Petitioner Memorandum Final (Divya's Try)

~THE LEGAL INSIDER’S 1ST ONLINE MEMORIAL WRITING COMPETITION, 2020~
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TEAM CODE –
LEGAL INSIDER’S 1st ONLINE MEMORIAL

WRITING COMPETITION
BEFORE
HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF GREY PARK
IN THE CASE CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT & FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
(PETITION FILED UNDER §32 OF GREY PERK’S CONSTITUTION.)
(WRIT PETITION NO. ______ OF 2020)
DR. JOHN
HOUSE…………………………...........................................PETITIONER
V.
PLUS PHARMA………...…………...................................................RESPONDENT
1
UNION OF GREY PERK.....................................................................RESPONDENT
2
~MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS~

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
TABLE OF CONTENT
 TABLE OF CONTENT.....................................................................................................................II
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES............................................................................................................III
LIST OF CASE LAWS................................................................................................................III
BOOKS REFERRED....................................................................................................................VI
STATUTES...............................................................................................................................VII
LEGAL DATABASE.................................................................................................................VIII
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS......................................................................................................VIII
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.................................................................................................X
 STATEMENT OF FACTS...............................................................................................................XI
 STATEMENT OF ISSUES...........................................................................................................XIII
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS...................................................................................................XIV
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED..........................................................................................................XV
ISSUE-I: WHETHER GOLLUM HAS VIOLATED §4 OF THE ACT. WITH RESPECT TO THE
AGREEMENT WITH SHADOWFAX?........................................................................................XV
A. THE CCA HAS ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RELEVANT MARKET...................................XV
B. GOLLUM PAPER MILLS IS NOT DOMINANT.....................................................................XVII
C. GOLLUM HAS NOT ABUSED ITS DOMINANT POSITION...................................................XVIII
ISSUE- II: WHETHER GOLLUM HAS VIOLATED §3 OF THE THE ACT. WITH RESPECT TO
AGREEMENT WITH SHADOWFAX?.....................................................................................XIX
A. THE FACTORS OF § 19(3) OF THE ACT HAVE NOT BEEN FULFILLED................................XX
B. THERE WAS COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY FOR GOLLUM..........................................XXI
C. THERE WAS NO REFUSAL TO DEAL................................................................................XXII
ISSUE III: WHETHER THE CCA’S APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED COMBINATION WAS
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE LAW?...........................................................................XXIII
A. RELEVANT MARKET FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED COMBINATION...................XXIV
B. INTENTION OF THE PROPOSED COMBINATION...................................................XXV
ISSUE-IV: WHETHER THE CCA ERRED IN DETERMINING THE “RELEVANT TURNOVER”?

........................................................................................................................................XXVIII

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A. THERE SHALL BE A ROLE OF EQUITY IN PENALTY IMPOSITION.................................XXVIII

B. THERE SHALL BE PROPORTIONALITY AND PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION.....................XXVIII
 PRAYER........................................................................................................................................XXX
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
LIST OF CASE LAWS
INDIAN CASES
S. No CASE NAME
1. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehrawardi, AIR 1981 SC 487.
2. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Assn. of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1.

3. Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dixit, (2005) 5 SCC 598.
4. Bandhu Mukti Morcha vs. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161.
5. Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subbra Chakraborty, AIR 722, (SC 1996).

6. C.C.E v. Standard Motor Products, AIR1989 SC 1298
7. Corbiere v. Canada (1999) 2 SCR 203
8. Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University, AIR1989 SC 903
9. Delhi Development Authority v. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats

(2008) 2 SCC 672.
10. Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101.
11. Education and Research Centre vs. Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 42.
12. Ekta Shakti Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi AIR 2006 SC 2609.
13. Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., AIR 1986 SC
872
14. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors.AIR
1981 SC 746.
15. Gobind v. State of M.P., 1975 AIR 1378.

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16. Haryana State Industrial Corporation. v. Cork Mfg. Co., (2007) 8 SCC 359.
17. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
18. LIC v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, AIR 1995 SC 1811.
19. Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager, U.P. Financial Corpn, AIR 1993 SC
935.
20. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
21. MS Bhut Educational Trust v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2000 Guj 160.
22. Nakara v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 130.
23. National Legal Service Authority v. UOI (2014) 5 SCC 438.
24. Navtej Singh Johar v. UOI, (2018) 1 SCC 791.
25. Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010 Cri LJ 94.
26. Netai Bag v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2000 SC 3313.
27. Nihal Singh & Ors v. State Of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 26.
28. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation 1986 AIR 180.
29. P. Rathinam v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1844.
30. P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 182.
31. Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1996 SC
2426.
32. Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC
111.
33. Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Admn. (1980) 3 SCC 526.
34. Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169.
35. R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N., (1994) 6 SCC 632.
36. Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1147.

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37. Rashid Ahmad v. Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR 1960 SC 163;
38. Rayappa v. State of T.N. AIR 1974 SC 555.
39. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124.
40. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149.
41. Sakal Papers v. Union of India, 1962 SC 305.
42. Bennett Coleman v. Union of India, 1973 SC 106.
43. Sanjay Kumar Manjul v. Chairman, UPSC, (2006) 8 SCC 42.
44. Saurabh Chaudri and others v. Union of India and others (2003) 11 SCC 146.
45. Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., (2018) 16 SCC 368.
46. Shakti Vahini v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 192.
47. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538.
48. Sir Chunilal Mehta and Sons. Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co.
Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314.
49. State of Tripura v. Niranjan Chakraborthy , (2001) 10 S.C.C. 740.
50. State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi (2006) 1 SCC 667.
51. Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (1999) 7 SCC 89.
52. Sukhdev and Ors v. Bhagatram and Ors AIR 1975 SC 1331.
53. Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1.
54. T.N. GodavarmanThirumulkpad v. UOI,, 2006 WP(C) No. 202 of 1995
55. Union of India v. International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC 437.
56. Vishaka v State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011.
57. Vishal Properties (P) Ltd. V. State of U.P. (2007) 11 SCC 172.
58. Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493

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BOOKS REFERRED
S.N PARTICULARS
O
M P JAIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 8th ed; 2018
1.
DD BASU, INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 23 rd ed;
2. 2018
BP BANERJEE, WRIT REMEDIES, 7th ed; 2015
3.
H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 4th ed; 2017
4.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (BRYAN A. GARNER ED., 9TH, 2009).
5.
RATANLAL AND DHIRAJLALS THE INDIAN PENAL CODE (33RD
6.
EDITION 2016)
STATUTES
S.
NAME OF THE STATUTE
NO.
1. The Constitution of India, 1950 [No. 101 of 2016]
2. The Indian Contract Act, Act No. 9 of 1872.

The Indian Penal Code, 1860
3.
LEGAL DATABASE
S.
NAME OF LEGAL DATABASE
NO.
1. HEINONLINE
2. LEXIS NEXIS
3. MANUPATRA
4. SCC ONLINE

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5. WESTLAW
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION KEY ABBREVIATION
& AND
§ Section
¶ Paragraph
No. Number
IPC Indian penal code
AIR AIR
Anr. Another
Art. Art.
SCC SCC
Ed. Edition
SCR Supreme Court Reports
v. Versus
Hon’ble Honourable
Manu Manupatra
SC Supreme Court
HC High Court

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Grey Park has the jurisdiction by the way of Writ Petition in
this matter under Art. 321 of the Constitution of Grey Park.
1
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part:
(1)The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2)The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. A newly established democratic state, Grey Perk is the fastest growing country. The
legislature had strengthened the laws relating to promote trade and encourage
employment.
2. A well-known government pharmaceutical company named PLUS PHARMA ltd. has
captured a large share of the target market. The company released an advertisement to
hire qualified Medical Representatives in order to extend their trade. Dr John House,
got appointed for that job and was awarded a letter of appointment to join on date
Feb. 18, 2016.
3. Dr John joined on the said date and played a major role in increasing the company’s
sales by 3% in first two months. He received great appreciation and applause from his
employer Mike Ross, the director of the company. On one of the occasions he
received recognition for handling a situation, where the company supplied mislabelled
medicines to a retailer. The goodwill of the company was restored by of John’s good
behaviour towards the owner of the retail shop.
4. He used good communication skills and persuasive power to grab the orders. His
actions were misconstrued by rest of the employees and were communicated in a
distorted manner to the employer that he was having illicit relationships with the
owners of certain pharmaceutical companies.
5. Mike called him and accused him for having illicit relationships during the course of
his employment and also for the decrease in sales of the company because of this.
After few days John noticed that his salary was also not credited in his bank account.
He sent several reminders to the employer for the salary, but his account was not
credited by the salary.

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6. Later, Dr John posted some statements on twitter and other social networking
platforms, stating that “It is ironical that Mike accuses me of maintaining illicit
relations with others when he himself approached me for the same. He is misusing his
position by not crediting my salary in order to satisfy his personal grudges.”
7. It led Mike to face some criticism in the society. Subsequently, Mike terminated the
contract of Dr John stipulating the termination clause and also filed a suit against Dr
John in the district court for defamation and the loss occurred to the company in
which he succeeded. Sometime later, Dr John, in an interview revealed that even if he
had relations with other males it had no concern with John and his employment
contract by virtue of right to privacy and right of not being discriminated on such
basis.
8. The Supreme Court took the cognizance of the matter and agreed to hear the issues.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
-ISSUE-I-
WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY DR. JOHN HOUSE IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
-ISSUE- II-
WHETHER SECTION 377 OF THE GREY PERK’S PENAL CODE 1860 VIOLATES ARTICLE 21
OF THE GREY PERK’S CONSTITUTION OR NOT?
-ISSUE-III-
WHETHER THE TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF DR. JOHN HOUSE BASED ON

CONTRACT IS VALID OR NOT?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
-ISSUE-I-
WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY DR. JOHN HOUSE IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
It is most respectfully submitted that the petition must be maintained before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court on the four grounds, namely, (1) the Petitioner’s fundamental rights have
been violated, (2) there is a substantial question of law of general public importance, (3) the
petitioner has a locus standi, and,(4) the availability of alternative remedies is no bar in
approaching the Hon’ble Apex Court under Art. 32 of the constitution. Art. 32 guarantees the
right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by Part III of the constitution i.e. fundamental rights
-ISSUE- II-
WHETHER SECTION 377 OF THE GREY PERK’S PENAL CODE 1860 VIOLATES ARTICLE 21
OF THE GREY PERK’S CONSTITUTION OR NOT?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that even though Section 377 of
Indian Penal Code has been read off still fails to adhere to the constitutional validity of the
laws enacted by the Government. Section 377 is discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable
hence violative of Right to Equality and Rule of Law enshrined under Article 14,
Differentiation on the basis of sex under Article 15, and Right to Life enshrined under Article
21 of the Union Of Grey perk.
-ISSUE-III-
WHETHER THE TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF DR. JOHN HOUSE BASED ON


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It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE-I: WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY DR.JOHN HOUSE IS MAINTAINABLE OR
NOT?
[¶I.1] The petitioner humbly submits that the writ petitions are maintainable under Art. 32 of
the Indian Constitution. This issue has been dealt with in folds. Firstly, the Fundamental
Rights have been violated. Secondly, there is a question of law of general public importance.
Thirdly, the petitioner has a locus standi, and lastly, the availability of alternative remedies is
no bar.
A. THERE HAS BEEN AN INFRINGEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
[¶I.2] Art. 32 of the Constitution of India guarantee the right to move the Supreme Court by
appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of the
constitution i.e. fundamental rights. The petition filed by Dr. House is on grounds of
infringement of fundamental right of not being discriminated on grounds of sexual orientation
under Art. 15 and Right to privacy under the right to life and personal liberty enshrined under
Art. 21 of the constitution.
[¶I.3] Hence the writ petition so filed is maintainable. Any person whose Fundamental right
has been violated, or who fears that his fundamental right will be violated can approach the
Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Indian Constitution provided he lies under its

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jurisdiction. Art. 21 of the Constitution envisage a right to life and personal liberty of a
person. The word “Life” under Art. 21 means a quality of life2
[¶I.4] The apex court in Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi 3
held that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty without the authority of law.
It was construed only as a guarantee against executive action unsupported by law. So long as
there was some law, which prescribed a procedure authorizing deprivation of life or personal
liberty, it was supposed to meet the requirement of Art. 21. As interpreted in Maneka Gandhi
case4 [Under Art. 32 of the Constitution] Art. 21 requires that no one shall be deprived of his
life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law and this procedure must be
reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary, whimsical or fanciful and it is for the court to
decide in the exercise of its constitutional power of judicial review whether the deprivation of
life or personal liberty in a given case is by procedure, which is reasonable, fair and just or it
is otherwise. In the present case, the termination of the contract was an arbitrary act of the
director of PPL which as a result violates Art. 21. The right to live with human dignity was
denied to Dr. House.
[¶I.5] A writ petition can be filed against the State for the violation of fundamental rights
under Art. 32 of the Constitution; therefore, the writ is maintainable against the Union of
Grey Park. To constitute a private party as being state, the same must fall within the ambit of
other authority u/a 12 and thus must satisfy the court that it is either an instrumentality or an
agency of the State. In order to adjudge the same, the functions of the corporation must be of
public importance, and closely related to governmental functions 5. Institutions engaged in
performing public functions are, by virtue of the functions performed, government agencies. 6
In the present case, Plus Pharma Ltd is a manufacturer of medicines, the act of manufacturing
the medicines can be interpreted to seek the collective benefit of the people living in that
country by protecting their health.
2
P. Rathinam v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1844.
3
(1981) 1 SCC 608
4
(1978) 1 SCC 248
5
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehrawardi, AIR 1981 SC 487
6
Sukhdev and Ors v. Bhagatram and Ors AIR 1975 SC 1331

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[¶I.6] The Supreme Court referring to Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry held that “good
reputation was an element of personal security and was protective by the Constitution,
equally with the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty and property. The court affirmed that
the right to the enjoyment of private reputation was of ancient origin and was necessary to
human society. Right to life under Art. 21 includes the right to livelihood and so if the
deprivation of livelihood is effected without reasonable procedure established by law, it
would be violative of Art. 21.7
B. THERE IS A QUESTION OF LAW OF GENERAL PUBLIC IMPORTANCE
[¶I.7] The jurisdiction conferred under Art. 32 on the Supreme Court is corrective one and
not a restrictive one.8 It has been held in a plethora of cases that when the question of law of
general public importance arises, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be invoked by
filing public interest litigation. The present case involves matter of general public importance
and substantial question of law.
[¶I.8] It has been held by this Hon’ble Court that when a question of law of general public
importance arises, or a decision shocks the conscience of the court, its jurisdiction can always
be invoked. Art. 32 is the residuary power of the Supreme Court to do justice where the court
is satisfied that there is injustice. 9 In the case at hand, the rights of homosexuals are in
question. Also, the implementation of a law for the same will have an impact on the public at
large. Hence, the matter concerned is a matter of public interest and national importance.
Hence, it is humbly submitted before this court that the matter involves the question of law of
general public importance and therefore, the appeal is maintainable under Art. 32 of the
Constitution of India.
7
P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 182
8
Haryana State Industrial Corporation. v. Cork Mfg. Co., (2007) 8 SCC 359.
9
C.C.E v. Standard Motor Products, AIR1989 SC 1298

P a g e | XVI
[¶I.9] The expression "substantial question of law" is not defined in any legislation.
Nevertheless, it has acquired a definite connotation through various judicial pronouncements.
A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, while explaining the import of the said expression,
observed that: “The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is
substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it
directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open
question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by
the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views.” 10
In the present case, the question of law involved in the petition is regarding the constitutional
validity of Section 377 of IPC in accordance with Art. 21. Hence, the case involves the matter
of general public importance and it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties
as the order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner.
[¶I.10] It is humbly submitted that substantial and grave injustice has been done to the rights
of the petitioner and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant
a review of the decision appealed against. Hence it is humbly submitted that the writ is
maintainable on the grounds that there is a question of general public importance raised and
also a substantial question of law to be focused on.
C. PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI
[¶I.11] Under the traditional rule of locus standi a person could seek direction under Art. 32
of the Constitution of India only in case infringement of their legal right by either the
Government or any other public body charged with statutory duties and any public. Such
legal rights must either be personal or individual. The person aggrieved or affected alone
could maintain a writ petition in case of infringement of specific subsisting legal right. 11 The
basic postulate as mentioned by Bhagwati J. in the S.P. Gupta Case was that it
is only a person who has suffered legal injury who can maintain a writ petition for redress.
10
Sir Chunilal Mehta and Sons. Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR
1962 SC 1314.
11
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149.

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[¶I.12] It is humbly submitted before this Honorable SC that the appellant has locus standi to
approach the Honorable SC in the present case. Art. 32 of the Constitution is couched in the
widest phraseology.12 This Court's jurisdiction is limited only by its discretion. Art. 32 is very
broad-based & confers discretion on the court to hear “in any cause or matter”. 13 “Locus
standi” is the right of a party to appear and be heard on the question before any tribunal. It
means the legal capacity to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. The Supreme Court has ruled
that to exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 32, the affected person doesn't need to personally
approach the court. The court can itself take cognizance of the matter and proceed suo motu
or on a petition of any public spirited individual or body14.
[¶I.13] Furthermore, even if the petitioner, in fact, moved to the Court in private interest,
Court can proceed to enquire about the state of affairs of the subject of the litigation in the
interest of justice and in furtherance of justice. Individual conduct of the party would not be
of any relevance when the Court construed not only provisions of any statute but also had
taken into consideration the subsequent events. 15If the court finds the question raised to be of
substantial public interest, the issue of locus standi of the person placing the relevant facts
and materials before the court becomes irrelevant. 16 Therefore, locus standi of the petitioner
should not be in question.
D. ALTERNATE REMEDY NO BAR
[¶I.14] It is contended that the writ petition filed by petitioner must not be barred on the basis
of availability of alternate remedies as there were no such effective and powerful alternate
remedies and arguendo, even on the existence of the same, a writ petition cannot be barred.
12
Nihal Singh & Ors v. State Of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 26.
13
Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169.
14
BodhisattwaGautam v. Subbra Chakraborty, AIR 722, (SC 1996).
15
Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dixit, (2005) 5 SCC 598.
16
T.N. GodavarmanThirumulkpad v. UOI,, 2006 WP(C) No. 202 of 1995.

P a g e | XVIII
[¶I.15] An alternative remedy is a rule of convenience, not of law 17. The existence of
alternate remedy is no bar to entertain a petition under Art. 3218. Where gross injustice is done
justifying interference, the existence of alternative remedy by way of appeal or repeal would
be no bar to exercise the writ jurisdiction under Art. 3219. In the instant case, the impugned
enactment is violating the fundamental rights of the stakeholders and hence it results in gross
injustice.
[¶I.16] In the case of Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras 20 it was inferred that there is no
need to resort to Art. 226 in the first instance before approaching the Supreme Court. It has
been held that denying a petition due to the presence of an alternative remedy is a matter of
discretion and not a rule of law.21 Earlier it was followed that one can move to SC only by
‘appropriate proceedings’ but now the court has moved beyond the restrictive interpretation
and has clarified that- there is no limitation in regard to the kind of proceedings envisaged in
clause (1) of Art. 32 except that the proceedings must be appropriate and this requirement of
appropriateness must be judged in the light of the purpose for which the proceeding is to be
taken, namely, enforcement of a fundamental right.
[¶I.16] Hence it is contended that the availability of alternate remedies cannot bar a person
from moving to the apex court if he anticipates any violation of a legal or there has been a
substantive violation of any such right. Therefore, in the light of aforementioned reasons it is
prayed that the petition may be maintained on grounds that there has been an infringement of
certain fundamental rights of the petitioner, also the present case involves substantive
question of law of general public importance hence the petitioner also has a standing. It is
also contended that the availability of alternative remedies cannot bar a proceeding before the
Apex Court.
17
Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1147.
18
Vishaka v State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011.
19
State of Tripura v. Niranjan Chakraborthy , (2001) 10 S.C.C. 740.
20
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124
21
Rashid Ahmad v. Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR 1960 SC 163;

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ISSUE- II: WHETHER SECTION 377 OF THE GREY PERK’S PENAL CODE 1860 VIOLATES
ARTICLE 21 OF THE GREY PERK’S PENAL CODE OR NOT?
[¶II.1] It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that Section 377 of Penal
Code fails to adhere to the constitutional validity of the laws enacted by the Government.
The aforementioned is discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable hence violative of Right
to Equality and Right to privacy enshrined under Article 14 & 21 of the constitution. The
petitioner has deconstructed the issue into following folds [A]; That Sec 377 violates Art.
14 as it is inherently arbitrary, based on no intelligible differential and reasonable object
[B]; Section 377 permits discrimination on the basis of Sexual Orientation [C]; that
application of § 377 is vague, due process under it not just, reasonable and equitable thus
violates Art. 21.
A. SEC 377 VIOLATES ART. 14 AS IT IS INHERENTLY ARBITRARY, BASED

ON NO INTELLIGIBLE DIFFERENTIAL AND REASONABLE OBJECT
[¶II.2] It is most respectfully submitted that sec. 377 of IPC is in violation of the
fundamental rights of the Constitution of Central perk. § 377 IPC violates the Equal
Protection clause enshrined under Article 14 22 which ensures fairness23, and guarantees
against arbitrariness,24 as every action of the government must be informed by reasons and
guided by public interest.25 The concept of equal treatment presupposes the existence of legal
of similar legal foothold and does not countenance of repetition of a wrong action to bring
forth wrongs on a par.26
[¶II.3] It is contended by the Petitioners, that Right to equality not only means right to be not
discriminated but also protection against arbitrary or irrational act of the State. 27 The
22
14. Equality before law
23
Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101; Mahesh Chandra v. Regional
Manager, U.P. Financial Corpn, AIR 1993 SC 935.
24
Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., AIR 1986 SC 872; Netai Bag v. State of
West Bengal, AIR 2000 SC 3313.
25
MS Bhut Educational Trust v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2000 Guj 160; LIC v. Consumer Education and
Research Centre, AIR 1995 SC 1811.
26
Union of India v. International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC 437; also Sanjay Kumar Manjul v. Chairman,
UPSC, (2006) 8 SCC 42; Ekta Shakti Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi AIR 2006 SC 2609; State of U.P.
v. Neeraj Awasthi (2006) 1 SCC 667; Vishal Properties (P) Ltd. V. State of U.P. (2007) 11 SCC 172.
27
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111.

P a g e | XX
discrimination severely affects the rights and interests of homosexuals and deeply impairs
their dignity. As in the present case, there was high level of anguish in John when he faced
huge social ostracization and had lost his means of living that ultimately led him to file this
petition.
[¶II.4] It is submitted that for upholding the classification under Article 14 twin test must be
satisfied, (I) Every classification must be founded on intelligible differentia & must not be
arbitrary in nature (II) Such classification or differentia must have a relation or nexus to the
object sought to be achieved thereby.28
I. SECTION 377 IS BASED ON NO ‘INTELLIGIBLE DIFFERENTIA’& MUST

NOT BE ARBITRARY IN NATURE
[¶II.5] It is submitted that “Intelligible differentia” means difference that is capable of being
understood. § 377 classifies acts based on whether they are in consonance with or against
the order of nature. It is contended that § 377 is based upon traditional Jeudo-Christian
moral and ethical standards,29 which conceive of sex in purely functional terms i.e.,
for the purpose of procreation and thus creates a classification between procreative
and non-procreative sex.30
[¶II.6] Considering any non-procreative sexual activity as being “against the order of
nature” is outdated, has no place in the modern society and most importantly, has no
scientific basis. Sexual expression and intimacy of consensual nature between adults of same
sex in private must be viewed as normal expression of human sexual competence and
sensitivity and cannot be treated as carnal intercourse31 against the nature. Consensual
physical relationship cannot be conditioned by moral notions of what nature does or does not
ordain.32
28
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538; Anuj
Garg v. Hotel Assn. of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1.
29
Samuel H. Dresner, Homosexuality and the Order of Creation, Judaism 40 (1991): 309; also Lawrence v
Texas 539 US 558 (2003)
30
Sholeh I. Mireshgi & David Matsumoto; Perceived Cultural Attitudes Toward Homosexuality and
Their Effects on Iranian and Ameircan Sexual Minorities, Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority
Psychology (2008 Vol. 14, No.4) 372-376.
31
Section 377, IPC, 1860.
32
Navtej Singh Johar v. UOI, (2018) 1 SCC 791.

P a g e | XXI
[¶II.7] It is submitted that, the guarantee of equal protection includes absence of any
arbitrary discrimination by the laws themselves or in the matter of their administration.
Reasonable and fairness is the heart and soul of Art 14. 33 As Art. 14 hits ‘arbitrariness’ of
state action in any forms.34 Also, it is the duty of state to allay the fears of citizens regarding
discrimination and arbitrariness.35 The prohibition under § 377 undermine respect for law
by penalizing conduct many people engage in, activities penalised under aforesaid
section regulate private conduct that is not harmful to others and the law is arbitrarily
enforced36 and thus invite the danger of blackmail because offence is cognizable.
II. THERE IS NO ‘RATIONAL NEXUS’ BETWEEN CLASSIFICATION AND

OBJECTIVE SOUGHT
[¶II.8] In considering reasonableness from the point of view of Article 14, the Court has also
to consider the objective for such classification. If the objective be illogical, unfair and
unjust, necessarily the classification will have to be held as unreasonable. 37 The petitioner
humbly submits that the objective of penalizing unnatural sex under Section 377 IPC has no
rational nexus to the classification created between procreative and non- procreative sexual
acts. Equal protection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does
require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which
the classification is made.38
[¶II.9] It is contended that § 377’s legislative objective of penalizing “unnatural sexual

offences” has no rational nexus to the classification created. It was based on a conception of
sexual morality specific to Victorian era drawing on notions of carnality and sinfulness. 39 Our
33
Delhi Development Authority v. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats (2008) 2 SCC
672
34
Rayappa v. State of T.N. AIR 1974 SC 555; Ajay v. Khalid AIR 1981 SC 487; Nakara v. Union of India AIR
1983 SC 130.
35
Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (1999) 7 SCC
89
36
Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010 Cri LJ 94
37
Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University, AIR1989 SC 903.
38
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111, 86 S.Ct. 760, 763 (1966)
39
Richard M. Davidson, Flame of Yahweh: Sexuality in the Old Testament, (Peabody, MA:
Hendrickson Publishers, 2007), 91–105.

P a g e | XXII
Constitution is organic in nature, being a living organ, it is ongoing and with the passage of
time, law must change. Horizons of constitutional law are expanding. 40 Rule of Law demands
protection of individual human rights. Such rights are to be guaranteed to each and every
human being. The LGBT community, even though insignificant in numbers, is still human
beings and therefore they have every right to enjoy their human rights.41
B. SECTION 377 PERMITS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL

ORIENTATION
[¶II.10] It is submitted that, Sexual orientation is a ground analogous to those listed in

Art. 15(1) such as race, color, religion, sex, etc, 42 and on the basis of historical, social,
political and economic disadvantage suffered by homosexuals, sexual orientation must be
seen as one of these grounds.43 Sexual minorities cannot be reduced to de minimis by
stating their number in population not enough to seek protection of fundamental rights.
[¶II.11] In determining the constitutionality of the statute, the Court must take
into consideration not the motives of the Legislature but the real effect of the statute. 44 It is
contended that §377, by criminalising consensual same-sex acts between two
males, is indirectly discriminatory against a particular section of the society i.e., ‘men
who have sex with men’ (MSM). Although it might seem facially neutral and it apparently
targets certain sexual acts instead of sexual identity of a person, but in its operation it does
end up unfairly targeting a particular community since these sexual acts which are
criminalised are associated more closely with one class of persons, namely, the
homosexuals.45
40
Saurabh Chaudri and others v. Union of India and others (2003) 11 SCC 146.
41
National Legal Service Authority v. UOI (2014) 5 SCC 438.
42
Corbiere v. Canada (1999) 2 SCR 203
43
Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493
44
Sakal Papers v. Union of India, 1962 SC 305; Bennett Coleman v. Union of India, 1973 SC
106

P a g e | XXIII
C. SEC 377 VIOLATES RIGHT TO LIFE U/A 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

GREY PERK
[¶II.12] It is most respectfully submitted that the Petitioner’s Fundamental rights have been
violated by the other sections of the society by harassing him when he came out of the closet
and confirmed his sexuality. Sexual minorities in societies need protection more than the
heterosexuals so as to enable them to achieve their full potential and to live freely without
fear, apprehension or trepidation. Section 377 of IPC violates Right to Life under Art.21 of
the Constitution as - Section 377 Does Not Satisfy the Compelling State Interest Test [I]; It
violates Right to dignity of an individual [II]; and, § 377 violates one’s Right to privacy &
Health [III].
I. SECTION 377 DOES NOT SATISFY THE COMPELLING STATE INTEREST

TEST
[¶II.13] It is opined that privacy claims deserve to be examined with care and to be denied
only when an important countervailing interest is shown to be superior as a law
infringing a fundamental privacy right must satisfy the compelling state interest test i.e.,
whether the state interest is of such paramount interest as would justify an infringement of
the right.46 Further, when the validity of a legislation is tested on the anvil of equality
clauses contained in Art. 14 and 15, the burden therefore would be on the state.47
[¶II.14] The state interest must be legitimate and relevant for a legislation to be non-
arbitrary and must be proportionate to achieve the state’s interest. A bare desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest. Also, various law commission reports found § 377 redundant in light of recent
criminal law amendments and laws.48 Hence it can be summed up § 377 doesn’t have any
rationale to be kept in books.
45
The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. The Minister of Justice,1999 (1)
SA 6
46
Gobind v. State of M.P., 1975 AIR 1378.
47
Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, AIR 2008 SC 663
48
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013); page 11 of Argument Advanced, para 21,
Law Reports ; POCSO Act 2012 (32 of 2012)

P a g e | XXIV
II. THAT § 377 IPC VIOLATES RIGHT TO DIGNITY OF AN INDIVIDUAL
[¶II.15] It is submitted that Art. 21 had penumbral rights defined under it one those right is to
live with dignity,49 the guarantee of human dignity forms part of our constitutional culture. 50
Dignity of a person is the intimate sense of himself and his being, entering into most private
sphere by penalizing that act, pierce through the founding norms of civilised society.
Homosexuality is an orientation and treating it like a ghastly act diminishes dignity of an
individual who happens to find expression in that orientation.51
[¶II.16] The sexual orientation, being an innate facet of individual identity, is protected
under the right to dignity.52 Therefore, protection of both sexual orientation and right to
privacy of an individual is extremely important, for without the enjoyment of these basic and
fundamental rights, individual identity may lose significance, a sense of trepidation may take
over and their existence would be reduced to mere survival. 53 Moreover, Sexual autonomy
and the right to choose a partner of one's choice is an inherent aspect of the right to life and
right to autonomy.54 An individual's exercise of choice in choosing a partner is a feature of
dignity and, therefore, it is protected under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution.55
III. SEC. 377 IPC VIOLATES RIGHT TO PRIVACY & HEALTH
[¶II.17] It is submitted that, the Supreme Court while interpreting Article 21 of the
Constitution in light of Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, held that the Right to Health was an integral component of one’s Right to
49
Francis Coralie Mullin vs. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors. (AIR 1981 SC 746
para 3); Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation 1986 AIR 180; Education and Research Centre vs.
Union of India[(1995) 3 SCC 42: 1995 (1) SCALE 354 at 375; Bandhu Mukti Morcha vs. Union of India
(1984) 3 SCC 161]
50
Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Admn. [(1980) 3 SCC 526];
51
Dr. Shekhar Seshadri; National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences IA No 9/2010 Suresh Kumar
Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1
52
Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 212.
53
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
54
Shakti Vahini v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 192 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 580 : (2018) 3
SCC (Cri) 1.
55
Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., (2018) 16 SCC 368 : AIR 2018 SC 1933.

P a g e | XXV
life.56 The right to health contains both freedom and entitlements. The freedoms include the
right to control one’s health and body, including sexual reproductive freedom. 57 Also, In R.
Rajagopal v. State of T.N.58 , while discussing the concept of right to privacy, it is a “right to
be let alone”, for a citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his/her own, his/her family,
marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education, among other matters.
[¶II.18] It Affects the Psychological Well-Being of Homosexual Individuals in a Negative

Manner : It has been accorded recognition and the right of choice to attributes which
are an inherent, integral and immutable part of an individual’s personality and can on the
strength of growing medical and psychiatric knowledge be rightly regarded as but a
natural benign variant of the human experience. 59 It is contended that criminalisation
of § 377 impacts homosexual men at a deep level and restricts their right to dignity,
personhood and identity, privacy and equality by criminalising all forms of sexual
intercourse homosexual men can indulge in. 60 While the privacy of heterosexual
relations, especially marriage is clothed in legitimacy, homosexual relations are subjected
to societal disapproval and scrutiny.61
[¶II.19] It acts as a serious impediment to successful public health interventions : Stigma,

discrimination and criminalisation faced by men who have sex with men are major barriers to
the movement for universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support.62 The
criminalisation of homosexual practices cannot be considered as a reasonable means or
proportionate measure to achieve the spread of AIDS/HIV since no link has been
56
Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1996 SC
2426.
57
General Comment No. 14 (2000) [E/C.12/2000/4; 11 August 2000].
58
R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N., (1994) 6 SCC 632.
59
NALSA v. Union of India [(2014) 5 SCC
438]
60
Sholeh I. Mireshgi & David Matsumoto; Perceived Cultural Attitudes Toward Homosexuality and
Their Effects on Iranian and Ameircan Sexual Minorities, Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology
2008 Vol. 14, No.4, 372-376.
61
Govindrajulu, in Re, (1886) 1
Weir.
62
United Nations A/6-/737 Assessment by UNAIDS, March 24, 2006; Delhi Declaration of
Collaboration, 26th September 2006

P a g e | XXVI
shown between the continued criminalisation and the effective control of the spread of the
HIV/AIDS virus.”
[¶II.20] Therefore it is humbly submitted by the petitioner in the instant case that the section
377 is discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable in nature hence violative of Right to
Equality and Right to privacy enshrined under Article 14 & 21 of the constitution of Central
perk is violative of the constitutional principles.
ISSUE III: WHETHER THE TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF DR. JOHN HOUSE BASED ON
[¶III.1] It is humbly contended before the hon’ble Supreme Court that the termination of
employment of the petitioner herein,finding its basis in the contract of employment is not
valid since the termination clause which was used as a tool by the respondent is uncertain and
arbitrary in nature.The petitioner will deal with this issue in 4 parts: A)Termination Clause-
uncertain and arbitrary, B)Breach of contract on the part of Respondent, C) Principles of
Natural Justice violated, and D)Violation of Article 19 of the Constitution.
A. TERMINATION CLAUSE- UNCERTAIN AND ARBITRARY
[¶III.2] It is submitted before the hon’ble court that a ‘Termination Clause’ is stipulated in all
work contracts. However, the termination clause unless un-conscionable authenticates relief
or compensation. Termination without justified ground is ‘illegal Termination’ or
‘Termination Bad in Law’.63
[¶III.3] If we look for a standard process to terminate an employee in India, there is none. He
may be terminated on the basis of work contract signed, however, giving an upper hand to
thelaw of the land which supersedes the provisions of contracts.
63
Termination of Contract,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5abd509cf8370a7c48bb9ebf/t/5ae0b20e562
fa79909d7fff7/1524675087041/2014+Termination+of+contract+2014.pdf.

P a g e | XXVII
[¶III.4] Laws in India offer employees a great degree of protection. Ordinary termination
requires a 30 days’ notice.64 It is evident from the fact sheet in the present case that the
respondent did not provide the petitioner with the notice which makes the termination even
more unreasonable.
[¶III.5] The terms of the contract kept both the parties at an unequal footing, granting more
bargaining power to the respondent, which is clear from the stipulating clause which says “If
the sales of the company decreases because of any employee, directly or indirectly, would
lead to the termination of such contract with that employee and the employee will be fired”65
[¶III.6] This clause does not specify clearly the quantum for decrease in sales, which means
that it can be moulded by the opinion and perspective of the employer. This uncertain and
blurred clause is arbitrary in nature owing to the circumstances of the facts. This clause gives
effect to termination if there is decrease in sales ‘directly or indirectly’. However, the word
‘indirectly’ in itself raises a question of uncertainty owing to an explanation of the extent to
which any employee could be responsible. In the present case, the efficiency of the petitioner
is evident from the factsheet which provides that ‘He played a major role in increasing the
company’s sales by 3% in first two months, proving himself to be efficient and effective in
discharging his duties. He received great appreciation and applause from his employer Mr.
Mike Ross who was the director of the company.’
[¶III.7] Therefore, defaming and terminating the employment contract of such a person who
proved to be an asset to the company and that too on the basis of rumours does not satisfy the
legal ground of termination of employment.
B. BREACH OF CONTRACT ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT
64
Due process in Terminating an employee in India, India Briefing, Dezan Shira and
Associates (June 1, 2017) https://www.india-briefing.com/news/due-process-terminating-
employee-india-14363.html/.
65
Moot Proposition: 1stThe Legal Insider National Memorial Writing Competition, 2020, Para
12.

P a g e | XXVIII
[¶III.8] The basic principle of a contract as enunciated in the Indian Contract Act is that there
must be some consideration. A contract without consideration is nudum pactum and is void.
The words used in sec 2(d) are “… has done or abstained from doing (past), or does
something or abstains from doing (present), or promises to do or abstain from doing
something(future) something…” this clearly states that consideration may be past present or
future.66
[¶III.9] In the present case, the petitioner sent multiple reminders to his employer, the
respondent for crediting his salary, which acts as a future consideration, in his bank account.
The only means of living earned by the petitioner is the salary received through his job as
medical representative. Even after so many reminders the respondent did not credited the
salary and continued defaming the petitioner on the basis of false facts.
C. PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE VIOLATED
[¶III.10] “Those whose duty it is to decide, must act Judicially. They must deal with the
question referred to them without bias and they must give to each of the parties the
opportunity of adequately presenting the case made. The decision must come to the spirit and
with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to meet out justice."67
[¶III.11] These few lines of an English case clearly explain the term 'Natural Justice', an
expression of English common law. It recognizes three basic principles68:
i. Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa: No one should be made a judge in his own case,
or the rule against bias.
ii. Audi alteram partem: No party should be condemned unheard, or the rule of fair hearing,
and
66
Souvik Chattrejee, Consideration under Indian Contract Act, 1872,(Legal Bites, Feb. 11,
2019), https://www.legalbites.in/consideration/.
67
Local Government Board v. Arlidge, Viscount Haldane, (1915) AC 120 (138) HL.
68
Principles of Natural Justice, NACEN, RTI, Kanpur, 2, (March 31, 2015).

P a g e | XXIX
iii. Speaking orders or reasoned decisions. Final decision should be by way of a speaking
order, for such an order prevents any bias or prejudice creeping into the decision.69
[¶III.12] Applying the first two principles in the present case, the respondent herein, violated
the first principle of natural justice by wrongfully terminating the contract with the petitioner.
He acted in bias against the petitioner and the second rule was violated when he accused the
petitioner for having illicit relationships during the course of his employment and for the
decrease in sales of the company because of his attempts of having such relations with the
owners of other pharmaceuticals with whom the company contracted. 70 The respondent failed
to give an opportunity of hearing from the petitioner. He merely relied on the grape wine
communication which came from the other employees. A reasonable opportunity should have
been given to the petitioner to prove his innocence.
[¶III.13] In Khem Chand Vs. Union of India71, this hon’ble court observed the concept of
reasonable opportunity. Accordingly, it is:
(a) an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence which he can only do, if he is
told what the charges leveled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are
based,
(b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross examining the witness produced against him
and by examining himself or any other witnesses to support his defence and finally,
(c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should be
inflicted on him which he can do only if the competent authority, after the enquiry is over and
after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the charge
69
Principles of Natural Justice, Taxmann, 256,
https://www.taxmann.com/bookstore/bookshop/bookfiles/Law %20 Relating%20to
%20Search%20%20Seizure--GC%20Das--Page%20Number%20256%20to%20268-sample
%20chapter.pdf.
70
Moot Proposition: 1st The Legal Insider National Memorial Writing Competition, 2020,
Para 9.
71
Khem Chand vs Union Of India, 1963 AIR 687, 1963 SCR Supl. (1) 229.

P a g e | XXX
sheeted employee, tentatively proposes to inflict and communicates the same to the
concerned employee.
[¶III.14] In the present case, no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner by the
respondent. This resulted into petitioner, expressing his feelings on the social media platform.
The petitioner’s success in the first two months by his hard work was misconstrued by the
other employees. The factsheet also mentions that the other employees stated the same to the
employer in a ‘distorted manner’.
D. VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
[¶III.15] The district court erred in its decision by observing that the terms of the contract are
non-negotiable whereas law is always above the contracts. The district court held him liable
for defamation of respondent whereas the ‘Right to freedom of speech and expression’ u/a 19
of the Constitution of India was ignored. It is a right to express one’s own convictions and
opinions freely by words of mouth, writing, printing, pictures or any other mode. It thus
includes the expression of one’s idea through any communicable medium or visible
representation.72
[¶III.16] An action taken against such expression may amount to curbing the freedom of
speech and expression of the petitioner if the content is mere opinion, neither defamatory nor
obscene.
[¶III.17] Thus, it is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that keeping all the
abovementioned arguments in point it would be unfair to let the petitioner sacrifice his means
of living, reputation in the society and the hard earned money just because of the personal
grudges of the employer of that company.
72
Dheerajendra Patanjali.Freedom of Speech and Expression, India v America - A study, 3,
ILJ.

P a g e | XXXI
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the facts presented, issues raised, argument advanced and
authorities cited, it is most humbly prayed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Grey
perk that it may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1. That the Writ Petition is maintainable under Art. 32 of the Constitution of Grey
Perk, 1950.

P a g e | XXXII
2. That to declare section 377 of penal code unconstitutional in nature.
3. Set aside the order of district court to set aside the penalty imposed on petitioner.
4. Award the cost incurred on proceedings of the court.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court may be pleased to pass any other order as it deems fit in the
interest of justice, equity and good conscience.
For this act of kindness, the appellant shall duty bound forever pray.
Place: Grey perk

Sd/-
Dated: 23rd February, 2010 Counsel for the Petitioners

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~THE LEGAL INSIDER’S 1ST ONLINE MEMORIAL WRITING COMPETITION, 2020~

LEGAL INSIDER’S 1st ONLINE MEMORIAL

HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF GREY PARK

IN THE CASE CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT & FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

(PETITION FILED UNDER §32 OF GREY PERK’S CONSTITUTION.)

(WRIT PETITION NO. ______ OF 2020)

~MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS~

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

ISSUE-IV: WHETHER THE CCA ERRED IN DETERMINING THE “RELEVANT TURNOVER”?

~MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS~

A. THERE SHALL BE A ROLE OF EQUITY IN PENALTY IMPOSITION.................................XXVIII

LIST OF CASE LAWS

2. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Assn. of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1.

4. Bandhu Mukti Morcha vs. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161.

5. Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subbra Chakraborty, AIR 722, (SC 1996).

9. Delhi Development Authority v. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats

15. Gobind v. State of M.P., 1975 AIR 1378.

~MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS~

17. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.

22. Nakara v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 130.

23. National Legal Service Authority v. UOI (2014) 5 SCC 438.

24. Navtej Singh Johar v. UOI, (2018) 1 SCC 791.

25. Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010 Cri LJ 94.

26. Netai Bag v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2000 SC 3313.

28. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation 1986 AIR 180.

29. P. Rathinam v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1844.

34. Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169.

35. R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N., (1994) 6 SCC 632.

~MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS~

37. Rashid Ahmad v. Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR 1960 SC 163;

38. Rayappa v. State of T.N. AIR 1974 SC 555.

39. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124.

40. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149.

41. Sakal Papers v. Union of India, 1962 SC 305.

42. Bennett Coleman v. Union of India, 1973 SC 106.

43. Sanjay Kumar Manjul v. Chairman, UPSC, (2006) 8 SCC 42.

45. Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., (2018) 16 SCC 368.

46. Shakti Vahini v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 192.

50. State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi (2006) 1 SCC 667.

53. Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1.

54. T.N. GodavarmanThirumulkpad v. UOI,, 2006 WP(C) No. 202 of 1995

55. Union of India v. International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC 437.

56. Vishaka v State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011.

58. Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493

~MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS~

2. The Indian Contract Act, Act No. 9 of 1872.

~MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS~

ABBREVIATION KEY ABBREVIATION

IPC Indian penal code

~MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS~

the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.

~MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS~

~MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS~

~MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS~

WHETHER THE TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF DR. JOHN HOUSE BASED ON

~MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS~

WHETHER THE TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF DR. JOHN HOUSE BASED ON

~MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS~

Petitioner Memorandum Final (Divya's Try)

Petitioner Memorandum Final (Divya's Try)

Petitioner Memorandum Final (Divya's Try)