GO-TAN VS TAN
support his minor child under Philippine laws
- Sharica, Steven’s wife filed Temporary Protective
Order against Steven and her parents-in-law
- In conspiracy of causing verbal, psychological and
economic abuse in violation of RA 9262
- RTC granted here prayer for TPO. But after the
comment of opposition, RTC dismissed the case on
the ground that it includes the parents-in-law of the
petitioner, they were not included in as respondents
under RA 9262
- Won PARENTS-IN-LAW MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE
PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF TPO IN ACCORD WITH
RA 9262
- YES. RA 9262 must be understood as suppletory
application of the RPC. Provisions on Article 8 about
conspiracy can be suppletorily applied in this statutory
law.
- Respondents had community of design and purpose in
tormenting her by giving insufficient financial support,
harassing by pressuring her and repeatedly abusing
her verbally, emotionally and mentally
- Sec. 3 of RA 9262 defines violence against women or
their children as any act or series of act committed by
any person. It can be done directly or through another
according to Sec. 5h. Likewise in Sec. 8b on the
issuance of protection order
DEL SOCORRO VS VAN WILSEM
- The Filipina Del Socorro married the foreign nation Van
Wilsem to Holland and they had a son. Later on, they
got their divorcee decree in Holland. Del Socorro,
together with her son went back to the Philippines.
- Van Wilsem promised to give monthly support but
they never received it
- Del Socorro filed complaint against him for violation of
Sec. 5 RA 9262 for the Van wilsem’s refusal to support
his minor child with the petitioner
- ISSUE:
o WON a foreign national has an obligation to
- He is subjected to the laws of his country. But under
the doctrine of processual presumption, he must
properly plead and prove it in our courts. Failure to do
so, pur courts will presume that their foreign law is the
same to our local laws.
o WON a foreign national can be held criminally
liable under RA 9262
- YES. Under Sec. 5, depravation or denial to the
support of the child is considered as an act of violence
against women and their children
o Penal laws are obligatory upon all who live and
sojourn in Philippine territory
o Also, there is no prescription because it is a
continuing offense.
- Petition was granted
DABALOS VS RTC
- Petitioner was charged with violation of Sec. 5a of RA
9262. The victim sought for the payment of the money
she had lent to the petitioner but he could not pay.
She confronted her about rumors about her, he
admitted. The respondent slapped the petitioner
causing to inflict her physical injuries.
- He contends that he was no longer in a relationship
with the victim during the offense so RA 9262 should
not be his charge.
- Issue: WON RA 9262 can be construed in a manner
that will favor the accused.
- Elements of VAWC
o The offender has or had sexual or dating
relationship
o The offender, by himself or through another.
Commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman
o The harassment alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to her
 - The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting
qualifications to any act or series of act committed
against a woman or her children and the woman is the
offender’s wife, former wife or with whom he had or
has sexual or dating relationship and it results in
physical harm
JABALDE VS PEOPLE
— Lin testified, he was a Grade 1 pupil of Cawitan
Elementary School. At around 9:00 a.m. of December
13, 2000, he was playing “langit lupa” during recess
with Ray Ann, Marco, Nova and another classmate.
During the course of their game, he touched the
shoulder of Nova, Jabalde’s daughter, causing the
latter to fall down and wounding her head. He then
helped Nova to stand while one of his classmates
called Jabalde. Afraid of what happened, he ran
towards a dilapidated building, which was near the
place of the incident. Soon thereafter, Jabalde arrived
and slapped him on his neck and choked him. Lin was
able to get out of her hold when he removed her
hands from his neck.
— He immediately ran towards their house some 500
meters away from the school. He told his mother
Aileen about the incident. Thereafter, he was brought
to Sta. Catalina Hospital for treatment and a medical
certificate was then issued to him.
— Jabalde posits that in her case, the act of inflicting
injuries, however minute they were, is punishable
under the RPC particularly Article 266(1)22 which
defines slight physical injuries; hence, she should be
punished under the RPC and not under Section 10(a),
Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.
ISSUE: Whether the acts of Jabalde as constitutive of
violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.
COURT’S RULING:
- Jabalde was accused of slapping and striking Lin,
hitting the latter on his nape, and immediately
thereafter, choking the said offended party causing the
latter to sustain injuries. 37 However, the records of the
case do not show that Jabalde intended to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of
Lin as a human being. Slaw
- The laying of the hands on Lin was an offshoot of
Jabalde’s emotional outrage after being informed that
her daughter’s head was punctured, and whom she
thought was already dead. In fact, her vision got
blurred and she fainted. When she returned into
consciousness, she sat on her chair in front of the
board for about five to ten minutes. 
- It would be unforeseeable that Jabalde acted with
cruelty when prosecution’s witness herself testified
that the abrasions suffered by Lin were just “mildly
inflicted.” If Jabalde indeed intended to abuse,
maltreat and injure Lin, she would have easily hurt the
7-year-old boy with heavy blows.
- As a mother, the death of her child, who has the blood
of her blood, and the flesh of her flesh, is the most
excruciating idea that a mother could entertain. The
spontaneity of the acts of Jabalde against Lin is just a
product of the instinctive reaction of a mother to
rescue her own child from harm and danger as
manifested only by mild abrasions, scratches, or
scrapes suffered by Lin, thus, negating any intention
on inflicting physical injuries. Having lost the strength
of her mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being that was so essential in the
crime of child abuse. In fine, the essential element of
intent was not established with the prescribed degree
of proof required for a successful prosecution under
Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.
BONGOLAN VS PEOPLE
Facts: Petitioner was charged with child abuse, an act in
violation of Section 10(a) of RA 7610, for allegedly
committing acts of physical abuse and/or maltreatment by
striking Jayson Dela Cruz (12 year old) with his palm hitting
the latter at his back and by slapping said minor hitting his
left cheek and uttering derogatory remarks to the latter’s
family, which acts of the accused are prejudicial to the child’s
development and which demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of the said child as a human being.
Petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated
Jayson. He explained that he only talked with Jayson and
Roldan after his minor daughters, Mary Ann Rose and
Cherrylyn, had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing
stones at them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair.
He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to
a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his
sons from harming his daughters. RTC and CA found and
declared petitioner guilty of child abuse.
Issue: Whether petitioner was guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling: NO. The law under which the petitioner was charged,
tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10 (a), Article VI
of Republic Act No. 7610, which relevantly states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or
Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s
Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child
abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including
those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms. –
xxxx
(b) “Child Abuse” refers to the maltreatment, whether
habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the
following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual
abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival,
such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an
injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth
and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC
and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at
the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we
disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child
abuse within the purview of the above-quoted
provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable
doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended
to debase the “intrinsic worth and dignity” of Jayson as a
human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate
or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of
hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, indicative of his being then
overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety
of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at information that he feloniously inflicts psychological violence
the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self- upon a woman with whom he has two children, resulting to
control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or mental and emotional anguish and public humiliation by
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human repeated verbal and emotional abuse consisting of several
being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. bad and insulting utterance directed against the victim.
Dinamling pleaded not guilty to both charges.
What crime, then, did the petitioner commit? Considering
that Jayson’s physical injury required 5-7 days of medical Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of
attention, the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries RA No. 9262. 
under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling: The elements of the crime are;

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the CA; and
ENTER a new judgment finding P GUlLTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under
paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code.
AAA VS PEOPLE
- She and the petitioner are husband and wife. They
have two children who witnessed the violence. The
wife incurred debts and used the television etc as
collateral
- The husband hauled these items to his parents’ house
- RTC convicted him and CA denied his petition
- ISSUE: WON act of the petitioner constitutes
emotional and psychological abuse
- The elements of the offender causes mental anguish to
a woman or her children through the acts of public
ridicule, repeated emotional and verbal abuse or denial
of financial support
- Psychological violence refers to acts or omissions
causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering to the victim
DINAMLING VS PEOPLE
Facts: Petitioner Ricky Dinamling was charged in two criminal
information for violation of R.A. No. 9262. It is alleged in the
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or
children
(2)  The woman is either the wife or former wife of the
offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such
offender has a common child. As for the woman’s child or
children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living
within or without the family abode.
(3)  The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental
or emotional anguish; and
(4)  The anguish is caused through the acts of public ridicule
or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial
of financial support or custody of minor children or access
to the children or similar acts or omissions.
In this case, the elements have been proven and duly
established. It is undisputed that the victim is a woman who
has then in a five-year ongoing relationship with Dinamling
and had two common children. The woman is often in fear of
petitioner due to latter’s physical and verbal abuse.
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5
(RA No. 9262) just like the mental or emotional anguish
caused on the victim. It is the means employed by the
perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect
caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To
establish psychological violence as the element of the crime,
it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the
acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar acts. And to
establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to
present a testimony of the victim as such experiences are
personal to this party.
In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim
nor the actual physical violence done by the perpetrator are
necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as
defined in Section 5(i) of RA 9262. The only exception is, as
in the case at bar, when the physical violence done,
petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly punching, kicking and
stripping her pants and underwear, although obvious acts of
physical violence, are also instances of psychological violence
since it was alleged and proven that they resulted in the
victim’s public ridicule. Accused is alleged to have caused the
mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such acts of
physical violence must be proven. In this instance, the
physical violence was a means of causing mental or
emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual
bodily injury, the physical violence translates to psychological
violence since its main effect was on the victim's mental or
emotional well-being. 
GARCIA VS DRILON
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the
RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against
her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to
be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of
custody of her children and of financial support and also a
victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully
comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-
respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO
ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended
the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO
should not be modified.  After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with
prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the
constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process
and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified
TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but
however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of
constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and
the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued
by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the
theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at
the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude
that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the
equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA
9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the
Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence
to the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic
social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid
and unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of
judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision:         1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has
limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the
complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have
authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of
a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the
pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in
the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection
of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union,  the Court ruled that all that
is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that
it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to
existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member
of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause
by favouring women over men as victims of violence and
abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may
have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO
exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due
process.
4.  The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is
justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing
mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the
Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any
issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is
not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay
officials.  Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any
branch of the Government while executive power is the
power to enforce and administer the laws.  The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive,
not a judicial, function.  The same holds true with the
issuance of BPO.  Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive
function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of
merit.
People vs. Silongan 401 SCRA 459
Facts:
On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaña went to
Sultan Kudarat with three other men to meet a certain
Macapagal Silongan alias Commander Lambada. They arrived
in the morning and were able to talk to Macapagal
concerning the gold nuggets that purportedly being sold by
the latter. The business transaction was postponed and
continued in the afternoon due to the death of Macapagal’s
relative and that he has to pick his brother in Cotabato City.
Then at around 8:30 PM, as they headed to the highway,
Macapagal ordered the driver to stop. Suddenly, 15 armed
men appeared. Alexander and his three companions were
ordered to go out of the vehicle, they were tied up, and
blindfolded. Macapagal and Teddy were also tied and
blindfolded, but nothing more was done to them. Alexander
identified all the abductors including the brothers of
Macapagal.
The four victims were taken to the mountain hideout in
Maguindanao. The kidnappers demanded P15, 000,000 from
Alexander’s wife for his release, but the amount was reduced
to twelve million. The victims were then transferred from one
place to another. They made Alexander write a letter to his
wife for his ransom. But on several occasions, a person
named Mayangkang himself would write to Alexander’s wife.
The two other victims managed to escape but Alexander was
released after payment of ransom. The trial court convicted
Macapagal and his companions of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention.
Issue: Whether the crime committed is rebellion and not
kidnapping and it is necessary that there is actual payment
of ransom in the crime of Kidnapping
Held: No, As regards the argument that the crime was
politically motivated and that consequently, the charge
should have been rebellion and not kidnapping, we find the
same likewise to be without merit. As held in Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte vs. CA, the
political motivation for the crime must be shown in order to
justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion. Merely
because it is alleged that appellants were members of the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front or of the Moro National
Liberation Front does not necessarily mean that the crime of
kidnapping was committed in furtherance of a rebellion.
Here, the evidence adduced is insufficient for a finding that
the crime committed was politically motivated. Neither have
the appellants sufficiently proven their allegation that the
present case was filed against them because they are rebel
surrenderees. This court has invariably viewed the defense of
frame-up with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can be
just as easily concocted.
And it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in
the crime of Kidnapping. For the crime to be committed, at
least one overt act of demanding ransom must be made. It is
not necessary that there be actual payment of ransom
because what the law requires is merely the existence of the
purpose of demanding ransom. In this case, the records are
replete with instances when the kidnappers demanded
ransom from the victim. At the mountain hideout where
Alexander was first taken, he was made a letter to his wife
asking her to pay ransom of twelve million. Also Mayangkang
himself wrote more letters to his family threatened the family
to kill Alexander if the ransom was not paid.
People vs. Dadles 278 SCRA 708
Facts: This case involves the alleged kidnapping of two
farmers, Alipio Tehidor and Salvador Alipan and their
respective sons, Dionisio and Antonio from their homes in
Barangay Amontay, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental on May
24, 1989. For the said kidnapping, appellant Narito alias
“Naring” Dadles was charged in two separate informations.
1989 at around 11:30 in the evening while Salvador, his
wife, Luzviminda and their sons, Vicente and Antonio were in
their house in Barangay Amontay, Binalbagan, Negros
Occidental, they heard somebody calling them from outside.
Luzviminda lighted a lamp and opened the door. She saw the
appellant and his nine (9) companions namely, Dindo,
Morito, Amay, Pedro, Juanito, Bernardo, Tiwi, Mike and
Bobby who were all armed. The appellant and Dindo went
upstairs and told Salvador to go with them downstairs as
they have something to talk about Salvador who was
apparently acquainted with the group acceded and followed
the appellant and Dindo downstairs. Then the appellant told
Luzviminda, “Nay, we will borrow Tatay, we will return him
tomorrow”. When Luzviminda refused, the appellant assured
her saying, “Nay, don’t worry, just let Tatay go with us
together with your son because they will be returned
tomorrow.” Thereafter, Salvador and Antonio left with the
group to an unknown destination. And like Francisca,
Luzviminda never saw her husband and son again after that
night.[5]
Appellant denied the charges against him and interposed an
alibi. The defense attempted to prove that on the said date
and time of the alleged kidnapping of the victims, the
appellant was in the house of defense witness Rogelio Ariola
sleeping soundly after a round of beer with the latter and his
other guests.
The appellant who was engaged in the business of selling
fruits claimed that he delivered fruits to one of his usual
customers, Rogelio, on May 23, 1989 in Barangay San Pedro,
Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. As Rogelio was not able to
pay appellant on the said date, the former allowed the
appellant to sleep over in his house until the following
morning. However, Rogelio was able to pay the appellant
only at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of the next day.
Thus, upon the advice of Rogelio, the appellant decided to
stay and sleep in the former’s house for another night. He
went home to Barangay Amontay at around 7:00 o’clock the
following morning.[6]
Rogelio Ariola who is a Minister of the Apostolic Church and a
resident of Barangay San Pedro, Binalbagan, Negros
Occidental testified that on May 24, 1989, there was an
occasion in their church and he went home at around 6:00
o’clock in the evening to attend to his guests, some of whom
were members of his church. The appellant was also in his
house as he had delivered fruits to Rogelio the previous day
and was waiting to be paid therefor. It was customary for the
appellant to sleep in Rogelio’s house whenever the latter
could not immediately pay him for the fruits delivered. Since
Rogelio paid the appellant only at around 6:00 o’clock in the
evening of May 24, the latter was no longer able to go home
to Barangay Amontay. Rogelio invited the appellant to sleep
in his house again that night and the latter accepted.[7]
In the meantime, Rogelio entertained his guests by buying
Gold Eagle Beer for them to drink. Their drinking session
lasted until 10:00 o’clock in the evening, after which, his
visitors went home leaving behind the appellant who then
slept in one of the rooms in Rogelio’s house.[8]
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental rendered a decision convicting the appellant of
two (2) counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. He
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of “double life
imprisonment”
Issue: Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting
accused-appellant narito dadles of two (2) counts of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention
Held: This court finds neither of the aforementioned
circumstances sufficient to detract from the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. It has been held in a large number of
cases that the lapse of a considerable length of time before a
witness comes forward to reveal the identity of the
perpetrators of the crime does not taint the credibility of the
witness and his testimony where such delay is satisfactorily
explained. Also, this court has had occasion to observe that
delay in reporting the occurrence of a crime or other unusual
events in rural areas is well known and should thus, not be
taken against the witness.
In the instant case, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses reveal that it was their overriding fear of reprisal
from the appellant’s group that prevented them from seeking
the aid of the authorities.
Anent the appellant’s defense, suffice it to state that his alibi
even if supported by the testimonies of his friends, deserves
the barest consideration.
This court has held time and again that the defense of alibi
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused
by the prosecution witnesses who had no untoward motive to
falsely testify against him. Relevant is the fact that there
appears to be no motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses to fabricate a criminal charge against the appellant
who is admittedly an acquaintance and whom they have
welcomed in their respective households several times in the
past. It must be noted that the prosecution witnesses in this
case are immediate relatives of the victims whose natural
interest in obtaining justice and redress by securing the
conviction of the parties responsible for the crime would
deter them from implicating persons other than the real
culprits.[20]
As the core issue in the appellant’s first assignment of error
is ultimately the credibility of the prosecution vis-a-vis the
defense witnesses, it may not be amiss to state herein the
well-settled doctrine that the opinion of the trial court as to
who of them should be believed is entitled to great respect,
the latter having had the unequalled opportunity to directly
observe the witnesses and to determine by their demeanor
on the stand the probative value of their testimonies. And
none of the recognized exceptions to the rule, that is, where
the record shows that facts and circumstances of weight and
influence have been overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied by the trial court which, if considered, would have
affected the result of the case, and when such findings are
arbitrary, exist in the case at bench.[23]
True it is that “evidence that one did or did not do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did
not do the same or similar thing at another time.”[28]
However, “it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like.
“The general rule is that evidence is not admissible which
shows or tends to show, that the accused in a criminal case
has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for
which he is on trial. It is not competent to prove that he
committed other crimes of a like nature for the purpose of
showing that he would be likely to commit the crime charged
in the indictment. A man may be a notorious criminal, but
this fact may not be shown to influence a jury in passing
upon the question of his guilt or innocence of the particular
offense for which he is on trial. A man may have committed
many crimes and still be innocent of the crime charged in the
case on trial. To permit proof of other crimes would naturally
predispose the minds of the jurors against the defendant.
One who commits one crime may be more likely to commit
another; yet logically, one crime does not prove another, nor
tend to prove another, unless there is such a relation
between them that proof of one tends to prove the
other.”[30]
The court therefore finds the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of kidnapping the victims, Salvador Alipan,
Antonio Alipan, Alipio Tehidor and Dionisio Tehidor. However,
“since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal
detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping x x x
was established, we find that the crime committed is slight
illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code.
x x x.”[34] Moreover, in the execution of the crime against
the first two (2) victims, Salvador and Antonio Alipan, more
than three (3) armed malefactors acted together in its
commission.[35] Thus, since the generic aggravating
circumstance of band[36] attended the commission of the
crime and there being no mitigating circumstance present,
the penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. For
the slight illegal detention of the latter two (2) victims, Alipio
and Dionisio Tehidor, the aggravating circumstance that the
crime was committed by a band as alleged in the information
finds no sufficient factual basis since the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses do not disclose that at least four (4) of
the malefactors were armed.[37] Hence there being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attendant in the
commission of the crime, the penalty of reclusion temporal
should be imposed in its medium period.
People vs. Ty 263 SCRA 746 Facts:
Vicente Ty AND Carmen Ty were charged with the crime of
kidnapping and failure to return a minor in an
information filed by 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor of
Kalookan City Rosauro J. Silverio.
That on or about the month of April 1989, in Kalookan City,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then the owners,
proprietors, managers and administrators of Sir John Clinic
and as such said accused had the custody of Arabella
Somblong, a minor, conspiring together and mutually helping
one another and with deliberate intent to deprive the parents
of the child of her custody, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail to restore the custody of said
Arabella Sombong to her parents by giving said custody of
subject minor to another person without the knowledge and
consent of her parents.
A decision was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City.
Finds both accused Spouses Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping a minor
and failure to return the same as defined and penalized by
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences
them to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
Issue: The trial court erred in finding that appellants
‘deliberately failed to restore the child to her mother,’ and
convicting them under art. 270 of the revised penal code,
and sentencing them to ‘reclusion perpetua
Held: Under the facts and ruling in Sombong, as well as the
evidence adduced in this case accused-appellants must
perforce be acquitted of the crime charged, there being no
reason to hold them liable for failing to return one Cristina
Grace Neri, a child not conclusively shown and established to
be complainant’s daugther, Arabella.
The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we were to consider
Cristina Grace Neri and Arabella Sombong as one and the
same person, still, the instant criminal case against the
accused-appellants must fall.
Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a
minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be
had, two elements must concur, namely:
(a) the offender has been entrusted with the custody of the
minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said
minor to his parents or guardians. The essential element
herein is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of
the minor but what is actually punishable is not the
kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the article seems to
indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or refusal of the
custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or
guardians.[11] Said failure or refusal, however, must not
only be deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige
the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid of
the courts in order to obtain custody. The key word therefore
of this element is deliberate and Black’s Law Dictionary
defines deliberate as:
Deliberate, adj. Well advised; carefully considered; not
sudden or rash; circumspect; slow in determining. Willful
rather than merely intentional. Formed, arrived at, or
determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing
of considerations, as a deliberate judgment or
People vs. Astorga
Appellant Arnulfo Astorga appealed the court’s decision on
Criminal Case No. 8243 wherein appellant was charged with
violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code or the kidnap and detention of a minor.
Astorga insisted that the inconsistencies and the
contradictions of the prosecution’s witnesses should be
deemed incredible and that the delay in the filing of the
accusation weakened the case. Furthermore, Astorga claimed
that he had no motive to kidnap the 8-year-old Yvonne Traya
which should’ve been apparent and proven upon conviction.
Ultimately, Astorga claimed that the court erred in convicting
him despite the fact that he had not detained nor locked
Yvonne up which is an important element in kidnapping.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the prosecution’s witnesses were credible.
2.) Whether or not the lack of motive by the appellant is
significant in the court’s decision.
3.) Whether or not it was kidnapping or coercion.
RULING:
1.) The delay in the making of the criminal accusation does
not necessarily weaken the credibility of the witnesses
especially if it had been satisfactorily explained. In the case,
one week was reasonable since the victim was a resident in
Binaungan and that the case was filed in Tagum, Davao.
2.) The court found it irrelevant to identify the motive since
motive is not an element of the crime. Motive is totally
irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Besides, the
appellant himself admitted having taken Yvonne to Maco
Central Elementary School.
3.) The court agreed with the appellant’s contention. The
evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain
Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant’s
forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot
be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the
person of Yvonne. There was no “lock up”. Accordingly,
appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code. Rather, the felony committed
was grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code.
Ong Chiun Kwan vs. CA345 SCRA 688
Facts: An information was filed charging Ong Chiu Kwan with
unjust vexation for cutting the electric wires, water pipes and
telephone lines of "Crazy Feet," a business establishment
owned and operated by Mildred Ong. He ordered Wilfredo
Infante to "relocate" the telephone, electric and water lines
of "Crazy Feet," because said lines posed as a disturbance.
However, Ong Chiu Kwan failed to present a permit from
appropriate authorities allowing him to cut the electric wires,
water pipe and telephone lines of the business
establishment. Municipal Trial Court's Ruling:
The MTC found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation,
and sentenced him to imprisonment for twenty days. The
court also ordered him to pay moral damages, finding that
the wrongful act of abruptly cutting off the electric, water
pipe and telephone lines of "Crazy Feet" caused the
interruption of its business operations during peak hours, to
the detriment of its owner, Mildred Ong.
Regional Trial Court's Ruling:
The RTC adopted the decision of the lower court in
toto, without stating the reasons for doing so.
Appellate Court's Ruling:
The CA dismissing the appeal, agreeing with the
MTC's finding that Ong Chiu Kwan was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of unjust vexation.
Issue: Whether Ong Chiu Kwan is guilty of unjust vexation
Held: The decision of the lower courts are reversed and set
aside, and Ong Chiu Kwan is sentenced to pay a fine while
award for damages are deleted. Supreme Court noted that
the RTC did not make a full finding of fact and conclusion of
law on its own. This violated the Constitution and Rules of
Court. The Supreme Court, however, chose to make a full
finding of fact and conclusion of law on its own. Ong Chiu
Kwan admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric,
water and telephone lines of Mildred Ong's business
establishment because these lines crossed his property line.
He failed, however, to show evidence that he had the
necessary permit or authorization to relocate the lines. Also,
he timed the interruption of electric, water and telephone
services during peak hours of the operation of business of
the complainant. Thus, his act unjustly annoyed or vexed
the complainant.
Consequently, Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust
vexation.
People vs. Llaguno 285 SCRA 124
Facts:
“The undersigned 3rd Asst. Fiscal of the City of Cebu[4]
accuses BOY LLAGUNO, JUDY REYES FLORANTE REYES and a
certain “ATIS” of the crime of KIDNAPPING WITH MURDER.
"That on or about the 4th day of February, 1987, at about
8:00 o’clock in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with firearm, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with
deliberate intent, did then and there kidnap and detain one
Bienvenido Mercado, and while under detention, with intent
to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there suddenly and unexpectedly shot said Bienvenido
Mercado with said firearm, hitting him on the vital part of his
body, thereby inflicting upon him a GUNSHOT WOUND to the
head as a consequence of which, Bienvenido Mercado died a
few days later."[5]
A consolidated Motion to Remand Case for Reinvestigation
and Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest alleging lack of
preliminary investigation was filed by Llaguno and Reyes
through Counsel Rolando M. Lim on February 23, 1987.[7]
The motion was granted and the records were returned to
the City Fiscal’s Office. Subsequently, in an Order dated
September 23, 1987, the trial court, then presided by Judge
Mario M. Dizon, dismissed the case against Wilfredo “Boy”
Llaguno:[8]
On October 26, 1987, Fiscal Generosa Labra requested a
resetting of the case because no witness for the prosecution
was available. Atty. Vicente Cabahug, the appellant’s
counsel, objected on the ground that the remaining accused,
Judy Reyes, was detained, adding that a previous warning
had already been given to the prosecution in the last hearing
during which it also failed to present any witness. Thus, the
trial court provisionally dismissed the case:[9]
On September 26, 1989, the accused through Counsel
Cabahug filed a Notice erroneously appealing the judgment
to the Court of Appeals[14] Correcting the lapse,
[15] the Court of Appeals in a letter dated December 6,
1989[16] forwarded the records of the case to this Court.
Issue: Wherefore the trial court erred in finding the existence
in this case of circumstances sufficient to sustain a
conviction.”
Held: Sufficiency of the Prosecution’s Evidence
In deciding this appeal, we emphasize that the burden of
proof in criminal cases is on the prosecution. Thus, a finding
of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s own
evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of evidence
for the defense.[40] Circumstantial Evidence Sufficient to
Convict Appellant of Murder?
Because there were no eyewitnesses to the killing, the trial
court’s resort to circumstantial evidence was inevitable. A
conviction may rest purely on circumstantial evidence,
provided the following requisites concur:[41]
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt."[42]
A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence
can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person, that is, the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of
guilty.”[43]
These circumstances, at first glance, may create a strong
suspicion that appellant did commit the alleged killing.
Nevertheless, a closer examination reveals that the facts
from which this inference was derived do not prove beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant was the author of the killing.
Appellant draws attention to the conflict between the
testimonies of Dr. Ceniza and Banzon[45] regarding the time
when the victim was taken out of the GF premises, and the
time when he was killed. According to Dr. Ceniza, appellant
told her on February 6, 1987 that he was going to confession
in the afternoon because he was feeling bad. Dr. Ceniza took
appellant’s statement to mean that the victim had already
been taken out of the GF premises and killed. Banzon, on the
other hand, testified that appellant told him in the morning
of that same day that the victim was still in the
company premises. Furthermore, he testified that it was only
around four o’clock in the afternoon of February 6, 1987
when appellant brought the pickup out of the premises of GF.
In other words, Banzon’s testimony sought to establish that
the victim was taken out of the GF premises after office
hours on February 6, 1987.[46] The inconsistencies in their
testimonies are evident.
This Court cannot rest easy with this discrepancy. Such
glaring and material inconsistency creates a reasonable
doubt whether it was appellant himself who took, Mercado,
the victim, out of the GF premises and consummated the
killing.
The two testimonies are clearly inconsistent. It is possible to
conjecture that the victim was killed between the time when
Banzon spoke with Appellant Reyes that morning of February
6, 1987 about 9:00 a.m. and the time when appellant told
Dr. Ceniza that he would go to confession in the afternoon of
that day because he felt guilty about having killed the victim.
However, we find this thought difficult to accept because the
prosecution failed to establish the time when Dr. Ceniza
talked to appellant. Furthermore, from the supposition of the
prosecution, it would follow that the victim was killed inside
the GF premises and that, after office hours, the body was
transported from the premises with the use of the Datsun. It
is undisputed, however, that a spent .45 caliber shell was
found beside the body, indicating that the victim was shot in
the place where his body was found, i.e., outside the GF
premises. Clearly, there are unexplained missing links in the
prosecution account.
In the light of these unexplained questions, the trial court
erred in nonetheless holding that the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution shows, beyond moral certainty,
that appellant was guilty of murder. In so doing, the lower
court transgressed
the basic rule that “when the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other or others consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence, in view of the constitutional presumption of
innocence, has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is
thus insufficient to support a conviction.”[49] Parenthetically,
when the prosecution’s case is anchored only on
circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances must be
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty of
the crime sought to be proven, and no other. In addition, the
circumstances under consideration must not support any
rational hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the
accused.
[50] Consequently, appellant may not be held criminally
liable for killing the victim. Kidnapping Was Sufficiently
Proven
The trial court did not find appellant liable for serious illegal
detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on the
ground that the period of detention was less than five days.
This Court, however, finds that the totality of the evidence
presented by the prosecution sufficiently proves beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crime of
slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal
Code. Article 268 of the Code provides:
“ART. 268. Slight illegal detention. -- The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be imposed upon any private individual who
shall commit the crimes described in the next preceding
article without the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated therein. The same penalty shall be incurred by
anyone who shall furnish the place for the perpetration of
the crime.
If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so
kidnapped or detained within three days from the
commencement of the detention, without having attained the
purpose intended, and before the institution of criminal
proceedings against him.
The evidence presented by the prosecution, which was
sustained by the trial court, clearly established that appellant
had in fact detained the victim without authority to do so.
Banzon testified that he witnessed the victim hanging by the
arms in appellant’s room. Banzon’s testimony significantly
jibes with the physical evidence showing that the victim
sustained multiple abrasions in both arms.[51] Furthermore,
Dr. Ceniza narrated that several employees called her up in
the morning of February 5, 1987 asking for permission to go
home because there was a “man hanging at the back in one
of the buildings of GF International.”[52] Dr. Ceniza’s
testimony was unrebutted. All these ineludibly prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the victim was deprived of his liberty
by appellant.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED.
Appellant Judy Reyes is hereby CONVICTED of slight illegal
detention and SENTENCED to the indeterminate penalty of
ten years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal
medium, as maximum. He is acquitted of murder
People vs. Santos 378 SCRA 157
Facts: On 7 March 1990, sometime after its first witness,
Eleuterio Rabor, had testified on direct examination, the
prosecution filed a Motion For Leave To Amend Information
so as to allege that the appellant is a recidivist or "at least a
habitual delinquent" by virtue of two (2) prior
convictions.
Over the objection of the accused on the ground that he had
already been arraigned and that the proposed amendment is
not a matter of form, 3 the trial court granted the motion. 4
Thus, the following amended information was filed on 16
April 1990.
"That on or about the 2nd day of May, 1988 at 4:00 o’clock
in the morning, more or less, in the Municipality of
Pinamungajan, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab one Epifanio Ferrer with the use of a kitchen
knife thereby inflicting upon the latter a mortal injury which
caused his instantaneous death.
That the accused is a recidivist by virtue of previous two (2)
final convictions embraced in the same title of the Revised
Penal Code with this present case, one, in the case of People
of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Kyamko docketed as criminal
case no. TCS-01 for Frustrated Murder of which he was
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of Four (4) years, Two
(2) months and one day to ten (10) years and one (1) day;
and second, the same accused was convicted in the case of
People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Kyamko docketed as
Crim. Case No. TCS-445 and was imposed t
Issue: Whether the trial court erred IN giving weight to the
manifestly biased, uncorroborated and unreliable testimony
of prosecution witness eleuterio rabor, who allegedly was an
eyewitness to the stabbing of the victims (sic) epifanio ferrer
by the accused
Held: The failure of Eleuterio Rabor to help the victim or to
report the incident to the police authorities after the
final appellant had ran away does not make his testimony less
worthy of credence. Such failure can be attributed to the
shock and fear instilled in the mind of Rabor upon seeing a
violent crime. 20 Not every witness to a crime can be
expected to act reasonably and conformably to the
expectation of mankind. "Human nature teaches us that
people may react differently to the same situation. One
person’s spontaneous or unthinking or even instinctive
response to a horrid and repulsive stimulus may be
aggression while another’s may be cold indifference." 21 We
have taken judicial notice of the fact that witnesses in our
country are reluctant to volunteer information to the
authorities. 22 In any event Rabor did in fact immediately
inform the victim’s mother of the stabbing incident. 23 This
was sufficient to remove any doubt that he had witnessed
the commission of the crime.
We also find no inconsistency between Rabor’s testimony and
his statement in his affidavit as to the position of the victim
at the time he was stabbed by the accused. In his direct
examination. Rabor testified that the victim was "leaning on
a chair with his chin laying (sic) on the right hand," which
testimony he reiterated on cross-examination. 24 In his
affidavit Rabor declared that the victim was sleeping sitting
down with his head suspended on the backchair; that it was
on this state that I saw Reynaldo Kyamko raising his hand
with a kitchen knife and stabbed Fanny Ferrer by the side of
his neck downward (lusong-lusong)." 25 What is thus clear is
that the affidavit did not give in minute detail the precise
position of the victim at the time he was stabbed. The
inconsistency then is more apparent than real. In any event,
the finding of Dr. Soberano as to the location and cause of
the wound sustained by the victim Lonfirms Rabor’s
testimony in open court and his statement in the affidavit.
The failure of the prosecution to present the other
eyewitness, Julito Fabular, neither diminished the credibility
of Rabor nor impaired the evidence for the prosecution. In
People v. Samillano, 26 this Court held:"It has, time and
again, been held that the non- presentation of certain
witnesses by the prosecution is not a sufficiently plausible
defense (People v. de la Cruz, 184 SCRA 461 [1990]) and
the matter of whom to present as witness by the prosecution
is addressed to the sound discretion of the fiscal or the
prosecution handling the case (People v. Fernandez, 186
SCRA 830 [1990]); People v.
Nabunat, 182 SCRA 52 [1990]); People v. Marilao, 177 SCRA
271 [1987]); People v. Campana, 124 SCRA 271 [1983]).
There should, thus, be no unfavorable inferences to be made
from the failure of the prosecution to present Ruben.
Moreover, if the appellant believes that Ruben’s testimony
would bolster his theory, then it is the defense who should
have presented Ruben. The coercive processes of the Court
were at the appellant’s disposal if Ruben refused to testify."
27
Besides, the testimony of Fabular would only be
corroborative and thus, dispensable. The non-presentation of
Fabular as a witness did not then imply suppression of
evidence.
Finally it is an oft-repeated rule that the testimony of a single
witness, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court as
to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt is
sufficient to convict.
PEOPLE VS FELIPE MIRANDILLA, JR.,
FACTS It was 2 December 2000, eve of the fiesta in
Barangay San Francisco, Legazpi City. At the plaza, AAA was
dancing with her elder sister, BBB.
AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby
store. When a man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her
shoulders, with a knife’s point thrust at her right side.
Another man joined and went beside her, while two others
stayed at her back, one of whom had a gun. They boarded a
waiting tricycle. Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle
and pushed her inside a concrete house. He ordered her to
remove her pants and raped her at gunpoint. AAA suffered
the same fate multiple times while moving from one place to
another. She was allegedly raped 27 times.
One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the
door of her cell. AAA reached the house of Evelyn Guevarra
who brought her to the police station. AAA was in foul smell,
starving and sleepless. When the police presented to her
pictures of suspected criminals, she recognized the man’s
face, he was Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the police told her.
The doctor discovered hymenal lacerations in different
positions of her hymen, indicative of sexual intercourse. Foul
smelling pus also oozed from her vagina – AAA had
contracted gonorrhoea.
Mirandilla denied the charges against him asserting that AAA
and him are lovers and their sexual intercourse was
consensual. He stated that he and AAA’s nightly sexual
intimacy continued, with abstentions only during AAA’s
menstrual periods.
Mirandilla was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Legazpi City, Branch 5, with kidnapping with rape (Crim.
Case No. 9278), four counts of rape (Crim. Case Nos. 9274
to 9277), and rape through sexual assault (Crim. Case No.
9279).
On review, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling,
convicting Mirandilla. It found him guilty of the special
complex crime of kidnapping with rape (instead of
kidnapping as the RTC ruled), four counts of rape, and one
count of rape by sexual assault. It rejected Mirandilla’s
defense that he and AAA were live-in partners and that their
sexual encounters were consensual. It noted that Mirandilla
failed to adduce any evidence or any credible witness to
sustain his defense.
ISSUE Whether or not the testimony of AAA is credible.
HELD: Yes. Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial
evidence to be believed, it must not only come from a
credible witness but must be credible in itself – tested by
human experience, observation, common knowledge and
accepted conduct that has evolved through the years.
As a rule, self-contradictions and contradictory statement of
witnesses should be reconciled, it being true that such is
possible since a witness is not expected to give error-free
testimony considering the lapse of time and the treachery of
human memory. But, this principle, learned from lessons of
human experience, applies only to minor or trivial matters –
innocent lapses that do not affect witness’ credibility. They
do not apply to self-contradictions on material facts. Where
these contradictions cannot be reconciled, the Court has to
reject the testimonies, and apply the maxim, falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus.

The record nowhere yields any evidence of ill motive on the
part of AAA to influence her in fabricating criminal charges
against Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. The absence of ill motive
enhances the standing of AAA as a witness.
ISSUE Whether or not “Sweetheart Theory” was proven.
HELD No. The sweetheart theory as a defense, however,
necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of
rape.
To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness based
on the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, testimony
must have been false as to a material point, and the witness
must have a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify a
material point. In other words, its requirements, which must
concur, are the following: (1) that the false testimony is as
to one or more material points; and (2) that there should be
a conscious and deliberate intention to falsity.

Mirandilla with his version of facts as narrated above

attempted to meet the prosecution’s prima facie case. To
corroborate it, he presented his mother, Alicia Mirandilla; his
relatives, Rogelio Marcellana and Emilio Mendoza; and, his
friend Arlene Moret.

Arlene Moret, the cigarette vendor who also served as the

CR’s guard, testified that AAA and Mirandilla arrived together
at the park. On cross examination, she claimed otherwise.
The accused’s mother, Alicia Mirandilla, testified meeting her
son only once, and living in Kilikao only after his
imprisonment. This contradicted Mirandilla’s claim that he
visited his mother several times in Kilikao.