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TEAM ENERGY CORPORATION vs.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE


G.R. No. 197760, January 13, 2014

Facts: Petitioner Team Energy Corporation is a VAT taxpayer. It is principally engaged in the
business of power generation and subsequent sale thereof to the National Power Corporation
(NPC) under a Build, Operate, Transfer (BOT) scheme. It then filed an Application for Effective
Zero-Rate of its supply of electricity to the NPC, which was subsequently approved. Petitioner
filed with the BIR its Quarterly VAT Returns for the first three quarters of 2005, respectively.
Likewise, petitioner filed its Monthly VAT Declaration for the month of October 2005 on
November 21, 2005, which was subsequently amended on May 24, 2006.

On December 20, 2006, petitioner filed an administrative claim for cash refund or for tax credit
certificate citing as legal bases Section 112 (A), in relation to Section 108 (B)(3) of the NIRC of
1997. Due to respondent’s inaction on its claim, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review
before this Court on April 18, 2007.

The CTA Special First Division partially granted petitioner’s claim. Disgruntled, respondent filed
a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision. The CTA Special First Division rendered an
Amended Decision granting respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, for having been
prematurely filed.

In the case at bench, petitioner’s administrative claim was filed on December 20, 2006 which is
well within the two-year [prescriptive] period prescribed under Section 112 (A) of the NIRC.
Observing the 120-day period for the Commissioner to render a decision on the administrative
claim, as required under Section 112 (D) of the NIRC, petitioner’s judicial claim should have
been filed not earlier than April 19, 2007. Petitioner, however, filed its judicial claim on April 18,
2007 or only 199 days from December 20, 2006, thus, prematurely filed.

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En Banc arguing that the requirement to
exhaust the 120-day period for respondent to act on its administrative claim for input VAT
refund/credit under Section 112 (C) of the NIRC is merely a species of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and is, therefore, not jurisdictional. However, the same was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the instant case.

Ruling: Yes, the CTA has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the instant case. Recently in the
consolidated cases of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 690
SCRA 336 (2013), (San Roque ponencia), this Court emphasized that Section 112 (A) and (C)
of the Tax Code must be interpreted according to its clear, plain and unequivocal language. In
said case, we held that the taxpayer can file his administrative claim for refund or issuance of
tax credit certificate anytime within the two-year prescriptive period. If he files his claim on the
last day of the two-year prescriptive period, his claim is still filed on time. The Commissioner will
then have 120 days from such filing to decide the claim. If the Commissioner decides the claim
on the 120th day or does not decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to file his
judicial claim with the CTA.
The San Roque ponencia firmly enunciates that the taxpayer can file his administrative claim for
refund or credit at any time within the two-year prescriptive period. What is only required of him
is to file his judicial claim within thirty (30) days after denial of his claim by respondent or after
the expiration of the 120-day period within which respondent can decide on its claim. Here,
there is no question that petitioner timely filed its administrative claim with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue within the required period. However, since its administrative claim was filed within the
two-year prescriptive period and its judicial claim was filed on the first day after the expiration of
the 120-day period granted to respondent, to decide on its claim, we rule that petitioner’s claim
for refund for the first quarter of 2002 should be granted.

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