzon (w ho really tried
to be the “ju st beast” ) g o t him self by attem pting to enforce the
“ law ” in the case o f the m urder o f a “native” by an English
man. We m ay also recall that not many years ago it was possible
in Bengal for a man to be condem ned to death w ithout a proper
trial or even being allowed to face his accusers, and I believe it
is still true, as it certainly was very recently that a man can be
arrested and held incom m unicado w ithout preferred charges
for so long as it seemed convenient. So much for “justice” .
Q uestion N o 1 w ould require a long discussion and a
p rofound know ledge o f the cultures referred to. It is partly
answ ered, as in the case o f N o 3, by the consideration that the
differences betw een these cultures are rather accidental than
essential; the w eight o f the differences tends to disappear in
p ro p o rtio n to o u r understanding and in the absence o f any third
party in w hose interest it is to em phasize them . For exam ple,
Jahangir (in his Memoirs) could speak o f his H indu friend
Ja d ru p ’s Vedanta as “ the same as o u r ta sa w w u f' (Sufism); and I
have k n o w n m ore than one R om an C atholic w ho saw and said
that there is no real opposition or essential difference betw een .
C hristianity and H induism , while, as Rene G uenon very truly
rem arks: “ H indus m ay som etim es be seen encouraging E uro
peans to return to C atholicism ,, and even helping them to
understand it, w ith o u t being in the least draw n to it on their
ow n acc o u n t.” T hose w ho k n o w India best and can think in the
term s o f Indian thought, are m ore im pressed by her cultural
unity than by her apparent diversity. T here are unities m ore
essential and m ore im p o rtan t than any political unity; and these
are based on com m on understandings o f the ultim ate ends o f
life rather than upon its im m ediate purposes, as to w hich there
can be an alm ost endless variety o f notions.
N o d o u b t the problem o f the m inorities in India is not
w ith o u t its difficulties; w e understand that very sim ilar
difficulties are faced by the Am erican N egroes at the present
m om ent; and that even in E urope the m inorities problem s will
n o t be too easily solved even w hen the w ar is over. It m ay be
doubted w hether they can be solved by any dem ocratic
go v ern m en t (in w hich the controlling pow ers represent in
terested jgroups) or any tyranny (in A ristotle’s definition,
go v ern m en t in the interest o f the ruler), o r by any oth er than a
ju s t governm ent, one in w hich (as in the Indian theory o f
governm ent) Justice (Dharma) is the K ing o f kings. T he present
position o f N egroes in “ dem ocratic” Amcrica, and the capacities
o f E nglishm en for feeling colour (ie, racial) prejudice do not
lead one to suppose that either o f these peoples w ould be very
capable o f ju stly balancing the interests o f different Indian
com m unities; and in any case, w ho has told them that to do so
is their business?
AKC
T o M ON SIE U R R O M A IN ROLLAND
August 22, 1920
M y dear M R om ain Rolland:
It is by a curious coincidence that I had w ritten to you only a
few days before I received yo u r letter o f July 6, w ith your
invitation to subscribe to the Declaration de I’Independence de
VEsprit. I accept w ith great appreciation this h o n o r and signify
m y adherence accordingly. I am indeed convinced that a real
unity m oves in the m inds o f m en w ho are w idely separated by
space and by artificial barriers, and that this unity persists
unchanged behind the curtain o f a conflict that is m ore o r less
unreal. B y unreal, I m ean arising from an illusion superim
posed upon people w ho have no quarrel w ith one another.
It is sad that the form ulae o f th o u g h t should have been
p ro stitu ted in the service o f hatred. B u t to destroy the unreal, it
is needful, n o t that w e should seek to punish others, only that
w e ourselves recognize and live in accord w ith w hat is real.
Alas that at the present tim e the “ P ow ers” have show n so
little self-respect, so little self-restraint, and so little sense o f
reality. T hey have sought to build for them selves “ bigger
barns” , n o t thinking that their life m ay be required o f them!
T here is a B uddhist text that it w ould have been well to
rem em ber— “ V ictory breeds hatred: because the conquered are
u n h a p p y .”
A nd w ith regard to the still subject races— h ow is it that the
“ P o w e rs” forget that the greatest injury m ust be inflicted by
the ty ran t upon himself?
Believe me, yours m ost cordially,
D ear Sir:
It is becom ing m ore and m ore evident that the A tlantic
C h arter is a dead letter so far as the A m erican G overnm ent is
concerned. C o n fro n ted w ith the situation in Java, all you have
done is to o rd er that the D utch— w ho are using A m erican
m ilitary equipm ent given to them for use against the Japanese,
to suppress the Javanese national m ovem ent— to paint o u t or
otherw ise rem ove o r conceal the signs o f its A m erican origin. Is
this n o t a case o f the ostrich hiding its head in the sand? I
w o n d er if you have asked yourself w hether such an underhand
policy will pay in the long run. T he Asiatic peoples are
perfectly able to recognize w ho are, o r are not, their friends;
and a tim e will com e w hen (to say nothing o f present
m oralities) the friendship o f even such far-aw ay peoples as the
Javanese m ay be o f value to the U nited States, w hose
g o v ern m en t is supposed to believe in som e kind o f cooperation
by all the peoples o f the w orld.
Y ours very truly,
T o DR A N U P SINGH
Ju ly 10, 1944
D ear D r A nup Singh:
I look forw ard w ith pleasure to the appcarancc o f a
S ym posium to be entitled the “ Voice o f India” , to be published
in the cause o f India’s freedom . We hear now adays alm ost
exclusively o f India’s right to a political and econom ic freedom
and (w ith the exception o f an infinitesim al num ber o f Indian
traitors w hose vested interests are bound up w ith the status quo)
w e affirm this right unanim ously and unconditionally.
T here are, nevertheless, other and perhaps even m ore im
po rtan t freedom s to be considered, w hich m ay be called
collectively a cultural freedom , bearing in m ind that in a
co u n try such as India, w ith all its millenial and living traditions,
and w here it has never been attem pted to live by “ bread alone” ,
no dividing line can be draw n betw een culture and religion.
T here are cultural and religious as well as political Im perial
isms; and if w e arc to be free in any m ore real sense than that in
w hich the “ econom ically determ ined” W estern m an o f today is
free, then o u r w hole system o f education m ust be liberated n o t
only from direct o r indirect control by any foreign govern
m ent, and from the text-book racket, b u t also from the
“ proselytising fu ry ” o f those w ho identify civilisation w ith
dem ocracy, and dem ocracy w ith industrialism and culture w ith
scientific hum anism — or, conversely, religion w ith C hristian
ity.
This m eans that W estern friends o f Indian freedom m ust
recognize that ours, if it is to be real, will include a freedom to
differ from them in very m any im portant issues. O u r “ voice”
that they can hear is largely the voice o f a generation o f m en
already tutored w illy-nilly by Europeans and m oulded by the
characteristic form s o f W estern education and W estern m oral-
ism; b u t there are other voices, those o f o u r true conservatives
and authentically Indian, w hich it is alm ost im possible for our
W estern friends to hear. T o these friends, w hose sense o f justice
and disinterested labours w e gladly acknow ledge, there m ust
be spoken this w o rd o f friendly w arning: that it is n o t always a
freedom to abolish the castc system or to break dow n purdah, or
to establish a system o f universal com pulsory education—
quantitative rather than qualitative, or a liberty to choose our
representatives by count o f noses, that w e w ant. We w ant also a
freedom n o t to do any o f these things, especially if, like the
Pasha o f M arrakesh, “ w e do n o t w ant the incredible Am erican
w ay o f life”— w ith its exorbitant percentage o f m ental casual
ties. T he voice o f a free India will not be an echo o f any other,
how ever confident, but her ow n.
AKC
Sirs:
T o Pandit Jaw aharlal N eh ru I extend cordial greetings on his
birthday, best wishes for his success in the conduct o f the
present Interim G overnm ent, in w inning the confidence and
su p p o rt o f o u r M uslim countrym en and friends, and in all his
endeavours to establish relations o f econom ic and cultural
intercourse w ith other peoples. By m any sacrifices and m uch
suffering, and by his persistent efforts in recent years to
“ discover India” he has qualified him self for the responsibilities
that rest upon him .
AKC
T h e co m m ittee in q u estion did n o t see fit to publish this ‘le tte r’. For A K C ’s
o th e r view s o f G andhi-ji, see also ‘M ah atm a’ in Mahatma Gandhi— Essays and
Reflections on H is Life and Work, edited by Sarvepalli R adhakrishnan, L ondon,
1939.
Prayascitta = expiation, ato n em en t, am ends, satisfaction, penance.
T o MR K O D A N D O RAO
April 10, 1947
D ear M r K odando Rao:
It was a pleasure to m eet you again and to hear you speak
yesterday. As you know , I also have constantly em phasized
that the great difference betw een the traditional Indian and the
m odern w estern outlook on life arc a m atter o f tim es m uch
m ore than that o f place. I w ould like to urge you to study som e
o f the m odern W estern w riters on these subjects, especially
G uenon, o f w h o m you will find som e account in a little book
o f m y ow n that I am sending you.
As M r T oynbee said, “ We (o f the West) arc ju st beginning to
see som e o f the effects o f our action on them (o f the East), but
we have hardly begun to see the effects— w hich will certainly
be trem endous— o f their com ing counteraction upon u s.”
T oynbee speaks o f the West as the “ aggressors” and the East as
the “ victim s” . H istorians, he says, a thousand years hencc, will
be “ chiefly interested in the trem endous counter cffcct w hich,
by that tim e, the victim s will have produced in the life o f the
agressor” , and thinks the real significance o f the com ing social
unification o f m ankind will “ not be found in the field o f
technics and econom ics, and n o t in the field o f w ar and politics,
but in the field o f relig io n .” Y ou, perhaps, w ould prefer to say
in the field o f th o u g h t or philosophy; at any rate, in that o f the
ultim ate principles on w hich any civilisation is really based.
We O rientals, then, have at least as m uch responsibility for
the kind o f w orld that w c shall be in the future as have the
W estern cultures that arc still predom inant but at the same tim e
declining. Few o f o u r students from India have had any chance
to realize the extent to w hich leaders o f W estern th o u g h t are
them selves aw are o f this decline. Y ou will find som e discussion
o f it in m y little book; but let me add that at H arvard, the
Professor o f E ducation very often refers to W estern civilization
as an “ organized barbarism ” , and that the Professor o f Sociology
in a letter I received yesterday refers to it as a “ nightm are” . T o a
large extent, Indian students are ju s t barbarians too, ju st
com ing over here to learn o u r m ethod o f organization. Is it
really this barbarism and this nightm are that w e w ant Indian
students to acquire and take back w ith them to India? Is it not,
on the o th er hand, also their du ty to bring som ething w ith them
w hen they com e here? Som ething o f their ow n to contribute to
the solution o f the great problem s o f the relation o f m an’s w ork
to his life, that faces the East and the W est alike?
H o w can m an live happily? This is a m uch m ore im portant
question than that o f h ow to raise their standard o f living— so-
called. We forget that m en have hearts as well as m inds and
bodies that w ant to be fed!
T here is som ething mean and cheap about the w ay we all
com e here, to study. T here is an old saying that w hoever
w ould obtain the w ealth o f the Indies m ust take the w ealth o f
the Indies w ith him , to buy w ith. W hat do our already
anglicized boys w ho are so m uch asham ed o f their “ unedu
cated” w ives and sisters bring w ith them ? D o they bring
anything w hatever that A m ericans havc’nt got already? O f
course these Am ericans are n o t interested in you; you have
n oth in g to offer and only com e to get w hat you can! N o t tw o
per cent o f Indian students com e here to study cultural
subjects— are only qualified to study p l u m b i n g ?
These boys return to India a queer m ixture o f East and W est,
strangers here and no longer at hom e there! H o w can they ever
expect to be happy men?
We arc glad to say that som e Indian students at least are soon
disillusioned and long to go back to discover India, for they
have never k now n their ow n hom e, the w hich they learn about
for the first tim e from E uropeans.*
Y ou raised the question o f hospitality: let me say that we
often, and w ith pleasure, entertain groups o f Indian students at
hom e. T hey take possession o f our kitchen, prepare their ow n
food; the shoes arc left at the door, they wash their hands, we
all eat on the floor, w ith our ow n fingers—ju st as one w ould in
India. M y wife and I arc intellectually m ore “ o rth o d o x ” and
old-fashioned than m ost o f the boys w ho com e to us. B ut we
arc painfully Europeanized nevertheless. W hat is m ore, we do
n o t expect that the boys will be free to invite us to cat w ith
them and their families in their hom es, nor do w e expect them
to treat us on term s o f social equality in India. H o w m uch less
have ordinary A m ericans and Europeans a right to expect such
a thing?
As a m atter o f fact, w e respect m ore those Indians w ho will
not cat w ith us, than those w ho will. We see no reason w hy we
should contam inate their hom es and kitchens m erely out o f
politcncs.
As for the girls: I say that how ever m uch they know — a m an
is still u n e d u c a t e d if he cannot appreciate and understand
and be happy w ith an Indian girl, if she is still Indian, how ever
little o f his kind o f inform ation she m ay have. Praise G od if the
Indian girl retains standards and concepts o f value about life and
conduct that E uropean w om en have been robbed of. If m ost o f
them w ant to stay as they are, for G o d ’s sake let them!
Take note o f w hat Sir G eorge B irdw ood w rote in 1880:
“ O u r (W estern) education has destroyed their love o f their ow n
literature . . . their delight in their ow n arts and, w orst o f all,
their repose in their o w n traditional and national religion. It has
disgusted them w ith their ow n hom es— their parents, their
sisters, their very wives. It b ro u g h t discontent into every
fam ily so far as its baneful influences have reached.”
W ith kind regards,
T o MRS GOBIN DR AM J. W A T U M U L L
A ugust 29, 1944
D ear M rs W atum ull:
M any thanks for yo u r letter and prospectus. I have always
had m ost pleasant relations w ith the “ B om bay m erchants” o f
India and C eylon and always respected them as staunch
supporters and adherents o f a truly Indian o rthodoxy.
As regards y o u r Foundation, I feel som e hesitation. I have, as
you say, contributed to the m utual understanding o f East and
W est. B ut this is n o t at all an easy problem , and means
som ething m ore than learning to do business and “ eat, drink
and be m e rry ” together. M o d em civilisation is fundam entally
opposed to all o u r deepest values. I am n o t all sure that even a
w ordly advantage is to be gained by learning from A m erica,
land o f the “ d ust b o w l” , now w hen, as Jacks and W hyte say in
T he Rape o f the Earth, “ m isapplied science has b ro u g h t to the
w o rld ’s richest virgin lands a desolation com pared w ith w hich
the ravages o f all the w ars in history are negligible.” C f the Earl
o f P o rtsm o u th ’s Alternatives to Death, and the m any sim ilar
books that have been lately published in England; and also, o f
course, M arco Pallis’ Peaks and Lamas, an outstanding w o rk o f
the contact o f cultures, and especially valuable for its discussion
o f the problem o f education.
O u r yo u n g m en w h o ' com e to Am erica k n o w little or
noth in g o f their o w n civilisation; these young ignoram uses,
graduates as they m ay be o f A gricultural o r E ngineering
colleges, have noth in g o f their o w n to contribute to A m erica.
A true reciprocity is im possible under these conditions. W hat
we need is Professors o f Indian rather than o f A m erican
civilization. I note that yo u r program considers only “ agri
cultural and technical” education, to the exclusion o f those
fields on w hich can be established a real cultural exchange. H ad
I n o t better w ait and look forw ard to y our visit to B oston this
Fall?
V ery sincerely,
C . F . A n d rew s, B ritish edu cato r w ith life long interest in Indian affairs;
associate o f G andhi, and Vice P resident o f R abindranath T a g o re ’s Santi-
n iketan in stitu tio n .
K atherine M ayo, crusading A m erican au th o r w h o liked to initiate ‘causes’;
best k n o w n for h er Mother India w h ich Indians view ed w ith indignation.
Sir J o h n W oodrofFe, B ritish ju ris t p ro m in en t on the C alcutta H ig h C o u rt.
H is av ocation w as the stu d y o f the T an tra, and he did m o re than any o th e r
A n g lo p h o n e orientalist to ex p o u n d its u n d erlying principles and signifi
cance. In th e earlier p art o f his w ritin g career, he published u n d er the pen
nam e A rth u r A valon.
R ichard W ilhelm and C arl G ustav Ju n g , The Secret o f the Golden Flower,
L o ndon, 1932.
T o ERIC GILL
May 23, 1939
D ear Eric:
. . . T alking o f “ sex sym bolism ” , it is w onderful h ow
C o u lto n m isunderstands and devalues the w onderful M ary
legend w hich he gives on P 509 o f his Five Centuries o f Religion.
H e misses entirely the trem endous significance o f the sacrifice
o f o n e’s eyes for the sake o f the vision. T here is a Vedic parallel,
too, w here W isdom is said to reveal her very body to some.
Perhaps you can prin t this legend som eday, and I could w rite a
few w ords o f introduction. O n the other hand, perhaps the
w orld does n o t deserve such things nowadays!
W ith love from Ananda,
Sir:
P erm it m e to say that M ildred W orth P inkham ’s book on
Women in the Sacred Scriptures o f Hinduism , recently review ed in
y o u r issue o f Septem ber 16th, cannot be very strongly
recom m ended. I rather agree w ith a m ore learned review er in
the Journal o f the American Oriental Society (1941, p 195), w ho
says: “ T h ere are a great m any quotations, som e o f them
interesting, but they neither prove n o r indicate anything in
particular. T hey are n o t suitable for the use o f H indu w om en,
n o r for scholarly reference, n o r are they w elded by interpreta
tive co m m en t into any sort o f unity, n o r is the “ status o f H indu
w o m en to d a y ” discussed in relation to these snatches from the
scriptures. T h e book is one o f sustained confusion from
beginning to end . . . . T he quotations are all from English
tanslations and provide neither a com prehensive list o f refer
ences, n o r sufficient context to be very helpful.”
T here is, o f course, an Indian theory, m etaphysical, as to the
natural, and therefore ju st, relationship o f the sexes, interpreted
in term s o f sky and eaith, sacerdotium and regnum, m ind and
perception, and it is, indeed, in term s o f the Liebesgeschichte
Him m els and the relationships o f Sun and M oon, that w hat we
should n o w call the “ psychology o f sex” is set forth. All this
fundam ental m aterial, in the light o f w hich alone can the special
applications be understood, is ignored. N either is it realized
that the w hole problem is n o t m erely one o f external
relationships, b u t one o f the proper co-ordination o f the
m asculine and fem inine pow ers in the constitution o f everyone,
w hether m an o r w om an, that is involved. N either is it even
hinted that in o u r ultim ate and very Self, these very pow ers o f
essence o f nature are O ne.
AKC
M y dear Sarton:
M any thanks for yo u r note. “ Spiritual A u thority . . . ”
m ight com e m ore into yo u r field, n o t only as having to do w ith
“ political science” (sociology), but because it deals th ro u g h o u t
w ith the problem o f conflict betw een the sexes, w hich is the
sam e thing as the conflict betw een the inner and the outer m an.
There is, in fact, a traditional psychology that is o f im mense
practical value and that leads to solutions o f the very problem s o f
disintegrated personality w ith w hich w e are still concerned.
K indest regards,
V ery sincerely,
T o S. DU RA I RAJA SINGAM
A pril 26, 1947
D ear M r Raja Singam:
M any thanks for your son’s letter and the interesting
photographs o f y ourself and family.
As regards your “ Selections” from m y w ritings, please o m it
page 12 (enclosed); page 9 requires som e alternation; I have
never placed nationalism above religion. B etter o m it the
paragraph I have struck out. Also page 11, o m it w hat I have
struck out: I have never been “ aw are o f the degrading position
of w om en in C eylon society” ! ! ! Such ideas w ould seem quite
nonsense to me.
I expect you have received m y book, A m I M y Brother’s
Keeper? I have no new photographs.
W ith best wishes,
Y ours sincerely,
S. D urai Raja Singam , Petaling Jaya, M alaysia (cf p 30). M r Singam was
collating a series o f q u otations from A K C ’s published w orks to be included
in a book o f Selections . . . . T h e section in question here w as A K C ’s
discussion o f ‘te m p o rary m arriage’ in The Dance o f Shiva, the chapter on
‘T h e Status o f Indian W o m en ’. T h e Selections . . . w ere published in a
lim ited edition by M r Singam for private circulation.
A m I M y Brother’s Keeper?, N ew Y ork, 1947.
T o THE SHIELD, L O N D O N
January 1911
Sirs:
I w rite these notes at the request o f a friend, b u t it m ust be
understood that I have made no special study o f the matter,
although I do take a great interest in the status o f w om en both
in East and W est. I am personally convinced that the State
R egulation o f Vice is altogether degrading and objectionable.
In India very little interest is taken in the State Regulation o f
Vice, because it is a purely E uropean institution; it practically
affects only the British A rm y, and its victim s, and m ost Indians
are probably unaw are o f the facts. M oreover, the contagious
diseases in question are either o f E uropean origin, or at least
have becom e m uch m ore prevalent since intercourse w ith
Europeans becam e easier.
T h ere is probably no social culture in w hich the h o n o u r o f
w o m en is m ore jealously guarded than the H indu; at the same
tim e, no society is free from the problem s o f prostitution, and
it is characteristic o f H induism that a solution very different
from the W estern has been sought. This solution lies in the
recognition o f the prostitute as a hum an being. T here is no
street solicitation in India, unless it m ay be in the large tow ns
w here the structure o f society has broken d ow n, and m odern
conditions prevail. In practice, the dancing girls attached to the
H in d u tem ples in Southern India, and the professional singers
and dancers generally in other parts o f India, are courtesans.
B ut they are also in the highest sense artists. T hey are
independent, and som etim es' even w ealthy. I do n o t think they
are ever exploited, as in the W hite Slave Traffic o f E urope. T he
m ost im p o rtan t point to observe, how ever, is that they now ise
lack self-respect— they have a position in the w orld, and are
skilled in a refined classic art, the lyric sym bolism o f w hich is
essentially religious. T he “ A nti-nautch” m ovem ent o f m odern
reform ers I regard as fundam entally m istaken, as it m erely
degrades the status o f the courtesan w ith o u t in any w ay
touching the ro o t o f the problem .
T here is also a very great difference betw een the Eastern and
W estern attitude tow ards sexual intercourse. O n the one hand
the ethic o f H induism , w ith its ideals o f renunciation, is even
severer than that o f R om an C atholic C hristianity: on the other,
w e have to n o te that H induism em braces and recognizes and
idealizes the whole o f life. T hus it is that sex relations can be
treated frankly and sim ply in religious and poetic literature. In
its highest form , the sex-relation is a sacram ent; and even m ore
secularly regarded, it is rather an art than a m ere anim al
gratification. All this, and m any other things, m ust be
considered in estim ating the status o f the Indian courtesan.
T he m ost fundam ental idea in Indian religious philosophy is
that o f unity. “ T h at art th o u ” : every living thing is an
incarnation o f the one Self. All living things are bound together
by this unity. T hus, in the m ost literal sense, “ In so m uch as ye
have done it un to these, ye have done it unto M e .” Further, “ In
as m uch as ye have done it unto Me, ye have done it to
yourselves— and h o w shall ye not pay the price?” For next to
this intution o f unity is the doctrine o f karma— the incvitablc-
ness o f the consequences o f actions. As surely as any individual
or society degrades o r enslaves any other, so surely that
degradation w ill react upon them selves. State Regulation is one
o f the m any m odern attem pts to escape the consequences o f
actions. B ut this is n o t possible: in one form or another the
price m ust be paid, and is paid. State Regulation is an attem pt
to protect men (and indirectly som e o f those w om en w ho
belong to the already econom ically protected class); it n o t only
docs n o t protect, b u t it degrades those w om en against w h o m
society has already offended econom ically and spiritually.
Som e o f these w om en have been betrayed— that is to say, they
have given for love to those w ho have deceived them w hat it is
quite respectable to sell for a hom e and a legal guarantee.
O th ers have been driven by pure econom ic stress, the need for
bread. Som e have been coerced. In India conditions arc
som ew hat different— courtesans arc generally the daughters o f
courtesans. In Southern India som e others arc o f those w ho arc
dedicated in infancy to a tem ple, as devadasis or servants o f the
god. I cannot say w hether all devadasis arc also courtesans— the
m ajority certainly.
N o society can purify itself physically o r spiritually by
further offending against such as these. W hat is needed is to
raise the status o f w om en, to h o n o u r m o therhood in reality and
n o t in nam e m erely; and to fee l responsibility. A society w hich
by its conventions o r its econom ic structure forces certain
w om en into this position has for its first duty to protect them ,
n o t those w ho have offended against them . T o fail in this duty
can b u t increase the evil.
N o society, as I have rem arked, has ever been free from the
problem o f prostitution. I think that the evil has been least evil
w here, as in India, the recognized standards o f life are
exceedingly high; and w here at the same tim e the courtesan is
protected by her defined social or religious status and her ow n
culture. T here is no d o u b t that under such conditions, spiritual
degradation and physical disease m ust have been reduced to a
m inim um . W here, on the other hand, the courtesan is treated as
an outcastc, scarcely even as a hum an being, the reverse result
m ust follow.
1 m ay, how ever, suggest that care should be taken to avoid
language w hich betrays a m issionary o r sectarian bias (such as
appears here and there in the “ Q ueens’s D aughters in India” ). I
will refer only to one other point— the relation o f the m atter to
police activity. State Regulation involves the registration o f
prostitutes, and this opens the door to blackmail and all kinds
o f abuse. It is m ost undesirable that any pow er o f this sort be
placed in the hands o f the Indian police.
AKC
T o D O N A LUISA C O O M A R A S W A M Y
M ay 15, 1932
D arling:
. . . As to virginity, o f the M atrona (ra ta vuvatih): there are
several w ays o f looking at it. In the first place, you know ,
w hatever is given o u t o r em anated (srsti, etc) by the plerom a
(puma) cannot diminish w hat is infinite (aditi). She is naturally
in every sense inviolable. N either is he really but only logically
disintegrated (vy asrusakd, etc. by the act o f fecundation, for the
sam e reason. Lateral birth: for one reason because the branches
o f a tree g ro w o u t sidew ays, like the arm s o f the cross,
im plying extension into tim espace. Also, in a quite literal sense,
C aesarian birth im plies virginity. T hirdly, this is one w ay o f
saying that the eternal m other “ dies” , or is “ slain” by the birth
o f the Son. It is for this reason M aya, m other o f B uddha dies, as
one can see by com paring w ith the Indra nativity in R V IV, 18,
1-2 c f V, 2, 1-2: Indra in fact destroys the w o m b (yonim
aibhidya) lest there should be any b u t an only Son o f G od. She
w ho lives is the hum an counterpart o f the eternal m other. In
C hristianity the eternal m other is the “ divine nature by w hich
the Father begets” , the tem poral m other M ary, from w h o m the
Son takes on “ h u m an ” nature. These arc also the tw o lotuses o f
the u pper and nether w aters, the lotus o f the nether w aters
representing the g round o f actual existence, the deck o f the ship
o f life. T he doctrine o f a tem poral and eternal birth o f C hrist is
o rth o d o x (T hom ist).
O n being “ bound to the stake” (yuba = vanaspati = tree =
cross) see also the case o f Nrmadha (= Purusa medha, “ h u m a n ”
sacrifice) in Jaim iniya Brahmana, II, 17, 1. By the w ay, in
connection w ith the extraordinary consistency w hich w e have
recognized in traditional scriptures: this consistency is really
that “ infallibility” w hich in C hristian tradition is attributed to
the Pope only, but as G uenon rem arks should be the attribute
o f every initiate th ro u g h w h o m the doctrine is transm it
ted . . . .
. . . O bserve the likeness o f the idea o f sacrifice in Vcdic and
H ebrew tradition. In the Zohar, “ T he im pulse o f the sacrifice is
the m ainstay o f the w orlds and the blessing o f all w orlds. “ By it
the “ lam p is kindled above” (ie, the Sun is made to rise). Again
as to nabha as starting point— “ W hen the w orld was created, it
was started from that spot w hich is the culm ination and
perfection o f the w orld, the central point o f the universe, w hich
is identical w ith Z io n ” , citing Psalms 2, 2: “ O u t o f Zion, the
perfection o f beauty, G od hath shined fo rth .”
T o go back to yo u r question about food: G andhi’s “ the only
acceptable form in w hich G od can dare appear to a people
fam ishing and idle (asanayita, auratal ) is w ork and prom ise o f
food as w ages” is true in principio and metaphysically: those in
potentia (“ ante natal hell”) arc precisely fam ishing and idle. T hat
is o f coursc karma katida stuff. From the jnana kanda point o f
view , the last end being the same as the first beginning,
“ idleness” (properly understood, viz, action w ith o u t action is
the principle o f action, as in B G ) is the goal, b u t in the.
m eantim e food is necessary to operation: to the final view is
illustrated in fasting as a metaphysical— n o t religious— rite, ie, in
“ initiation” o f mrtyu, asandya, c f B r Up I, 1, 2............
D ona Luisa C o o m arasw am y , A K C ’s w ife, was, at the tim e this letter was
w ritten , in India stu d y in g Sanskrit.
T o W ILLIAM ROT HE NSTEIN
Septem ber 15, 1910
D ear Rothenstein:
It was good to hear from you, A ugust 28, and will be still
better to see you so soon. As I told M rs H. . . , I am engaging
tent accom m odation from 5.10 at C am p, Exhibition, personal
ly for 2 m en and 3 ladies subject to confirm ation by M rs
H. . . w hen she arrives in Bom bay.
It has been a h o t tim e b u t very interesting travelling about
the last 3 m onths. I have collected m any good pictures and
stayed w ith m any dear and beautiful Indians. T here is nothing
like the peace and stillness o f the real ones. I can give you letters
to som e, especially Benares and C alcutta. B ut I also strongly
recom m end a visit to Lucknow to see dancing there. A boy o f
15, pupil o f India’s m ost fam ous dancer, is so beautiful and so
static. These conventional gesture dances, sym bolizing all
religion in a R adha-K rishna archon-language are the m ost
w onderful things in the w orld, all have the quality o f H indi
poetry. This is so w onderfully trenchant: “ w hen w e loved, the
edge o f the sw o rd was too w ide for us to lie on, b u t n ow a sixty
foot bed is too n a rro w .” A nother song says w ith exquisite
absurdity: “ H ad I k n o w n that love brings pain, I m ust have
proclaim ed w ith beat o f d rum that none should lo v e .” H o w
m any philosophers have proclaim ed that all so rro w is w ound
up w ith desire, and h o w futile save for the few that escape,
like electrons fro m an atom , these proclam ations by beat o f
d ru m .
I cannot m ake m y hom e in England anym ore for a time.
A fter a year in E urope next year I shall live here m ost o f the
tim e for 10 years. M y wife is going back earlier than we
expected for various reasons, m ostly connected w ith this, and I
shall let the chapel next year and she will build a little cottage by
the sea at S. . . [probably Staunton, but illegible], I d o n ’t k now
yet if she will be o u t here m uch w ith me or not. We have got on
very well living in purely Indian fashion so far.
I w o n d er if you will go so far as Lahore— I expect not. You,
too, o u g h t to be here for years. I have never felt the land so
m uch before. I feel the intense thinness o f English life in
contrast. T here is such a deep em otional and philosophical
religious background to all this. T here is, or in the ideal life at
least, there is not any m eaningless activity.
Learn all the H industani you can. It is really easy. Especially
pronounce all vowels as continental and learn to pronounce
consonants after. Forbes’ Hindustani M anual (C rosby Lock
w ood, 3/6) is good.
I d o n ’t think y o u ’ll get m uch out o f M onica W illiams. T he
Bhagavad G ita is the first thing. T hen Law s o f Matiu, Tiruvacha-
kam, and such books. B ut this will n o t reach you in tim e, and
anyhow you will find it easier to read up the m atter after y o u ’ve
been here than now .
W hen in B om bay, drive th ro u g h the M arw ari bazaar. There
is very little else to sec in the place, com paratively speaking.
Y ou o u g h t to sec A gra for the architecture, but can very well
o m it D elhi.
Y ours,
To WILLIAM ROTHENSTEIN
Date uncertain
Dear Rothenstein:
Please post m e the H im har (?) print to C am pden. I am afraid
you m ust have been disappointed last night. I had not heard
him sing before. H ow ever, the hym n have a little idea. T he
follow ing is a translation:
U nknow able, abiding in the th o u g h t o f B rahm ans, rare one,
Veda-Essence, atom unk n o w n to any, w ho art honey, w ho
art m ilk, w ho art a shining beam , Lord o f the devas,
inseparably m ingled in the dark V ishnu, in the four-headed
B rahm a, in the fire, in the w ind, in the sounding ocean, in
the m ightly m ountains, w ho are great and rare and precious,
dw elling in T ig er-to w n (C hidam baram , a sacred to w n in
S outh India)— vain arc all the days w hen thy N am e is not
spoken.
Is it n o t grand to know that m en can sing this passionately? I
return to C am pden Saturday, and shall n o t be up again for ten
days after that.
Y ours very sincerely,
D ear R othenstein:
I shall probably ju s t have tim e to see you in B om bay on 27th,
as I am passing th ro u g h after a to u r in Rajputana. Y ou m ust
really go to Jaipur to see th c people. T he w hole country is full o f
beauty and rom ance, so different from the British parts. I
should alm ost recom m end a night or a few hours at A jm ere to
see the m arble pavillions on the edge o f the lake. Shah Jahan
m ust have been a suprem e artist— everything he had to do w ith
is m arvellous, and his reign m arks the zenith o f M ughal art.
I find the indegcnous elem ent in this art even larger than I
surm ised, and the Persian elem ent very m uch smaller. People
have a m ania for thinking that everything com es from
som ew here else than w here you find it. I am beginning to see
that the best things arc always well rooted in the soil. I have got
hold o f a m agnificent lot o f old Rajput cartoons and tracings o f
m iniatures— I can’t tell you h ow beautiful som e o f them are.
M ost arc 18th century, and the best m ay have been earlier than
that; even so, one can only think o f Boticelli as giving an idea o f
one o r tw o. This H indu or Rajput art is the descendant o f
Ajanta, its rise and zenith and decline seems to cover at least 1500
years.. T he 200 years o f secular M ughal art is b u t a breath beside
it.
T his is a beautiful R ajput city on a lake. I have been over the
Palace, pure w hite m arble. N o furniture at all in the Raja’s
apartm ents. H o w different the old idea o f luxury. We have no
conception n o w o f w hat luxury can be— w e k n o w only
com fort. It seems to m e w e have lost in nothing m ore than in
o u r idea o f pleasure.
Y ou will find m e alone. M y wife had to go hom e on certain
fam ily affairs, and the question o f econom y also had to be
considered. I have been spending m ore than all m y possessions
on pictures. I expect w e shall m ake great changes. I feel I m ust
be o u t here m ore and also w hen in England m ore in L ondon,
etc. So w e are going to let the C hapel for 5 or 7 years and build
a cottage at Staunton by the sea near Barnstaple and have that
for a co u n try house instead. It is a great w rench, but I think
m ust be for the present.
It will be good to see you at Allahabad. Y ou will have to help
me ju d g e som e pictures, etc. I suppose you will com e about
January 5 -1 0 or thereabouts.
W hen in B om bay the only thing o f interest is to drive
th ro u g h the M arw ari Bazaar. I will see you soon after arrival
how ever.
Y ours,
T o WILLIAM R OT HE NS TEIN
D ecem ber 29, 1914
D ear R othenstein:
T hanks for y o u r tw o notes. I quite agree that criticism and
appreciation are n o t a perm anent com pensation for creation.
H ow ever, the Lord m ade critics as well as artists, I suppose:
and they feel bou n d to get justice done for the w orks that have
touched them m ost. This necessity w hich they feel may be the
m eans o f creating beauty in their o w n w ork.
T he m ore austere Indian poetry w hich is at the sam e tim e
fully poetical w ould be found, I take it, in the Saiva and Sakta
hym ns. I w ould gladly w o rk at these if I could find a suitable
collaborator. H ow ever, I think it is still very necessary to
present the typical Vaisnava w ork. Even the Manchester
Guardian declared last year that T agore was the first Indian poet
to love life and believe in physical beauty! It is a natural
transition for m e from the Vaisnava paintings to the Vaisnava
literature, and I shall probably do m ore o f it. I have in hand a
very big w o rk on Rajput-Painting w hich it is alm ost settled will
be published by C larendon Press. In this connection, if you
have any new im p o rtan t R ajput paintings w hich I could see, or
photos o f them , I should be very pleased, as the very last
subjects are ju s t going in for reproduction now .
I w ish there was any chance o f having a good m useum in
India. If they w ould only ask m e to undertake it— perhaps at
D elhi— I should feel I had g o t one or tw o things I really could
do well. I also regret there is no place to w hich I can present or
bequeath m y o w n collection. T he other sort o f w ork I should
like w o u ld be to be a Professor o f “ Indian” at a W estern
U niversity— b u t that idea w ould seem absurdly fanciful to
m ost people.
M eanw hile I have also undertaken a book on B uddha and
B uddhism for H arrap. I regret that som e o f T ag o re’s B uddhist
pictures (w hich I think really very bad) will be used again in
this; how ever, it can’t be helped.
Y ours very sincerely,
Rajput Painting (see In tro d u ctio n ), C laren d o n Press, L ondon, 1916. R epub
lished in 1975.
Buddha and the Gospel o f Buddhism, L ondon, 1916; there have been at least tw o
m o re recent editions. See B ibliography.
K abir was a 14/15th century bhakti poet; a num ber o f his poem s w ere
translated by R ab in d ran ath T ag o re and published as One Hundred Poems o f
Kabir, L o n d o n , 1915.
T h e T ag o re referred to in the last parag rap h o f the letter w as A banindranath
T ag o re o f the C alcu tta school and uncle o f the b etter k n o w n R abindranath.
T o S. DU RA I RAJA SINGAM
July 21, 1947
D ear Raja Singam:
I think you had better use the article on art as it is, w ith
correction o f spelling and punctuation in a few places. If you
w ish, you can also quote m e as follows:
O n the last page it is a pity that Sanjiva D ev uses the w ord
aestheticism because this w ord, like aesthete, has always a bad
m eaning, w hich the w ords aesthetic, aesthetics, aesthetician do
n o t necessarily have. So it is not true that I consider
“ A estheticism to be the sine qua non in the daily life o f m a n .”
W hat I say is w hat R uskin said, that “ Industry w ith o u t art is
b ru tality ” or, as St T hom as A quinas expressed it, “ T here can
be no good uses w ith o u t a rt.” In his capacity as C reator, G od is
the archetype o f the hum an artist as m anufacturer; w hich is
w h at is m eant w hen art is called an “ im itation o f nature in her
m anner o f o peration” , ie, o f the D ivine N ature. B haratan
K um arappa’s understanding o f the place o f art in hum an
life— stated in his w ise and splendid book, Capitalism, Socialism
or Villagism — is far deeper than G andhi-ji’s, w ho is to o ready to
give expression to his o w n feelings on a m atter on w hich he
really know s alm ost nothing.
V ery sincerely,
Sir:
A propos o f M r D ouglas N e w to n ’s article in yo u r issue o f
N o v em b er 1st, I should like to point out that “ art” is like
“ G o d ” , precisely in this respect, that it cannot be seen; all that
w e can see is things made by art, and hence properly called
artifacts, and these arc analogous to those effects, w hich are all
that w e can see o f G od. T he art rem ains in the artist, regardless
o f the vicissitudes to w hich his w orks are subject; and I protest
against the serious use o f the term “ art” by a w riter w ho really
m eans “ w o rk s o f a rt” .
AKC
T o ADE DE BET HU NE
July 26, 1943
T o ADE DE BETHU NE
N o v em b er 22, 1939
D ear M iss Bethune:
I have a rule against lending any books; prim arily because
m ine is a reference library, containing only books I am apt to
need at any tim e. H ow ever, I break it to send the pam phlets
you refer to, if you will return them w ithin ten days.
1 think you o u g h t to go into the m atter a little m ore deeply. I
d o n ’t think all the w riters treat it from a profane p oint o f view.
It is o f course an erro r to suppose that people are being asked to
sacrifice som ething real in returning to severer form s, all that is
real exists in these em inently, although w ith less hum an appeal.
Y ou arc quite right about “ e m o tio n ” . Movere as a purpose o f
art originally m eant to im pel to corresponding action, n o t the
inducing o f “ feelings” . C hristian art after the 13th century
gradually substitutes feeling for know ledge as the thesis (see
su m m ary o f B rehier’s rem arks, quoted in m y “ T raditional
C onception o f Ideal P o rtraitu re” in the current issue o f
Twice-a- Year.
In plainchant there is no clim ax (characteristic also o f
religious m usic elsewhere): it is n o t im posing (because a rite
before a ceremony): it does n o t represent violence o f action.
These arc also characteristics o f R om anesque [as distinct] from
G othic: G othic being a decadence, a step on the w ay to the
pathos and sentim entality o f m odern C hristianity in w hich— in
accordance w ith o u r inversion o f the superiority o f contem pla
tion to action— ethics has becom e the end instead o f the means
o f religion. T he revolt o f kings (against the C hurch), artists
(against patrons), w om an (against man) are all aspects o f one
and the sam e tendency.
I think you should o w n A R obertson, The Interpretation o f
Plainchant, O x fo rd , 1937 (sec p 106, parallel w ith Byzantine
plastic arts): and probably also G astouc, L ’A rt Gregorien and
L ’Eglise et la musique. Cccil G ray, History o f Music, has a good
section on Plainchant. St A ugustine’s D e Musica is im portant;
see J. H ure, A ugustin tnusicien, 1924.
I think also Glcizes, Vers une connaissance plastique: la form e et
Vhistoire.
I m ust say y o u r o w n h andw riting makes a handsom e page!
V ery sincerely,
A de D e B ethunc, as above.
“ T h e T rad itio n al C o n cep tio n o f Ideal P o rtraitu re” , Journal o f the Indian
Society o f Oriental A rt, VII, 1939; also in Twice-a-Year, II—IV, 1939-40; also
in W hy Exhibit Works o f A rt? L ondon, 1943 (this w as reprinted as Christian
and Oriental Philosophy o f A rt, N e w Y o rk , 1956).
A R o b ertso n , The Interpretation o f Plainchant, O x fo rd , 1937.
A m ede G astoue, L ’art gregorien and L ’Eglise et la musique, Paris, 1936.
Cecil G ray, History o f Music, 1928 and 1935, N e w Y ork.
A lbert Gleizes, Vers une conscience plastique: la form e et Vhistoire.
T o GEORGE SARTON
M arch 12, 1946
D ear G eorge Sarton:
T hanks for the article on “ p o rtraits” . I daresay you k n o w that
Indian (incl. C am bodian, etc) “ p o rtrait” statues are not
intended to be “ likenesses” . C f “ T he T raditional C onception
o f Ideal P o rtraitu re” in m y W hy E xhibit Works o f Art?, 1943, C h
VII . . . : c f B onaventura In H exiam em , col 12 n q: melius videbo
me in Deo quam in me ipso.
AKC
A P hilip M cM ah o n , as above.
E d ito r’s note: T h e follow ing scries o f letters on the ‘T ru e P hilosophy o f A rt”
w ere occasioned by a review in the N ew English Weekly, L ondon 11 Ju ly
1940, o f A K C ’s b o o k let. The Christian and Oriental, or True, Philosophy o f
Art, published in 1939 at N e w p o rt, R hode Island. See B ibliography.
Sir:
In further com m ent on the . . . True Philosophy o f A r t , I
m u st take exception to M r R ead’s statem ent in yo u r issue o f
A ugust 8, “ language is a m ore beautiful material than m e tal.”
T he choice o f material has nothing to do w ith beauty, but is a
m atter only o f p ropriety and taste o r predilection. Beauty is the
attractive aspect o f perfection, and all perfection, approachable
o r attainable in hum an perform ance, is a perfection in som e
given kind; and as there are no degrees o f perfection, it follows
that one m aterial is n o t as such m ore “ beautiful” than any other
(cf Greater H ippias, 291, “ G old is no m ore beautiful than
w o o d ” ). We cannot as such say that green is m ore “ beautiful”
than red pigm ent, but only that w e prefer one to the other: the
use o f green w hen red w ould be appropriate w ould be a cause
o f ugliness. In the sam e w ay, the “ scale o f grandeur and
com p lex ity ” has noth in g to do w ith beauty. From the point o f
view o f the . . . True Philosophy, art is n o t an aesthetic, b u t a
rhetorical activity, and w hile “ pleasure perfects the o p eratio n ” ,
it becom es the sin o f luxary if w e divorce the pleasure from the
operation and m ake it the sole end. I am surprised that M r read
should introduce m atters o f predilection (de qustibus non est
disputandum) into any discussion o f “ a rt” , w hich is the principle
o f m anufacture, and o f the artefact, w hich can be ju d g e d only
in term s o f the ratio o f achievem ent to intention, regardless o f
w h at the intention m ay have been.
AKC
T o THE N E W ENGLISH WEEKLY L O N D O N
Sir:
I am astonished to find M r R om ney Green, w ith w hose
philosophy I am generally in cordial agreem ent, saying that
“ art is m ainly an affair o f in stinct.” Socrates, on the other
hand, “ could n o t give the nam e o f art to anything irratio n al.”
W hile for the w hole M iddle Ages, “ art is an intellectual
v irtu e .” A rt is that kind o f know ledge by w hich we k n o w h ow
to m ake w hatever it has been decided should be m ade for a
given purpose, and w ith o u t w hich there can be no good use.
W ere it m erely or m ainly a m atter o f instinct, then art w ould
be m erely o r m ainly a function o f our anim al nature, rather
than o f hum an nature as such. W orks are traditionally supposed
to provide for the needs o f soul and body at one and the same
tim e; and that means that they arc to be at the same tim e useful
and intelligible, aptus et pulcher.
O f expressions that arc m ainly instinctive one m ight citc a
b ab y ’s crying o r a la m b ’s gam boling. O f these, the form er is
n o t “ m usic” , n o r the latter “ dancing” . D ancing, if we ignore
such sensate cultures as our ow n, is a rational activity because
the gestures arc signs o f things, and w hat is signified is
som ething over and above the pleasures o f the feelings (D e
Ordine, 34). M r G reen him self is w illing to allow that a
“ significant” art m ust be significant o f som ething. B ut an
instinctive expression, how ever “ revealing” it m ay be (of the
exprcssor’s o w n state o f m ind), cannot be described as
“ significant” . T o signify is to intend a given m eaning, and this
is an act o f the m ind: w hile any unintended subm ission to the
pulls o f instinct is n o t an act, but a passion.
AKC
T o T HE N E W ENGLISH WEEKLY L O N D O N
M arch 30, 1944
Sir:
In fu rther reply to M r R om ney Green: the artist does not
w o rk by “ in stin ct” , as bees do o r as lam bs gam bol, b u t per
verbum in intellectu conceptum. In other w ords, ars sine scientia
nihil. M r H o p e’s m isunderstanding o f the w o rd “ instinct” is
private, and useless for the purposes o f com m unicating w ith
others.
W hat should be m ade is decided n o t by the artist b u t by the
w hole man, o f w h o m the m an as artist is only one aspect: the
w hole m an ’s active life being governed by prudence as well as
art. W orks o f art are “ for good use” . T he artist know s how to
m ake th em ,, b u t the man know s what is needed.*
AKC
* See n o te on p 401.
T o T HE N E W ENGLISH WEEKLY, L O N D O N
Ju n e 3, 1945
Sir:
A propos o f Im agination, discussed by M r W illiams in yo u r
issue o f M ay 10, I think it is too often overlooked that the w o rd
itself is the equivalent o f Iconography. T o im agine is to form an
im age o f an idea, a thing in itself invisible; and this kind o f
“ im itatio n ” is the proper w o rk o f art, to be distinguished from
the studio practice o f m aking “ copies o f copies” . It presup
poses, n o t observation, b u t contem plation. T he em bodim ent
o f such concepts, fathered by Nous on Aisthesis in the actual
m aterial o f sound o r pigm ent, calls for know ledge and
precision, and that is w here the R om antics so often fall short,
by their exclusive reliance on feeling; it is true that mens sine
desiderio non intelligit, b u t also that sine intellectu non desiderat. H e
w ho truly im agines docs not so m uch know w hat he likes as he
likes w h at he know s.
A KC
T o DR JO SE PH T. SHIPLEY
O ctober 29, 1946
D ear Shipley:
V ery sincerely,
* This, too, is m uch too clliptical as it stands. D r C oom arasw am y often used
the w o rd art equivocally— a t tim es in a vertical, platonic and fully traditional
sense; at o th e r tim es, he uses it in a h o rizontal sense m eaning skill alone.
A ristotle, e .g ., uses th e w o rd m o re in the latter sense and even th en
distinguishes b etw een artistic and m oral sin, fo r it suggests th a t beauty has
n o th in g to d o w ith virtue. A rt, o r p ro d u ctio n by art, im plies an intellectual
o p eratio n , a co n tem p lativ e act— as A K C often asserted. N o w intellect, as
d istinct fro m reason, is concerned w ith p u re tru th ; and as so o n as o n e departs
fro m tru th , o n e departs fro m intellect, w ith all this im plies fo r art. N o t so
w ith reason w h ich , like an algebraic form ula, can be adapted to alm o st any
term s. R eason deals w ith relationships (as w ell as, indirectly, w ith tru th ),
intellect w ith intrinsic natures and essences. T h e intrinsic n atu re o f tru th
cannot be separated fro m th e k in d red quality o f beauty, w hich is the
sp len d o r o f th e true. O n e can sin ad ro itly o r m aladroitly, b u t m ere finnesse
docs n o t neutralize the evil— i f an y th in g , it adds to it. Sim ilarly, a p o em can
be th e p ro d u c t o f little m o re th an a facility w ith w ords. B eauty, a divine
q uality o r attrib u te, can n o t characterize so m eth in g evil, trivial o r w ay w ard ,
except in a w h o lly accidental sense. A m u rd er cannot b e a beautiful act if
w o rd s have an y m eaning.
P rofessor M o n ro e C . B eardsley and Professor W ilbun K urtz W im satt, J r .,
w h o exchanged correspondence w ith D r C o o m arasw a m y o n the n o tio n o f
‘in te n tio n ’ in literary criticism .
T o ERIC GILL
June 1934
D ear Eric:
As to m y book, there is one erro r I regret, nam ely m y use o f
consonantia, in w hich I m ade a m istake. Consonantia is w ith
reference to sym m etry o f parts, that kind o f order in things which
A ugustine regarded as, together w ith their unity, the m ost
evident trace o f G od in the w orld. 1 hope to be able to correct
this in a later edition. I am w orking at m ore m aterial from
Scholastic sources— M aritain’s book is really very insufficient
and M ediaeval aesthetic has yet to be dem onstrated, starting
from the fundam ental analogy betw een the divine artifices.
T his recognized analogy enables us to understand from
expositions o f “ creation” and in connection w ith the m agnifi
cent doctrine o f exem plarism (w hich goes back to neo-
Platonic— n o t to say earlier sources) ju s t w hat the mediaeval
authors u n derstood by operation per artem. I hope that at the
sam e tim e that I collect this m aterial to com plete a long article
on Vedic exem plarism — and as I have often said before, there
can be no reason even from the m ost o rth o d o x C hristian point
o f view w h y the C hristian philosopher should n o t fortify his
position by use o f m aterial draw n from pagan sources, w hich is
precisely w h at was done by the great doctors o f C hristian
E u ro p e long ago.
W ith regard to yo u r other point, I think m ost likely the
secret o f a “ balance betw een love and th o u g h t” centers, n o t in
not loving things, b u t in loving them n o t as they are in
them selves, b u t as they are m ore perfectly— bottom s
included— in G od. Speculum aeternum mentes re videntium ducit in
cognitionem omnium creatorum, quod rectuis bi cognoscunt quam alili
(A ugustine). G od is understood to k n o w things n o t by their
private essences, but by their form s (ideas), and it is precisely
these form s that w e o u g h t to try to see and to im itate in o u r art,
w hich is o r o u g h t to be an angelic communication.
N o w I w an t to see if you can help m e as follows: find a
young m an o f the p roper education w ho w ants to earn a few
pounds to m ake a translation for m e o f A quinas’ Opusculum de
pulchro et bono w hich is a part o f his com m entary on D ionysius’
D e divinis nominibus; and perhaps also A quinas’ Opusculum de
ente et essentia. M y Latin I am polishing up, b u t it is still
laborious, and I w ould like a d rau g h t version at least o f the D e
pulchro. I have in view the m aking o f further articles on
Scholastic aesthetic and insist that the study o f mediaeval art in
o u r universities is m ostly play until the fundam ental positions
are considered.
W ith this request, I rem ain ever cordially,
T o ERIC GILL
M ay 23, 1939
M y dear Eric:
This is a short note in reply to yours o f M ay 5. I’ve been
aw ay from the M useum for 3 weeks b u t expect to get back
soon th o ’ I shall have lost a m onth: I g o t a facial cram p, due to a
chill they say, and one consequence is a w atering o f the eyes
that prevents reading w ith any com fort. H ow ever, I expect to
be p retty near well by next week.
M airet did speak o f asking you to w rite on m y stu ff and I
should have liked that. If Father V ann docs it, he should be lent
also the Z alm oxis article, the V edanta article and Eckstein,
w hich I had n o t sent to M airet. I’m glad you like the “ B iu n ity ” ;
I th o u g h t I had sent you one and will do so next w eek. It was
approved by Bowen w ho is a Professor at Catholic University
here. M y lecture at this university, w ill be printed as a Stephens
pam phlet at the sam e tim e as yours. Yes, as som eone has
rem arked, Plato could n o t broadcast his stuff; but on the other
hand, could w e have written it? It is a question w hether this
absorption and preoccupation w ith means is not pretty danger
ous. T h e South Sea Islanders did their carving w ith very sim ple
tools o f stone and shell; w hen they w ere given good steel tools
their craftsm anship w ent to pieces.
T he chief new idea expressed in m y lecture to be printed, I
think is that merely functional art equates w ith “ bread
alone. . . . , husks that the swine did eat”— a “ g o o d ” , o f
course, b u t an insufficient good for man.
Affectionately,
* See, for exam ple, Irish and R om anesque art generally; o r rep ro d u ctio n s in
the W iesbaden M ss, illustrating St H ild eg ard e’s (12th century) visions. W hat
you w ould probably dislike in these w orks is that they have a m eaning. In as
m uch as m o d ern m an is typically anti-intellectual, it is n o t surprising that
appreciations o f m o d ern art such as those in th e ‘H ostess R e p o rts’ can be
collected. I send you separately a rep rin t in w hich th e tw o coloured
rep ro d u ctio n s m ig h t please you w ere it n o t for the fact th at they, to o , are
‘ab o u t so m e th in g ’. (A K C ’s note)
M iss H illa R ebay, S olo m o n R. G u g g en h eim F oundation.
W hy E xhibit Works o f Art?, L ondon, 1943. See B ibliography.
Figures o f Speech or Figures o f Thought, L ondon, 1946. See B ibliography.
A rt and Thought, L o ndon, 1947; this w as the Festschrift to w hich A K C
referred.
T o MR L. HARRISON
D ecem ber 17, 1946
D ear M r H arrison:
M any thanks for yo u r very kind letter w hich I read w ith
pleasure. First let m e say you will find som e m ore m aterial in
Figures o f Speech or Figures o f Thought . . . and som e on dance
and m usic in T he Mirror o f Gesture . . . ; a chapter on m usic in
m y Dance o f Shiva (o p); and on the representations o f (the ethos
of) m usical m odes in m y Rajput Painting (O xford, 1914) o r this
M u se u m ’s Catalog o f the Indian Collections, Vol V. M arco Pallis’
Peaks and Lamas (A m ed at present o p) gives a very valuable
discussion o f the relation o f the arts to society as a w hole ( in
T ibet, b u t typical for any traditional society); cf also the chap,
“ N otes on Savage A rt” in m y Figures o f Speech . . .
I think the point to be rem arked is that ju s t as w e have
isolated painting as som ething to be seen in Galleries, so w e
have isolated m usic as som ething to be heard in Halls; whereas
it was in all traditional societies bound up w ith all the activities
o f life (as it still is in India). For this relation o f music, dram a
and poetry to life as a w hole, see in Beryl de Z oete and W alter
Spies, Dance Drama in Bali (a w onderful book), C olin M cPhee’s
A House in Bali. . and perhaps also m y “ B ugbear o f Literacy”
in Asia M agazine for February 1944; also A strov, T he Winged
Serpent. . ., p 33 and passim. For India, also Fox Strangew ays,
Music o f Hindustan, O x fo rd , 1914; and D anielou, Introduction to
the Study o f Musical Scales, L ondon, 1943; K urt Sachs, History o f
Music, East and West. B ut these last you doubtless already
know . I believe the N ew Y ork Public Library is rather
specialized in m usical literature o f these kinds. It w ould be
im possible for m e ju s t n o w to think o f w riting about music,
because o f all the o th er w o rk I am involved in, b u t w hy d o n ’t
you do it yourself, using som e o f the material to be found in all
sources?
For the principle o f vocation generally, I m ight perhaps have
also m entioned m y Religious Basis o f the Forms o f Indian
Society. . . N ew Y ork, 1946.
Let m e k n o w if this helps, and if you w ish w rite again.
V ery sincerely,
T o MRS W . Q. SWART
M arch 15, 1933
D ear M adam :
T here exists o f course a vast literature on Indian art. W e have
here w h at is on the w hole the best collection o f Indian paintings
in the w orld*, and certainly the best general Indian collections
and w o rk in g library in A m erica. I think it w ould be essential
for you to spend a sh o rt tim e here before actually going to
India. In the m eantim e I w ould suggest yo u r looking up m y
article on “ T h e T eaching o f D raw in g in C eylon” in the Ceylon
National R eview for D ecem ber 1906; T agore, L ’Alpone, Paris,
1921; m y “ Introduction to the A rt o f Eastern A ssi” , O pen Court
M agazine, M arch 1932; and articles on Indian art in the
'Encyclopaedia Britannica. Also such magazines as Rupam , nos
1-40, and the Journal o f Indian A rt. Also, H adaw ay, Illustrations
o f M etal Work in Brass and Copper. . . .
We have no m odern Indian paintings here. T hey are
analogous to “ Pre-Raphaelite” art in Europe; m ore significant
as representing a revolution o f taste and outlo o k than as
everlasting w orks o f art, th ough they have great charm and
sensitiveness.
Y ou w o u ld also find m uch m aterial in m y Mediaeval Sinhalese
A rt, 1908. For the rest I can only suggest you spend a few days
here. I should be glad to assist you.
V ery sincerely,
T o GEORGE SARTON
D ate uncertain
D ear Sarton:
T here are three im p o rtan t pieces o f Islamic glass in the
M useum o f Fine A rts. T he lam p o f Karim al-D in, w ho retired
in 723 A H (= 1323); and published in G aston W iet, Musee
Arabe, le Caire Catalogue general . . . lampes et bouteilles en verre
emaille, M useum o f Fine A rts Bulletin, January 1928, and w ith a
revised translation o f the inscriptions in the 1940 edition o f the
M FA Handbook. T he glass globe was m ade for Saif al-din
A rghun al-‘A la’i, w ho died in 748 A H (= 1347-8). It has been
published by M ayer, Saracenic Heraldry , p 74; and also in M FA
Bulletin for A ugust 1912 and in Eastern A rt, Vol II, p 245. A
glass bottle bears no inscription.
T here are over 300 im p o rtan t pieces o f enam elled glass
kn o w n . W iet in his catalogue (1929) has published 118 glass
objects and the m ajority o f them arc lam ps, o f w hich 87 can be
dated by their inscriptions (see his Introduction). T here arc 19
in the M etropolitan M useum o f A rt, a collection second only to
the C airo M useum .
AKC
Robin Field was a m em ber o f the faculty o f fine arts at H arvard U niversity,
C am b rid g e, M assachusetts, U SA .
W e w ill n o t fu rth e r identify m ost o f these tides, as sufficient in fo rm atio n is
p ro v id ed for the serious reader, except to n o te that P lotinus’ Enneads are n o w
available in a on e v o lu m e edition (sam e translation); there have been
additional translations o f D ionysius in w hole o r in part; there have been
m o re recent editions a n d /o r translations o f E ckhart, Le Nombre d ’or, and
W alter S co tt’s Hermetica (1985). “ M ythes, m ysteres et sy m b o les” by Rene
G uen o n appeared also as a chapter in his Apergus sur I’initiation (Paris, 1946,
1975).
T o DR K W A N G - W A N KIM
T o J O H N OS MA N
June 25, 1947
D ear M r O sm an:
I m ost certainly apologize for having neglected to send any
kind o f bibliography. Even n o w I cannot pretend to send you a
com plete guide, but I will list som e essential books for India,
and later ask you to let me k now w hether you m ean also
Islamic and Persian m aterial.
T he basic epitom e o f Indian religion and philosophy is, o f
course, the Bhagavad Gita; there are m any, b u t no perfect
translations; I prefer on the w hole the one by Bhagavan Das
and M rs [Annie] Bcsant. For the U panishads, H um e, The
Thirteen Principal Upanishads (O xford) has its uses, b u t it is not
always accurate, and the Introduction hardly acceptable from
the H indu point o f view; I prefer the freer b u t m ore
understanding version by the Rev W. R. Teape, in his The
Secret Lore o f India. For the B rahm anas and A ranyakas, for
w hich I have the highest respect, the follow ing are good:
E ggeling’s Satapatha B r (5 vols in SBE; Kieth, Rigveda
Brahmanas (H arvard O riental Series, vol 25) and Aitareya
A ranyaka (O xford) and Sankhayana Aranyaka (Royal Asiatic
Society, O riental T ranslation Fund, RAS, London) and O ertel,
Jatm iniya Upanishad Brahmana (in Journal o f the A m erican
O riental Society, 16) and Caland, Pancavimsa Brahmana (Cal
cutta, 1931) are all pretty good. All these sources at least should
be in y o u r library as well as m y H induism and Buddhism
(Philosophical Library, N . Y ., 1943).
For a general in troduction to the East and its problem s I
kn o w noth in g equal to M arco Pallis, Peaks and Lamas;
N ikhilananda’s T he Gospel o f Sri Ramakrishna (B. Y ., V edanta
C entre) a classic, nearly in the same class as Z im m er, Der Weg
zu m Selbst (Rascher Verlag, Zurich) dealing w ith the still living
Sri R am ana M aharsi.
For Indian sociology, Bhagavan Das, The Science o f Social
Organization-, B haratan K um arappa, Capitalism, Socialism or
Villagism (Shakti K aryalayam , M adras), m y Religious Basis o f
the Forms o f Indian Society (O rientalia, N . Y.) and A. M .
H ocart, Les Castes (Paris). For B uddhism , Dhammapada (Pali
T ex t Soc, “ M in o r A nthologies” , 1931), Hare, Woven C a
dences. . . . Saddharma Pundarika (SBE Vol X VI), Suzuki, Essays
in Z en Buddhism (Luzac, London).
H induism further: G. U . Pope, Tiruvacagam (O xford, 1900);
R. C . T em ple, T he Word o f Lalla (C am bridge, England 1924);
[R abindranath] T agore, O ne Hundred Poems o f Kabir (N . B.:
T a g o re ’s o w n w ritings are n o t very im portant); [A rthur]
A valon (= [Sir John] W oodroffe) Shakti and Shakta(and his
o th er w orks published by Luzac, London [and later by Ganesh,
M adras]. General: The Cultural Heritage o f India (3 vols) [now 4
volum es]; Legacy o f India and Legacy o f Islam (both O xford).
D ram a, m usic, etc: Fox-Strangw ays, Music o f Hindustan
(O xford); A K C and D uggirala, Mirror o f Gesture (Weyhe,
N .Y .); A K C , C hap 8 in Asian Legacy (John Day, N . Y.); Kieth,
Sanskrit Drama (O xford); D e Z o et and Spies, Dance Drama in
Bali (N . Y ., very good)-, A K C , “ Indian D ram atic T h e o ry ” (in
Dictionary o f World Literature); D anielou, Introduction to Indian
Scales (Royal India Society, London).
I w ould em phasize the difficulty for any student to under
stand Eastern culture unless he has a background o f know ledge
o f the traditional philosophy and culture o f E urope— prc-
Socratics, Plato, Philo, H erm es, Gospels, Plotinus, D ionysius,
B onaventura, St T hom as, E ckhart, Ruysbroeck, Bochm e.
A dd the w orks o f Rene G uenon (see in m y A m I M y Brother’s
Keeper ?)
Also o f great use w ould be P ro f B R ow land’s Outline and
Bibliographies o f Indian A rt (H arvard); very fine is Stella
K ram rich, The H indu Temple (1946, Calcutta); on Yoga,
W oods, Yoga System o f Patanjali (H arvard O riental Series, Vol
17); D anielou, Yoga: M ethod o f Re-integration (U niversity
B ooks, N .Y .); Z im m er, Kunstform uttd Yoga im Indischen
Bildkunst (Berlin, 1926). . .
Sincerely yours,
T o LORD RAGLAN
July 14, 1938
D ear Lord Raglan:
V ery m any thanks for your letter. M ost likely you cannot
agree w ith m y (traditional) point o f view according to which
the ritual action is a m im esis, repitition and continuation o f
“ w hat was done in the beginning” (explicit statem ents to this
effect can be cited at least as far back as the Satapatha Brahmana,
about the 8th ccntury BC). We arc nevertheless in full
agreem ent that “ the m yth-tellcr is dealing w ith actions and
sym bols already k n o w n to h im .” It is these same actions that
arc equally im itated in ritual. 1 do n o t accept a “ m y th m ak cr” in
the m odern sense o f “ au th o r” . T he m yth is transm itted
deliberately, and thus “ the actions arc already k now n to the
m y th -tcllcr” , and the only question that can arise here is
“ w hether he understands his m aterial” ; by the tim e m y th has
becom e rom ance, o r cuhcm criscd, this becom es m ore and
m ore doubtful. H o w then was the Urmythos first know n?
C ontem platively; the actus primus being always a contem pla
tion, after w hich the artist em bodies the vision in m aterial
(colour, sound, gestures, etc).
M y position is philosophically “ realistic” . T h at w hich is
told, o r rather referred to (the ultim ate content being strictly
inexpressible, th o u g h it can be experienced), is a reality apart
from tim e, “ seen” o r “ heard” contem platively (or as if in a
dream ) by the so-called “ m y th -m ak cr” (there is an old Indian
sto ry o f a sage w ho failed to reach heaven ju s t bccausc he
claim ed authorship in w hat had as a m atter o f fact been revealed
to him ). T his reality is expounded and outlined in the narrative
m y th o r ritual. It rem ains for the contem porary auditor to
becom e aw are o f it as a living experience, and n o t a m atter o f
literary art alone, again contem platively. T his all im plies a
prim ordial revelation, or rather audition; w hich m ay be dated
back, perhaps, to the A urignacian.
C ertainly, I do n o t believe that hum an sacrifice “ originated
in the im agination o f som e story-teller” , using all these w ords
in all their m odern connotations. T raditionally, the creation o f
the w orld, w hether th o u g h t o f as a past o r as a continuous
event, is essentially a “ hum an sacrifice”— the cosm ic aspect o f
D eity being the “ U niversal M an ” , and creation a subdivision o f
this unity. This division is at the same tim e a voluntary sacrifice
(“ dividing H im self, He fills these w o rld s” ) and a passion (“ into
h ow m any parts did they, the first sacrificers, o r creators,
divide H im ?” ). It is strictly in im itation o f this subdivision that
the bread is broken in the C hristian sacrifice.
T h e treatm ent o f the m yths as historical is always a quite late
and cuhcmcristic procedure. The veritable crucifixion, for
exam ple, is a cosm ic extension o f the C ross o f Light. T here has
been a continuous transm ission, not only publically o f the
m y th qua narrative, b u t also in its real significances. T he
distinction is constantly m ade in Indian ritual books betw een
those w ho m erely participate in a rite, and those w ho
understand it; the form er m ay receive tem poral benefits, the
latter only spiritual.
These points o f view are probably quite unacceptable to you.
B ut if they interest you at all, I do suggest your looking at Rene
G uenon, “ Le Rite ct le Sym bole” , and “ M ysteres ct Sym boles”
in Le Voile d ’Isis, 40, 1935; and F rithjof Schuon, “ D u Sacrifice”
in Etudes Traditiomelles (new nam e o f same magazine), April
1938.
V ery sincerely,
PS: Y ou say “ the hum an body m ust com e before the statue” ; 1
am thinking (in Platonic fashion, if you like) o f the form a
humanitatis prior to either.
Jacqucs E vola, Rivolto Contro il Mondo Modemo, M ilan, 1934; sec also later
editions
T o PROFESSOR W A R D
U ndated
D ear Professor W ard:
R um i, M athnaw i , VI, 4578 (Gibb M em orial N ew s Series IV
6, p 511) com pares the divine hero to “ a h undred m en
concealed in a single m an (as w e should say, ‘a host in
him selF ), a h u n d red bow s and arrow s concealed in a single
blowpipe ” . T he w ord is naivak . . ., for which I find in stcingass’
Persian Dictionary, am ongst various m eanings, “ tube th ro u g h
w hich an arro w is projected” . R u m i’s date is 1207-1273
(M athnaw i ab o u t 1260). For Indra’s “ b o lt” (vajra) w e have tw o
old Indian accounts o f the m ythological origin o f the arrow *,
in one o f w hich, w hich can hardly be later than 8th century b c ,
they are said to be the “ slivers w ithin it” (Indra’s bolt) that w ere
“ separated from it” and becam e arrow s. C f Taittirva Samhita
V I.I.3.5.
AKC
* In terestingly, an early nam e fo r C h rist w as Chosen Arrow.
P rofessor W ard can n o t be fu rth er identified.
‘T h e B lo w p ip e in Persia and India’, A K C American Anthropologist, N ew
Series, 45, 1943.
‘T h e S ym bolism o f A rc h ery ’, A K C , Ars Islamica, X , 1943.
T o DA VID W H IT E
O cto b er 15, 1946
D ear M r W hite:
T here m ust be a great deal m ore literature on M yth than I
k n o w of. T h e m ain thing is to k n o w the m yths o f the various
peoples, and to learn to recognize their similarities. For this,
perhaps, Lord R aglan’s The Hero should be considered; and, o f
course, folk-tales in general— w hy are there so m any versions
o f the same story all over the w orld? So one com es to think o f
an Urmythos o f w hich all others are broken fragm ents; m yths
are the pattern that history exemplifies.
O f m y ow n I suggest “ M ind and M y th ” in the N ew English
W eekly o f Dec. 24, 1942 ( vide supra)-, “ Literary S ym bolism ” in
the Dictionary o f World Literature (also in Figures o f Speech or
Figures o f Thought (Luzac, L ondon, 1946). B ut I do com m end
J. A. Stew art, M yths o f Plato (M acm illan 1905); Fritz M arti,
“ R eligion, Philosophy and the C ollege” , Review o f Religion,
VII, 1942, 41 ff (“ M en live by m yths . . . they are no m ere
poetic in v en tio n s”— m ost serious students o f m yth em phasize
that m yths are not “ inventions” ); W ilbur M arshall U rban, The
Intelligible World, 1929; Plato, Theatetus 144 D; w ith A ristotle,
Metaphysics 982 B; N . Berdyaev, Freedom and the Spirit, 1935;
E. Siecke, Drachenkampfe, Leipzig, 1907 (p 60: unglaublich, das
heute noch jem and sich einbilden kennte, weitverbreitete M ythen
Konnen ihre Entstehur der Erftndung eines einzelnen Dichters
verstanden (p 61) ein Grundirrtu, z u glauben, der mythische
Ausdruck sei allegorisch; p 49, die Sage ist von Gottermythen
ausgegangen. Herzfeld in M itth aus Iran 6, 1934, ridicules Fraser’s
interpretations o f m yths as “ m istaken explanations o f phe
n o m en a” ; says D ie Geburt der Geschichte ist der Tod des M ythos\
lays d o w n sequence, mythos = ursprungliche Gottersage,
Sage = heroische Stadium, legende = Stadium in w hich m y th is
m ixed w ith lives o f real m en and so hofisch und pseudo-
historische— all like m y M yth, Epic, Rom ance; M . P. N ilsson,
Mycenean Origin o f Greek M ythology, 1932, “ m y th o lo g y can
never be converted into h isto ry ” . Read all the A m erican Indian
O rig in M yths also. Also N . K. C hadw ick, Poetry and Prophecy.
As for the “ history o f literature” , from B eo w u lf to Forever
A m ber (sequence: m etaphysics, tragedy, sensation) consider
that in the last stage tragedy is impossible, nothing rem ains b u t
the lovely and the horrible; tragedy is only possible w here there
is a conflict betw een w hat is and w hat o u ght to be, the H ero
conquers o r loses according to w hether he can be w hat he
o u ght. T he sam e in the history o f pictorial art, C hristian and
other; Picasso is n o t tragic, he only depicts the horrible. From
things universally true to o u r curiosity about personalities,
w hat a co m e-d o w n — as Lodge used to say, “ From the Stone
A ge until n o w , quelle degringoladeV’
I w o u ld rather count in Blake w ith the m etaphysical poets
than w ith the Rom antics.
I am afraid this is a rather b rief answ er, b u t all I can m anage
now .
V ery sincerely,
T o PROFESSOR R A Y M O N D S. STITES
January 25, 1937
D ear Professor R aym ond S. Stites:
I am having a p h oto o f the bronze sent to you.
I can best explain m y position about “ genius” by saying that
W agner is typically a genius in m y sense, but n o t Bach. I
believe this really covers the ground.
N o m essiah is telling anything new or personal, b u t
“ fulfilling” . N o t only C hrist, but also B uddha em phasizes this
in their o w n w ords. I am n o t forgetting such expressions as “ A
new law I give unto y o u ” , b u t am referring to the w hole
attitude. T h e “ new law ” is that o f the proceeding G od as
distinguished from the old G odhead, and in this sense every
gospel is new , and at the same tim e this “ n ew ” is always the
same “ n o v elty ” , n o t a personal one. 1 use “ genius” , then, in the
m odern sense o f a person extraordinarily gifted in expression
o f a personal experience. T hose others such as C hrist, D ante,
D ionysius, etc, are rather “ heroes” in the G reek sense.
I have no d o u b t that by a further definition o f term s we
m ig h t reach a clear agreem ent.
M any thanks for yo u r letter,
V ery sincerely
T o PROFESSOR R A Y M O N D S. STITES
January 31, 1937
D ear Professor Stites:
If you will get Etudes Traditionnelles for Dec 1938, you will
find an article by G uenon, “ La Porte E tro ite” in w hich the
theory o f the 7 rays o f the sun is stated w ith great exactitude
and sim plicity.
AKC
T o PROFESSOR RA Y M O N D S. STITES
A pril 12, 1937
D ear Professor Stites:
I have n o t yet published on the Seven Rays o f the Sun, except
for a b rie f reference in a little book on The Symbolism o f the
D om e w hich is to be published by H arvard U niversity Press
soon. I have given a lecture at Ann A rbor on “ Is A rt a
Superstition o r a W ay o f Life?” and shall send you it w hen
printed.
I do n o t by any means cite Bach as a genius— but as
som ething better, a m aster craftsm an. W agner is a genius using
the m aterial for his o w n ends rather than for its o w n sake.
N o d o ubt, the end o f the road is beyond all art: bccause the
reality is n o t in any likeness n o r in any w ay expressible. In the
m eantim e Plato (etc) does n o t require to look directly at the
Sun before one has acquired the eagle-eye, b u t m uch rather to
look directly at the shadow s and through them at the Sun.
M aterialism and sentim entality im ply a looking at the shadow s
for their o w n sake. T he love o f fine bodies is all right: but for
those “ w ho can think o f nothing nobler than bodies” (St
T hom as). O n e can decide to play w ith the kaleidoscopic pattern
o f things: o r to see this as a pattern em broidered on a
perm anent ground. T he m etaphysical w hole or holy m an
cannot make o u r kind o f distinction betw een w hat a thing is and
w hat it means; all values are traditionally at the same tim e
substantial and transubstandal (the Eucharist preserves an
isolated survival o f this once universal point o f view). T o speak
o f the picture that is n o t in the colours does not destroy the
colours but adds som ething to the definition o f w hat can be
experienced th ro u g h the aesthetic surfaces. T he w hole m an
does n o t only feel (aesthetics) but also understands (cognition)
what is expressed and to w hich he is attracted by the colours. I’m
discussing all this once m ore in a long introduction to the
fo rthcom ing book by R ow land, o f reproductions o f Indian
frescocs— a discussion o f the “ N ature o f B uddhist A rt” . A rt is
n o t a luxury b u t a necessity.
Siva is by no means the only “ guardian” o f the arts. All are
referred to divine sources, in various ways.
V ery sincerely,
X m as D ay 1943
I do n o t have all o f C usa’s w orks. T he w ords M ens sine
desiderio non intelligit, et sine intellectu non desiderat are from one
o f his serm ons at Brixcn, m y source being E. V ansteenberghe,
Autour de la docte ignorance, M unster, 1915, p 56. C f
B onaventura, N on est perfecta cognitio sine dilectione, I Sent, d. 10,
q. 1, q 2, fund 1 (see J-M Bissen, L ’Exemplarisme divin selon S t
Bonaventure, Paris, 1929, p 95). . . . In other w ords, I suppose,
the will is involved in all real know ing; w e cannot k n o w
som ething in w hich we arc n o t inter-est-ed.
Cordially,
T o PROFESSOR H. H. ROWLEY
M ay 10, 1945
D ear Professor H. H. Rowley:
M any thanks for sending me your “ Subm ission in Suffer
in g ” , w hich I have been reading w ith m uch interest. I think it
will conduce to clarification if we equate karma w ith ananke and
dharma w ith heimarmene, “ fo rtu n e” and “ destiny” , respectively.
I am n o t sure that w e o u ght to separate the idea o f subm ission
in suffering from that o f subm ission in pleasure; these are
contraries by w hich we o u ght never to be dis-tracted (see
Bhagavad G ita II. 14, 38, 57). O u r only reasonable attitude
tow ards the contraries that fortune (by the ineluctable opera
tion o f m ediate causes) brings upon us is one o f patience ; on the
other hand, it is o u r part to cooperate w ith our destiny, if w e arc
ever to reach our destination.
T his patience under the slings o f fortune is an apatheia in the
original high m eaning o f the w o rd — a not-being subject-to-
pathological-states o r “ affections” ; the m an w ho is overcom e
by such being in fact pathetic. O n this patience, cf M arcus
A urelius X. 28 “ to the rational being [ie, obedient to the G od
and D aim on w ithin him , V. 10] only has it been granted o f
freewill to yield to w hat befalls, whereas m erely to yield is a
m atter o f necessity, anankaion, for all” ; c f Philo, LA III. 21
active and passive subm ission (com m only th o u g h t o f as
“ Stoic” positions, but M arcus A urelius and Philo are essentially
Platonists, and only accidentally “ Stoic” ).
D id I send you m y “ Recollection, Indian and Platonic” ? If
not, I will do so.
V ery sincerely,
T o H. G. RAW LINS ON
D ecem ber 10, 1946
D ear R aw linson:
B y the w ay, apropos o f “ no sentience in N irv an a” , the
traditional doctrine is that there is no sentience after death, the
body alone being an instrum ent o f feeling— Brhadar Up 4.5.13,
Axiochus, D iogenes Laertius, x. 64, 124, also in O T : “ the dead
k n o w n o t an y th in g .”
O f course I cannot at all agree w ith yo u r view o f the Vcdic
sacrifice. In any case, the B uddha’s (in S 1.169) substitution o f
internal sacrifice is only an echo o f the old teachings about the
A gnihotra in $A X , SB X I.5.6.3, SB X .5.4.16; c f already in RV
V III.70.3, na yajnair.
V ery sincerely,
T o RAMA P. CO OM A RA S W A M Y
1944
M y dear Rama:
T he follow ing is in response to yo u r question about images:
it says in E xodus xx, 4: “ T h o u shalt not m ake un to thee any
graven im age, o r any likeness o f anything that is in heaven
above, o r that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the w aters
under the earth ” ,
B E C A U S E G od instructed M oses w ith definite directions,
as in E xodus x x v , 9: “ A ccording to all that I (God) show thee,
after the pattern o f the tabernacle, and the patterns o f all the
instrum ents thereof, even so shall ye m ake it. ” T hen G od lists
the things that are proper to H I S T A B E R N A C L E : you k now
by n o w that this world that we live in is in imitation o f that world
that God lives in; n ow then G od gives specific patterns the w hich
M oses received and b ro u g h t to his people, for the things that
are p roper for m an to have and use. A nything other than those
specified by God are forbidden as subhuman , at least as u n w o rth y o f
m en w ho w orship G od and take His and only His directions as
their m eans o f living.
C hapters 25 th ro u g h 31 give the m ost w onderful description
o f w hat is suitable for G o d ’s follow ers to do and have. A t one
point M oses w onders w ho and how these things shall be made,
and in C hapters 3 1 -3 2 , it says:
Sec, 1 have called by nam e Bezaleel the son o f U ri, the son o f
H ur, o f the tribe o f Judah: (3) A nd I have filled him w ith the
Spirit o f G od, in w isdom and in understanding, and in
know ledge, and in all m anner o f workmanship, (4) to devise
cunning w orks, to w o rk in gold, and in silver, and in brass,
(5) and in cutting o f stones, to set them , and in carving
tim ber, to w o rk in all m anner o f w orkm anship. (6) and I,
behold, I have given w ith him Aholiab, the son o f
A hisam ach, o f the tribe o f Dan: and in the hearts o f all that are
wise hearted I have p u t wisdom, that they may make all that I have
commanded thee:
N o w G od has provided for His tabernacle on earth (our
w orld) all that is proper fo r man to have, and the w ay to m ake
these things, as H e declared in Exodus xxxi-xxxii: by those
w ho are “wise hearted” , and filled with H I S “wisdom and skill”.
A n d only that w hich is m ade by these “ w ise-hearted, and
filled w ith HIS w isdom and skill” can be rightly called art. Y ou
o u g h t to k n o w this, you w ho have often heard this discussed.
N O W AS TO W HY ONE SHALL OR SHALL NOT WORSHIP AN
i m a g e : A ll works o f art are images o f something; im ages arc
rem in d ers, rep resen tatio n s and signs. It all depends on
w h e th e r a m an on seeing an im age o f G od is such a man as can
be reminded by it o f God, or is he such a man as to be able only to see
the image (or clay) and not what it is supposed to remind him of? It
w o u ld indeed be dangerous to allow such a m an to have an
im age o f G od, for he w o u ld m istake the stone, paint-
p ig m cn t, the w o o d , w hatsoever the im age is m ade o f for his
G od. (T h a t’s rig h tly called the w o rsh ip o f an im age, or
g raven im age.)
B ut there are those w ho use the im age as a rem inder, and only
when they are in the presence o f the real thing no longer need the
reminder.
T here is the m atter o f im portance; rightly used, im ages, like
every oth er thing on earth, have their value, b u t to use the
im age in place o f the real thing, as if it w ere the real thing, is
wrong and forbidden, e x a m p l e : W hen you travel by m o to r car,
you see ro u te n u m b e rs on the w ay, these arc sy m b o ls or
images; you reach y our destination, you do n o t take up all the
signs along the w ay (other people likewise use them ), or do you
take up the boat o r the bridge w hen you have crossed to the
oth er side o f the river? Y ou use these things w hen you need
them , likew ise images; b u t it w ould be silly to say they are no
use while you are still crossing overl
In India, it is the custom to desecrate all the clay im ages o f the
household on T hursdays, and on Fridays you go to the bazaar
and buy fresh clay im ages w hich are taken to the Ganges and
there consecrated and m ade holy; these are then used in the
average hom e for less than a w eek, and once m ore the same
cerem ony, o f discarding and acquiring new im ages, is enacted;
this is a w onderful m ethod o f keeping people from getting
attached to the clay in the clay-im age, but to use it as a reminder or
sign o f the divinity it represents.
Sankaracharya was a very great scholar in India and he too
used im ages in the w ay above m entioned. O nce he felt
em barassed, he th o u g h t it was childish; how ever, this is w hat
he concluded: “ G od, be pleased to forgive me for w orshipping
Y ou in this T em ple th ro u g h this Im age, I, w ho k n o w Y ou have
no special abode here, b u t are everyw here, and that you have
no special form , for Y ou are n o t this im age n o r are Y ou
an y th in g .”
T his does n o t m ean that he intended to change his m anner o f
w orship, b u t it is an explanation that he understood that the
image was fo r him only a'sign post.
All the religions o f the w orld except the Jew s and M oham
m edans m ake use o f Icons, or im ages, or sym bols.
T he Jew s and the M oham m edans forbade it because they felt
that the real thing should n o t be represented lest on the “ D ay o f
Ju d g e m e n t” w hen G od calls all the dead to rise, these things
will fail to com e to life. A nd they are very strong on G od being
the only and the very creator, and all the things that m en m ake
shall n o t im itate the things that G od made, but shall distinctly
look like som ething else, ie, that the sym bol shall look like a
m athem atical sym bol or sign, so that the m istake o f the
im itation for the real thing should n o t have the slightest chance
for existing. This is the w ay they w ish to avoid error. B ut for
those who wish to risk the true use, and purpose to take great care not
to make the wrong use o f images, fo r them also it is right that they shall
have the freedom to do what is right, and should they fa il, it is at their
own peril. A nd they shall, o f course, take the consequences,
should they m ake the erro r o f thinking that the clay is other
than a sign post for the m ind to use on its w ay to concentration
or contemplatio or Yoga.
All the religions (as I started to sjy) have perm itted the use o f
icons or sym bols, m ade in stone, plaster, paint, w ood, w ords
(w hich are praises o f the Lord) o r in any other m aterials
w hatever, w ith the definite restrictions, that those things shall
be m ade according to the pattern showed thee and by those w ho
are “ w ise-hearted” and filled w ith the “ w isdom and skill” that
G od graces m an w ith.
For religions other than the C hristian this expression is used:
“ Im itation o f the Eternal Idea” , in other w ords, exactly w hat
the C hristains say. W hen you read Plato, I hope in the original,
you will m eet every C hristian idea (including the above), but
cut m ore sharply and stated m ore poignantly. For the Greeks o f
P lato ’s tim e w ere a people w ho could stand for and w ho could
love C h rist for His ferocity, b u t w e w ant to m ake H im m eek
and m ild, a sm o o th and handsom e youth; in other w ords, we
w ish to m ake C h rist according to o u r idea o f w hat H e o u g h t to
be; it is so m uch easier than to try to com e up to H im , and you
k n o w we like short cuts, even to heaven. B ut I need hardly add
that although there are short cuts to Heaven, these cannot be discovered
by a people who adore as their “Culture-Heroes” the makers o f
refrigeration boxes and labor saving devices, as well as man killing
implements . . . .
T o RAMA P. C O O M A R A S W A M Y
. June 24, 1947
M y dear Rama:
I am afraid m y long letter about caste, etc, cannot 'have
reached you. T o perform srdddha, or have it perform ed for one
by a B rahm an, does n o t m ake one a Brahm an. O u r family is
Vcllala; this is n o t a well k n o w n caste nam e in N o rth India, but
any T am il you m ay run across will know it. We do w ear the
yajiiopavita\ I have received upanayana from a B rahm an in the
Punjab, and shall resum e w earing the thread w hen w e com e to
India. I suggested that you should accept the offer to give you
upanayana in Bengal, but if you did n o t do so, there will be
other opportunities, and m eantim e you can always live like a
H indu, and according to B rahm an standards and w ays . . . .
O u r people are Vellalas, originally from T anjore, b u t long
settled in N . C eylon (Jaffna) and then also in C olom bo. T hey
are Saivas\ they are given upanayana and w ear the thread. We
crem ate the dead and take the ashes to Benares. We keep up a
hereditary connection w ith Pandas at Allahabad. O u r people are
usually vegetarians, and em ploy B rahm an cooks. I once
perform ed by father’s sraddha, b u t otherw ise this has been done
m y oth er m em bers o f the family in Ceylon.
W ith best love,
T o RAMA P. C OO M A R A S W A M Y
June 25, 1947
M y dear Rama:
In tw o recent letters, I think I m entioned numdah as m aterial
for kurtas ; I should have said pattu (patoo), as numdah is a felt
used only for rugs. T here are m any nice handm ade w oolen
m aterials obtainable in Punjab.
Also, I think I w rote sraddha; I should have said sraddha. The
form er means “ faith” , the latter denotes the rite. O ne should be
careful to be accurate not only in translation, but also in
transliteration; to use oo for w, and so forth is slipshod.
Regarding suddha, “ pure” (foods, etc, see in BG ch xviii). O ur
inner and outer lives are bound up together, so that physical and
spiritual purity are intimately related. Ritual purity is a discipline,
som ething to be done and understood. Do not think o f it as a
mechanical formality. In Iceland, “ no one turned his face
unwashed to Holyfell” , and this fastidious instinct towards sacred
things can be found all over the world. It may be possible, but it is
not likely, to be fastidious inwardly only. Those who are crude
outw ardly are likely to be crude inwardly. All “ means” (Skr =
upaya, rites, imagery, etc) are indispensable supports, until one has
reached the “ end o f the road” , which is still a long, long way off
for those are m ost apt to believe they can do w ithout them!
Love,
Father
R am a P. C o o m arasw am y , as above.
T o D O N A LUISA C O O M A R A S W A M Y
N o v em b er 23, 1935
D arling:
It certainly was a relief to hear from you after 20 days! I am
looking forw ard to hearing m ore about G urukul. As to magic,
one m u st rem em ber that th o u g h prevalent, it is by no means
encouraged for W ayfarers, b u t is a “ hindrance” . I am ju s t
halfw ay th ro u g h correcting p ro o f (mainly checking som e
h u n d red o f references) in “ A ngel and T ita n ” w hich is at last to
ajjpear, taking 47 pp o f JA O S . As to D r Ross, he m ade no
p ro p er arrangem ents for paym ent, and I have to prove the
debt. (I have statem ents from M r H aw es, Edgar Parker, and
M r H olm es, etc) and in any case the estate will take som e tim e
to settle; I shall be glad w hen it is done— this m onth I couldn’t
have paid H olm es b u t for $50 received from College A rt
A ssociation for the Introduction I recently sent you (I hope you
like it, I think it quite right for its purpose). A aron was here last
night, w e had a great talk. A t the close, discussing circles, he
said “ a circle has no ends” ; on the contrary I said, “ its ends
coincide” ; he saw the point b u t finds it hard to think in that
fashion. I hope several long letters sent a w eek o r tw o back
reach you (addressed to Raj pur). D id I m ention that M an u ’s
d aughter is called “ R ib” in X , 82, 23 [presum ably the reference
is to the Rig Veda]? By the w ay, A aron’s reply was “ T h a t’s
w h at m y father w ould have said”— I m ean about the circles.
T h ey both (W arners) ask to be rem em bered. We are beginning
to have light snow . I im agine it’s quite pleasantly cool at
H ardw ar. Also it m ust be a really H indu place, w ith pilgrim s
com ing and going. I m ay w rite a jo in t article w ith P ro f Furfey,
o f C atholic U niv, W ashington, on enclosed lines. I spent $150
this m onth, and as I said am hoping that you can save all above
$100 against Spring and Sum m er. I think as I said last tim e, you
should probably stay there till end o f A pril and then go to
France for a m o n th o r tw o. I think yo u r dream o f clim bing the
pravat was good; a variant o f the ladder sym bolism , and
analogous to the “ up stream ” [pratikiila, pratisota, etc) jo u rn ey ;
uphill, countercurrent. W hen it gets cold up there you will be
able to get nice pattu to m ake up. 1 shouldn’t w o rry about what
you can read in the RV; the im p o rtan t thing is to get com m and
o f the vocabulary and style, w e can do the rest here. It com es
infinitely easier to m e n o w than a year ago, and by contrast the
U panisads and B G are no effort at all; b u t o f course “ classical”
Skr, w hich m ost people k n o w better, w ould be harder for us.
B y the w ay, N ala-D am ayanti = M anas and Vac, etc. As you
know , there is only one story to be told. She holding her
svyamvara, “ o w n choice” is the patim icchanti stri o f RV and
B rahm anas.
1 w ro te tw o days ago “ D eath is im m ortal, Life m o rtal” ,
today found SB X , 5,2,3: “ D eath is the Person in the Sun, and
the L ight that shines is w hat is alive; therefore, D eath does n o t
die, for he is w ithin, therefore he is not seen, for he is w ithin
w h at is alive.” N B : the best translation o f amrta is n o t
im m ortal, b u t sim ply living as contrasted w ith dying. T he
devas are alive, m an is so to speak “ dead and alive” , m ortal,
corruptible. A m rta rarely m eans “ im m o rta l” (Bloom field, I
m u st say, already recognized this, b u t m any have forgotten it).
B uddhist M ara = M rtya = G andharva = K am adeva = Eros;
herm eneutically A m or has been interpreted as a-mors. L ove-and-
D eath unifies; Life divides.
W ith T hom as, “ the state o f glory is n o t under the S un” , c f
SB X , 5,1,5: “ W hatsoever is on this side o f the Sun, all that is
possessed by D eath ” . It is th ro u g h the Sun that one escapes;
“ no m an com eth to the (D ragon-) Father save th ro u g h M e .”
26th
T o WALTER SHEWRING
A ugust 6, 1947
M y dear W alter Shew ring:
. . . I’m sorry to hear that like m yself you are slow ed up. N o
do u b t these later days have drained us all o f strength, in spite o f
ourselves and o f such detachm ent as we m ay have acquired.
O n ly this w eek I received a very tragic letter from a m an w ho I
had th o u g h t o f as a pow erful healer o f others— and n ow seeks
healing for himself.
I think you know we— m y wife and I— plan to retire to
com parative solitude som ew here in N India n o t later than the
end o f 1948. . . .
N o d o u b t the w hole w orld is “ in for” a long period o f
suffering for its sins, and w e are all involved, som e m ore, som e
less, in the earning o f such retribution— w hich w ould be true
enough even from a secular point o f view. . . .
Sincerely,