Direct Perception

University of Arkansas Press
Direct Perception: The View from Here

Author(s): William H. Warren
Source: Philosophical Topics, Vol. 33, No. 1, Perception (SPRING 2005), pp. 335-361
Published by: University of Arkansas Press
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PHILOSOPHICAL
TOPICS
VOL.33,NO.1,SPRING
2005
Direct Perception: The View from Here
WilliamH. Warren
Brown University
The viewthatperception is directholdsthata perceiver is awareofor in contact

withordinary mind-independent objects,rather than mind-dependent surrogates
thereof.In thispaperI tryto articulatean accountof directperceptionfroma
Gibsonianpointofview,locatedwithinthewiderterrain ofcognitivescienceand
psychology.James Gibson'secologicaltheory that
proposes perception is a relation
inwhichan activeagentis in contactwithbehaviorally relevantfeatures
andprop-
ertiesofitsenvironment;thisrelationis causallysupported byperceptual systems
thatareattunedtoinformation whichspecifies thosefeatures andproperties. I will
arguethatthetheoryoffers themeansto resistthemainlinesof attackon direct
perception,includingtheArguments fromIllusion,Hallucination, Appearances,
and Underspecification.
In so doing,italso suggestsa positiveaccountofillusions
and hallucinations,
as wellas theintentional (object-directed)and perspectivai
(fromhere)aspectsofperception.
ASSUMING THE POSITIONS: THE DIRECT VIEW
Thepositionthatperception is directbeginswiththecommonsense intuition

that
everydayperceiving involvesan awareness ofordinary environmental situations.1
In thecase of vision,whenI see a copperbeech treewitha cylindrical trunk,
smoothbark,andcopper-green leavesata particular
locationon thegroundahead,
335
theobjectofwhichI am awareis themind-independent treein theworld.2The
logicofperception consequently adheresto thelogic knowingratherthanthe
of
logicofbelief.In casesofgenuine(veridical)perception, ifone perceives a situa-
tionX,thenX is perforce thecase;in contrast, ifone believes that X is thecase,X
mayor maynotbe so.Thiscomports withoureveryday perceptual encounters with
objectssuchas treesandtomatoesand daggers, as wellas withoureveryday praxis
ofactingsuccessfully withrespectto suchobjects.
One interpretation ofthedirectclaimis that"awareness" ofan objectrefers to
theperceiver's consciousphenomenal experience ofthatobject.Thus,whenI per-
ceivethetreeI havea subjective phenomenalexperience oftheshapeofitstrunk,
thesmoothness ofitsbark,thecopper-greenness ofitsleaves,itslocationin space,
and so on. One concernwiththisformulation is thatitlimitsdirectperception to
animals(suchas primates)towhomwe arewillingto grantconsciousexperiences,
and failsto extendto loweranimals(suchas frogsor honeybees)whomayor may
notenjoyconsciousexperiences. Yetin all ofthesespecies,behavioris observedto
be orientedto environmental situations and thusdemandssomeformofpercep-
tualcontactwiththeenvironment, whether or notitis consciously experienced.
A secondinterpretation is that"awareness" refersto theperceiver havingaccess
toitsenvironment, suchthattheagentis in contactwithor in touchwithordinary
objectsand theirproperties. On thisreading,awarenessis a relationbetweenthe
perceiver and theenvironment, inwhichtheperceiver is awareoforin contactwith
theenvironmental It is theintentional,
situation. object-directed, world-involving
content ofperception thatmatters here,rather thanthesubjective phenomenology.
Gibson(1979) putitthisway:
isanachievement
Perceiving oftheindividual, notanappearance inthe
theatreofconsciousness. It is a keeping-in-touch withtheworld, an
of
experiencingthings rather than a of
having experiences. Itinvolves
awareness-of ofjustawareness.
instead (239-40)
Directperception constitutesepistemiccontactwiththeenvironment in thesense
thattheperceiver is informed of theenvironmental situationand has a basisfor
actionwithinandknowledge abouttheworld.Thus,whenI perceive a tree,I am in
contactwiththetreesuchthatI canactadaptively it,
(avoid hug climb
it, it),osten-
sively it
indicate at
(point it), make demonstrative judgments about it (Snowdon
1992),andso forth.Thisis thetakeI shallemphasizehere.However, I hastento add
thatforcreatures withphenomenalexperiences, subjectiveexperience ordinarily
goeshandinhandwithperceptual contact.Thatis,exceptin anomalousinstances,
one subjectively
experiences thethingswithwhichone is in contact.
Itis worthnotingthatthedirectclaimdoes notbyitselfresolvetheepistemo-
logica!problemofskepticism. On thefaceofit,directperception appearsto pro-
videtheobserverwithstrongjustification forherbeliefs,and henceknowledge,
aboutthestateof theenvironment: ifone perceives X, thenitfollowsthatX is in
factthecase.Butdirectperception does notensurethattheobserver can internally
336
distinguishinstancesofgenuineperception fromotherkindsofsensory experience,
suchas illusionsor hallucinations.The havingofan experience ofa treethusdoes
notprovideone withan incorrigible forthebeliefthata treeis pres-
justification
ent,becauseone cannottell"frominside"whether theexperience is a caseofper-
ceptionor a hallucination.
However, thedirectclaimdoes haveepistemological implications, fora suc-
cessfuldirectaccountofperception wouldenablea satisfactory accountofknowl-
edge.On an internalist view,directperceptual experience providesa noninferential
basis fortheinternaljustification of one's perceptual(and consequent)beliefs
(Huemer2001).On an externalist view,directperception provides a reliableprocess
thatlinksenvironmental situationsto perceptualbeliefs,so thatthebeliefsare
externallyjustifiedwhetherthe observerknowsthe processis reliableor not
(Dretske1981;Goldman1986).Eitherway,perception is thefundamental pointof
contactwiththeenvironment andprovides theprimary basison whichbeliefs, con-
cepts,andknowledge maybe formed. To theextent thatthiscontactis undermined,
an epistemic barrieris raisedbetweenthecognitive agentand theworld.
NO PERCEPTION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION:

THE INDIRECT VIEW
position,in contrast,
The indirect arguesthatthecommonsense ofper-
intuition
ceptionas thedirectawarenessof environmental objectsis naïve.Upon closer
examination,a perceiveris actuallyonlyin directcontactwiththeproximalstim-
ulationthatreachesthereceptors, or withsense-data,or withthesensationsor
-
internalimagestheyelicit but not withthe distalobjectitself.Thomas Reid
(1785/1969)observes:
Allphilosophers,
from thattheimme-
PlatotoMr.Hume,agreeinthis,
diateobjectofperceptionmustbe someimagepresent inthemind.
(EssayII,Ch.7,124)
theperceiver
Consequently, mustmakean inference fromthegivensense-datato
situation
theenvironmental they betoken. Hereis theearlyBertrand Russell( 1912):
Therealtable,ifthereisone,isnotthesameas whatweimmediately
experience
bysight ortouchorhearing.Therealtable, ifthere
isone,is
notimmediatelyknown tousatall,butmustbeaninference from what
known Letus givethenameof"sense-data"
is immediately tothe
thatareimmediately
things known insensation.(11-12)
Theresultofsuchan inference
is a percept, belief,
perceptual descrip-
propositional
tion,or othermentalrepresentationoftheenvironment. is directly
The perceiver
awareonlyofsomemind-dependent proxy- thesense-data, image,orrep-
internal
-
resentation3and onlyindirectlyaware of themind-independentworld.
337
Thereareseveralpersuasive arguments in favoroftheindirect position.The
Arguments from Illusion and Hallucination contend that,because nonveridical
are
sensoryexperiences subjectively indistinguishable from veridical ones,the
of
immediateobject awareness must be the same in both cases. Hence,one is
of
directlyaware a mind-dependent proxy, not the environmental object.The
from
Argument Appearances assertsthat one only has immediate access tothevari-
able appearanceofan object(e.g.,itsprojectedformin thefieldofview),which
dependsupon one'svantagepoint.Thus,one mustperceivetheobject'sconstant
properties indirectly, bywayof themediatingappearance.The Argument from
Underspecification, which is commonly taken for in
granted cognitive science,con-
tendsthattheproximalstimulation is inherently ambiguous and insufficientto
the
specify object and its This
properties. assumption leads straight to the claim
thatthe perceivermustmake inferences frominadequatepremises,somehow
"goingbeyondtheinformation given"in orderto arriveat an internal representa-
tion of the environment. These argumentsappear to effectively undercutthe
prospects fordirectperception.
Yettheindirect viewalso hassomeundesirable implications. On thefaceofit,
indirect perception does notcomportwithourphenomenology seeingor feel-
of
ingtheworldaroundus:we do notseemtobe awareofmerestimulation or sense-
dataor appearances, butoffull-bodied environmental objects;norarewe awareof
makingexplicitinferences fromsense-datato internalrepresentations of such
objects.To explainawaythisobjection,themovement fromproximalstimulation
to representation canbe ascribedto a processofunconscious inference (Helmholtz
1866/1925), suchthattheperceiver is awareoftheresulting representation ofthe
environment ratherthanthemediating sense-dataand inference process.Yetstill,
phenomenologically, we seemtobe awareoftheenvironment aroundus,nota rep-
resentation insideourheads,and indirect theoristsoweus an accountoftheinten-
tionallyofperception.
Moreseriously, theindirect viewcreatesan openingfora skeptical argument
knownas Hume'sproblem.On thisview,theobserveronlyhas immediateaccess
toproximal stimulation, sense-data, or internal representations.Withoutsomesort
of independent, extrasensory accessto theenvironment, thereis no wayforthe
observerto workoutwhichsense-dataor patternsof stimulation correspondto
whichenvironmental features, or whatenvironmental objectis denotedbywhich
representation (the"symbolgrounding problem"is a recentmanifestation). This
inherent circularity leavestheperceiver trappedin a closeduniverseofphenome-
nal sense-dataor uninterpretable representations (Bickhardand Terveen1995;
Searle1980;Shaw2003). The indirectpositionthusintroduces a "veilofpercep-
tion"betweentheperceiver and theworld,behindwhichordinary objectsremain
concealed.Worseyet,ithasbeenarguedthattheindirect viewcannotsupportreal-
isminthefaceoftheskeptical argument, andwhenpressedtendsto slideintophe-
nomenalism or idealism(Huemer2001;Smith2002).
338
The indirectresponseto Hume'sproblemis "inference to thebestexplana-
tion,"according to which theobserver constructs an internal representationofthe
externalworldthatbestaccounts the for order in sensoryexperience. But such a
processpresumesthattheobserverhas at his disposala setof predicatesthatis
adequatefordescribingthematerialworld,and a basis forunderstanding how
theworldis causallyrelatedto sensoryexperience. The Argument fromUnder-
onlymakesmatters
specification worse,forifthestimulation underdetermines the
environmental situation,thereis evenlesshopeofinferring thelatterfromthefor-
mer(Turveyand Shaw 1979).To resolvethisdilemma,indirecttheoriesrelyon
priorknowledgeor assumptions about(1) thestructure oftheworld(including
descriptivelyadequatepredicates), and (2) howtheworldstructures stimulation
(and sensoryexperience). However, thepossessionofsuchknowledge mustagain
be accountedforin someextrasensory manner.The indirect positionthusunder-
minesthecognitiveagenťsaccessto theenvironment, castingepistemicdoubt
uponitsprimary pointofcontactwiththeworld.Andiftheagentcannotperceive
theenvironment, itcannotformconcepts, entertain thoughts, acquireknowledge,
or communicate abouta sharedsocialworld.
Giventheeffort expendedbyphilosophers in thelasthalfcentury todischarge
sense-dataand defendsomeversionofdirectperception (Crane2005),itmaybe
surprisingthatmostpractitioners in cognitivescienceand psychology unflinch-
inglyadhereto an indirect view.Although talkof"sense-data" and
is anachronistic
"sensation"is treated term,inpracticeitis stillgenerally
as a historical believedthat
ourperceptions oftheworldareinferred fromsensory dataandcorrespond notto
environmental objects but to images or representations in our own minds.
Formanyvisionscientists, Helmholtz(1866/1925)stillsetsthetone:
Wecannever escapefrom theworldofoursensations totheideaofan
outerworld, exceptbyinference from thechanging sensation toouter
objectsas thecausesof this
change. (32)
A well-known bald statement
sciencetextpresentsa particularly
cognitive ofthe
view:
representationalist
Theproblem thenistotakethissetofexcitations
[ofthetwo-dimen-
sionalarray
ofreceptors], infer inwhatkindoflayout
whatobjects these
might betoken, create oftheseobjects
intheminda representation in
theirlayout. or modeloftheworldandthe
It is thisrepresentation,
resultsoftheinferences whichcanbemadewithinit,whichweexperi-
ence;nottheworlditself. (Oatley1979,166)
Currently Bayesianapproachto vision,yeta
thefieldis in thegripof a statistical
familiar
formulation persists:
Perception is a processof unconscious as suggested
inference, by
Helmholtz (1925).Bayesian
probability a normative
provides modelfor
howpriorknowledge shouldbecombined withsensorydatatomake
abouttheworld.
inferences (Knill, andYuille1996,15)
Kersten,
339
Someofmyclosestcolleaguesareevenavowedphenomenalists (Loomis1992).The
neurologistV.S. Ramachandran, echoingTaine'snotoriousremarkthatperception
is merely has actuallysaidin publicthatwe arehallucinating
"truehallucination,"
all thetime(Ramachandran et al. 1998).
A GIBSONIAN VIEW OF DIRECT PERCEPTION
The holdoutsin psychology and cognitivescienceforthelasthalfcenturyhave

beenJamesJ.Gibson and those byhiswork(e.g.,Mace 1977;Shaw2003;
influenced
Shaw,Turvey,and Mace 1981). Gibsonbeganhisfirstbook (1950) byasking,
Ifthemindconstructs theworld whydoesitagreesowellwith
foritself,
theenvironment inwhich moveandgetabout?
weactually Ifspaceper-
ceptionisa subjective thenwhyareweso seldom
process byillu-
misled
soryperceptions?(14)
He spenttheremainderofhislifedeveloping accountofperception
a scientific that
wasconsistent Neartheendofhiscareer,
withdirectrealism. he phrasedhisanswer
thisway:
WhenI assert oftheenvironment
thatperception , I meanthat
isdirect
byretinal
itisnotmediated neural
pictures, ormental
pictures, pictures.
(1979,147)
ofperception
Thefunction incontact
istokeepusintouchwith, with,
theworld.
(1974)
The cardinalproblemwiththeindirect positionis thustheintroduction ofmedi-
atingobjects of awareness such as sensations,retinalor mental images, or internal
the of
representations; problem perceptual inference is a consequence of the twin
assumptions of mediation and underspecification.
Gibson'secologicalapproachbringsa numberofcontributions to thepresent
discussion, and I willfocuson fourofthemhere.
1. Theenvironment Whatmakestheapproach"ecological"is thatperception
cannotbe understood in isolation, butonlyin thecontextofan environment. The
perceiver is embedded in a particularecological niche, and itsperceptual systems
areadaptedto theregularities ofthatnicheand theenergyarraysitstructures. A
perceptual system is tuned byevolution and to
learning patterns ofstimulation that
specifyenvironmental features and properties whicharerelevant to theperceiver's
way of life,so that the agent"competently inhabits"its environment, inMcDowell's
( 1994)words.The frog's visualsystem, forexample,is tunedto particular patterns
ofmotionthat,in therestricted contextofitsniche,specify smallediblepreyand
largeloomingthreats. The fish'slaterallineorganis tunedto pressurewavesthat
specify obstacles, the movements ofpredators andprey, andthepositionsofneigh-
borsin theschool.Eventhenarwal'stuskturnsout to be a senseorgantunedto
340
salinitydifferentialsthatspecify thefreezing of thewater'ssurfaceoverhead.The
narwalis thereby in perceptual contactwitha property ofitsniche- thepenetra-
-
bilityofthesurface thatis criticalto itssurvival. Suchperceptual abilitiescannot
be understood without reference totheperceivers environment andhowitpatterns
theavailablestimulation. Thisis a secondglosson "theviewfromhere,"implicat-
inga situatedperceiver in a particular nichewhopossessesperceptual equipment
enablingitto competently inhabitthatniche.
2. Perception andaction.Gibson'ssecondcontribution is hisemphasison per-
ceptionas intimately relatedto action.Perception did notevolveto be thepassive
recipient ofsenseimpressions froman "outer"world,butratherto guideeffective
actionin theworld.Reciprocally, actionsystemsevolvednot onlyto perform
behavior, butalso to exploretheenvironment: "Weperceivein orderto move,but
we also movein orderto perceive"(Gibson1979,223). Successful behavioris the
bottomlineforevolution, giventhatnaturalselectionis predicated uponsurvival
andreproductive success.Thedemandsofefficacious actionin a particular ecolog-
icalnichethusshapeperceptual systems, includingthevariablesofstimulation to
whichtheyaresensitive (specificpatterns oflight,pressure, salinity) and theenvi-
ronmental features withwhichtheymakecontact.
Mostbasically, perceivers mustmakecontactwithbehaviorally relevantfea-
turesof theirenvironments. Gibsondubbedtheseaffordances , combinations of
environmental properties thatafford particular actionsfora givenanimal:config-
urationsof surfacesthatsupportlocomotionfora bipedwitha particular mor-
phology,objects of a certain size and shape that can be grasped by a prehensile
hand, thingsthat are edible by a particularingestivesystem,and so forth.
Perception is thuspragmatic andtask-specific. Itneednot"solve"generalproblems
suchas therecovery of absolutespace and time,but mustprovidecontactwith
behaviorally relevant features and properties suchas reachablepreyand looming
threats.
Thecriteria fortheveridicality ofdirectperception aresimilarly pragmatic: suf-
in
ficiency guiding action rather than accurate of
judgments arbitrary physical
properties. However, a broaderperceptualcompetence emergesfromthisfunda-
mentalcontactwiththeaffordances of a niche.Giventhataffordances areconsti-
tutedbymaterial objects and theirproperties, perceptual systems evolve sensitivities
to information specificto suchproperties (surfacelayout,shape,size,reflectance,
materialcomposition, motion),whichgeneralizes to otherenvironmental situa-
tions.Astheydifferentiate informational variablesand makefiner discriminations,
a richerperceptualawarenesspiggybacks upon theprimary perception of affor-
dances.
The argumentthatperceptionevolvedto guideactionhas severalimplica-
tions.First,itoffersan external rationalefortheclaimofdirectperception. Beyond
our intuitionof directawareness, or our senseof therealpresenceof perceived
objects,theperceiver mustbe in epistemiccontactwithitsenvironment because
efficacious actionis orientedto environmental objects.This also suggestsa basis
341
fortheintentionality or object-directedness ofperception. Object-directed percep-
tualsystems in
emerged the course of evolution becausesuccessful behavioris ori-
entedto constantdistalobjects,not variableproximalstimulation. Perceptual
systems thusbecamesensitive to information forpersisting features oftheenviron-
mentsuchas objectsand surfaces, ratherthanfleeting retinalimagesor an internal
kaleidoscope ofsensations, because it is those features to whicheffective actionsare
directed. Thefrogis inperceptual contact with theprey, not the motion pattern; the
fishwiththeobstacle,notthepressure waves; and the narwal with the water's sur-
face,notitssalinity.
Theintentionality ofperception is closelyrelatedto thephenomenaofpercep-
tualconstancy, suchas position,size,shape,and colorconstancy. As theperceiver
movesthroughtheworld,a flowofopticalstimulation is generatedat therecep-
tors,suchthatthevisualdirection, visualangle,projectedform,and luminanceof
objectsin thevisualfieldarecontinually changing, withan accompanying fluxof
visualappearances. Yetwe areperceptually awareofmore-or-less constant objects,
whichdo notappearto dramatically changetheirsize,shape,or surfaceproperties
as we movewithrespect to them.Gibson(1979),however, emphasized thatpercep-
tionis simultaneously intentional and perspectivai: we co-perceive thepersisting
features oftheenvironment andtheirvarying relationship to us,whichcorresponds
to theviewfromhere.Self-motion allowstheperceiver to disentangle properties
attributable to thestable"objective" environment and themobile"subjective" self.
Thisis anotherglosson "theviewfromhere,"alludingto thetensionbetweenthe
perception ofconstant objectsand theirvariableappearances.
3. Information. Gibson'sthirdcontribution is his conceptof information as
. An
specificity energyarray is informative about the environmental situation when
itis lawfiilly structured by,and specific to,thatsituation. Specificity meansthatthe
mapping from higher-order patterns of stimulation to a perceived environmental
feature orproperty is generally univocal:itmaybe one-to-one or many-to-one, but
itis rarely A
one-to-many.givenproperty (say, surface shape) might be specifiedby
multiple variables (e.g.,texture, shading, disparity,motion) in multiple modalities
(e.g.,vision,haptics;Gibson1966,54-55). However, as themappingfromstimula-
tionpatterns to environmental situations becomesone-to-many (equivocal),the
variablesbecomeambiguousand increasingly underspecify thesituation, and at
somepointmustbe considered probabilistic cues. The line here is admittedly fuzzy.
Somenoisein informational variablesunderecologicalconditionsmustbe toler-
ated,ofcourse,suchas occasionalblowingbitsofbarkthatmimicthemotionof
bugs;suchcasescan yieldperceptual illusionsor unsuccessful actions.The visual
also
system appears to make some use of statisticalregularities (e.g.,Geisleret al.
2001),whichmightbe bootstrapped by specific variables. The claimhereis that
perceptual systems on
relyprimarily specific variables that correspond to theenvi-
ronmentalsituationwitha veryhighprobability, or convergeon themduring
learning(Jacobsand Michaels2006).
Ecologicalinformation is lawfulnotin theNewtoniansenseofbeinguniver-
sal in spaceand time,butin an ecologicalsenseofbeingregularwithinan ecolog-
342
icalcontextofconstraint. Informational variablesmayspecify environmental fea-
turesbyvirtueofgenerallawsofopticsand physics(Euclid'slawofvisualangles,
physicallawsofwavepropagation) or byvirtueoflocalconstraints in an ecologi-
cal niche(themovingblackspecksin thefrog'snicheareoverwhelmingly edible
bugs;terrestrial objectsnormally reston theground).An evolvingperceptual sys-
temcannotknow,and does notcare,whether suchinformational regularities are
theconsequenceofgeneralphysical lawsor localecologicalconstraints - itsimply
exploitsregularities, whatever theirorigin.Suchinformation mayspecify environ-
mentalfeatures andproperties (whatGibsoncalledexterospecific information), the
configurations and movements oftheagenťsownbody(propriospecific informa-
tion),theenvironment in relationto theagent(information foraffordances, ego-
centricposition, self-motion), andreciprocally guidetheagenťsactionsin relation
to theenvironment (controlinformation; Warren2006).
Gibson'sconceptofinformation offers a basisforboththeintentional andper-
spectivaiaspectsofperception. His hypothesis (Gibson1979)is thatconstant envi-
ronmental objectsandproperties arespecified bytheinvariant structure intheflow
ofstimulation, thatis,byhigher-order spatiotemporal patterns thatremaininvari-
antundertransformation (as theobserver moves,objectsmove,lighting conditions
change, etc.).Thus, the persisting material composition of a granite vase is speci-
fiedbya particular of
pattern optical texture, its polished surface by the sharpness
ofspecularreflections, itssaddleshapebysecond-order spatialderivatives oftex-
ture,shading, disparity, and motion (Koenderink and van Doom 1992; Lappin and
Craft2000), and so on. Reciprocally, the varyingspatialrelationship between
objectsandtheperceiver is specifiedbytheperspective structureofstimulation. This
corresponds to the view of the environment from here, which locates environmen-
talsurfacesandobjectsrelative totheperceiver, andtheperceiver relative toitsenvi-
ronment. The co-perception of intentional and perspectivai properties thushasa
basisin theinvariant and perspective structure ofstimulation.
Gibson'sconceptofspecific information bearscertainsimilarities tothenotion
ofnatural that
signs carry natural , as
informationdeveloped by Dretske and Millikan.
According to Dretske (1986), natural signs are reliable indicators of states ofaffairs
by virtueof lawful relations, objective constraints, or pervasive regularities between
thesignandthestateofaffairs; suchrelations arenonaccidental andsupportcoun-
terfactuals.The motionpattern ofblackspecksis a naturalsignofthepresence of
ediblebugsbyvirtueofbothgenerallawsofopticsandecologicalconstraints ofthe
frog'sniche.Thattherelationis univocalis indicatedbytheclaimthatitsupports
counterfactuals: iftherewerenotbugsin theimmediatevicinity of thefrog,the
motionpatternofblackspeckswouldnormallynotbe present.Millikan(2004)
usefullyintroduces theidea of locallyrecurrent naturalsignsthatcarrylocalinfor-
mationaboutaffairs withina boundednaturaldomain,analogousto an ecological
context ofconstraint. Unfortunately, in an effort to developa generaltheory ofsig-
nification,sheweakenstherelationto one ofmerecorrelation, encompassing low
probabilities.Thisundermines Gibson'saccountofperception as a reliableprocess
thatyieldscontactwiththeenvironment, andplaysintothehandsoftheArgument
343
fromUnderspecifìcation. Low-probability, partiallydiagnosticrelationsmaybe
exploitedbyinferential cognitive processesin doingdetective work,medicaldiag-
nosis,weatherforecasting, and so on,butourprimary perceptual contactdepends
on high-probability, specific information - includingour perceptual contactwith
thematerial clues,symptoms, and cloudformations thatprovidepremises forcog-
nitiveinference processes.
4. Perceptual systems. Gibson'sfourthcontribution is hisconceptofa percep-
tualsystem . A perceptual system is an activeorganwhosefunction is "seekingand
extracting information abouttheenvironment fromtheflowing arrayofambient
energy" (Gibson1966,5). The visualsystem, forexample,consistsnotonlyofthe
retina,optictract,and visualcortex,butalso movingeyesin a movinghead on a
locomotingbody,the associatedmusculature, and attentionalcapacities,with
descending as wellas ascendingneuralpathways. Throughevolutionand learning
a perceptualsystembecomesattunedto information, and whenit is attendedto
anddetected theseneuralloopsbecomeactiveso thatthesystem "resonates" to the
information. The claimis thatthedetection ofinformation byan attuned perceptual
system yieldsawareness ofthespecified environmental situation . In Millikans(1984)
terms,detecting information to yieldawareness(in bothsenses)of theenviron-
mentis thebiologicalproper function ofa perceptual system.
Of whatdoes thisattunement consist?In somesense,theperceptualsystem
comesto embodyan implicitmappingfrompatterns of stimulation to specified
features and properties, suchthatthedetectionofinformation causallysupports
perceptual contactwithand subjective experience oftheenvironmental situation.
The proximalstimulation is thus"transparent," so theperceiver seestheenviron-
ment,notthestimulation or information. HereHume'sproblemseemsto rearits
headonceagain.Butwecannowseehowa perceptual system might becomeadapted
to informational regularities in the course of evolution and learning, suchthatits
attunement is understood as emergent ratherthana priori . First,bydeveloping sen-
sitivity to invariant patterns of stimulation, the activity of the perceptualsystem
comesto covarywithpersisting environmental entities. Reciprocally, bydevelop-
ingsensitivity topatterns ofsimulation thatvarysystematically withself-movement
(as opticflowvarieswithlocomotorproprioception), theperceptual system's activ-
ity comes to covary with the agent-environment relation, and these patterns
becomecontrolinformation forself-movement. Third,bydeveloping sensitivity to
thosepatterns ofstimulation thatenablesuccessful action(as movingblackspecks
specify ediblethings), itsactivity comesto covarywiththeaffordances oftheenvi-
ronment, and thesepatterns becomecontrolinformation foractionsthatrealize
affordances.4 Finally,giventhataffordances are constituted by combinations of
properties, theperceptual discrimination ofproperties co-evolves withdifferenti-
atedactions;and a perceptual system thatis sensitive to properties becomesgener-
ative,enablinga richerawarenessof the environment at large.An attuned
perceptual system thus,in somesense,comesto embodymappingsfrominforma-
344
tiontoenvironmental situations andtheir behavioral meanings, thanks tothefactthat
theserelations aresemantically closedovertheperceiving-acting agent-environment
system (Shaw2003).
Note,however, thatbiologicalproperfunctions do notalwaysguarantee suc-
cessfuloutcomes.In thepresentcase,theactivation ofan attunedperceptual sys-
temdoesnotensureveridical perceptual experience. Information-based perceptual
systems arereliable, butnotinfallible. A frogmayexperience theoccasionalblow-
ingbitofbarkas an ediblebug,andendup witha mouthful ofwood.Fora terres-
trialobserverin a gravitational field,objectsgenerally reston theground(witha
fewrecognizable exceptions suchas birds),and hencethedeclination angleofan
objecťsbase fromthehorizonspecifies itsdistancealongthegroundplane(Ooi,
Wu,and He 2001).A perceptual systemthatrelieson declinationanglecan yield
anomalousresultsin instanceswhenthegravitational constraint is violated.For
instance, a floating or invisibly suspendedobjectlookstobe resting on theground
planeatthepointwhereitsbaseoccludesthegroundtexture, yielding concomitant
shiftsinjudgeddistanceand size(Gibson1950).
Yetsuchanomaliesarealso a spectacular vindication thattheperceptual sys-
temis doingthejob itevolvedtodo: extract informational variablesthat,withinits
ecologicalcontext ofconstraint, normally specify environmental features andprop-
erties.5To regardthesecasesas "perceptual errors" or"misperceptions" is a markof
logicalratherthanecologicalanalysis(Ben-Ze'ev1984).Suchanomaliesaresuffi-
ciently rareunderecologicalconditions thattheydo notundermine theday-to-day
reliabilityofperception, buttheydo raisethequestionofwhatisbeingexperienced
in suchinstances.
To setup an answertothatquestion, letmedistinguish twolevelsoftheanaly-
sis of perception. Gibson'sfocuswas on thefunctional relationsamongbehav-
iorallyrelevantenvironmental features, specificinformation, and a perceiving
agent. I will refer to this as the functional level of epistemic contact, on whichthe
agent is informed about its environment (McDowell [1994] calls it the "semantic"
level).Thescientific questions at thislevel arewhat environmental features areper-
ceived,whatinformation is availableunderecologicalconditions, andwhichinfor-
mationalvariablesareactuallyusedbyperceivers.
Exactlyhowtheneuralmachinery of a perceptual system detectsvariablesof
stimulation is an important butdistinct scientific question. Itsitsatthelevelofcausal
for
support perception (McDowell[1994] callsit the"syntactic" level).Atthislevel,
activeperceptual systems extract higher-order spatiotemporal variablesfromthe
flowing energy arrays at their receptors. They become attuned to suchregularities
overphylogenetic and ontogenetic time,yielding integrated neural networks with
and
ascending descending pathways that are selective forhigher-order variables of
stimulation. A casein pointis theextendedfamily ofnetworks ofmotion-sensitive
cellsin visualcortexthatareselective forcomplexopticflowpatterns, and whose
activity to
appears covary with self-motion, object motion, and surface shape.
345
Thus,at thecausallevelthefrog's eyeandbrainaredetecting themotionpat-
ternsofblackspecks,whileat thefunctional levelthefrog(under normal ecologi-
calconditions) is in contactwithediblebugsandcanbehaveaccordingly. Following
McDowell(1994), therelationbetweenthesetwolevelsis a causalenabling,not
constitutive,one: theneuralmachinery enablesthefrogto perceiveitsenviron-
ment,butitis notconstitutive oftheepistemic contactrelation.The frog'smotion-
sensitivecellscrankthrough theirphysio-chemical roundsbutthemselves "know"
nothing abouttheexternal world,orevenabouttheproximal causeoftheiractivity.
Thus,to saythattheneuralmachinery is framing hypotheses ordrawing inferences
abouttheworld,or makingassumptions aboutthelawsofoptics,is something ofa
category mistake. Imputing suchintentional properties to thecausal is
level purely
metaphoricaland can be misleadingin regardto actual neural processes.
Informational regularities,frommovingblackspecksto salinity, aresimplyfactsof
naturetowhichperceptual systems haveadapted.Atthecausallevel,attunedneu-
ralsystems aresimplyresonating to patternsofstimulation. Atthefunctional level,
theagentis in contactwithand experiences itsenvironment.
Marr(1982) famouslyaccusedGibsonof "seriouslyunderestimating] the
complexity of the information-processing problems involved in vision"(29). He
wassurelyrightaboutthisatthecausallevelofneuralmechanisms thatdetectpat-
ternsofstimulation, whichwas of subsidiary interestto Gibsonand aboutwhich
littlewas actuallyknownat thetimeofhiswriting on thesubject(Gibson1966).
ButMarrconfusedthelevelofcausalsupportwithGibson'sfunctional-level claim
thatinformation doesnothavetobe decoded,processed, The speci-
or interpreted.
ficityofinformation allowstheperceiver to be in directcontactwithitsenviron-
ment,withoutinferential or interpretiveprocesses.
REPRESENTATION REDUX
How does Gibson'sapproachto perception comparewiththerepresentationalist

one?On thestandardrepresentationalist view,perceptionis conceivedas a process
ofgetting or
an image,description, symbol - some representation- oftheenviron-
mentalobjectintothehead or mind of the The
perceiver. representation standsfor
something the of
in theworldand constitutes object awareness; theobserver does
notimmediately the but
or experience environment, only
perceive hermental rep-
resentationthereof.
However,getting a representation oftheworldintothehead does notreally
solve the problem.First, it sets up logical regressanalogous to the classic
a
homunculus of
problem picture-in-the-head iftheobjectofawareness
theories: is
an internal or who the or
image representation, perceives image interprets rep- the
resentation?Second,thisreturns us to Hume'sproblem,forinterpreting a repre-
sentationpresumespriorknowledge of theenvironmental entitiesforwhich the
346
representationsstand,and howtheycorrespond. Third,itcommitstherepresenta-
fallacyof confusing
tionalist theobjectof awarenesswiththevehicleofawareness
(Huemer2001). One mayperceivetheenvironment (theobjectof awareness)by
meansofan internal state(thevehicleofawareness), butto saythatone perceives
thevehicleof awarenessitselfis a category mistakethatleadsto theregress. The
endsup claiming
representationalist thatweonlyperceive ourinternal which
states,
involvescreatingan internalrepresentation of an internalrepresentation (etc.),
thereby ringingdowntheveilofperception.
perception
Alternatively, maybe conceptualized betweentheper-
as a relation
ceiverand theenvironment, in whichtheperceiver is awareofor in contactwith
ordinary environmental objects.Gibson'sviewofdirectperception is ofthisstripe.
Butthequestionpersists: whatgoeson in theperceiver whenshebecomesawareof
an environmental object,ifnotgetting a descriptionofitintoherhead?ForGibson,
theobserver'sperceptual system,which is attunedto specificinformation, resonates
to thatinformation. Therearethuscoordinatedchangesof statein theenviron-
mentand theperceiver. The perceptual system's activity covarieswithdistalenvi-
ronmental featuresand properties, enablingactionsto be orientedto them.The
objectofawareness is theenvironmental object,andthevehicleofawareness is the
resonatingperceptual system.
- callitrepresentation -
Recently, a revisionist notionof representation ļ has
beendeveloped, partly inspired byGibsoniantheory(Dretske1981,1986;Millikan
1984,2004).A representation 1 an internal
is statethatcovarieswithsomedistalfea-
tureoftheenvironment andthustracks it.6Moreover, ithasthefunction ofindicat-
the
ing presence of that feature to another part of the (a
system "representation
consumer").Thatis,a representation 1is selectedforbecauseitenablesthecon-
sumerto successfully orientitsbehaviorto theindicatedfeature; thesystem thus
incorporatesa "semantic mapping function" that the
maps representation t onto the
A representation
feature. ļ can consequently carry information about a distal envi-
ronmentalfeaturewithoutrepresenting the intervening chainof naturalsigns
(reflected
light,proximal stimulation, neural activity,etc.).It canalso"misrepresent"
thepresence ofa feature in caseswhen,forexample, proximal stimulation occursin
theabsenceofthefeature. Millikan(2004) callsthemintentional representations .
Thisnotionofrepresentation ļ should sound familiar, for it is closely related to
Gibson'snotionofan attunedperceptual Both
system. covary with an environmen-
talfeatureand enablebehaviororientedto thatfeature. Representations { arenot
presumed to constitute objects of awareness, unlike mental images (call them rep-
resentation^, andarenotvehiclesofinference or computation (Millikan2004,84),
unlikesymbolic representations in a languageofthought (representation). Indeed,
Millikan(2004,159-60)herself claimsthatthechangesin innerstatesthatresult
fromtheGibsoniandetectionofinformation and guidebehaviorsatisfy herdefi-
nitionofintentional representations.
However, thedefinition ofrepresentations xis sufficiently weakthattheyturn
outtobe rather promiscuous. They can be plausibly attributed to almostanysystem
347
withmovingparts,includingsimplephysicalmechanisms. As Chemero(2000)
argues,an adequatedescription
ofsucha system in representational termsrequires
a priorunderstanding ofhowthesystem works(e.g.,in dynamical terms)inorder
to appropriately
ascriberepresentations
to itsparts.Once one has suchan under-
standing,therepresentational
redescriptionseemssuperfluous: a representational
storycanbe told,and maybe descriptivelyconvenient,butitdoesnotadd valueto
thepriorexplanation.In thepresent
case,itmaybepossibleto redescribe thedetec-
tionofinformation byan attunedperceptual systemin representational but
ļ terms,
thisdoes no furtherworkforus in explainingperceptionthanthemorespecific
Gibsonianconceptsthathavealreadybeenintroduced. It alsorisksconfusionwith
moreintractableversionsofrepresentationalism.Thus,I proposeto stickwiththe
presentconcepts.
TO SEE OR NOT TO SEE: THE ARGUMENTS

FROM ILLUSION AND HALLUCINATION
How,then,mightdirectperception be sustainedinthefaceoftheindirect critique?

Havingdeveloped a Gibsonian account ofdirectperception, in theremainder of
the paper I use it to resistthe standardlines of attack,beginningwith the
Arguments fromIllusionand Hallucination.In illusionsand hallucinations the
worldis notas itappearsto be,and hencetheyseemto providecounterexamples
todirectperception. Although theyaredistinct phenomena, theformsoftheargu-
mentsaresimilar, so following Smith(2002),letus review.
1.Indistinguishability : The first stageintheargument is theclaimthatitis pos-
siblein principleto haveinstancesof illusion/hallucination thatare subjectively
indistinguishable from instances ofveridical perception.7 In an illusion,an object
appears to have a property or feature that the physicalobject itself does notactu-
allypossess. In a hallucination, an entire objectappears to be presentthatis not
actuallypresent.
2. Thesense-datum inference : The secondstageistheinference that,whenexpe-
riencing an illusion or hallucination, there is something of which one is aware,even
though it is not physical. In the case of illusion,when a physicalobjectappearsto
havea property thatitdoes notactuallypossessone mustbe awareofsomeobject
thatpossessesthatproperty. Byvirtueof Leibniz'sLaw of theindiscernibility of
the
identicals, object ofawareness cannot be the normal physical object, so we must
be awareofsomenonnormal object.The caseofhallucination is morestraightfor-
ward:sinceno normalphysical objectthatcorresponds to one'sexperience is actu-
the
ally present, object of awareness must be some nonnormal object.This
nonnormal object ofawareness is variously as a
interpreted sense-datum, sensation,
appearance, mentalimage,or internal representation.
3. Thegeneralization step: Thethirdstagein theargument generalizes thenon-
normalobjectof awarenessfromnonveridical cases to veridicalones. If one is
348
immediately awareofsense-data in casesofillusion/hallucination, and ifone'ssub-
jectiveexperience in suchcasesis indiscernible fromthatin casesofgenuineper-
ception,thentheobjectsof immediateawarenessin genuineperception mustbe
sense-data as well.Thisfollowsfromtheconverse principle oftheidentity ofindis-
cernibles, totheeffect thatifone cannotdistinguish an illusory/hallucinatory expe-
rienceand a genuineperceptual experience "frominside," theobjectsofawareness
mustbe identical. McDowell( 1982)callsthisthehighest common factor conception,
inwhichthecommonelementinperception andillusion/hallucination - theexpe-
rienceorappearance - is takentobe theobjectofawareness inbothcases.Thecon-
clusionis thatin perceptionone is directly awareonlyof sense-data,and hence
indirectly awareofordinary physical objects.
Thereis a bestiary ofperceptual illusionsthatseemto fitthisgeneralpicture.
Forexample, ingeometrical illusionssuchas theMuller-Lyer (doublearrow)or the
Ponzo (converging lines) illusions,two line segmentsappearto havedifferent
lengths whentheyareactually ofequalphysical lengthon thepage.In Kanizassub-
jectivetriangle, interpolated contoursareseenwherethereis no localstimulation
at all.A floating objectthatlookstobe resting on thegroundappearsfarther away
andlargerin sizethanitactuallyis.In casesofoutright hallucination,thepinkele-
phantthatappearsbeforeme is notpresentat all,andyetI havea verycompelling
experienceof one. Whatam I seeingin suchcasesifnotan illusory, nonnormal
objectofawareness withsuchproperties?
Buttheargument is potentially vulnerableto attackat eachstage.First,with
regardto indistinguishability, itis oftenthecasethatillusionscanbe dispelledbya
littleperceptual exploration. Underordinary mobileviewingconditions, thefloat-
ingobjectis revealedtobe suspendedin theair,as specified bydifferential motion
betweenitsbaseandthegroundtexture. Perception is notconstituted by instan-
an
taneousperceptbut an encounterwiththeworldthatis extendedin timeand
space,involving perceptual exploration and theconsequences ofaction.However,
granting thisdoes littleto infirm theargument, foritturnson themerepossibility
ofan indistinguishable illusion:as longas illusion/hallucination is possiblein prin-
ciple,thenwhatever highest common factoritmay share withveridical perception
can be construedas theobjectofawareness. It is certainly possible to concoct in-
principleexamples,such as a perfectvirtualenvironment thatcan be actively
exploredbya movingobserver, or an interactive hallucinated worldinducedby
meansofdirectneuralstimulation, à la TheMatrix.
The secondand thirdstagesaremorevulnerable. The sense-datum inference
holds that theremustbe some nonnormalobject of awarenessin cases of
illusion/hallucination. Butwhenone is experiencing a hallucination, thereis no
compelling reasonto maketheinference thatone is seeingorawareofanyobjectat
all,normalor nonnormal.One is merelyhavingan experience, whichdoes not
implythereification ofanyobjectof awareness. We maybe seducedintomaking
theinference byourordinary wayofspeaking, inwhich"seeing"and"beingaware
of" implysuccessful contactwithobjects.Butdespitemyhabitof saying"I see a
pinkelephant" whenhallucinating, I am notsuccessfully seeinga pinkelephant, I
349
onlyseemtobe seeingone.The subjective experience doesnotpermittheconclu-
sionthatI standin an awarenessrelationto a realor nonnormalpinkelephant.I
am merely havingan experience ofa pinkelephant, withno objectofawareness at
all. To anticipate,ifwe can developa clearerunderstanding of what"havingan
experience"means,we mayfindthatwe can accountforillusory/hallucinatory
experiences withoutintroducing a newontologicalclassofnonnormalobjectsof
awareness. Wecan thusresistthesense-datum inference.
The generalizing stepholdsthattheindistinguishability ofveridicaland non-
veridical experiences is reasonenoughto concludethattheybothhavenonnormal
objectsofawareness.Butthisdoes notfollownecessarily, foritremainslogically
possiblethatin instances ofgenuineperception theobjectofawareness is an ordi-
narymind-independent object,whereasin instancesofillusion/hallucination itis
something else(or nothingat all).8Thislineofargument has a disjunctivist flavor
(Hinton1967;Martin2002;McDowell1982;Snowdon1980-81)- an experience
is eithera veridicalperception oran illusion/hallucination - exceptthatitdoesnot
denysubjective experience as a commonelement.Perceptual and illusory/halluci-
natoryexperiences maybe thesameinternally, and yetbe externally distinguished
bywhether or notone is awareofan ordinary environmental object.
Thetroublehereis thatthegeneralization stepseemsthemorereasonableand
parsimonious one to take:evenifitis notlogically necessary thattherebe onlyone
objectofawareness, whyshouldwe believetherearetwo?To anticipate, ifwe can
makeitreasonablethatveridicaland hallucinatory casesproducethesamesubjec-
tiveexperience, one witha normalobjectofawarenessand theotherwithoutone
at all,thenwe can also resistthegeneralizing step.
Letmebeginbyassembling a positiveaccountof illusion/hallucination. The
argument's driving assumption thatperceptual awareness shouldbe assimilated to
illusion/hallucination hasitprecisely backward: rather,thephenomenaofillusion/
hallucination are predatory upon directperception.Theyare byproducts of an
attunedperceptual system that is to of its
adapted regularities ecological niche and
provides the causal support for direct perception. Why is it thatwe have illusions
ofsurface edgesandobjectsizeandhallucinate boundedthree-dimensional objects
likedaggersand pinkelephantswithsurfaceproperties - at all?Becausetheseare
manifestations oftheproperfunction ofa perceptual system thatis tunedto infor-
mationforenvironmental surfaces, and
edges, objects.
The keyto undoingtheargument is thefollowing claim:phenomenal experi-
ence(an internal matter) supervenes the
upon activity ofan attunedperceptual sys-
tem,whereas perceptual awareness orcontact(an external matter) supervenes jointly
upontheperceptual system and theenvironment. RecallthatGibson'saccountof
directperceptiondrivesa wedgebetweenawarenessas consciousphenomenal
experience andawareness as epistemic contact(see thefirst quoteabove).In every-
dayperceptual encounters withtheenvironment, subjective experience is normally
congruent withthesituationtheperceiver is in contactwith.Thisis becauseper-
ceptualsystems aretunedbyevolution andlearning tovariables ofstimulation that
350
specifytheenvironment, suchthatwhentheinformation is detectedthespecified
situationis experienced and behavioris adaptive.This is theproperfunction of
perceptual systems.Consequently,theactivityof an attunedperceptual systemis
to giveriseto phenomenal
sufficient experiences.Thiswas,roughly, Shakespeare's
owntheory ofhallucinations:
Orartthoubut
A dagger
ofthemind,a falsecreation
from
Proceeding theheat-oppressedbrain?
Act2,Scene1,49)
(Macbeth,
Butneuralactivity intheheat-oppressed brainat thecausallevelis notbyitself suf-
ficientforepistemic contactatthefunctional level,becausethelatteris constituted
bya relationbetweentheperceiver and itsenvironment.
Although therearevariousclassesofillusions, eachwithitsownetiology, most
tradeon theinformation to whichperceptualsystemsare (or are not) attuned
withintheirecologicalcontextof constraint. Some illusionsderivefrominsuffi-
cientinformation, suchthattheavailablestimulation is eitheroutsidetherangeof
thesensorsor is insufficiently structured fortheperceptualsystemto determine
theproperty in question.Forexample,indimlightstrawberries andbananaslook
gray because the retinalcones are insufficiently stimulated, whereas undernarrow-
bandsodiumvaporlighttheylookgraybecausethestimulation does notcontain
rangeofwavelengths
a sufficient todetermine theirspectralreflectance. Theseillu-
soryexperiences thusstem from insufficientactivation of the relevant perceptual
system.
Otherillusionsderivefromstimulation thatmimicstheinformation thatis
normally present under ecological conditions closelyenough to activate an attuned
perceptual system. Someopticaldisplays closelyreplicate theinformation thatordi-
narilyspecifies an environmental situation,for a
example, trompe Voeil painting,
theopticalshimmer of a mirage,or thepatchof sunlight on mykitchencounter
thatlookslikespilledsugar.A persuasivecase can be madethatmanygeometric
illusions,suchas theMuller- Lyerand Ponzo figures, present2D opticalpatterns
containing of
fragments perspective information that are sufficient toengagevisual
constancy mechanisms which evolved to determine 3D size and shape (Gillam
1980).Subjective trianglesmay derive from contour integration mechanisms that
evolvedto detectcontinuousobjectedgesin complexnoisyscenes(Geisleret al.
2001).In thesecases,thepresented pattern ofstimulation activates an attunedper-
ceptualsystem, an
yielding illusory experience of theenvironmental situationsuch
stimulation ordinarily specifies.
Oftenillusory effectsarea consequenceoftakingtheperceiver outsideitsnor-
mal ecologicalcontextof constraint. Whenthe frogsnaps hungrily at moving
inkspots in the laboratory or the moth fliestoward a streetlamp, are
they guidedby
nonecological stimulation thatmimicstheinformation specific to theaffordances
ofbugedibility or moon-oriented navigation within their respective niches.The
351
frogand themothexperiencetheaffordances (to theextentthattheyhavecon-
sciousexperiences)becausesubjectiveexperiencesuperveneson theactivity of
theirperceptual systems, and theirbehavioris adaptedto theaffordances in accor-
dancewiththeproperfunctions of theirperceptualsystems. Buttheyarenotin
perceptual contactwiththeaffordances, norbugsor moon,forthesethingsarenot
actuallypresent.Rather,thefrogand themothare in contactwiththeordinary
entitiesthatarepresent - theinkspotsand thelamp- eventhoughtheyareexpe-
riencedas havingillusory properties theydo notactuallypossess.
To summarize, in casesofillusion,thedetection ofstimulation patterns byan
attunedperceptual system at thecausallevelyieldsphenomenalexperience ofthe
environmental properties theyordinarily specify, butwithoutperceptualcontact
withthoseproperties at thefunctional level.Similarly, in casesofoutright halluci-
nation,activity in an attunedperceptualsystem(howeverit is produced)yields
phenomenal experience ofenvironmental objectsandproperties forwhichthesys-
temis tuned,butwithoutperceptual contactwithanything at all.
Wenowhavethetoolswe needto deflatetheargument fromillusion/halluci-
nation.The sense-datum inference appealsto theintuition thatwhenone is expe-
riencingan illusionor hallucination, theremustbe some nonnormalobjectof
awareness. Butwenowhavean understanding of"havingan experience" thatallows
us to accountforillusions/hallucinations withoutreifying objectsofawareness. At
thecausallevel,thedetection ofstimulation patterns yieldsactivation ofan attuned
perceptual system, uponwhichsupervenes a phenomenalexperience ofthespeci-
fiedsituation.In principle, anyconditionthatservesto generatethesame(type-
identical)activityin the perceptualsystemwill resultin an indistinguishable
subjectiveexperience, whethertheconditionis a virtualrealitydisplay, electrical
stimulation of thecortex,or an old-fashioned hallucination. "Havingan experi-
ence"is attributedto activity intheattunedperceptual system uponwhichitsuper-
venes.Thereis no needto introduce nonnormal objectsofawareness, becausethere
is no corresponding thingtheobserveris awareofor in contactwith,justa phe-
nomenalexperiencethatsuperveneson perceptualsystemactivity. We can thus
resistthesense-datum inference.
Thegeneralization steprelieson theapparent reasonableness oftheconclusion
thatifveridicaland nonveridical experiences areinternally indistinguishable, then
they must share the same (nonnormal) object of awareness. But we now have a
compelling account of how it is thatthe same subjective experience can occur in
perceptual caseswhentheobjectofawareness is an ordinary environmental object,
andincorresponding hallucinatory caseswhen there is no object of awareness atall.
In casesofdirectperception, theinformation in an ordinary environmental situa-
tionactivatesan attunedperceptual system, yielding a phenomenal experience and
perceptual contact with the specified situation. In corresponding cases of
someotherconditioncreatesthesameactivity
illusion/hallucination, inthepercep-
tualsystem, whichmustyieldthesamephenomenalexperience, butwithoutthe
corresponding perceptual contact.9
352
Thus,despiteindistinguishable phenomenal experiences,in theperceptualcase
theobjectofawareness is an ordinary environmental whereas
object, in theillusory/
hallucinatorycasethereis no property/object ofawareness.Thisis no longera mere
buta scientifically
logicalpossibility, groundedone thatfollowsfroma theoryof
perceptual systems. the
Moreover, generalization stepcommitstherepresentation-
alistfallacy
byproposing thatmind-dependent entities
aretheobjectsofawareness.
In thefaceofthis,itis theintroduction ofnonnormal objectsthatseemsunreason-
able,and ontologicalparsimony is actuallyupheldifwe refuseto introduce them.
We can thusresistthegeneralization step.In sum,directperception as epistemic
contactis notthreatened bytheargument fromillusion/hallucination.
THE VIEW FROM HERE: THE ARGUMENT FROM APPEARANCES
A relatedargumentagainstdirectperceptionclaimsthattheperceiver onlyhas
immediateaccessto theappearanceof an environmental object, not the object
itself.Humeputitthisway:
. . .nothing
caneverbepresent tothemindbutanimageorperception,
andthesenses areonlytheinlets,
through which theseimages arecon-
veyed,without beingable to produceanyimmediate intercourse
between themindandtheobject.Thetable,whichwesee,seemsto
diminish, asweremove farther
from it:Buttherealtable,whichexists
independent ofus,suffers
noalteration: Itwas,therefore,nothing but
itsimagewhich waspresenttothemind.(Hume,1748/1993, XII.I,p.
104)
It is thevariableappearanceor imagethatis immediately perceived, notthecon-
stantrealobject,and hencetherecan be no immediateintercourse betweenthe
mindand theworld.Perception oftheenvironment is necessarily
indirect, medi-
atedbyappearances.
The argument fromappearances is essentiallya restatement oftheproblemof
perceptual constancy. Hume was referring to sizeconstancy: as one'sviewingdis-
tancefromthetablechanges,itsapparent(projected)sizevaries,yetwe perceivea
constant(full-size)table.WilliamJames(1890) pointedout shapeconstancy: as
one'sviewofthetable-topchanges,itsapparent(projected)shapehas an infinity
oftrapezoidal forms withvarying obtuseandacuteangles,yetweperceive thetable
as havinga constant(square)shape.Thisraisesa further paradox: How can itbe
thatweseeone andthesametabletobe bothsmallandlarge,bothtrapezoidal and
square?
The indirectsolutionis plain:one is immediately awareof onlythevarying
appearanceof thetable,fromwhichtherealconstanttablemustbe inferred. A
standardindirectaccountis that,withexperience, we learnto associatethereal
shapeof thetablewiththevariousprojectedformsofwhichwe areimmediately
aware.Perception is thusa two-stepprocess,in whichwe firstsee theapparent
353
shape (theprojectedform)and theninfertherealshapebased on priorknowl-
edge.10Buthowdo we acquiretheseassociations, withouthavingperceptual access
to therealshape?Noë (thisissue)offers I
what take to be a variantof thissolution
whenhe alsoarguesthatperception is a "two-step process"inwhichwe perceive an
object"bywayof"seeingitsappearance, "mediated by"prior sensorimotor knowl-
edgeofthewaytheobject'sappearancewouldchangewithbodilymovement. To
theextentthatonlyappearancesare immediately accessible and percepts of the
environment arearrivedaton thebasisofmediating knowledge, thisis redolentof
theindirect view.
Theparadoxstemsfroma failure torecognize thatone is seeingdifferent prop-
ertiesofthesametable,itsintrinsic and perspectivai properties. The diameterof
thetabletopis an intrinsic property, measuredon thephysicaltable,thatis inde-
pendentofviewingdistance;whereasitsprojectedsizeis a perspectivai property,
measuredas a visualanglefroman observation point,thatdependson viewingdis-
tance.Its geometricshape is an intrinsicpropertymeasuredon the tabletop,
whereasitsprojectedform,aspect,or silhouette is a perspectivai,view-dependent
propertymeasuredas a visualsolid angle (the sheafof visualdirectionsto its
boundingcontour).Thereis no contradiction betweenseeingthetabletopssurface
shapetobe squareand itssilhouette tobe trapezoidal, fortheyaresimplyintrinsic
and perspectivai properties,respectively, ofone table.
Thisdistinction is closelyrelatedto whatGibson(1950,ch.3) initially called
thevisualworld , thethree-dimensional layoutofenvironmental surfaces,and the
visualfieldya two-dimensional arrayofprojectedforms(nestedvisualsolidangles)
thatcorresponds to theviewfromhere.He arguedthatone canattendtoeitherthe
visualworldor thevisualfield,butthattheyinvolvedifferent "kindsof seeing" -
theformer morenatural, thelattermoreanalytic. ClaudeMonettriedto teachhis
acolyteshow to adopt an analyticattitude bysaying,
Trytoforget whatobjects youhavebefore you Merely think,hereis
squareofblue,hereanoblongofpink,herea streak
a little ofyellow,
andpaintitjustas itlookstoyou.
Wenormally attendto environmental objectsandsurfaces, andtheirperceived
size,shape,and surfacecolor remain roughly constantover changesin viewpoint
and illumination.We can alternatelyattendto thevisualfield- muchas theprac-
ticedpainterdoeswhensighting a scene- yieldingan experience ("a littleoblong
ofbrown")thatvarieswithviewpoint Weseemto experience
and illumination. the
visualdirectionofan objectas "thedirection fromhere,"itsprojected sizeorvisual
angleas "theportionofthevisualfieldittakesup,"anditsprojected shapeorvisual
solidangleas "theformofthesilhouette Thisphenomenology
in thevisualfield."
suggeststhatbothconstant objectsand theirvariableappearancesareaccessibleto
attentiveawareness, yetourprimary
and modeofattention is to theenvironmen-
talobjectstowardwhichourbehavioris directed.
Thisdual accessdoes notimplythatenvironmental objectsareperceivedby
wayof their in a
appearances, two-step inferential
process.Rather, theconstant sizes
354
andshapesofobjectsaredirectly specified bytheinvariant structure instimulation.
Gibson(1979) arguedthatinvariant patterns in the(typically) flowing opticarray
specify thepersisting properties of theenvironment, thereby accountingforthe
perceptualconstancies. Forexample,one of hismostimportant insights was the
roleofthetextured groundsurfaceand otherbackground surfaces in providing a
stablescalerelativetowhichobjectsareperceived. The constant locationofa table
is specifiedbyitsopticalcontactwiththegroundsurface(Bian,Braunstein, and
Andersen2005). Itsconstantsize is specifiedbytheinvariant ratioof thetable's
visualangleto thatofthegroundtexture. In a compelling demonstration ofthis
observers
effect, do notnoticethata virtualroomdoublesin sizeas theystepfrom
one sideofitto theother:despiteaccuratedisparity and motioninformation, size
judgments aredominated bytherelative sizeofa testobjectwithrespect to thetex-
turedbackground(Glennerster et al. 2006). Similarly, theconstantshapeof the
tableis specifiedbytheinvariant ratioofthevisualsolidanglesofthetabletopand
thegroundtexture: as theviewpointchanges,bothsolidanglesdeformtogether,
leavingtheirhigher-order relationsinvariant. Formorecomplex3D surfaces, the
invariants thatspecify shapeare second-order spatialderivatives of thetexture,
shading, disparity,and motionfields, as notedabove.
Thus,constantsize and shape are directly specifiedbywhatGibsoncalled
"formless invariants,"
higher-order relations thatremaininvariant overchangesin
viewpoint, notbymomentary formsor appearances.Of course,theopticarrayis
describedin termsofvisualdirections andvisualangles,butitis theabstract rela-
tionsdefinedoverthemthatconstitute theinvariant information. The visualsys-
temhas evolvedextendednetworks to extractthesehigher-order relationsat the
causallevel,whichmayincorporate neuralcircuitsthatregister visualdirections,
visualangles,andtheirchanges. Andtotheextent thatprojected sizesandforms are
present inthevisualfield,theymay be accessible to attentiveawareness. But percep-
tionofenvironmental objectsatthefunctional levelisbasedon thedetection ofthe
formless invariants,noton awareness ofmomentary formsandinference toobject
properties.
Conversely,perspective structure providesa basisfortheperspectivai aspectof
perception, in thesense that itcorresponds to the view from here. The perspective
structure oftheopticarrayat a stationary viewpointconsistsofvisualdirections,
visualangles,visualsolidangles,and theirinclusionrelations. Itprovidesinforma-
tionaboutthepositionsandorientations ofenvironmental surfaces relative to the
observer, and locatestheperceiver relativeto theenvironment. Forexample,the
distanceofthetablealongthegroundplaneis specified bythevisualanglebetween
itsbaseandthehorizon(thedeclination angle), and the slantofthetabletopto the
lineof sightis specifiedbythetexture gradient within itscontour.Perception of
suchegocentric relationsat thefunctional levelis basedon theregistration ofthe
informational variablesbyan attunedvisualsystemat thecausallevel,notinfer-
encefroman awareness ofprojected forms. Yetgiventhatprojected sizesandforms
arepresentin thevisualfield,and areaccessibleto attentive awareness, thenone is
ableto attendto an object'sappearance.
355
The essentialpointis thatalthoughone can attendto environmental objects
or to theirappearancefromhere,itdoes notfollowthattheformer areperceived
bywayofthelatter. Constantsizeand shapecanbe perceived directly
bydetecting
formless higher-orderinvariants,independently of awarenessof theirprojected
sizesand forms.
SEEING OR NOTHINGNESS: THE ARGUMENT

FROM UNDERSPECIFICATION
The Argument fromUnderspecification assertsthatenvironmental features are

inherently underspecifted or underdetermined by proximal stimulation. This is
oftenpresented as a self-evident truth, based on the observation that theenviron-
mentis three-dimensional and theretinalimagemerelytwo-dimensional. As the
well-known Amesdemonstrations (Ittelson1968)forcefully showed, anystatic
for
a an
imageof,say, table, equivalence class of exploded-view 3D configurations,
stretchedalongthe line ofsight,can be constructed thatall projectthesameimage.
Eveniftheobserver is allowedto move,an equivalenceclassofdeforming config-
urationscouldbe concoctedthatallprojectthesamedynamicimageofa table;this
was actuallydonebythespecialeffects teamforTheFellowship oftheRing.Ifwe
takethisassertionat facevalue,directly perceiving theenvironmental situation
fromtheproximalstimulation is indeedhopeless,an "ill-posedproblem," fora
givenimage could in principle correspond to an infinite
number of3D worlds.
The nextstepin theargumentis theclaimthattheperceivermustconse-
quentlygo"beyondtheinformation given"andinferthestateoftheworldfroman
ambiguousimage.The onlywayto do thisis to introduceauxiliaryassumptions
constrain
thatsufficiently the"inverseopticsproblem"so thata unique3D inter-
pretationofthe2D imageis possible.DavidMarr(1982)summarized thisapproach
as follows:
Ineachcasethesurfacestructure
isstrictly from
underdetermined the
inimages
information alone,andthesecret theprocesses
offormulating
liesindiscovering
accurately precisely can
information
whatadditional
beassumed
safely abouttheworldthatprovides
powerfulenoughcon-
fortheprocess
straints torun.(265-66)
Forinstance, Marr'sstudentUllman(1978) provedthatifone assumesthatobjects
arerigid,thentheimagesequenceproducedbya rotating nonplanarobjecthas a
unique Euclidean shapeinterpretation.
As Helmholtzoriginallyobserved,the assumptionsnecessaryto solvethe
inverseproblemrepresent priorknowledge on thepartoftheperceiverabouttwo
things:(1) thestructureoftheworld,and (2) how theworldstructures
patterns of
stimulation.The firstincludesknowledgeaboutthesituations,objects,and prop-
ertiesthatexistin theenvironment,
including worldly
predicatesinwhichto frame
hypotheses andconclusions;therigidity
assumption andtheuseofEuclideanpred-
356
icatesto describeshapeareexamples.The secondincludesknowledge aboutregu-
suchas thelawsofgeometrical
larities optics,whicharenecessary todetermine the
inverserelationsthattaketheperceiver fromtheimagebackto theworld,as in
Ullman'sstructure- from-motion algorithm. Thesetwoformsofpriorknowledge
arelikewise explicitin theBayesianapproachtovision,whichframes perception as
a problemofstatistical inference thatincorporates assumptions aboutthestructure
ofenvironmental scenesand principles ofimageformation (Knilletal. 1996,15).
The argument fromunderspecification suffers twokeydeficiencies. First,the
claimofinherent underspecification dependsupontreating perception as a logical
ratherthanan ecologicalmatter. Although itis indeedlogically thecasethatthe2D
imageis ambiguousregarding thedistance,size,and shapeofan objectin empty
3D space,underecologicalconditions withtextured surfaces,a groundplane,and
freeobservermovement, manybehaviorally relevantproperties arespecified(as
sketched above).Although thesameimagecanlogically be producedbyan infinite
numberofexploded-view Amesconfigurations, theenvironment doesnotconspire
togenerate suchconfigurations (thegeneric viewpoint principle),andtheodd acci-
dentalviewis dispelled byordinary headmovements. Gibson's(1950;1979)funda-
mentalinsight wasthatwhentheproblem ofperception isecologized inthismanner,
manyenvironmental properties turnoutto be specified byhigher-order informa-
tion,and manylongstanding puzzlescan be reframed or resolved. Thisis a factual
matter thatmustbe workedout through thestudyofecologicaloptics.
Thedeepertrouble withtheinferential solutionto underspecification is itscir-
- itrunssmackintoHume'sproblem,
cularity whichwasafteralla caseforskepti-
cism,notindirect realism.In orderto perceivetheworld,priorknowledge about
theworldandhowitstructures stimulation is assumed.Butwheredoesthisknowl-
edgecomefrom, ifnotbywayofthesenses?As Gibson(1979) observed,
Theerror lies,itseemstome,inassuming thateitherinnateideasor
acquiredideasmustbeapplied tobaresensory inputsforperceivingto
Thefallacy
occur. istoassume thatbecause inputsconvey noknowledge
theycansomehow bemadetoyield knowledge by"processing"them
Knowledge oftheworldcannot beexplained bysupposing thatknowl-
edgeoftheworldalready exists.
(253)
Bothnativismand empiricism ultimatelyrequiresomeformofdirectperception
as an enablingcondition,or else nothingcould be perceived(Turveyand Shaw
1979).Theindirect viewowesus a seriousaccountofhowan initially blindsystem
couldworkout,through evolutionor learning,
knowledge of inaccessiblefeatures
oftheworldandtheirrelations to patterns
ofstimulation,
withoutassumingsome
degreeofspecificity.
Thedirectviewoffers a reasonably accountofperceptual
straightforward evo-
lution,basedon specificity.Perceptualsystemsbecome attuned to informational
in thesamemannerthatothersystems
regularities adapttoothersortsofenviron-
mentalregularities (suchas a foodsource):possessingtherelevant bitofphysio-
logicalplumbing(whetheran enzymeor a neuralcircuit)to exploita regularity
confersa selective
advantage upontheorganism. Sincethewaterbeetlelarva'sprey
357
floatson thesurfaceof thepond and illumination regularly comesfromabove,
possessionof an eyespotand a phototropic circuitcan enhanceitssurvivaland
reproductive success.Butiftheillumination wereambiguousandpriorknowledge
wererequiredto inferthedirectionof theprey,it is notclearhow sucha visual
mechanism wouldgetofftheground.Naturalselection converges on specificinfor-
mationthatsupportsefficacious action.
Whattheindirect viewtreatsas assumptions imputedtotheperceiver canthus
be understood as ecologicalconstraints underwhichtheperceptual system evolved.
The perceptualsystemneednotinternally represent an assumptionthatnatural
surfaces areregularly textured, thatterrestrialobjectsobeythelawofgravitation,
or thatlightcomesfromabove.Rather, thesearefactsofnaturethatareresponsi-
ble fortheinformational regularities to whichperceptualsystems adapt,suchas
texture gradients, declination angles,and illumination gradients. Theyneednotbe
internally represented as assumptions becausetheperceptual system neednotper-
formtheinverseinferences thatrequirethemas premises. The perceptual system
simplybecomesattunedto information that,withinitsniche,reliably specifies the
environmental situationand enablestheorganismto acteffectively.
Thisis notto saythatanyenvironmental feature ofinterest is so specified.Itis
undoubtedly thecase thatmanyenvironmental properties are not directlyper-
ceivedbutmustbe ascertained byothercognitive means.Gibson's(1959) claimis
merely that,forevery perceivable property oftheenvironment , however subtle
, there
existsan informational variable, however that
complex, specifies it. This pointsup the
factthatouranalysisofspecificity depends on what properties we assume areper-
ceivedand exactly howwe describethem.Ifsurface shape is described qualitatively
(e.g.,as a locallyplanar,spherical, cylindrical,or saddle-shaped patchofsurface),
thenthesecond-order spatialdifferential structureofstimulation providesspecific
information forshape,and perceptual are
judgments highlyaccurateand precise.
However, ifsurfaceshapeis describedin Euclideanterms(e.g.,in termsofmetric
localdepth,slant,or curvature), surfaceshapeis onlyspecified up to a scalefactor,
and judgmentsare an orderof magnitudeworse(Koenderink2001; Tittleet al.
1995;Todd2004). Perceptual performance can onlybe as accurateand preciseas
theavailableinformation willallow.The studyofperception is thussomething of
a closedcircle:it mustincludeascertaining whatenvironmental properties are
in factreliablyperceivable, what informational variablesare specificto them
underecologicalconditions, and whichvariablesareactuallyusedbythepercep-
tualsystem.
In sum,whenconsidered ecologically ratherthanlogically, theargument from
underspecification does not hold up. There are in factpatterns of stimulation that
specify some environmental features and properties under ecological conditions.
Ata minimum, suchinformation supports directperception ofcertain behaviorally
relevantfeatures so thatperceptualsystemscan getofftheground;moreambi-
tiously,itrenders priorknowledge and inference unnecessary forperception ofthe
environment.
358
REPRISE
I havearguedthatGibson'secologicaltheoryprovidestheelementsofa plausible
accountofdirectperception and offersmeansto fendoffthestandardarguments
it. direct
against Specifically, perception is a relationofepistemic contactbetween
an activeagentandenvironmental situations, witha causalbasisin thedetection
of
information to
specific thosesituationsby an attuned perceptual The
system. speci-
ofinformation
ficity underecologicalconditions allowsfordirectperception with-
out priorknowledge or inference.Illusionsand hallucinations areunderstoodas
phenomenal experiences thatsupervene upontheactivity ofperceptual in
systems,
theabsenceofperceptual contact,and do notimplynonnormalobjectsofaware-
ness.Perceptual constancy reflects
theinvariant structureoftheopticarray, which
specifiespersisting objectsand properties, whereasvariableappearancesreflect
attentionto theirprojected sizesand formsin theopticarray, whichcorrespond to
theviewfromhere.The former arenotperceived bywayofthelatter, forformless
invariants can be detectedwithoutseeingmomentary formsand inferring object
properties. The ecologicalviewthussuggests a basisfortheintentionalityofper-
ception:evolution producedperceptual systems thatareattunedto invariantstruc-
ture and are object-directedbecause successfulbehavior is oriented to
environmental objects.
NOTES
ThankstoChrisHill,TonyChemero, Jeff andJoshSieglefortheirhelp-

Hutchison,
fulcommentson a previousdraft.Allerrorsof omissionand commissionareof
coursemyown.
1.I usetheterm "situation" tocover

generically theenvironmental layoutofsurfaces, events,
objects,
andtheir aswellastheir
properties, relationshiptotheperceiver.
2. Perceptionshouldbedistinguishedfrom recognition."Seeing thecopperbeechtree"doesnot
mean theobject
recognizing beforemeasa copper beech tree(which presumesthatI havethe
concept, beech
copper butrather
tree), perceivingtheobjectanditsproperties,
suchasitsshape,
surface
size, material
color, composition,location,affordance
properties,andsoon.
3. Thisuseoftheterm is
representationconsistentwith standard theories
"representationalist" of
perceptionaswellaswithcommon parlance incognitivescience,inwhicha mentalrepresenta-
tionisaninternal
image ordescription
thatstands forsomething intheworldandconstitutes
the
objectofawareness.
Revisionist
viewsofrepresentationwillbeconsidered below.
4. Anticipating
Millikan's
(2004)"pushmi-pullyu représentations."
5. Infact,such areexactly
manipulations howvision scientists
test
their about
hypotheses a percep-
tualsystem's
reliance
oninformationalvariables.
6. Theinternalstate
might bea mental
stateora neural state.
Thelatterisclose
towhatneuroscien-
tists
calltheneural ofa feature,
representation some neuralrealestate
whose iscorrelated
activity
with thepresence
ofa distal
feature a physical
(e.g., edge)andisusedbyother neural
processes
todetermine
(e.g., surface
layout).
359
7. Notethatinneither casemustonebedeceived thattheworld
intobelieving really is as it
- theperceptual
appears appearance itself fortheargument,
issufficient evenifoneknows it's
illusory.
8. Anotherwayofputtingthis
isthat itisthesubjective
since that
experiences areindiscernible,the
oftheidentity
principle ofindiscernibles applies
strictly only tothesubjective
experiences, notto
their
putative ofawareness.
objects
9. Arevisionist likeHuemer
representationalist (2001,128)would theexperiences
saythat arethe
same because
experience
represents tobethesameobjects
there whereas
andproperties; I saythe
arethesame
experiences becausetheactivityofanattuned perceptual
systemisthesame.
10.Huemer (2001)tries
toputa direct spinonthis
realist inwhich
solution, projectedangular size
andshapearemind-independent properties andhence
(true!), wedirectly
perceiveobjective
properties,
namelyvisual Butthis
angles. isunsatisfactory
becausetheconstant
sizeandshape of
environmental
objectsmuststill
beinferred from their
appearances.
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Direct Perception

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University of Arkansas Press

Direct Perception: The View from Here

Direct Perception: The View from Here

The viewthatperception is directholdsthata perceiver is awareofor in contact

ASSUMING THE POSITIONS: THE DIRECT VIEW

Thepositionthatperception is directbeginswiththecommonsense intuition

NO PERCEPTION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION:

A GIBSONIAN VIEW OF DIRECT PERCEPTION

The holdoutsin psychology and cognitivescienceforthelasthalfcenturyhave

How does Gibson'sapproachto perception comparewiththerepresentationalist

TO SEE OR NOT TO SEE: THE ARGUMENTS

How,then,mightdirectperception be sustainedinthefaceoftheindirect critique?

THE VIEW FROM HERE: THE ARGUMENT FROM APPEARANCES

SEEING OR NOTHINGNESS: THE ARGUMENT

The Argument fromUnderspecification assertsthatenvironmental features are

ThankstoChrisHill,TonyChemero, Jeff andJoshSieglefortheirhelp-

1.I usetheterm "situation" tocover

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