220 NOTICES OF BOOKS

GERSH (S. E.) Kivrjcng aKivtjToq: a study of with 'power' (6vva/nig) leads to a chapter on the
spiritual motion in the philosophy of theme of power (ch. I I ) : power and emanation; the
Proclus. (Philosophia antiqua, xxvi.) Leiden: 'ontological status' of power (this involving an
E.J. Brill. 1973. Pp. v i i i + 1 4 3 . Fl. 48. analysis, pp. 30 ff., of 'the notion of existence'
through brief studies of the terms vnoaraaiq, vnap^iq,
The 'spiritual motion' which is the subject of this and ovaia); the different varieties of power. Ch. I l l
book is that motion associated in Neoplatonic considers motion in relation to the process of remain-
philosophy with the supra-sensible or 'spiritual' ing, procession and reversion in which the activity
sphere of reality. (Gersh refers to this sphere as of the immobile appears. G. discusses in this
'spiritual' rather than as 'intelligible', finding, p. 1, chapter (pp. 53-60) the interpretation of spiritual
that the latter term in Proclus does not cover strictly motion which he finds in W. Beierwaltes' Proklos
speaking the transcendent hypostases of Life and (1965). While accepting much of Beierwaltes'
Intellect; he does not propose, however, to extend analysis, he feels it lacks 'a treatment of the function
his analysis either to the absolute transcendent, the of power within the system of spiritual motion',
One, or to souls, whose activity takes place in time, relating then power to the remaining—procession—
in relation therefore to the sensible world.) The reversion process. Ch. IV deals with evepyeia in its
origins and importance of the concept of spiritual various senses (this leading to a study, pp. 83-90, of
motion are indicated (pp. 2-5), and the problem this the concept of avaXoyla), and in its relation to power.
concept raises is presented as it appears, according to Motion appears again in Ch. V, this time in its
A. H. Armstrong, in Plotinus: how is the non- relation to multiplicity and to difference. G. finds
durational and changeless nature of Intellect to be it difficult in his Conclusion (pp. 118—19) ' ° assess
reconciled with a dynamic aspect of Intellect in Proclus' contribution to the notion of spiritual
which duration and change are implied ? G. chooses motion, since not enough is known of the doctrines
Proclus as the Neoplatonist who provides the most of Proclus' immediate predecessors (Porphyry,
carefully reasoned discussion of spiritual motion, and Iamblichus, Syrianus), and falls back on a compari-
who, one might conclude, may be of assistance in the son between Proclus and Plotinus. Generally
clarification of this concept and in the resolution of speaking, he concludes that both Neoplatonists saw
the problem it raises. spiritual motion as a dynamic logical relation, but
that there is in Proclus a greater explication and
The problem is described further (ch. I) in the systematisation of the elements involved in spiritual
particular form in which it appears in Proclus. The motion. The book ends with two Appendices
'self-constituted' entities of the spiritual sphere are ('Ipcog as a cosmic process'; 'avOvnoararoq ovaia) and
shown in Proclus to be classified as immobile (d/aVjjTog), a bibliography.
while performing also a movement of 'reversion'
(EmaTpoqjrj) both to their prior causes and to them- One might move from this summary of the major
selves (pp. 10-11). How can this motion be recon- themes studied by G. to a less superficial approach to
ciled with the immobility of these entities? Or, his book by raising questions concerning methodo-
more precisely {cf. p. 83 n. 2), how is the activity logy. G.'s method, as described in the Preface, is
(evepyeta) that is reversion to be explained insofar that of'philosophical analysis' (as distinct from earlier
as it relates to an essentially immobile nature"? G. studies, which were 'mainly descriptive and his-
reviews briefly (pp. 11 ff.) previous approaches to this torical . . ., making little pretence to philosophical
question (Lindsay, Rosan, von Ivanka, Beutler, evaluation'). If one is to apply philosophical
Grondijs), finding that in the main they interpret analysis to the history of philosophy, one should
spiritual motion as some type of 'logical relation,' a confront the historical text, I would suggest, from
'static' logical relation (the spiritual world considered an articulated and consistent philosophical position.
as a 'fact'), or a 'dynamic' logical relation (the G. seems to draw his philosophical approach in
spiritual world as a 'process'), the latter interpreta- particular from Rosan and Beierwaltes. Although
tion involving, as its epistemological basis, a concept the attitude to Rosan's 'ontological' interpretation
of some interdependence between mind and object: is not uncritical {cf. pp. 40-1), Rosan's college
'reality constitutes a process involving motion of ontology might have been more useful were it
thought from one object to another, i.e. it must be to integrated critically as part of a unified and con-
some degree at least mental' (p. 16). G. discerns sistent philosophical approach to Proclus. How-
this epistemological basis in Proclus in the sense that ever, questions like 'does power exist?' are raised in
in Proclus 'the hypostases of Intellect and Being one part of the book {cf. pp. 30, 40), whereas else-
constitute a multiplicity within unity in which Life where one seems to be moving on another philo-
is the mediator' (p. 24). Consequently the 'dynamic sophical planet, that of Hegel and 'subjective
logical relation' interpretation of spiritual motion objectivity' {cf. p. 117). Beierwaltes, in his con-
seems acceptable, and G. proceeds to study in detail frontation of Hegel with Proclus, seems to have
the dynamic logical relations which seem to con- inspired the latter point of view {cf. pp. 116-17),
stitute the spiritual world of process. and is the source of G.'s postulate that 'dynamic
To mention briefly some of the themes in Proclus logical relations' in the spiritual world must be 'in
discussed by G.: Proclus' equation of 'difference' part mental' (p. 16; cf. p. 58 n. 1). Beneath the
 NOTICES OF BOOKS 221
confusing philosophical presence of Rosan and aware of the elementary handbook nature of the
Beierwaltes, one might sense other possible philo- El. Th. as compared to other works of Proclus (cf.
sophical positions. In his Conclusion, G. asks what p. 18), and of its 'geometrical' approach (cf. p. 7
motivated the innovations introduced by Proclus n. 2), but one feels at times that perhaps not enough
into Plotinus' theory of spiritual motion. 'Perhaps methodological care was taken in the use of the text
one might say,' he suggests, 'that in the work of (e.g., parts of different demonstrations coupled with
Proclus we see a subconscious attempt to rationalise a different proposition on p. 66; application on
in the scientific manner various doctrines which are pp. 84-5 of a proposition in a way not warranted by
most appropriate within the context of mystical a more appropriate text).
intuition. The simultaneous affirmation of opposites The formulation and resolution of the method-
or contradictories is one of the most characteristic ological problems which arise in the study of
traits of the mystical mind. . . . The polarity of Neoplatonism should perhaps take place within the
motion and rest with which we have been concerned context of, and without hindering, the reconstruction
is only one of these contradictory pairs' (p. 122). and interpretation of the history of Neoplatonic
These are surely philosophical assumptions, based thought. In presenting in this book a detailed
perhaps on an epistemology which might constitute analysis of certain themes in Proclus, G. extends
a framework for the interpretation of Proclus. considerably this process of interpretation. His
Indeed, G. does use elsewhere the categories of the book constitutes an ample justification of his concep-
'rational' and the 'mystical' (or 'religious'), namely tion of the metaphysical concepts of motion, activity,
in his characterisation of Proclus' thought: he finds power, difference, multiplicity as essentially inter-
(p. 5) a 'reasoned and deductive form' in Proclus' related, and it is perhaps this aspect of the complexity
discussions, 'careful argumentation', Proclus bringing of Proclus' thought which occasionally makes the
contradictory ideas 'within the realm of strict logic, book rather involved. The reader is reminded at
or at least within the realm of logic as conceived by times of Plotinian themes (appearing in a more
a Neoplatonic philosopher'. Notwithstanding this complicated form), concluding perhaps that Proclus'
reasoned form of Proclus' work, it appears that G. metaphysics is fundamentally Plotinian and that, as
must base his interpretation to a considerable extent G. observes (p. 121), 'Plotinus had merely postu-
on 'footnotes' in Proclus, on 'hints' and on extra- lated . . . a process of spiritual evolution in his
polations (cf. pp. 9, 43, 46-8, 55 n. 3, 56 n. 2, 68, philosophy, but it was the task of later thinkers to
101-12), this suggesting perhaps the possibility of describe how this process took place'.
some confrontation between G.'s concept of
rationality and Proclus' philosophising. D. J. O'MEARA
The defectiveness however of Proclus' 'rational' The Catholic University of America
explanation may be felt to stem rather from the
inadequacy of the evidence we have for Proclus'
thought (cf. p. 24 n. 1). One might suggest here
another methodological point. G. uses Proclus' Dooos (E. R.) The ancient concept of progress
Platonic Theology, his Commentaries on Plato, but his and other essays on Greek literature and
main source is the Elements of Theology. The El. Th.
belief. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1973. Pp.
is an elementary handbook composed of a chain of
vii + 218. £4-25.
basic metaphysical propositions (cf. Dodds' edition,
p. 187), each proposition accompanied by a 'demon- This collection of papers, seven published (or
stration' (dn6dei£ ic,; cf. Dodds' Index verborum). soon to be published) elsewhere and three previously
This approach has been compared to that of Euclid unpublished, spans a long period of time (1929 to
and Spinoza (Dodds p. xi). Indeed Proclus not 1971 and beyond) and a great variety of audiences
only proceeds more geometrico, but seems to have or readers, ranging from the sixth form at Marl-
written his handbook in the manner of a geometrical borough College ('The Religion of the Ordinary Man
Sroixdcoaiq (cf. Proclus' references to axov/elov in Classical Greece') through audiences for special
and aToiyeioGK as given in C. Mugler, Diet. hist, de university lectures ('The Ancient Concept of Pro-
la terminologie ge'om. des grecs, Paris 1959, pp. 380-1).gress', 'The Prometheus Vinctus and the Progress of
This seems true also of El. Th.'s sister-work, the Scholarship') to the Cambridge Philological Society
Elements of Physics. If therefore one is to use the El. ('Morals and Politics in the Oresteia') on the one
Th. as a source for particular aspects of Proclus' hand, and the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical
philosophy (assuming there is a philosophy common Research ('Supernormal Phenomena in Classical
to the El. Th., the Platonic Theology, the CommentariesAntiquity') on the other. The range of subject
and the work on the Chaldaean Oracles), sufficient matter is equally wide; and the whole presents, if
allowance has to be made for the particular nature not a full and formal portrait, at least a series of
of the El. Th., the paideutic level of generality of the informative snapshots of the characteristics and
propositions and the didactic relation both between development of a very distinguished, complex and
the propositions themselves and between each pro- versatile mind.
position and its demonstration. G. is of course Dodds is always sensitively aware of the fact that