People vs.

Ladjaalam

Facts:

 Ladjaam, his wife and Sailabbi maintained their house as drug den.
 At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the issuance of a search warrant
against appellant, his wife and some John Does.
 After the search warrant was issued about 2:30 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was conducted inside the office of the
Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga City Police Office in connection with the service of the search warrant.
 Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga Police. [O]n the morning
of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to go to appellant’s house to buy ‘shabu.’
 The latter got three (3) decks of shabu from his waist bag. Appellant instructed Locson to go behind the curtain where
there was a table. There were six (6) persons already smoking. There was a lighted kerosene lamp made of a medicine
bottle placed on the table. They asked Locson to smoke ‘shabu’ and Locson obliged.

Issue: whether the appellant is guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425 by maintaining a drug den.

Ruling:

The RTC:

The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr. clearly
established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and maintained a drug den in his extension house where shabu or methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was sold, and where persons or customers bought and used shabu or methamphetamine
hydrochloride by burning the said regulated drug and sniffing its smoke with the use of an aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a
lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its existence [may be] proved not only by
direct evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of
the house, or its general reputation among police officers. The uncorroborated testimony of accused Walpan Ladjaalam
a.k.a. Warpan’ that he did not maintain an extension house or a room where drug users who allegedly buy shabu from him
inhales or smokes shabu cannot prevail over the testimonies of Locson, SPO1 Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He admitted that
he is the owner of the extension house but he alleged that there were four (4) occupants who rented that extension house. He
knew the name of only one of the four occupants who are allegedly from Jolo, a certain Momoy, the husband. Aside from being
uncorroborated, Walpan’s testimony was not elaborated by evidence as to when or for how long was the extension house rented,
the amount of rental paid, or by any other document showing that the extension house was in fact rented. The defense of denial
put up by accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan’ is a weak defense. Denial is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over
the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary weight over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between the positive declaration of the prosecution
witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence.

SC agreed with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an offense for which he was correctly
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome
Locson, who himself had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the time of the raid.
The former’s testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified before the court. That appellant did not
deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to the prosecution’s story.

People vs. ROM

Facts:

 That on the 31s[t] day of August, 2000, at about 10:30 P.M, Appellant Rom, with deliberate intent, did then and there
knowingly maintain a den for regulated users along the interior portion of Barangay T. Padilla in violation to (sic) the
provision of Sec. 15-A of Art. III of RA 6425.
 Two weeks prior to 31 August 2000, the VCS-CCPO received confidential information from their informant that alias
Dodong, who turned out later to be the appellant, whose real name is Vicente Rom, was engaged in the illegal sale of
shabu and also maintained a drug den at his residence in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City. Thus, the VCS-CCPO
conducted surveillance and monitoring operation.
 After the briefing, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area and upon arrival there at around 10:20 p.m., PO2
Martinez proceeded directly to the appellant’s house, which was earlier pointed to by their informant, who was also
with them during the buy-bust operation. 
 Afterwards, PO2 Martinez told the appellant that he wanted to sniff the shabu, so the latter required the former to pay
an additional amount of ₱10.00 as rental fee for the use of his place. 
 The appellant denied that he sold shabu to PO2 Martinez. He also denied that he was maintaining a drug den and that
he allowed persons to sniff shabu inside the house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, in exchange for a sum of money. 
 As to the charge of maintaining a drug den, the same was also established by the fact that PO2 Martinez himself paid
₱10.00 to sniff the shabu in one of the rooms of the appellant’s house. The appellant’s denial, therefore, cannot prevail
over the evidence hurled against him.
 The appellant believes that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as their testimonies as to
the facts and circumstances surrounding the case were contrary to human conduct, especially with regard to the
allegation that he knowingly maintained a drug den, since he was no longer the owner of the house, which was the
subject of the search, and he did not live there anymore.

Issue:

Whether or not ROM is guilty of maintaining a drug den.

Ruling:

The appellant’s contentions are devoid of merit.

Going to the charge of maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
the prosecution had also established appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its existence may be
proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the
general reputation of the house, or its general reputation among police officers. In this case, this fact was proven by none other
than the testimony of PO2 Martinez, the poseur-buyer, who after buying the shabu had told the appellant that he wanted to sniff
the same to which the latter responded by requiring the former to pay a rental fee of ₱10.00. The appellant, thereafter, allowed
PO2 Martinez to enter his house and directed him to proceed to one of the rooms located at the right side of the sala. Upon
entering the said room, PO2 Martinez saw three other persons already sniffing shabu. This testimony of PO2 Martinez was
corroborated by PO3 Yanson and P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez.

Moreover, as aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, several peso bills were found in the appellant’s wallet, including three
₱10.00 peso bills, which circumstances bolstered the prosecution’s assertion that the appellant has indeed allowed his house to be
used as a drug den for a fee of ₱10.00 per person.

In his attempt to exonerate himself, the appellant vehemently asserts that he was no longer the owner of the house in Barangay T.
Padilla, Cebu City, and he was no longer residing therein. The defense also presented Teresita Bitos to corroborate this claim of
the appellant.

The testimony of Teresita Bitos corroborating the appellant’s testimony was not credible.1âwphi1 She herself admitted that the
appellant requested her to testify in his favor.

Also, considering the seriousness of the charges against the appellant, he did not bother to present his daughter, who is the
alleged owner of the house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, to bolster his claim.
People vs. Dela Cruz

Facts:
  NBI, received a Complaint from Corazon Absin (Corazon) and Charito Escobido (Charito). The complainants claimed
that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day, Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked
up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs.

 The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which
was made part of the amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the forensic
laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan.
Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous
drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology.

 Dela Cruz denied the charges and testified that while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for
extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he
refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI.
His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine
sample, to no avail.

Issue:

Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.

Ruling:

We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law or jurisprudence.

Disregarding petitioner’s objection regarding the admissibility of the evidence, the lower court also reasoned that "a suspect
cannot invoke his right to counsel when he is required to extract urine because, while he is already in custody, he is not
compelled to make a statement or testimony against himself. Extracting urine from one’s body is merely a mechanical act, hence,
falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."

We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent affirmation by the CA, erroneous on three counts.

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed
under Article II of R.A. 9165.

First, "[a] person apprehended or arrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase
must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended
for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.

Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among others, the "importation,"  "sale,
trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation", "manufacture" and "possession" of dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession thereof "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"  ;
being "employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort"; "maintenance of a den, dive or resort"; "illegal chemical diversion of
controlled precursors and essential chemicals" ; "manufacture or delivery" or "possession" of equipment, instrument, apparatus,
and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs
"during parties, social gatherings or meetings" ; "unnecessary" or "unlawful" prescription thereof; "cultivation or culture of plants
classified as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof"; and "maintenance and keeping of original records of transactions on
dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals." To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested
or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note that accused
appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.

A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the intent of the law to rehabilitate persons
apprehended or arrested for the unlawful acts enumerated above instead of charging and convicting them of other crimes with
heavier penalties. The essence of the provision is more clearly illustrated in People v. Martinez as follows:

On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15 (Use of
Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, with regard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes the practice of
law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and
solely in the form of residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more in
keeping with the intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use,
provided that there is a positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15.The minimum penalty under the last paragraph
of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue is imprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first
time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the
basis of residue alone would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an opportunity to
recover for a second chance at life.

Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all
persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of this provision would run counter to our
pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, to wit:

x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will.
The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to
drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to
the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art.
III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.

We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and raises the issue only now
before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may
have attended his arrest. However, "a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest."

We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such proscription. Cases where
non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the
principal cause of the arrest.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts
are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of
counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of
evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be
compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical
examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from
gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S.
vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints;
(U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or
shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.

In the instant case, we fail to see howa urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion. 1âwphi1 The RTC and the CA,
therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a
mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."

The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his
urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit
his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.