ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REMEDIAL LAW DEPARTMENT

SYLLABUS: SCHOOL YEAR 2021-2022

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I

Covers Civil and Criminal Procedures
By: Henedino M. Brondial

CIVIL PROCEDURE
(As amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, effective May 1, 2020)

I. JURISDICTION

A. Classes of Jurisdiction
- Jurisdiction according to its nature: original, appellate

A court is one with original jurisdiction when actions or proceedings are originally filed with
it.

A court is one with appellate jurisdiction when it has the power of review over the decisions or
orders of a lower court. [1 Riano 47, 2016Bantam Ed.]
Appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is but a continuation of the original suit, not a
commencement of a new action [Morales v.CA, G.R. No. 126623 (1997)]
- Jurisdiction according to its object; corresponding principles

Original and Appellate Jurisdiction

 A court is one with original jurisdiction when actions or proceedings are
originally filed with it. A court is one with appellate jurisdiction when it has
the power of review over the decisions or orders of a lower court
 MeTCs, MCTCs and MTCs are courts of original jurisdiction without
appellate jurisdiction. RTC is likewise a court of original jurisdiction with
respect to cases originally filed with it; and appellate court with respect to
cases decided by MTCs within its territorial jurisdiction. (Sec. 22, BP 129)
 CA is primarily a court of appellate jurisdiction with competence to review
judgments of the RTCs and specified quasi-judicial agencies (Sec. 9[3], BP
129). It is also a court of original jurisdiction with respect to cases filed
before it involving issuance of writs of certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus, and prohibition. CA is a court of original and exclusive
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs (Sec. 9 [1],[2],
BP 129).
 The SC is fundamentally a court of appellate jurisdiction but it may also be a
court of original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, public
ministers and consuls, and in cases involving petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus (Sec. 5[1], Art. VIII, Constitution). The Supreme
Court en banc is not an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of
a division of the Supreme Court may be appealed.
i. over the subject matter
2. It is the power to deal with the general subject involved in the
action, and means not simply jurisdiction of the particular case
then occupying the attention of the court but jurisdiction of the
class of cases to which the particular case belongs. It is the power

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 or authority to hear and determine cases to which the proceeding
in question belongs.
3. When a complaint is filed in court, the basic questions that ipso
facto are to be immediately resolved by the court on its own: (a)
what is the subject matter? (b) does it have jurisdiction over the
said subject matter? Answering these questions inevitably
requires looking into the applicable laws conferring jurisdiction.

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 i. over the persons of the parties
A. Over the Parties
 The manner by which the court acquires jurisdiction over the parties
depends on whether the party is the plaintiff or the defendant
 Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired by his filing of the complaint or
petition. By doing so, he submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
 Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is obtained either by a valid
service of summons upon him or by his voluntary submission to the court’s
authority.
 The mode of acquisition of jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant
applies to both ordinary and special civil actions like mandamus or unlawful
detainer cases.
 Classification of parties in civil cases:
 A- plaintiff
 B- defendant
 C- co-defendant
 D-3rd, 4th defendant
 E- Intervenor
 In criminal cases
 Accused-
 Plaintiff- usually represented by the office of Solicitor General
 Special Proceedings
 Petitioner
 Oppositor


 
a.1 Over the Plaintiff - Acquired when the action is commenced by the filing
of the complaint and timely payment of the docket fees
 
a.2 Over the Defendant - Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
required only in an action in personam; it is not a prerequisite in an action
in rem and quasi in rem. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the
person is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case, while
in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court,
provided the latter has jurisdiction over the res.
 By voluntary appearance of the defendant, without service of
summons or despite a defective service of summons. The
defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons.
 Instances when appearance of defendant is not tantamount to
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court:
i. when defendant files the necessary pleading;

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 ii. when defendant files motion for reconsideration of the
judgment by default;
iii. when defendant files a petition to set aside the judgment of
default;
iv. when the parties jointly submit a compromise agreement for
approval of the court;
v. when defendant files an answer to the contempt charge;
vi. when defendant files a petition for certiorari without
questioning the court’s jurisdiction over his person.
ii. over the “res”
Jurisdiction over the res or property in litigation
(1) Jurisdiction over the res refers to the court’s jurisdiction over the thing or
the property which is the subject of the action. Jurisdiction over the res
may be acquired by the court by placing the property of thing under its
custody (custodia legis). Example: attachment of property. It may also be
acquired by the court through statutory authority conferring upon it the
power to deal with the property or thing within the court’s territorial
jurisdiction. Example: suits involving the status of the parties or suits
involving the property in the Philippines of non-resident defendants.
i. Real Action- It is not necessary for the
ii. Personal Action
iii. Action in Personam is not necessarily a Personal action so as
Action in Rem
iv.
(2) Jurisdiction over the res is acquired by the seizure of the thing under legal
process whereby it is brought into actual custody of law, or it may result
from the institution of a legal proceeding wherein the power of the court
over the thing is recognized and made effective (Banco Español Filipino vs.
Palanca, 37 Phil. 291).
i. Converting the case to quasi in rem. The court does not
require

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 iii. over the issues
Jurisdiction over the issues
 It is the power of the court to try and decide issues raised in the pleadings
of the parties.
 An issue is a disputed point or question to which parties to an action have
narrowed down their several allegations and upon which they are desirous
of obtaining a decision. Where there is no disputed point, there is no issue.
 Generally, jurisdiction over the issues is conferred and determined by the
pleadings of the parties. The pleadings present the issues to be tried and
determine whether or not the issues are of fact or law.
 Jurisdiction over the issues may also be determined and conferred by
stipulation of the parties as when in the pre-trial, the parties enter into
stipulations of facts and documents or enter into agreement simplifying the
issues of the case.
 It may also be conferred by waiver or failure to object to the presentation
of evidence on a matter not raised in the pleadings. Here the parties try
with their express or implied consent issues not raised by the pleadings.
The issues tried shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in
the pleadings.
 In criminal cases- upon arraignment
 In civil cases- determined by pleadings
 Rule 7- parts of pleadings
o Contents include evidentiary matters, in connection to Section
5
o No more amendments to confer to evidence
iv. over the territory

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 B. Elements of Jurisdiction: subject matter, parties, issues

C. Jurisdiction of Regular Courts

1. Supreme Court
D. SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other

public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

E. (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the

law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or
any penalty imposed in relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may
require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of
the judge concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law.

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Courts of Appeals

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1. Regional Trial Court

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 A. Intellectual Property Courts
B. Special Courts
2. Family Courts

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 3. Metropolitan Trial Courts
 composed of eighty-two (82) branches.

 Metropolitan Trial Court in the National Capital Region, to be known as the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Metro Manila

 Constitute Metropolitan Trial Courts in such other metropolitan areas as may be established
by law whose territorial jurisdiction shall be co-extensive with the cities and municipalities
comprising the metropolitan area.

Municipal Trial Courts in cities

 In every city which does not form part of a metropolitan area, there shall be a Municipal Trial
Court 

Municipal Trial Courts and

In each of the municipalities that are not comprised within a metropolitan area and a municipal circuit
there shall be a Municipal Trial Court 

Municipal Circuit Courts

here shall be a Municipal Circuit Trial Court in each area defined as a municipal circuit, comprising
one or more cities and/or one or more municipalities. 

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"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within
their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof."

"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and
intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the
demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which
must be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees: Provided,
further, That where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the
same or different transactions;

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided,
That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession; and

"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided,
That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots

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4. Sandiganbayan

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 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 02

OPERATIONALIZING IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH THE PEOPLE’S

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION AND THE STATE POLICIES TO
FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE
AND PROVIDING GUIDELINES THEREFOR

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1

CREATING THE PRESIDENTIAL COMPLAINT AND ACTION COMMISSION UNDER

THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

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 Hannah Serana vs. Sandiganbayan, 653 SCRA (2011)
Facts:
Hannah Serana was appointed by former President Estrada as a student
regent of UP Cebu, to serve a one-year term. President Estrada gave
P15,000,000.00 to the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc as
financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The renovation of Vinzons
Hall Annex failed to materialize. The Ombudsman filed estafa case against
her before the Sandiganbayan. She moved to quash the information. She
claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent
because the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; the petitioner is
not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; the offense charged was not
committed in relation to her office; and the funds in question personally came
from President Estrada, not from the government. As to jurisdiction over her
person, she contends that as a UP student regent, she is not a public officer
who held the position in an ex officio capacity.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Serana’s case.
Held:
No, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over this case. In Geduspan v. People,
the SC held that while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary grade 27 and higher but who are by express provisions of law placed
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and trustees, or
manager of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities,
or educational foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents performs functions similar
to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate
of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606.
Thus, her position as a board of regent (UP student regent) is among those
enumerated and the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her.
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan, 762 SCRA (2015)

Facts: The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a criminal case against Danilo Duncano, the
Regional Director of the BIR for failing to disclose in his SALN for 2002 is financial and business
interest in Documail Provides Corp and Don Plus Trading and Nissan Patrol motor vehicle
registered in the name of his son. Duncano filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before Sandiganbayan stating that it doesn’t have jurisdiction
jurisdiction to try and hear the case because he is an official of the executive branch occupying
the position of a Regional Director but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary
Grade 27. The OSP alleged that the fact that the position of Regional Director was specifically
mentioned without indication as to its salary grade signifies the lawmakers’ intention that
officials occupying such position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

Issue: WON SB has jurisdiction over Reginal directors with salary grade lower than grade 27

Held: No, the SB has no jurisdiction over this. Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction
over the cases assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise classified as

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Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense. The
jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain with the
Sandiganbayan. The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and
expertise to big-time cases involving the so-called "big fishes" in the government rather than
those accused who are of limited means who stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called "small
fry," which, in turn, helps the court decongest its dockets.35

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law.

De Lima vs. Guerrero, 843 SCRA (2017)

5. Court of Tax-Appeals
City of Manila vs. Judge Cuerdo, February 4, 2014
NATURE:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse
and set aside the Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals.

FACTS:
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the
taxable period from January to December 2002 against the private respondents.In addition to
the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of
the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business
taxes. private respondents were constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under
protest.

On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of Pasay City the complaint
denominated as one for “Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously–Collected Local
Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
The RTC granted private respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied. Petitioners then filed a
special civil action for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed petitioners’ petition
for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the
RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under
Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of
an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 7 but the CA denied it in its Resolution hence, this
petition

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

HELD:
The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the RTC in a local tax case. In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its
appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In
transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be
assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not
indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the
transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that “if a case may be appealed to
a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” This
principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992)
where the Court stated that “a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate

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jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or
decisions of the lower court.

CE Casecnan Water & Energy Co. vs. Prov. Of Nueva Ecija

759 CRA 180
6. Quasi-Judicial Tribunals (Sec. 1, Rule 43)
F.  This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax
Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by
any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these
agencies are the

1. Civil Service Commission

2. Central Board of Assessment Appeals

3. Securities and Exchange Commission

4. Office of the President

5. Land Registration Authority

6. Social Security Commission

7. Civil Aeronautics Board

8. Bureau of Patents

9. Trademarks and Technology Transfer

10. National Electrification Administration

11. Energy Regulatory Board

12. National Telecommunications Commission

13. Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657

14. Government Service Insurance System

15. Employees Compensation Commission

16. Agricultural Invention Board

17. Insurance Commission

18. Philippine Atomic Energy Commission

19. Board of Investments

20. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission,

21. voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.

1. Sharia’h Courts: appellate, district, circuit

21
  
Equivalent to the Regional Trial Courts in rank are the Shari'a District Courts which were
established in certain specified provinces in Mindanao where the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines is being enforced.

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There are five Shari'a District Courts and fifty one Shari'a Circuit Courts in existence.

A Shari'a District Court is of limited jurisdiction.   It was created under Presidential

Decree No. 1083. Cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shari'a District
Courts primarily pertain to family rights and duties as well as contractual relations of
Filipino Muslims in the Mindanao. 
G. It has exclusive original jurisdiction over the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
H. 1.  All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising
under Presidential Decree No. 1083; 

2.  All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of a
deceased Muslim, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or
appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate
value of the property; 

3.  Petitions for declaration of absence and death and for cancellation and correction
of entries in the Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI, Book Two of Presidential
Decree No. 1083;

4.  All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if
they have not specified which law shall govern their relations; 

5.  All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and
all auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; 
I.
It has concurrent original jurisdiction over the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
J.  
K. 1.  Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of the family home, change of name and
commitment of insane person to any asylum; 

2.  All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1(d) wherein the
parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer
which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit
Courts; and 

3.  All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief where the parties are
Muslims or the property involved belongs exclusively to a Muslim. 
L.
The Shari'a District Court has appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Shari'a
Circuit Courts within their territorial jurisdiction.

It shall decide every case on the basis of the evidence and the records transmitted
as well as such memoranda, briefs or oral arguments as the parties may submit.

The decisions of the Shari'a District Courts, whether on appeal from the Shari'a

Circuit Courts or not, shall be final. The Supreme Court shall, however, continue to
exercise original and appellate jurisdiction over certain issues as provided by the
Constitution.
M.    

Lomondot vs. Balindong, 762 SCRA 494

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Facts:
On August 16, 1991, petitioners Omaira and Saripa Lomondot filed with the SDC, Marawi City,
a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with prayer for mandatory injunction and
temporary restraining order against respondents Ambog Pangandamun (Pangandamun) and
Simbanatao
Diaca (Diaca). Petitioners claimed that they are the owners by succession of a parcel of land
located at Bangon, Marawi City, consisting an area of about 800 sq. meters; that respondent
Pangandamun illegally entered and encroached 100 sq. meter of their land, while respondent
Diaca occupied 200 sq. meters, as indicated in Exhibits “A” and “K” submitted as evidence.
Respondents filed their Answer arguing that they are the owners of the land alleged to be
illegally occupied.
DECLARING plaintiffs owners
ORDERING defendants to VACATE the portions or areas they illegally encroached as indicated
in Exhibits “A” and “K” and to REMOVE whatever improvements thereat introduced;
Respondents filed an appeal[5] with us... we dismissed the petition for failure of respondents to
sufficiently show that a grave abuse... of discretion was committed by the SDC as the decision
was in accord with the facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Respondents' motion for
reconsideration was denied with finality on September 17, 2007.[7] The SDC Decision dated
January 31, 2005... became final and executory on October 31, 2007 and an entry of
judgment[8] was subsequently made.
Petitioners filed a motion[9] for issuance of a writ of execution with prayer for a writ of
demolition.
On February 7, 2008, the SDC granted the motion[10] for a writ of execution and the writ was
issued with the following fallo:
On February 3, 2009, petitioners filed a Motion[13] for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition to
implement the SDC Decision dated January 31, 2005. The motion was set for hearing.
On March 4, 2009, the SDC issued an Order
Motion for Writ of Demolition is HELD IN ABEYANCE. The Sheriff is DIRECTED to exert efforts
to bring the parties back to the negotiating table seeing to it that Sultan Alioden of Kabasaran is
involved in the negotiation. Atty. Saro is REQUIRED to... file his comment on the motion for writ
of execution within fifteen (15) days from notice to guide the court in resolving the incident in the
event the negotiation fails.
the SDC issued another Order[16] which held in abeyance the resolution of the motion for
issuance of a writ of demolition and granted an ocular inspection or actual measurement of
petitioners' 800-sq.-meter land.
While the decision has become final and executory and a Writ of Execution has been issued,
there are instances when a Writ of Execution cannot be enforced as when there is a
supervening event that prevents the Sheriff to execute a Writ of Execution.
The defendants claimed they have not encroached as they have already complied with the Writ
of Execution and their buildings are not within the area claimed by the plaintiffs. This to the
Court is the supervening event, thus the order granting the request of Atty. Jimmy Saro,...
counsel for the defendants, to conduct a survey to determine whether there is encroachment or
not. Thus, the Order dated May 5, 2009.
Wherefore, Engr. Hakim Laut Balt is hereby commissioned to conduct a survey of the 800
square meters claimed by the plaintiffs. Said Eng. Balt is given a period of one (1) month from
notice within which to conduct the survey in the presence of the parties.
the motion for issuance of a writ of demolition is DENIED.
Undaunted, petitioners filed with the CA-Cagayan de Oro City a petition for certiorari assailing
the Orders issued by the SDC... the CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari assailing the SDC Orders

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Petitioners' claim that the SDC's order for a conduct of a survey to determine whether
respondents' land are within petitioners' 800-sq.-meter land... would, in effect, be amending a
final and executory decision.
Issues:
RESPONDENT JUDGE, HONORABLE RASAD G. BALINDONG, COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF DEMOLITION
AFTER THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE COURT COULD NOT
BE IMPLEMENTED AND INSTEAD DIRECT THE CONDUCT OF THE SURVEY.
Petitioners' claim that the SDC's order for a conduct of a survey to determine whether
respondents' land are within petitioners' 800-sq.-meter land... would, in effect, be amending a
final and executory decision.
Ruling:
We find for the petitioners.
Principles:
Such decision had become final and executory after we affirmed the same... and an entry of
judgment was made. Such decision can no longer be modified or amended.
It is settled that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final
and immutable judgment, and one of which is a supervening event.
A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment became final and
executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the judgment attained... finality, including
matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were
not yet in existence at that time. In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of
execution or the quashal of the writ of execution, or he may... move the court to modify or alter
the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening event. The party who
alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts by
competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy... to frustrate the conclusive
effects of a final and immutable judgment.
In this case, the matter of whether respondents' houses intruded petitioners' land is the issue in
the recovery of possession complaint filed by petitioners in the SDC which was already ruled
upon, thus cannot be considered a supervening event that would stay the execution of a... final
and immutable judgment. To allow a survey as ordered by the SDC to determine whether
respondents' houses are within petitioners' land is tantamount to modifying a decision which
had already attained finality.
We find that the SDC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for
the issuance a writ of demolition. The issuance of a special order of demolition would certainly
be the necessary and logical consequence of the execution of the final and immutable...
decision.[35] Section 10(d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court provides:
Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. —... x x x x
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution.- when the property subject of
the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his
agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon
special... order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and
after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.

Municipality of Tangkal vs. Balindong, 814 SCRA (2017)

Facts

The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed a Complaint with the Shari'a
District Court of Marawi City (Shari'a District Court) against the petitioner, Municipality of
Tangkal, for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land with an area of
approximately 25 hectares located at Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal, Lanao del Norte. They
alleged that Macalabo was the owner of the land, and that in 1962, he entered into an

25
agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal allowing the latter to "borrow" the land to pave the
way for the construction of the municipal hall and a health center building. The agreement
allegedly imposed a condition upon the Municipality of Tangkal to pay the value of the land
within 35 years, or until 1997; otherwise, ownership of the land would revert to Macalabo.
Private respondents claimed that the Municipality of Tangkal neither paid the value of the land
within the agreed period nor returned the land to its owner. Thus, they prayed that the land be
returned to them as successors-in-interest of Macalabo.

The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue
and lack of jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no religious affiliation and represents no
cultural or ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws. Moreover, since the complaint for recovery of land is a real action, it should have been
filed in the appropriate Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte.

In its Order dated March 9, 2010, the Shari'a District Court denied the Municipality of Tangkal's
motion to dismiss. It held that since the mayor of Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M. Batingolo, is a
Muslim, the case "is an action involving Muslims, hence, the court has original jurisdiction
concurrently with that of regular/civil courts." It added that venue was properly laid because the
Shari'a District Court has territorial jurisdiction over the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Lanao
del Norte, in addition to the cities of Marawi and Iligan. Moreover, the filing of a motion to
dismiss is a disallowed pleading under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts.

The Municipality of Tangkal moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Shari'a District
Court. The Shari'a District Court also ordered the Municipality of Tangkal to file its answer within
10 days. The Municipality of Tangkal timely filed its answer and raised as an affirmative defense
the court's lack of jurisdiction.

Within the 60-day reglementary period, the Municipality of Tangkal elevated the case to us via
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order
(TRO). It reiterated its arguments in its earlier motion to dismiss and answer that the Shari'a
District Court has no jurisdiction since one party is a municipality which has no religious
affiliation.

Issue

Whether or not the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City has jurisdiction in an action for recovery
of possession filed by Muslim individuals against a municipality whose mayor is a Muslim.

Held

The matters over which Shari'a district courts have Jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, specifically in Article 143. Consistent with the purpose of the law to
provide for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among
Muslims, it has a catchall provision granting Shari'a district courts original jurisdiction over
personal and real actions except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. cralawred The
Shari'a district courts' jurisdiction over these matters is concurrent with regular civil courts, i.e.,
municipal trial courts and regional trial courts. There is, however, a limit to the general
jurisdiction of Shari'a district courts over matters ordinarily cognizable by regular courts: such
jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the
action must be filed before the regular courts.
The complaint below, which is a real action involving title to and possession of the land situated
at Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal, was filed by private respondents before the Shari'a District
Court pursuant to the general jurisdiction conferred by Article 143(2)(b). In determining whether
the Shari'a District Court has jurisdiction over the case, the threshold question is whether both
parties are Muslims. There is no disagreement that private respondents, as plaintiffs below, are
Muslims. The only dispute is whether the requirement is satisfied because the mayor of the
defendant municipality is also a Muslim.

When Article 143(2)(b) qualifies the conferment of jurisdiction to actions "wherein the parties
involved are Muslims," the word "parties" necessarily refers to the real parties in interest.
Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines real parties in interest as those who stand to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or are entitled to the avails of the suit. In this

26
case, the parties who will be directly benefited or injured are the private respondents, as real
party plaintiffs, and the Municipality of Tangkal, as the real party defendant. In their complaint,
private respondents claim that their predecessor-in-interest, Macalabo, entered into an
agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal for the use of the land. Their cause of action is
based on the Municipality of Tangkal's alleged failure and refusal to return the land or pay for its
reasonable value in accordance with the agreement. Accordingly, they pray for the return of the
land or the payment of reasonable rentals thereon. Thus, a judgment in favor of private
respondents, either allowing them to recover possession or entitling them to rentals, would
undoubtedly be beneficial to them; correlatively, it would be prejudicial to the Municipality of
Tangkal which would either be deprived possession of the land on which its municipal hall
currently stands or be required to allocate funds for payment of rent. Conversely, a judgment in
favor of the Municipality of Tangkal would effectively quiet its title over the land and defeat the
claims of private respondents.

It is clear from the title and the averments in the complaint that Mayor Batingolo was impleaded
only in a representative capacity, as chief executive of the local government of Tangkal. When
an action is defended by a representative, that representative is not-and neither does he
become-a real party in interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in interest; the
representative remains to be a third party to the action. That Mayor Batingolo is a Muslim is
therefore irrelevant for purposes of complying with the jurisdictional requirement under Article
143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims. To satisfy the requirement, it is the real party defendant,
the Municipality of Tangkal, who must be a Muslim. Such a proposition, however, is a legal
impossibility.

The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a "Muslim" as "a person who testifies to the
oneness of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad and professes Islam."31 Although the
definition does not explicitly distinguish between natural and juridical persons, it nonetheless
connotes the exercise of religion, which is a fundamental personal right. The ability to testify to
the "oneness of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad" and to profess Islam is, by its nature,
restricted to natural persons. In contrast, juridical persons are artificial beings with "no
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires."33 They are considered persons
only by virtue of legal fiction. The Municipality of Tangkal falls under this category. Under the
Local Government Code, a municipality is a body politic and corporate that exercises powers as
a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity representing the
inhabitants of its territory.

In view of the foregoing, the Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction under the law to decide
private respondents' complaint because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. 

1.
Military Courts. Articles of War
 Person Subject to it

(a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary; all members of the reserve force, from the dates
of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions;
and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said
service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same;

(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary second lieutenants;

(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not otherwise subject to
these articles;

(d) All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Mislang, 883 SCRA, Oct. 15, 2018

DECISION

27
Antecedent Facts

Respondent Mislang who was the Commanding Officer of the 41 st Infantry Battalion,
Philippine Army (PA), along with Valera, the then Governor of the Province of Abra,
and agents Durwin and Baharin of the Military Intelligence Group were all charged
with Grave Misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman for allegedly hatching a
plot to kill the former Mayor of Lagayan, Abra, Cecilia S. Luna (Luna) and her
family; and in relation to the shooting of complainants Corporal Eduardo Barcelona
(Barcelona) and Corporal Antonio Rosqueta (Rosqueta) of the 41 st Infantry
Battalion, PA, where the latter was mortally wounded, for the following:

i. complaint-affidavit dated March 8, 2005 of Luna;

ii. complaint-affidavit dated March 11, 2005 of Barcelona, 41 st Infantry

Battalion, PA; and
iii. complaint-affidavit dated April 13, 2005 of Elena V. Rosqueta. 8

According to Barcelona, he and Rosqueta (now deceased) regularly reported to

respondent for both official and unofficial, as well as legal and illegal, instructions.
Respondent allegedly gave each of them a .45 caliber pistol in April 2004, and
directed them to tail and assassinate Mayor Luna. For the said purpose, they were
also provided seed money by the respondent. Barcelona and Rosqueta also met
with respondent's so-called assets, Durwin and Baharin.9

In June 2004, respondent allegedly ordered the inclusion of Mayor Luna's two sons,
Ryan and Jendrick, in the assassination plot. In July 2004, respondent brought
Barcelona and Rosqueta, and another supposed lackey of respondent, Corporal
John Pablo to the place where the assassination was to be done. The murders were
supposed to take place during a birthday party. The self-confessed hired gunmen
also claimed to have conversed with Valera, who was allegedly privy to the scheme.
The planned assassination was, however, not carried out because of the absence of
Ryan and Jendrick at the event.10

The failed assassination plot allegedly enraged respondent. Barcelona and Rosqueta
were placed on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) status in December 2004, as they
began distancing themselves from the respondent. Subsequently, Respondent also
allegedly ordered the assassination of Barcelona and Rosqueta, who in turn filed a
complaint with the Intelligence Security Group in Fort Bonifacio against respondent
on December 17, 2004.11 Meanwhile, Durwin and Baharin contacted Barcelona and
Rosqueta for a meeting. On their way to a party in Isabela Province, Durwin and
Baharin shot Rosqueta to death and seriously wounded Barcelona who nonetheless
survived.12

Meanwhile, on March 8, 2004, Barcelona and Rosqueta submitted their affidavits

relative to respondent's part in the assassination plot. 13 Respondent did not submit
a counter-affidavit to refute the charges against him.

While petitioner found insufficient evidence to hold Valera administratively liable 14,
it nonetheless deemed the evidence substantial enough to conclude that
respondent, together with agents Durwin and Baharin, were guilty of unlawful
behavior in relation to their office.15

Consequently on May 9, 2011, the petitioner issued its Joint Decision, which
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered:

28
1. The charges for Grave Misconduct against respondent VICENTE P. VALERA are
hereby DISMISSED.

2. Respondents COLONEL NOEL MISLANG, Batallion Commander, 41st Infantry

Batallion, Philippine Army, MAURO DURWIN, Agent, Military Intelligence Group,
and FLORENCIO BAHARIN, Agent, Military Intelligence Group, are hereby
found GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and are accordingly METED OUT the
penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE.

The Commanding General, Philippine Army, or his duly authorized representative is

hereby directed to immediately implement this Decision.

SO ORDERED.16

On the same date, petitioner issued an Order 17 for the execution of respondent's
dismissal from the service.

Aggrieved, respondent sought recourse before the CA without first moving for
reconsideration the petitioner's Joint Decision.18 Neither the petitioner nor the
complainants filed a comment on the petition before the CA.19

Considering that no comment on the petition was filed before it, the CA considered
respondent's assertion that neither copies of the complaint-affidavits, nor any order
from the petitioner to file his counter-affidavits were received by him. The CA took
notice of the manifestations and motions filed by the respondent before the
petitioner, alternatively asking either to be furnished copies of the complaints or
seeking the dismissal of the administrative cases for violation of due process and
his right to a speedy disposition of his cases. Respondent contended that he was
not made a party to the proceedings.

On June 16, 2009, or four years after the complaints were filed before the
petitioner, respondent's former counsel Atty. Leonardo P. Tamayo wrote a letter to
Hon. Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law
Enforcement Office (MOLEO), informing the latter that several complaints based on
the same evidence supporting the complaints filed before the petitioner had also
been filed against the respondent before the General Court Martial, PA; that while
pending preliminary investigation before the petitioner, the General Court Martial
took cognizance of the complaints, arraigned the respondent, heard the cases and
rendered an Order on February 7, 2007 declaring respondent "Not Guilty". 20

The records also disclosed a letter21 dated November 11, 2010 of Director Wilbert
Candelaria (Dir. Candelaria), Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office,
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, informing respondent's counsel that
OMB-L-A-05-0202-C and OMB-L-C-05-0276-C were already dismissed as of
September 24, 2010; while OMB-L-A-05-0201-C, OMB-L-C-05-0275-C, OMB-L-A-
05-0309-D, and OMB-L-C-05-0409-D were still undergoing preliminary
investigation and administrative adjudication.

On October 15, 2012, the CA issued the presently assailed decision. Reasoning that
the rule of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet"22 applies in this case, the
CA observed that the evidence relied upon by the petitioner were the affidavits of
Barcelona and Rosqueta, implicating the respondent in a supposed conspiracy
through their admissions of illegal activities. In this regard, the CA found no
independent or extraneous evidence to prove conspiracy.

The CA also found that the General Court Martial, PA, had jurisdiction over the
complaints against the respondent, citing the Memorandum of Agreement 23 (MOA)
dated January 28, 2004 between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the

29
Office of the Ombudsman. delineating the lines of disciplinary authority between
them. The appellate court thus ruled that the decision of the General Court Martial
finding respondent "Not Guilty" became res judicata to the effect that the petitioner was
precluded from further acting on the same complaints investigated, tried, and deliberated upon
by the military court under the following charges:

CHARGE I: Violation of the 96th Article of War.

(Conduct Unbecoming of an Officer and a Gentleman)

Specification I: In that LTC NOEL P. MISLANG 0-9155 INF (GSC) PA during his
incumbency as the Commanding Officer of the 41 st Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, a person subject to military law, did, sometime in April
2004 before the National and Local Election, at the province of Abra, wrongfully and
unlawfully issued an order to Cpl Eduardo A Barcelona 805092 (Inf) PA and Pfc
Antonio R Rosqueta 792505 (Inf) PA, intelligence operatives of 41 st Infantry
Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, to assassinate Mayor Cecil Luna,
and her family, of Lagayan, Abra. Contrary to law.

CHARGE II: Violation of the 97th Article of War.

(Neglects to the Prejudice of Good Order and Military Discipline)

Specification I: In that LTC NOEL P. MISLANG 0-9155 INF (GSC) PA, while being
the Commanding Officer of the 41st Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, a person subject to military law, did, for the period covering June
2004 to November 2004, fail to institute prompt disciplinary actions against his
erring personnel namely: Cpl Eduardo A Barcelona 805092 (Inf) PA and Pfc Antonio
R Rosqueta 792505 (Inf) PA, intelligence operatives of 41 st Infantry Battalion,
5th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, knowing them to be involved in illegal
activities. Contrary to law.24

The petitioner is now before this Court arguing that res judicata is inapplicable in
this case, and insisting that the factual findings in its May 9, 2011 Joint Decision
are supported by substantial evidence, and thus conclusive upon the reviewing
authority.

Issue

Did the CA correctly set aside the Office of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision dated
May 9, 2011?

Petitioner insists that the same was based on substantial evidence and points out
that it may render its decision in administrative disciplinary cases based only on the
affidavits and documents constituting the evidence on record, as it had done so in
this case.25

Furthermore, petitioner argues that it has jurisdiction over the complaints against
respondent notwithstanding the General Court Martial's exercise of its concurrent
jurisdiction over the same acts subject of the complaints. 26

Finally, petitioner now argues that respondent violated the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies in filing his petition for review before the CA without
prior resort to a motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman. Petitioner also
asserts that respondent failed to attach a copy of the assailed May 9, 2011 Joint
Decision to respondent's petition that was filed before the CA, which allegedly
should have been fatal to respondent's appeal. 27

The Court's Ruling

30
Addressing the alleged procedural errors first, this Court finds no merit in
petitioner's contention that respondent's Rule 43 petition before the CA should have
been dismissed outright. The inference that the assailed Joint Decision was not
attached to the petition lodged before the CA cannot be made simply from
petitioner's bare assertion that the wrong document was attached to its copy of the
petition furnished by the respondent. It does not necessarily follow that the CA was
not furnished a correct copy of the appealed Joint Decision. A plain reading of the
CA's decision would show that it apparently had a copy of the subject May 9, 2011
Joint Decision, as it even cited the same in its footnotes. 28 The CA then was not
deprived the opportunity to fully review the appealed Joint Decision. Petitioner also
could have manifested and resolved this matter before the appellate court. It is
now too late in the day to make a fatal issue of it before this Court.

The argument that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not

filing a motion for reconsideration prior to appealing his case before the CA also
fails to persuade. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
absolute.29 The exceptions include instances when there is a violation of due
process, as well as when the issue involved is purely a legal question. 30 Recall that
respondent alleged that he was not furnished copies of the complaints despite
repeated manifestations and motions lodged before the petitioner, requesting that
he be furnished so that he could file his counter-affidavits and position paper. Due
process concerns had been put in issue before the CA. Also raised on appeal was
the legal effect of respondent's "acquittal" before the General Court Martial on the
pending complaints before the Ombudsman, undoubtedly a legal question. There
was thus sufficient basis to dispense with a prior motion for reconsideration.

On the question of jurisdiction, it is beyond dispute that the Ombudsman 31 and the
General Court Martial of the AFP have concurring or coordinate jurisdiction over
administrative disciplinary cases involving erring military personnel, particularly
over violations of the Articles of War that are service-connected. 32 We briefly revisit
the nature of court-martial proceedings for context.

In discussing the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to court-martial

proceedings insofar as those not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for
Courts-Martial, this Court had clarified that a court-martial is a court, and the
prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and not an administrative
case.33 Nonetheless, in threshing out the court martial's jurisdiction and the nature
of offenses committed by military personnel under the Articles of War, this Court
also emphasized its administrative disciplinary character, viz:

Article 96 of the Articles of War provides:

ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. - Any officer, member of

the Nurse Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is
convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed
from the service.

We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-
connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No.
7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the
alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and
the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and
disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on
their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of
the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the
same–dismissal from the service–imposable only by the military court. Such
penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the
military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military
discipline.34 (Emphasis in the original).

31
The peculiarity and import of court-martial proceedings was explained thus:

Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable
only to military personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization
requiring a system of discipline separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel carry high-powered arms and
other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the nature of
a military organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a
separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed
government personnel.

A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may

question his reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction
from a civil court. However, a soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a
restraining or injunction if his military commander reassigns him to another area of
military operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will collapse.35

Being sui generis, court-martial proceedings contemplate both the penal and

administrative disciplinary nature of military justice. In view of its administrative
disciplinary aspect which court-martial proceedings share with the petitioner, both
have the concurrent authority to dismiss respondent from the service. "In
administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining
authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take
cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction".36

Having settled that point, this Court proceeds to debunk respondent's theory that
by virtue of the MOA of January 28, 2004 , the General Court Martial had exclusive
jurisdiction over the instant case because it is non graft and corruption related.

Both the CA and the respondent take the view that petitioner acted without
authority in issuing its Joint Decision because the MOA of January 28, 2004
between petitioner and the AFP delineated their lines of disciplinary authority, such
that non-graft and corruption cases against military personnel are to be endorsed
by petitioner to the AFP. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the MOA does
not set aside its disciplinary power as Ombudsman, arguing that adherence to the
MOA is expected but not required. Petitioner insists that because the complaints
were directly filed before it, its jurisdiction had already vested.

It bears stressing that the January 28, 2004 MOA was not, and could not have
been, an abrogation of the Ombudsman's plenary jurisdiction over complaints
against public officials or employees for illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient acts
or omissions. "[T]he jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a
matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties". 37

A plain reading of the MOA would indicate that it was executed to avoid conflicting
decisions and wastage of government resources through proper coordination. The
MOA itself expressly recognizes petitioner's primary jurisdiction, 38 even as it
foresaw the need for jointly conducting inquiries and/or fact-finding investigations
between the petitioner and the AFP, assisted by the Commission on Audit if need
be, with respect to graft and corruption cases. 39 It even reserved petitioner's
authority to determine what law was violated in cases directly lodged before it,
including the provisions of the Articles of War. 40 What it does provide is that, should
a case be filed before it and it finds that it is non-graft or corruption-related, then it
is to be endorsed to the AFP. The purpose of the proviso is coordination and
avoidance of conflicting parallel investigations.

32
When the January 28, 2004 MOA provided that non-graft cases against military
personnel shall be endorsed by petitioner to the disciplinary authority of the AFP 41,
it had done so as a matter of efficiency and in recognition of the latter's concurrent
jurisdiction over the same offenses and its vast resources for the conduct of
investigations, including military intelligence. [C]oncurrence of jurisdiction does not
allow concurrent exercise of jurisdiction. This is the reason why we have the rule
that excludes any other concurrently authorized body from the body first exercising
jurisdiction. This is the reason why forum shopping is malpractice of law. 42

The records disclose that the AFP had first acquired jurisdiction and that petitioner
should have taken notice of such fact after having been apprised of it on June 16,
2009.43 This would not have been an abrogation of its jurisdiction, but adherence to
the principle of concurrence of jurisdiction that was operationally recognized by the
January 28, 2004 MOA.

The earliest complaint-affidavit filed before the petitioner was dated March 8,
200544, whereas the respective Sinumpaang Salaysay of Rosqueta and Barcelona
were executed on December 17, 200445 at the Philippine Army Headquarters,
clearly ahead of the former. While the AFP's specification of charges were proffered
later or in May of 200546, it appears that as early as January 13, 2005 47, the
respondent was already reassigned pending investigation preliminary to court-
martial trial proper. The AFP fielded senior military officers to investigate the
allegations against respondent and to secure the affidavits of enlisted personnel,
officers, and others linked to the controversy. 48 As a result, Lt. Col. Remy R.
Maglaya submitted his Investigation Report to the Army Inspector General on
January 31, 2005.49 The AFP having first acquired jurisdiction, petitioner should
have refrained from further acting on the complaints.

We find that in this case, the AFP General Court Martial's exercise of jurisdiction is
to the exclusion of the Ombudsman exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Necessarily,
the present petition must be denied.

Even assuming that petitioner validly exercised its jurisdiction, this Court cannot
agree that petitioner's Joint Decision was grounded on substantial evidence. We
note that petitioner failed to accord respondent administrative due process. There is
nothing on the record to show that respondent was furnished with, or had
otherwise received a copy of the complaint-affidavits on which petitioner's Joint
Decision was based. Thus, it cannot be said that respondent had a fair opportunity
to squarely and intelligently answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal
evidence thereto.

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Reyes,50 this Court has emphasized that "[a]

judgment in an administrative case that imposes the extreme penalty of dismissal
must not only be based on substantial evidence but also rendered with due regard
to the rights of the parties to due process." Pertinently:

[D]ue process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following

cardinal principles: (1) the respondents' right to a hearing, which includes the right
to present one's case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some
basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the
tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the
controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7)
the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the
reasons for it and the various issues involved.51 (Emphasis in the original)

33
Petitioner's contention that it may decide cases based solely on the affidavits
without need of formal hearing, is correct. However, there is nothing on the record
that would refute respondent's assertion that he had not been able to submit
counter-affidavit or a position paper to present his side because he was not
furnished copies of the complaints despite repeated manifestations and motions. As
the opportunity to consider and appreciate the respondent's counter-statement of
facts was denied him, the Court agrees that the CA was hard-pressed to consider
the evidence against the respondent as substantial.

In Primo C. Miro v. Maarilyn Mendoza Vda. De Erederos, et al.,52 it is settled that:

[F]indings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported
by substantial evidence. Their factual findings are generally accorded with great
weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, by reason of their special
knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.

xxxx

This rule on conclusiveness of factual findings, however, is not an absolute one.

Despite the respect given to administrative findings of fact, the CA may resolve
factual issues, review and re-evaluate the evidence on record and reverse the
administrative agency's findings if not supported by substantial evidence. Thus,
when the findings of fact by the administrative or quasi-judicial agencies (like the
Office of the Ombudsman/Deputy Ombudsman) are not adequately supported by
substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts. 53

Keeping in mind that:

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, jurisdiction is generally limited to the review

of errors of law committed by the appellate court. The Supreme Court is not
obliged to review all over again the evidence which the parties adduced in the
court a quo. Of course, the general rule admits of exceptions, such as where the
factual findings of the CA and the trial court are conflicting or
contradictory.54 (Emphasis in the original)

The question of whether or not substantial evidence exists to hold the respondent
liable for the charge of grave misconduct is one of fact, but a review is warranted
considering the conflicting findings of fact of the Deputy Ombudsman and of CA.

Applying the rule on res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the CA noted that
the petitioner relied solely on the allegations in the complaint-affidavits of the two
self-confessed killers-for-hire to implicate respondent as a co-conspirator. This rule
prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided
that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial
confession.55 In this case, the CA found no corroborative evidence of conspiracy,
direct or circumstantial. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that its administrative
proceedings are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidentiary rules.

Notably, petitioner's factual conclusions were indeed based solely on the allegations
in the complaint-affidavits. Compounding this observation with the fact that
respondent was not furnished copies of the complaint-affidavits as would have
afforded him the opportunity to present his side, the CA cannot be faulted for
concluding that petitioner's Joint Decision was not supported by substantial
evidence. Generally, "while administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the
Office of the Ombudsman, are not bound by the technical rules of procedure, this
rule cannot be taken as a license to disregard fundamental evidentiary rules; the

34
decision of the administrative agencies and the evidence it relies upon must, at the
very least, be substantial."56

As the Court explained in Miro v. Mendoza:

The evidence presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to have
probative value. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than
a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.57

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing discussion, the petition is

hereby DENIED.

N. Discuss the concept, description and application of the following:

1. Delegated jurisdiction
> MTC, MCTC, and the MMTC are granted delegated jurisdiction to hear and determine
cadastral and land registration cases in the following instances:
1. Where the lot sought to be registered is not the subject of controversy and application
2. Where the lot is contested but the value thereof doesn’t exceed P100,000 and no
oppositor, such value to be ascertained by the:
> Affidavit of the claimant or
> By the agreement of the respective claimants, if there be more than one, or
> From the corresponding tax declaration of the real property
-By RTC
-Remedy is to appeal to the CA

2. Special jurisdiction
O. Courts of special/limited jurisdiction are those which have jurisdiction only for a
particular purpose or a clothed with special powers for the performance of specified
duties beyond which they have no authority of any kind.
-Habeas corpus in the absence of the RTC judges
-Involves urgency
-Only in MTC

Which restricts the court’s jurisdiction only to particular cases and subject to such limitations
as may be provided by the governing law

1. Limited jurisdiction
Those which have no power to decide their own jurisdiction and only try cases permitted by the statute
-may be in MTC or RTC
-MTC- Unlawful detainer, forcible entry: issue of possession, cant go beyond
-RTC- pecuniary estimation
-issues involved
2. Primary jurisdiction
Courts will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge and experience of said tribunal in determining
technical and intricate matters of fact
Unduran vs. Aberasturi, 823 SCRA (2017)
FACTS:

         This is a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s
En Banc Decision dated October 20, 2015, which the petition was denied and affirmed the Court of
Appeals decision. In the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, they maintain their contention believing
that it is the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) not the regular courts, which has
jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving ancestral domain of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICC’s) and Indigenous Peoples (IP’s) regardless of the parties involved.

35
         In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that:

1. The NCIP and not the regular courts has jurisdiction over the case under the principle
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint, and pursuant to jurisprudence allowing exemptions thereto;
2. The jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case rests upon the NCIP as conferred by
the IPRA;
3. The IPRA is a social legislation that seeks to protect the IPs not so much from
themselves or fellow IPs but more from non-IPs;
4. The IPRA created the NCIP as the agency of government mandated to realize the rights
of IPs;
5. In the exercise of its mandate, the NCIP was created as a quasi-judicial body with
jurisdiction to resolve claims and disputes involving the rights of IPs;
6. The jurisdiction of the NCIP in resolving claims and disputes involving the rights of IPs is
not limited to IPs of the same tribe;
7. Harmonizing the related provisions of the IPRA supports the argument that the NCIP has
jurisdiction over cases involving IP rights whether or not the parties are IPs or non-ICCs/IPs;
8. The NCIP as quasi-judicial agency provides IPs mechanisms for access to justice in the
fulfillment of the State's obligations to respect, protect and fulfill IP's human rights;
9. The NCIP has the competence and skill that would greatly advance the administration of
justice with respect to protection and fulfillment of ICC/IP rights/human rights; and
10. (Recognition and enforcement of customary laws and indigenous justice systems fulfill
the State's obligations as duty bearers in the enforcement of human rights.

    
ISSUE:

        Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has the jurisdiction over the disputes and controversies
involving the ancestral domain of the ICC and IP regardless of the parties involved not the NCIP.

HELD:

         Yes. It is the court of general jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear and decide cases whose
subject matter does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. In contrast, a court of limited jurisdiction, or a court acting
under special powers, has only the jurisdiction expressly delegated.  An administrative agency, acting in
its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction which could wield only such powers that are
specifically granted to it by the enabling statutes. Limited or special jurisdiction is that which is confined to
particular causes or which can be exercised only under limitations and circumstances prescribed by the
statute.

         Meanwhile, the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited under customary laws presents two important issues:
first, whether it is legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs with penalties under customary laws; and
second, whether a member of a particular ICC/IP could be punished in accordance with the customary
laws of another ICC/IP.

         Therefore, the Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of a case is not merely based on the allegations of the complaint in certain cases where
the actual issues are evidenced by subsequent pleadings. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court
cannot be made to depend on the defenses raised by the defendant in the answer or a motion to dismiss;
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Suffice it also to
state that the Court is unanimous in denying the petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the CA
correctly ruled that the subject matter of the original and amended complaint based on the allegations
therein is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

LBP vs. Dalauta, 835 SCRA (2017)

FACTS:
Eugenio Dalauta (Dalauta) was the registered owner of an agricultural land in Florida,
Butuan City. The land was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under
compulsory acquisition of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Thus, Dalauta received on February 7, 1994 a Notice of Coverage notifying him that his
land was subject of expropriation. Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered

36
₱192,782.59 as compensation for the land, but Dalauta rejected such valuation for
being too low.
The case was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). A summary
administrative proceeding was conducted to determine the appropriate just
compensation for the subject property. In its Resolution, the PARAD affirmed the
valuation made by LBP in the amount of ₱192,782.59.

Dalauta filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as
Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
 
Dalauta argued that the valuation of his land should be determined using the formula in
DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, which was Land Value (LV) = Capitalized Net Income
(CNI) x 0.9 + Market Value (MV) per tax declaration x 0.1, as he had a net income of
₱350,000.00 in 1993 from the sale of the trees that were grown on the said land to
Norberto C. Fonacier.

On May 30, 2006, the SAC rendered its decision pegging the just compensation in the
amount of ₱2,639,557.00, higher than the value made by LBP. Unsatisfied, LBP filed a
motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the SAC.

Hence, LBP filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the
CA, arguing, among others that the SAC erred in taking cognizance of the case when
the DARAB decision sustaining the LBP valuation had long attained finality and that the
SAC violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, in
fixing the just compensation.

The CA ruled that the SAC correctly took cognizance of the case. It ruled that the SAC
had original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation.  
 
ISSUES

1. Whether or not the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case
despite the finality of the PARAD Resolution.
2. Whether or not the trial court correctly computed the just compensation of the
subject property.

 
RULING:
Yes. It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court,
has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners." This "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the
RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original
jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review
of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the
decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from
Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in
the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to
convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be
contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void.
Thus, direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid.
 
No. On Just Compensation

Upon an assiduous assessment of the different valuations arrived at by the DAR, the
SAC and the CA, the Court agrees with the position of Justice Francis Jardeleza

37
that just compensation for respondent Dalauta's land should be computed based
on the formula provided under DAR-LBP Joint Memorandum Circular No. 11,
series of 2003 (JMC No. 11 (2003). The case was remanded to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 5, Butuan City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, for purposes of
computing just compensation in accordance with JMC No.11.

3. Residual jurisdiction
Jurisdiction of a court in spite losing its jurisdiction because of the perfection of an appeal still
retains it for purposes of preserving the rights of the parties.

A is the plaintiff and B is the defendant. Trial court ruled in favor B. A appeals. Before the
records are transferred to the appellate court, the trial court retains jurisdiction.

How can that particular trial court exercise such jurisdiction? Can an execution be granted ex
parte? No. On what action can the trial court act upon? Motion for execution pending appeal.
Once appeal is perfected, and the records of the case have been transmitted to the appellate
court, there is no more exercise of residual jurisdiction. But in case of execution as a matter of
right, once jurisdiction is lost, it can never be regained. Nonetheless, under Rule 39, the writ of
execution can be granted by the trial court only.

How can the trial court, if it has already lost its jurisdiction, still exercise the same? In the
exercise of residual jurisdiction.

Dev. Bank of the Phil. Vs. Carpio, 816 SCRA (2017)

o Requisites: trial, judgment, appeal
- FACTS:
-
- On August 21, 2001, Dabay Abad, Hatab Abad, Omar Abas, Hanapi Abdullah, Rojea Ab Abdullah,
Abdullah Abedin, Alex Abedin, et al .(Abad, et al.), represented by their attorney-in-fact, Manuel L.
Te, filed a complaint for delivery of certificates of title, damages, and attorney's fees against petitioner
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprise
(GFSME) before the RTC.
-
- In their, Complaint, Abad, et al. prayed, among others, for the issuance of a writ of seizure, pending
hearing of the case, for delivery of their certificates of title they claimed to be unlawfully detained by
DBP and GFSME. They alleged that their certificates of title were submitted to DBP for safekeeping
pursuant to the loan agreement they entered into with DBP. The same certificates of title were turned
over by DBP to GFSME because of its call on GFSME's guarantee on their loan, which became due
and demandable, and pursuant to the guarantee agreement between DBP and GFSME.
-
- As prayed for, the RTC issued the Writ of Seizure on August 24, 2001. The writ was accompanied by
Plaintiffs Bond for Manual Delivery of Personal Property issued by Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation (CBIC).
-
- On September 5, 2001, DBP filed its Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Quash Writ of
Seizure on the ground of improper venue, among others. Abad, et al. filed their Opposition and later,
their Supplemental Opposition, to which they attached the Delivery Receipt showing that the court
sheriff took possession of 228 certificates of title from GFSME.
-
- In its Order, dated September 25, 2001, the RTC granted DBP's omnibus motion and dismissed the
case for improper venue.
-
- On December 20, 2001, DBP and GFSME filed their Joint Motion to Order Plaintiffs to Return Titles
to Defendants DBP and GFSME. After Abad, et al. filed their opposition, the RTC issued the Order,
dated January 27, 2003, directing Abad, et al. to return the 228 certificates of title.
-
- Abad, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court praying, among others, for the
nullification and reversal of the January 27, 2003 Order of the RTC. The Court, however, in its June
9, 2003 Resolution, dismissed the petition.
-
- On September 18, 2003, DBP filed its Motion for Writ of Execution of the January 27, 2003 Order
before the RTC. On December 16, 2003, the RTC issued the corresponding Writ of Execution. The
Sheriffs Return of Service, however, indicated that Abad, et al. failed to deliver the certificates of title

38
-
-
- ISSUE:
-
- Whether or not the court erred in its blind adherence to and strict application of section 20, Rule 57 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
-
-
- RULING:
-
- No. Accordingly, the CA did not commit any reversible error when it applied the rules of procedure in
resolving the issue at hand. The application for damages was belatedly filed.
-  SEC. 20. Claim for damages on account of illegal attachment. - If the judgment on the action be in
favor of the party against whom attachment was issued, he may recover, upon the bond given or
deposit made by the attaching creditor, any damages resulting from the attachment. Such damages
may be awarded only upon application and after proper hearing, and shall be included in the final
judgment. The application must be filed before the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the
judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching creditor and his surety or sureties,
setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof.
-
- If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the attachment was
issued, he must claim damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an application
with notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties, before the
judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The appellate court may allow the application to
be heard and decided by the trial court.
-
- Nothing precludes DBP from instituting an action for collection of sum of money against
respondents.1âwphi1Besides, if the parcels of land covered by the certificates of title, which DBP
sought to recover from respondents, were mortgaged to the former, then DBP, as mortgage-creditor,
has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real
action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is
complete by itself. If the mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action
for the collection of the debt, and vice versa.

-JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT that remains within the trial court, even if it has lost jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the jurisdiction
-Ordinary appeal- appeal by record on appeal
If notice of appeal- upon filing by notice of appeal of the appeallant, petition for review,court loses
jurisdiction upon approval of the records in due time

Inc. vs. De la Cruz, 781 SCREA (2016)

Lotte is a domestic corporation where respondents are among those who were hired and
assigned to the confectionery facility. On 14 December 1995 - and yearly thereafter until the
year 2000 - 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services (7J) entered into a contract with Lotte. In
compliance with the terms and conditions of the service contract, and to accommodate the
needs of Lotte for personnel/workers to do and perform "piece works," respondents, among
others, were hired and assigned to Lotte as repackers or sealers. However, either in October,
1999 or on February 9, 2000, Lotte dispensed with their services allegedly due to the
expiration/termination of the service contract by with 7J.

Respondents lodged a labor complaint against Lotte and 7J where the LA rendered judgment
declaring 7J as their employer. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the LA. Respondents filed a petition
for certiorari in the CA, insisting that their employer is Lotte. Lotte denied that respondents were
its employees and prayed that the petition be dismissed for failure to implead 7J. CA reversed
and set aside the rulings of the LA and the NLRC thereby declaring Lotte as the real employer
and that 7J who engaged in labor-only contracting was merely the agent of Lotte.

Issue: W/N 7J is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded in respondents’
petition in the CA.

SC: Yes. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can
be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of
indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest

39
the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act
in a case".

Without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court

cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions
of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even
as to those present.

7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest because it will be affected by the outcome of

the case. LA and NLRC found 7J solely liable as the employer. CA rendered Lotte jointly and
severally liable with 7J, who was not impleaded, by holding that the former is the real employer.
Its decision directly affected 7J.

4.
Epistolary jurisdiction
It is the power and authority of the court to hear, try, and decide a case arising
from a letter petition introduced by a third person, rather than the aggrieved
party, for the protection of public interest, pursuant to the concept
of Judicial Activism.

Resident Marine Mammals vs. Reyes, 756 SCRA (2015)

ISSUE:  Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is violative of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and statutes 

FACTS:  Petitioners, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the

petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species,
which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria
Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and as friends (to
be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the
protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-
petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and
undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others. On June
13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This
contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies
included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic
data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as
well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait. On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX
formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and
production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square
kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait. JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well
during the second sub-phase of the project. On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR
Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas
exploration project in Tañon Strait.14 Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX
began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan
town in the western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008. The
petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution. 

DECISION:  Granted 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service
contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, the Court held that
the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to
a ban on them per se. In fact, portions of the deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4,
Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts as understood in
the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses
prevalent during the martial law regime. In summarizing the matters discussed in the

40
ConCom, the Court established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is the
exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this
Court enumerated in La Bugal: Such service contracts may be entered into only with
respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to
several safeguards, among which are these requirements: (1) The service contract shall
be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms,
conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and
avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country. (2) The President
shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is
presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at
different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny. (3)
Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress
to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and
interpose timely objections, if any.69cralawlawlibrary. Adhering to the aforementioned
guidelines, the Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance with
the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.

5. Split jurisdiction
P.  this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari
petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial
bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter –
precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of
justice.  The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially
35

considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized
competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases
without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees
with the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents'
complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari
seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be
filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one
court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the
very same case.

Q. Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial

abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the
authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving
to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same
case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant
of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC
carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to,
its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC,
in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter

City of Manila vs. Judge Cuerdo (2014)

Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Resolutions  dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the Court of
1

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87948.

The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo,
assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against private respondents
SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware
Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus
Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private
respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM),

41
said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect under
Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the
issuance of their business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the ₱19,316,458.77
assessment under protest.

On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City] the
complaint denominated as one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected
Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction"

which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM before public respondent's sala [at Branch
112]. In the amended complaint they filed on February 16, 2004, private respondents alleged that, in
relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM were violative of
the limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of Republic Act. No. 7160 [Local Government
Code] on double taxation. They further averred that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which
amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had already been declared to be illegal and
unconstitutional by the Department of Justice. 2

In its Order  dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ of
3

preliminary injunction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration  but the RTC denied it in its Order  dated October 15,
4 5

2004.

Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the July 9, 2004 and
October 15, 2004 Orders of the RTC. 6

In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari
holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction
over private respondents' complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA
9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in
the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,  but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated November
7

29, 2006.

Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:

I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the case for
lack of jurisdiction.

II- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in enjoining by issuing a Writ of Injunction the
petitioners, their agents and/or authorized representatives from implementing Section 21 of
the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, as amended, against private respondents.

III- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction despite failure of
private respondents to make a written claim for tax credit or refund with the City Treasurer of
Manila.

IV- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that under Section 21 of the Manila
Revenue Code, as amended, they are mere collecting agents of the City Government.

V- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction because petitioner
City of Manila and its constituents would result to greater damage and prejudice thereof.
(sic) 8

Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the instant petition should be denied for
being moot and academic.

42
Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court discovered that a Decision  in the
9

main case had already been rendered by the RTC on August 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby renders JUDGMENT in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant to grant a tax refund or credit for taxes paid pursuant to
Section 21 of the Revenue Code of the City of Manila as amended for the year 2002 in the
following amounts:

To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc. - P 11,462,525.02

To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, Inc. - 3,118,104.63
To plaintiff Star Appliances Center - 2,152,316.54
To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc. - 1,362,750.34
To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., Inc. - 419,689.04
To plaintiff Watsons Personal Care Health - 231,453.62
Stores Phils., Inc.
To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp. - 140,908.54
To plaintiff Surplus Marketing Corp. - 220,204.70
To plaintiff Signature Mktg. Corp. - 94,906.34
TOTAL: - P 19,316,458.77

Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under Section 21, Revenue Code of Manila
from herein plaintiff.

SO ORDERED. 10

The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the above Decision had already
become final and executory per the Certificate of Finality  issued by the same trial court on October
11

20, 2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution  was issued by the RTC on November 25, 2009. In view of the
12

foregoing, it clearly appears that the issues raised in the present petition, which merely involve the
incident on the preliminary injunction issued by the RTC, have already become moot and academic
considering that the trial court, in its decision on the merits in the main case, has already ruled in
favor of respondents and that the same decision is now final and executory. Well entrenched is the
rule that where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy,
thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value. 13

In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on jurisdiction raised by petitioners
owing to its significance and for future guidance of both bench and bar. It is a settled principle that
courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review.14

However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper to
likewise address a procedural error which petitioners committed.

Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA which dismissed their
petition filed with the said court and their motion for reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no
dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as they disposed of
the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed judgment or order is considered
final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should have
filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate process
over the original case.15

Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  As such, it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.
16 17

43
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of
substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on
certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within
which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when
there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.  Considering that the present petition
18

was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45, that an error of judgment is averred, and because of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction,
the Court deems it proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the instant petition for
certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.

Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the central issue in this case. The basic
question posed before this Court is whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action
for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

This Court rules in the affirmative.

On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA 1125) creating the CTA and giving
to the said court jurisdiction over the following:

(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation
thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or
part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties,
fees or other money charges; seizure, detention or release of property affected fines,
forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto; or other matters arising under the
Customs Law or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs; and

(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases involving the
assessment and taxation of real property or other matters arising under the Assessment
Law, including rules and regulations relative thereto.

On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending RA
1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the
level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the amendatory act provides
thus:

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:

a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed

assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation
thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed

assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations
thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code
provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;

3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally
decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;

4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties,
fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines,
forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs
Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs;

44
 5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally
decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;

6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for
review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the
Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;

7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product,
commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product,
commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and
302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic
Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said
duties.

b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of the
National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, That offenses
or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the principal amount of taxes and fees,
exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00)
or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts and the
jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the
recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously instituted
with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the filing of the criminal
action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to
reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action will be recognized.

2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:

a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases
originally decided by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction.

b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.

c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory
assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provides, however, that collection
cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties,
claimed is less than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.

2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:

a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax
collection cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.

b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the
Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective
jurisdiction.
19

A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is clearly stated that the CTA has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction, there
is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that
th e CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC
in local tax cases filed before it.

45
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original
jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied
from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.  Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v.
20

COMELEC,  Garcia v. De Jesus,  Veloria v. COMELEC,  Department of Agrarian Reform

21 22 23

Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,  and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,  this Court has ruled against the
24 25

jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the ground that there is no law which
expressly gives these tribunals such power.  It must be observed, however, that with the exception
26

of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,  these rulings pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals exercising
27

quasi-judicial powers. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 8249  now provides that
28

the special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs
of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme
Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP
129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue,
among others, a writ of certiorari,whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional
Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is
provided under Section 21 of BP 129.

The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the
CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that
judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of
the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in
cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA,
by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.

Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have
the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over
appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also
such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There
is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.

Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al.  that "if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal
29

or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."  This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of
30

Appeals,  where the Court stated that "a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
31

jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or
decisions of the lower court."  The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were reiterated in the more
32

recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo  and Bulilis v. Nuez.

33 34

Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law,
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.

If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies
with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA,
of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter – precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which
is anathema to the orderly administration of justice.  The Court cannot accept that such was the
35

legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with
the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax
cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with
the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax
refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule

46
otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case
while another court rules on an incident in the very same case.

Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial abhorrence to split
jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax case
filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against
interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the
decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness
to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by
the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate
jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to
review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision
over the acts of the latter. 36

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it
effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the
final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make
the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has
authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise
of that jurisdiction.  For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of
1âwphi1

any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending
before it.
37

Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction
should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These
should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them
in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any
attempted thwarting of such process.

In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA and
shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general
grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are
such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential
to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or
are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and
include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 38

Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers
necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation,
implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing
laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that
are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for
the enforcement of its judgments and mandates."  Hence, demands, matters or questions ancillary
39

or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be
taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over
the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters
which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance. 40

Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of the CTA to
take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a
local tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule that, insofar as quasi-
judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue writs of certiorari must still be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of their
appellate jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies.

1. Expanded/Extended jurisdiction

47
 Edcel Lagman vs. Pimentel III, 854 SCRA (2018)

FACTS:

These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018.

On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the
rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives
his written Report, citing the events and reasons that impelled him to issue
Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No. 388 while the
House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full
support to the Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke the same.

On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of
Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the
Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending Proclamation No. 216
until December 31, 2017.

In a letter to the President, through Defense Secretary Lorenzana, AFP Chief of Staff

General Guerrero, recommended the further extension of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year beginning
January 1, 2018 “for compelling reasons based on current security assessment.”

On the basis of this security assessment, Secretary Lorenzana wrote a similar

recommendation to the President “primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-
inspired Da’awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other like-minded
Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and
the communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters and financiers, and to
ensure speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the
attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic development and prosperity in
Mindanao.”

Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December 8, 2017,

asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further extend the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018,
or for such period as the Congress may determine.

On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint
session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.

ISSUE:

PROCEDURAL:

1. Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses No. 4
fatal to their petitions.
2. Whether or not the President should be dropped as party respondent.

48
3. Whether or not the Congress was an indispensable party to the consolidated
petitions.
4. Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment from examining the persistence of rebellion in Mindanao.
5. Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution in seeking review
of the extension of Proclamation No. 216.
6. Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s
request for extension of martial law is subject to judicial review.
7. Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the period
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
8. Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to
extend Proclamation No. 216.
9. Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner of the
President’s exercise of military powers.
10. Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the requisites for the
issuance of an injunctive writ.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both

Houses No. 4 fatal to their petitions. NO.

The Court held that since Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 is an official act of Congress,
the they can take judicial notice thereof. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
provides that a court can take judicial notice of the official acts of the legislative
department without the introduction of evidence.

 Moreover, the Court noted that respondents annexed a copy of the Resolution to their
Consolidated Comment.

SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not the President should be dropped as party

respondent. YES.

The Court held that the President should be dropped as party respondent considering
that he enjoys the presidential immunity from suit.

The Court reiterated their ruling in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, to wit:

It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he
can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to
enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch
and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government.

THIRD ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress was an indispensable party to the

consolidated petitions. YES.

49
The Court held that in cases impugning the extension of martial law for lack of sufficient
factual basis, the entire body of the Congress, composed of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, must be impleaded, being an indispensable party thereto.

The Court further ruled that in these consolidated petitions, petitioners are questioning
the constitutionality of a congressional act, specifically the approval of the President’s
request to extend martial law in Mindanao. Clearly, therefore, it is the Congress as a
body, and not just its leadership, which has interest in the subject matter of these cases.

FOURTH ISSUE: Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of

conclusiveness of judgment from examining the persistence of rebellion in
Mindanao. NO.

The Court held that as to the second requirement, there was np identity of issues
between the Lagman and Padilla cases, on one hand, and the case at bar.

Conclusiveness of judgment, a species of the principle of res judicata, bars the re-
litigation of any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved
in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits. In order to successfully apply in a succeeding litigation the
doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, mere identities of parties and issues is required.

The issue put forth by petitioners in the earlier Lagman case, which this Court already
settled, refers to the existence of a state of rebellion which would trigger the President’s
initial declaration of martial law, whereas the factual issue in the case at bar refers to the
persistence of the same rebellion in Mindanao which would justify the extension of
martial law.

The fact that petitioners are not barred from questioning the alleged persistence of the
rebellion in these consolidated petitions is also supported by the transitory nature of
the Court’s judgment on the sufficiency of the factual basis for a declaration of
martial law.

Verily, the Court’s review in martial law cases is largely dependent on the existing
factual scenario used as basis for its imposition or extension. The gravity and scope of
rebellion or invasion, as the case may be, should necessarily be re-examined, in order to
make a justiciable determination on whether rebellion persists in Mindanao as to justify
an extension of a state of martial law.

FIFTH ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari)
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution in
seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216. NO.

The Court reiterated their earlier ruling in Lagman case where they emphasized that the
Court’s jurisdiction under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is special and
specific, different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. It was
further stressed therein that the standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether
the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions, whereas under Section 18,
Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
President’s exercise of emergency powers.

50
 Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section
5 of Article VIII is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

The Court added that to apply the standard of review in a petition for certiorari will
emasculate the Court’s constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII, which was
precisely meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible martial law abuse
and limit the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.

Finally, the Court held that a certiorari petition invoking the Court’s expanded
jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
Congress’ extension of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ.

PRELIMINARIES ON MARTIAL LAW

Congressional check on martial law

Congressional check on the President’s martial law and suspension powers thus consists
of:

1. The power to review the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of

the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to revoke such proclamation or
suspension. The review is “automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress
itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension is made.” The Congress’ decision
to revoke the proclamation or suspension cannot be set aside by the President.
2. The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension, upon the
President’s initiative, for such period as it may determine, if the invasion or rebellion
persists and public safety requires it.

Joint executive and legislative act

When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or suspension, as

described during the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution, becomes a “joint executive
and legislative act” or a “collective judgment”         between the President and the
Congress.

SIXTH ISSUE: Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the

President’s request for extension of martial law is subject to judicial review. NO.

The Court ruled that they cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the
absence of any constitutional violation. Petitioners have not shown that the above-
quoted rules of the Joint Session violated any provision or right under the Constitution.

Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating its
rules, the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, et al. explained that the limitation of this unrestricted power deals only with
the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. It should be added that there must
be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained.

In the instant case, the rules in question did not pertain to quorum, voting or
publication. Furthermore, deliberations on extending martial law certainly cannot be
equated to the consideration of regular or ordinary legislation. The Congress may

51
consider such matter as urgent as to necessitate swift action, or it may take its time
investigating the factual situation. This Court cannot engage in undue speculation that
members of Congress did not review and study the President’s request based on a bare
allegation that the time allotted for deliberation was too short.

SEVENTH ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and
determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. YES.

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably silent as to how many
times the Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may extend the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus.

What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority
to extend such proclamation or suspension are (1) that the extension should be
upon the President’s initiative; (2) that it should be grounded on the
persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety;
and (3) that it is subject to the Court’s review of the sufficiency of its factual
basis upon the petition of any citizen.

Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the proclamation
and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the authority to decide on its
duration; thus, the provision states that that the extension shall be “for a period to be
determined by the Congress.”

Commissioner Jose E. Suarez’s proposal to limit the extension to 60 days was not
adopted by the majority of the Commission’s members. The framers evidently gave
enough flexibility on the part of the Congress to determine the duration of the
extension. Plain textual reading of Section 18, Article VII and the records of the
deliberation of the Constitutional Commission buttress the view that as regards the
frequency and duration of the extension, the determinative factor is as long
as “the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires” such
extension.

EIGHTH ISSUE: Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual
basis to extend Proclamation No. 216. YES.

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for the
extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and (b) public safety
requires the extension.

Rebellion persists as to satisfy the first condition for the extension of

martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension indicate that the
rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and its
“remnants” have been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao,
carrying on through the recruitment and training of new members, financial and
logistical build-up, consolidation of forces and continued attacks.

52
AFP General Guerrero also cited, among others, the continued armed resistance of the
DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies. Moreover, The AFP’s data also showed that
Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are now acting as instructors to the new members of
the Dawlah Islamiyah.

Also, it does not necessarily follow that with the liberation of Marawi, the DAESH/ISIS-
inspired rebellion no longer exists. Secretary Lorenzana, during the Congress’ Joint
Session on December 13, 2017, explained that while the situation in Marawi has
substantially changed, the rebellion has not ceased but simply moved to other places in
Mindanao.

Acts upon which extension was based posed danger to general public

The Court also ruled that the acts, circumstances and events upon which the extension
was based posed a significant danger, injury or harm to the general public.

The Court added that the information upon which the extension of martial law or of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be based principally
emanate from and are in the possession of the Executive Department. Thus, “the Court
will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the Executive Department; in tum, the
Executive Department will have to open its findings to the scrutiny of the Court.”

The Executive Department did open its findings to the Court when the· AFP gave its
“briefing” or “presentation” during the oral arguments, presenting data, which had been
vetted by the NICA, “based on intelligence reports gathered on the ground,” from
personalities they were able to capture and residents in affected areas, declassified
official documents, and intelligence obtained by the PNP. According to the AFP, the
same presentation, save for updates, was given to the Congress. As it stands, the
information thus presented has not been challenged or questioned as regards its
reliability.

The facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress amply establish that
rebellion persists in Mindanao and public safety is significantly endangered by it. The
Court, thus, holds that there exists sufficient factual basis for the further extension
sought by the President and approved by the Congress in its Resolution of Both Houses
No. 4.

NINTH ISSUE: Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and
manner of the President’s exercise of military powers. NO.

The Court reiterated their ruling in the earlier Lagman case that the determination of
which among the Constitutionally given military powers should be exercised in a given
set of factual circumstances is a prerogative of the President. The Court’s power of
review, as provided under Section 18, Article VII do not empower the Court to advise,
nor dictate its own judgment upon the President, as to which and how these military
powers should be exercised.

TENTH ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the
requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ. NO.

By jurisprudence, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioners have the burden to

establish the following requisites: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to
be protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act

53
and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage; and (4) no other ordinary,
speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

Petitioners anchored their prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ on respondents’
gross transgressions of the Constitution when they extended the martial law in
Mindanao for one year. The Lagman petition likewise alleges that petitioner Villarin, a
Davao City resident, is personally prejudiced by the extension or martial law in
Mindanao “which would spawn violations of civil liberties of Mindanaoans like
petitioner Villarin who is a steadfast critic of the Duterte administration and of the
brutalities committed by police and military forces”.

The alleged violations of the petitioners’ civil liberties do not justify the
grant of injunctive relief. The petitioners failed to prove that the alleged
violations are directly attributable to the imposition of martial law. They
likewise failed to establish the nexus between the President’s exercise of his martial law
powers and their unfounded apprehension that the imposition “will target civilians who
have no participation at all in any armed uprising or struggle”. Incidentally, petitioners
failed to state what the “civil liberties” specifically refer to, and how the extension of
martial law in Mindanao would threaten these “civil liberties” in derogation of the rule
of law. Evidently, petitioners’ right is doubtful or disputed, and can hardly be
considered a clear legal right, sufficient for the grant of an injunctive writ.

This Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend
upon competent proof and on the basis of the best evidence obtainable under the
circumstances. We emphasize that the grant or denial of an injunctive writ cannot be
properly resolved by suppositions, deductions, or even presumptions, with no basis in
evidence, for the truth must have to be determined by the procedural rules of
admissibility and proof.

Incidentally, there is nothing in the Constitution, nor in any law which supports
petitioners’ theory. Such purported human right violations cannot be utilized
as ground either to enjoin the President from exercising the power to
declare martial law, or the Congress in extending the same. To sanction
petitioners’ plea would result into judicial activism, thereby going against
the principle of separation of powers.

As discussed above, petitioners are not left without any recourse. Such transgressions
can be addressed in a separate and independent court action. Hence, petitioners can
lodge a complaint-affidavit before the prosecutor’s office or file a direct complaint
before the appropriate courts against erring parties.

2. Equity jurisdiction
hus, the trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order the deposit of the P10
million down payment in court. The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to
prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in
cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case
because of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal jurisdiction. 24 Equity is the principle by which
substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law
are inadequate.
Regulus Dev. Inc. vs. De la Cruz, 781 SCRA

54
References:
1. Section 5, Article VIII, 1986 Constitution
2. Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
3. B.P. Blg. 129
4. RA 7691
5. RA 8369 (Family Courts Act)
6. SC-AO No. 113-95- Intellectual Property Courts
7. PD 1486; 1606 (Sandiganbayan)
8. RA 7975; 8249; 10660 (Sandiganbayan)
9. RA 9282 (Court of Tax Appeals)
10. RA 9054 (Sharia’h Courts)
11. RA 11054 (Bangsamoro Basic Law, July 2018)

Other Cases On:

Jurisdictional estoppel
1. Duero vs CA – 373 SCRA 11
2. Gonzaga vs CA - 394 SCRA 472
3. Manila Bankers vs. Ng Kok Wei, 418 SCRA
4. Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. CA, 699 SCRA
Hierarchy of Courts
5. Agan vs. Piatco, 420 SCRA
6. Liga Ng Mga Barangay vs. Atienza, 420 SCRA

55
 7. St. Mary Crusade Fndtn vs. Riel, 745 SCRA
8. Intramuros Administration vs. Offshore Construction
And Development Co., 857 SCRA (2017)
9. Bureau of Customs vs. Gallegos, 857 SCRA 57 (2017)
Residual Prerogatives
10. Katon vs. Palanca, 437 SCRA 565
Concurrent Jurisdiction:
11. Pat-og vs. CSC, 697 SCRA (2013)

Actions incapable of pecuniary estimation: First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. vs.
Phil Bank of Communications, June 19, 2018,
Justice Leonen, en banc (note: for class discussion)

II. RULES 1 to 5

A. Actions: Commencement (Sections 3 and 5, R-1)

Cases:
1. Alday vs. FGU Insurance– 350 SCRA
2. Mercado vs. CA, 569 SCRA
3. Proton Pilipinas vs. Banque Nationale de Paris, 460 SCRA
4. Ruby Shelter Builders vs. Formaran, 578 SCRA 283
5. St. Louis University vs. Cobarrubias, 626 SCRA 649 *
6. Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute, 726 SCRA, June 18, 2014 *
7. Sy-Vargas vs. Estate of Ogsos, 805 SCRA (2016)
8. Camaso vs. TSM Shipping Inc., 807 SCRA (2016)

B. One suit for one action (Sec. 3, R-2)

Splitting a single cause of action (Sec. 4, R-2)
Joinder of Causes of action (S-5. R-2)
Dynamic Builders vs. Presbitero, 755 SCRA 90 (2015)
- No injunction against national govt projects

C. Parties to Civil Actions (S-1, R-3)

Joinder of Parties (S-6, 7, R-3)
Indispensable and Necessary Parties (S-7,8, R-3)
Class Suit (S-12, R-3)
Juana Complex Homeowners Asso. Vs. Fil-Estate,
667 SCRA 440, March, 5 2012
Death or Separation of a Party (S-16,17,18, R-3)
Transfer of Interest (S-19, R-3)
Contractual Money Claims (S-20, R-3)
Cases:
1. Relucio vs. Lopez, 373 SCRA 578
2. De Castro vs CA 386 SCRA 301 *
3. Orquiola vs CA – 389 SCRA 461
4. China Banking Corp., vs Oliver – 390 SCRA 263 *
5. David vs. Paragas, Jr. 751 SCRA 648 *
6. Land Bank vs. Cacayuran, 757 SCRA, April 22, 2015 *
7. Lotte Phils. Co. Inc. vs. De la Cruz – 464 SCRA 591
8. Carabeo vs. Dingco, 647 SCRA 200 *
9. De la Cruz vs, Joaquin – 464 SCRA 576
10. Navarro vs. Escobido, 606 SCRA 1
11. Divinagracia vs. Parilla, 753 SCRA 87
12. Enrique vda de Santiago vs. Vilar, 857 SCRA (2017)

D. Venue of Actions: real actions, personal actions

Cases:
1. Pacific Consultants International Asia vs. Schonfeld - 516 SCRA
2. Biaco vs. Counbtryside Rural bank – 515 SCRA 106
3. BPI Savings Bank vs. Sps. Yujuico – 763 SCRA 486 (7/2015)
4. Planters Dev. Bank vs. Ramos, 840 SCRA (2017)

56
 E. Summary Procedure vs. Small Claims Suit
- What are their salient characteristics
- How to determine if the case is summary or under small claims
- OCA 45-2019: increased amount of small claims to P400,000
Case:
A.L. Ang Network Inc. vs. Mondejar, 714 SCRA (1/28/14)

- Note: starting Rule 6, note the substantial/formal amendments.

III. RULE 6: Kinds of Pleadings (Sections 1-13)

A. Pleadings: Complaint, Answer, Counterclaim, Cross-claim, Reply,
Third-Party Complaint, Counter-counterclaim
- Compulsory vs. Permissive counterclaim
B. Defenses: Negative, Affirmative, Negative Pregnant

Cases:
1. Alba vs. Malapajo – 780 SCRA 534
2. Lim Teck Chuan vs. Uy -752 SCRA 268
3. Metrobank vs. CPR Promotions -760 SCRA 59
4. Valdez vs. Dabon – 775 SCRA 1
5. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan – 406 SCRA 190
6. Caneland Sugar Corp. vs. Alon – 533 SCRA 28

IV. RULE 7: Parts and Contents of a Pleading (Sections 1-6)

A. Parts: Caption, Body, Relief, Date

B. Signature and Address
C. Distinguish Verification and Certification
D. Distinguish Parts from Contents

Cases:
1. Alma Jose vs. Javellana – 664 SCRA 1
2. Medado vs. Heirs of Antonio Consing – 665 SCRA 534
3. COA vs. Paler - 614 SCRA
4. Basan vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. – 749 SCRA 541
5. Uy vs. CA – 770 SCRA 513
6. People vs. Arojado – 774 SCRA 193
7. Powerhouse vs. Rey, 807 SCRA (2016)
8. Board of Investments vs. SR Metals Inc. 882 SCRA 57, 10/2018
9. Heirs of Josefina Gabriel vs. Segundina Cebrero, Nov. 12, 2018

V. RULE 8: Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings (Sections 1-13)

A. Allegations in Pleadings: ultimate facts and evidence

B. Actionable documents: how to allege, how to contest)
C. Affirmative defenses in the Answer

Cases:
1. Fernando Medical Enterprises vs. Wesleyan University
781 SCRA 508, January 20, 2016
2. Go Tong Electrical Supply vs. BPI Family Savings Bank
760 SCRA 486
3. Asian Const. & Dev. Corp. vs. CA - 458 SCRA
4. Benguet Exploration Inc. vs. CA – 351 SCRA

VI. RULE 9: Effect of Failure to Plead (Sections 1-3)

A. Effect of Failure to Plead

B. Waiver of defenses and objections

57
 C. Default:
- when to declare
- how to declare
- remedy against Order; remedy against judgment
Cases:
1. BDO vs. Tansipek – 593 SCRA 456
2. Salvador vs. Rabaja – 749 SCRA 654
3. Bitte vs. Jonas – 777 SCRA 489

VII. RULE 10: Amended and Supplemental Pleadings (Sections 1-9)

A. Amendments: a matter of right or a matter of discretion
: formal or substantial
B. Amendments not necessary to conform to the evidence
C. Effects of amendments
D. Supplemental Pleadings
Cases:
1. Yujuico vs. United Resources Asset Mgt. Corp. – 760 SCRA
2. Lisam Enterprises vs. Banco De Oro – 670 SCRA
3. Tiu vs. Phil. Bank of Communications – 596 SCRA 432
4. Remington Industrial Sales Corp. vs. CA -382 SCRA 499

VIII. RULE 11: When to File Responsive Pleadings (Sections 1-11)

- Notes the changes in the periods to file responsive pleadings, particularly in the Answer and
Reply, and what are the reasons therefore; Extension of time to file responsive pleadings

IX. RULE 12: Bill of Particulars (Sections1-6)

- When applied/purpose
- Compliance vs. non-compliance
- The Fresh Period Rule: Fortune Life Ins. Co. Inc. vs. COA
845 SCRA 599, Nov. 21, 2017

X. RULE 13: Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers
(Sections 1-19)

A. Distinguish Filing from Service

B. Manner of Filing; Modes of Service
- Service by electronic means and facsimile
- what is presumptive service
- what is conventional service
- is there still priority in the mode of service?
C. Completeness of Filing/Service
D. Proof of Filing/Service
E. Notice of Lis Pendens
Cases:
1. Palileo vs. Planters Dev. Bank – 738 SCRA
2. Heirs of Numeriano Miranda vs. Miranda – 700 SCRA

XI. RULE 14: Summons (Sections 1-23)

A. What is a Summons; Alias Summons

B. Who issues
C. Who serves
D. To whom served
- to entity without juridical personality (S-7)
- to prisoners (S-8)
- to minors and incompetents (S-10)

58
 - to spouses (S-11)
- to juridical entities: public or private; domestic or foreign
E. Kinds of Summons
a. Service in person (S-5)
b. Substituted (S-6)
c. Extraterritorial (S-17)
1. personal
2. publication
3. any mode
d. Publication (S-16)
F. Proofs of Service (S-21,22)
G. Voluntary Appearance (s-23)
Cases:
1. Valmonte vs CA- 252 SCRA
2. Millenium Ind. & Com. Corp., vs Tan- 326 SCRA
3. E.B. Villarosa vs. Benito – 312 SCRA
4. Santos vs. PNOC Exploration, 566 SCRA 272
5. Mason vs. CA, 413 SCRA
6. Jose vs. Boyon, 414 SCRA
7. Manotoc vs. CA – 499 SCRA 21
8. Ong vs. Co, February 25, 2015
9. Domagas vs. Jensen – 448 SCRA 663
10. Dole Phil. Vs. Quilala – 557 SCRA 433
11. Green Star Express v. Nissin Universal Robina Corp – 761 SCRA
12. Guy vs. Gacott – 780 SCRA 579 (1/13/16)
13. G.V. Florida Transit Inc. vs. Tiara Commercial Corporation
842 SCRA, October 18, 2017
14. Arrieta vs. Arrieta, 866 SCRA 140, Nov. 19, 2018
On voluntary appearance:
1. Sunrise Garden Corp. vs. CA – 771 SCRA 616
2. Tujan-Militante vs. Nustad, 827 SCRA (2017)

XII. RULES 15: Motions (Sections 1-13)

A. Definition
B. Requirements
C. Kinds: litigious; non-litigious
D. Omnibus Motion
E. Prohibited Motions
F. Dismissal with prejudice
Cases:
1. Republic vs. Dimarucut, 857 SCRA (2017)
- what happened to the 3-day notice rule?
2. Acampado vss. Cosmilla, 771 SCRA
3. Laude vs. Gines-Jabalde, 775 SCRA
4. De Guzman vs. Ochoa, 684 SCRA

Note: Rule 16 has been deleted

- Are there no more motions to dismissed?
- What is preclusion of issues/collateral estoppel?
Almagro vs. PAL, 880 SCRA 107

XIII. RULE 17: Dismissal of Actions (Sections 1-4)

A. Dismissal Upon Notice (S-1)
B. Dismissal Upon Motion (S-2)
C. Dismissal due to plaintiff’s fault (S-3)
Cases:
1. Blay vs. Bana, 858 SCRA, 3/7/2018
2. Lim Tech Chuan, 752 SCRA 268

59
 3. Ching vs. Cheng, 737 SCRA

XIV. RULE 18: Pre-Trial (Sections 1-10)

A. When conducted
B. Nature and Purpose
C. Notice
D. Effect of failure to appear
E. Pre-trial Brief/Pre-trial Order
F. Mediations
G. Judicial Dispute Resolutions
Note: A.M. No. 03-1-09 Supreme Court effective August 16, 2004 (Guidelines to be observed
by trial courts judges and clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and use of deposition-
discovery measures)

XV. RULE 19: Intervention (Sections 1-4)

- Who may intervene (S-1)
- When to intervene (S-2)
Cases:
1. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Sison, 612 SCRA
Compare with Ombudsman vs. Chavez, 700 SCRA
2. Anonuevo vs. Intestate Estate of Jalandoni, 636 SCRA
3. Rodriguez vs. CA, 698 SCRA 352
4. Fernandez vs. CA, 691 SCRA 167
5. Yao vs. Perello, 414 SCRA
6. Pinlac vs. CA, 410 SCRA
7. Chipongian vs. Benitez-Lirio -768 SCRA 204

XVI. RULES 20 to 22:

A. Calendar of Cases (Sections 1-2)
B. Subpoena (Sections 1-10)
C. Computation of Time (Sections1-2)

XVII. RULES 23-29: MODES OF DISCOVERY

A. Rule 23: Depositions Pending Actions (Sections 1-29)

a. Use of depositions (S-4)

b. Officers to take depositions (S-10, 11,12)
c. Deposition upon written examination (S-15)
d. Deposition upon written interrogatories (S-25)
e. Effects of errors and irregularities (S-29)
People vs. M.C. Sergio and J. Lacanilao, October 9, 2019
- Rule 23 was applied in a criminal case (Note: for class discussion)
Cases:
1. Dasmarinas Garments, Inc. vs. Reyes, 225 SCRA
2. People vs. Webb, 312 SCRA
3. Vda de Manguerra vs. Risos, 563 SCRA
4. Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, 623 SCRA
5. Go vs. People, 677 SCRA

B. Rule 24: Depositions Before Actions or Pending Appeal (Sections 1-7)

C. Rule 25: Interrogatories to Parties (Sections 1-6)

Cases:
1. Afulugencia vs. Metro bank,715 SCRA
2. Phil. Health vs. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital, 744 SCRA
- Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories

60
D. Rule 26: Admission by Adverse Party (Sections 1-5)
- Effect to failure to file and serve request for admission
Case: Duque vs. Yu, 856 SCRA (2017)

E. Rule 27: Production or Inspection of Documents or Things(one Section)

F. Rule 28: Physical and Mental Examination of Persons (Sections 1-4)

G. Rule 29: Refusal to Comply with Modes of Discovery (Sections 1-6)

XVIII. RULE 30: Trial (Sections 1-9)

A. Schedule of Trial (S-1)
B. Adjournments and Postponement (S-2,3,4)
C. Order of Trial (S-5)
D. Reception of Evidence (S-9)

XIX. RULE 31: Consolidation or Severance (Sections 1-2)

Consolidation (S-1)
Cases: Rep. vs. Heirs of Enrique Oribello, 692 SCRA
Marano vs. Pryce Gases Inc., 755 SCRA
Severance (S-2)
Case: Metrobank vs. Sandoval, 691 SCRA

XX. RULE 32: Trial By Commissioner (Sections 1-13)

- Distinguish from Trial with Assessors

XXI. RULE 33: Demurrer to Evidence ((Sections 1-2)

A. Demurrer to Evidence
- Distinguish between civil and criminal actions
- The similarities and differences between them
Cases:
1. Bernardo vs. CA – 278 SCRA 782 (abandoned?)
2. Radiowealth Finance Co. vs. Del Rosario – 335 SCRA 288
3. Cabador vs. People – 602 SCRA 760
4. Claudio vs. Saraza – 768 SCRA 356
5. Felipe vs. MGM Motor Trading Corp. – 771 SCRA 360
6. Republic vs. Gimenez – 778 SCRA 261 (1/11/16)
7. Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People, July 19, 2016

XXII. RULE 34 & 35: Judgment on the Pleadings (Sections 1-2)

Summary Judgment (Sections 1-6)
Cases:
1. Republic vs. Shell Petroleum Corp. – 777 SCRA393
2. Comglas Corp. vs. Santos Car Check Center – 754 SCRA 481
3. Phil Bank of Communications vs. Go. – 642 SCRA
4. Adolfo vs. Adolfo -753 SCRA 580

XXIII. RULE 36: Judgments, Final Orders and Entry Thereof (Sections 1-6)
- When is judgment deemed entered? Effect?
6. Several judgments (S-4)
7. Separate judgments (S-5)
8. Judgments against entities without personality (S-6)
Case: FASAP vs PAL, 858 SCRA (for class discussion)

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 REMEDIES AGAINST FINAL JUDGMENTS

XXIV. RULE 37: New Trial or Reconsideration

A. New Trial or Reconsideration (R-37)

- Grounds for New Trial (S-1)
- Grounds for Reconsideration (S-1)
- Effects of a Grant or Denial (S-6,7,8)
Cases:
1. Mendezona vs. Ozamis – 376 SCRA
2. People vs. Li Ka Kim – 429 SCRA 169
3. Padilla Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua – 596 SCRA 15
4. Chua vs. People -762 SCRA 523
5. Senit vs. Peo[ple – 778 SCRA 425 (1/11/16)

XXV. RULES 40 – 45 (APPEALS)

A. Appeal from MTC to RTC (R-40)

Perfection of Appeal (S-4)
Docket Fees (S-5)
Appeals from order of dismissal (S-8)
De Vera vs. Santiago, 759 SCRA 431 (2015)
B. Appeal from RTC to CA (R-41)
Modes of Appeal (S-2)
Notice of Appeal vs Record on Appeal (S-5,6)
Perfection of Appeal (S-9)
Heirs of Arturo Garcia vs. Mun. of Iba, 763 SCRA 349
C. Petition for Review from RTC to CA (R-42)
How appeal taken (S-1)
Failure to comply with requirements (S-3)
Perfection of Appeal (S-8)
Maravilla vs. Rios, 767 SCRA 522 (2015)
D. Appeals from QJA to CA (R-43)
Contents of Petition (S-6)
Action on Petition (S-8)
Effect of Appeal (S-12)
Galindez vs. Firmalan, 864 SCRA 282 (June 2018)
E. Ordinary Appealed Cases to the CA (R-44)
Appellants Brief (S-7)
Appellees Brief (S-8)
De los Santos vs. Lucenio, 859 SCRA 449 (March 2018)
F. Appeal by Certiorari (R-45)
Contents of Petition (S-4)
Requirements (S-7)
Mendoza vs. Palugod, 867 SCRA 299 (2018)
Kensonic, Inc. vs. UNI-Line Multi Resources, 864 SCRA 560
G. Dismissal of Appeal (R-50)
Valderama vs. Arguelles, 860 SCRA 188 (2018)
Material Data Rule (S-1)
Fresh period Rule: Fortune Life Insurance vs. COA, 845 SCRA (Nov. 21, 2017)
- Immutability of judgment
In re: Adoption of Karen Herico Licerio, 886 SCRA 318, Nov. 21, 2018
- What is a harmless error?
- How does the CA acquire jurisdiction over the person of the Respondent?

REMEDIES AGAINST EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS

62
XXVI. RULES 38 and 47

A. Relief from Judgments (R-38)

Petition for Relief from Judgment (S-1)
Petition for Relief from Denial of Appeal (S-2)
Time for filing Petition (S-3)
Preliminary Injunction (S-5)
Cases:
1. Mesina vs. Meer – 383 SCRA625
2. The Provincial Government of Aurora
Vs. Marco – 757 SCRA 222
3. Thomasites Center for International Studies
Vs. Rodriguez – 782 SCRA 391 (1/27/16)

B. Annulment of Judgment (R-47)

Coverage. Grounds, Period (S-1,2,3)
Contents (S-4)
Effect (S-7)
Cases:
1. Diona vs. Balanque – 688 SCRA 22
2. Santos vs. Santos – 737 SCRA 637
3. Yuk Lik Ong vs. Co – 752 SCRA 42
3. Lasala vs. National Food Authority – 767 SCRA 430
4. Manguba vs. Morga-Seva -775 SCRA 312
5. Sibal vs. Bquel – 778 SCRA 517 (1/11/16)

XXVII. RULE 39 - EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS

A. Kinds of Execution

1. Matter of right, ministerial (S-1)

2. Discretionary (S-2)
a. stay of discretionary execution (S-3)
b. judgments not stayed by appeal (S-4)
Cases on execution pending appeal:
Banes vs. Banes, 374 SCRA 340
Santos vs. COMELEC, 399 SCRA 611
FEBTC vs. Toh, 404 SCRA
Stronghold Insurance vs. Felix, 508 SCRA
Abenion vs. Shell Petroleum, 816 SCRA (2017)
Ocampo vs. Enriquez, 835 SCRA484 (2017)

B. Mode of Execution
1. By motion (S-6)
Villareal vs. MWSS, 857 SCRA 162
RCBC vs. Sera, 701 SCRA 124
2. By independent action (S-6)
Davis vs. Davis, 858 SCRA 145
Panotes vs. Townhouse Dev. Corp., 512 SCRA

C. Manner of Execution
1. when party is dead (S-7)
2. when judgment is for money (S-6)
3. when judgment is for specific act (S-10)
4. when it is a special judgment (S-11)

D. Properties exempt from execution (S-13)

D’Armoured Security Agency vs. Orpia, 461 SCRA 312

63
 E. Third Party Claim (S-16)
PSALM vs. Maunlad Homes, Inc., 817 SCRA (2/8/17)

F. Execution Sale (S-17 to 26)

G. Redemption:
1. The right of redemption vs equity of redemption
2. Who may redeem (S-27)
3. Effects of redemption (S-29)

H. Other remedies to fully satisfy judgment

1. Examination of judgment obligor (S-36)
2. Examination of obligor of judgment-obligor (S-37)
3. Appointment of receiver (S-41)
4. Sale of ascertainable interest (S-42)

I. Judgment: principal vs surety (S-46)

J. Effect of Judgment (S-47)

1. in rem
2. in personam
3. res judicata
City of Cebu vs. Dedamo, 689 SCRA

K. Effect of foreign judgment (S-48)

Fujiki vs. Marinay, 700 SCRA 69
BPI vs. Guevarra, 752 SCRA 342
Sarto vs. People, 856 SCRA 548

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

ON JURISDICTION

A. Supreme Court:
1. No original Jurisdiction over criminal cases
2. Appellate jurisdiction: a) by petition for review b) by notice of appeal
B. Court of Appeals
1. No original jurisdiction
2. Appellate jurisdiction: a) by notice of appeal b) by petition for review
C. Sandiganbayan (PD 1601; PD 1861; RA 7975, 8249, 10660)

1. Original and exclusive jurisdiction under the ff. guidelines:

a. what offense or crime was committed

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 a) R.A. 3019 – Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
b) R.A. 1379 – the law on Ill-gotten Wealth
c) Chap. II, Title VII, Bk. 2 of RPC – Bribery
d) Exec. Orders 1, 2, 14, 14-A – PCGG cases
e) Estafa under the Hannah Serana case, 542 SCRA, 1/22/08
f) Falsification under the Ramiscal vs Sandiganbayan, 630 SCRA
b. Who committed the offense/crime
b-1. Public officers in the executive, legislative and judicial branches
of the government with salary grade 27 according to R.A. 6758 The
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
Read: Escobal vs. Garchitorena, 422 SCRA
b-2. Private individuals committing the offense/crime with public
officers, Read: People vs. Henry T. Go, March 25, 2014
Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, 603 SCRA
People vs. Benipayo, 586 SCRA
c. How was the offense/crime committed

Read: Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA

Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA
Hannah Serana vs. Sandiganbayan, 542 SCRA
Sen. Leila M. De Lima vs. Hon. Juanita Guerrero
G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017, 843 SCRA (2017)

Other cases: Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan, 762 SCRA (2015)

Inocentes vs. People, 796 SCRA (2016)
Edgar Crisostomo vs. Sandiganbayan, 4/14/2005
Esteban vs. Sandiganbayan, 3/11/2005

2. Appellate Jurisdiction
All cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of original or appellate jurisdiction over
cases of public officers with salary grade less than 27
charged with offenses/crimes aforementioned

D. Regional Trial Courts

1. Original exclusive: all criminal cases which are not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court. The offense must carry a penalty of more than
six years or prision major
2. Appellate jurisdiction: all criminal cases from the MTC
Note: The ff. offenses are cognizable only by the RTC regardless of the penalty
impossible:
i. Violations of the Omnibus Election Code
ii. Violations of the Intellectual Property Law
iii. Violations of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012
iv. Violations of the Anti- Money Laundering Law
v. Violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
vi. Cases of Written Defamations

E. Family Courts (RA 8369)

1. Exclusive original:
a. where a party is a minor at the time of commission
b. violence against women and children
c. child abuse
d. drug cases
F. Metropolitan/Municipal Trial Court
1. All violations of city/municipal ordinances
2. All offenses punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years
3. Violations of traffic rules and regulations
4. Violations of the Bouncing Check Law
5. Damage to property with fine of not more than P10,000.00
G. Courts of Muslim Mindanao (RA 6734 as amended by 9054)
1. Shari’ah Circuit courts

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 2. Shari’ah District courts
3. Shari’ah Appellate courts
- All personal, family and property relations cases between muslims residing
in the autonomous region of muslim mindanao
H. What are military courts? Only service-oriented cases…

Note: Read the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (RA 10175)

Read Bonifacio vs. RTC of Makati, Br. 149, 620 SCRA
Read Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice, Feb. 18, 2014, 716 SCRA

RULE 11O – Prosecution of Offenses

A. Institution of Criminal Actions (Sec. 1)

- how is criminal action instituted
- when is it deemed instituted
- who is qualified to institute it: a) by complaint, de parte
b) by information, de oficio
Read: Jimenez vs. Sorongon, 687 SCRA 151

B. Sufficiency of Complaint or Information (Sec. 6)

- name of accused
- name of offended party
- name of offense
- cause of accusation: qualifying and aggravating circumstances
- place of commission
- date of commission
Read: People vs. Valdez, 663 SCRA 272
Miguel vs. Sandiganbayan, 675 SCRA 560
People vs. Soria, 685 SCRA 483

C. Amendment vs. Substitution (Sec. 14)

- distinguish
- compare with rule 10
Read: Corpus Jr. vs. Pamular, 879 SCRA 187, Sept. 5, 2018

D. Place where action is to be instituted (Sec. 15)

- venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases
Read: Union Bank vs. People, 667 SCRA 113
E. Intervention of the offended party (Sec. 16); compare with rule 19

RULE 111 – Prosecution of Civil Action

A. Civil liability arising from the offense is deemed instituted (Sec. 1)

- Exceptions: waiver, reservation, prior institution (WaRP)
- on filing fees; counterclaim, cross-claim, 3rd party complaint
- compare with Secs. 7,8,11 of Rule 6
- peculiar nature of B.P. 22
Read: Solidum vs. People, 718 SCRA 263
Castillo vs. Salvador, July, 2014
Dy vs. People, 800 SCRA 39
B. Suspension of Civil Action (Sec. 2)
- when suspended; consolidated
- what is the Bar Rule in Amparo and Habeas Data
Read: Lim vs. Kou Co Ping, 679 SCRA 114

C. Independent Civil Action (Sec. 3)

- Articles 32,33,34 and 2176
Read: Casupanan vs. Laroya, 388 SCRA 28
Caterpillar, Inc. vs. Samson, 808 SCRA 309 (2016)

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D. Effect of death on the Civil Action (Sec. 4)
- compare with Secs. 17, 18, an 20 of Rule 3
Read: People vs. Romero, 306 SCRA 90

E. Prejudicial Question (Secs. 6 and7)

Read: Magistrado vs. People, 527 SCRA 125
Pimentel vs. Pimentel, 630 SCRA 436
J.M. Dominguez vs. Liclican, July 28, 2015
Alsons Dev. & Invst. Corp. vs. Heirs of Romeo D. Confessor, 9/19/2018

RULE 112 – Preliminary Investigation

A. Definition/Description
- when a matter of right
- distinguish from Preliminary Examination
Read: Fenequito vs. Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113
Burgundy Realty Corporation vs. Reyes, 687 SCRA 524
B. Who may conduct P. I.
Read: Abanado vs. Bayona, 677 SCRA 595
Heirs of Nestor Tria vs. Obias, 635 SCRA 91
Memorandum Circular No. 58
1. offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
2. new and material issues are raised
3. prescription of offenses not due to lapse in 6 months
4. filed within 30 days from said Notice
C. Procedure in Metro Manila vs. Outside Metro Manila
Read: Uy vs. Javellana, 680 SCRA 13
D. Inquest, what is
- when applied
- waiver of Art. 125 of RPC
Read: People vs. Valencia, 214 SCRA 89
E. Quantum of Evidence
- probable cause vs. prima facie
PCGG vs. Navarro-Gutierrez, 773 SCRA
De Lima vs. Reyes, 779 SCRA

RULE 113 - Arrest

A. Definition
- how made; when; time, method
- who may arrest

B. Warrantless Arrests (Sec. 5)

a. in flagrante delicto rule
b. hot pursuit rule
c. “escape” rule
d. “absconding” rule (sec. 23, par. 2, rule 114
Procedure: delivery to the nearest police station/precinct
Read: Luz vs. People, 667 SCRA 421
Antiquera vs. People, 712 SCRA, 12/11/2013
People vs. Vasquez, 714 SCRA, 1/15/2014
Read: RA 7438 – The Rights of Persons Arrested

RULE 114 - Bail

A. Definition/Description

B. Conditions/Requirements

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 - effective upon approval and shall remain in force at all stages of the
proceedings until promulgation of judgment by the RTC
- when appearance is required

C. When:
- bail is a matter of right; a matter of discretion;
- bail as a constitutional right

D. Kinds:
a. corporate surety
b. property bond
c. cash bond
d. recognizance: is an obligation of record entered into before some court
or magistrate duly authorized to take it, with the condition to do some particular act
particularly the appearance of the accused for trial

E. Amount of bail; guidelines

F. Where to file bail

- RTC; MTC exercising special jurisdiction

G. Forfeiture vs. Cancellation of Bail

- forfeiture: failure to appear; jumping bail
- cancellation: death; conviction; acquittal; dismissal

Read: 1. Zuno vs. Cabebe, 444 SCRA 382

2. Govt of HK Spec. Adm. Region vs. Olalia, 521 SCRA
3. Leviste vs. CA, 615 SCRA 619
4. Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan, 767 SCRA 282, August 18, 2015
5. Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan, 844 SCRA (2017)
6. Altobano-Ruiz vs. Judge Pichay, 856 SCRA (2018)
- What is the new policy/rule on Hold Departure Order, Watchlist Order?

RULE 115 – Rights of the Accused

- Distinguish the constitutional from statutory rights of the accused

1. Presumption of Innocence, Del Castillo vs. People, 664 SCRA

2. Right to be Heard, Miguel vs. Sandiganbayan, 675 SCRA
3. Right to Counsel, People vs. Lara, 678 SCRA; People vs. Espiritu, 302
4. Right Against Self-Incrimination, People vs. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216
5. Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial, Villareal vs. People 664 SCRA

RULE 116 - Arraignment and Plea

A. What is arraignment
How; When; Where; Why

B. Kinds of Plea:
(a) conditional
(b) unconditional
(c) negative/indirect (refusal to plead)
(d) inverted (pleads guilty with exculpatory evidence)
(e) improvident plea (not knowing fully well)

C. Plea of guilty to a capital offense vs. non-capital offense

- requirements

D. Presentation or Inspection of evidence in prosecution’s possession

- modes of discovery (Rules 23-29)

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E. Suspension of arraignment
a) when suffering from unsound mental condition
b) prejudicial question
c) petition for review
d) absence of judicial personnel
Read: 1. People vs. Estomaca – 256 SCRA 421
2. People vs. Pangilinan – 518 SCRA 359
3. Daan vs. Sandiganbayan – 560 SCRA 233
4. People vs. Janjalani -639 SCRA 157

F. Bill of Particulars, Read: Enrile vs. People, August 11, 2015

RULE 117 Motion to Quash

A. Motion to Quash vs. Motion to Dismiss; Grounds

B. When and How to move to quash
C. Effects when motion is granted; denied
D. Remedies against denial/grant of motion

Read: 1. People vs. Lacson – 400 SCRA 267

2. Panaguiton vs. DOJ – 571 SCRA 549
3. People vs. Dumlao – 580 SCRA 409
4. Soriano vs. People – 591 SCRA 244
5. Cerezo vs. People – 650 SCRA 222
6. Co vs. New Prosperity Plastic Products, 727 SCRA 503,6/30/14
7. People vs. De Leon, 754 SCRA 147

RULE 118 Pre-Trial

A. Pre-trial in civil cases vs. Pre-trial in criminal cases. Distinguish

B. Non appearance at the pre-trial; effects
C. The Pre-trial Order; when and how done; effect of lack of Order
Read: Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo, 837 SCRA 160, 8/15/2017
A.M. No., 18-13-16-SC, Plea Bargaining in Drug Cases, 4/10/2018

RULE 119 - Trial

A. The Speedy Trial Act/RA 8493 as amended by OCA Circular No. 101-2017
- the time requirement
- exclusions
- remedies
Read: Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases
A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, effective September 1, 2017
- Imperial vs. Joson, 635 SCRA 71

B. Order of Trial
- civil vs. criminal cases
- distinguish from Order in presentation of evidence

C. Modes of Discovery in criminal cases

Read: People vs. Maria Cristina Sergio and Julius Lacanilao, October 9, 2019. For class
discussion. Compare with People vs. Webb, Vda. De Manguerra vs. Risos and Go vs. People.

D. The “State-Witness” rule; requirements

Read: Jimenez vs. People, 735 SCRA, Sept. 2014
People vs. Dominguez, 856 SCRA 109

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E. Mistake in charging the proper offenses; effects

F. Demurrer to Evidence
Read: Cabador vs. People, 602 SCRA
People vs. Tan, 625 SCRA
Rep. vs. De Borja, 814 SCRA 10 (2017)
Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People, 823 SCRA (2017)
People vs. Ting, 888 SCRA 426, 12/5/2018
G. Reopening vs. New Trial

RULE 120 - JUDGMENT

1. Nature of judgment in criminal cases vs. civil cases

2. Judgment of conviction vs. judgment of acquittal
3. Judgment for two or more offenses; accused
4. Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment
Cases:
1. Llamas vs. CA – 601 SCRA 288
2. People vs. Monteclaros – 589 SCRA 320
3. Hipos Sr. vs. Bay – 581 SCRA 674
4. People vs. Lorenzo – 619 SCRA 389
5. People vs. Baron – 621 SCRA 646
6. Abellana vs. People – 655 SCRA 683
7. People vs. Asis – 629 SCRA 250
8. Basilonia vs. Villaruz, 765 SCRA 489
9. Morillo vs. People, 777 SCRA 207

RULE 121 – NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

1. In civil cases vs. criminal cases

2. Grounds; effect
Cases:
1. Estino vs. People – 584 SCRA 304
2. Briones vs. People 588 SCRA 345
3. Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan – 619 SCRA 364
4. Lumanog vs. People – 642 SCRA 248
5. Payumo vs.Sandiganbayan – 654 SCRA 277

RULES 122-125 – APPEALS

1. Appeals in Civil cases vs. Appeals in Criminal cases

2. Similarities and differences
Cases:
1. Macapagal vs. People, 717 SCRA 425, 2/26/14
2. People vs. Morales – 616 SCRA 223
3. Quidet vs. People – 618 SCRA 1
4. Balaba vs. People – 593 SCRA 210
5. People vs. Olivo – 594 SCRA 77
6. Guasch vs. Dela Cruz – 589 SCRA 297
7. People vs. Taruc – 579 SCRA 682
8. Tiu vs. People – 586 SCRA 118
9. Colinares vs. People – 662 SCRA 266 (probation law)
10. Villareal vs. People, 743 SCRA (probation law)
11. Dungo vs. People, 761 SCRA 375
12. Manansala vs. People, 777 SCRA 563

RULE 126 – SEARCH AND SEIZURE

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1. The constitutional provision on searches and seizures
2. Search Warrant vs. Warrant of Arrest
3. When searches and seizures allowed without warrants
4. Motion to Quash

Read: “The constitutional validity of warrantless search and seizure of prohibited drugs
and eventual arrest”. By Jorge Ro Coquia, 610 SCRA 670
Cases:
1. Marimla vs. People, 604 SCRA (2009)
2. People vs. Punzalan, 774 SCRA 653
3. People vs. Nuevas, 516 SCRA (2007)
4. Veridiano vs. People, 826 SCRA (2017)
5. People vs. Cosgafa, 830 SCRA (2017)
6. Miguel vs. People, 833 SCRA (2017)
7. Dimal vs. People, 862 SCRA (2018, plain view doctrine)
8. Reyes vs. People, 865 SCRA (2018)
9. People vs. Sapla, G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020 (J. Caguioa)
“The cases adhering to the doctrine that exclusive reliance on an
unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that
permits a warrantless search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond
a visual search…should be the prevailing and controlling line
of jurisprudence.
Can the police conduct a warrantless intrusive search of a vehicle on the sole
basis of an unverified tip by an anonymous informant? Resounding NO! Dissent by Justices
Lazaro-Javier, Lopez and Carandang)

RULE 127 – PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

1. Relate to Rules 57-61

a. Preliminary Attachment
b. Preliminary Injunction
c. Receivership
d. Replevin
e. Support Pendente Lite

2. What provisional remedies are not applicable in criminal cases

3. Is petition for relief from judgment available in criminal cases?

Yes, according to Hilario vs. People, 551 SCRA 191, April 14, 2008

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REMEDIAL LAW DEPARTMENT

S Y L L A B U S
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II
SCHOOL YEAR 2021-2022
PROF. HENEDINO M. BRONDIAL

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I. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES (Rules 57-61)

A. Preliminary Attachment (R-57)

1. Grounds (S-1)
2. Requirements (S-3)
3. Manner of Attaching (S-5)
4. Discharge of Attachment (S-5,12,13)
5. Third Party Claim (S-14)
6. Claim for damages (S-20)
Cases:
1. Lim Jr. Vs. Lazaro, 700 SCRA
2. Ligon vs. RTC of Makati, Br. 56, 717 SCRSA
3.Mangila vs. CA, 387 SCRA
4. Chuidian vs. Sandiganbayan, 349 SCRA
5. Alejandro Ng Wee vs. Tankiansee, 545 SCRA
6. Torres vs. Satsatin, 605 SCRA
7. Luzon Dev. Bank vs. Krishman, 755 SCRA, April 13, 201,
8. Northern Luzon Island Co. vs. Garcia, 753 SCRA 603
9. Watercraft Venture Corp. vs. Wolfe, 770 SCRA 179
10. Phil. Airconditioning Center vs. RCJ Lines, 775 SCRA 265

B. Preliminary Injunction (R-58)

1. Definition, Classes (S-1)
2. Grounds (S-3); TRO
3. Requirements (S-4)
4. Damages (S-8)
Cases:
1. Idolor vs. CA, 351 SCRA
2. Gustilo vs. Real, 353 SCRA
3. Lagrosas vs. Bristo-Myers, 565 SCRA
4. Jenosa vs. Delariarte, 630 SCRA
5. Solid Builders Inc. vs. China Bank, 695 SCRA, 4/3/13.
6. Knights of Rizal vs. DMCI Homes, Inc., 824 SCRA (2017)
7. Novecio vs. Lim, 754 SCRA 111
8. Cayabyab vs. Dimson, 830 SCRA 520
9. Republic vs. Cortez, 769 SCRA 267
10. AMA Land, Inc. vs. Wack-Wack Residents’ Assoc., Inc.
831 SCRA 328 ( requisites for Injunction)
11.Roldan vs. Barrios, (concurrent jurisdiction of Injunction, 4/23/18)
12. Phil. Investment Two Inc. vs. Mendoza, 886 SCRA 197 (2018)
13. Phil. National Construction Corporation vs. Hon. Jesus B. Mupas\
Promulgated November 10, 2020
- What cases/subject matters proscribe injunctive relief?

C. Receivership (R-59)
1. When writ may issue (S-1)
2. Requirements (S-2)
3. Power of receiver (S-6)
4. Termination and Compensation (S-8)
Cases:
1. Larrobis, Jr. vs. Phil Veterans Bank, 440 SCRA
2. Chavez vs. CA, 610 SCRA
3. Koruga vs. Arcenas, 590 SCRA
4. Tantano vs. Espina-Caboverde, 702 SCRA – 7/29/13
5. Hiteroza vs. Cruzada, 794 SCRA 511 (2016)
6. Banco Filipino vs. BSP, 864 SCRA 32, June 4, 2018

D. Replevin (R-60)
1. When writ may issue (S-1)
2. Requirements (S-2)

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 3. Third Party Claim (S-7)
4. Judgment and Damages (S-9,10)
Cases:
1. Orosa vs. CA, 329 SCRA
2. Smart Communiations vs. Astorga, 542 SCRA
3. Hao vs. Andres, 555 SCRA
4. Navarro vs. Escobido, 606 SCRA
5. Agner vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, 697 SCRA, 6/3/13

E. Support (R-61), relate to Articles 194-208 of Civil Code

1. Application for Support Pendente Lite (S-1)
2. Comment, Hearing, Order (S-2,3,4)
3. Enforcement of Order (S-5)
4. Restitution (S-7)
Cases:
1. De Asis vs. CA, 303 SCRA
2. People vs. Manahan, 315 SCRA
3. Lim vs. Lim, 604 SCRA
4. Gotardo vs. Buling, 678 SCRA
5. Republic vs. Yahon, 726 SCRA 438
6. Del Socorro vs. Van Wilsem, 744 SCRA516
7. Lim-Lua vs. Lua, 697 SCRA
8. Salas vs. Matusalem, 705 SCRA 560
9. Abella vs. Cabanero, 836 SCRA 453 (2017)

II. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Rules 62-71)

A. Interpleader (R-62)
1. What is an action in Interpleader (S-1)
2. Requisites (S-1)
3. Procedure (S-2 to 7)
Cases:
1. Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club vs. Won, 70 SCRA
2. Eternal Gardens vs. IAC, 165 SCRA
3. Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dizon Realty, 548 SCRA
4. Bank of Commerce vs. Planters Dev. Bank, 681 SCRA
5. Belo Medical Group, Inc. vs.Jose L. Santos and
Victoria G. Belo, 838 SCRA 142, Aug. 30, 2017

B. Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies (R-63)

1. Nature; Kinds (S-1)
2. Parties (S-2)
3. Conversion into ordinary action (S-6)
Cases:
1. Almeda vs. Bathala Marketing Ind.,542 SCRA
2. De Borja vs. Pinalakas na Ugnayan ng Maliliit na
Mangingisda ng L, M at V., 823 SCRA 550 (2017)
3. Malana vs. Tappa, 600 SCRA
4. Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, 676 SCRA
5. Sabitsana vs.Muertegui, 703 SCRA (8/5/13)
6. Dept of Finance vs. De la Cruz, Jr., 768 SCRA 73
7. Erice vs. Sison, 846 SCRA (2017)
8. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Standard
Insurance Co. Inc., 885 SCRA 69, Nov. 7, 2018

C. Review of Judgments and Final Orders of the COMELEC and COA (R-64)
- The distinctive nature and procedure of this special civil action
Case: Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy vs. COMELEC 705
SCRA 340, September 10, 2013

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D. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (R-65)

1. Certiorari (S-1)
a. grounds
b. requirements
c. procedure; parties and effects
Cases:
1. Ampil vs. Ombudsman, 703 SCRA, 7/31/13
2. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. vs. Mondejar, 714 SCRA, 1/28/14
3. Maglalang vs. PAGCOR, 712 SCRA, 12/11/13
4. People vs. Castaneda, 712 SCRA, 12/11/13
5. UP Board of Regents vs. Ligot-Teylan, 227 SCRA
6. Tuazon vs. RD of Caloocan, 157 SCRA
7. GSIS vs. CA, 867 SCRA (2018)
8. Reyes vs. Sandiganbayan SCRA, 868 SCRA (2018)

2. Prohibition (S-2)
a. grounds
b. requirements
c. procedure; parties and effects
Cases:
1. Vivas vs. Monetary Board of BSP, 703 SCRA 8/7/13
2. Corales vs. Republic, 703 SCRA, 8/27/13
3. Javier vs. Gonzales, 815 SCRA (2017)
4. Career Executive Service Board vs. Civil Service
Commission, 819 SCRA 482 (2017)
3. Mandamus (S-3)
a. grounds
b. requisites
c. procedure; parties and effects
d. damages
Cases:
1. Hipos, Sr. vs. Bay, 581 SCRA 3/17/09
2. Sanchez vs. Lastimosa, 534 SCRA, 9/25/07
3. Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, 517 SCRA, 3/7/07
4. Laygo vs. Mun. Mayor of Solano, N.V., 814 SCRA (2017)
5. Cudia vs. Superintendent of PMA, February 24, 2015
6. Villanueva vs. JBC, 755 SCRA 182

E. Quo Warranto (R-66)

1. Parties (S-1 to 6)
2. Period (S-8)
3. Limitation (S-11)
4. Judgment for Cost (S-12)
Read for class discussion: Republic vs. Sereno, May 11, 2018, 863 SCRA 1
Cases:
1. Mendoza vs. Allas, 302 SCRA
2. Calleja vs. Panday, 483 SCRA.
3. Lokin, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 621 SCRA
4. Aratea vs. COMELEC, 683 SCRA
5. De Castro vs. Carlos, 696 SCRA, 4/16/13
6. Velasco vs. Belmonte, 779 SCRA 81 (1/12/16)

F. Expropriation (R-67)
1. The right of Eminent Domain
-Constitutional provision: “private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation”
- RA 7160: The Local Govt. Code, Sec. 19
2. Who may expropriate

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 3. Two stages in expropriation
1. determination of public use
2. just compensation
Cases:
1. City of Manila vs. Serrano, 359 SCRA
2. National Power Corp. vs. CA, 436 SCRA
3. Republic vs. Andaya, 524 SCRA
4. Asia’s Emerging Dragon vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA
5. Abad vs. Fil-homes Realty, 636 SCRA
6. NPC vs. YCLA Sugar Dev. Corp., 712 SCRA 550
7. Limkaichong vs. LBP, 799 SCRA 139 (8/2/16)
8. LBP vs. Dalauta, 835 SCRA (2017)

G. Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage (R-68)

1. The Complaint (S-1)
2. The Judgment (S-2)
3. Sale of foreclosed property (S-3)
- Equity of Redemption vs. Right of Redemption
4. Deficiency Judgment (S-6)
Read the law on extra-judicial foreclosure: RA 3135, 4118
Cases:
1. Ramirez vs. Manila Banking Corp., 712 SCRA, 12/2013
2. Marquez vs. Alindog, 714 SCRA, 1/2014
3. Ardiente vs. Provincial Sheriff, 436 SCRA
4. LZK Holdings vs. Planters Dev. Bank, 714 SCRA, 1/2014
5. Goldenway Merchandising Corp. vs. Equitable PCI
Bank, 693 SCRA, March 13, 2013
6. Solid Builders vs. CBC, 695 SCRA (also on injunction)
7. Robles vs. Yapcinco, 739 SCRA 75
8. MBTC vs. CPR Promotions and Marketing, Inc., 760 SCRA 59
9. Roldan vs. Barrios, 862 SCRA 318, April 23, 2018
10. PDBank vs. Lubiya Agro Ind. Corp, 885 SCRA 470
Nov. 14, 2018 (Re: RA 3135)

H. Partition (R-69)
1. The Complaint (S-1)
2. The Order (S-2)
3. Stages of Partition:
4. Rule of Commissioners (S-3 to 7)
5. The Judgment (S-11)
Cases:
1. Balus vs. Balus, 610 SCRA
2. Feliciano vs. Canosa, 629 SCRA
3. Mangahas vs. Brobio, 634 SCRA
4. Vda. De Figuracion vs. Figuracion-Gerilla, 690 SCRA
5. Agarrado vs. Librando-Agarrado, 864 SCRA 582, June 6, 2018
I. Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer (R-70)
1. Parties (S-1)
2. Procedure: Summary (S-3 to 15)
3. Judgment (S-17)
4. Immediate Execution (S-19 vs S-21)
- preliminary injunction (S-20)
5. Appeals

Cases:
1. Prov. of Cam. Sur vs. Bodega Glassware, 821 SCRA (2017)
2. Santiago vs. Northbay Knitting, Inc., 842 SCRA (2017)
3. Regalado vs. De la Rama vda. De dela Pena, 848 SCRA (2017)
4. Ferrer vs. Rabaca, 632 SCRA
5. CGR Corp. vs. Treyes, 522 SCRA 765

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 6. Zacarias vs. Anacay, 736 SCRA 508, 9/24/14
7. Supapo vs. De Jesus, 756 SCRA 211, 4/20/15
9. De Guzman-Fuerte vs. Estomo, 862 SCRA (2018)
10. Iglesia de Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Phil. Inc.
Vs. De la Cruz, 862 SCRA (2018)
11.Emma Buenviaje Nabo v. Felix C. Buenviaje
G.R. No. 224906, Oct. 7, 2020 (On tolerance)

J. Contempt (R-71)
1. Kinds: direct (S-1); indirect (S-3)
2. Procedure (S-4 to 9)
3. Judgment and Review (S-11)

Cases:
1. Yasay vs. Recto, 313 SCRA
2. Sison vs. Caoibes, Jr., 429 SCRA 258
3. Espanol vs. Formoso, 525 SCRA
4. Marantan vs. Diokno, 716 SCRA 164, 2/2014
5. Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club vs. Sanchez, 717 SCRA
6. Tormis vs. Paredes, 749 SCRA 505, Feb. 4, 2015
7. Oca vs. Custodio, 832 SCRA (2017)
8. Causing vs. De la Rosa, 857 SCRA (2017)
9. Sps. Bayani & Myrna Partoza vs. Lilian Montano & Amelia
Solomon, 866 SCRA 35 (2018)

III. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Rules 72 to 109)

A. Settlement of Estate
1. Venue vs Jurisdiction (R-73)
2. Kinds of settlement
a. Extrajudicial
(1) By Agreement
(2) By self-adjudication
b. Judicial
(1) Summary (R-74)
(2) By Petition (R-75 to 90)
a. Intestate
b. Testate
(3) By partition (R-69)
3. The Administrator or Executor
(a) Special vs Regular (R-80)
(b) Bonds (R-81)
(c) Powers and Duties (R-84)
(d) Accountability (R-85)
4. Claims Against the Estate (R-86)
5. Actions by and against Executor and Administrator (R-87)
6. Distribution and Partition (R-90)

Cases:
1. San Luis vs. San Luis, 514 SCRA, February 2007
2. Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen, 702 SCRA, 7/31/13
3. Agtarap vs. Agtarap, 651 SCRA, June 2011
4. Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay, 683 SCRA, October 2012

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 5. Lee vs. RTC of Q.C., 423 SCRA, February 2004
6. Heirs of Hilario Ruiz vs. Edmond Ruiz, 252 SCRA, January 1996
7. Unionbank vs. Santibanez, 452 SCRA, February 2005 (R-86)
8. Heirs of Maglasang vs. MBC, 706 SCRA 235
9. Pilapil vs. Heirs of M. Briones, 514 SCRA, February 2007
10. Sabidong vs. Solas, 699 SCRA, June 2013
11. Aranas vs. Mercado, 713 SCRA
12. Silverio Sr. vs. Silverio Jr., 733 SCRA 183, (8/13/14)
13. Butiong vs. Plazo, 765 SCRA 227

B. Escheats (R-91)
1. Definition
2. Historical background and legal basis
3. Actions for Revisions (S-5)
Cases:
1. Alvarico vs Sola, 382 SCRA
2. Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo, 770 SCRA 397
3. Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc. 831 SCRA 319, July 2017
4. Republic vs. Heirs of Menardo Cabrera, 884 SCRA (2017)

C. Guardians and Guardianship (R-92 to 97) as amended by

A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC, May 1, 2003

1. Venue vs Jurisdiction (S-92)

2. Appointment, kinds, Qualifications (S-93)
3. Requirement (S-94)
4. Power and Duties (S-96)
5. Termination (S-97)
Cases:
1. Goyena vs. Ledesma Gustilo, Jan. 13, 2003
2. Caniza vs. CA, Feb. 24, 1997
3. Neri vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy, 683 SCRA
4. Oropesa vs. Oropesa, 671 SCRA (4/2012)
5. Abad vs. Biazon, 687 SCRA (12/2012)

D. Trustees (R-98)
1. Parties
2. Kinds/Classes
Cases:
1. Advent Capital and Finance Corp. vs. Alcantara, 664 SCRA
2. Land Bank of the Phil. vs. Perez, 672 SCRA

E. Adoption and Custody of Minors (R-99-100)

1. The Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (RA 8552)
2. Inter Country Adoption Act of 1995 (RA 8043)
3. Rule of Adoption (A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC dated July 31, 2002, effective Aug.
22, 2002)
a. Who may adopt (S-4)
b. Who may be adopted ( S-5)
c. Venue and Jurisdiction S.20)

Cases:
1. Cang vs CA – 296 SCRA 128
2. Vda de Jacob vs CA – 312 SCRA 772
3. Republic of the Phil. Vs Hon. Jose R. Hernandez- 253 SCRA 509
4. Republic vs CA – 255 SCRA 99
5. Reyes vs. Mauricio, 636 SCRA
6. In the Matter of Stephanie Nathy Astorga-Garcia, 454 SCRA

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7. Petition for Adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim, 588 SCRA 98 (2007)
8. Nery vs. Sampana, 734 SCRA
9. Castro vs. Gregorio, 738 SCRA
10. Bartolome vs. SSS, 740 SCRA
11. Re: Adoption of Karen Herico Licerio, 886 SCRA 318, Nov. 21, 2018
- On immutability of judgments; exceptions

F. Habeas Corpuz (R-102)

4. Definition and Nature or Scope (S-1)
5. Requisites for Application (S-3)
6. Disallowance or Discharge of Writ (S-4)
7. Preliminary citation vs writ (S-6)
8. The return: when evidence; when plea (S-10,12,13)
Cases:
1. Ilusorio vs Bildner, 332 SCRA 169
2. Serapio vs Sandiganbayan- 396 SCRA 443
3. Lacson vs. Perez, 357 SCRA 756
4. Sangca vs. City Prosecutor of Cebu, 524 SCRA 610
5. Mangila vs. Pangilinan, 701 SCRA 355
6. Tujan-Militante vs. Cada-Deapera, July 28, 2014
7. Datukan Malang Salibo vs. The Warden, 755 SCRA 296
8. Padilla vs. Congress of the Phil., 832 SCRA (July 2017)
-0n suspension of privilege during martial law
9. Osorio vs. Navera, 856 SCRA 435, February 267, 2018

H. Change of Name vs. Correction/Cancellation of Entries, as amended

R.A. 9048 and 10172 (Rule 103 vs. Rule 108)

1. Venue vs Jurisdiction
2. Contents of Petition/Grounds
3. Hearing
4. Judgment
5. R.A. 9048 and its Implementing Rules
Cases:
1. Eleosida vs Civil Registrar of Q.C. – May 9, 2002
2. Republic vs. Kho – 526 SCRA
3. Petition for Change on Name of Julian Lim
Carulasan Wang – 454 SCRA
4. Braza vs. Civil Registrar of Neg. Occ. – 607 SCRA (2009)
5. Republic vs. Silverio – 537 SCRA
6. Republic vs. Cagandahan –565 SCRA
7. Republic vs. Uy – 703 SCRA (August 12, 2013)
8. Minoru Fujiki vs. Marinay, June 26, 2013
9. People vs, Merlinda Olaybar, February 10, 2014
10. Onde vs. CR of Las Pinas, 734 SCRA, Sept. 2014
11. Almojuela vs. Republic, 801 SCRA 399
12. Gan vs. Republic, 803 SCRA 204
13. Chua vs. Republic, 845 SCRA 407, Nov. 2017

I. Prerogative Writs

A. Writ of Amparo

Cases:

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 1. Tapuz vs. Del Rosario, 554 SCRA
2. Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Asso., 554 SCRA
3. Castillo vs. Cruz, 605 SCRA
4. Razon vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA
5. Roxas vs. GMA, 630 SCRA
6. Burgos vs. Esperon, 715 SCRA, February 2014
7. Republic vs. Cayanan, 844 SCRA 183 (2017)
8. Gadian vs. Librado, 841 SCRA (2017)
- Amparo Writ is both preventive and curative
9. Lucena vs. Ilago, G.R. No. 252120, Sept. 15, 2020

B. Writ of Habeas Data

Cases:
1. Caram vs. Segui, August 5, 2014
2. Vivares et Al. vs. St. Therese College, Sept. 29, 2014
3. Meralco vs. Lim, 632 SCRA
4. Lee vs. Ilagan, 738 SCRA 59

C. Writ of Kalikasan

Cases:
1. Dolot vs. Paje, 703 SCRA (continuing Mandamus).
2. Paje vs. Casino, 749 SCRA 39 (Writ of Kalikasan)
3. Arigo vs. Swift, 735 SCRA 102
4. Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape
Tanon Strait vs. Angelo Reyes et Al., 756 SCRA 513,
April 21, 2015
5.West Tower Condominium vs. Phil. Ind. Corp., 758 SCRA
6. Segovia vs. Climate Change Commission, 819 SCRA 543
March 7, 2017

IV. E V I D E N C E (Rules 128-133)

(As amended by A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC effective May 1, 2020)*

A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION
(Rule 128, Sections 1-4: General Provisions)

1. Definition/Meaning and Scope of E.

2. Kinds and Classifications of E.
3. Axioms of Admissibility
a. Relevancy
b. Competency
c. Authenticity
d. Offer
4. Kinds of admissibility
a. conditional

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 b. multiple
c. curative

Cases:
1. Ong Chia vs. Republic, 328 SCRA
- on naturalization
2. Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA
- on privacy of communication & correspondence
3. People vs. Yatar, 428 SCRA
- on the right against self-incrimination (DNA)
4. Tating vs. Marcella, 519 SCRA
- on admissibility, weight and sufficiency of evidence
5. People vs. Salafranca, 666 SCRA
- multiple admissibility
6. SCC Chemicals Corp. vs. CA, 353 SCRA
- curative admissibility (hearsay evidence admissible
when not objected)

Sec. 3 inserted the words “the Constitution” *

B. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

(Rule 129, Sections 1-4))

1. Judicial Notice
a. mandatory and discretionary
b. when to take judicial notice
2. Judicial Admissions
a. when is there judicial admissions
Cases:
1. LBP vs. Banal, 434 SCRA
- contents of the records of other cases
2. People vs. Kulais, 292 SCRA
- of testimonies in other cases
3. Laureano vs. CA, 324 SCRA
- admissibility of foreign laws
4. Maquiling vs. COMELEC, 700 SCRA
- admissibility of foreign laws/official records
5. People vs. Baharan, 639 SCRA
- admissibility of extrajudicial confession/plea of guilty
6. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 662 SCRA
- exception to admissibility of testimonies in other cases
7. Ligtas vs. People, 767 SCRA 1
- admissibility of decisions and records in other cases
8. Juan vs. Juan, 837 SCRA, Aug. 24, 2017
- website article is not of judicial notice

Amended Sections 1, 3 and 4 by inserting certain words *

C. RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY
(Rule 130, Sections 1-54)

1. Object/Real Evidence (Section 1)

Cases:
1. Salas vs. Matusalem, 705 SCRA
-how to establish paternity and filiation
2. People vs. Mercury de la Curz, 802 SCRA, Sept. 7, 2016
3. People vs. Manuel De la Rosa, Dec. 13, 2017
4. People vs. Lazaro, 886 SCRA,Nov. 21, 2018
5. People vs. Emmanuel Oliva, January 7, 2019
- on chain of custody rule

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 6. People vs. John Orcullo y Susa, July 8, 2019

2. Documentary Evidence (Sections 2-10)

Cases:
1. St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. vs. LWV Const. Corp. 847 SCRA
2. People vs. Vibar, 858 SCRA
- on admissibility of private documents

a. The Best Evidence Rule, NOW Original Document Rule

Cases:
1. MCMP Const. vs. Monark, Nove. 10, 2014
2. Loon vs. Power Master, Inc., 712 SCRA
3. Dimaguila vs. Monteiro, 714 SCRA
4. Republic vs. Mupas, 769 SCRA
5. Robinol vs. Bassig, 845 SCRA

b. Secondary Evidence

c. Parole Evidence
Cases:
1. Leoveras vs. Valdez, 652 SCRA
2. Paras vs. Kimwa Const., 755 SCRA
3. PNB vs. Pasimio, 769 SCRA
4. Mancol vs. DBP, 846 SCRA
Amendments are found in Sections 2, 3, 3(b), 3(c), 4 (a)(b)(c), 7 {9 is now 10}

d. Electronic Evidence
- A.M. 01-7-01-SC, Rules on Electronic Evidence
- R.A. 8792, E-Commerce Law
Cases:
1. Heirs of Sabanpan vs. Comorposa, 408 SCRA
2. Torres vs. PAGCOR, 661 SCRA
3. Ang vs. Republic,618 SCRA
4. People vs. Enojas
5. Syhunliong vs. Rivera, June 4, 2014
6. Bartolome vs. Maranan, 740 SCRA
7. BBB vs. AAA, 750 SCRA
8. Astorga & Repol Law Offices vs.
Villanueva, 751 SCRA

Section 4 of Rule 130 incorporated Electronic Evidence rule

Sections 11-20 remain: Interpretation of Documents

3. Testimonial Evidence (Sections 21-54)

a. Qualifications: “one who can perceive and perceiving can

make known his perception”
i. ability to observe/perceive
ii. ability to recall/remember
iii. ability to relate/communicate

b. Disqualifications:
Case: Marcos vs. Heirs of Andres Navarro, 700 SCRA
Note: mental incapacity or immaturity in Section 21 has been deleted. Is it no
longer a disqualification?
Case: People vs. Golimlim, 427 SCRA
People vs. Golidan, 850 SCRA 579, Jan.2018
i. marital disqualification (Sec. 23)
Cases:
1 Alvarez vs. Ramirez, 473 SCRA.

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 2.People vs. Castaneda, 88 SCRA
ii. privileged communication (Sec. 24)
Cases:
1. Chan vs. Chan, 702 SCRA
2. Lacurom vs. Jacoba, 484 SCRA
3. Samala vs. Valencia, 514 SCRA
4. Almonte vs. Vasquez, 244 SCRA
5. Syhunliong vs. Rivera,725 SCRA

iii. death or insanity/dead man’s statute (Section 39)

Cases:
1. Razon vs. CA, 207 SCRA
2. Sunga-Chan vs. Chua, 363 SCRA
3. Bordalba vs. CA, 374 SCRA
Discuss Executive Privilege under the doctrines laid down in Senate of the Philippines vs.
Ermita (488 SCRA) and Neri vs. Senate Committees (435 SCRA)

c. Testimonial Privilege
i. Parental and filial privilege (Section 25)
ii. Privilege relating to trade secrets (Section 26)

d. Admission of a Party (Section 27)

- by third parties (S-29)
- by partners (S-30)
- by conspirators (S-31)
- by privies (S-32)
- by silence (S-33)
Cases:
1. Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
706 SCRA
2. Cambe vs. Ombudsman, 812 SCRA Dec. 6, 2016
3. Ocampo vs. Ocampo, 830 SCRA

e. Offer of Compromise (Section 28)

f. Confessions (Section 34)

- judicial vs. extra-judicial
Cases:
a. People vs. Dacanay, 807 SCRA, (2016)
b. People vs. Opiniano, 832 (2017)
c. Cruz vs. People, 846 SCRA

g. Previous Conduct (Section 35)

Cases:
1. People vs. Santos, 221 SCRA 715
2. People vs. Nardo, 353 SCRA 339
3. RP vs. Heirs of Alejaga, Sr., 393 SCRA 361

h. Hearsay Evidence Rule (Sections 37-49)

Cases: Patula vs. People, 669 SCRA
People vs. Aguirre, 845 (independently relevant statement)
i. Exceptions:
i. Dying Declaration: Pp vs. Calinawan, 817 SCRA 424
ii. Statement of decedent or person of unsound mind
iii. Declaration against interest: Pp vs. Bernal, 274 SCRA
iv Declaration about pedigree: Tizon vs. CA, 276 SCRA
v. Family Reputation or tradition: Jison vs. CA, 286 SCRA
vi. Common reputation
vii. Res gestae: Pp vs. Dimapilit, 836 SCRA;Pp vs. Mercado, 883
SCRA, Oct. 2018
viii. Records of regularly conducted business activity
(formerly, entries in the course of business)

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 Phil. Airlines vs Ramos, 207 SCRA 461
ix. Entries in Official Records: Pp vs. Corpuz, 856 SCRA 610; Sabili
vs. COMELEC, 670 SCRA; Cercado-Siga, 752 SCRA
x. Commercial lists: Meralco vs. Quisumbing, 336 SCRA
xi. Learned treatises
xii. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding: Pp vs. Ortiz-Miyako,
279 SCRA; Go vs. People, 677 SCRA
xiii. Child Witness Rule: People vs. Ibanez, 706 SCRA
People vs. Esugon, 759
xiv. Residual exception (Section 50)

j. Opinion Rule Sections 51-53)

i. Expert Witness: Lavarez vs. Guevarra, 822 SCRA 130
Avelino vs. People, 701 SCRA
ii. Ordinary Witness: Pp vs. Duranan, 349 SCRA

k. Character Evidence (Section 54)

People vs. Deopita, 436 SCRA 794

D. BURDEN OF PROOF, BURDEN OF EVIDENCE AND PRESUMPTIONS

(Rule 131, Sections 1-6)

1. Burden of Proof vs. Burden of Evidence

Case: FEBTC vs. Chante, 707 SCRA

2. Presumptions
a. Conclusive presumptions
i. Ibaan Rural bank vs. CA, 321 SCRA
ii. Alcaraz vs. Tangga-an, 401 SCRA
iii. University of Mindanao vs. PSP, 778 SCRA (1/11/16)
b. Disputable presumptions
i. Rosaroso vs. Soria, 699 SCRA
ii. Heirs of Trazona vs. Heirs of Canada, 712 SCRA
iii.Uy vs. Lacsamana, 767 SCRA
iv. Diaz vs. People, 776 SCRA 43

- suppression of testimony: People vs. Padrigone, 382 SCRA

Metrobank vs. CA, 333 SCRA
- official duty: De los Santos vs. COA, 703 SCRA; Pp vs. Barte, 819 SCRA
People vs. Candidia, 707 SCRA
- cohabitation: People vs. Edualino, 271 SCRA

- survivorship; absence

3. Legitimacy or Illegitimacy (Section 4)

4. Presumptions in civil actions/criminal actions (Sections 5 & 6)

E. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
(Rule 132, Sections 1-40)

1. Examination of Witnesses (Sections 1-18)

- Order of Presentation of Evidence. People vs Fabre, 385 SCRA
- Leading and Misleading Questions. People vs. Perez, 397 SCRA
- Impeachment. People vs. Castellano, 400 SCRA
- Reference to Memorandum
- Present Memory Revived, People vs. Plasencia, 249 SCRA
- Past Recollection Recorded, Canque vs. CA, 305 SCRA

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 Note: Former Section 14 transposed to Section 54 of 130

2. Authentication and Proof of Documents (Sections 19-33)

- Classes of Documents
- Public Documents
Cases: 1. Iwasawa vs. Gangan, 705 SCRA
2. Asian Terminals vs. Philam Insurance, 702 SCRA
- Private Documents
- Offer of Evidence. Aludos vs. Suerte, 673 SCRA; Westmont
Investment Corporation vs. Francia, Jr., 661 SCRA

(What is the Apostille Convention?)

3. Offer and Objection (Sections 34-40)

-Tender of Excluded Evidence
Fortune Tabacco Corp. vs. Com of Int. Rev.,761 SCRA 173
Amoquis vs. Ballado, 878 SCRA, Aug. 20, 2018

F. WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

(Rule 133, Sections 1-8)

The Hierarchy of Evidence:

i. Overwhelming Evidence

ii. Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt. “ That degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind”
1. People vs. Caliso – 659 SCRA
2. People vs. Patentes – 716 SCRA
3. People vs. Arcenal – 821 SCRA 549
4. People vs. Alboka – 856 SCRA 252

iii. Clear and Convincing

1. Supreme Court vs. Delgado – 658 SCRA
2. Govt of Hongkong Special Adm. Region
Vs. Olalia, Jr. – 521 SCRA
3. People vs. Fontanilla – 664 SCRA
4. People vs. Cabiles, 827 SCRA

iv. Preponderance of Evidence

1. PCIB vs. Balmaceda – 658 SCRA

2. De la Llana vs. Biong – 711 SCRAi
3..Canlao vs. People – 659 SCRA (equipoise doctrine)

v. Substantial Evidence

1. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Reyes – 658 SCRA

2. Ramos vs. BPI Family Savings Bank – 711 SCRA

vi. Prima facie evidence

1. Lucas vs. Lucas – 650 SCRA

2. Estate of Marcos vs. Republic – 814 SCRA 600
3. Marcos vs. Cabrera-Faller – 815 SCRA 285

vii. Probable Cause

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 1. PNB vs. Tria - 671 SCRA
2. Del Castillo vs. People – 664 SCRA

viii. Iota of Evidence (circumstantial)

1.. People vs. Anticamara – 651 SCRA
2 . People vs. Deocampo 666 SCRA
3. Celedonio vs. People, 761 SCRA 363
4. Bacerra vs. People, 828 SCRA 525

By: Henedino M. Brondial, Sr.

Chair, Remedial Law Department
Arellano University School of Law

PRAYER BEFORE CLASS

ALMIGHTY GOD AND LOVING FATHER, WE STAND BEFORE YOU

IMPLORING YOUR GUIDANCE IN CONDUCTING THIS CLASS TODAY.

HELP ME TO ALWAYS ACT FAIRLY AND JUSTLY COUPLED WITH

MERCIFUL UNDERSTANDING AND COMPASSION. GUIDE ME TO

ENFORCE DISCIPLINE AND NEVER TO BE PREJUDICED AGAINST ANY

STUDENT. KEEP ME FROM ABUSING MY AUTHORITY AND TEACH ME TO

EXERCISE IT WITH CONVICTION.

DEAR LORD, YOU HAVE CHOSEN THESE STUDENTS TO BE YOUR

INSTRUMENTS IN PROMOTING JUSTICE, HONESTY AND INTEGRITY.

ENLIGHTEN THEIR MINDS; STRENGTHEN THEIR SPIRITS; FILL THEIR

HEARTS WITH COURGAGE AND DETERMINATION. GRANT THEM YOUR

WISDOM AND ASSISTANCE IN ALL THEIR ACTIONS AND DECISIONS,

SPECIALLY IN THEIR STUDY OF LAW. TO YOU, THE SUPREME MASTER

AND PERFECT TEACHER, I COMMEND THEM TO YOUR LOVING CARE.

A M E N.

PRAYER AFTER CLASS

DEAR LORD, WE HAVE COMPLETED THE TASK YOU HAVE DESIGNED FOR US
TODAY. THANK YOU FOR LEADING US THROUGH. KEEP US ALWAYS MEEK AND
HUMBLE, KNOWING THAT WITHOUT YOU WE ARE NOTHING. CONTINUE TO GUIDE US,
AND HELP US NOT BE DISCOURAGED IN OUR SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE, WISDOM
AND UNDERSTANDING. WE LOOK FORWARD TO OUR NEXT MEETING UNDER YOUR
EVER-ABIDING GUIDANCE AND INSPIRATION. KEEP US SAFE AND SECURE, EVER
FREE FROM ANY ARM AND INJURY. A M E N.

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