Hernando, Hannah Francesca A.

Using Fictitious Names and Concealing True Name

People v. Estrada

April 2, 2009 G.R. Nos. 164368-69 J. Brion

Syllabus Question & Answer

“Jose Velarde”; Publicity and habituality of use – The repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot
be deemed habitual, as it does not amount to a customary practice or use.

Further, there must be a sign or indication that the user intends to be known by the alias in addition to his
real name from that day forth for the use of alias to fall within the prohibition in CA No. 142. All of Estrada’s
representations to the people present when he used the alias were made in privacy and in secrecy, with
no iota of intention of publicity. The people involved were his Chief of Staff and lawyer-friend, with whom
he shared matters of highest and strictest confidence, as well as bank officers, who were sworn to secrecy
under banking laws.

Relevant RPC Provisions, Concepts, & Doctrines

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by

him  publicly  and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which
he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent
authority. 

To be held liable for the illegal use of alias, there must be an indication that the offender intends to
be  known by such alias in addition to his real name, and there must be habituality. The repeated
use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed habitual, as it does not amount to a
customary practice or use.

ISSUE/S:

W/N Estrada is liable under CA 142 for illegal use of alias? NO.

FACTS OF THE CASE

An information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada. A separate
information for illegal use of alias was also filed against him. The information stated that the respondent,
as President of the Republic of the Philippines, in order to conceal the ill-gotten wealth he acquired during
his tenure and his true identity, unlawfully represented himself as “Jose Velarde” in several transactions,
which is neither his registered name at birth or baptismal name. He used this alias in signing documents
with Equitable PCI Bank and other corporate entities to open accounts as well as receive numerous
checks.

Estrada argues that there is no proof of public and habitual use of alias because the documents offered by
the prosecution as evidence were banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot
be revealed without proper procedures.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that there was failure by the prosecution to present evidence that proved
Estrada’s commission of the crime of illegal use of alias. It held that there is an illegal use of alias in the
context of Commonwealth Act 142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual. According to the
Sandiganbayan, Estrada did not publicly use the alias “Jose Velarde.” The definition of publicity in the law
of libel—that communication to a third person is publicity—was rejected by the Sandiganbayan. It held that
the application of the libel law definition is onerous to the accused and is precluded by the ruling in Ursua,
which provided that CA 142, as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against the state and
favorably for the accused. It ruled that the definition under the law on libel, even if it applies, considers a
communication to a third person covered by the privileged communication rule to be non-actionable.
Estrada’s use of the alias in front of bank officers sworn to secrecy was one of privileged communication
and could not be considered as “public” under CA 142.

RULING

The Ursua case defined an alias as a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by
him  publicly  and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is
registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority.  To be
held liable for the illegal use of alias, there must be an indication that the offender intends to be  known by
such alias in addition to his real name, and there must be habituality. The repeated use of an alias within a
single day cannot be deemed habitual, as it does not amount to a customary practice or use.

The Sandiganbayan was correct in finding that Estrada only used the alias “Jose Velarde” on February 4,
2000—repeatedly, on a single day. The several transactions involving the signing of documents with
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had their reference to February 4, 2000. They were
all made on or about or  prior or subsequent to that date, as indicated in the information, thus plainly
implying that all these transactions took place only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date
sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To reiterate, the repeated use of an alias within a single day
cannot be deemed habitual, as it does not amount to a customary practice or use.

Further, there must be a sign or indication that the user intends to be known by the alias in addition to his
real name from that day forth for the use of alias to fall within the prohibition in CA No. 142 as amended.

The presence of Messrs. Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust
Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known as Jose Velarde. In
relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the general public who had no access to Estrada’s
privacy and to the confidential matters that occurred when he sat as President. Lacquian was the Chief of
Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend
bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his
affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public
consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time.

The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez—the Bank Officers,
assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. As ruled by the Sandiganbayan,
Estrada’s use of the alias in front of bank officers sworn to secrecy was one of privileged communication
and could not be considered as “public” under CA 142. All of Estrada’s representations to these people
were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.