Executive Supervision

Article X, Section 4, 1987 Constitution:

“The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.”

Supervision involves the power to review of executive orders and ordinances, i.e., declare them
ultra vires or illegal (Sections 30, 56 and 57, 1991 LGC); the power to discipline (Section 61,
1991 LGC); the power to integrate development plans and zoning ordinances (Sections 447, 458
and 467, 1991 LGC); the power to resolve boundary disputes (Section 118, 1991 LGC); the
power to approve leaves (Section 47, 1991 LGC), accept resignations (Section 82, 1991 LGC)
and fill-up vacancies in the sanggunian (Section 44, 1991 LGC); and the power to augment basic
services (Section 17, 1991 LGC).

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Case 1: FRANKLIN M. DRILON vs ALFREDO S. LIM

G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994

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Facts:

Four oil companies and a taxpayer appealed to Drilon who then declared the Manila Revenue
Code null and void for non-compliance with prescribed procedure in enacting tax ordinances
pursuant to Sec. 187 of LGC.

RTC Ruling: It revoked Drilon’s decision and sustained the ordinance, holding that
procedural requirements were observed. It also declared Sec. 187of LGC as unconstitutional
because it vested within the SOJ the power and control over local governments, violating local
autonomy.

Drilon petitioned to SC averring that Sec. 187 was constitutional and that procedural
requirements were not observed. Petition was originally dismissed because SolGen had not
submitted certified true copy of the Decision but was reinstated after Drilon MR-ed.

Issue:

W/N Sec. 187 is constitutional, and procedural requirements specified therein were not observed
in the enactment of the MRC?

Ruling:

YES. RTC ruling is reversed in that it declares Sec. 187 unconstitutional, but SC
affirms RTC ruling that procedural requirements were satisfied.

RTC was rather hasty in invalidating Sec. 187 because it allegedly empowers the SOJ to review
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tax ordinances and to annul them. It gave power to control rather than to supervise. Sec. 187
authorizes the SOJ to review only the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances and if
necessary, revoke them. When he modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not authorized to
substitute his own judgement for the judgement of the local government.

SC finds that Drilon set aside the MRC, but he did not replace it with his own version of what it
should be. He did not say that it is a bad law. He only found that it was illegal. This is an act of
mere supervision, not of control.

Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on the draft MRC, as
required by law; no copies of the proposed MRC was published; no minutes were
submitted; and it was not translated into Tagalog. On the other hand, RTC ruled that procedure
requirements were satisfied. SC agrees with RTC. But because substantive provisions were not
raised in the petition, SC makes no ruling on that.

LGC, Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax, Ordinances and
Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. - The procedure for approval of local tax
ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this
Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the
enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60)
days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall
not have the effect of Suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of
the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt
of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice
acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of
competent jurisdiction.
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 xxx

Notes: The President or the “higher” local government has no power of control over LGs and
“lower” LGs, respectively.

Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the
latter. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed,
he/she may, in his/her discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his/her subordinate or
he/she may even decide to do it himself/herself.

Supervision is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
functions in accordance with law. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the
rules are followed, but he/she himself/herself does not lay down such rules, nor does he/she have
the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he/she may order the work
done or redone but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He/she may not prescribe his/her own
manner for the doing of the act. He/she has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the
rules are followed.

Control Supervision
 Lays down rules in doing of an act  Overseeing
 Impose limitations when there is none  Ensure that supervised unit follows law/ rules
imposed by law  Allows interference if supervised unit acted
 Decide for subordinate or change decision contrary to law
 Substitute judgment over that made by  Over actor and act
subordinate  There must be a law
PUBLIC
AlterCORPORATION_CASE
wisdom, law-conforming judgment or  17-18,
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involves questions of law (declare legal 3
exercise of discretion or illegal); not wisdom or policy
 Discretion to order act undone or re-done
 Prescribe manner by which act is done

Case 2: NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY vs HON. VICTORIA ISABEL A.

PAREDES
G.R. Nos. 130775/ 131939, September 27, 2004

Facts:

DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of the Liga ng mga
Barangay in giving remedy to alleged violations made by the incumbent officer of the Liga in the
conduct of their elections, issued 2 memorandum circulars which alter, modify, nullify or set
aside the actions of the Liga.

Petitioner contends that DILG’s appointment constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs
of the Liga, since the latter is not subject to DILG control and supervision. Respondent judge
contends that DILG exercises general supervisory jurisdiction over LGUs including the different

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leagues based on sec. 1 of Admin. Order No. 267 providing for a broad premise of the
supervisory power of the DILG.

Issue:

WON DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President has power of control over the Liga ng mga
Barangay.

Ruling:

No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local government, which exclude the power of control. As the entity
exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILG’s authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules
are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself nor does it have the discretion to modify or
replace the same.

xxx

Notes: Elect representatives to the National Liga ng mga Barangay; The Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) cannot appoint an interim caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of
the Liga without violating local autonomy.

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Case 3: SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO CITY vs. JADEWELL

PARKING SYSTEMS, CORP.
G.R. No. 160025, April 23, 2014

Facts:

On February 9, 2005, this Court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing
Baguio City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon, his agents, representatives and/or any person or persons
acting upon his orders or in his place or stead to immediately reopen the streets and/or premises
operated and/or occupied by Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell). They were
further directed to let the said streets and premises remain open until further orders of this Court.

However, Jadewell subsequently informed this Court that, contrary to the representation of
Mayor Yaranon and in violation of the writ (of preliminary mandatory injunction), the parking
spaces, roads and streets operated and/or occupied by Jadewell remained closed. It presented
pictures taken on March 1, 2005 showing the continued closure of the parking spaces at
Burnham Park and the adjoining Abad Santos Drive, Lake Drive and Harrison Road. It also
submitted affidavits of pay parking customers attesting to the fact that until now, the parking
spaces and streets that Jadewell previously utilized for pay parking has not been opened. Further,

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counsel for Jadewell furnished with a copy to the court of its February 15, 2005 letter to Mayor
Yaranon urging the latter to comply with the writ.

Faced with the conflicting manifestations of the parties, this Court directed Judge Iluminada
Cabato-Cortes, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, to determine
whether or not Mayor Yaranon in fact complied with the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and to submit a report thereon. Investigation of the Judge are as follows: That on
March 21, 2005 at around 2:25 in the afternoon, the Honorable Executive Judge instructed the
undersigned together with Gilbert Evangelista to go to Jadewell Parking Systems particularly
along Harrison and Ganza Areas to verify whether said premises are already open for business,
but it is still closed with G.I. pipe railings measuring about 74 feet at the main entrance and exit;
April 4, 2005, the undersigned were again instructed by the Executive Judge to check on the
premises of Jadewell Parking Systems, particularly located at the aforementioned areas to find
out whether there were changes in the physical set up but there was none; Judge Cabato-Cortes
personally visited the premises on April 4, 2005. She found that the account of sheriff Bacolod
accurately reflected the actual condition in the said premises. She observed that there were
several policemen posted at the parking area adjacent to Ganza Restaurant. When she
interviewed some of the policemen, they confirmed that the entrance and exit to the parking area
were indeed closed.

Issue:

Whether or not the City Mayor of Baguio committed direct and indirect contempt by
disobedience and acting opposition to its authority.

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Ruling:

Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and
dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or defiance of the court's orders but also such
conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court arid the administration of law into disrepute
or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. Under the Rules of Court,
contempt is classified into either direct or indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the
presence of or so near a court or judge. It can be punished summarily without hearing. If the
pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court
where the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt. It is equivalent to a misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a judge. Contemptuous statements made in the pleadings
filed with the court constitute direct contempt. Similarly, false or misleading allegations in a
pleading or other document filed with the court having cognizance of the case tending to
frustrate the due dispensation of justice constitute direct contempt. Candidness to the court is
essential for the expeditious administration of justice.

Here, Mayor Yaranon misled this Court into believing that he had already obeyed the directive
contained in the writ. The very caption of his paper itself manifested his intention to make
believe that the writ had been fully complied with. It attempted to create the impression that the
premises and streets previously operated by Jadewell were already open pursuant to this Court's
order when in fact they were not. Indubitably, it constituted fraud on the court punishable as
contempt.

His continuing refusal to carry out and implement the writ is a willful disregard of and
disobedience to this Court's lawful orders. His defiance controvertibly proves his intention to tie
the hands of justice and prevent it from taking its due course. Hence Baguio City Mayor Braulio
D. Yaranon is hereby found GUILTY of (1) direct contempt for the falsehood he deliberately
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foisted on this Court and (2) indirect contempt for his continued disobedience to and defiance of
the writ of preliminary injunction the court had issued.

xxx

Notes: The local government is vested and tasked the power to legally implement and
facilitate all ordinances and rules within its territory. Furthermore, the LGU are mandatorily
required to abide by order of the court in the exercise of their delegated powers.

Case 4: BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 138810, October 20, 2004

Facts:

On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting
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petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8
of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum
rates specified therein, “provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the
approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.

Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00
per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit
unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution
No. 210. Respondent argues that Resolution was enacted pursuant to Sec. 177 (c) & (d) of BP
337 (LGC of 1983) which authorizes LGUs to regulate businesses and is in the nature of a
contract between Petitioner and Respondent.

Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging
that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates
charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation
in the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators within its territorial jurisdiction

Ruling:

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NO. The resolution is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national legislature.
There is no law authorizing LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV. Whatever authority the
LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn when President Marcos issued PD 1512
terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously
granted by local governments. Today, pursuant to Sec. 3 of EO 436 only persons, associations,
partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of
Authority by the NTC may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or render cable
television service within a service area. It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or
legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises. Consequently, the
protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does
not extend to privileges, franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or
ultra vires.

The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to
LGUs. Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of
their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Accordingly, we have upheld enactments providing, for instance, the regulation of gambling, the
occupation of rig drivers, the installation and operation of pinball machines, the maintenance and
operation of cockpits, the exhumation and transfer of corpses from public burial grounds, and the
operation of hotels, motels, and lodging houses as valid exercises by local legislatures of the
police power under the general welfare clause.

Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare
clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public
properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of
constructing CATV system the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures,
and the parceling of large regions allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV
operators. This is the same regulation that it exercises over all private enterprises within its
territory.
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But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain
Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits
of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws
and (2) it violates the States deregulation policy over the CATV industry.

1. The apparent defect in Resolution No. 210 is that it contravenes E.O. No. 205 and E.O.
No. 436 insofar as it permits respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod to usurp a power
exclusively vested in the NTC, i.e., the power to fix the subscriber rates charged by
CATV operators. The fixing of subscriber rates is definitely one of the matters within the
NTCs exclusive domain.
2. Deregulation is the reduction of government regulation of business to permit freer
markets and competition. Oftentimes, the State, through its regulatory agencies, carries
out a policy of deregulation to attain certain objectives or to address certain problems. In
the field of telecommunications, it is recognized that many areas in the Philippines are
still unserved or underserved. Thus, to encourage private sectors to venture in this field
and be partners of the government in stimulating the growth and development of
telecommunications, the State promoted the policy of deregulation.

The fifth Whereas Clause of E.O. No. 436 states:

WHEREAS, professionalism and self-regulation among existing operators, through a nationally

recognized cable television operators association, have enhanced the growth of the cable
television industry and must therefore be maintained along with minimal reasonable government
regulations;

When the State declared a policy of deregulation, the LGUs are bound to follow. Verily, in the
case at bar, petitioner may increase its subscriber rates without respondents approval.
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PETITION GRANTED.

Legislative Control

The Congress shall allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units. (Section 3, Article X of the 1987
Constitution)

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to
levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local governments. (Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution)

Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which
shall be automatically released to them. (Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution)

Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and
development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law,
including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits (Section 7, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution)
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The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. (Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution)

Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may be prescribed
by law. (Section 9, Article X of the 1987 Constitution)

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. (Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution)

The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a
plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. (Section 11, Article X of the 1987 Constitution)

The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by
the President from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. (Section 18, Article X of the
1987 Constitution)

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Case 1: LEVY D. MACASIANO vs HON. ROBERTO DIOKNO
G.R. No. 149848 November 25, 2004

Facts:

On 13 June 1990, the Municipality of Paranaque passed Ordinance 86, s. 1990 which authorized
the closure of J. Gabrielle, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets
located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon.
The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MCC Ordinance 2, s.
1979, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open
spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain
terms and conditions. On 20 July 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance
86, s. 1990 of the municipal council subject to conditions. On 20 June 1990, the municipal
council issued a resolution authorizing the Parañaque Mayor to enter into contract with any
service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea
markets and/or vending areas. On 8 August 1990, the municipality and Palanyag, a service
cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the
flea market with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of
Parañaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by Palanyag on the said streets. On 13
September 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic
Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabrielle St.
in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to Palanyag. On 16 October 1990, Macasiano wrote
a letter to Palanyag giving the latter 10 days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market
stalls shall be dismantled.

On 23 October 1990, the municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition for
prohibition and mandamus with
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4_October for preliminary
2020 injunction. On 17 December 9
1990, the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance 86 s. 1990 of the
Municipality of Parañaque and enjoining Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against
Palanyag. Hence, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed by Macasiano thru the OSG.

Issue:
Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque
authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid?

Ruling:

The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to property for public use, Article 424 of Civil
Code provides that "property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists
of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities. All other property
possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to
the provisions of special laws." In the present case, thus, J. Gabrielle G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt.
Gacia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore
considered public properties of the municipality. Properties of the local government which are
devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress.
Hence, local government have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public
properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.

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 PUBLIC CORPORATION_CASE DIGEST_Week 4_October 17-18, 2020 10

Case 2: RURAL BANK OF ANDA VS. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF

LINGAYEN-DAGUPAN
G.R. No. 155051, May 21, 2007

Facts:

The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley,
Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3. Cadastral
Lot 737 and Lot 739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imelda's Park, while
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on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-
5201-A and on the south by the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help of
Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1.

Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6375 (TCT 6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being
claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley.

In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot 736
from the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the smell of horse manure
was already bothering the priests living in the seminary.[3] The concrete fence enclosing Lot 736
has openings in the east, west, and center and has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at
any time of the day.[4]

On 22 December 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan, passed and approved
Resolution Nos. 104[5] and 105.[6] Resolution No. 104 converted Lot 736 from an institutional
lot to a commercial lot. Resolution No. 105 authorized the municipal mayor to enter into a
contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 with an area
of 252 square meters.[7]

In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence was
being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor of
Binmaley, Rolando Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss the
situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the
Rural Bank of Anda should be stopped.

On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence and
restore
PUBLICthe concrete fence. On
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construction of the building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willing to
discuss with respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736.

On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions, Injunction
and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan. On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
Injunction.

Issue:

Whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are valid

Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not have title over Lot
736. The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land Management Services in
Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was ever presented to their office.
[9]

Respondent claims Lot 736 based on its alleged open, continuous, adverse, and uninterrupted
possession of Lot 736. However, the records reveal otherwise. Even the witnesses for respondent
testified that Lot 736 was used by the people as pathway, parking space, and playground.[10]
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On the other hand, the Municipality of Binmaley alleged that it is the sole claimant of Lot 736
based on the Property Identification Map, Tax Mapping Control Roll of the Municipality of
Binmaley, and the Lot Data Computation in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley.
However, these documents merely show that the Municipality of Binmaley is a mere claimant of
Lot 736. In fact, the chief of Survey Division of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, San Fernando City, La Union testified that the cadastral survey[11] of Lot 736, which
was surveyed for the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989, had not been approved.[12] The
cadastral survey was based on the Lot Data Computation[13] of Lot 736 which was likewise
contracted by the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989.

The records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to the school, the seminary, or the
church, which are all located on lots adjoined to Lot 736.[14] Lot 736 was also used for parking
and playground.[15] In other words, Lot 736 was used by the public in general.

Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since
Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of
acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public domain and is owned by the state. As held in
Hong Hok v. David:[16]
There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the
applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be public domain. For it is well settled "that no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government." It is
indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion
of Justice J.B.L. Reyes follows: "The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over
the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no
showing that the same has been
PUBLIC CORPORATION_CASE acquired by
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purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public domain."
This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and
waters of the public domain.[17] Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: "All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the state."

Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without

prior grant from the government.[18] Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus,
Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently, the contract of lease between the
Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.

xxx

Notes: Pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, any land that has never been acquired through
purchase, grant or any other mode of acquisition remains part of the public domain and is owned
by the State. LGs cannot appropriate to themselves public lands without prior grant from the
government

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Case 3: NATIVIDAD FIGURACION vs SPOUSES CRESENCIANO, & AMELITA LIBI
G.R. No. 155688 November 28, 2007

Facts:
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In 1948, the Cebu City government expropriated a parcel of land of Galileo Figuracion to be
turned into a portion of N. Escario Street. In 1989, the Sangguniang Panglungsod approved the
reconveyance of the unused portion of the lot to the successor-in-interest, Isagani Figuracion. A
new TCT was issued to Isagani Figuracion.

The Spouses Libi were owners of an adjacent lot and has been using the said lot as access to the
road. They refused to vacate the lot despite demand. The lower court ordered that the Spouses
Libi remove the fence they have erected on the said lot. The Spouses filed for easement, then
amended their complaint and shifted cause of action to one for the annulment of sale to
Figuracion with damages

Issue:

WON the action by the Spouses Libi to annul the reconveyance of the lot to Figuracion is proper.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the Spouses Libi were not the real-parties-in-interest to annul the TCT of
Figuracion, since they are not themselves claiming title to or possession of the lot. Libi alleged
that they bought the adjacent lot in the belief that they had an outlet to N. Escario Street through
the lot owned by the Cebu City government. Clearly, they have no interest in the title of the lot.

Reversion is a proceeding by which the State seeks the return of lands of the public domain
through the cancellation of private title erroneously or fraudulently issued over it. The action
should be in the name of the State. Thus, Spouses Libi cannot be considered the proper parties
therein.

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The Spouses’ sole interest is the use of the property as access to N. Escario Street. Such interest
is tangential to any issue regarding ownership or possession of the property. Hence, it is not
sufficient to vest in them the legal standing to sue for reversion of the property. They should
have maintained the action for easement.

The wisdom and intent of the City Council to recognize the right of Isagani Figuracion to
repurchase the lot cannot be gainsaid. The City of Cebu has the power and authority to sell the
expropriated property that is no longer needed for that purpose for which it was intended. The
Spouses Libi not only lacked the legal personality but also have no legal basis to challenge the
reconveyance

xxx

Notes: A city can validly reconvey a portion of its street that has been closed or withdrawn from
public use where Congress has specifically delegated to such political subdivision, through its
charter, the authority to regulate its streets. Such property withdrawn from public servitude to be
used or conveyed for any purpose for which other property belonging to the city may be lawfully
used or conveyed.
Case 4: ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF KALIBO, AKLAN vs MUNICIPALITY OF
BURUANGA, AKLAN
G.R. No. 149145, March 31, 2006

Facts:

Petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo was allegedly the lawful owner and possessor of a
parcel of residential and commercial land, designated as Lot 138. The Roman Catholic Church
was built in 1984 in the middle portion of the said lot and has been in existence since then up to
the present. That sometime in 1978, the Municipality of Buruanga constructed its municipal
building on the northeastern portion
PUBLIC CORPORATION_CASE of the4_October
DIGEST_Week Lot 13817-18,
after2020
it obtained the permission of the then 14
parish priest of Buruanga on the condition that the municipality remove all the improvements it
constructed thereon if and when the petitioner needed the said lot.

When the municipal building was razed by fire in 1989, petitioner, through its counsel requested
the officials of the municipality to refrain from constructing its new building on the same site
because it is the property of the church and it needed the lot for its social projects. However, the
construction of the new municipal building on the same site proceeded. Consequently, petitioner
filed a complaint and prayed that it be declared the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138.
Petitioner contends that it does not allegedly lose its possession or ownership over the property if
the possession or use by another of the same is by mere tolerance.

In its answer, the municipality alleged that said lot was surveyed as property of the municipality
and that the said municipality alone had possessed the said land under the claim of title
exclusively for over fifty (50) years, exclusive of all other rights and adverse to all other
claimants.

After due trial, the trial court declared petitioner as the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138-
Band the Municipality of Buruanga as the lawful owner and possessor of Lots 138-A and 138-C,
the said lots being public plaza for public use. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ownership of
petitioner over Lot138-B but declared Lots 138-A and 138-C as property of public dominion.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of Lot 138 since 1894 and for many decades thereafter vests ipso jure or by operation of law
upon it a government grant, a vested title, to the subject property

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Ruling:

No. There was no question that petitioner has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of Lot 138-B since 1894 as evidenced by the church structure built
thereon but there was no evidence to show that such possession and occupation extended to Lots
138-A and138-C beginning the same period. No single instance of the exercise by the petitioner
of proprietary acts or acts of dominion over these lots was established. Its unsubstantiated claim
that the construction of the municipal building as well as the subsequent improvements thereon
was by its tolerance does not constitute proof of possession and occupation on the petitioner’s
part. Absent the important requisite of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereon since 1894, no government grant or title to Lots 138-A and 138-C had vested
upon the petitioner ipso jure or by operation of law.
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the
adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his
own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and
talked of by the public or the people in the neighbourhood. Use of land is adverse when it is open
and notorious.
xxx

Notes: A lot comprising the public plaza is property of public dominion; hence, not susceptible to
private ownership by the church or by the municipality.

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