HISTORY

Project on
RISE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE-
CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

Submitted to- Submitted by-

Dr. Rachna Sharma Manpreet Kaur

18028
Group 4

RAJIV GANDHI NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LAW,

PUNJAB 2019-20
Contents
1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................3

2. CONTINENTAL SYSTEM ................................................................................4

2.1 BACKGROUND .............................................................................................4

2.2 FRENCH CUSTOMS POLICY ....................................................................5

2.3 BERLIN DECREE .........................................................................................6

2.4 MILAN DECREE ...........................................................................................8

3. EFFECTS OF THIS SYSTEM ON DIFFERENT NATIONS .......................9

3.1 UNITED KINGDOM .....................................................................................9

3.2 CONTINENTAL EUROPE...........................................................................9

3.3 SCANDINAVIA AND THE BALTIC REGION .......................................10

3.4 PORTUGAL AND SPAIN ...........................................................................11

4. EFFECT OF CONTINENT POLICY ON NAPOLEON RULE ..................11

5. ANALYSIS OF CONTINENTAL SYSTEM ..................................................13

6. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................14

7 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...............................................................................................16
1. INTRODUCTION

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), also known as Napoleon I, was a French military leader and
emperor who conquered much of Europe in the early 19th century. Born on the island of Corsica,
Napoleon rapidly rose through the ranks of the military during the French Revolution (1789-1799).
After seizing political power in France in a 1799 coup d’état, he crowned himself emperor in 1804.
Shrewd, ambitious and a skilled military strategist, Napoleon successfully waged war against
various coalitions of European nations and expanded his empire. Since 1792, France’s
revolutionary government had been engaged in military conflicts with various European nations.
In 1796, Napoleon commanded a French army that defeated the larger armies of Austria, one of
his country’s primary rivals, in a series of battles in Italy. In 1797, France and Austria signed the
Treaty of Campo, resulting in territorial gains for the French. The following year, the Directory,
the five-person group that had governed France since 1795, offered to let Napoleon lead an
invasion of England. Napoleon determined that France’s naval forces were not yet ready to go up
against the superior British Royal Navy. Instead, he proposed an invasion of Egypt in an effort to
wipe out British trade routes with India. Napoleon’s troops scored a victory against Egypt’s
military rulers, the Mamluks, at the Battle of the Pyramids in July 1798; soon, however, his forces
were stranded after his naval fleet was nearly decimated by the British at the Battle of the Nile in
August 1798.1 In early 1799, Napoleon’s army launched an invasion of Ottoman Empire-
ruled Syria, which ended with a failed siege of Acre, located in modern-day Israel. That summer,
with the political situation in France marked by uncertainty, the ever-ambitious and cunning
Napoleon opted to abandon his army in Egypt and return to France. 2 However, after a disastrous
French invasion of Russia in 1812, Napoleon abdicated the throne two years later and was exiled
to the island of Elba. In 1815, he briefly returned to power in his Hundred Days campaign. After
a crushing defeat at the Battle of Waterloo, he abdicated once again and was exiled to the remote
island of Saint Helena, where he died at 51. 3

1
Stromberg, R. (1986). Reevaluating the French Revolution. The History Teacher, 20(1), 87-107.
doi:10.2307/493178
2
Furet, F. (1981). The French Revolution Revisited. Government and Opposition, 16(2), 200-218.
Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/44483389
3
Ibid.
2. CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

2.1 BACKGROUND

The Continental System or Continental Blockade was the foreign policy of Napoleon I of
France against the United Kingdom during the Napoleonic Wars. As a response to the naval
blockade of the French coasts enacted by the British government on 16 May 1806, Napoleon issued
the Berlin Decree on 21 November 1806, which brought into effect a large-scale embargo against
British trade. The embargo was applied intermittently, ending on 11 April 1814 after Napoleon's
first abdication.4 The blockade caused little economic damage to the UK, although British exports
to the continent (as a proportion of the UK's total trade) dropped from 55% to 25% between 1802
and 1806. As Napoleon realized that extensive trade was going through Spain and Russia, he
invaded those two countries. His forces were tied down in Spain—in which the Spanish War of
Independence was occurring simultaneously—and suffered severely in, and ultimately retreated
from, Russia in 1812.

Napoleon decided to attack the "nation of shopkeepers" by5

 starving Britain of money

 destroying British trade, particularly the re-export of colonial goods to Europe

4
Napoleon Bonaparte. (1835). The Dublin Penny Journal, 3(154), 393-394. Retrieved from
www.jstor.org/stable/30003253
5
Ibid.
The Continental System was Napoleon's attempt to stop Britain's export and re-export trade with
Europe and it was outlined in two Decrees issued by the Emperor. The Berlin Decree forbade the
import of British goods into any European countries allied with or dependent upon France, and it
installed the Continental System in Europe. All connections with Britain were to be cut, even the
mail. British merchants smuggled in many goods and the Continental System was not a powerful
weapon of economic war. There was some damage to British trade, especially in 1808 and 1812,
but British control of the oceans led to replacement trade with North and South America, as well
as large scale smuggling in Europe. The loss of Britain as a trading partner also hit the economies
of France and its allies. Angry governments gained an incentive to ignore the Continental System,
which led to the weakening of Napoleon's coalition.

2.2 FRENCH CUSTOMS POLICY

As a link in his general colonial policy, which in the main, scrupulously followed the lines of the
Old Colonial System, Napoleon had already in 1802, during the year of peace, fixed a customs
tariff on colonial goods in such a way that the duties were 50 per cent. Higher for almost all
specified goods, and 100 per cent. Higher for unspecified goods, imported from foreign colonies
than on goods imported from French colonies . 6 In the new customs statute, which became a law
immediately before the outbreak of war in 1803, this arrangement was kept practically unchanged;
but a high duty (8 francs per kg.) was established on cotton goods, which, of course, was aimed at
the British textile industry. The outbreak of war immediately revived the old line of pure
prohibition, well known from the days of the Convention and the Directory, against everything
British. Colonial goods and industrial products coming directly or indirectly from Great Britain or
its colonies were to be confiscated, and neutral vessels had to furnish detailed French consular
certificates showing that the goods were of innocent origin. Nevertheless, the characteristic
concession was made that the master of a ship who, 'through forgetfulness of forms or in
consequence of change of destination', failed to provide himself with such certificates, might
nevertheless be allowed to discharge his cargo on condition that he took French goods of
corresponding value in return freight—an idea which Napoleon was destined to develop strongly

6
Sr. M. Barbara. (1926). Napoleon Bonaparte and the Restoration of Catholicism in France. The
Catholic Historical Review, 12(2), 241-257. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/25012302
in his later policy. In the new customs statute of the following year, the principle of prohibition
was retained. On the one side, it is true, it was made milder, among other things by conceding the
right to import certain classes of goods in vessels clearing from ports that had no French
commercial representative; but, on the other hand, it was made more strict by a further prohibition
with a very wide range, namely, that vessels which had cleared from, or had unnecessarily put in
at, a British port should not be admitted to French ports. This last regulation anticipated the great
Berlin decree, which may be looked upon as the origin of the Continental System proper. 7

By these measures Napoleon felt that he had effectively closed the French, Italian, and Swiss
markets to British industry and trade; but it now remained to close the rest of the continental
markets in the same way.8 In doing this he fell back, in reality, on the old policy of prohibition
directed especially against England, though without giving up the French customs policy, which
was prohibitive against all; on the contrary, the latter policy went hand in hand with the former
throughout his period of rule. But it was to the measures directed exclusively against Great Britain
that Napoleon himself gave the name of the Continental System

2.3 BERLIN DECREE

The Berlin Decree was issued in Berlin by Napoleon on November 21, 1806, after the French
success against Prussia at the Battle of Jena, which led to the Fall of Berlin. The decree was issued
in response to the British Order-in-Council of 16 May 1806 by which the Royal Navy instituted a
blockade of all ports from Brest to the Elbe. The decree proclaimed that "the British Isles are
declared to be in a state of blockade" and forbade all correspondence or commerce with Great
Britain. All British subjects found in the territory of France or its allies were to be arrested as
prisoners of war and all British goods or merchandise seized. Any vessel found contravening the
decree and landing in a continental port from a port of Britain or its colonies was to be treated as
if it were British property and therefore liable to confiscation, along with all of its cargo. The goal
of the so-called Continental System was to force Britain to the peace table by starving her of trade

7
Schroeder, P. (1990). Napoleon Bonaparte. The International History Review, 12(2), 324-329.
Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/40106182
8
Higby, C., & Willis, C. (1948). Industry and Labor under Napoleon. The American Historical
Review, 53(3), 465-480. doi:10.2307/1840565
with Europe and thereby wrecking her economy. However, the blockade's effectiveness was
difficult to enforce over so vast an area and was generally unpopular among French subjects and
allies. Historian Paul Schroeder considers it to have proved an ineffective method of economic
warfare. The Continental System eventually led to economic ruin for France and its allies. Less
damage was done to the economy of Britain, which had control of the Atlantic Ocean trade. [6] Other
European nations removed themselves from the Continental System, which led in part to the
downfall of Napoleon.9

The preamble states:10

(1) that England does not acknowledge international law;
(2) that she treats all enemy subjects as enemies (this is directed against her legislation against
alien enemies);
(3) that she extends the right of capture to merchant vessels and merchandise and private property;
(4) that she extends the blockade to unfortified places (a reproach which forms a reminiscence of
the siege character of a blockade) and to places where she has not a single ship of war;
(5) that she uses the right of blockade with no other object than that of hampering intercourse
between peoples and building up her own trade and industry on the ruins of the trade and industry
of the Continent;
(6) that trade in English goods involves complicity in her plans;
(7) that her proceedings have benefited her at the expense of everybody else;
(8) and, consequently, that retaliation is justifiable.

It is further stated, therefore, that the Emperor intends to use her methods against her, and
accordingly that the regulations will remain permanently in force until England has acknowledged
that the law of war is the same by land and by sea and cannot be extended to private property and
unarmed individuals, and that blockade shall be restricted to fortified places guarded by sufficient
forces.

9
Supra note 6
10
Sloane, W. (1898). The Continental System of Napoleon. Political Science Quarterly, 13(2), 213-
231. doi:10.2307/2140167
2.4 MILAN DECREE

After regulating in greater detail the treatment of British vessels and goods on the especially
exposed coast-line of North Germany, he gave to certain provisions which applied to that coast
validity for his own empire through the first Milan decree (November 23, 1807). This contained
detailed regulations concerning the manner in which it was to be determined that vessels had called
at a British port, concerning the confiscation of vessels and cargoes in this case (not merely their
expulsion, as was prescribed in the Berlin decree), and concerning the certificates of origin
previously mentioned touching the non-British provenience of goods. 11 It was during his stay in
the kingdom of Italy that Napoleon was informed of the British Orders in Council of November
11; and he seems to have been seized by a violent fit of anger, which found expression in the
second of the fundamental laws of the Continental System, namely, the second Milan decree,
issued on December 17, 1807. The part of the Orders in Council to which he especially devoted
his attention was the in itself not very remarkable examination (the warning) by British war-ships;
but of course he also took notice of the obligatory call in England and the duty on re-exports. On
the very same day that the Milan decree was issued, for instance, Napoleon gave orders to Decrès,
his minister of the marine, to detain a Russian vessel—that is to say, a vessel belonging to an allied
nation—which had arrived in the port of Morlaix in Brittany; and for this order he gave the truly
Napoleonic justification that it was either really English—in which case it was condemned as a
matter of course—or that it was really Russian, and in that case should be detained to prevent it
from being taken by the English. Decrès was also charged to give orders to the same effect to all
French ports concerning Danish, Dutch, Spanish, and all other vessels, and to investigate whether
the regulations were similarly applied in the vassal states. On this basis Napoleon afterwards
systematically built up his treatment of non-French vessels in the ports of France and its subsidiary
states, with gradually more and more developed protectionist tendencies as against shipping which
was not purely French.

11
Bertaud, J. (1986). Napoleon's Officers. Past & Present, (112), 91-111. Retrieved from
www.jstor.org/stable/650999
3. EFFECTS OF THIS SYSTEM ON DIFFERENT NATIONS

3.1 UNITED KINGDOM

The embargo encouraged British merchants to seek out new markets aggressively and to engage
in smuggling with continental Europe. Napoleon's exclusively land-based customs enforcers could
not stop British smugglers, especially as these operated with the connivance of Napoleon's chosen
rulers of Spain, Westphalia and other German states. The System had mixed effects on British
trade, with British exports to the Continent falling 25% to 55% compared to pre-1806 levels.
However, trade sharply increased with the rest of the world, covering much of the decline. Britain,
by Orders in Council (1807), prohibited its trade partners from trading with France. The British
countered the Continental system by threatening to sink any ship that did not come to a British
port or chose to comply with France. This double threat created a difficult time for neutral nations
like the United States. In response to this prohibition, compounded by the Chesapeake Incident,
the U.S. government adopted the Embargo Act of 1807 and eventually Macon's Bill No. 2. This
embargo was designed as an economic counterattack to hurt Britain, but it proved even more
damaging to American merchants. Together with the issues of the impressment of foreign seamen,
and British support for Indian raids in the American west, tensions led to a declaration of war by
the U.S. in the War of 1812. This war, not Napoleon's blockade, sharply reduced British trade with
the United States.12

3.2 CONTINENTAL EUROPE

The embargo also affected France itself. Shipbuilding, and its trades such as rope-making,
declined, as did many other industries that relied on overseas markets, such as the linen industries.
With few exports and lost profits, many industries were closed down. Southern France, especially
the port cities of Marseille and Bordeaux, as well as the city of La Rochelle, suffered from the
reduction in trade. Moreover, the prices of staple foods rose in most of continental Europe.
Napoleon's St. Cloud Decree in July 1810 opened the southwest of France and the Spanish frontier

12
DWYER, P. (2010). Napoleon and the Universal Monarchy. History, 95(3 (319)), 293-307. Retrieved
from www.jstor.org/stable/24428761
to limited British trade, and reopened French trade to the United States. It was an admission that
his blockade had hurt his own economy more than the British. It had also failed to reduce British
financial support for its allies. The industrialized north and east of France, and Wallonia (the south
of today's Belgium) saw significantly increased profits due to the lack of competition from British
goods (particularly textiles, which were produced much more cheaply in Britain). In Italy, the
agricultural sector flourished; but the Dutch economy, predicated on trade, suffered greatly as a
result of the embargo. Napoleon's economic warfare was much to the chagrin of his own
brother, King Louis I of Holland.

3.3 SCANDINAVIA AND THE BALTIC REGION

Vice-Admiral James Saumarez was the commander of the Royal Navy in the Baltic campaign of
1808–1814 that secured British trade to the region. Britain's first response to the Continental
system was to launch a major naval attack on the weakest link in Napoleon's coalition, Denmark.
Although ostensibly neutral, Denmark was under heavy French and Russian pressure to pledge its
fleet to Napoleon. London could not take the chance of ignoring the Danish threat. In the Second
battle of Copenhagen in August–September 1807, the Royal Navy bombarded Copenhagen, seized
the Danish fleet, and assured control of the sea lanes in the North Sea and Baltic Sea for the British
merchant fleet. The island of Heligoland off the west coast of Denmark was occupied in September
1807. This base made it easier for Britain to control trade to North Sea ports and to facilitate
smuggling. The attacks against Copenhagen and Heligoland started the Gunboat War against
Denmark, which lasted until 1814.13 Sweden, Britain's ally in the Third Coalition, refused to comply
with French demands and was attacked by Russia in February and by Denmark/Norway in March
1808. At the same time, a French force threatened to invade southern Sweden, but the plan was
stopped as the Royal Navy controlled the Danish straits. The Royal Navy set up a base outside the
port of Gothenburg in 1808 to simplify operations into the Baltic Sea. The Baltic campaign was
under the command of Admiral James Saumarez. In November 1810 France demanded that
Sweden should declare war upon the United Kingdom and stop all trade. The result was a phoney
war between Sweden and Britain. A second navy base was set up on the island of Hanö in the south

13
Ibid.
of Sweden in 1810.14 These two bases were used to support convoys from Britain to Gothenburg,
then through the Danish straits to Hanö. From Hanö the goods were smuggled to the many ports
around the Baltic Sea. To further support the convoys, the small Danish island of Anholt was
occupied in May 1809. A lighthouse on the island simplified navigation through the Danish straits.
Russia also chafed under the embargo, and in 1810 reopened trade with Britain. Russia's
withdrawal from the system was a motivating factor behind Napoleon's decision to invade Russia
in 1812, which proved the turning point of the war.

3.4 PORTUGAL AND SPAIN

Portugal openly refused to join the Continental System. In 1793, Portugal signed a treaty of mutual
assistance with Britain. After the Treaty of Tilsit of July 1807, Napoleon attempted to capture the
Portuguese Fleet and the House of Braganza, and to occupy the Portuguese ports. He failed, as
King John VI of Portugal took his fleet and transferred the Portuguese Court to Brazil with a Royal
Navy escort. The Portuguese population rose in revolt against the French invaders, with the help
of the British Army under Arthur Wellesley, later 1st Duke of Wellington. Napoleon intervened, and
the Peninsular War began in 1808. Napoleon also forced the Spanish royal family to resign their
throne in favor of Napoleon's brother, Joseph.

4. EFFECT OF CONTINENT POLICY ON NAPOLEON RULE

The embargo also had an effect on France. Ship building and its trades declined, as did many other
industries that relied on overseas markets. With few exports and a loss of profits, many industries
closed entirely. Southern France especially suffered from the reduction in trade. Moreover, the

14
Ruppenthal, R. (1943). Denmark and the Continental System. The Journal of Modern History, 15(1),
7-23. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/1871504
prices of staple foods rose for most of continental Europe. 15 Napoleon’s St. Cloud Decree of 1810
opened the southwest of France and the Spanish frontier to limited British trade and reopened
French trade to the United States. .Continental Blockade was the main reason for why Napoleon
fell from power, offsetting consequences which include Napoleon's failed Spanish and Russian
campaigns. The Continental Blockade was an attempt made by Napoleon in order to suffocate the
British economy. Following on from a major naval defeat at the Battle of Trafalgar, the French
navy had been decimated. Napoleon recognised that he could not launch a direct attack against
Britain just as he had done so in the past with the neighbouring European countries, such as modern
day Belgium. Subsequently, Napoleon instead adopted a new strategy and aimed to wage an
economic war on Britain instead. Napoleon was aware that the majority of British trade was fed
into mainland Europe, hence in 1806, he issued the Berlin Decrees in which he declared that the
French empire would no longer trade with Britain16 However, in order to combat this, Britain
began trading with neutral countries which prompted Napoleon to launch the Milan Decrees of
1807 which extended the blockade to include the aforementioned neutral countries. Napoleon had
aimed to stall the British economy, attempting to lead it into an economic depression by cutting
off its trade links with mainland Europe. However, the system was a failure as Portugal, a
longstanding ally of Britain, continued to smuggle in British goods. Moreover, Napoleon's
Continental Blockade resulted in the value of British goods to rise significantly and therefore
attempts to cripple the British economy were rendered useless. Additionally, with countries like
Portugal undermining Napoleon's authority, there was a shift in the power Napoleon was able to
extend over Europe which further contributed to his downfall. The blockade led to consequences
such as the Peninsular War and the Russian Campaign which in turn led to the severe loss of men
and materiel – all a result of Napoleon's enforcement of the Continental Blockade. The blockade
certainly proved to be the first step towards Napoleon's downfall as it was the foundation of poor
decisions and severe underestimation of the extent of his future campaigns. Had Britain not been
the results of the system, such results could have been avoided. Therefore, the role Britain played
within the Continental Blockade was the key factor in Napoleon's downfall. 17

15
Napoleon Bonaparte. (1835). The Dublin Penny Journal, 3(154), 396-397. Retrieved from
www.jstor.org/stable/30003256
16
Supra note 14
17
Ruppenthal, R. (1943). Denmark and the Continental System. The Journal of Modern History, 15(1),
7-23. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/1871504
5. ANALYSIS OF CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

as regards the other continental states within Napoleon's more or less undisputed realm of power,
on the other hand, the effects were bound to be far more varied, differing not only according to the
degree of their political independence and to their actual observance of the Continental decrees
within their territories, but also according to the relative importance of the two opposite tendencies
of which they were the object.18 A moment's consideration will show that their position had
features in common both with that of France and with that of Great Britain. It resembled the former
in so far as they, like France, had to abstain from supply by sea; it resembled the latter inasmuch
as they, like Great Britain, were shut out from sales in the markets which were under the direct
sway of Napoleon. Consequently, the effects in the non-French parts of Central and Southern
Europe cannot be expected to have the same self-evident, consistent appearance as in France; but
they have a practical and historical interest of their own. Moreover, the effects on the Napoleonic
mainland were bound to vary with the position of foreign trade and of the production of goods
intended for foreign sale. In this connexion, however, we must emphasize at the outset the
limitation in the effects which follow from the fact that in scarcely any of the continental states
was economic life centred on international exchange. The great commercial cities of Hamburg,
Bremen, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp, and, in France, Bordeaux, Marseilles, Nantes, Havre,
and La Rochelle, were, it is true, entirely dependent on foreign trade and suffered proportionately
from the blockade in so far as it became effective; but this point has been already so fully illustrated
in the preceding part that it is not necessary to dwell further upon it here. Among the non-French
states, countries which, like Saxony, Switzerland, the Grand Duchy of Berg, Bohemia, and Silesia,
had already reached the industrial stage and were therefore very dependent on international
intercourse, were those most affected by the Continental System; however, they too were affected
very differently, according to their political position. 19 The difference between industrial countries
and countries especially given over to agriculture and the yielding of raw materials, namely, North
Germany and especially the Baltic States, Prussia, Mecklenburg, Russia, Austria, and
Hungary, did not primarily consist in the fact that the latter were independent of foreign trade,

18
Carter, J. (1939). Interpretation of the Career of Napoleon Bonaparte. The Historian, 1(2), 164-189.
Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/24435883
19
Rayapen, L., & Anderson, G. (1991). Napoleon and the Church. International Social Science
Review, 66(3), 117-127. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/41882000
since they also had exports. It consisted, rather, in the fact that, from the standpoint of the
Continental System, the industrial life of the two groups of countries was affected quite differently
by the blockade. The industrial countries, on the one side, found obstacles placed in the way of
their supply of raw materials; but, on the other hand, owing to the strangling of British supply,
they increased the possibilities of sale for their own manufactures outside of France and Italy. As
regards all the continental states within Napoleon's realm of power, the Continental System had a
restrictive effect on exports by throwing difficulties in the way of imports, which it is the sole
business of exports to pay for. One may also express the matter in this way: increased self-
sufficiency must diminish the need of exports by diminishing imports. The only reasonably
conceivable exception from this might be if in any case imports by land increased more than
imports by sea diminished; and it is not impossible that the greatly extended intercourse of Saxony
with Eastern Europe led to such a result. 20

6. CONCLUSION

Continental System had little success in its mission of destroying the economic organization of
Great Britain, and most of the things it created on the Continent lasted a very short time. The
visible traces that it left in the economic history of the past century are neither many nor strong.
Indeed, it is difficult to find any more obvious and lasting effect than that of prolonging the
existence of the prohibitive system in France far beyond what was the case, not only in Great
Britain, but also in Prussia21. Thus there are good grounds for doubting that the material
development of our civilization would have been essentially different if this gigantic endeavour to
upset the economic system of Europe had never been made. In general, it is true that what sets its
mark on the course of economic development—largely in contrast with what is political in the
narrower sense—is that which can be used as a foundation for further building, where cause can
be laid to cause. Isolated efforts to destroy the texture of economic society, even if they are made
with a giant's strength, can generally do little more than retard the process of development, and

20
O'Rourke, K. (2007). War and Welfare: Britain, France, and the United States 1807-14. Oxford
Economic Papers, 59, new series, I8-I30. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/4500096
21
Daly, C. (1952). The New French Revolution. The Furrow, 3(5), 177-189. Retrieved from
www.jstor.org/stable/27655977
gradually they disappear under the influence of what may be called in the fine—perhaps too fine—
phrase, 'the self-healing power of nature'. he relatively limited effect of the Continental System on
the economic life of Europe was primarily due to the autarchy of the different countries, that is,
their far-reaching economic self-sufficiency in all vital matters. The speedy conclusion of the
blockade of France at the outbreak of the revolutionary wars was undoubtedly connected, not only
with the particular ideas with which we have become acquainted, but also with the slenderness of
the prospects of starving a country in the position of France; and to a lesser degree the
circumstances were the same with regard to a food blockade of the British Isles. On the other hand,
it may be taken for granted that a blockade of the latter kind would now be effective if it could be
carried out. But even with regard to its practicability the situation is altered. Nowadays such a
blockade demands, almost inevitably, the command of the seas, as the countries that now produce
corn are so many and so scattered that it can hardly be possible to command them all by land; and
the same holds good of the majority of products other than foodstuffs, even of the majority of raw
materials. The possibility of blockading a country simply by power over the sources of supply has
therefore been enormously reduced since the time of Napoleon with regard to all the main
commodities of world commerce. Such a possibility is mainly reduced to a number of important,
but quantitatively insignificant, articles, such as certain special metals, potassium, and indigo.
Therefore, the possibilities of an effective blockade have been so far diminished that nowadays, to
a much greater extent than a hundred years ago, they require power over the transport routes, while
formerly there were greater possibilities of becoming master over production itself.
7 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Jain and Mathur, (2000) a history of the modern world, Jain Prakshan Publishers.
Ncert, (2006) India and the contemporary world, Ncert Publishers

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Stromberg, R. (1986). Reevaluating the French Revolution. The History Teacher, 20(1),
87-107. doi:10.2307/493178
Furet, F. (1981). The French Revolution Revisited. Government and Opposition, 16(2),
200-218. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/44483389
Daly, C. (1952). The New French Revolution. The Furrow, 3(5), 177-189. Retrieved from
www.jstor.org/stable/27655977
Napoleon Bonaparte. (1835). The Dublin Penny Journal, 3(154), 393-394. Retrieved from
www.jstor.org/stable/30003253
Carter, J. (1939). Interpretation of the Career of Napoleon Bonaparte. The Historian, 1(2),
164-189. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/24435883
Napoleon Bonaparte. (1835). The Dublin Penny Journal, 3(154), 396-397. Retrieved from
www.jstor.org/stable/30003256
Schroeder, P. (1990). Napoleon Bonaparte. The International History Review, 12(2), 324-
329. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/40106182
Sr. M. Barbara. (1926). Napoleon Bonaparte and the Restoration of Catholicism in
France. The Catholic Historical Review, 12(2), 241-257. Retrieved from
www.jstor.org/stable/25012302
Bertaud, J. (1986). Napoleon's Officers. Past & Present, (112), 91-111. Retrieved from
www.jstor.org/stable/650999
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