Table of Contents

Case Page
1. Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Palomar, G.R. No. L-
.................... 12-14
19650, 29 Sep 1966
2. Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. NLRC, G.R.
.................... 14-15
No. L-50320, 31 Jul 1981 
....................
3. Corpus v. People, G.R. No. 180016, 29 April 2014
4. Director of Lands v. CA, G.R. No. 102858, 28 July
....................
1997 
5. Secretary of the DPWH and District Engineer
Contreras v. Sps. Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, 21 April ....................
2015
....................
6. People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, 30 Aug 1967
....................
7. People v. Amigo, G.R. No. 116719, 18 Jan 1996
8. Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179431-32, 22
....................
June 2010
....................
9. Maglasang v. People, G.R. No. 90083, 4 Oct 1990
10. In re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon.
Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallaria, A.M. ....................
No. 98-5-01-SC, 9 Nov 1998
....................
11. De Castro v. JBC, G.R No. 1991149, 17 March 2010
12. Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,
....................
G.R. No. 113105, 19 Aug 1994 
13. Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary
of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987, 24 April ....................
2012
....................
14. Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208556, 19 Nov 2013
15. Remman Enterprises, Inc. and Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders’ Association v. Professional
Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service and ....................
Professional Regulation Commission, G.R. No. 197676,
4 Feb 2014
16. Roos Industrial Construction, Inc v. NLRC, G.R. No. ....................
1
 172409, 4 Feb 2008
17. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. No.
....................
148560, 19 Nov 2001
18. First Metro Investment Corp, v. Este Del Sol
....................
Mountain Reserve, G.R. No. 141811, 15 Nov 2001
19. Norma Del Socorro v. Ernst Johan Brickman Van
....................
Wilsem, G.R. No. 193797, 10 Dec 2014
20. Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad
....................
Water District, G.R. No. 116471
21. Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) Party-list v. COMELEC, G.R. ....................
No. 177508, 7 Aug 2009
22. Hon. Ma. Lourdes Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s
....................
College, G.R. No. 161107, 12 March 2013 
23. White Light Corp. v. City of Manily, G.R. No.
....................
122846, 20 Jan 2009 
....................
24. Ortega v. People, G.R. No.151085, 20 Aug 2008
....................
25. CIR v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 160528
26. Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Standard, Inc.,
....................
G.R. No. L-28329, 7 Aug 1975
27. Soccoro Ramirez v. CA and Ester S. Garcia, G.R.
....................
No. 93833, 25 Sep 1995 
28. Philippine National Bank v. Tejano, G.R. No.
....................
173615, 16 Oct 2009 
29. Domingo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 112371,
....................
7 Oct 1998. 
30. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 103882 &
....................
105276, 25 Nov 1998 
....................
31. Espiritu v. Cipriano, G.R. No. L-32723, 15 Feb 1974

....................
32. Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, 10 Oct 2010

33. Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines,

....................
G.R. No. L-26419, 16 Oct 1970

34. Security Bank and Trust Company v. RTC of Makati, ....................

2
 G.R. No. 113926, 23 Oct 1996

....................
35. Go v. Distinction Properties Development and
Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 194024

....................
36. Luzon Development Bank v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos.
168464 & 168666, 12 Jan 2011

37. Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos, Norte v.

....................
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos, Norte, G.R. No. 169435,
27 Feb 2008

....................
38. Brent School, Inc. v. Zamor, G.R. NNNo. L-48494, 5
Feb 1990

....................
39. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R. No.
196231, 4 Sep 2012

....................
40. Galicto v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 193978, 28 Feb 2012

Page
................
8
41. Wa-acon v. People, G.R. No.164575, 6 Dec 2006.  ....
................
42. Lastrilla v. Granda, G.R. No. 160257, 31 Jan 2006.  ....
................
43. Samson v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133076, 22 Sep 1999. ....
................
44. LAMP v. Secretary of Budget and Management, supra.  ....
................
45. Belgica v. Ochoa, supra.  ....
46. Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, 7 ................
Dec 2010.  ....
3
 47. Francisco, Jr. et. al. v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 166910, 19 ................
Oct 2010.  ....
................
48. Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125532, 10 Jul 1998.  ....
................
49. Quiño v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 197466, 13 Nov 2012.  ....
50. Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 108033, ................
14 Apr 1997.  ....
................
51. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006.  ....
................
52. Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, 28 Apr 2004.  ....
................
53. Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. Nos. 187883-187910, 16 Jun 2009.  ....
54. Carbonilla v. Board of Airline Representatives, G.R. No. 193247, 14 ................
Sep 2011.  ....
55. Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. ................
No. 171101, 5 Jul 2011.  ....
................
56. Tropical Homes, Inc. v. NHA, G.R. No. L-48672, 31 Jul 1987.  ....
................
57. Abakada Guro Party-list v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, 14 Aug 2008.  ....
58. Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, 5 ................
Nov 1997.  ....
................
59. Deutsche Bank AG Manila v. CIR, G.R. No. 188550, 28 Aug 2013.  ....
60. Sa L-acion v. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 94723, 21 ................
Aug 1997.  ....
................
61. Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, 28 Jun 2011.  ....
62. Privatization and Management Office v. Strategic Management and/or ................
Philippine Estate Corporation, G.R. No. 200402, 13 Jun 2013.  ....
................
63. Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183623, 25 Jun 2012.  ....
64. Makati Shangri3la Hotel and Resort, Inc. v. Harper, G.R. No. 189998, ................
29 Aug 2012.  ....
................
65. Ursua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, 10 Apr 1996.  ....
................
66. Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, 11 Dec 1992.  ....
4
 ................
67. Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, 11 Sep 2009.  ....
................
68. Lledo v. Lledo, A.M. No. P-95-1167, 9 Feb 2010.  ....
69. Executive Secretary, et. al. v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. ................
No. 199324, 7 Jan 2013.  ....
................
70. Obiasca v. Basallote, G.R. No. 176707, 17 Feb 2010.  ....
71. Dabalos v. RTC of Angeles City, Pampanga, G.R. No. 193960, 7 Jan ................
2013.  ....

72. Sps. Plopenio v. DAR and Land Bank, G.R. No. 161090, 4 Jul 2012 a ................
Plopenio v. DAR and Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161092, 4 ....
Jul 2012. 
................
73. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, ....
G.R. No. 193459, 15 Feb 2011. 
74. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante, G.R. No. 167304, 25 Aug ................
2009.  ....
................
75. Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. L-32560-61, 22 Oct 1970.  ....
................
76. City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. G.R. No. 118127, 12 Apr 2005.  ....
................
77. Amadora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47745, 15 Apr 1988.  ....
................
78. Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, 28 Jul 1999.  ....
79. National Power Corporation v. Angas, G.R. Nos. 60225-26, 8 May ................
1992.  ....
80. Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of Benguet, G.R. No. ................
183137, 10 Apr 2013.  ....
................
81. People v. Bello, G.R. Nos. 166948-59, 29 Aug 2012.  ....
................
82. GSIS v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 162372, 11 Oct 2011.  ....
................
83. People v. Delantar, G.R. No. 169143, 2 Feb 2007.  ....
................
84. Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, 16 Apr 2013.  ....
85. Canet v. Mayor Julieta Decena, G.R. No. 155344, 20 Jan 2004.  ................
5
 ....
................
86. Atienza v. Villaros, G.R. No. 161081, 10 May 2005.  ....
87. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Dando, G.R. No. 177456, 4 Sep ................
2009.  ....
88. Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, G.R. No. L-4712, 11 ................
Jul 1952.  ....
................
89. Gachon v. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, 20 Jun 1997.  ....
................
90. Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of ....
Appeals, G.R. No. 117188, 7 Aug 1997. 
91. Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, ................
supra.  ....
................
92. Radaza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177135, 15 Oct 2008.  ....
93. Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98382, 17 ................
May 1993. ....
................
94. Borromeo v. Mariano, G.R. No. L-16808, 3 Jan 1921.  ....
................
95. People v. Mediado, G.R. No. 169871, 2 Feb 2011.  ....
................
96. Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio, G.R. No. 165132, 7 Mar 2012 ....
97. Tuna Processing, Inc. v. Philippine Kingford, Inc., G.R. No. 185582, ................
29 Feb 2012.  ....
................
98. Go v. Distinction Properties, supra.  ....
................
99. People v. Sandiganbayan, supra.  ....
................
100. In the matter of the Estate of Emil H. Johnson, Ebba Ingeborg ....
Johnson, G.R. No. 12767, 16 Nov 1918. 
................
101. De Villa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87416, 8 Apr 1991.  ....
................
102. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, supra.  ....
103. Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc., et. al. v. Seludo, Jr., G.R. No. ................
173840, 25 Apr 2012.  ....
104. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, 22 ................
6
 Feb 1991.  ....
................
105. Ursua v. Court of Appeals, supra.  ....
106. In the matter of charges of plagiarism against Associate Justice ................
Mariano C. Del  ....
................
Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17, 8 Feb 2011.  ....
................
107. Pelizloy v. Benguet, supra.  ....
108. Moreno, Jr. v. Private Management Office, G.R. No. 159373, 16 ................
Nov 2006.  ....
................
109. De Castro v. JBC, supra.  ....
110. Floresca, et. al. v. Philex Mining Corp., G.R. No. 30642, 30 Apr ................
1985.  ....
................
111. Ting v. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562, 31 Mar 2009.  ....
112.  CIR v. Bicolandia Drug Corporation, G.R. No. 148083, 21 Jul ................
2006.  ....
113. Nestle Philippines v. Uniwide Sales, Inc., G.R. No. 174674, 20 Oct ................
2010.  ....
114. Maria Luisa Park Association, Inc. v. Almendras, G.R. No. 171763, ................
5 Jun 2009.  ....
115. Estate of Nelson R. Dulay v. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc., G.R. No. ................
172642, 13 Jun 2012.  ....
................
116. Eslao v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 108310, 1 Sep 1994.  ....
117. CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, G.R. No. 187485, 12 Feb ................
2013.  ....
................
118. Gamboa v. Teves, supra.  ....
119. PDIC v. Stockholders of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., G.R. ................
No. 181556, 14 Dec 2009.  ....
................
120. People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, 17 Dec 2008.  ....
................
121. Dabalos v. RTC, supra.  ....
................
122. Lledo v. Lledo, supra.  ....
................
123. Pacanan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186224, 25 Aug 2009.  ....
7
 ................
124. Barroso v. Ampig, G.R. No. 138218, 17 Mar 2000.  ....
125. Violago, Sr. v. COMELEC and Alarilla, G.R. No. 194143, 4 Oct ................
2011.  ....
................
126. Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, 16 Apr 2013.  ....
127. Suico Industrial Corp. v. Lagura-Yap, G.R. No. 177711, 5 Sep ................
2012.  ....
................
128. Tomas v. Santos, G.R. No. 190448, 26 Jul 2010.  ....
................
129. BPI v. Dando, supra.  ....
................
130. Sec. Leila De Lima v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 204528, 19 Feb 2013.  ....
131. CIR v. Filinvest Development Corporation, G.R. No. 163653, 19 Jul ................
2011.  ....
................
132. Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Hon. Ferdinand J. ....
Marcos, G.R. No. 120082, 11 Sep 1996. 
133. Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Sps. Pastor, G.R. No. ................
69344, 26 Apr 1991.  ....
................
134. Lincoln Philippine Life Insurance Company, Inc. v. Court of ....
Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 118043, 23 Jul 1998. 
................
135. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. CIR, ....
G.R. No. 159471, 26 Jan 2011. 
................
136. Accenture, Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. 190102, 11 Jul 2012.  ....
................
137. CIR v. SC Johnson and Son, Inc. G.R. No. 127105, 25 Jun 1999.  ....
138. CIR v. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 163835, 7 ................
Jul 2010.  ....
................
139. CIR v. Procter & Gamble Philippines, G.R. No.  66838, 2 Dec 1991.  ....
................
140. Republic v. Kerry Lao Ong, G.R. No. 175430, 18 Jun 2012.  ....
141. Department of Health v. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc., G.R. No. 182358, ................
20 Feb 2013.  ....
142. Salvacion v. Central Bank, supra. ................
8
 ....
................
143. Hagad v. Gozo Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, 12 Dec 1995.  ....
................
144. Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, 13 Feb 2008.  ....
................
145. Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr., G.R. No. 169053, 19 Jun 2009.  ....
................
146. Hacienda Luisita v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, supra.  ....
................
147. Tuna Processing, Inc. v. Philippine Kingford, Inc., supra.  ....
148. Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, 5 Mar ................
2010.  ....
................
150. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Stockholders of ....
Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, supra. 
151. Lintag v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 158609, 27 Jul ................
2007.  ....
................
152. Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. ....
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206844-45, 23 Jul 2013. 
153. Dueñas v. Santos Subdivision Homeowners Association, G.R. No. ................
149417, 4 Jun 2004.  ....
154. Eugenio v. Executive Secretary Drilon, G.R. No. 109404, 22 Jan ................
1996.  ....
155. People s Industrial and Commercial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. ................
No. 112733, 24 Oct 1997.  ....
................
156. Salvador v. Mapa, G.R. No. 135080, 28 Nov 2007.  ....
................
157. People v. Adviento, G.R. No. 175781, 20 Mar 2012.  ....
158. Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. V. Surio, et. al., G.R. No. ................
154213, 23 Aug 2012.  ....
................
159. Narzoles v. NLRC, G.R. No. 141959, 29 Sep 2000.  ....
................
160. Hon. Ma. Lourdes Fernando v. St. Scholastica s College, supra.  ....
................
161. Maxey v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45870, 11 May 1984.  ....
162. Valencia v. Surtida, G.R. No. L-17277, 31 May 1961.  ................
9
 ....
................
163. Ponce v. Guevarra, G.R. No. L-19629 & L-19672-92, 31 Mar 1964.  ....
................
164. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, 3 Feb 1997.  ....
................
165. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, ....
158633, & 161658, 3 Nov 2008. 
................
166. Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, 17 Oct 2006.  ....
................
167. Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, 10 Jul 2003.  ....
................
168. Chavez v. JBC, supra.  ....
169. Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 Sep ................
2003.  ....
170. Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, ................
supra.  ....
................
171. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. ....
147589 & 147613, 26 Jun 2001. 
172. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. L- ................
21064, 18 Feb 1970.  ....
................
173. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra.  ....
................
174. Nitafan v. CIR, G.R. No. L-78780, 23 Jul 1987.  ....
................
175. Malacora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-51042, 30 Sep 1982.  ....
................
176. Gamboa v. Teves, supra.  ....
................
177. Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, 2 May 1997.  ....
................
178. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 30 Jul 1993.  ....
179. Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. ................
177131, 7 Jun 2011.  ....
................
180. Espina v. Zamora, G.R. No. 143855, 21 Sep 2010.  ....
181. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. ................
10
 91649, 14 May 1991.  ....
................
182. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 25 Aug 1994.  ....
................
183. Gamboa v. Teves, supra. ....

G.R. No. L-19650             September 29, 1966

11
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:

Facts:

In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional
scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at
each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc.,
its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation is to be
open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to
participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to
be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed
can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in
which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its
position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.

The Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does
not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of
December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as
well threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it
(Caltex) and all its representatives".

Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief
against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow
petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public".

Issues :
1. Whether or not the petition states sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and
2. Whether or not the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law.

Ruling:
1. No, we cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of
construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a
given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room for
declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption
that, if the circumstances here presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be
divorced from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible.
Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case

12
 here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of construction or
interpretation as any other.

2. No, taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association
with the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known
principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied
upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned — it is only logical that the
term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent
with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves
a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is
not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from
the "gift enterprise" therein included.

This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the
determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is
axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed
matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable.

We find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to
hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift
enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they
involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the
appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.

Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief,
and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does
not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

G.R. No. L-50320 March 30, 1988

13
PHILIPPINE APPAREL, WORKERS UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION APPAREL PHILIPPINE APPAREL,
INC., respondents.

PARAS, J. :

Facts:

In anticipation of the expiration of their 1973-1976 collective bargaining agreement, the Union
submitted a set of bargaining proposals to the company. Negotiations were held thereafter, but due to
the impasse, the Union filed a complaint with the Department of Labor praying that the parties be
assisted in concluding a collective agreement. Notwithstanding the complaint, the parties continued
with negotiations. Finally, on 3 September 1977, the parties signed the agreement providing for a
three-stage wage increase for all rank and file employees, retroactive to 1April 1977. Meanwhile, on
21 April 1977, Presidential Decree 1123 was enacted to take effect on 1 May 1977 providing for an
increase by P60.00 in the living allowance ordained by Presidential Decree 525. This increase was
implemented effective 1 May 1977 by the company.  The controversy arose when the petitioner union
sought the implementation of the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 as provided for in the collective
bargaining agreement. The company alleges that it has opted to consider the P0.80 daily wage
increase (roughly P22 per month) as partial compliance with the requirements of PD 1123, so that it is
obliged to pay only the balance of P38 per month, contending that that since there was already a
meeting of the minds between the parties as early as 2 April 1977 about the wage increases which
were made retroactive to 1 April 1977, it fell well within the exemption provided for in the Rules
Implementing PD 1123. The Union, on the other hand, maintains that the living allowance under PD
1123 (originally PD 525) is distinct from the negotiated daily wage increase of P0.80.

On 13 February 1978, the Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA
against the company. On 30 May 1978, an Order was issued by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the 
complaint and referred the case to the parties to resolve their disputes in accordance with the
machinery established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. From this order, both parties appealed
to the Commission. On 1 September 1978, the Commission (Second Division) promulgated its
decision, setting aside the order appealed from and entering a new one dismissing the case for
obvious lack of merit, relying on a letter of the Undersecretary of Labor that agreement between the
parties was made 2 April 1977 granting P27 per month retroactive to 1 April 1977 which was squarely
under the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. The union filed
for reconsideration, but the Commission en banc dismissed the same on 8 February 1979. Hence,
the petition.

Issues:

Whether the Commission was correct in determining the agreement falls under the exceptions.

Ruling:

The collective bargaining agreement was entered into on 3 September1977, when PD 1123 was
already in force and effect, although the increase on the first year was retroactive to 1 April 1977.
There is nothing in the records that the negotiated wage increases were granted or paid before May
1977, to allow the company to fall within the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules
implementing PD 1123. There was neither a perfected contract nor an actual payment of said
14
increase. There was no grant of said increases yet, despite the contrary opinion expressed in the
letter of the Undersecretary of Labor. It must be noted that the letter was based on a wrong premise
or representation on the part of the company. The company had declared that the parties have
agreed on 2 April 1977 in recognition of the imperative need for employees to cope up with inflation
brought about by, among others, another increase in oil price, but omitting the fact that negotiations
were still being held on other unresolved economic and non-economic bargaining items (which were
only agreed upon on 3 September 1977).

The Department of Labor had the right to construe the word “grant” as used in its rules implementing
PD 1123, and its explanation regarding the exemptions to PD 1123 should be given weight; but, when
it is based on misrepresentations as to the existence of an agreement between the parties, the same
cannot be applied. There is no distinction between interpretation and explaining the extent and scope
of the law; because where one explains the intent and scope of a statute, he is interpreting it. Thus,
the construction or explanation of Labor Undersecretary is not only wrong as it was purely based on a
misapprehension of facts, but also unlawful because it goes beyond the scope of the law.

The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the commission, and
ordered the company to pay, in addition to the increased allowance provided for in PD 1123, the
negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily effective 1 April 1977 as well as all other wage increases
embodied in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, to all covered employees; with costs against the
company.

15
LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 180016

April 29, 2014

Facts:
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo
City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to
casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner
approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on
commission basis. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if
unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner
remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was
able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items
entrusted to him, but to no avail.

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa on or about the fifth (5th) day
of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines.

The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information.

The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the
decision of the RTC.

An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the
incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a photocopied evidence can be admitted in the court as the main conclusive
evidence.
2. Whether or not an information must be submitted on when the pieces of jewelry were
supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one
testified to by private complainant.
3. Whether or not the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the
Equal Protection Clause.

Ruling:

1. Yes, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated
May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely a
photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner
never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked
and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that
petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of
evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that
when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.
2. No, In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the
16
 foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the
fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that
Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a
material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money
or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of
the commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of
the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto defective.
Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant should have
delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy,
hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot
now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred against
him.

 the designation of the offense by the statute;

 the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
 the name of the offended party;
 the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.

3. No, the court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is
proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the
harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less
serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime
in other jurisdictions.

WHEREFORE, is hereby DENIED.

17
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA,
MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts:
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of
his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. The application
was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional
Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant
died. Hence, his heirs — Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado —
represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were
substituted as applicants.

In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:

. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23
(1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the
Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view
that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance
with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared
November 19, 1991.

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This
Court notes that the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His
remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of
Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not
for certiorari under Rule 65.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion

2. Whether or not failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is a mere "procedural defect."
18
Ruling:

1. Admittedly, the provision Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides in clear and
categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the
land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in
a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register
the title of private respondents.

The Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires
notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which
must be complied with. "If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have
stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition
who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of
the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such
requirement in its detailed provision.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such
proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state,
who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise,
persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred
from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as
an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by
satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the
same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty. He
must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best
be achieved when all persons concerned.

2. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of

default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in
as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.

Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law.
Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered
because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense
with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and
again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for
application.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration is
DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.

19
G.R. No. 179334               April 21, 2015

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT

ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON, Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:

Facts:

In 1940, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) took respondents-movants' subject
property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur
Highway. In a letter dated December 15, 1994, respondents-movants demanded the payment of the
fair market value of the subject parcel of land. Celestino R. Contreras (Contreras), then District
Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District of the DPWH, offered to pay for the subject land at
the rate of Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter, per Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal
Committee (PAC) of Bulacan. Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents-movants demanded the return
of their property, or the payment of compensation at the current fair market value.3 Hence, the
complaint for recovery of possession with damages filed by respondents-movants. Respondents-
movants were able to obtain favorable decisions in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of
Appeals (CA), with the subject property valued at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00)
per square meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum.

Both the RTC and the CA valued the property at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00) per
square meter, plus six percent (6%) interest from the time of the filing of the complaint until full
payment. We, however, did not agree with both courts and ruled instead that just compensation
should be based on the value of the property at the time of taking in 1940, which is Seventy Centavos
(P0.70) per square meter.4 In addition, and by way of compensation, we likewise awarded an interest
of six percent (6%) per annum from 1940 until full payment.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the taking of private property without due process should be nullified
2. Whether or not the compensation is based on the market value of the property at the time of
taking

Ruling:
1. No. The government’s failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to actual
taking cannot simply invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the
property subject of expropriation is indubitable devoted for public use, and public policy
imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily
nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken
one of the State’s inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good.

20
 Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the
property to the landower. What is left to the landower is the right of compensation.
2. Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated valuation,
the long-established rule is that the fair equivalent of the property should be computed not at
the time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because the purpose of ‘just
compensation’ is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for the
loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld by a plethora of cases, is
the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted. This principle was plainly
laid down in Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the true
measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.

To entertain other formula for computing just compensation, contrary to those established by law and
jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of economic policies - a matter which this Court has
no competence to take cognizance of. Time and again, we have held that no process of interpretation
or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Equity
and equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence. As
we have shown above, established rulings of this Court are in place for full application to the case at
bar, hence, should be upheld.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

21
G.R. No. L-22301             August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:

Facts:

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962
reading as follows: "The undersized accuses secret agent MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation
of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one
home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition,
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding
authorities. Contrary to law."

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year
and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are
forfeited in favor of the Government."

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be
affirmed.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm.

Ruling:
1. Yes. The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for
any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or
any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts
of firearms, or ammunition."

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not
exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.
"Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot
be set aside.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

22
G.R. No. 116719             January 18, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PATRICIO AMIGO alias "BEBOT", accused-appellant.

MELO, J.:

Facts:

On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent half-day at their store, located at No.
166-A, Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City, Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera back
home, situated at the back of Car Asia, Bajada, Davao City.

On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada, Davao City, an orange
Toyota Tamaraw driven by one Virgilio Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional
Hospital, Bajada, Davao City, without noticing the Ford Fiera coming from the opposite direction. This
Tamaraw was heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which was situated at the comer of the said hospital.

With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at Lingling's vulcanizing shop owned and
operated by a certain Galadua. He was also seated at the right front seat beside Virgilio.

Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on collision occurred between the
Fiera and the Tamaraw, causing a slight damaged to the right bumper of the latter.

The accused approached Benito and mumbled "Ah, so you are a Chinese," and suddenly took a five
inch knife from his waist and simultaneously stabbed Benito hitting him twice on the chest.

Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of
Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should
have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance
of any modifying circumstances, should be reclusion temporal in its medium period or 17 years, 4
months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

Issues:

Whether or not the penalty reclusion perpetua is too harsh or cruel for the consequence of stabbing
Benito.

Ruling:

No, In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of
the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be
imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua thereby
eliminating death as the original maximum period.

A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that here is really nothing therein which
expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death
23
penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress
hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a
penalty and pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts
is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED
LEX. The remedy is elsewhere — clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by the
legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the law.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

24
G.R. Nos. 179431-32               June 22, 2010

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
(CIBAC), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts:
The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered
under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14,
2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to
participate, CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five
nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number
of qualifying votes
The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29,
2007, were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C.
Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees’ certificates of acceptance
were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, whereby it withdrew the
nominations of Loki, Tugna and Galang.
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219, whereby it resolved to set the matter
pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the
substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing.

On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-054 thuswise:

WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal
of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and
fourth nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as
second nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-
List System Act; and

2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy.

Ruling:

1. No. The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in
accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot
surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the
25
 power to make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power
that is not legislative in character may be delegated.

Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative
boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs.

The authority to make IRRs (Implementing Rules and Regulations) in order to carry out an express
legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively
legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and
promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes.

To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;

2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;

3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and

4. It must be reasonable.

The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act. Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite.

The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804
underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in the resolution itself.

Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of
whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin
against Section 13 succeeds.

As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. The administrative agency issuing
the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and
cannot engraft additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the Legislature.

2. Yes. Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to
seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of
office by Cruz-Gonzales. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.

WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.

We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes
a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination
to the Commission on Elections.

26
Principles:

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition

shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not
less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required
number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person
who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election.

Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization can
substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the
COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his
nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated.

The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling under
any of the three exceptions.

When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the
exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language
fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the
exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting
authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a
rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the
applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.

The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the
general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words.
Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply
to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt
will be resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal
construction of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the
operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.

27
G.R. No. 90083 October 4, 1990

KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City
Court), Negros Occidental, respondents.

Facts:
On January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy of a complaint
dated December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto
Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all the five Justices
of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust
judgments or resolution."
By reason of the strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the
Office of the President, which, as he should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much
more, remove, Justices of the Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty. Castellano was required to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper
conduct.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the complaint was a constructive criticism?

Ruling:
We note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division, even the
most basic tenet of our government system — the separation of powers between the judiciary, the
executive, and the legislative branches has — been lost on Atty. Castellano. We therefore take this
occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is supreme — the third great
department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all
justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments
or declare them 'unjust.'

Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief
Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts.

Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good
faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices, concerned as Respondents (sic)" is but a
last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible accusation.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and

IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby ordered to
28
PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of Calatrava, Negros
Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED.

A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998

In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as
Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabananatuan City,
respectively.

NARVASA, C.J.:

FACTS:

Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President of Hon. Mateo
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City,
respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15,
Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any
appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The issue was first ventilated at the meeting of the Judicial and Bar Council on March 9, 1998. The
meeting had been called, according to the Chief Justice as Ex Officio Chairman, to discuss the
question raised by some sectors about the "constitutionality of ** appointments" to the Court of
Appeals, specifically, in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. Attention was drawn to Section
15, Article VII of the Constitution reading as follows:

ISSUE:

Is the President nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of
Art. VIII

Ruling:
During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean
that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein
unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every
6 years. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of
the ban. They valid in the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the
judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling
reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.
29
G.R. No. 191002               April 20, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL -
ARROYO, Respondents.

Facts:

After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, the position of Chief Justice
was left vacant. Section 4 (1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution states that,
"vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from occurrence thereof," from a, "List of nominees
prepared by the Judicial Bar Council for every vacancy" furthermore, Section 15, Article VII was also
taken into consideration which prohibits the President or the Acting President from making
appointments within two (2) months immediately before the next Presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled and there were five (5) candidates for the
position from the most senior of the Associates of the court and one of them is Associate Justice
Reynato C. Corona who was chosen by the President and was appointed for the position of Chief
Justice. 

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next
Chief Justice since the Constitution do not apply to the Supreme Court. If the framers of the
Constitution intended the prohibition to apply in the Supreme Court then it should have expressly
stated it in the Constitution. 

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice.

Ruling:

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

30
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court
shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the
power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments
within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume
that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended
Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

31
G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and A.

GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management; HON. VICENTE T.
TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and
limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the
President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork
barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become
Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE,
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the
same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill
he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions.
The Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A. Gonzales as taxpayers,
prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on the
Countrywide Development Fund, the special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation
for Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount
appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion allocated for the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of the President of the Special Provision of
Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the
Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights,
(CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and
Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional.
2. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the
automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional
Ruling:

32
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process
(Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is found in Article VI
on the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department in the
Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The
burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the
Constitution.

Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is the power given to the
President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art.
VI, Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item.

A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums
of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit (Beckman, The Item Veto Power of
the Executive,
31 Temple Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).

Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of
the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is
violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts
(Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special
provision is therefore valid.

The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for
the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of
Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.

Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the
challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the
right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in
1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such
purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades
the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to
be amended.

On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the
Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain
when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the
guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the
Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry
into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

33
GR. No. 164987 April 24 2012
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty
Vs
Secretary of Budget and Management

MENDOZA, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) filed an action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA
of 2004).

According to petitioner, the provision is silent and prohibits an automatic and direct allocation of lump
sums to individual senators, and congressmen for the funding of of projects.

Petitioner insists that the silence in law of direct or even indirect participation by members of
Congress betrays a deliberate intent on the part of the Executive and the Congress to scrap and do
away with “pork barrel” system.

Petitioner concluded that that the “pork barrel has become legally defunct under the present state of
GAA 2004”.

LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and,
thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an
executive function.

The proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws of the repeal or
amendment thereof, which is the only function given to the congress by the Constitution.

Respondent claimed that there is no concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of “pork barrel” is a
source of unwanted money for unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who misuse their
allocations.

Respondent suffice to say that the perception of LAMP must not be based on mere speculations
34
circulated in the news media.

Issue:

Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and
illegal.

Ruling: No. The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented
showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually
spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members
of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly
legal and capable of lawful enforcement.

Legislative authorization, the congress enters the picture and deliberates or acts on the budget
proposals of the Presidents, and congress in the exercise of its own judgement and wisdom
formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which
specifies that no money may be paid from the Treachery except in accordance with an appropriation
made by law.

The powers of government are generally subdivided into three branches: Legislative, Executive and
Judiciary. The Judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government
or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess in jurisdiction or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. Hence, in the case provides
absent in clear showing that an offense to the principle of separation of powers as committed, much
less tolerated by both the Legislative and Executive, the Court is constrained to hold that a lawful and
regular government budgeting and appropriation process ensued during the enactment and all
throughout the implementation of the GAA of 2004.

35
G.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN
M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as
SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S.
BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

FACTS:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions, taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules On
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus), all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System.
Pork Barrell refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and
secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district. The “Pork Barrel System”
involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: (a) Congressional Pork Barrel or the
discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (PDAF); and (b) Presidential Pork Barrel or certain
funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under PD 910 issued by then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos for the development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth while the
Presidential Social Fund is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and
projects not funded under the regular budget.
In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some
P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and
various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn
affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (stands for Janet Lim Napoles)
had facilitated the swindling of billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no
fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013, the
Commission on Audit released report revealing substantial irregularities in the disbursement and
utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during the Arroyo administration.
As for the 'Presidential Pork Barrel', whistle-blowers alleged that "at least P900 Million from royalties
in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
36
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy,
several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the Pork Barrel System be
declared unconstitutional

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not THE PORK BARREL SYSTEM IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THE PDAF
2. Whether or not THE PORK BARREL DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

RULING:
YES. Congressional Pork Barrel is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Supreme Court declared that
the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and its predecessor, the Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) are unconstitutional, based on the following grounds:

37
(a.1) Separation of Powers. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, legislators have been
authorized to participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including
“the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the “regulation
and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers principle. From the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
(a.2) Non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate is lodged in
Congress and must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Insofar as the 2013 PDAF Article has conferred
unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary
funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine, it has violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power;

NO. The Presidential Pork Barrel is only PARTLY UNCONSTITUTINAL. The phrase
“and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power  insofar as
it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for
energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other
public funds under the broad classification of “priority infrastructure development
projects”, it has transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

The funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall
remain therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise
declared as unconstitutional.

As a final order, DIRECTED all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the
bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all
government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related
to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under
the Pork Barrel System. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY but
PROSPECTIVE in effect. WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.

38
G.R. No. 197676               February 4, 2014

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND

BUILDERS'ASSOCIATION, Petitioners,
vs.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE and
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, Respondents.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Facts:

R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines"
was signed into law on June 29, 2009 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims
to professionalize the real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of
licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners (real estate
brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the country. Prior
to its enactment, real estate service practitioners were under the supervision of the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade Regulation and
Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in the exercise of its consumer regulation functions.
Such authority is now transferred to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES)
created under the new law.

The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated on
July 21, 2010 by the PRC and PRBRES under Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010.

On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association (CREBA) instituted Civil Case No.
10-124776 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners sought to
declare as void and unconstitutional the following provisions of R.A. No. 9646:

After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.

According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because (1) it violates
Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that
"[e]very bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
39
expressed in the title thereof"; (2) it is in direct conflict with Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 648 which transferred the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority
(NHA) to regulate the real estate trade and business to the Human Settlements
Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which
authority includes the issuance of license to sell of subdivision owners and
developers pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957; (3) it violates the due
process clause as it impinges on the real estate developers’ most basic ownership
rights, the right to use and dispose property, which is enshrined in Article 428 of the
Civil Code; and (4) Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 9646 violates the equal protection
clause as no substantial distinctions exist between real estate developers and the
exempted group mentioned since both are property owners dealing with their own
property.

After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.

On July 12, 2011, the trial court rendered its Decision denying the petition.

Issues:

1. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject"
rule under Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution;

2. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648, with
respect to the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate real estate developers;

3. Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they affect the
rights of real estate developers, are unconstitutional for violating substantive due
process; and

4. Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate developers differently from other
natural or juridical persons who directly perform acts of real estate service with
reference to their own property, is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause.3

Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

40
There is no question here that petitioners who are real estate developers are entities
directly affected by the prohibition on performing acts constituting practice of real
estate service without first complying with the registration and licensing requirements
for brokers and agents under R.A. No. 9646. The possibility of criminal sanctions for
disobeying the mandate of the new law is likewise real.

1. R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the one-title, one-subject rule.

The primary objective of R.A. No. 9646 is expressed as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes the vital role of real
estate service practitioners in the social, political, economic development and
progress of the country by promoting the real estate market, stimulating
economic activity and enhancing government income from real property-
based transactions. Hence, it shall develop and nurture through proper and
effective regulation and supervision a corps of technically competent,
responsible and respected professional real estate service practitioners
whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and will
promote the growth of the real estate industry.

We find that the inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the law’s
primary goal of developing "a corps of technically competent, responsible and
respected professional real estate service practitioners whose standards of
practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth
of the real estate industry." Since the marketing aspect of real estate
development projects entails the performance of those acts and transactions
defined as real estate service practices under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9646, it
is logically covered by the regulatory scheme to professionalize the entire real
estate service sector.

2. No Conflict Between R.A. No. 9646 and P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O.
No. 648

Petitioners argue that the assailed provisions still cannot be sustained because they
conflict with P.D. No. 957 which decreed that the NHA shall have "exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business."

41
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so
irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be
made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never
presumed.

There is no conflict of jurisdiction because the HLURB supervises only those real
estate service practitioners engaged in the sale of subdivision lots and condominium
projects, specifically for violations of the provisions of P.D. No. 957, and not the
entire real estate service sector which is now under the regulatory powers of the
PRBRES.

The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with other
laws in a way that will form a uniform system of jurisprudence.

3. No Violation of Due Process

Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 are unduly
oppressive and infringe the constitutional rule against deprivation of property without
due process of law.

The contention has no basis. There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on

their use and enjoyment of property is caused by the implementation of R.A. No.
9646. If petitioners as property owners feel burdened by the new requirement of
engaging the services of only licensed real estate professionals in the sale and
marketing of their properties, such is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable
regulatory measure.

4. R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the equal protection clause.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to operate.

R.A. No. 9646 was intended to provide institutionalized government support for the
development of "a corps of highly respected, technically competent, and disciplined

42
real estate service practitioners, knowledgeable of internationally accepted
standards and practice of the profession."

Hence, in approving R.A. No. 9646, the legislature rightfully recognized the necessity
of imposing the new licensure requirements to all real estate service practitioners,
including and more importantly, those real estate service practitioners working for
real estate developers. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over
their own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in
the ordinary course of business, a business which is highly regulated by the State to
ensure the health and safety of home and lot buyers.

The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between ordinary property
owners exempted under Section 28(a) and real estate developers like petitioners,
and the classification enshrined in R.A. No. 9646 is reasonable and relevant to its
legitimate purpose. The Court thus rules that R.A. No. 9646 is valid and
constitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 12, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 10-124776 is hereby
AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

No pronouncement as to costs.

43
G.R. No. 172409             February 4, 2008

ROOS INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. and OSCAR TOCMO, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSE
MARTILLOS, respondents.

TINGA, J.:

Facts:

On 9 April 2002, private respondent Jose Martillos (respondent) filed a complaint

against petitioners for illegal dismissal and money claims such as the payment of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement plus full backwages, service incentive leave,
13 month pay, litigation expenses, underpayment of holiday pay and other equitable
reliefs before the National Capital Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC NCR South Sector Case No. 30-04-01856-
02.

Respondent alleged that he had been hired as a driver-mechanic sometime in 1988

but was not made to sign any employment contract by petitioners. As driver
mechanic, respondent was assigned to work at Carmona, Cavite and he worked
daily from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. at the rate of P200.00 a day. He was also required
to work during legal holidays but was only paid an additional 30% holiday pay. He
likewise claimed that he had not been paid service incentive leave and 13 month pay
during the entire course of his employment. On 16 March 2002, his employment was
allegedly terminated without due process.

Petitioners denied respondent’s allegations. They contended that respondent had

been hired on several occasions as a project employee and that his employment
was coterminous with the duration of the projects. They also maintained that
respondent was fully aware of this arrangement. Considering that respondent’s
employment had been validly terminated after the completion of the projects,
petitioners concluded that he is not entitled to separation pay and other monetary
claims, even attorney’s fees.

44
In a Resolution dated July 29, 2004, the Second Division of the NLRC dismissed
petitioners’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The NLRC stressed that the bond is an
indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer and that the
perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed
by law is mandatory and jurisdictional.

The Labor Arbiter ordered petitioners to pay respondent the aggregate sum
of P224,647.17 representing backwages, separation pay, salary differential, holiday
pay, service incentive leave pay and 13TH month pay.

Petitioners received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision on 17 December 2003. On

29 December 2003.

Petitioners elevated the dismissal of their appeal to the Court of Appeals by way of a
special civil action of certiorari.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the filing of the appeal bond is substantial compliance with the
NLRC rules.

Ruling:

The Court denies the petition of certiorari.

No. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the appeal bond is not merely procedural but
jurisdictional. Without said bond, the NLRC does not acquire jurisdiction over the
appeal. Indeed, non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the
effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. It must be stressed that there is
no inherent right to an appeal in a labor case, as it arises solely from the grant of
statute.

Evidently, the NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeal within the
ten (10)-day reglementary period to perfect the appeal as the appeal bond was filed
eight (8) days after the last day thereof. Thus, the Court cannot ascribe grave abuse
of discretion to the NLRC or error to the Court of Appeals in refusing to take
cognizance of petitioners’ belated appeal.

45
It is well to recall too our pronouncement in Senarillos v. Hermosisima, et al. that the
judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was
originally passed, since the Court’s construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. Such
judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law but consists merely of
a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, as is the situation in this case.

At all events, the decision of the Labor Arbiter appears to be well-founded and
petitioners’ ill-starred appeal untenable.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

46
G.R. No. 148560               November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts :
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted
under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),  as amended
by RA 7659,  wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the
Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a)
it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"
standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in
crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
together with his co-accused,  did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱4,097,804,173.17)
thereby unjustly enriching himself at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino
people, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in

their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the
bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:

47
ISSUE :

Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional or completely vague

Ruling :

NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language
of the law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c
the petitioner is alleged to have committed.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory
definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to
the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague
and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in
its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle.

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining.

To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual
characters.

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in
spatial and temporal succession.

48
The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to
ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and
other venalities in public office.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the
petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 141811            November 15, 2001

FIRST METRO INVESTMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
ESTE DEL SOL MOUNTAIN RESERVE, INC., VALENTIN S. DAEZ, JR., MANUEL
Q. SALIENTES, MA. ROCIO A. DE VEGA, ALEXANDER G. ASUNCION,
ALBERTO * M. LADORES, VICENTE M. DE VERA, JR., and FELIPE B.
SESE, respondents.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Facts:

On January 31, 1978, petitioner FMIC granted respondent Este del Sol a loan of
P7,385,500.00 to finance the construction and development of the Este del Sol
Mountain Reserve.

Under its terms, the proceeds of the loan were to be released on staggered basis in
which the interest was at 16% per annum based on the diminishing balance and was
payable in 36 months, subject to a 20% one-time penalty on the amount due
together with all the penalties, fees, expenses or charges, plus attorney's fees
equivalent to twenty-five (25%).

Respondent Este del Sol executed several documents as security for payment,
among them, a Real Estate Mortgage and individual Continuing Suretyship
agreements by co-respondents. 

Respondent Este del Sol also executed an Underwriting Agreement and Consultancy
Agreement, where they shall pay petitioner FMIC an annual supervision fee

49
(P200,000.00) and consultancy fee (P332,500.00) per annum for a period of four (4)
consecutive years. The said amounts of fees were deemed paid by respondent Este
del Sol to petitioner FMIC which deducted the same from the first release of the loan.

Este del Sol failed to meet the schedule of repayment in accordance with a revised
Schedule of Amortization as a result petitioner FMIC caused the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage on June 23, 1980. 

After the trial, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioner FMIC. Finding
the decision of the trial court unacceptable, respondents interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals. On November 8, 1999, the appellate court reversed the challenged
decision of the trial court.

Issue: WoN the Underwriting and Consultancy Agreements were simply cloaks or
devices to cover an illegal scheme employed by petitioner FMIC to conceal and
collect excessively usurious interest.

Ruling:

Yes. An apparently lawful loan is usurious when it is intended that additional

compensation for the loan be disguised by an ostensibly unrelated contract providing
for payment by the borrower for the lender's services which are of little value or
which are not in fact to be rendered, such as in the instant case. In this connection,
Article 1957 of the New Civil Code clearly provides that:

Art. 1957. Contracts and stipulations, under any cloak or device whatever, intended
to circumvent the laws against usury shall be void. The borrower may recover in
accordance with the laws on usury.

This Court agrees with the factual findings and conclusion of the appellate court, to
wit:

We find the stipulated penalties, liquidated damages and attorney's fees, excessive,
iniquitous and unconscionable and revolting to the conscience as they hardly allow
the borrower any chance of survival in case of default. And true enough, ESTE
folded up when the appellee extrajudicially foreclosed on its (ESTE's) development
project and literally closed its offices as both the appellee and ESTE were at the time
50
holding office in the same building. Accordingly, we hold that 20% penalty on the
amount due and 10% of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale as attorney's fees
would suffice to compensate the appellee, especially so because there is no clear
showing that the appellee hired the services of counsel to effect the foreclosure, it
engaged counsel only when it was seeking the recovery of the alleged deficiency.

The Court is convinced that the appellate court committed no reversible error in its
challenged Decision, thus the instant petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 193707               December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

Facts:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they
were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the
filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only
eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the
Philippines.

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to

their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to
Php17,500.00 more or less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in
the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in

Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. Respondent and
his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay
Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City. To date, all the parties, including
their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.

51
The RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against respondent. Consequently,
respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu dismissed the case for he being an alien.

September 1, 2010, the petitioner presented a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child

Ruling:

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree
with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law,
as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences
of his failure to do so.

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel, the Court held that –

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights
and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which
they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support

petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the
Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

The doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that
the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the
law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine

52
law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing
the non-compliance therewith.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262
is a continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present.
Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to
petitioner’s child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand
the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

53
G.R. No. 166471               March 22, 2011

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner,

vs.
LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Respondent.

Facts:

La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic,
industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.

On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB)
an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a
waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPC’s application.
LTWD claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is
exclusive. Section 47 states that:

Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or

agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the district or any
portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of directors of said
district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall
be subject to review by the Administration.

NWRB approved TMPC’s application for a CPC. NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise
cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional.

54
LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 18 November 2002 Resolution,6 the
NWRB denied the motion.

LTWD appealed to the RTC.

Issues:

Whether or not the RTC erred in holding that Section 47 of PD No. 198 is valid.

Ruling:

The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the
operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are
exclusive in character.

In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President

Marcos) created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the
BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in
character. Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, allows the BOD and the LWUA to
create directly franchises that are exclusive in character.

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always
prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must
conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all
laws that do not conform to it.

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm

of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by
the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null
and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.

The petition is granted. Section 47 of PD No. 198 is declared unconstitutional. The

judgment of the RTC is set aside and the resolution of NWRB is reinstated.

55
G.R. No. 177508               August 7, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND

TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) PARTY-LIST, represented by SALVADOR B.
BRITANICO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

Facts:

Before the Court is a petition for prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party
List (petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369) and
enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the
statute.

On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this

petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution. Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and
43 of RA 9369. According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable
application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the
Constitution.

The COMELEC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their respective
Comments. At the outset, both maintain that RA 9369 enjoys the presumption of

56
constitutionality, save for the prayer of the COMELEC to declare Section 43 as
unconstitutional.

Issues:

1. Whether RA 9369 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution;

2. Whether Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7,

Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution;

3. Whether Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution; and

4. Whether Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution.

Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is that

the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition
the Court to declare a law unconstitutional must show that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or
argumentative one; otherwise, the petition must fail.

In this case, petitioner failed to justify why RA 9369 and the assailed provisions
should be declared unconstitutional.

1. RA 9369 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution

The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" has
always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The
requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects
related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.

2. Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7,

Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
57
Petitioner argues that Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the
powers of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET).

Petitioner concludes that in entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the

COMELEC en banc undermine the independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction
of the PET and the SET.

The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain

only to the adoption and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation
controversies in case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration in
the certificates of canvass. The COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not provide
that Congress and the COMELEC en banc may now entertain pre-proclamation
cases for national elective posts.1avvphi1

3. Section 43 does not violate Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution

Both petitioner and the COMELEC argue that the Constitution vests in the
COMELEC the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of
election laws. Petitioner and the COMELEC allege that Section 43 is unconstitutional
because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the government concurrent power
with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses.

The grant of the "exclusive power" to the COMELEC can be found in Section 265 of
BP 881, which provides:

Sec. 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission
may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within
four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of
the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if
warranted.

It is clear that the grant of the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute election
offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a
legislative enactment. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution were to give

58
the COMELEC the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute election offenses,
the framers would have expressly so stated in the Constitution. They did not.

4. Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution

According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just an ordinary contract but is an
agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of votes. The role of poll
watchers is vested with public interest which can be regulated by Congress in the
exercise of its police power.

First, the non- impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from
prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the
intention of the parties.

Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause. The

constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of
the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of the community.

Section 34 would still be constitutional because the law was enacted in the exercise
of the police power of the State to promote the general welfare of the people. We
agree with the COMELEC that the role of poll watchers is invested with public
interest.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

59
G.R. No. 161107               March 12, 2013

HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as City Mayor of Marikina

City, JOSEPHINE C. EVANGELIST A, in her capacity as Chief, Permit Division,
Office of the City Engineer, and ALFONSO ESPIRITU, in his capacity as City
Engineer of Marikina City, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE and ST. SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMY-
MARIKINA, INC., Respondents.

Facts:
Respondents St. Scholastica’s College (SSC) and St. Scholastica’s Academy-
Marikina, Inc. (SSA-Marikina) are educational institutions organized under the laws
of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal offices and business addresses at
Leon Guinto Street, Malate, Manila, and at West Drive, Marikina Heights, Marikina
City, respectively.

On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents
ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it
80% see-thru, and, at the same time, to move it back about six (6) meters to provide
parking space for vehicles to park. On April 26, 2000, the respondents requested for
an extension of time to comply with the directive. In response, the petitioners,

60
through then City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, insisted on the enforcement of the
subject ordinance.

Not in conformity, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application
for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the
Regional Trial Court, Marikina, Branch 273 (RTC).

RTC rendered a Decision, granting the petition and ordering the issuance of a writ of
prohibition commanding the petitioners to permanently desist from enforcing or
implementing Ordinance No. 192 on the respondents’ property.

The RTC noted that the petitioners could still take action to expropriate the subject
property through eminent domain.
The CA denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issues:
Whether or not Section 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid exercises of police
power by the City Government of Marikina.

Ruling:
Section 3(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1) meter in
height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall be of an open fence type, at least
eighty percent (80%) see-thru; and
Section 5 In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking
area allowance located between the front monument line and the building line of
commercial and industrial establishments and educational and religious institutions.

80% See-Thru Fence Requirement

The petitioners argue that while Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 may be invalid,
Section 3.1 limiting the height of fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess
of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru, should remain valid and enforceable
against the respondents.

The enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in an undue interference with
the respondents’ rights to property and privacy. Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192 is,
thus, also invalid and cannot be enforced against the respondents.

Separability

61
Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, as amended, are, thus, invalid and cannot
be enforced against the respondents. Nonetheless, "the general rule is that where
part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if susceptible to being separated from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced."

Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5, it is clear that the petitioners were
acting in excess of their jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192 against the
respondents. The CA was correct in affirming the decision of the RTC in issuing the
writ of prohibition. The petitioners must permanently desist from enforcing Sections
3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance on the respondents' property in Marikina City.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of prohibition is hereby issued

commanding the respondents to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing
Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994, as amended, on the
petitioners' property in question located in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.

No pronouncement as to costs.

62
G.R. No. 122846               January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA

TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S.
LIM, Respondent.

Facts:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the
Ordinance. The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City

Government to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its
constituents in general and the youth in particular.

SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short
time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila.

63
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up
rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and

charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting
out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by
owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear
the same meaning.

SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of
this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand
(₱5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or
both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case
of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the
operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent
conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall
automatically be cancelled.

On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC)
filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order.

MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium

Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed
a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground
that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-
hotels and motels in Manila.

RTC granted the motion to intervene.

Issues:

Whether or not the Ordinance No. 7774 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

64
Yes, the primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as
guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a
precise definition. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process
guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even
corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property
is concerned.

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights.

The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners
as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The
Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day
with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down
as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.

The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the
lives of its citizens.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared

UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

65
G.R. No. 151085             August 20, 2008

JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner, then about 14 years old, was charged with the crime of Rape in two
separate informations both dated April 20,1998, for allegedly raping AAA.
On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM. Among her siblings
CCC, BBB, DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before these
disturbing events.
BBB caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home. BBB
then informed their mother MMM who in turn asked AAA. There, AAA confessed that
petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3) different occasions.
The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. Petitioner woke AAA up and
led her to the sala. There petitioner raped AAA. The second occasion occurred the
following day, again at the petitioner's residence.
AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. In all
of these instances, petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he would

66
spank her. AAA did not tell her parents about her ordeal.
The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996.
On May 13, 1999, the RTC finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of RAPE
as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance.

Issues:
Whether or not the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case,
considering that at the time he committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13 years
old.

Ruling:

A legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and
follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes
best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and
objects of the legislature.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the
plain meaning of R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear
lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner. No other interpretation is
justified, for the simple language of the new law itself demonstrates the legislative
intent to favor the CICL.

It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth,
by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore,
petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and
the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below
15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.

However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2)
counts of rape committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that
there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains
the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are
liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of
actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.

67
The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from
the civil indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of
rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily
resulting from the odious crime of rape.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084
filed against petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 160528             October 9, 2006

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondent.

Facts:
On November 5, 1997, VP-Revenue Operations and Tax Services Officer, Atty.
Edgardo P. Curbita, filed a written request for refund of the amount of P2,241,527.22
which represents the total amount of 20% final withholding tax withheld from the
[respondent] by various withholding agent banks, and which amount includes the
20% final withholding tax withheld by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) for the period starting March 1995
through February 1997.
On December 4, 1997, the [respondent’s] AVP-Revenue Operations and Tax
Services Officer again filed with [petitioner] CIR another written request for refund of
the amount of P1,048,047.23, representing the total amount of 20% final withholding
tax withheld by various depository banks of the [respondent] which amount includes
the 20% withholding tax withheld by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Equitable
Banking Corporation (EBC), and the Jade Progressive Savings & Mortgage Bank
68
(JPSMB) for the period starting March 1995 through November 1997.

Issues:
Whether or not the provision in Section 13 of PD No. 1590 applies even if there were
in fact no taxes paid under any of subsections (A) and (B) of the said decree.

Ruling:
Two points are evident from this provision. First, as consideration for the franchise,
PAL is liable to pay either a) its basic corporate income tax based on its net taxable
income, as computed under the National Internal Revenue Code; or b) a franchise
tax of two percent based on its gross revenues, whichever is lower. Second, the tax
paid is "in lieu of all other taxes" imposed by all government entities in the country.
It is clear that PD 1590 intended to give respondent the option to avail itself of
Subsection (a) or (b) as consideration for its franchise.
PAL was owned and operated by the government at the time the franchise was last
amended.
By basing the tax rate on the annual net taxable income, a) PD 1590 necessarily
recognized the situation in which taxable income may result in a negative amount
and thus translate into a zero tax liability.
It can reasonably be contemplated that PD 1590 sought to assist the finances of the
government corporation in the form of lower taxes. When respondent operates at a
loss (as in the instant case), no taxes are due; in this instance, it has a lower tax
liability than that provided by Subsection (b).
While the Court recognizes the general rule that the grant of tax exemptions is
strictly construed against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing power, Section 13 of
the franchise of respondent leaves no room for interpretation. Its franchise exempts it
from paying any tax other than the option it chooses: either the "basic corporate
income tax" or the two percent gross revenue tax.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

69
G.R. No. L-28329 August 17, 1975

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner,
vs.
ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., (Formerly: Standard-Vacuum Refining
Corp. (Phil.), respondent.

Facts:
On December 9, 1957, Respondent ESSO operates a petroleum refining plant in
Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act No. 387 which provides: "During the
five years following the granting of any concession, the concessionaire may import
free of customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments, supplies and
accessories," respondent imported and was assessed the special import tax.
The Collector of Customs on February 16, 1962, held that respondent ESSO was
subject to the payment of the special import tax provided in Republic Act No. 1394,
as amended by R.A. No. 2352, and dismissed the protest.
On March 1, 1962, respondent appealed the ruling of the Collector of Customs to the

70
Commissioner of Customs.
The Commissioner of Customs , affirmed the decision of said Collector of Customs
on March 19, 1965.

Issues:
Whether or not the exemption enjoyed by herein private respondent ESSO Standard
Eastern, Inc. from customs duties granted by Republic Act No. 387, or the Petroleum
Act of 1949, should embrace or include the special import tax imposed by R.A. No.
1394, or the Special Import Tax Law.

Ruling:
It is a well accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous, as Republic Act No.
1394 appears to be, courts may examine both the printed pages of the published Act
as well as those extrinsic matters that may aid in construing the meaning of the
statute, such as the history of its enactment, the reasons for the passage of the bill
and purposes to be accomplished by the measure.

Against this unambiguous language of R.A. No. 387, there is the subsequent
legislation, R.A. No. 1394, the Special Import Tax Law, which, according to the
herein petitioner, shows that the legislature considered the special import tax as a
tax distinct from customs duties.
We are convinced that R.A. No. 387, The Petroleum Act of 1949, was intended to
encourage the exploitation, exploration and development of the petroleum resources
of the country by giving it the necessary incentive in the form of tax exemptions. This
is the raison d etre for the generous grant of tax exemptions to those who would
invest their financial resources towards the achievement of this national economic
goal.
The reason for this is very clear: The legislature wanted to continue the incentives for
the continuing development of the petroleum industry.

WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the weight given by this Court to the
findings and conclusions of the Court of Tax Appeals on a matter it is well-equipped
to handle, which findings and conclusions We find no reason to overturn, the petition
of the Commissioner of Customs to reverse the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
should be, as it is hereby, denied.

No costs.

71
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

Facts:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
"hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and
personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."

72
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and
sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the
amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at
the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes."

Issue:

Whether or not the provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

Ruling:

We disagree.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute.

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person,
not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder.

The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".

73
The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.

The applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer
from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the
acts punishable.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR., Respondent.
G.R. No. 173615
October 16, 2009
PERALTA, J.:

Facts:

Respondent Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr. supposedly with the participation of eight (8)
other employees of petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) in its branch in Cebu
City, allegedly committed grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and acts violative of Republic Act No.

74
3019, relative to the corporate accounts of and transactions with corporations.
All of these transactions transpired at the time that PNB was still a government-
owned and controlled corporation.
In the meantime, on May 27, 1996, the PNB had ceased to be a government-owned
and controlled corporation, and in view of its conversion into a private banking
institution by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 80.
Respondent, who was then the Vice-President and Manager of the bank, and the
eight other employees were administratively charged before the PNB Management
Hearing Committee on February 24 and March 17, 1994.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, it denied respondent’s
reconsideration on that ground.
Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on petition for review. The
Court of Appeals found merit in respondent’s appeal. The Civil Service Commission
are hereby REVERSED and the case is remanded to the Civil Service Commission
for further proceedings.

Issue:
Whether or not E.O. No. 80 has the effect of removing from the jurisdiction of the
CSC the appeal of respondent which was already pending before the CSC at the
time the said law converted PNB into a private banking institution.

Ruling:

We draw no merit in the petition.

In essence, Section 6 of E.O. No. 80, also known as the Revised Charter of PNB,
treats of the effects of converting the bank into a private financial and banking
institution.

Section 6. Change in Ownership of the Majority of the Voting Equity of the

Bank. - When the ownership of the majority of the issued common voting
shares passes to private investors, the stockholders shall cause the adoption
and registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the
appropriate Articles of Incorporation and revised by-laws within three (3)

75
 months from such transfer of ownership. Upon the issuance of the certificate
of incorporation under the provisions of the Corporation Code, this Charter
shall cease to have force and effect, and shall be deemed repealed. Any
special privileges granted to the Bank such as the authority to act as official
government depositary, or restrictions imposed upon the Bank, shall be
withdrawn, and the Bank shall thereafter be considered a privately organized
bank subject to the laws and regulations generally applicable to private banks.
The Bank shall likewise cease to be a government-owned or controlled
corporation subject to the coverage of service-wide agencies such as the
Commission on Audit and the Civil Service Commission.

In a language too plain to be mistaken, the quoted portion of the law only states no
more than the natural, logical and legal consequences of opening to private
ownership the majority of the bank’s voting equity.
Sound indeed is the rule that where the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation or even
construction.
This is based on the presumption that the words employed therein correctly express
its intent and preclude even the courts from giving it a different construction. Section
6 of E.O. No. 80 is explicit in terms. It speaks for itself. It does not invite an
interpretation that reads into its clear and plain language petitioner’s adamant
assertion that it divested the CSC of jurisdiction to finally dispose of respondent’s
pending appeal despite the privatization of PNB.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. 

G.R. No. 112371 October 7, 1998

AIDA DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

PURISIMA, J.:

Facts:

76
On March 23, 1987, petitioner Aida Domingo was appointed by the President as
Regional Director, Region V of the Department of Social Welfare and Development,
and she assumed office as such.

Several government vehicles were thereafter endorsed to her office for the use of the
personnel of the entire Region V of DSWD.

On November 14, 1989, Regional Auditor Manuel Cañares sent a communication to

the petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD Regional Office
disbursement accounts showed that officials provided with government vehicles
were still collecting transportation allowances.

The said Auditor then requested the petitioner, in her capacity as Regional Director,
to instruct all persons concerned to cease from collecting the transportation
allowances in question.

However, despite the assignment to her of a vehicle for her official use, the petitioner
asserted entitlement to a commutable transportation allowance and collected a total
amount of P48,600.00 as transportation allowance for the period from July 1, 1988 to
December 31, 1990.

Petitioner asked for reconsideration of the auditor's directive; contending that she
should only be disallowed to claim transportation allowance on the days she actually
used a government vehicle. According to petitioner, she already refunded P1,600.00
for the thirty two (32) days she actually utilized a government vehicle.

Issue:

Whether or not a commutable transporlation allowance may still be claimed by a

government official provided with a government vehicle, for the days the official did
not actually use the vehicle.

Ruling:

77
It is an elementary rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no need, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, for any
interpretation. Words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain,
ordinary, and common usage meaning.

In the case under consideration, it must be noted that the provisions of law referred
to in the General Appropriations Acts of 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991, utilized the
word "assigned" and not "used". Webster's Dictionary defines the word "assign" as
"to transfer (property) to another in trust". Had legislative intent been that
government officials issued an official vehicle could still collect transportation
allowance if they do not actually use subject vehicle, the word "use" instead of
"assign" should have been employed.

It is undeniable that several government vehicles were issued to the Regional Office
of DSWD in Region V. That the vehicles thereat were issued not to petitioner herself,
as Regional Director, but to the Regional Office itself, is of no moment.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Commission on Audit is hereby

AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 103882 November 25, 1998

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE
CORPORATION, respondents, CULTURAL CENTER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, intervenor.

78
 G.R. No. 105276 November 25, 1998
PASAY CITY AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:

FACTS:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and
chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by
dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to
establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and
harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in
consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.

Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the
reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement
with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.

Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement
between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is
outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.  

Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce
of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than
that in the definition provided by the dictionary.

RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was
affirmed by the CA with modifications.

ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area.
II.      Whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of
man.

79
RULING:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of
the respondent court that the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged areas.
To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.  
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a
seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide
terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach
scarp or berm.

The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot
broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of
Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That
Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas
from the term “foreshore lands.” Well entrenched, to the point of being elementary, is
the rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. So also, resort to
extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, is unwarranted, the
language of the law being plain and unambiguous.

It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as
amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found
to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and
null and void.

G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974

PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU and LEONORA A. DE ESPIRITU, petitioners,

vs.

80
RICARDO CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, RIZAL, BRANCH
XV, respondents.

ESGUERRA, J.:

Facts:

The case originated as one for unlawful detainer instituted on May 30, 1969, by
plaintiffs, now petitioners, in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, against private
respondent Ricardo Cipriano for the latter's alleged failure to pay rentals.

The plaintiffs are the owners of the property in question, leased to the defendant
since 1954; The house of the defendant was built on the property with the knowledge
and consent of the plaintiff pursuant to an oral contract of lease;

Before 1969 the lease of the property was on year-to-year arrangement, rentals
being then payable at or before the end of the year; The following are the rates of
rentals:

(a) 1954 to 1957 P12.00 a year

(b) 1968 to 1959 P13.20 a year

(c) 1960 to 1961 P14.00 a year

(d) 1962 P16.00 a year

(e) 1963 to 1965 P24.70 a year

(f) 1967 to 1968 P48.00 a year

Effective January 1969 the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis and
rental was increased to P30.00 a month by the plaintiffs; The defendant has
remained in possession of the property up to the present;

Since January 1969 the defendant has not paid rental at the present monthly rate;

A formal notice to vacate, dated March 22, 1969, was sent by registered mail to, and
received by, defendant.

81
On July 7, 1970, Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued
an order giving private respondent herein seven days within which to file his motion
to dismiss. Subsequently, on July 13, 1970, respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's
complaint, invoking the prohibitory provision of Republic Act 6126, entitled "An Act
To Regulate Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which Another's Dwelling Is
Located For One Year And Penalizing Violations Thereof.

Issue:

Whether or not Republic Act 6126 were to be applied to the present case.

Ruling:

Respondent contends that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be given
retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from
being remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and
prospective construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains
that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that
where the law is clear, Our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as
found.

Respondent's tenacious insistence On the retroactive operation of Republic Act 6126

represents a last ditch effort on his part to hold on to the premises while at the same
time escaping the obligation to pay the increased rate. We can not countenance
such a situation, for to permit the same to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer
absurdity and causing injustice to the petitioner herein.

Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass
retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously
vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to
have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent in
expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the
enactment.

82
Under the circumstances of this case, We, therefore, rule that Republic Act 6126 is
not applicable to the case at bar. As the language of the law is clear and
unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly says.

WHEREFORE, the assailed orders of August 4 and October 16, 1970, are hereby
nullified and set aside.

Costs against respondent.

83
G.R. No. 186400               October 20, 2010

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

Facts:

On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the

declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the
following disposition:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between

petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on
February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the
Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.

A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed
the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages

solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA
erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case,
which did not even involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of the Family
Code.

Issues:

Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized

before the effectivity of the Family Code.

Ruling:

The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.

84
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is
unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the
Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule,
in fact, reads:

Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
Civil Code.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is
only room for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is
what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there
is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there
should be no departure."

Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger
anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our
social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the
family members.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

85
G.R. No. L-26419 October 16, 1970

GEDEON G. QUIJANO and EUGENIA T. QUIJANO, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE EX-
OFICIO SHERIFF OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, respondents-appellees.

BARREDO, J.:

Facts:

That the petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-interest of the herein
respondent-bank, in the amount of P19,500.00;

That the petitioners' urban real estate loan was approved per RFC Board Resolution
No. 2533 on April 30, 1953;

That the mortgage contract was executed by the petitioners in favor of the
respondent-bank on March 23, 1954;

That the said loan of P19,500.00 was to be received by the petitioners in several
releases, subject among others.

That the first release of P4,200 was made on April 29, 1954, and the other releases
were made subsequent thereafter;

That as of July 31, 1965, the outstanding obligation of the petitioners with the
respondent-bank, including interests, was P13,983.59;

That on July 27, 1965, petitioner Gedeon Quijano, as holder of Acknowledgment No.
10181, wrote the respondent-bank in Manila offering to pay in the amount of
P14,000.00 for his outstanding obligation with the respondent-bank, out of the
proceeds of his back pay pursuant to Republic Act No. 897;

86
That the respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis Branch advised the petitioners of the non-
acceptance of his offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or
subsisting on June 20, 1953 when Republic Act 897 was approved;

That the respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis City Branch, filed on October 14, 1965, an
application for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the petitioners,
and that acting on the application of the respondent-bank, the Provincial Sheriff, thru
his deputies, scheduled the public auction sale for January 18, 1966, after advising
petitioner Gedeon Quijano of the application for foreclosure filed by the respondent-
bank;

That the parties herein agree to transfer the auction sale scheduled for January 16,
1966 to February 18, 1966, without the necessity of republication of the notice of
sale.

Issue:

Whether or not the obligation of the petitioners was subsisting at the time of the
approval of Republic Act No. 897, the Amendatory Act of Julie 20, 1953 to Republic
Act 304, and the original back pay law.

Ruling:

The appeal has no merit.

It is indeed settled that under the above provisions, the Government or any of its
agencies does not have any discretion in the acceptance of back pay certificates.

It is true that appellants' application for an urban real estate loan was approved by
appellee bank on April 80, 1953. It appears, however, that appellants did not avail of
it until much later, as in fact, they executed the mortgage contract only on March 23,
1954, and furthermore, that the release of the amount of the said loan of P19,500.00
was to be made in installments and subject to compliance with certain conditions by
said appellants.

It may be truly said, as contended by appellants, that when their application for the
loan was approved by the appellee Bank on April 30, 1953, an agreement was
perfected between them and said Bank, but it should be noted that under such
agreement the only enforceable obligation that was created was that of the Bank to
grant the loan applied for, whereas the obligation of appellants to pay the same
87
could not have arisen until after the amount of the loan has been actually released to
them.

Appellants' appeal that a more liberal construction of the law would enable "many
crippled or disabled veterans, or their wives and orphans, or those who had in one
way or another unselfishly sacrificed or contributed to the cause of the last war" to
take advantage of their back pay certificates, does deserve sympathy, for indeed,
among the avowed purposes of the said law are: "First, to serve as a source of
financial aid to needy veterans, like crippled or disabled veterans, and to their wives
and orphans. Secondly, to give recognition to the sacrifices of those who joined the
last war, and particularly to those who have given their all for the cause of the last
war." (Congressional Record No. 61, 2nd Congress, 4th Regular Session, May 6,
1953, page 74, as quoted in Florentino, et al. vs. PNB, 98 Phil. 959, 961-963).têñ.
£îhqw⣠On the other hand, however, 

We cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and
unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. This Court has
steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the
application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for
only when such literal application is impossible.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. No costs.

88
G.R. No. 113926 October 23, 1996

SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 61, MAGTANGGOL EUSEBIO
and LEILA VENTURA, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.:

Facts:

On April 27, 1983, private respondent Magtanggol Eusebio executed Promissory

Note No. TL/74/178/83 in favor of petitioner Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC) in
the total amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) payable in six
monthly installments with a stipulated interest of 23% per annum up to the fifth
installment.

On July 28, 1983, respondent Eusebio again executed Promissory Note No.
TL/74/1296/83 in favor of petitioner SBTC. Respondent bound himself to pay the
sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) in six (6) monthly installments
plus 23% interest per annum.

Finally, another Promissory Note No. TL74/1491/83 was executed on August 31,
1983 in the amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00). Respondent agreed
to pay this note in six (6) monthly installments plus interest at the rate of 23% per
annum.

On all the abovementioned promissory notes, private respondent Leila Ventura had
signed as co-maker.

On March 30, 1993, the court a quo rendered a judgment in favor of petitioner. Upon
the failure and refusal of respondent Eusebio to pay the aforestated balance
payable, a collection case was filed in court by petitioner SBTC.

Issues:

89
Whether or not the 23% rate of interest per annum agreed upon by petitioner bank
and respondents is allowable and not against the Usury Law.

Ruling:

From the examination of the records, it appears that indeed the agreed rate of
interest as stipulated on the three (3) promissory notes is 23% per annum. The
applicable provision of law is the Central Bank Circular No. 905 which took effect on
December 22, 1982, particularly Sections 1 and 2 which state:

CB Circular 905 was issued by the Central Bank's Monetary Board pursuant to P.D.
1684 empowering them to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for loans and
certain forbearances.

The court has ruled in the case of Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals  that:

P.D. No. 1684 and C.B. Circular No. 905 no more than allow
contracting parties to stipulate freely regarding any subsequent
adjustment in the interest rate that shall accrue on a loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits. In fine, they can agree to
adjust, upward or downward, the interest previously stipulated.

All the promissory notes were signed in 1983 and, therefore, were already covered
by CB Circular No. 905. Contrary to the claim of respondent court, this circular did
not repeal nor in anyway amend the Usury Law but simply suspended the latter's
effectivity.

Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and
unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to apply the same according to
its clear language.

The rate of interest was agreed upon by the parties freely. Significantly, respondent
did not question that rate.

The promissory notes were signed by both parties voluntarily. Therefore, stipulations
therein are binding between them. Respondent Eusebio, likewise, did not question
any of the stipulations therein. In fact, in the Comment filed by respondent Eusebio

90
to this court, he chose not to question the decision and instead expressed his desire
to negotiate with the petitioner bank for "terms within which to settle his obligation."

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the respondent court a quo, is

hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the rate of interest that should be
imposed be 23% per annum.

SO ORDERED.

RULES OF COURT:

Central Bank Circular No. 905 which took effect on December 22, 1982, particularly
Sections 1 and 2 which state:

Sec. 1. The rate of interest, including commissions, premiums, fees

and other charges, on a loan or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits, regardless of maturity and whether secured or unsecured, that
may be charged or collected by any person, whether natural or judicial,
shall not be subject to any ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to the
Usury Law, as amended.

Sec. 2. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of
express contract as to such rate of interest, shall continue to be twelve
per cent (12%) per annum.

CB Circular 905 was issued by the Central Bank's Monetary Board pursuant to P.D.
1684 empowering them to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for loans and
certain forbearances, to wit:

Sec. 1. Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, as amended, is hereby amended

to read as follows:

Sec. 1-a. The Monetary Board is hereby authorized to prescribe the

maximum rate of interest for the loan or renewal thereof or the
forbearance of any money, goods or credits, and to change such rate
or rates whenever warranted by prevailing economic and social
conditions: Provided, That changes in such rate or rates may be
effected gradually on scheduled dates announced in advance.

91
In the exercise of the authority herein granted, the Monetary Board may prescribe higher
maximum rates for loans of low priority, such as consumer loans or renewals thereof as well as
such loans made by pawnshops, finance companies and other similar credit institutions although
the rates prescribed for these institutions need not necessarily be uniform. The Monetary Board
is also authorized to prescribed different maximum rate or rates for different types of borrowings,
including deposits and deposit substitutes, or loans of financial intermediaries.

G.R. No. 194024               April 25, 2012

PHILIP L. GO, PACIFICO Q. LIM and ANDREW Q. LIM Petitioners,

vs.
DISTINCTION PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION,
INC. Respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim (petitioners) are registered
individual owners of condominium units in Phoenix Heights Condominium located at
H. Javier/Canley Road, Bo. Bagong Ilog, Pasig City, Metro Manila.

Respondent Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc. (DPDCI) is a

corporation existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal office at No. 1020
Soler Street, Binondo, Manila. It was incorporated as a real estate developer,
engaged in the development of condominium projects, among which was the
Phoenix Heights Condominium.

In February 1996, petitioner Pacifico Lim, one of the incorporators and the then
president of DPDCI, executed a Master Deed and Declaration of
Restrictions (MDDR)3 of Phoenix Heights Condominium, which was filed with the
Registry of Deeds. As the developer, DPDCI undertook, among others, the
marketing aspect of the project, the sale of the units and the release of flyers and
brochures.

In August 2008, petitioners, as condominium unit-owners, filed a complaint  before

the HLURB against DPDCI for unsound business practices and violation of the
MDDR.

92
In defense, DPDCI denied that it had breached its promises and representations to
the public concerning the facilities in the condominium. It alleged that the brochure
attached to the complaint was "a mere preparatory draft" and not the official one
actually distributed to the public, and that the said brochure contained a disclaimer
as to the binding effect of the supposed offers therein. Also, DPDCI questioned the
petitioners’ personality to sue as the action was a derivative suit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioners.

RULING:

The petition fails.

Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise
a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. Thus, it was
ruled that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is determined by
the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property involved and the
parties.

In this case, the complaint filed by petitioners alleged causes of action that
apparently are not cognizable by the HLURB considering the nature of the action
and the reliefs sought. A perusal of the complaint discloses that petitioners are
actually seeking to nullify and invalidate the duly constituted acts of PHCC – the April
29, 2005 Agreement 27 entered into by PHCC with DPDCI and its Board
Resolution28 which authorized the acceptance of the proposed offsetting/settlement
of DPDCI’s indebtedness and approval of the conversion of certain units from
saleable to common areas. All these were approved by the HLURB.

93
G.R. No. 168646               January 12, 2011

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
ANGELES CATHERINE ENRIQUEZ, Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner DELTA is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of developing

and selling real estate properties, particularly Delta Homes I in Cavite. DELTA is
owned by Ricardo De Leon (De Leon), who is the registered owner of a parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-637183 of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite, which corresponds to Lot 4 of Delta Homes I. Said
Lot 4 is the subject matter of these cases.

On July 3, 1995, De Leon and his spouse obtained a ₱4 million loan from the BANK
for the express purpose of developing Delta Homes I. To secure the loan, the
spouses De Leon executed in favor of the BANK a real estate mortgage (REM) on
several of their properties, including Lot 4. Subsequently, this REM was amended by
increasing the amount of the secured loan from ₱4 million to ₱8 million. Both the
REM and the amendment were annotated on TCT No. T-637183.

DELTA then obtained a Certificate of Registration and a License to Sell from the

Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

Issue:

1. Whether the Contract to Sell conveys ownership;

94
2. Whether the dacion en pago extinguished the loan obligation, such that DELTA
has no more obligations to the BANK;

3. Whether the BANK is entitled to damages and attorney’s fees for being compelled
to litigate; and

4. What is the effect of Enriquez’s failure to appeal the OP’s Decision regarding her
obligation to pay the balance on the purchase price.

Ruling:

Contract to sell does not transfer ownership

There is nothing in the provisions of the contract entered into by DELTA and
Enriquez that would exempt it from the general definition of a contract to sell. The
terms thereof provide for the reservation of DELTA’s ownership until full payment of
the purchase price; such that DELTA even reserved the right to unilaterally void the
contract should Enriquez fail to pay three successive monthly amortizations.

Since the Contract to Sell did not transfer ownership of Lot 4 to Enriquez, said
ownership remained with DELTA. DELTA could then validly transfer such ownership
(as it did) to another person (the BANK).

Dacion en pago extinguished the loan obligation

The BANK then posits that, if title to Lot 4 is ordered delivered to Enriquez, DELTA
has the obligation to pay the BANK the corresponding value of Lot 4. According to
the BANK, the dation in payment extinguished the loan only to the extent of the value
of the thing delivered. Since Lot 4 would have no value to the BANK if it will be
delivered to Enriquez, DELTA would remain indebted to that extent.

A dacion en pago is governed by the law of sales. Contracts of sale come with

warranties, either express (if explicitly stipulated by the parties) or implied (under
Article 1547 et seq. of the Civil Code). In this case, however, the BANK does not
even point to any breach of warranty by DELTA in connection with the Dation in
Payment. To be sure, the Dation in Payment has no express warranties relating to
existing contracts to sell over the assigned properties. As to the implied warranty in
case of eviction, it is waivable and cannot be invoked if the buyer knew of the risks or
danger of eviction and assumed its consequences.

95
Award of damages

There is nothing on record that warrants the award of exemplary damages74 as well
as attorney’s fees in favor of the BANK.

Balance to be paid by Enriquez

As already mentioned, the Contract to Sell in favor of Enriquez must be respected by

the BANK.1avvphi1 Upon Enriquez’s full payment of the balance of the purchase
price, the BANK is bound to deliver the title over Lot 4 to her. As to the amount of the
balance which Enriquez must pay, we adopt the OP’s ruling thereon which sustained
the amount stipulated in the Contract to Sell.

We will not review Enriquez’s initial claims about the supposed violation of the price
ceiling in BP 220, since this issue was no longer pursued by the parties, not even by
Enriquez, who chose not to file the required pleadings before the Court. The parties
were informed in the Court’s September 5, 2007 Resolution that issues that are not
included in their memoranda shall be deemed waived or abandoned. Since Enriquez
did not file a memorandum in either petition, she is deemed to have waived the said
issue.

WHEREFORE, the Decisions of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

96
MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its
MunicipalMayor, CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal
Mayor, SALVADOR PILLOS, and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 169435
February 27, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.:

FACTS:
The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong,
Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which
were previously organized as rancherias, each of which was under the independent
control of a chief. Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution
passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and
created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 dated
September 30, 1916.

The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides:

SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan,

Ragas and Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are
hereby separated from the said municipality and constituted into a new and
separate municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, with the
following boundaries:

97
 On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the
barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road;
on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of
barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province
boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the same time the
boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and
Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.

Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear that
Marcos shall be derived from the listed barangays of Dingras, namely: Capariaan,
Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit. The Municipality of Nueva Era or
any of its barangays was not mentioned. Hence, if based only on said paragraph, it
is clear that Nueva Era may not be considered as a source of territory of Marcos.
1. There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named
only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however,
lies in the description of Marcos' boundaries as stated in the second
paragraph, particularly in the phrase: "on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt.
Province boundary."
2. On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos' eastern boundary,
Marcos claimed that the middle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins its
eastern side, formed part of its territory. Its reasoning was founded upon the
fact that Nueva Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos Norte-Apayao
boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos
Norte-Apayao boundary, part of Nueva Era would consequently be obtained
by it.
3. Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after
almost 30 years, or only on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan
passed Resolution No. 93-015. Said resolution was entitled: "Resolution
Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated
Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."
4. Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after
almost 30 years, or only on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan
passed Resolution No. 93-015. Said resolution was entitled: "Resolution
Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated
Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."

98
 5. On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. it
hereby DISMISSES said petition for lack of merit. The disputed area
consisting of 15,400 hectares, more or less, is hereby declared as part and
portion of the territorial jurisdiction of respondent Nueva Era.
6. On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its
decision of March 19, 2001. The questioned decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte is hereby AFFIRMED.
7.  Marcos filed a petition for review of the RTC decision before the CA.

ISSUE:
WON that the Eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers the middle
portion of Nueva Era.

RULING:

The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:

On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to

the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder
road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common
boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos
Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is
at the same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and
Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by the boundary between the
municipalities of Batac and Dingras.

Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory,

Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded.
Marcos contends that since it is "bounded on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt.
Province boundary," a portion of Nueva Era formed part of its territory because,
according to it, Nueva Era is between the Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province
boundary. Marcos posits that in order for its eastern side to reach the Ilocos Norte-
Mt. Province boundary, it will necessarily traverse the middle portion of Nueva
Era.The court cannot accept the contentions of Marcos.

99
Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the
said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of
Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory.

Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No.
3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent.

The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its

application. We thus uphold the legislative intent to create Marcos out of the territory
of Dingras only.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is

partly REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is
Reinstated.

100
BRENT SCHOOL, INC., and REV. GABRIEL DIMACHE, petitioners,
vs.
RONALDO ZAMORA, the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Office of the
President, and DOROTEO R. ALEGRE, respondents.
G.R. No. L-48494
February 5, 1990

Facts:
Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by Brent School Inc.. The
contract fixed a specific term for its existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971,
the date of execution of the agreement, to July 17, 1976 director by Brent School,
Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00.

Three months before the expiration of the contract, Alegre was given a copy ofthe
report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of the termination
of his services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was
"completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment.". Alegre
accepted the amount of P3,177.71 for period May 16 to July 17, 1976, and signed a
receipt as full payment of the contract.

However, Alegre later protested the announced termination of his employment. He

argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July
17, 1976, since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of
his employer, and his employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the
status of a regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause.

101
The Regional Director considered Brent’s School as an application for clearance to
terminate employment (and not a report on termination) and refused to give the
clearance and instead required Alegre to be reinstated as a “permanent employee”
to his former position. According to the Regional Director, the termination is not
sanctioned by the PD 422 and prohibited by Circular no 8 of the Bureau of Private
Schools.

Brent school filed for motion for reconsideration to the Regional Director, Secretary
of Labor, and the Office of the President who dismissed the motion for lack of merit
and they too find the termination to be unjust. Brent School appeals to the Court that
the employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed before the
Labor Code was promulgated.
Issue:
Whether or Not the provisions of labor code as amended, have anathematized “fixed
period employment” or employment for a term and Mr Alegre is entitled to
reinstatement.

Ruling:
No. Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having
lawfully terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period
thereof, he is declared not entitled to reinstatement and the other relief awarded and
confirmed on appeal in the proceedings below.

It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School
and Alegre on July 18, 1971, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a
stipulation fixing the duration thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly
recognized as valid by this Court,

Under American law the principle is the same. "Where a contract specifies the period
of its duration, it terminates on the expiration of such period."  "A contract of
employment for a definite period terminates by its own terms at the end of such
period." As revised, said article, renumbered 270, 23 now reads:

. . . Regular and Casual Employment.—The provisions of written

agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade

102
 of the employer except where the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or service to be employed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to he casual if it is not covered by the

preceding paragraph: provided, that, any employee who has rendered
at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the
activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue
while such actually exists.

G.R. No. 196231               January 28, 2014

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND
REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO,
OFFICER-IN-CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA
TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, AND ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG, Respondents.

Facts:

(a) PSI Rolando Mendoza and four policemen were investigated by the Ombudsman
involving a case for alleged robbery (extortion), grave threats and physical injuries
amounting to grave misconduct allegedly committed against a certain Christian
Kalaw. The same case, however, was previously dismissed by the Manila City
Prosecutors Office for lack of probable cause and by the PNP-NCR Internal Affairs
Service for failure of the complainant (Christian Kalaw) to submit evidence and
prosecute the case. On the other hand, the case which was filed much ahead by
Mendoza et al. against Christian Kalaw involving the same incident, was given due
course by the City Prosecutors Office.

(b) The Ombudsman exercised jurisdiction over the case based on a letter issued
motu proprio for Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzalez III, directing the PNP-NCR
- without citing any reason - to endorse the case against Mendoza and the arresting

103
policemen to his office for administrative adjudication, thereby showing undue
interest on the case. He also caused the docketing of the case and named Atty.
Clarence V. Guinto of the PNP-CIDG-NCR, who indorsed the case records, as the
nominal complainant, in lieu of Christian Kalaw. During the proceedings, Christian
Kalaw did not also affirm his complaint-affidavit with the Ombudsman or submit any
position paper as required.

(c) Subsequently, Mendoza, after serving preventive suspension, was adjudged

liable for grave misconduct by Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales (duly approved on
May 21, 2009) based on the sole and uncorroborated complaint-affidavit of Christian
Kalaw, which was not previously sustained by the City Prosecutor's Office and the
PNP Internal Affairs Service. From the said Resolution, Mendoza interposed a timely
motion for reconsideration (dated and filed November 5, 2009) as well as a
supplement thereto. No opposition or comment was filed thereto.

(d) Despite the pending and unresolved motion for reconsideration, the judgment of
dismissal was enforced, thereby abruptly ending Mendoza’s 30 years of service in
the PNP with forfeiture of all his benefits. As a result, Mendoza sought urgent relief
by sending several hand-written letter-requests to the Ombudsman for immediate
resolution of his motion for reconsideration. But his requests fell on deaf ears.

ISSUE:

1. Whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative

disciplinary jurisdiction of the President is a justiciable question.

2. Whether or not Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed an administrative

offense?

RULING:

1. It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became
a constitutionally-mandated office to give it political independence and
adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the 1973 Constitution,
President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as
amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to
investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any administrative act of any

104
 administrative agency, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation.

Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very
powerful government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other
grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers, both constitutional and
statutory, that are commensurate with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of
public officers.

2. Yes. Because Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and

inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by
allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine
(9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed
rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary
cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering
there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the
desperate resort to hostage-taking. The Court finds him guilty of Gross
Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust,
and hereby meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from service.

RULE OF LAW: Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance

of Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. NO. 292 and other pertinent Civil.

105
G.R. No. 193978               February 28, 2012

JELBERT B. GALICTO, Petitioner,
vs.
H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President
of the Republic of the Philippines; ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary; and FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.

BRION, J.:

Facts:

On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address
the alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and
Members of the Board of Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System
– a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which has been unable to
meet its standing obligations.

Based on its findings that "officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and
[GFIs] x x x have been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses,
incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as well as other] irregular and abusive
practices,"  the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 "urging the President to

106
order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive
allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing
boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs].

Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7,

entitled "Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position
Classification System in the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes." EO 7
provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation
and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs.

EO 7 was published on September 10, 2010. It took effect on September 25, 2010
and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs from
granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of
directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional benefits
and allowances to their employees.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition has been mooted by supervening events.

Ruling:

Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present
case has already been rendered moot by these supervening events: (1) the lapse on
December 31, 2010 of Section 10 of EO 7 that suspended the allowances and
bonuses of the directors and trustees of GOCCs and GFIs; and (2) the enactment of
R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs
empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine their own compensation
system, in favor of the grant of authority to the President to perform this act.

A moot case is "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of

supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value."  "[A]n action is considered ‘moot’ when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead[,] or when
the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to
judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties x

107
x x. Simply stated, there is nothing for the x x x court to resolve as [its] determination
x x x has been overtaken by subsequent events."

This is the present situation here. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has expressly
empowered the President to establish the compensation systems of GOCCs and
GFIs. For the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of EO 7 will
merely be an academic exercise. Any further discussion of the constitutionality of EO
7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its face in light of the
enactment of R.A. No. 10149. In the words of the eminent constitutional law expert,
Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., "the Court normally [will not] entertain a petition touching
on an issue that has become moot because x x x there would [be] no longer x x x a
‘flesh and blood’ case for the Court to resolve."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

G.R. No. 164575             December 6, 2006

ROBERT P. WA-ACON, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Facts:

During July 19, 1979 to September 28, 1981, accused Robert P. Wa-acon, a Special
Collecting Officer at National Food Authority (NFA) willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, misapply, embezzle and
convert the received and entrusted rice stocks and empty sacks to his own personal
use and benefit with a total value of P114,303.00.
Petitioner denied the crime and contended the rice delivered to him weighed less
than that for which he signed.
Petitioner explained that he could not check the weight of the sacks delivered to him
as the weighing scale in their office had a maximum capacity of only twelve (12)
kilograms.

108
Petitioner claimed that he informed his superiors of such shortage verbally, but was
unheeded.
Citing the presumption under the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code that "the failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds
which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use" and
the inability of accused Wa-acon to "rebut the presumption that he had put the rice
stocks and the empty sacks to personal use," the Sandiganbayan found him guilty of
malversation of public funds under the Revised Penal Code
Petitioner filed Motion for Reconsideration, and then denied on the ground that
accused that no new substantial issues and cogent reasons raised to justify the
reversal of the April 22, 2004 Decision.
Hence this petition

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of malversation of public funds?

Ruling: Yes. Article 217, as amended by Republic Act 1060, no longer requires
proof by the State that the accused actually appropriated, took, or misappropriated
public funds or property. Instead, a presumption, though disputable and rebuttable,
was installed that upon demand by any duly authorized officer, the failure of a public
officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property should be prima
facie evidence that he had put such missing funds or properties to personal use.
When these circumstances are present, a "presumption of law" arises that there was
malversation of public funds or properties as decreed by Article 217. 

A "presumption of law" is sanctioned by a statute prescribing that "a certain

inference must be made whenever facts appear which furnish the basis of the
interference." This is to be set apart from a "presumption of fact" which is a
"[conclusion] drawn from particular circumstances, the connection between them
and the sought for fact having received such a sanction in experience as to have
become recognized as justifying the assumption."

When there is a presumption of law, the onus probandi (burden of proof), generally

imposed upon the State, is now shifted to the party against whom the interference is
made to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut the presumption and hence, to
demolish the prima facie case.

109
LASTRILLA vs. GRANDA

ROBERT LASTRILLA, Petitioner, 

vs. 
RAFAEL A. GRANDA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 160257; Ponente: PUNO, J.; Date: January 31, 2006
 
Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Effects of Presumption on Construction and Interpretation
 
FACTS:
Respondent Rafael Granda is a grandson and legal heir of the deceased spouses
Rafael and Aurora Granda, who died in June 1989 and September 16, 2000,
respectively. The Granda spouses had ten children including Jesse Granda, the
respondent’s father, and Silvina Granda, the respondent’s aunt.  
 

110
The deceased Granda spouses owned several parcels of land with some
improvements thereon in Tacloban City which were allegedly sold by the Granda
spouses, as evidenced by three (3) deeds of absolute sale, with the following
amounts: Php 3.8M, Php 5M and Php200K, all dated December 7, 1985, witnessed
by petitioner, Robert Lastrilla, and the deceased spouses' youngest daughter
Silvina and notarized by Atty. Camilo Camenforte.
 
On February 21, 2001 or more than five months after Aurora's death, respondent
filed the instant complaint for Violation of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal
Code against petitioner, Silvina, Atty. Camenforte, and petitioners siblings who were
listed as buyers in two of the deeds of absolute sale, claiming that the signatures of
his deceased grandparents were falsified and antedated. 
 
Upon verification, the examining officers of the PNP Crime Laboratory confirmed that
the signatures of each of the respondent's grandparents "were not written by one
and the same person”
 
The CA found probable cause against private respondent Robert Lastrilla, and
directed the Office of the Prosecutor of Tacloban City to issue a recommendation for
the filing of three (3) informations charging Robert Lastrilla of the crime of
Falsification of Public Document under Article 172 (1), in relation to Article 171
(1), (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code. 
 
ISSUE: WON there is probable cause to engender the belief that petitioner is one of
the authors of the falsification. 
 
RULING: YES. In the case at bar, there is no question that all the elements of
falsification are present. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt.
 
Article 171. x x x 
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric; 
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate; x x x 
5. Altering true dates; x x x 
 
111
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents.-- The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not
more than P5,000 shall be imposed upon:  1. Any private individual who shall commit
any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or
official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; x
x x 
 
From the records, there is no question that petitioner signed as an instrumental
witness to the subject deeds of absolute sale. As such, he attested that the Granda
spouses, as vendors, signed the said deeds in his presence on December 7, 1985.
By petitioner's own admission, however, the negotiations for the sales only started in
1998, thus, the deeds were admittedly antedated. 
 
The disputable presumption is that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act and takes ordinary care of his concerns.
This presumption assumes greater significance to the case of petitioner who, as "the
one tasked [by his siblings] to ensure that the signatures on the subject deeds were
all authentic and genuine," is naturally expected to not have voluntarily affixed his
signature in the subject deeds unless he understood the clear significance of his act. 

SAMSON VS AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133076
Sept 22, 1999

FACTS:

On February 23, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act No.
8535, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City.

Petitioner Moises Samson asserts that RA No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria
established by the Local Government Code particularly, Sections 7, 11(a) and
450(a), as to the requirements of income, population and land area, seat of
government  and no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon City. In addition, he
also said the law would amend the Constitution.

112
Respondents argued that petitioner failed to substantiate said allegations with
convincing proof and that petitioner Samson had the burden of proof to overcome
the legal presumption that Congress considered all the legal requirements under the
Local Government Code of 1991 in passing R.A. 8535. Further, respondents stated
that the petition itself is devoid of any pertinent document supporting petitioner's
claim that R.A. 8535 is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: 
WON petitioner was able to successfully overcome the presumption of validity
accorded in R.A. No. 8535.

RULING:
No, the Court ruled that petitioner was not able to successfully overcome the
presumption of validity accorded in R.A. No. 8535. There is a presumption of
constitutionality in favor of a statute. One who attacks a statute must prove its
invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. Every law is presumed to have passed through
regular congressional processes. 

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT THAT NO CERTIFICATIONS ATTESTING

COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS 

Petitioner   did   not   present   any   proof,   only   allegations,   that   no  

certifications   were   submitted   to the House Committee on Local Government—as
such certifications attesting compliance with the LGC and its IRR is required.
Allegations cannot substitute for proof.  The presumption stands that the law
passed by Congress complied with all the requisites.

Representative from the Bureau of Local Government Finance estimated the

combined average annual income of the 13 barangays for 2 years to be around
P27M. Under the Local Government Code, a proposed city must have an average
annual income of only at least P20M for the immediately preceding two years.

Representative from NSO estimated the population in the barangays that would
comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be around 350,000. This figure is more
than the 150,000 required by the Implementing Rules. 

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There is no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since under the
LGC, the proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income and
population or land area.  Compliance   with   either   requirement,  in   addition  
to   income,   is enough.  

Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), petitioners  

v.
The Secretary of Budget and Management, respondent
G.R. No. 164987               April 24, 2012
MENDOZA, J.

FACTS:
LAMP is a group of lawyers with a mission of dismantling all forms of political,
economic or social monopoly in the country. They assail the constitutionality and
legality of the implementation of the PDAF as provided in the GAA 2004.
 
According to LAMP, the provision is silent and therefore, prohibits an automatic or
direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the
funding of projects.

114
LAMP further decries the supposed flaws in the implementation of the provision,
namely: 1) the DBM illegally made and directly released budgetary allocations out of
PDAF in favor of individual Members of Congress; and 2) the latter do not possess
the power to propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually funded by
PDAF. By allowing the Members of Congress to receive direct allotment from the
fund, to propose and identify projects to be funded and to perform the actual
spending of the fund, the implementation of the PDAF provision becomes legally
infirm and constitutionally repugnant.

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the petition miserably lacks legal
and factual grounds. They said that it cannot be denied that the petition cannot stand
on inconclusive media reports, assumptions and conjectures alone. That the Court
should decline the petitioner’s plea to take judicial notice of the supposed iniquity of
PDAF because there is no concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of "pork barrel," is
a source of "dirty money" for unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who tend to
misuse their allocations. These "facts" have no attributes of sufficient notoriety or
general recognition accepted by the public without qualification, to be subjected to
judicial notice.

ISSUE:
1.) WON the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review / inquiry are met
in this case
2.) WON the implementation of the PDAF is unconstitutional and illegal.

RULING:
1.) YES. An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of
"ripeness." And a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
LAMP contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as
citizens and taxpayers. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be
adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be
tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or
hardship to taxpayers. This affords "ripeness" to the present controversy. 

115
The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation
and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real
or substantial controversy before the Court.

In the Locus Standi rule, “the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.”

In this case, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF
funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing
to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons
individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the
constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys.

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with
paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional
spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the
assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

2.) NO. The implementation of the PDAF is not unconstitutional and illegal. 

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not

lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of
Congress. 

To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the
sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation
because to invalidate a law based on baseless supposition is an affront to the
wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which
approved it. This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the
clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and

116
only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court
pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act
must be struck down.

LAMP would have the Court declare the unconstitutionality of the PDAF’s
enforcement based on the absence of express provision in the GAA allocating PDAF
funds to the Members of Congress and the latter’s encroachment on executive
power in proposing and selecting projects to be funded by PDAF. Regrettably, these
allegations lack substantiation. No convincing proof was presented showing that,
indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who
actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Not even a documentation of
the disbursement of funds by the DBM in favor of the Members of Congress was
presented by the petitioner to convince the Court to probe into the truth of their
claims. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the
form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of
Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law
which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement. In a case like this, the
Court’s hands are tied in deference to the presumption of constitutionality lest the
Court commits unpardonable judicial legislation. The Court is not endowed with the
power of clairvoyance to divine from scanty allegations in pleadings where justice
and truth lie. Again, newspaper or electronic reports showing the appalling effects of
PDAF cannot be appreciated by the Court, "not because of any issue as to their
truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be
established in accordance with the rules of evidence."

G.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.
GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN
DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL
TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT
117
and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S.
BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

FACTS:

Pork Barrell refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized

projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district. 
The “Pork Barrel System” involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: (a)
Congressional Pork Barrel or the discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature
(PDAF); and (b) Presidential Pork Barrel or certain funds of the President such as
the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under PD 910 issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos for the development of indigenous energy resources
vital to economic growth while the Presidential Social Fund is sourced from the share
of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR through which the
President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded
under the regular budget.

In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that “the government has been
defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds
from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of
ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-
blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had
facilitated the swindling of billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects”
using no fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade.
In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released report revealing substantial
irregularities in the disbursement and utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during
the Arroyo administration.

As for the 'Presidential Pork Barrel', whistle-blowers alleged that "at least P900
Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan
province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the
Pork Barrel System be declared unconstitutional

ISSUE: 
118
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual
and justiciable controversy;

RULING: 

A. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the

constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided
by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the
most important and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy. This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which
pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable x x x." 
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In
other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement
of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the
questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will
decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they
are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases.
B. Locus Standi

119
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-
taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the
National Treasury." Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to
question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they
pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as
taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the
Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement
given that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest." The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral Arguments that
the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete
breakdown of controls" amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the
seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon
the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. All told, petitioners
have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.

Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission

G.R. No. 192935
December 7, 2010

FACTS:

Prior to the historic May 2010 elections, the then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III
declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and
120
of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the
presidency.

At the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive
Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth
Commission).

The Philippine Truth Commission is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of
the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the
petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution

RULING:
Yes. The clear mandate of the envisioned Truth Commission is to investigate and
find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration" only, which is the Arroyo administration. The intent to single
out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying
equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness.

The test has four requisites:

121
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; 
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or

embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed.

The Court said that a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier
past administrations before the Aquino administration would allow it to pass the test
of reasonableness and will be regarded as valid and not affront to the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. and JOSE MA. O. HIZON, Petitioners, 

vs.
TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, MANILA NORTH TOLLWAYS CORPORATION, BENPRES
HOLDINGS CORPORATION, FIRST PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, TOLLWAY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION, CITRA METRO MANILA TOLLWAYS
CORPORATION and HOPEWELL CROWN INFRASTRUCTURE,
INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 166910 October 19, 2010

122
Facts:
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1112, authorizing the
establishment of toll facilities on public improvements. In order to attract private
sector, P.D. 1112 allowed the collection of toll fees for the use of certain public
improvements that would allow a reasonable rate of return on investments. 
.
On the same date, P.D. 1113 was issued, granting to the Philippine National
Construction Corporation ("PNCC"), then known as the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP"), for a period of thirty years
franchise to construct, maintain and operate toll facilities in the North Luzon and
South Luzon Expressways, with the right to collect toll fees.

On December 22, 1983, P.D. 1894 was issued therein further granting PNCC a
franchise over the Metro Manila Expressway ("MMEX"), and the expanded and
delineated NLEX and SLEX. PNCC was granted the "right, privilege and authority to
construct, maintain and operate any and all such extensions, linkages or stretches,
together with the toll facilities appurtenant thereto, from any part of the North Luzon
Expressway, South Luzon Expressway and/or Metro Manila Expressway and/or to
divert the original route and change the original end-points of the North Luzon
Expressway and/or South Luzon Expressway.

In the agreement entered by PNCC with private sectors the supplemental Approval
Operation Agreement (STOA) defines the scope of the road project coverage, the
terminal date of the concession, and provisions on initial toll rate and a built-in
formula for adjustment of toll rates, investment recovery clauses and contract
termination in the event of the concessionaire’s.

Petitioners Francisco and Hizon, as taxpayers and expressway users, seek to nullify
the various STOAs adverted to above and the corresponding Toll Regulatory (TRB)
resolutions. the STOAs and the toll rate-fixing resolutions violate the Constitution in
that they veritably impose on the public the burden of financing tollways by way of
exorbitant fees and thus depriving the public of property without due process. 

Petitioners also seek to nullify certain provisions of P.D. 1113 and P.D. 1894, which
uniformly grant the President the power to approve the transfer or assignment of
usufruct or the rights and privileges thereunder by the tollway operator to third
parties, particularly the transfer effected by PNCC to MNTC. Wherein the authority to

123
approve is an exercise of legislative power under Article VI, Section 1 of the
Constitution.

Issue:
1. WON petitioners in the petitions have locus standi? And the existence of
actual controversy? (Ripeness)
2. WON The President is duly authorized to approve contracts, inclusive of
assignment of contracts, entered into by the TRB relative to tollway
operations?

Ruling:

1. Yes, petitioners being taxpayers have locus standi on the issue.  The
petitioner as taxpayers establish that he has a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained thus sustaining, direct injury as a result if
redressed by favorable action. The case as well is in current and contains actual
controversy given the adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 2. Yes, the president has the authority
to approve pertaining to the TRB resolution. The court finds the following Valid and
Constitutional, DENYING petition of Petitioners.

1. the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement dated April 30, 1998 covering the
North Luzon Tollway Project and the TRB Board Resolution No. 2005-4 issued
pursuant thereto;

2. the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement dated November 27, 1995 covering
the South Metro Manila Skyway and the TRB Board Resolution No. 2004-53 and
previous TRB resolutions issued pursuant thereto;

3. the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement covering the South Luzon Tollway
Project or South Luzon Expressway and the TRB Board resolutions issued pursuant
to the said agreement, particularly the TRB Board resolutions allowing the toll rate
increases that are supposed to have been implemented on June 30, 2010;

4. Section 3, paragraph (a) of Presidential Decree No. 1112, otherwise known as the
"Toll Operation Decree," in relation to Section 3, paragraph (d) thereof and Section
8, paragraph (b) of Presidential Decree No. 1894; and

124
5. Section 3, paragraph (e) 3 of P.D. No. 1112 and Section 13 of P.D. No. 1894.

GUINGONA VS CA
G.R. 12553

FACTS:
Sometime in the last quarter of 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted an investigation on the alleged participation and involvement of national
and local government officials in "jueteng" and other forms of illegal gambling.

In November 1995, one Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an eyewitness to the

networking of national and local politicians and gambling lords, sought admission
into the Government's "Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program."

125
Allegedly, he gained first-hand information in his capacity as Chairman of the Task
Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG) during the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino
until his resignation.

After a thorough evaluation of his qualifications, convinced of his compliance with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as the "Witness Protection,
Security and Benefit Act," the Department of Justice admitted Roque to the program.

Roque executed a sworn statement before NBI alleging that during his stint as
Chairman, several gambling lords, including private respondent Rodolfo Pineda, and
certain politicians offered him money and other valuable considerations, which he
accepted, upon his agreement to cease conducting raids on their respective
gambling operations.

ISSUE:
WON THE ISSUE RAISED BY PETITIONERS DO NOT WARRANT THE
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER.

RULING:

The Court finds the petition fundamentally defective. The Constitution provides that
judicial power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."

Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the

following: 
(1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; 
(2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and 
(3) the person challenging must have "standing"; that is, he has personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury.

The first requisite is that there must be before a court an actual case calling for the
exercise of judicial power. Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through
advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems or friendly suits
126
collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests. Courts do not sit
to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging. As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power,
an actual controversy between litigants must first exist.

Actual Case
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an
assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence. 

A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or

dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy
admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an
opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

In the case at bar, Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the assailed Decision
would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage witnesses to come out
and testify. But their apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified by this
particular case. A mere apprehension does not give rise to a justiciable controversy.

After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government prosecutors,
Respondent Court allowed the admission of Roque into the Program. In fact, Roque
had already testified in court against the private respondent. Thus, the propriety of
Roque's admission to the Program is already a moot and academic issue that clearly
does not warrant judicial review.

Petitioners failed not only to present an actual controversy, but also to show a case
ripe for adjudication. Hence, any resolution that this Court might make in this case
would constitute an attempt at abstraction that can only lead to barren legal
dialectics and sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.

127
Quiño vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 197466. November 13, 2012
JOEL P. QUIÑO, MARY ANTONETTE C. DANGOY,JOSEPHINE T. ABING, JOY
ANN P. CABATINGAN,TESSA P. CANG, WILFREDO T. CALO, HOMER
C.CANEN, JOSE L. CAGANG, ALBERTO CABATINGANand FRANCISCO T.
OLIVERIO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RITCHIE
R.WAGAS, respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J. :

128
FACTS:
Two candidates for the position of Mayor, petitioner Quino and respondent Wagas 

Petitioner Joel P. Quiño and private respondent Ritchie R. Wagas both ran for the
position of Mayor of Compostela. 

Results of the canvassing showed that Quiño won against Wagas. Quiño, along with
the rest of the petitioners who were the winning candidates for members of the
Sangguniang Bayan, were proclaimed by the MBOC on May 11, 2010. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not Quino’s petition for certiorari has become moot and academic.

RULING:
MOOT AND ACADEMIC
Yes, the petition for certiorari becomes moot and academic. Because there no longer
exists an actual controversy between the parties and resolving the merits of this case
would no longer serve any useful purpose. As we held in Ocampo v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

PROCLAMATION DONE, PETITION ALREADY MOOT AND ACADEMIC

The Special Board of Canvassers of Compostela, Cebu already proclaimed the
petitioners as the winning candidates for municipal mayor, vice-mayor and
councilors. With this development, the reliefs prayed for in the present petition have
become moot and academic. 

MOOT AND ACADEMIC 

It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass
upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are
involved they decline jurisdiction of moot cases.

There no longer exists an actual controversy between the parties and resolving the
merits of this case would no longer serve any useful purpose.

OCAMPO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL RULING

At any rate, the petition has become moot and academic. 

129
The Twelfth Congress formally adjourned on June 11, 2004. And on May 17, 2004,
the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bienvenido Abante the duly elected
Congressman of the Sixth District of Manila pursuant to the May 10, 2004 elections.

ENRILE VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL 

We ruled that a case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon
the merits. 

GANCHO-ON VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT  

Thus: It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to
pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests
are involved they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. 

And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. 

WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari is DISMISSED on the ground of

MOOTNESS.  SO ORDERED.

TEOFISTO C. GANCHO-ON, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND LAKAS

NG NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA-PAFLU, respondents.

G.R. No. 108033 

April 14, 1997

130
BELLOSILLO, J.

Facts:

On 16 January 1992 respondent Lakas ng Nagkakaisang Manggagawa-PAFLU filed

with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification
election in a bid to exclusively represent the truck drivers of Eros Repair Shop.
Petitioner Teofisto C. Gancho-on, owner of the shop, moved for the dismissal of the
petition on the ground of absence of employer-employee relationship. He contended
that the members of respondent Union who would constitute the proposed
bargaining unit were not employees of his shop but of individual owners of the trucks
used in the trucking and hauling business managed by his wife, Herminia. As a
support of his contention, he presented certificates of registration indicating the
ownership of four (4) vehicles being driven by the union members. In addition, he
submitted copy of the application to operate business filed with the Mayor's Office
together with an application for renewal of the certificate of registration which
described his business as an automotive repair shay. Respondent Union opposed
the motion and asserted that while petitioner may be the registered owner of the
shop, his wife was the manager of the trucking and hauling business under the same
name and style as the shop. It offered in evidence the following documents executed
by petitioner's wife herself: 

(a) an affidavit dated 10 February 1992 alleging among others that she was the
manager of Eros Repair Shop which was engaged in the trucking and hauling of
sugar cane and that the truck drivers were paid on commission basis;

(b) a letter dated 17 February 1992 addressed to the Assistant Regional Director of
the DOLE informing the latter of the violation by one of the truck drivers of Eros
Repair Shop of a memorandum issued to all truck drivers; and, 

(c) another letter dated 20 February 1992 addressed to the same official seeking
advice concerning eleven (11) of her truck drivers who failed to report for work.

On 13 May 1992, the petition for certification election was given due course with the
following options: respondent union, or no union at all. Petitioner assailed the order
for certification election before respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment, still
insisting on the absence of employer-employee relationship. However, the latter
subsequently denied it. Thus, the petitioner elevate this case before the Supreme
Court. On 11 January 1993 the certification election nevertheless proceeded.
131
Respondent union thereafter submitted to the Court an original copy of the
declaration of the final certification election results showing that it did not garner a
single vote because out of thirty-six (36) drivers, all of the twenty (20) who cast their
votes favored a "no union." This notwithstanding, petitioner argues that it is still
necessary for the Court to resolve the issue of employer-employee relationship not
only for the guidance of the bench and bar in general but also because the matter
"hangs like the sword of Damocles over his head."

Issue:

Whether or not the issue of employer-employee relationship still contended by the

petitioner is ripe and is the actual controversy of the case?

Ruling:

No. The Court held that the issue of employer-employee relationship still contended
by the petitioner is not ripe and is not the actual controversy of the case. 

Petitioner entirely misses the material points which have rendered the present
proceeding moot and academic. First, subject resolution of respondent Secretary as
aforestated decreed that the pre-election conference preparatory to the certification
election be immediately conducted. The certification election thereafter became a fait
accompli. Second, in a sense salutary to petitioner, the defeat suffered by
respondent Union in its bid to be certified as the sole bargaining agent of the truck
drivers made irrelevant the findings of both the Med-Arbiter-Designate and
respondent Secretary that an employer-employee relationship existed. It should be
emphasized that the issue of employer-employee relationship came into being only
because petitioner denied its existence in his motion to dismiss the petition for
certification election. Since the certification proceeding before the Med-Arbiter
merely provided the mainspring of this petition the defeat of respondent Union in the
election has stripped this case of its raison d'etre.

It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass

upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are
involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become
moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical-use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which
petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition.

132
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H.

HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S.
MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C.
BOLASTIG, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II,

133
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF
OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171396             May 3, 2006

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA
People Power I, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, in a move to suppress alleged
plans to overthrow the government, issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP
1017), declaring a state of national emergency. She cited as factual bases for the
said issuance the escape of the Magdalo Group and their audacious threat of the
Magdalo DDay; the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines;
and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. On the same day, she
issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) setting the standards which the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) should
follow in the suppression and prevention of acts of lawless violence. The following
were considered as additional factual bases for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5: the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and
Bataan; the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three
soldiers; and the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front
organizations to join5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces
in mass protests. Immediately, the Office of the President announced the
cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th People Power I
anniversary celebration. It revoked permits to hold rallies. Members of the Kilusang
Mayo Uno (KMU) and the National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno
(NAFLU-KMU), who marched from various parts of Metro Manila to converge at the
EDSA Shrine, were violently dispersed by anti-riot police. Professor Randolf David,
Akbayan party-list president Ronald Llamas, and members of the KMU and NAFLU-
KMU were arrested without a warrant. In the early morning of February 25, 2006,
operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) raided the Daily
Tribune offices in Manila and confiscated news stories, documents, pictures, and
mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen were stationed inside the editorial and
business offices, as well as outside the building. A few minutes after the search and
seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another
pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.

134
The PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that would not follow
“standards set by the government during the state of national emergency.” On March
3, 2006, exactly one week from the declaration of a state of national emergency and
after all the present petitions had been filed, President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 1021 (PP 1021), declaring that the state of national emergency
has ceased to exist and lifting PP1017. These consolidated petitions for certiorari
and prohibition allege that in issuing PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, President Arroyo
committed grave abuse of discretion. It is contended that respondent officials of the
Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic
institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected
by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
2. Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the
constitutionality of the proclamation?
 
RULING:

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a
call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever
becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
However, there were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied
power.
 
a. To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives.")
b. To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The
absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and
oppression on the part of the police or military]; and
c. To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section
17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative
legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly
unconstitutional.
135
This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held
that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury
as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for
they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search”
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

G.R. No. 159357             April 28, 2004

Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.

136
FACTS:
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief against
Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered political
party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional
provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a
declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious
leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring
the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate. Bro. Mike
Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents filed their Motions to Dismiss.
All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the common grounds that it
does not state a cause of action and that there is no justiciable
controversy.

The Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for
Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and
Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, which raised no new arguments other
than those already considered in the motions to dismiss.

The trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because "in
praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the
respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law,
the Petition has raised only a question of law." It then proceeded to a
lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of
church and state principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined
at some point that the endorsement of specific candidates in an election
to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause. 

 After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to
include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde
and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as
mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.

Issue:

Whether or not:

137
 (a) Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable
controversy?
(b) Did it state a cause of action? 
(c) Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for
Declaratory Relief?

Ruling: No

(a) Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory relief should be filed
by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive
order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to
interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to
seek a judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder. The
essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.

A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy

that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is
conjectural or merely anticipatory. The SJS Petition for Declaratory
Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an existing
controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the named
respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state
what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the
respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter
were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.

There is no factual allegation that SJS’ rights are being subjected to

any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation that should be
prevented by the declaratory relief sought. The judicial power and
duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights that
are legally demandable and enforceable cannot be exercised when
there is no actual or threatened violation of a legal right.
(b) A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of
the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter. Its
essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff;
138
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the former to the latter.

The Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single

allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief from
the named respondents. In any event, even granting that it
sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was
nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the
said respondents. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to
the time the Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have
provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be
jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.

(c) Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and

substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest means a
material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or
instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the
question involved.

Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an

act or a statute must show "not only that the law or act is invalid,
but also that they have sustained or are in immediate or imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in some
indefinite way." They must demonstrate that they have been, or are
about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are
lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they
have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation. A taxpayer’s action may be properly
brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power. In the present case, there is no allegation, whether

139
 express or implied, that taxpayers’ money is being illegally
disbursed.

Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that

SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters would be
adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, if the
question at issue was not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS had
suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said
respondents. Neither did it allege that any of its members would be
denied the right of suffrage or the privilege to be voted for a public office
they are seeking.

Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are

citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too general and beyond the
contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the
presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly
speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde

is GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are
hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS
Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause
of action.

140
G.R. No. 187883               June 16, 2009
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-
ENDRIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of
Representatives, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 187910               June 16, 2009
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, Respondent.

FACTS:

The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned
citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109
entitled "A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the
Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a
Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress." 

Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive
interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the
procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the case filed by the petitioners contains an actual controversy
that would compel the court to exercise its power of judicial review over the
validity of House Resolution No. 1109
2. Whether or not the petitioners, as taxpayers and concerned citizens, have the
locus standi to institute this case

RULINGS:

1. NO. The Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual
cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to
be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The
"case-or-controversy" requirement bans this court from deciding "abstract,
hypothetical or contingent questions," lest the court give opinions in the nature

141
 of advice concerning legislative or executive action. An aspect of the "case-or-
controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In our jurisdiction, the
issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff.
Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.

In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial
review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently
proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the
second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of
Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing
amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet
transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More
importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of
power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House
Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain
contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would
warrant an intervention from this Court.

2. NO. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can

demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by the remedy being sought.

In the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that
would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal
stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures
adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of
the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners’
personal stake in this case is no more evident than in Lozano’s three-page
petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that
they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A
taxpayer’s suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. It is undisputed that there
has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet.

142
 To be sure, standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases
where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance or
when paramount public interest is involved. While the Court recognizes the
potential far-reaching implications of the issue at hand, the possible
consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not
infuse petitioners with locus standi under the "transcendental importance"
doctrine.

143
SERGIO I. CARBONILLA, ET. AL vs. BOARD OF AIRLINES REPRESENTATIVES
(BAR)
G.R. No. 193247, September 14, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET. AL vs. BOARD OF AIRLINES
REPRESENTATIVES (BAR)
G.R. No. 194276, September 14, 2011

FACTS:
The Bureau of Customs issued Customs Administrative Order No. 1-2005 (CAO 1-
2005) amending CAO 7-92.  On 9 February 2006 the Department of
Finance approved CAO 1-2005. CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005 were promulgated
pursuant to Section 3506 in relation to Section 608 of the Tariff and Customs Code
of the Philippines (TCCP).
Prior to the amendment of CAO 7-92, the BOC created on 23 April 2002 a committee
to review the overtime pay of Customs personnel in Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) and to propose its adjustment from the exchange rate of ₱25 to US$1
to the then exchange rate of ₱55 to US$1. Furthermore, for more than two years
from the creation of the committee, several meetings were conducted with the
agencies concerned, including respondent Board of Airlines Representatives (BAR),
to discuss the proposed rate adjustment that would be embodied in an Amendatory
Customs Administrative Order. However, the Board of Airline Representatives (BAR)
alleged that it learned of the proposed increase in the overtime rates only sometime
in 2004 and only through unofficial reports.
BAR wrote a letter addressed to Edgardo L. De Leon, Chief, Bonded Warehouse
Division, BOC-NAIA, informing the latter of its objection to the proposed increase in
the overtime rates. They also sent a letter to the Department of Finance reiterating
its concerns against the issuance of CAO 1-2005. However, they were not able find
a valid ground to disturb the validity of CAO 1-2005, much less to suspend its
implementation or effectivity. They wrote in the letter that the implementation
effective 16 March 2005 is legally proper. 
Cruz requested the Office of the President and the Office of the Executive Secretary
to review the decision of Usec. Mendoza. Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel B.
Gaite (Deputy Exec. Sec. Gaite) issued an Order requiring BAR to pay its appeal fee
and submit an appeal memorandum within 15 days from notice. BAR paid the appeal
fee and submitted its appeal memorandum on 19 January 2007.

144
The Office of the President denied the appeal of BAR and affirmed the Decision of
the Department of Finance. Still, BAR filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
also denied. Then they filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before the Court of
Appeals.
Furthermore, Petitioners Carbonilla, et al. filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene
before the Court of Appeals on the ground that as customs personnel, they would be
directly affected by the outcome of the case. Petitioners Carbonilla, et al. also
adopted the Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for intervention filed by Carbonilla, et al.
They held that the intervenors’ case was for collection of their unpaid overtime
services and their interests could not be protected or addressed in the resolution of
the case. They filed a motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, without
resolving Carbonilla, et al.’s motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
promulgated the assailed Resolution of the Office of the President and declared
Section 3506 of the TCCP, CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005 unenforceable against BAR.
In its 5 August 2010 Resolution, the Court of Appeals, among others, denied
Carbonilla, et al.’s motion for reconsideration. The Office of the President, et al. also
filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court of Appeals granted BAR’s
motion for reconsideration and denied the Office of the President, et. al motion for
reconsideration. Thus, a petition was filed in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not CAO 7-92, CAO 1-2005 and Section 3506 of the TCCP is
unconstitutional.

RULING: No, the Court ruled that CAO 7-92, CAO 1-2005 and Section 3506 of the
TCCP is constitutional.
When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or invalid, a
party may raise its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that the
regulation is being enforced. For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review,
the party assailing the regulation must show that the question of constitutionality has
been raised at the earliest opportunity.
Section 3506 of the TCCP provides that Customs employees may be assigned by a
Collector to do overtime work at rates fixed by the Commissioner of Customs when
the service rendered is to be paid by the importers, shippers or other persons
served. The rates to be fixed shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid
to employees of private enterprise.

145
To test whether Section 3506 of the TCCP is enforceable, it must comply the
completeness and sufficient standard tests. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when
it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second
test requires adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 
In this case, Section 3506 of the TCCP complied with the requirements. The law is
complete in itself that it leaves nothing more for the BOC to do: it gives authority to
the Collector to assign customs employees to do overtime work; the Commissioner
of Customs fixes the rates; and it provides that the payments shall be made by the
importers, shippers or other persons served. Section 3506 also fixed the standard to
be followed by the Commissioner of Customs when it provides that the rates shall
not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise.
Furthermore, employees rendering overtime services are not receiving double
compensation for the overtime pay, travel and meal allowances provided for under
CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005. Section 3506 provides that the rates shall not be less
than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise. The
overtime pay, travel and meal allowances are payment for additional work rendered
after regular office hours and do not constitute double compensation prohibited
under Section 8, Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution as they are in fact authorized
by law or Section 3506 of the TCCP.
Therefore, the CAO 1-2005 is constitutional and is enforceable. The Court directed
Petitioner Bureau of Customs to implement CAO 1-2005 immediately. However, the
petition filed by the carbonilla, et. al., was denied.

146
G.R. No. 171101               July 5, 2011
HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,
LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION and RIZAL COMMERCIAL
BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioners-in-Intervention,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER
PANGANDAMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; ALYANSA
NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE GALANG,
NOEL MALLARI, and JULIO SUNIGA1 and his SUPERVISORY GROUP OF THE
HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. and WINDSOR ANDAYA, Respondents.
FACTS:

Hacienda Luisita de Tarlac (Hacienda Luisita) was a 6,443-hectare mixed

agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac
and owned by Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). In 1957, the
Spanish owners of Tabacalera offered to sell Hacienda Luisita as well as their
controlling interest in the sugar mill within the hacienda, the Central Azucarera de
Tarlac (CAT), as an indivisible transaction. The Tarlac Development Corporation
(Tadeco), then owned and/or controlled by the Jose Cojuangco, Sr. Group, agreed to
buy and undertook to pay the purchase price for Hacienda Luisita in pesos, while
that for the controlling interest in CAT, in US dollars.

The Philippine government, through the then Central Bank of the Philippines,
assisted the buyer (Tadeco) to obtain a dollar loan from a US bank. Also, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Board of Trustees extended a PhP
5.911 million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price component of the sale.
One of the conditions contained in the approving GSIS Resolution No. 3203, as later
amended by Resolution No. 356, Series of 1958, was that “the lots comprising the
Hacienda Luisita shall be subdivided by [Tadeco] and sold at cost to the tenants,
should there be any, and whenever conditions should exist warranting such action
under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act.”

As of March 31, 1958, Tadeco had fully paid the purchase price for Hacienda Luisita
and Tabacalera’s interest in CAT.
In 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the RTC against Tadeco, et
al. for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the [now] Department of Agrarian
147
Reform (DAR) so that the land can be distributed to farmers at cost. Responding,
Tadeco alleged that Hacienda Luisita does not have tenants, and sugar lands are
not covered by existing agrarian reform legislations. The RTC rendered judgment
ordering Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. Tadeco appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA).

However, in 1988, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to withdraw the
government’s case against Tadeco. The CA dismissed the case, but subject to the
condition that Tadeco obtain the approval of the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) of a stock distribution plan (SDP).
Pursuant thereto, Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation, Hacienda Luisita, Inc.
(HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose,
Tadeco assigned and conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75
hectares) and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI
shares of stock.

To accommodate the assets transfer from Tadeco to HLI, the latter, with the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) approval, increased its capital stock
from PhP 1.5 million to PhP 400 Million divided into 400 million shares with par value
of PhP 1/share. 150 million of the shares were to be issued only to qualified and
registered beneficiaries of the CARP, and the remaining 250 million to any
stockholder of the corporation.

On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs)

complement of Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the
proposed HLI’s Stock Distribution Option Plan. The Stock Distribution Option
Agreement (SDOA), styled as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), was entered
into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs and attested to by then DAR
Secretary Philip Juico.
Under the SDOA, included as part of the distribution plan are: (a) production-sharing
equivalent to three percent (3%) of gross sales from the production of the agricultural
land payable to the FWBs in cash dividends or incentive bonus; and (b) distribution
of free homelots of not more than 240 square meters each to family-beneficiaries.
The production-sharing, as the SDP indicated, is payable “irrespective of whether
[HLI] makes money or not,” implying that the benefits do not partake the nature of
dividends, as the term is ordinarily understood under corporation law.

148
In a follow-up referendum the DAR conducted, 5,117 FWBs opted to receive shares
in HLI. 132 chose actual land distribution.
The PARC, by Resolution No. 89-12-2, approved the SDP of Tadeco/HLI.
In 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda from
agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of Republic Act No. 6657. The DAR
approved the application per DAR Conversion Order No. 030601074-764-(95),
subject to payment of 3% of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLI’s
continued compliance with its undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions.
In 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12 million shares of stocks of
Centennary Holdings, Inc., ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to the latter.
Consequently, TCT No. 292091 was issued in the name of Centennary. Centennary
is wholly-owned by HLI.
HLI transferred the remaining 200 hectares covered by TCT No. 287909 to Luisita
Realty Corporation (LRC) in two separate transactions, both uniformly involving 100
hectares for PhP 250 million each.

Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300 hectares to Luisita Industrial Park
Corporation (LIPCO) for PhP 750 million. The latter acquired it for the purpose of
developing an industrial complex. The land was subdivided by LIPCO into two titles,
covering 180 and four hectares. Later, LIPCO transferred the land to the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) by way of dacion en pago in payment of
LIPCO’s PhP 431,695,732.10 loan obligations.

Apart from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from the
area coverage of Hacienda Luisita which had been acquired by the government as
part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) complex. Hence, 4,335.75
hectares remained of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.

Two separate petitions were filed by respondents (naming themselves the

Supervisory Group and AMBALA group) with the DAR to revoke the SDOA, alleging
that HLI had failed to give them their dividends and the one percent (1%) share in
gross sales, as well as the thirty-three percent (33%) share in the proceeds of the
sale of the converted 500 hectares of land. They further claimed that their lives have
not improved contrary to the promise and rationale for the adoption of the SDOA.
They prayed for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its revocation.
Subsequently, DAR Sec. Pangandaman recommended to the PARC Executive
Committee (Excom) (a) the recall/revocation of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2

149
approving HLI’s SDP; and (b) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through the
compulsory acquisition scheme.

PARC issued the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01 directing that the lands subject
of the revoked SDO plan be placed under the compulsory coverage or mandated
land acquisition scheme of the CARP. 
ISSUE:

I. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS PARC AND SECRETARY

PANGANDAMAN HAVE JURISDICTION, POWER AND/OR AUTHORITY TO
NULLIFY, RECALL, REVOKE OR RESCIND THE SDOA.
II. WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 31 OF RA 6657 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
III. WHETHER OR NOT OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE IN
THE CASE.

RULING:

YES. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to

approve the plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC.
However, contrary to petitioner HLI’s posture, PARC also has the power to revoke
the SDP which it previously approved. It may be, as urged, that RA 6657 or other
executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARC with the
power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority, however, is
deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a
basic postulate that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is
expressed.94

We have explained that "every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all

such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to
make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all
such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred
from its terms."95 Further, "every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed
to include all incidental power, right or privilege.96

Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the

conferment of express power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the
150
agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily includes the power to revoke or
recall the approval of the plan.

As public respondents aptly observe, to deny PARC such revocatory power would
reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP, because the very same agency tasked to
ensure compliance by the corporate landowner with the approved SDP would be
without authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance with it.98 With the view We
take of the case, only PARC can effect such revocation. 

NO. SECTION 31 OF RA 6657 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement (FARM) asks for the invalidation of Sec.
31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance,
to resort to stock distribution, an arrangement which, to FARM, impairs the
fundamental right of farmers and farmworkers under Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the
Constitution.106

To a more specific, but direct point, FARM argues that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 permits
stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer; in fine, there is stock
certificate ownership of the farmers or farmworkers instead of them owning the land,
as envisaged in the Constitution. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an
anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian
reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.107

Reacting, HLI insists that agrarian reform is not only about transfer of land ownership
to farmers and other qualified beneficiaries. It draws attention in this regard to Sec.
3(a) of RA 6657 on the concept and scope of the term "agrarian reform." The
constitutionality of a law, HLI added, cannot, as here, be attacked collaterally.

Not all the requisites for judicial review are present.

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review over, and pass
upon the constitutionality of, acts of the executive or legislative departments, it does
so only when the following essential requirements are first met, to wit:

(1) there is an actual case or controversy;

(2) that the constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible opportunity 
151
(3) the action is brought by a proper party or one with locus standi; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 

It took the Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement (FARM) some eighteen (18)
years from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of
RA 6657. The question of constitutionality will not be passed upon by the Court
unless it is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case at the first
opportunity. FARM is, therefore, remiss in belatedly questioning the constitutionality
of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The second requirement that the constitutional question
should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity is clearly wanting. 

The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the
very lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present,
the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of the case. The
unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. If some other grounds exist by
which judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a law, such
recourse is favored.111 Garcia v. Executive Secretary explains why:

Lis Mota — the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial
review — means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality,
although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground,
such as the application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able
to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question
raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful,
speculative, or argumentative.

Constitutional issue has been rendered moot and academic (stock distribution
scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available option under
existing law)

Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31 of
RA 6657 vis-a-vis the stock distribution component of said Sec. 31. In its pertinent
part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides: “[T]hat after June 30, 2009, the modes of
152
acquisition  shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition.”
Thus, for all intents and purposes, the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA
6657 is no longer an available option under existing law. The question of whether or
not it is unconstitutional should be a moot issue.

The Court, in some cases, has proceeded to resolve constitutional issues otherwise
already moot and academic provided the following requisites are present:

(i) there is a grave violation of the Constitution

(ii) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved
(iii) when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public
(iv) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is constitutional as it simply implements Sec. 4 of Art. XIII

of the Constitution that land can be owned collectively by farmers

Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution reads, in part: “The State shall, by law,
undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of the farmers and
regular farmworkers, who are landless, to OWN directly or COLLECTIVELY THE
LANDS THEY TILL or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of
the fruits thereof....”

The Constitution allows two (2) modes of land distribution—direct and indirect

ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method
by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the
agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of agricultural land by individual
farmers. The aforequoted Sec. 4 expressly authorizes collective ownership by
farmers. No language can be found in the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or
prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being the legal entity through
which collective ownership can be exercised.

By using the word “collectively,” the Constitution allows for indirect ownership of land
and not just outright agricultural land transfer. This is in recognition of the fact that
land reform may become successful even if it is done through the medium of juridical
entities composed of farmers.

153
Collective ownership is permitted in two (2) provisions of RA 6657. Its Sec. 29 allows
workers’ cooperatives or associations to collectively own the land, while the second
paragraph of Sec. 31 allows corporations or associations to own agricultural land
with the farmers becoming stockholders or members. Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is
constitutional as it simply implements Sec. 4 of Art. XIII of the Constitution that land
can be owned COLLECTIVELY by farmers.

The wisdom of Congress in allowing a stock distribution plan through a corporation

as an alternative mode of implementing agrarian reform is not for judicial
determination. Established jurisprudence tells us that it is not within the province of
the Court to inquire into the wisdom of the law, for, indeed, We are bound by words
of the statute.

Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution is not self-executory

Likewise, Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution makes mention of a commitment on the

part of the State to pursue, by law, an agrarian reform program...but subject to such
priorities as Congress may prescribe. This necessarily implies that the above
constitutional provision is not self-executory and that legislation is needed to
implement the urgently needed program of agrarian reform. And RA 6657 has been
enacted precisely pursuant to and as a mechanism to carry out the constitutional
directives.

DAR and PARC must ensure that the farmers should always own majority of
the common shares entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to
ensure that the farmers retain control over the agricultural land

FARM contends that the farmers in the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of
RA 6657 do not own the agricultural land but are merely given stock certificates.
Thus, the farmers lose control over the land to the board of directors and executive
officials of the corporation who actually manage the land. They conclude that such
arrangement runs counter to the mandate of the Constitution that any agrarian
reform must preserve the control over the land in the hands of the tiller.

While it is true that the farmer is issued stock certificates and does not directly own
the land, still, the Corporation Code is clear that the FWB becomes a stockholder
who acquires an equitable interest in the assets of the corporation, which include the
154
 agricultural lands. It was explained that the “equitable interest of the shareholder in
the property of the corporation is represented by the term stock, and the extent of his
interest is described by the term shares. The expression shares of stock when
qualified by words indicating number and ownership expresses the extent of the
owner’s interest in the corporate property.

A share of stock typifies an aliquot part of the corporation’s property, or the right to
share in its proceeds to that extent when distributed according to law and equity and
that its holder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation.
The FWBs will ultimately own the agricultural lands owned by the corporation when
the corporation is eventually dissolved and liquidated.

There is nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657. The policy

on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the
hands of the farmers. Then it falls on the shoulders of DAR and PARC to see to it the
farmers should always own majority of the common shares entitled to elect the
members of the board of directors to ensure that the farmers will have a clear
majority in the board. Before the SDP is approved, strict scrutiny of the proposed
SDP must always be undertaken by the DAR and PARC, such that the value of the
agricultural land contributed to the corporation must always be more than 50% of the
total assets of the corporation to ensure that the majority of the members of the
board of directors are composed of the farmers. The PARC composed of the
President of the Philippines and cabinet secretaries must see to it that control over
the board of directors rests with the farmers by rejecting the inclusion of non-
agricultural assets which will yield the majority in the board of directors to non-
farmers. Any deviation, however, by PARC or DAR from the correct application of
the formula prescribed by the second paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6675 does not
make said provision constitutionally infirm. Rather, it is the application of said
provision that can be challenged. Ergo, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 does not trench on the
constitutional policy of ensuring control by the farmers.

YES. The operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case. The Court maintained its
stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the
suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional
laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies
that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions,
they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this
score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that

155
resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI.
The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in
its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they
allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution
scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to
remain as stockholders of HLI or not.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01

dated December 22, 2005 and Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006,
placing the lands subject of HLI’s SDP under compulsory coverage on mandated
land acquisition scheme of the CARP, are hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 qualified FWBs shall have the option to
remain as stockholders of HLI. DAR shall immediately schedule meetings with the
said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or
practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest,
in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their
thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.

156
Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. NHA
G.R. No. L-48672
July 31, 1987
Gutierrez, Jr., J..
 
FACTS

In 1972, Tropical Homes, Inc. (THI) entered into a contract with private respondent
Arturo  Cordova for the sale of a lot at Better Living Subdivision in Parañaque. The
Contract price was P32,108.00. There was a 10% downpayment upon the execution
of the contract, and the balance is payable at a monthly amortization of P318.16
beginning May 17, 1972 for 20 years. Section 14 of the contract provided that the
contract will be automatically cancelled upon default in payment of any installment
within 90 days from its due date.

In 1973, Cordova was informed that the contract was cancelled due to nonpayment
of installments for a period of seven (7) months. He filed a letter-complaint at the
Department of Trade asking for a refund of the total payments he made amounting to
P8,627.86. The case was referred to NHA as they had jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to PD 957.

On February 21, 1978, the NHA issued the resolution including a decision favoring
Cordova which states that the complainant was entitled to the refund of his payments
on the first contract totalling P8,627.86 and was recommended that THI be ordered
to refund to Arturo Cordova the amount of P8,627.86 with 12% interest per annum
from 1 October 1976, until fully paid.

On April 1978, PD No. 1344 was passed which provided the following:

157
 Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate
trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
a) Unsound real estate business practices;
b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub-division
lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman; and
c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
Section 2. The decision of the National Housing Authority shall
become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
the date of its receipt. It is appealable only to the President of the
Philippines and in the event the appeal is filed and the decision is not
reversed and/or amended within a period of thirty (30) days, the
decision is deemed affirmed. Proof of the appeal of the decision must
be furnished the National Housing Authority.
 
Tropical Homes, Inc. questioned the constitutionality of PD No. 1344 because a)
it deprives them access to courts of law and b) the manner of appeal provided
for therein is violative of due process.

 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutional issue is the lis mota of the case. 
 
RULING:
No. The Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary
to a determination of the case i.e. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota presented.
In this case, the petitioner has not clearly shown how a ruling upon the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 1344 will in any way affect the correctness of the
decision rendered against him. The resolution promulgated by respondent NHA, was
issued before the passage of the questioned decree. Moreover, The writ of execution

158
of NHA did not rely upon P.D. No. 1344.  The issue of constitutionality is poorly
discussed.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS) * OFFICERS/MEMBERS

SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO,
RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners, 

vs.

 HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON.

GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as
Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.|||

G.R. No. 166715, [August 14, 2008]

FACTS:

RA 9355 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of

the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Bureau of Customs (BOC), encouraging
their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system
of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
(Fund) and Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).

Petitioners, invoking their rights as taxpayers, challenges the constitutionality of RA

9335, a tax reform legislation, on the following grounds:

Establishing a system of rewards and incentives transforms the BIR and BOC
officials and employees into mercenaries and bounty hunters that are driven to attain
these rewards. They find that this will only invite corruption and sacrificing the duty of
the officials and employees to serve the people.

159
Limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection as there is no valid classification as to why such system should not apply
to all employees and officials of other government agencies.

The law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks
a sufficient standard on the matter, making the President free to fix an unrealistic and
unattainable targets that may cause the dismissal of officials and employees; and

The creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates

the doctrine of separation of powers.

ISSUE:

WON RA 9335 is unconstitutional?

RULING:

The Court held that the petition was PARTIALLY GRANTED.

A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality.

To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.  To invalidate RA 9335 based on
petitioners' baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.

Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be
rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for
exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the
concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to
duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government
personnel.||| 

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and

interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are
entitled to respect.  Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and
are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they
have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and
legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent
court.

160
Section 12 of RA 9335 is Unconstitutional

Section 12 provides for the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee,

which violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve
the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn
any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged with
the implementation of the law.|||

Effect of the unconstitutionality of Sec 12 of RA 9335

Sec. 13 of RA 9335 provides the separability clause which states, “If any provision of
this Act is declared invalid by a competent court, the remainder of this Act or any
provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and
effect.

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to

the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a
statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than
complete nullity of the statute. 

The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate
and detach any invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter may
continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand independently of the invalid
section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a complete,
intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for
a system of rewards and sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.

Petition is PARTIALY GRANTED. 

161
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, respondents. Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 
281 SCRA 330, G.R. No. 124360, G.R. No. 127867 November 5, 1997
Puno J:,

FACTS:

The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled
“An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” R.A.
No. 8180 ends (26) years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry.
Few cases carry a surpassing importance on the life of every Filipino as these
petitions for the upswing and downswing of our economy materially depend on the
oscillation of oil. Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330,
G.R. No. 124360, G.R. No. 127867 November 5, 1997

The petition is anchored on three arguments:

First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported
refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends
that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and
discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do

162
not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from
abroad.

Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the
downstream oil industry but instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed
policy of the law. Petitioner avers that the tariff differential between imported crude
oil and imported refined petroleum products bars the entry of other players in the oil
industry because it effectively protects the interest of oil companies with existing
refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the objective of the law "to foster a truly
competitive market."

Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180
violates Section 26(1) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only
one subject which shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the
imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of
the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional.

RULING: Yes

In G.R. No. 124360 where the petitioner is Senator Tatad, it is contended that
section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision of the
Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed
in its title. We do not concur with this contention. As a policy, this Court has adopted
a liberal construction of the one title—one-subject rule. We have consistently ruled
that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details
of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out
the general subject. We hold that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is
germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to
put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum. 

163
TWO ACCEPTED TESTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A
VALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.—“There are two accepted tests
to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under
the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature
and exercise a power essentially legislative.”

SECTION 15 CAN HURDLE BOTH THE COMPLETENESS TEST AND THE

SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST.—Given the groove of the Court’s rulings, the
attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground of undue delegation of
legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in
R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of
the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is
mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported
reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation.

THE COURTS, AS GUARDIANS OF THE CONSTITUTION, HAVE THE INHERENT

AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER A STATUTE ENACTED BY THE
LEGISLATURE TRANSCENDS THE LIMIT IMPOSED BY THE FUNDAMENTAL
LAW.—Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have
the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature
transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the
Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as
unconstitutional and void.

LIBERAL STANCE ON A PETITIONER’S LOCUS STANDI WHERE THE

PETITIONER IS ABLE TO CRAFT AN ISSUE OF TRANSCENDENTAL
164
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PEOPLE.—The effort of respondents to question the locus
standi of petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In language too lucid to be
misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner’s locus
standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to
the people. In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v.
Tan, we stressed: “x x x Objections to taxpayers’ suit for lack of sufficient personality,
standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the
importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court’s duty,
under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws
and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed
aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.”

DEUTSCHE BANK AG MANILA BRANCH, PETITIONER,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 188550
August 19, 2013
Sereno, CJ.: 

FACTS:

Petitioner withheld and remitted to respondent the amount of P67,688,553.51, in

accordance with National Internal Revenue Code of 1997. It represented the fifteen
percent (15%) branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking unit net
income remitted to Deutsche Bank Germany (DB Germany) for 2002 and prior
taxable years. Believing that petitioner made an overpayment of BPRT, petitioner
filed with the BIR an administrative claim for refund or issuance of its tax credit
certificate in the total amount of P22,562,851.17, the alleged excess BPRT paid on
branch profits remittance to DB Germany.

Petitioner requested from the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) a confirmation
of its entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10%, a tax treaty relief, under the RP-
Germany Tax Treaty. Due to the inaction of the BIR on its administrative claim,
petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. CTA Second Division denied the
petition on the ground that application of tax treaty relief should be filed first from
International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) of the BIR  prior to the payment by the
165
former of its BPRT and actual remittance of its branch profits to DB Germany, or
prior to the availment of a preferential tax rate of 10% under a tax treaty. The court
likewise ruled that the 15-day rule for tax treaty relief application under RMO No. 1-
2000 cannot be relaxed for petitioner. CTA En Banc affirmed the CTA Second
Division’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can avail the tax treaty relief in accordance with Article
II, Section 2 (1987 Constitution of the Philippines) the adoption of international laws?

RULING:
YES, the petitioner can avail the tax treaty relief. According to Article II, Section 2 of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “The Philippines adopts the generally-accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land.” In the case at bar, the
Supreme Court held that, our Constitution provides for adherence to the general
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The time-
honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the performance in
good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the agreement.
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties, and obligations under the treaty
must be performed by them in good faith. More importantly, treaties have the force
and effect of law in this jurisdiction. A state that has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislations those modifications that may be
necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. Thus, laws and
issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the
parties entitled thereto. The BIR must not impose additional requirements that would
negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements. The
obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of
RMO No. 1-2000. More so, when the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not provide for
any pre-requisite for the availment of the benefits under said agreement. Bearing in
mind the rationale of tax treaties, the period of application for the availment of tax
treaty relief as required by RMO No. 1-2000 should not operate to divest entitlement
to the relief as it would constitute a violation of the duty required by good faith in
complying with a tax treaty. Logically, noncompliance with tax treaties has negative
implications on international relations.

166
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and
Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA
E. SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997

FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts
of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from
him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was,
however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court
awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost
P1,000,000.00.

Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the
China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment,
or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for
declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.

167
ISSUE: Whether or not should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as
the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?

RULING: NO.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to
release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy
the judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment
and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then
proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not
anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those
entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention
of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous
effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore
Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw
deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter
protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is
not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives
and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the
country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the
protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against
attachment, garnishment or other court processes.

Further the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its
justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially

168
to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would
negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail.”

G.R. No. 176579               October 9, 2012

HEIRS OF WILSON P. GAMBOA,* Petitioners,
vs.
FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, et al.
 
FACTS:

In his petition, Gamboa prays, among others:

For the Honorable Court to issue a declaratory relief that ownership of common or
voting shares is the sole basis in determining foreign equity in a public utility and that
any other government rulings, opinions, and regulations inconsistent with this
declaratory relief be declared unconstitutional and a violation of the intent and spirit
of the 1987 Constitution;
For the Honorable Court to declare null and void all sales of common stocks to
foreigners in excess of 40 percent of the total subscribed common shareholdings;
and
For the Honorable Court to direct the Securities and Exchange Commission and
Philippine Stock Exchange to require PLDT to make a public disclosure of all of its
foreign shareholdings and their actual and real beneficial owners.
169
Other relief(s) just and equitable are likewise prayed for. (Emphasis supplied)
As can be gleaned from his prayer, Gamboa clearly asks this Court to compel the
SEC to perform its statutory duty to investigate whether "the required percentage of
ownership of the capital stock to be owned by citizens of the Philippines has been
complied with [by PLDT] as required by x x x the Constitution."51 Such plea clearly
negates SEC’s argument that it was not impleaded.

There is no dispute, and respondents do not claim the contrary, that (1) foreigners
own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises
the sole right to vote in the election of directors, and thus foreigners control PLDT;
(2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDT’s common shares, constituting a minority of
the voting stock, and thus Filipinos do not control PLDT; (3) preferred shares,
99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares earn only
1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn;50 (5) preferred shares have twice the
par value of common shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the
authorized capital stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%.

 
ISSUES:
Whether or not the PLDT violated the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of
Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
 
RULING:
Yes. The last sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution reads:The
participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise
shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and
managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the
Philippines. This a reiteration of the last sentence of Section 5, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution,49 signifying its importance in reserving ownership and control of
public utilities to Filipino citizens.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have the same 60 percent Filipino
ownership and control requirement for public utilities like PLOT. Any deviation from
this requirement necessitates an amendment to the Constitution as exemplified by
the Parity Amendment. This Court has no power to amend the Constitution for its
power and duty is only to faithfully apply and interpret the Constitution.
170
While they had differing views on the percentage of Filipino ownership of capital, it is
clear that the framers of the Constitution intended public utilities to
be majority Filipino-owned and controlled. To ensure that Filipinos control public
utilities, the framers of the Constitution approved, as additional safeguard, the
inclusion of the last sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
commanding that "[t]he participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any
public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and
all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be
citizens of the Philippines.
The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the development of an economy
"effectively controlled" by Filipinos. Consistent with such State policy, the
Constitution explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to
Philippine nationals, who are defined in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 as
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 percent of whose
capital with voting rights belongs to Filipinos. The FIA’s implementing rules explain
that "[f]or stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine
nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full
beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is
essential." In effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpretation that
the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares
with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership. This is precisely because
the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership of
stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation.
The Court, by treating the petition as one for mandamus,56 merely directed the SEC
to apply the Court’s definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution in determining whether PLDT committed any violation of the said
constitutional provision. The dispositive portion of the Court’s ruling is addressed not
to PLDT but solely to the SEC, which is the administrative agency tasked to enforce
the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution.
To do this the 1935 Constitution, which contained the same 60 percent Filipino
ownership and control requirement as the present 1987 Constitution, had to be
amended to give Americans parity rights with Filipinos. There was bitter opposition to
the Parity Amendment62 and many Filipinos eagerly awaited its expiration. In late
1968, PLDT was one of the American-controlled public utilities that became Filipino-
controlled when the controlling American stockholders divested in anticipation of the
expiration of the Parity Amendment on 3 July 1974.63 No economic suicide happened

171
when control of public utilities and mining corporations passed to Filipinos’ hands
upon expiration of the Parity Amendment.

PRIVATIZATION and MANAGEMENT OFFICE, Petitioner, vs. STRATEGIC

ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and/or PHILIPPINE ESTATE
CORPORATION, Respondents.

G.R. No. 200402 June 18, 2014

FACTS:

PMO, then operating as the Asset Privatization Trust (APT), held a public bidding to
sell the PNCC properties in order to generate maximum cash recovery for the
government. 
The Asset Specific Bidding Rules (ASBR) governed the bidding process, which had
the following pertinent rules:

(1) the indicative price of the PNCC properties shall be announced on the day of the
bidding; 

(2) the winning bidder is the one that submits the highest total bid and that complies
with all the terms of the ASBR; 

172
(3) PMO reserves the right to reject any or all bids, including the highest bid; and 

(4) the delivery of financial information regarding the PNCC properties shall not give
rise to a warranty with respect to the said data or information. Strategic Alliance
Development Corporation, as a participant in the bidding process,14 signified its
acceptance under these terms

On the day of the bidding, the indicative price was announced at ₱7,000,000,000.
None of the bidders met the threshold. Strategic Alliance Development Corporation,
despite giving the highest offer, only gave ₱1,228,888,800 as its bid offer.
Consequently, PMO rejected all the bids.

As a result, Strategic Alliance Development Corporation protested the rejection of its

bid and insisted that a notice of award of the PNCC properties be issued in its favor.
PMO refused.
Subsequently, the former filed a Complaint for Declaration of Right to a Notice of
Award and/or Damages before the RTC.  Ruling in the bidder’s favor, the trial court
held that the failure to explain the basis of the indicative price of ₱7 billion constituted
a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of the public’s right to information,
warranting the issuance of a notice of award of the PNCC properties to Strategic
Alliance Development Corporation.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC so PMO questioned the aforesaid
ruling before this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Meanwhile, PMO’s co-
petitioner, PNCC, moved for reconsideration. In resolving the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by PNCC, the CA totally reversed itself in its Amended
Decision. The CA held that PMO and PNCC cannot be compelled to accept the
bidder’s meager offer, which was grossly disadvantageous to the Filipino people.
The CA also considered that PMO had the right under the ASBR to reject any or all
bids; and that its exercise of discretion to reject the bid of Strategic Alliance
Development Corporation had not been attended by unfairness, arbitrariness or
grave abuse.

ISSUE: 

WON the announcement of the indicative price after the submission of the sealed
bids constituted an act of fraud on the part of PMO and WON the evaluation of the
indicative price was erroneous, and that the public’s right to information was violated
by the failure of PMO to explain the high indicative price thus the need for issuance

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of a notice of award of the PNCC properties to Strategic Alliance Development
Corporation.

RULING: 

The court denied the entreaties of Strategic Alliance Development Corporation

(PHES)

The late announcement of the indicative price does not amount to fraud. PMO timely
announced the indicative price on the day of the bidding pursuant to the ASBR.
Therefore, absent a clear and convincing evidence of fraud, and given that PMO
followed the protocol, fraud on its part cannot be presumed.

To justify the acceptance of its bid for the PNCC properties, PHES reiterates that
PMO erred in computing and explaining the indicative price of 7 billion, in violation of
the public’s right to due process. However, its allegations are irrelevant considering
that the Civil Code and the ASBR pertinently provide that bids are mere offers, which
may be rightfully rejected by PMO. Moreover, PHES unsuccessfully anchors its claim
on a violation of the public’s right to information because the said right merely gives
access to public records, and does not precipitate a positive right to obtain an award
of the PNCC properties.

Therefore, the Court denies the prayer for the issuance of a notice of award to
Strategic Alliance Development Corporation.

LETICIA B. AGBAYANI, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and LOIDA MARCELINA J.
GENABE, Respondents

G.R. No. 183623 

June 25, 2012

FACTS:

Agbayani and Genabe were both employees of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 275 of Las Piñas City, working as Court Stenographer and Legal Researcher
II. On December 29, 2006, Agbayani filed a criminal complaint for grave oral

174
defamation against Genabe. City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City found probable cause
for grave oral defamation, upon petition for review by Genabe. DOJ undersecretary
Ernesto Pineda found only for slight oral defamation as it was uttered in the heat of
anger. DOJ also moved for dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply with RA
7160, Sec. 408 and 409 (d). Motion for Reconsideration of Agbayani was denied.
Petition for review on certiorari was filed with CA and dismissed.

ISSUE: 

WON, DOJ abuse its discretion when it set aside the findings of the City Prosecutor
of Las Pinas.

RULINGS:

No, the rules of procedure, in this case DOJ circular No. 70, Section 5 and Section 6
should be viewed as instruments to facilitate the attainment of justice and are not to
be applied with severity and rigidity. Indeed, there was substantial compliance with
said DOJ rules as respondent Genabe actually mentioned the name of petitioner as
private complainant. CA also found there was proper service of petition as petitioner
was able to file his comment. In addition, in Guy vs. Asia United Bank, a motion for
reconsideration from the resolution of the secretary of justice filed four days beyond
the non-extendible period of 10 days under sec. 13 NPS Rules on Appeal in
instances where he finds absence of Prima Facie evidence is not time barred but
subject to the approval of the court.
In Villanueva vs. People oral defamation or slander is the speaking of base and
defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade,
business or means of livelihood. It is grave when it is of a serious or insulting nature.
The gravity depends upon (1) expression used, (2) personal relations of the parties
involved, (3) special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationships
between the offended party and the offender, which may prove the intention of the
offender at the time.

In case at bar, Genabe was about to punch her time card on December 27, 2006
when she was informed she had been suspended for failing to meet her deadline
in a case, which was done by Agbayani to the presiding judge. This event
precipitated the words uttered by Genabe, hence being under “heat of anger and
obfuscation”, clearly a slight oral defamation only.

175
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., 
petitioner, vs. ELLEN JOHANNE HARPER, JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER
HARPER, and RIGOBERTO GILLERA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 189998.  August 29, 2012.]

FACTS:

November 1999, Christian Harper came to Manila on a business trip as the Business
Development Manager for Asia of ALSTOM Power Norway AS, an engineering firm
with worldwide operations. He checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel. He was due to
check out on November 6, 1999. In the early morning of that date, however, he was
murdered inside his hotel room by still unidentified malefactors. 

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It appears that at around 11:00 am of November 6, 1999, a Caucasian male entered
the Alexis Jewelry Store in Glorietta and expressed interest in purchasing a Cartier
lady's watch valued at P320,000.00 with the use of two Mastercard credit cards and
an American Express credit card issued in the name of Harper. But the customer's
difficulty in answering the queries phoned in by a credit card representative
sufficiently aroused the suspicion of saleslady Anna Liza Lumba (Lumba), who
asked for the customer's passport upon suggestion of the credit card representative
to put the credit cards on hold. Probably sensing trouble for himself, the customer
hurriedly left the store, and left the three credit cards and the passport behind.    

In the meanwhile, Harper's family in Norway must have called him at his hotel room
to inform him about the attempt to use his American Express card. Not getting any
response from the room, his family requested Raymond Alarcon, the Duty Manager
of the Shangri-La Hotel, to check on Harper's room. Alarcon and security personnel
went to Room 1428 at 11:27 a.m., and were shocked to discover Harper's lifeless
body on the bed. Criminal Investigation showed that Harper’s passport, credit cards,
laptop and an undetermined amount of cash had been missing from the crime scene;

Respondents commenced this suit in the RTC to recover various damages from
petitioner pertinently alleging: 
“The murderer succeeded to trespass into the area of the hotel's private rooms
area and into the room of the said deceased on account of the hotel's gross
negligence in providing the most basic security system of its guests, the lack of
which owing to the acts or omissions of its employees was the immediate cause
of the tragic death of said deceased.”
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. CA affirmed. Respondents were granted a
total amount of 52, 078, 702.50 as actual and compensatory damages, and 200,00
as attorney’s fees. Petitioners appealed that there is error in granting this for the lack
of negligence on their part. 

Petitioner argues that respondents failed to prove its negligence; that Harper's own
negligence in allowing the killers into his hotel room was the proximate cause of his
own death; and that hotels were not insurers of the safety of their guests.    

ISSUE:  WHETHER OR NOT THE THERE WAS NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF

THE PETITIONERS AND ITS SAID NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF THE DEATH OF MR. CHRISTIAN HARPER.

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RULING:

Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Shangri-la is liable due to its own negligence. 

As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant law is Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, which states that –
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
was no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this chapter."
 In determining whether or not there is negligence on the part of the parties in a
given situation, jurisprudence has laid down the following test: Did defendant, in
doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person
is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law.
A review of the testimony of Col. De Guzman reveals that on direct examination he
testified that at the time he assumed his position as Chief Security Officer of
defendant-appellant, during the early part of 1999 to the early part of 2000, he
noticed that some of the floors of the hotel were being guarded by a few guards, for
instance, 3 or 4 floors by one guard only on a roving manner. He then made a
recommendation that the ideal-set up for an effective security should be one guard
for every floor, considering that the hotel is L-shaped and the ends of the hallways
cannot be seen. He also qualified that as to his direct testimony on "ideal-set up", he
was referring to one guard for every floor if the hotel is fully booked. At the time he
made his recommendation in the early part of 1999, it was disapproved as the hotel
was not doing well and it was not fully booked so the existing security was adequate
enough. He further explained that his advice was observed only in the late
November 1999 or the early part of December 1999.

It could be inferred from the foregoing declarations of the former Chief Security
Officer of defendant-appellant that the latter was negligent in providing adequate
security due its guests. With confidence, it was repeatedly claimed by defendant-
appellant that it is a five-star hotel. Unfortunately, the record failed to show that at the
time of the death of Christian Harper, it was exercising reasonable care to protect its
guests from harm and danger by providing sufficient security commensurate to it
being one of the finest hotels in the country. In so concluding, WE are reminded of
the Supreme Court’s enunciation that the hotel business like the common carrier’s
business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are

178
bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests but also security to their persons
and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business.

The apparent security lapses of defendant-appellant were further shown when the
male culprit who entered Christian Harper’s room was never checked by any of the
guards when he came inside the hotel. As per interview conducted by the initial
investigator, PO3 Cornelio Valiente to the guards, they admitted that nobody know
that said man entered the hotel and it was only through the monitor that they became
aware of his entry. It was even evidenced by the CCTV that before he walked to the
room of the late Christian Harper, said male suspect even looked at the monitoring
camera. Such act of the man showing wariness, added to the fact that his entry to
the hotel was unnoticed, at an unholy hour, should have aroused suspicion on the
part of the roving guard in the said floor, had there been any. Unluckily for Christian
Harper, there was none at that time.

Unfortunately, the record failed to show that at the time of the death of Christian
Harper, it was exercising reasonable care to protect its guests from harm and danger
by providing sufficient security commensurate to it being one of the finest hotels in
the country. In so concluding, WE are reminded of the Supreme Court's enunciation
that the hotel business like the common carrier's business is imbued with public
interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging
for hotel guests but also security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty
constitutes the essence of the business

Ursua vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No: 112170
10 April 1996

FACTS:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On May 9, 1989 the Provincial Governor
of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an
investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of
unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the
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Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor
to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany
trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area.

On 1 August 1989, Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office
of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the
complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his
letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger,
Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the
Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was
reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents
before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just
sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the
complaint.

When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City, he was
instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing
down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to
proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He
handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms.
Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he
acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez."

On December 18, 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its
evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that
the failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his
registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that
no document from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name
of accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his
conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner Ursua violated the Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R.A. No. 6085 for using an alias name?

RULING: No, because such act does not constitute an offense within the concept of
C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in
business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to

180
prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from
those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended.

There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never

intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal
statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.
The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals
and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be
safe, and the discretion of the court limited.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner
CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4
August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:

Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or

other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of
pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the
local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of
all alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon
entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent
court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any
local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the
approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of
their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or
two surnames.

Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of
name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than
one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family
name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if
an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real

181
name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority
for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be
recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or
names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in
the proper local civil registry.

ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is

entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied
petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by

182
the  Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that
the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also
anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary
Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal
or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other
hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987
operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

RULING:

NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim
for benefits.

RATIO:

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date
clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on
the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal,
there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting
the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and
manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the
two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication

are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari
materia.

183
Penera vs. COMELEC and Andanar
G.R. No. 181613
September 11, 2009

FACTS: Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty

candidates in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2
April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election Director (ORED),
Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well

184
as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her
political party, for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political
activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period. Andanar claimed that on
29 March 2007 – a day before the start of the authorized campaign period on 30
March 2007 – Penera and her partymates went around the different barangays in
Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote for
them on the day of the elections.

Penera alone filed an Answer denying the charges but admitted that a motorcade did
take place and that it was simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby
cities and provinces, where the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was
preceded by a motorcade, which dispersed soon after the completion of such filing.
The COMELEC disqualified Penera but absolved the other candidates from Penera’s
party from violation of section 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the new definition of the term “candidate” in Section 15 of RA
8436 as amended by RA 9369 is in conflict with Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code such that premature campaigning may no longer be committed

RULING: In denying Penera’s petition, the Supreme Court, through Associate

Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, found that Penera and her witnesses admitted that
the vehicles, consisting of two jeepneys and ten motorcycles, were festooned with
multi-colored balloons; the motorcade went around three barangays in Sta. Monica;
and Penera and her partymates waved their hands and threw sweet candies to the
crowd. Thus, for violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing
election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period, Penera
was disqualified from holding the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica.

The Court declared that “there is no absolute and irreconcilable

incompatibility between Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of
premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and reconcile these two
provisions and, thus, give effect to both.”

The Court held, further, that:

185
“True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after
the filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet
officially considered a candidate.  Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her
COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming
elections. The commission by such a person of any of the acts enumerated under
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making
speeches, etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as for the purpose
of promoting his/her intended candidacy.

When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy,
his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the
filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her
election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which
he/she may be disqualified.  Also, conversely, if said person, for any reason,
withdraws his/her COC before the campaign period, then there is no point to view
his/her acts prior to said period as acts for the promotion of his/her election as a
candidate. In the latter case, there can be no premature campaigning as there is no
candidate, whose disqualification may be sought, to begin with.

Third, in connection with the preceding discussion, the line in Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that “any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign
period,” does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be
committed, for which the offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period. 
Contrary to the pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in the said proviso was it
stated that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, such that
the offender may freely carry out the same with impunity.

As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her
becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already
commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as
election campaign or partisan political activity.  However, only after said person
officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said
acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of
the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting
premature campaigning.  Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period,

186
when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous
advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to
his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their
election campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature
campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, harmony in the provisions of

Sections 80 and 79 of the Omnibus Election Code, as well as Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 8436, as amended, is not only very possible, but in fact desirable, necessary
and consistent with the legislative intent and policy of the law.

LLEDO vs LLEDO
 
CARMELITA LLEDO, Complainant, 
vs 
ATTY. CESAR V. LLEDO, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch
94, Quezon City, Respondent
A.M. No. P-95-1167 
February 9, 2010

187
 
FACTS:
 
On December 21, 1998, Atty. Cesar V. Lledo, former branch clerk of court of the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94 was dismissed from service via a court decision on
a case where his wife, Carmelita, had filed an administrative case against him,
charging the latter with immorality, abandonment, and conduct unbecoming a public
official because he left his family to live with another woman with whom he also
begot children. He failed to provide support for his family.

The Court, in its December 21, 1998 Decision, DISMISSED him from the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
any government-owned or controlled corporation. 

On April 3, 2006, Cesar L. Lledo, Jr., Cesar's son, wrote a letter to then Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban. He related that his father had been bedridden after suffering
a severe stroke and acute renal failure. He had been abandoned by his mistress and
had been under Cesar Jr.'s care since 2001. The latter appealed to the Court to
reconsider its December 21, 1998 Decision, specifically the forfeiture of leave
credits, which money would be used to pay for his father's medical expenses. 

Treating the letter as a motion for reconsideration, the Court, on May 3, 2006,
granted the same, specifically on the forfeiture of accrued leave credits. Cesar Jr.
wrote the Court again expressing his gratitude for the Court's consideration of his
request for his father's leave credits. He again asked for judicial clemency in
connection with his father's claim for refund of the latter's personal
contributions to GSIS.

In a letter dated April 16, 2009, Jason C. Teng, Regional Manager of the GSIS
Quezon City Regional Office, explained that a request for a refund of retirement
premiums is disallowed. He explained that “if those that were expected to have no
future claim (e.g. those with forfeited retirement benefits) were suddenly allowed to
receive claims for payment of benefits, this would have a negative impact on the
financial viability of the GSIS.”

188
In its Comment, the GSIS Board said that Cesar is not entitled to the refund of his
personal contributions of the retirement premiums because "it is the policy of the
GSIS that an employee/member who had been dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits cannot recover the retirement premiums he has paid
unless the dismissal provides otherwise." The GSIS Board pointed out that the
Court's Decision did not provide that Cesar is entitled to a refund of his retirement
premiums.

Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 186 states: Section 9. Effect of dismissal or

separation from service. - Upon dismissal for cause of a member of the System,
the benefits under his membership policy shall be automatically forfeited to the
System, except one-half of the cash or surrender value, which amount shall be
paid to such member, or in case of death, to his beneficiary. Section 11(d) of
Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended states that “Upon dismissal for cause or
on voluntary separation, he shall be entitled only to his own premiums and
voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of three per centum per annum,
compounded monthly.”

ISSUE: WON COMMONWEALTH ACT NO 186 HAS BEEN IMPLIEDLY

REPEALED.
 
RULING:  NO.  It is noteworthy that none of the subsequent laws expressly repealed
Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended. In fact, none of the subsequent laws
expressly repealed the earlier laws.  As a general rule, repeals by implication are
not favored. When statutes are in pari materia, they should be construed
together. A law cannot be deemed repealed unless it is clearly manifested that
the legislature so intended it.
 
For the latter law to be deemed as having repealed the earlier law, it is necessary to
show that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and
that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of
repugnance, clear and convincing in character. The language used in the later
statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly
enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice.
Finally, it should be remembered that the GSIS laws are in the nature of social
legislation, to be liberally construed in favor of the government employees. To allow
forfeiture of these personal contributions in favor of the GSIS would condone undue
enrichment.
189
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Government Service
Insurance System is hereby DIRECTED to return to Atty. Cesar Lledo his own
premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of three per centum per
annum, compounded monthly.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ET. AL. VS FORERUNNER MULTIRESOURCES INC.

G.R. NO. 199324
January 7, 2013

FACTS:
On December 12, 2002, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive
Order No. 156 which imposes a partial ban on the importation of used motor
190
vehicles. The ban is part of several measures EO 156 adopts to "accelerate the
sound development of the motor vehicle industry in the Philippines.”

In Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. and two related petitions,
EO 156 was found to be a valid executive issuance enforceable throughout the
Philippine customs territory, except in the Subic Special Economic and Freeport
Zone in Zambales (Subic Freeport) by virtue of its status as a "separate customs
territory" under Republic Act No. 7227.
Respondent Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc sued the government in the Regional
Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan to declare invalid EO 156. Respondent attacked EO
156 for (1) having been issued by President Arroyo ultra vires, (2) trenching the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution and (3) having been
superseded by Executive Order No. 418, modifying the tariff rates of imported used
motor vehicles. Respondent sought a preliminary injunctive writ to enjoin, litis
pendentia, the enforcement of EO 156.

Trial court granted relief, initially by issuing a Temporary Restraining Order followed
by a writ of preliminary injunction.
On petitioners’ motion, the trial court reconsidered its Order and lifted the injunctive
writ.
On appeal, CA set aside the trial court’s order and held that RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in lifting the preliminary injunctive writ it earlier issued. Moreover,
CA held that the implementation of EO 156 would put petitioner in a financial crisis.

ISSUE:

WON Executive Order No. 418 impliedly repealed Executive Order No. 156

RULING:

No, the Court ruled that Executive Order No. 418 did not impliedly repeal Executive
Order No. 156. This question was already settled in a Resolution dated 22 August
2006 denying reconsideration of the ruling in Southwing. The respondents in those
cases, importers of used motor vehicles via the Subic Freeport, had espoused the
theory presently advanced by respondent. 
191
The subsequent issuance of E.O. No. 418 increasing the import duties on used
motor vehicles did not alter the policy of the executive department to prohibit the
importation of said vehicle. There is nothing in the text of E.O. No. 418 which
expressly repeals E.O. No. 156. The Congress, or the Office of the President in this
case, is presumed to know the existing laws, such that whenever it intends to repeal
a particular or specific provision of law, it does so expressly. The failure to add a
specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal previous
administrative issuances.

E.O. No. 156 is very explicit in its prohibition on the importation of used motor
vehicles. On the other hand, E.O. No. 418 merely modifies the tariff and
nomenclature rates of import duty on used motor vehicles. Nothing therein expressly
revokes the importation ban.

Petition is thereby granted, and CA’s decision is set aside.

ARLIN B. OBIASCA,  Petitioner, vs. JEANE O.

BASALLOTE, Respondent.

G.R. No. 176707               February 17, 2010

FACTS:

192
On May 26, 2003, the City Schools Division Superintendent Beloso appointed
respondent Basallote to the position of AO II of DepEd, Tabaco National High School
in Albay. 

The new City Schools Division Superintendent Oyardo, through a letter dated June
4, 2003, advised the School Principal Gonzales to return the papers for the said
position and that a school ranking should be submitted for review. 

During the assumption of the respondent to the position on June 19, 2003, she
received a letter form the HRMO informing her that her appointment could not be
forwarded to the CSC because of her failure to submit the position description form
(PDF) duly signed by Gonzales. 

Respondent ed for the signature of Gonzales but the latter refuses and because of
this, Respondent informed Oyardo. Instead of helping her, she was advised to return
to her former teaching position (Teacher I) which she then followed. 

Come August 25, 2003, Oyardo appointed Petitioner Obiasca to the same position
(AO II) and such appointment was sent to and properly attested by the CSC. Upon
knowledge, respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon against Oyardo, Gonzales and Diaz. The office found Oyardo and
Gonzales administratively liable for withholding information from respondent
regarding the status of her appointment but Diaz was absolved of any wrongdoing. 
Respondent also filed a protest with the CSC Regional Office V but it was dismissed
on the ground that it should first be submitted to the Grievance Committee of the
DepEd for appropriate action.

Respondent elevated the matter to the CSC and in its November 29, 2005
resolution, the CSC granted the appeal, approved respondent’s appointment and
recalled the approval of petitioner’s appointment. 

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA claiming that the CSC
acted without factual and legal bases in recalling his appointment. In its September
26, 2006 decision, CA denied the petition and upheld respondent’s appointment. 

The CA found that the respondent was no doubt, qualified for the position. The CA
opined that Diaz unreasonably refused to affix her signature on respondent’s PDF
and to submit respondent’s appointment to the CSC on the ground of non-
193
submission of respondent’s PDF. The CA ruled that the PDF was not even required
to be submitted and forwarded to the CSC. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but his motion was denied on February 8, 2007. Hence, this petition. 

Issue: 

WON the deliberate failure of the appointing authority to submit respondent’s

appointment to the CSC within 30 days from its issuance made her appointment
ineffective and incomplete.

Ruling: 

No. The appointment of the respondent shall be deemed valid and effective
rendering the subsequent appointment of the petitioner void. 

Section 9(h) of PD 807 Already Amended by Section 12 Book V of EO 292

It is important to also note that Section 9(h) of PD 807 cannot be interpreted as

requiring that an appointment must be submitted by the appointing authority to the
CSC within 30 days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment would become
ineffective. Such interpretation fails to appreciate the relevant part of Section 9(h)
which states that "an appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the
appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall
remain effective until it is disapproved by the CSC.

Section 12, Book V of EO 292 amended Section 9(h) of PD 807 by deleting the
requirement that all appointments subject to CSC approval be submitted to it within
30 days. 

Under the facts in this case, respondent promptly assumed her duties as
Administrative Officer II when her appointment was issued by the appointing
authority. Thus, her appointment took effect immediately and remained effective until
disapproved by the CSC. Respondent’s appointment was never disapproved by the
CSC. In fact, the CSC was deprived of the opportunity to act promptly as it was
wrongly prevented from doing so. More importantly, the CSC subsequently approved
respondent’s appointment and recalled that of petitioner, which recall has already
become final and immutable.

The law on the matter is clear. There is no requirement in EO 292 that appointments
should be submitted to the CSC for attestation within 30 days from the issuance. It
certainly cannot restore what EO 292 itself already and deliberately removed. At the
very least, that requirement cannot be used as basis to unjustly prejudice

194
respondent. The problem is petitioner’s insistence that the law be applied in a
manner that is unjust and unreasonable.

Also, in appointing petitioner, the appointing authority effectively revoked the

previous appointment already accepted by the respondent. It is the CSC, not the
appointing authority, which has this power. Accordingly, petitioner’s subsequent
appointment was void. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The
incumbent must first be legally removed, or her appointment validly terminated,
before another can be appointed to succeed her.

In sum, the appointment of petitioner was inconsistent with the law and well-
established jurisprudence. It not only disregarded the doctrine of immutability of final
judgments but also unduly concentrated on a narrow portion of the provision of law,
overlooking the greater part of the provision and other related rules and using a legal
doctrine rigidly and out of context. Its effect was to perpetuate an injustice.

“When the law is clear, there is no other recourse but to apply it regardless of its
perceived harshness. Dura lex sed lex. Nonetheless, the law should never be
applied or interpreted to oppress one in order to favor another. As a court of law and
of justice, this Court has the duty to adjudicate conflicting claims based not only on
the cold provision of the law but also according to the higher principles of right and
justice.”

G.R. No. 193960               January 7, 2013

KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA),
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-

195
QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY
(PAMPANGA); AND ABC, Respondents.

Facts: 
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of
Angeles City, Branch 59. Petitioner filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause with motion to quash the information. Petitioner averred that at the
time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in dating relationship
with private respondent; hence, RA. NO. 9262 was inapplicable.
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had
ended prior to the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought
payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She
then inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her
which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the
latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information.
The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion. It did not consider material the fact that the
parties’ dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since
the parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical
injuries constituted an act of violence against women and their children as defined in
Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.

Issue: Whether or not the offender and the offended woman should be in a dating
relationship at the time of the infliction of the violence?

Ruling: No. The Court is not persuaded.

RA 9262 is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or
series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through
physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the
woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or
dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is
likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship.
 Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on
statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the
courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women
with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. 
196
As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased
for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of
such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was
committed. 
Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give
credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual
or dating relationship.

SPOUSES ROMEO LL. PLOPENIO vs DAR and LBP

G.R. No. 161090
and
EDUARDO PLOPENIO vs DAR and LBP
G.R. No. 161092

197
Facts:
Petitioner-spouses own 11.8643 hectares of coconut land in Caramoan, Camarines
Sur, while petitioner Eduardo owns 22.8349 hectares of coconut land in the same
locality. In 2000, the land of their brother Gavino Plopenio, likewise located in
Caramoan, Camarines Sur, was valued by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) at P51,125.60 per hectare. On this basis, petitioners
offered their entire landholdings to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for
acquisition and distribution pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

On October 26, 2001, public respondent Land Bank sent a Notice of Valuation and
Adjudication valuing the land of petitioner-spouses at P23,485.00 per hectare and
that of petitioner Eduardo at P22,856.62 per hectare. Dissatisfied with Land Bank’s
offer, petitioners rejected the Notice of Valuation and Acquisition and referred the
matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Sur for
summary administrative proceedings.

The PARAD affirmed the valuation made by Land Bank in a Decision dated 5
September 2002, a copy of which petitioners received on 27 September 2002. On 11
October 2002, or 14 days thereafter, petitioners filed their Motion for
Reconsideration. The PARAD denied their Motion in an Order dated 20 November
2002, which petitioners received on 21 December 2002.

Petitioners then filed separate Petitions before the SAC-RTC on 6 January 2003, or
16 days after their receipt of the PARAD’s Order. They explained that they were
allowed to file their appeal 15 days from the receipt of the Order of denial of their
Motion for Reconsideration. Since the 15th day fell on a Sunday, they reasoned that
they should be allowed to file their appeal until 6 January 2003.

In its Answer, Land Bank alleged that the Decision of the PARAD had already
attained finality after the lapse of the 15-day period, counted from petitioners’ receipt
of the PARAD’s Decision. Thus, it argued that the SAC-RTC should no longer
entertain the Petitions.
In its assailed Decisions, the SAC-RTC ruled that the Decision of the PARAD had
already attained finality because petitioners failed to file their Petitions on time. The
petitions therefore are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of valid cause of action.
From the Decisions and Orders of the SAC-RTC, petitioners then filed the instant
Petitions for Review directly before the Court.

198
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners resorted to a wrongful mode of appeal by filing the
instant Rule 45 Petitions with the Supreme Court.

RULING:

The consolidated Petitions for Review are DENIED. While the general rule is that
appeals raising pure questions of law from decisions of RTCs are taken to this Court
via a Rule 45 petition, decisions of trial courts designated as SACs are only
appealable to the Court of Appeals.

It is a settled rule that the right to appeal is a remedy of statutory origin. As such, this
right must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
the law authorizing its exercise.The special jurisdiction of the SAC-RTC is conferred
and regulated by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and appeals therefrom
are governed by Section 60 which provides:

       Section 60. Appeals. – An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special
Agrarian Courts by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of notice of the decision; otherwise, the decision shall become
final.

That law expressly states that appeals from SACs must be taken to the Court of
Appeals without making a distinction between appeals raising questions of fact and
those dealing purely with questions of law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. Consequently,
the Court rules that the only mode of appeal from decisions of the SAC-RTC is via a
Rule 42 petition for review to the Court of Appeals, without any distinction as to
whether the appeal raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of
fact and law.

Furthermore, even if the appeals were allowed to prosper, the Petitions before the
SAC-RTC were filed out of time.

In the event of a denial of the motion for reconsideration, the 1994 DARAB Rules
provide:

          SECTION 12. x x x. The filing of a motion for reconsideration shall suspend

the running of the period within which the appeal must be perfected. If a motion for
199
reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal
during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution
of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall
have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to
perfect his appeal. 

In this case, the petitioners only filed their Petitions on 6 January 2001, or 16 days
after they received the Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration. Clearly, the
Petitions before the SAC-RTC were filed out of time.

GR No. 193459, 2011-02-15

Ma.  Merceditas Gutierrez
vs.
House of Representative

Facts:
200
On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and
spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment
complaint against Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (Petitioner) upon the endorsement of
Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.

Private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo
Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed
another impeachment complaint against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement
by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael
Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus. ( complaints
were merged)

Transmitted the report to Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.

Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, were adapted in the said 15th
impeachment proceeding to meet the exigency in such situation, in keeping with the
"effective" implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. The
provisional adoption of the previous Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within the
power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
purpose.

The Petitioner filed a complaint on the violation of the Constitution with regards to
court proceedings and due process clause. Petitioner anchored its petition on the
grounds that the Rules of Impeachment proceedings were not promulgated in line
with the constitutional requirement of publication.

Issue: 
Whether or not the promulgation of the Impeachment Rules requires Publication
requirement  for it to have it’s effectivity?

Ruling:

No, in the case of Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations which held that the Constitution categorically requires publication of
the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries explains that the Impeachment Rules is
201
intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section
3(8), Art. XI of Constitution. Wherein the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries
were not considered null and void in its entirety.

In such case the word promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is
generally understood--that is, to make known.  (Generalia verba sunt generaliter
inteligencia.) The formal act of announcing a rule of court is within the discretion of
Congress on how to promulgate Impeachment rules. Hence, the petitioner’s
contention on the Publication requirement needed for the promulgation of Rules of
Impeachment does not hold grounds.

PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN AND AMANTE

G.R. NO: 167304

August 25, 2009

FACTS:

202
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City,
Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. She was able to get hold of a
cash advance in the amount of ₱71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to
defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection,
which she headed. Almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no
liquidation was made. Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter
to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance
within seventy-two hours from receipt.

Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution

recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against
respondent Amante. On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information with the
Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445.
Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND
MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION stating that the Decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman made an incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had
already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash advance.

And that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because
respondent Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of salary
grade 26. The OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over respondent
Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated
under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the OSP, the language of the law is
too plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to the salary grade
of city local officials/heads. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against Amante
for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT A MEMBER OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD

UNDER SALARY GRADE 26 WHO WAS CHARGED WITH VIOLATION OF THE
AUDITING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES FALLS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN.

RULING:

203
Yes. The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again
amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249.

The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly
provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the
offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The
last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions
states:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all

cases involving: 

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:   

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:  

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan

and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads. 

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; 

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank; 

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; 

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor; 

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;  (2)

204
Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; 

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; 

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution; and 

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. 

B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes

committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to their office. 

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante,
being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged
commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.

In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position

with salary grade '26'. Her office is included in the enumerated public officials in
Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7975. However, she is charged with violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of
the Philippines which is not a case falling under Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b)
of P.D. No. 1606 as amended.

Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may

not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.  In other
words, the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence
excludes all others. Expressio unius ext exlusio alterius.

Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare tacitum- what is expressed puts an

end to what is implied. The legislative body would not have made specific
enumerations in the statute, if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning
and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 

Gatchalian vs. Commission on Elections

205
Nos. L-32560–61. October 22, 1970
ESMERALDO M. GATCHALIAN, petitioner on his behalf and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.: 

FACTS
The Commission on Elections promulgated on August 13, 1970, Comelec Resolution
No. RR-707 holding that “donations of billboards to the Commission by
foreigners or companies or corporations owned and controlled partially or
wholly by foreigners are not covered by the provision of Sec. 56 of the
Revised Election Code.”

RESOLUTION LIFTING THE BAN CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FOREIGNERS

Upon the request of the Advertising Council of the Philippines, COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. RR-731 to the effect that the ban in Sec. 46 of the
Revised Election Code, as amended, does not cover the projected campaign for
funds and other contributions by the Advertising Council of the Philippines and
others similarly situated, during the 120 days immediately preceding a regular or
special election; and “that in line with the ruling in its resolution numbered RR-707,
donations and contributions for the above campaign may be received from
foreigners, companies or corporations owned and/or controlled wholly or
partially by foreigners.

PETITION BY GATCHALIAN
Petitioner Esmeraldo M. Gatchalian, a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional
Convention for the first district of Rizal. filed a petition impugning the validity of said
Resolutions Nos. RR-707 and 731 as violative of Sec. 56 of the Revised Election
Code. 

COMELEC DENIED THE PETITION

COMELEC denied the petition, claiming that contributions by foreigners to the
Comelec Billboards Committee are not made in aid or support of any particular
candidate in a particular district nor would it in any way influence the result of the
election.

SEC. 56, REVISED ELECTION CODE

206
Sec. 56 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, provides that “No foreigner shall
aid any candidate, directly or indirectly, or to take part in or to influence in any
manner any elections.”

The prohibited active intervention of foreigners thereunder may consist of: 

(1)  aiding any candidate, directly or indirectly, in any election; 
(2) taking part in any election; and 
(3)  influencing in any manner any election. 

ISSUE

Whether or not the term “any candidate” in Sec. 56 comprehends “some candidates”
or “all candidates.”

RULING
It was held that the term “any candidate” should be construed also to mean some or
all candidates. 

The term “any candidate” should be construed also to mean some or all candidates.
It has been held that the term “any candidate” voted for at any election refers to
“candidates"; and that the term “any person” is not limited to “any person” in the
singular, but is applicable as well to two or more persons.
 
“When the context so indicates, the word may be construed to mean, and indeed it
has been frequently used in its enlarged and plural sense, as meaning “all,” “all or
every,” “each,” “each one of all,” “every,” without limitation; indefinite number or
quantity, an indeterminate unit or the number of units out of many or all, one or more
as the case may be, several, some.

207
City of Manila v. Laguio
G.R. No. 118127
April 12, 2005

Facts:

Sometime in March 1993, the City of Manila passed a local ordinance which
prohibits establishments from operating business which provide certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in
entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and
adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. Operating motels is
among the prohibited businesses. Private respondent Malate Tourist Development
Corporation (MTDC), one of the affected corporations being engaged in the motel
industry, filed a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
against the execution of the ordinance before the RTC.

MTDC contends among other constitutional infirmities, that the ordinance is

unconstitutional because the City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of
motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code)
grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation
and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other
similar establishments. City of Manila answers that they had the power to "prohibit
certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code,
which  reads,  thus:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment

or amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools,
public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other
places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for
amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community
or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or,
prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social
and moral welfare of the community. RTC favored MTDC and declared the
ordinance unconstitutional. Thus, this case elevated before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
208
Whether or not the ordinance is constitutional?

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the ordinance is unconstitutional.

The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement

or entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments (Section 458
(a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors,
and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This
enumeration therefore cannot be included as among "other events or activities for
amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community
or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which
the City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.

The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it
and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof.  By
reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be construed
strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting
said powers must be construed against the City Council.

It is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the
natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the construction of
such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or
otherwise come under the rule of strict construction.

It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that words in
different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to
each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them
useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise.
Likewise, where words under consideration appear in different sections or are widely
dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies.

209
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court declaring the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED.  Costs against petitioners

210
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA
A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A.
AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A.
AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A.
AMADORA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS,
VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO
ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR.
and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian,
A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-47745
April 15, 1988

FACTS:

Pablito Daffon, a student of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos fired a gun while he was
at the auditorium of the school with some of the students. The stray bullet hit Alfredo
Amadora which caused immediately death of Alfredo. The parents of the deceased
filed a petition against Daffon before the RTC. The trial court convicted the accused
for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents also sued the school for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the school’s negligence.
The RTC ruled in favor of Amadora, wherein, the principal, the dean of boys and the
teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. 

The Institution appealed and claimed that when the incident happened the school
year has already ended. Amadora argued that even though the semester has
already ended, his son was there in school to complete a school requirement in his
Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school on the basis that
under the last paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of arts and trades (vocational
schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos can be held civilly liable for the
negligence which caused to the death of Amadora.

RULING:

211
No. The Court ruled that all schools may not be held directly liable. Its liability is only
subsidiary. Moreover, for non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of
school who should be directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. 

For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable
for the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the head of school. It also
ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year ends or when the
semester ends. 

Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody of the school authorities as
long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises.
Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the
campus in the company of his classmates and friends enjoying the ambience and
atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of
the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180. 

However, a teacher can avoid direct liability, and for the school, to avoid subsidiary
liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to
prevent the injury complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of a bonus
pater familias. 

In this case, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named and there was
no sufficient evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable and the
school. Therefore, Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held subsidiarily liable.

212
G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999
JOEL G. MIRANDA, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
 
Facts:

On March 24, 1998, Jose "Pempe" C. Miranda, then incumbent city mayor of
Santiago, Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post in
view of the synchronized elections of May 11, 1998. In March 27, 1998, private
respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy. The petition was GRANTED by the Comelec in its
resolution dated May 5, 1998. The Comelec further ruled to DISQUALIFY Jose
"Pempe" Miranda.

On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy,
petitioner Joel G. Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post,
supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda. During the May 11,
1998 elections; petitioner and private respondent vied for the mayoralty seat, with
petitioner garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private respondent who got
only 20,336 votes.

On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void
Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-288. He prayed
for the nullification of petitioner's certificate of candidacy for being void ab
initio because the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner
was supposed to substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due course.

On December 8, 1998, the Comelec En Banc rendered nullifying the substitution by

petitioner Joel G. Miranda of his father as candidate for the mayoralty post of
Santiago City.

Petitioner sought the Court's intercession via a petition for certiorari, with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue:

213
Whether or not the annulment of petitioner's substitution and proclamation is proper
and legally sound.

Ruling:

Yes, while there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a

registered or accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of
the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not
include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to
be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section
78 of the Code.

The court explains the difference between the "disqualification" of a candidate and
the "cancellation" of his certificate of candidacy. The majority holds that, under
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three instances in which a
candidate may be "substituted," and these are "death, withdrawal or disqualification"
of such candidate. Inasmuch as the certificate of candidacy of petitioner's father,
Jose "Pempe" Miranda, was merely "cancelled," he could not be legally substituted
by reason of the rule on statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions
where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where
a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no
valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate
whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be
substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily
and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been
denied due course and/or cancelled.

A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considereda candidate in

much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at
all cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.

Under ejusdem generis rule, where a general word or phrase (such as

"disqualification for any cause" in this case) follows an enumeration of particular and
specific words of the same class (such as the words "dies" and "withdraws" in the
214
instant case) or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to
be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

A deceased candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy,

otherwise his political party would not be allowed to field a substitute candidate in his
stead under Section 77 of the Code. In the case of withdrawal of candidacy, the
withdrawing candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy in
order to allow his political party to field a substitute candidate in his stead. Most
reasonable it is then, under the foregoing rule, to hold that a valid certificate of
candidacy is likewise an indispensable requisite in the case of a substitution of a
disqualified candidate under the provisions of Section 77 of the Code, just as it is in
the two previous instances.

Furthermore, interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper freinda est, ut euiatur

inconveniens et absurdum, meaning, where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as
will avoid inconvenience and absurdity shall in all cases be adopted. To include
those disqualified candidates whose certificate of candidacy had likewise been
denied due course and/or cancelled among those who may be substituted under
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, leads to the absurdity where a substitute
is allowed to take the place of somebody who had not been a candidate in the first
place.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by

respondent for the position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due course
and/or cancelled.

215
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. ANGAS 
G.R. Nos. 60225-26              
May 8, 1992

FACTS:

The petitioner National Power Corporation filed two complaints for eminent domain
against private respondents. The complaint which sought to expropriate certain
specified lots situated at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for the purpose of
the development of hydro-electric power and production of electricity. 

The lower court declared and confirmed that the lots mentioned in the complaints
have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by the petitioner, and
ordered the latter to pay the private respondents just compensation for their lands
expropriated "with legal interest thereon until fully paid."

On May 16, 1980, one of the private respondents (Sittie Sohra Batara) filed an ex-
parte motion praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance for the
lands expropriated from her, including legal interest at 6% per annum. It was granted
by the lower court and directed the petitioner to deposit the sums of money as
adjudged. Petitioner complied with said order and deposited the sums of money with
interest computed at 6% per annum.

On February 10, 1981, one of the private respondents (Pangonatan Cosna Tagol),
filed with the trial court an ex-parte motion praying for the first time that the legal
interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at
12% per annum as allegedly "authorized by Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank
issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 116 and in a decision of the Supreme
Court that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the courts, in the absence of
express contract, shall be computed at 12% per annum." 

The lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interest per annum.
Subsequently, the other private respondents filed motions also praying that the legal
interest on the just compensation awarded to them be computed at 12% per annum. 

216
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the lower court's last order alleging that the
main decision had already become final and executory with its compliance of
depositing the sums of money as just compensation for the lands condemned, with
legal interest at 6% per annum and that Presidential Decree No. 116 is not
applicable to this case because it is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code which applies.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation
for expropriated lands, the law applicable is the Central Bank Circular No. 416 which
fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per annum.

RULINGS:

NO. The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods
or credits. The term "judgments" as used in Section 1 of the Usury Law, as well as in
Central Bank Circular No. 416, should be interpreted to mean only judgments
involving loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, following the principle
of ejusdem generis. Under this doctrine, where general terms follow the designation
of particular things or classes of persons or subjects, the general term will be
construed to comprehend those things or persons of the same class or of the same
nature as those specifically enumerated. 

Applying the said rule on statutory construction to Central Bank Circular No. 416, the
general term "judgments" can refer only to judgments in cases involving loans or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits. On the other hand, Art. 2209 of the Civil
Code applies to transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in
connection with any delay in the performance of the obligation arising therefrom
other than those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.
In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of
money, goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public
purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the
interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The
legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the
properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the
delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the
joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way
of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code
shall apply.

217
 
Central Bank Circular No. 416 

By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act No. 2655, as

amended, otherwise known as the "Usury Law," the Monetary Board, in its
Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the
rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate
of interest, shall be twelve per cent (12%) per annum.

Art. 2209 of the Civil Code 

Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the
debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per annum.
The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular
and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the
general words as including all that is embraced in said class, although not
specifically named by the particular words. This is justified on the ground that if the
lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it
would have not made an enumeration of particular subjects but would have used
only general terms.

218
PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its President,
GREGORY K. LOY, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183137
April 10, 2013
 
FACTS:
 
Pelizloy Realty Corporation ("Pelizloy") owner of Palm Grove Resort, is a resort
designed for recreation and has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and function
halls. It is located at the Municipality of Tuba, Province of Benguet. The Provincial
Board of the Province of Benguet approved Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 05-
107, otherwise known as the Benguet Revenue Code of 2005 ("Tax Ordinance").
Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance levied a ten percent (10%) amusement
tax on gross receipts from admissions to "resorts, swimming pools, bath
houses, hot springs and tourist spots.

Pelizloy's assailed that the Tax Ordinance's imposition of a 10% amusement tax on
gross receipts from admission fees for resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourist spots is an ultra vires act on the part of the Province of Benguet.

However, the province of Benguet argued that provinces can validly impose
amusement taxes on resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and
tourists’ spots. For it is classified as “amusement places.” The validity of the Tax
Ordinance was anchored in Section 140 of the Local Government Code. The
Province of Benguet asserts that the enumeration in the Tax Ordinace is
encompassed bu the phrase “other places of amusement.”

219
Pelizloy, then filed a petition for declaratory relief and injunction before the RTC.
However, it was denied.  They also filed for a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, the case was elevated and the instant petition in the Supreme Court.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not the Province of Benguet is authorized to impose amusement
taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and
tourist spots for being “amusement places” under Section 140 of the Local
Government Code.
 
RULING: No, the Court ruled that the Province of Benguet is not authorized to
impose amusement taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath
houses, hot springs, and tourist spots. Section 140 of the Local Government Code
provides that a province may levy an amusement tax to be collected from the
proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses,
boxing stadia, and other places of amusement at a rate of not more than thirty
percent (30%) of the gross receipts from admission fees.
 
What is expressly stated in Section 140 is the amusement tax to be collected from
the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses,
and boxing stadia. The resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and
tourist spots are not among those places expressly mentioned. Thus, the issue of
determining where the enumerations of resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourist spots is encompassed in the phrase “other places of
amusement.”
 
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter
follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be
restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned.
 
Section 131 (c) of the Local Government Code provides a clear definition of
amusement places. It defined amusement places to include theaters, cinemas,
concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission
to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances.

Indeed, theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia are bound by a
common typifying characteristic in that they are all venues primarily for the
220
staging of spectacles or the holding of public shows, exhibitions,
performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an audience.
Accordingly, ‘other places of amusement’ must be interpreted in light of the
typifying characteristic of being venues "where one seeks admission to entertain
oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances" or being venues primarily
used to stage spectacles or hold public shows, exhibitions, performances, and other
events meant to be viewed by an audience.

In this case, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and
tourist spots cannot be considered venues primarily "where one seeks admission to
entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances". While it is true
that they may be venues where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily
venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage or present shows
and/or performances.

The ejusdem generis rule will not apply in this case. Ejusdem generis rule will not
apply where the specific things in the enumeration have no distinguishable common
characteristics and they greatly differ from each other. In this case, the enumeration
of the Province of Benguet do not have the common factor for it to be considered as
in the “other places of amusement.” The resorts, swimming pools, bath houses,
hot springs and tourist spots do not belong to the same category or class as
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. It follows that they
cannot be considered as among the ‘other places of amusement’ contemplated by
Section 140 of the LGC and which may properly be subject to amusement taxes.

The petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The second paragraph of Section
59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005, that imposes
amusement taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs and tourist spots, is declared null and void. Province of Benguet is
permanently enjoined from enforcing the second paragraph of Section 59, Article X
of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005 with respect to resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots.

221
People vs. Bello
166948-59
August 29, 2012

FACTS:
In 1998 the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (the Committee) inquired into alleged
anomalies at the AFP-RSBS. After investigation, the Committee found that when
acquiring lands, the AFP-RSBS would execute two sets of deeds of sale: one, an
unnotarized bilateral deed of sale that showed a higher price and the other, a
unilateral deed of sale that showed a discounted purchase price. The first would be
kept by the AFP-RSBS Legal Department while the second would be held by the
vendors. The latter would then use these unilateral deeds of sale in securing titles in
the name of AFP-RSBS. This was done, according to the Committee, to enable the
AFP-RSBS to draw more money from its funds and to enable the vendors to pay
lesser taxes.

The Committee recommended to the Ombudsman (OMB) the prosecution of General

Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Ret.), former AFP-RSBS president, who signed the unregistered
deeds of sale covering acquisitions of lands in General Santos, Tanauan, Calamba,
and Iloilo for falsification of public documents or violation of Article 172, paragraph 1,
in relation to Article 171, paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019,1 Sections 3(e) and 3(g).

Acting on the Committee’s recommendation, the OMB filed with respect to the
acquisition of lands in Iloilo City information before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31 against respondents Meinrado Enrique A. Bello,

222
Manuel S. Satuito, Rosario Barbasa-Perlas, Hermie Barbasa, Minviluz Camina,
Joelita Trabuco, Rosalinda Tropel, Felipe Villarosa, Abelio Juaneza, and Raul
Aposaga for six counts of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e), and six counts of
falsification of public documents under Article 171, RPC.

Satuito and Bello filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the information on
the ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case. On February
12, 2004 the Sandiganbayan granted the motions and ordered the remand of the
records to the proper courts, hence, this petition by the People of the Philippines,
represented by the OMB, which challenges such order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction
over offenses involving the heads of the legal departments of government-owned
and controlled corporations?

RULING:  No. In clarifying the meaning of the term "manager" as used in Section
4(a)(1)(g), the Sandiganbayan also invoked the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. Under
this doctrine, a proper construction may be had by considering the company of
words in which the term or phrase in question is founded or with which it is
associated.6 Given that the word "manager" was in the company of the words
"presidents, directors or trustees," the clear intent, according to the Sandiganbayan,
is to limit the meaning of the term "manager" to officers who have overall control and
supervision of government-owned and controlled corporations. The directors or
trustees of government-owned and controlled corporations do not, for example,
exercise overall supervision and control; when they act collectively as a board, the
directors or trustees merely lay down policies for the operating officers to implement.
Since "managers" definitely do not have the same responsibilities as directors and
trustees or as presidents, they belong to a distinct class of corporate officers that,
under the definition above, has charge of a corporation’s "divisions or departments."
This brings Bello’s position within the definition.

In its February 12, 2004 decision, the Sandiganbayan held that, not being a
stock or non-stock corporation, AFP-RSBS cannot be regarded as a
government-owned and controlled corporation. Consequently, respondent
AFP-RSBS legal department officers did not fall under Section 4(a)(1)(g)
of R.A. 8249 that defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. On motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution, however, the Sandiganbayan changed its
223
 position and ruled that AFP-RSBS is after all a government-owned and
controlled corporation, having been created by special law to perform a public
function.

Still, the Sandiganbayan held that Section 4(a)(1)(g) cannot apply to the
accused since Bello, who held the highest rank among those who allegedly
conspired to commit the crime charged, did not hold any of the government
positions enumerated under that section, the pertinent portion of which reads:

Sec. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the

Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-

owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. (Emphasis ours)

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the Sandiganbayan

decision dated February 12, 2004 and resolution dated February 2, 2005 in Criminal
Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31, and DIRECTS the Sandiganbayan to REINSTATE
these cases, immediately ARRAIGN all the accused, and resolve accused Raul
Aposaga’s motion for reinvestigation.

224
GSIS vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 162372
October 19, 2011
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:

On May 30, 1997, RA 8291 or the GSIS Act was enacted expanding and increasing
the coverage and benefits of the GSIS and instituting reforms. Pursuant to the
powers granted to it under Section 41() of the said law, the GSIS Board of Trustees
approved a Resolution that adopted the GSIS Employees Loyalty Incentive Plan
(ELIP) which was later renamed to GSIS Retirement/Financial Plan (RFP). Its
objective was to motivate and reward employees for meritorious, faithful and
satisfactory service.

To be entitled to the plan, the employee must be qualified to retire with 5 year lump
sum under RA 660 or RA 8291 or had previously retired under applicable retirement
laws.

Dimagiba, the corporate auditor of GSIS communicated to the President and

General Manager of GSIS that the GSIS RFP was contrary to law. After her request
was denied by the president and gen manager, Dimagiba sought the assistance of
COA in determining the legality of the said plan.

The COA’s General Counsel issued a memorandum stating that the GSIS RFP is a
supplementary retirement plan, which is prohibited under the Teves Retirement Law.
Since there is no provision in RA 8291 expressly repealing the Teves Retirement
Law, the two laws must be harmonized absent an irreconcilable inconsistency. It also

225
violates Section 41(n) of RA 8291 which speaks of an early retirement plan or
financial assistance. However, Garcia, the President and Gen. Manager of GSIS,
asserted the legality of the plan and stated that it is in line with the powers granted to
its Board of Trustees.

Dimagiba did not respond to Garcia, but she issued Notice of Disallowance on the
grounds that GSIS RFP is null and void for contradicting the prohibition in creating
supplemental retirement schemes and violating Section 41 (n) of RA 8291 which
speaks of an early retirement plan or financial assistance.

Issue:

Whether or not the GSIS Retirement/ Financial Plan is null and void.

Ruling:

Yes. RA 8291 provides for the following:

Section 41. Powers and Functions of the GSIS. — The GSIS

shall exercise the following powers and functions:

 (n) to design and adopt an Early Retirement Incentive Plan

(ERIP) and/or financial assistance for the purpose of
retirement for its own personnel; x x x.

GSIS is granted the power to adopt a retirement plan and/or financial assistance for
its employees, but its must be noted that it is qualified by the words “early”,
“incentive”, and “for the purpose of retirement”. What Section 41(n) contemplates is a
situation wherein GSIS, due to circumstances which calls for termination of some of
its employees, must design a plan to encourage, induce, or motivate these
employees, who are not yet qualified for either optional or compulsory retirement
under our laws, to instead voluntarily retire. This means that the retirement plan is
actually an incentive scheme to encourage employees to retire. This is also the
interpretation to the phrase “financial assistance” found in Section 41(n). Under the
doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the construction of a particular word or phrase, which is
in itself ambiguous, or is equally susceptible of various meanings, may be made
clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with
which it is associated. Hence, the financial assistance is also an incentive scheme to
induce the employees to retire early.

226
This is not the case with GSIS RFP. Its objective is to motivate and reward
employees for meritorious, faithful and satisfactory service. It does not pertain to an
early retirement incentive or financial assistance plan, but a mere retirement benefit
which is a form of reward for an employee’s loyalty. Moreover, to avail of this plan,
one must be qualified to retire under RA 660 or RA 8291 o must previously retired
under existing retirement laws. This means that GSIS RFP covers employees who
were already eligible to retire or had already retired. this is not included in the scope
of "an early retirement incentive plan or financial assistance for the purpose of
retirement. Its purpose is not to encourage GSIS’s employees to retire before their
retirement age, but to augment the retirement benefits they would receive under our
present laws. Thus, the GSIS RFP is a supplementary retirement plan, which is
prohibited by the Teves Retirement Law.

Since the Teves Retirement Law was not repealed by RA 8291 because there has
been no showing of any irreconcilable inconsistency between the two laws, the
former is still a good law. Hence, GSIS RFP is null and void for violating the
provision against supplementary retirement plans as provided by the Teves
Retirement Law.

227
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

 vs. 

SIMPLICIO DELANTAR, appellant.||| 

G.R. No. 169143 [Formerly G.R. No. 138328], [February 2, 2007]

FACTS: 

Sometime and during the period from 1994 to August 1996, accused Simplicio
Delantar, through coercion and influence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously promote, facilitate and induce [AAA], 4 a female child below 12 years of
age, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for money, profit and
other consideration. 

AAA was brought by the accused to her first client, an Arab national named Mr.
Hammond at least 11 times to a hotel where he stayed. Delantar would tell AAA that
they had to go to the client so they can pay of their bills, settle something, or they
had to ask for money for AAA’s tuition fees. Once they are left alone, Mr. Hammond
would proceed on kissing AAA, her breasts, embracing her, and inserting his finger
inside her vagina. Every single time the trip to the client ended, AAA would tell
Delantar that she doesn’t want to go back as the client was “bastos”. Delantar would
promise that it wouldn’t happen again, but it did. Only then when Mr. Hammond
refused to pay Php 5,000 that they stopped visiting him. 

228
The second client was former Governor Jalosjos. As with the first client, Jalosjos
would tell AAA that they needed the money. The second client, unlike he first, was
successful on having sexual intercourse with AAA (as he was found guilty of two
counts of rape  and 6 counts of acts of lasciviousness in People v. Jalosjos).

The RTC found Delantar guily beyond reasonable doubt when he delivered and
pimped AAA to the clients and sentenced him to Reclusion Perpetua. 

The CA affirmed and modified the RTC’s ruling; the modification being sentencing
Delantar to pay complainant [AAA] the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

ISSUE:

WON the lower courts erred in sentencing Delantar to the maximum penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua? 

RULING:

The Court held YES. 

The penalty prescribed by Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its

medium period to reclusion perpetua. However, it was not proven that appellant is
the parent or guardian of AAA. The establishment of either relationship would
have justified the imposition of the penalty provided in the law in its
maximum. 

In the case at bar, the only evidence presented to establish AAA's alleged
relationship to appellant is her birth certificate 76 which mentions appellant as
the father. However, said document does not bear appellant's signature. In
fact, appellant, in his testimony, denied that he is AAA's father. At best,
appellant is AAA's de facto guardian.

According to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or

phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Section 31 (c), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610 states:

 (c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its

maximum period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent,
guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of an

229
 establishment which has no license to operate or its license has
expired or has been revoked.

It should be noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the
provision all denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely
deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal
relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either by being
the ward's biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian).
Appellant is neither AAA's biological parent nor is he AAA's adoptive father.
Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law.

He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of fourteen (14) years,

eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, and to pay a fine in the sum of P20,000.00 to be administered
as a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and
disbursed for the rehabilitation of AAA,  and P50,000.00 as moral damages.|||

Canet vs. Decena

G.R. No. 155344 
January 20, 2004

FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur, passed
Resolution No. 049 Series of 1998, authorizing petitioner Rolando N. Canet to
establish, operate and maintain a cockpit in Sitio, Cabaya, San Roque, Bula,
Camarines Sur.
Canet, relying on Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998, filed an application for mayor’s
permit. Mayor Julieta Decena denied the application since under the Local
Government Code of 1991, the authority to give licences for such business is vested
in the Sanguniang Bayan. Moreover, Mayor Decena could not issue the permit as
well because there was no ordinance passed by the Sanguniang Bayan to authorize
it.
On July 26, 1999, Canet filed a complaint against Decena for mandamus and
damages with application for preliminary mandatory injunction in RTC of Pili,
Camarines Sur, Branch XXXI. Decena’s move to dismiss the complaint was denied.
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued on Feb. 1, 2000.

230
Decena, on the other hand, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court
of Appeals. On April 3, 2000, the CA issued a temporary restraining order instructing
Canet and the presiding judge to temporarily cease and desist from enforcing the
writ of preliminary injunction issued on Feb. 1, 2000.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Decena, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor, can be compelled to
issue the necessary business permit to petitioner absent a municipal ordinance
which would empower her to do so.

RULING:
NO. Since there was no ordinance allowing the operation of cockpit, it cannot be
implemented. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention
of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the
maxim expression unius est exlusio alterius and expressium facit cessare tacitum
what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.

The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent Judge are

ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE while the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued by the Court of Appeals on July 10, 2002 is made permanent.

Ramon M. Atienza, petitioner

vs.
Jose T. Villarosa, Respondent
G.R. No. 161081
May 10, 2005

FACTS:
On June 25, 2002, Occidental Mindoro Governor Jose VILLAROSA issued a
memorandum concerning the authority to sign purchase orders of supplies,
materials, equipment, and repairs needed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The
memo stated that all such purchase orders must be signed by the Governor, citing
as basis DILG Opinion 148, s. 1993.

Occidental Mindoro Vice Governor Ramon ATIENZA responded on the bases of the
DILG Opinion 96, s. 1995, as affirmed by COA Opinions of Jun. 28, Apr. 11, and

231
Feb. 9, 1994. He also cited LGC 466 and 468 as bases for the separation of the
legislative and executive powers at the provincial level.

On July 1, 2002, Villarosa responded by issuing a memorandum terminating the

casual and job order employees recommended or hired by Atienza. These
employees included 28 plus clerks, 30 utility workers, and an x-ray technician.
Villarosa claims that the employees were redundant and that they bloated the
bureaucracy.

On July 3, 2002, Villarosa issued another memorandum regarding the “Enforcibility

of previous memoranda Issued on June 20, 26 and July 1, 2002 to be adhered to for
strict compliance.

July 9, 2002 – Atienza raised his objections to the 2 memoranda, invoking the
separation of powers at a provincial level, where the legislature is headed by the
Vice Governor and the executive is headed by the Governor.

Atienza thus filed a petition for prohibition before the CA, assailing the 2 memoranda
as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner claimed that the
memoranda excluded him from the use and enjoyment of his office in violation of the
pertinent provision of the LGC. He prayed that Villarosa be enjoined from
implementing the 2 memoranda. The CA dismissed the petition for prohibition.

Atienza and Villarosa’s terms have ceased on June 30, 2004. Atienza did not seek
re-election, while Villarosa lost his re-election bid, so the case has become moot. 

ISSUE: 

1. WON the vice-governor is authorized to approve purchase orders issued in

connection with the procurement of supplies, materials, equipment, including
fuel, repairs and maintenance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
2. WON the Governor has the authority to terminate or cancel the appointments
of casual/job order employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the
Office of the Vice-Governor..

RULING:
Yes. The vice-governor is authorized to approve purchase orders.

232
The doctrine of necessary implication states that what is implied in a statute is as
much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood by
implication to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its
purpose or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction. 
In this case, the authority granted to the Vice-Governor to sign all warrants draw on
on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as well as to approve disbursement vouchers which
includes the authority to approve purchase orders covering the same applying the
doctrine of necessary implication. 

Hence, the Vice-Governor shall be the presiding officer of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan and can sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all
expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan.

No. The Governor has no authority to terminate or cancel the appointments.

According to Rep. Act No. 716, Sec. 465 (b), for efficient, effective and economical
governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the province and its
inhabitants, the provincial governor shall appoint all officials and employees whose
salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of provincial funds and whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may
be authorized by law to appoint.

In here, the Vice-Governor, as stated in Sec. 466 of the Local Government Code
where subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and
employees of the sangguniang panlalawigan, except those whose manner of
appointment is specifically provided in this Code.

Thus, while the Governor has the authority to appoint officials and employees whose
salaries are paid out of the provincial funds, this does not extend to the officials and
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because such authority is lodged with
the Vice-Governor. In the same manner, the authority to appoint casual and job
order employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan belongs to the Vice-Governor.

233
G.R. No. 177456               September 4, 2009
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner,
vs.
DOMINGO R. DANDO, Respondent.

FACTS:

The instant Petition stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages
filed on 13 March 2003 by BPI against Dando before the RTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. 03-281. The Complaint alleged that on or about 12 August 1994, Dando
availed of a loan in the amount of ₱750,000.00 from Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC), under a Privilege Cheque Credit Line Agreement.

234
The parties agreed that Dando would pay FEBTC the principal amount of the loan, in
lump sum, at the end of 90 days; and interest thereon every 30 days, the periods
reckoned from the time of availment of the loan. Dando defaulted in the payment of
the principal amount of the loan, as well as the interest and penalties thereon.
Despite repeated demands, Dando refused and/or failed to pay his just and valid
obligation.4 In 2000, BPI and FEBTC merged, with the former as the surviving
entity,5 thus, absorbing the rights and obligations of the latter.

After Dando filed with the RTC his Answer with Counterclaim,7 BPI filed its Motion to
Set Case for Pre-Trial. Acting on the said Motion, the RTC, through Acting Presiding
Judge Oscar B. Pimentel (Judge Pimentel), issued an Order8 on 11 June 2003
setting Civil Case No. 03-281 for pre-trial conference on 18 August 2003. Judge
Pimentel subsequently issued, on 16 June 2003, a Notice of Pre-Trial
Conference,9 which directed the parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs at
least three days before the scheduled date of pre-trial. Dando submitted his Pre-trial
Brief10 to the RTC on 11 August 2003. BPI, on the other hand, filed its Pre-trial
Brief11 with the RTC, and furnished Dando with a copy thereof, only on 18 August
2003, the very day of the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference.

When the parties appeared before the RTC on 18 August 2003 for the scheduled
Pre-Trial Conference, Dando orally moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03-
281, citing Sections 5 and 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The RTC, through an
Order issued on the same day, required Dando to file a written motion within five
days from the receipt of the said Order and BPI to file its comment and/or opposition
thereto.
On 25 August 2003, Dando filed with the RTC his written Motion to Dismiss Civil
Case No. 03-281, for violation of the mandatory rule on filing of pre-trial briefs.13 BPI
filed an Opposition14 to Dando’s Motion, arguing that its filing with the RTC of the
Pre-Trial Brief on 18 August 2003 should be considered as compliance with the rules
of procedure given that the Pre-Trial Conference did not proceed as scheduled on
said date. In an Order dated 10 October 2003, the RTC granted Dando’s Motion to
Dismiss Civil Case No. 03-281.

BPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 of the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC,
praying for the liberal interpretation of the rules. Expectedly, Dando filed his
Comment/Opposition thereto.
On 13 January 2004, the RTC, now presided by Judge Cesar O. Untalan (Judge
Untalan), issued an Order resolving the Motion for Reconsideration of BPI as follows:
235
The Court finds merit in plaintiff’s motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not that RTC Judge Untalan committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing its Order dated 13 January
2004.

RULING:
No. Relevant herein are the following provisions of the Rules of Court on pre-trial:
Rule 18
PRE-TRIAL
SEC. 6. Pre-trial brief. – The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse
party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days
before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain,
among others:
xxxx
Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the
pre-trial.
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear. – The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so
required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the
action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to
present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
(Emphases ours.)

It is a basic legal construction that where words of command such as "shall,"

"must," or "ought" are employed, they are generally and ordinarily regarded as
mandatory. Thus, where, as in Rule 18, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court,
the word "shall" is used, a mandatory duty is imposed, which the courts ought
to enforce.

The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply
disregarded for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a
game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to
relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character,

236
mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and
the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard.

This is not to say that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with. However,
exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their application. In
not a few instances, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure
to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merit. This is
in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving
all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and
procedural imperfection should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions. In that way,
the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general objective of
procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the
administration of justice.

Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best served if the parties to
Civil Case No. 03-281 are given the full opportunity to thresh out the real issues and
litigate their claims in a full-blown trial. Besides, Dando would not be prejudiced
should the RTC proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 03-281, as he is not
stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.

DIOKNO VS REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION

G.R. NO. L-4712,
JULY 11, 1952

FACTS:

Plaintiff, Ramon Diokno, is the holder of a back-pay certificate of indebtedness

issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines under the provisions of Republic Act No.
304.

When this action was brought, he had an outstanding loan with the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation amounting to P50,000, of which P47,355.28 was still unpaid. 

237
In this action he seeks to compel the defendant corporation to accept payment of the
balance of his indebtedness with his back pay certificate. 

The defendant resists the suit on the ground that plaintiff's demand is not only not
authorized by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 304 but contrary to the provisions
thereof, and furthermore because plaintiff's loan was obtained on January 27, 1950,
much after the passage of Republic Act No. 304, and because the law permits only
"acceptance or discount of backpay certificates," not the repayment of loans.

The court a quo held that Section 2 of Republic Act No. 304 is permissive merely,
and that even if it were mandatory, plaintiff's case cannot fall thereunder because he
is not acquiring property for a home or constructing a residential house, but
compelling the acceptance of his backpay certificate to pay a debt he contracted
after the enactment of Republic Act No. 304.  It, therefore, dismissed the complaint
with costs.

ISSUE:

WON Diokno can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan?

RULING:

No. While it is true that its ordinary signification the word "shall" is imperative, the
rule is not absolute.

In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term "shall" is a
word of command, and one which has always or which must be given compulsory
meaning; as denoting obligation. It has a preemptory meaning, and it is generally
imperative or mandatory. 

However, it may be construed as "many", when so required by the context or by the

intention of the statute. In the ordinary signification, "shall" is imperative, and not
permissive, though it may have the latter meaning when required by the context.

The word "shall" is generally regarded as imperative, but in some context it is given a
permissive meaning, the intended meaning being determined by what is intended by
the statute.

In the provision subject controversy, it is to be noted that the verb-phrase "shall

accept or discount" has two modifiers, namely, "subject to availability of
loanable funds" and "at not more than  two per centum per annum for ten
years." 

238
As to the second modifier, the interest to be charged, there seems to be no question
that the verb phrase is mandatory, because not only does the law use "at not more"
but the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the backpay
certificate for the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been
issued, can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. 

But as to when the discounting or acceptance shall be made, the context and the
sense demand a contrary interpretation. The phrase "subject" means "being under
the contingency of" (Webster's Int. Dict.) a condition. If the acceptance or discount of
the certificates to be "subject" to the condition of the availability of a loanable funds,
it is evident that the Legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the
condition that there are "available loanable funds." In other words, acceptance or
discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds.

Thus, Diokno cannot use his backpay certificate to pay for his loan to RFC.

VICTORIA G. GACHON and ALEX GUEVARA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. NORBERTO C. DEVERA, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch XXIV, RTC, Iloilo
City; HON. JOSE R. ASTORGA, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Iloilo City; and SUSANA GUEVARA, represented by her
attorney-in-fact, ROSALIE GUEVARA, respondents.

239
G.R. No. 116695

June 20, 1997

FACTS:

A complaint for forcible entry was filed by private respondent Susana Guevara
against Patricio Guevara and petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before
the Municipal Trial Court for Cities of Iloilo City. Summons was served on and
received by petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing them to file an answer within
the reglementary  period of 10 days.

Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did not acquire
jurisdiction over him. On September 4, 1993, petitioners filed with the MTCC an
urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer.

On September 7, 1993, the MTCC denied the motion on the ground that it was a
prohibited pleading under the rule on summary procedure. On September 8, 1993, or
more than 10 days from their receipt of the summons, petitioner submitted an urgent
motion praying for the admission of their answer, which was attached thereto.
Two days later, petitioners filed another motion pleading for the admission of an
amended answer. On September 23, 1993, the MTCC denied the motions and
considered the case submitted for resolution.

ISSUE:

WON Section 6, of the rule on summary procedure, Mandatory or directory statutes,

such that an answer filed beyond the time stated be accepted

RULING:

Section 6, of the rule on summary procedure is a mandatory Statute, thus answers

must be filed within the reglementary period.
It is clear that the use of the word “shall” in the rule on summary procedure
underscores the mandatory character of the challenge provisions. Giving the
provisions a directory application would subvert the nature of the rule on summary
procedure and defeat its objective and expediting the adjudication of suits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied, and the assailed decision is affirmed in toto.
Double costs against petitioners.

240
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and
REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013
MENDOZA, J.:

241
FACTS:

In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only
seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001,
decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero
and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that the petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents
argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.”
It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of
either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the
Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that
both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated
duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each
from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue
that petitioner has no “real interest” in questioning the constitutionality of the JBC’s
current composition. The respondents also question the petitioner's belated filing of
the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for declaratory relief is not among those within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
RULING:

YES, The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of
Section 8 (1), Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be
considered as that which would result in the adjudication of rights sans the execution
process because the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of the rights
under the document sought to be construed. It being so, the original jurisdiction over
242
the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the
fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory
relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. 

UNDER THE MAXIM NOSCITUR A SOCIIS, WHERE A PARTICULAR WORD OR

PHRASE IS AMBIGUOUS IN ITSELF OR IS EQUALLY SUSCEPTIBLE OF
VARIOUS MEANINGS, ITS CORRECT CONSTRUCTION MAY BE MADE CLEAR
AND SPECIFIC BY CONSIDERING THE COMPANY OF WORDS IN WHICH IT IS
FOUNDED OR WITH WHICH IT IS ASSOCIATED.―Under the maxim noscitur a
sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is
associated. This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or
restricted by the latter. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and
give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. In short, every meaning to be
given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of
the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with
other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.

LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC.,

petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY
CORPORATION, EMDEN ENCARNACION and HORATIO AYCARDO,
respondents.

243
Facts:

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (LGVHA) was organized on February

8, 1983. They are the sole homeowners' association in Loyola Grand Villas, a duly
registered subdivision in Quezon City and Marikina City that was owned and
developed by Solid Homes, Inc. It was registered with the Home Financing
Corporation, the predecessor of herein respondent HIGC, as the sole homeowners'
organization in the said subdivision under Certificate of Registration No. 04-197. For
unknown reasons, however, LGVHAI did not file its corporate by-laws. 

Sometime in 1988, the officers of the LGVHAI tried to register its by-laws. They failed
to do so. To the officers' consternation, they discovered that there were two other
organizations within the subdivision — the North Association and the South
Association. According to private respondents, a non-resident and Soliven himself
(the developer), respectively headed these associations. They also discovered that
these associations had five (5) registered homeowners each who were also the
incorporators, directors and officers thereof. None of the members of the LGVHAI
was listed as member of the North Association while three (3) members of LGVHAI
were listed as members of the South Association.

In July, 1989, when Soliven inquired about the status of LGVHAI, Atty. Joaquin A.
Bautista, the head of the legal department of the HIGC, informed him that LGVHAI
had been automatically dissolved for two reasons. First, it did not submit its by-laws
within the period required by the Corporation Code and, second, there was non-user
of corporate charter because HIGC had not received any report on the association's
activities. Apparently, this information resulted in the registration of the South
Association with the HIGC.

These developments prompted the officers of the LGVHAI to lodge a complaint with
the HIGC. They questioned the revocation of LGVHAI's certificate of registration
without due notice and hearing and concomitantly prayed for the cancellation of the
certificates of registration of the North and South Associations by reason of the
earlier issuance of a certificate of registration in favor of LGVHAI.

On January 26, 1993, after due notice and hearing, private respondents obtained a
favorable ruling from HIGC Hearing Officer who disposed of HIGC Case No. RRM-5-
89 as follows:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the Loyola
Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc., as the duly registered and existing
244
homeowners association for Loyola Grand Villas homeowners. South Association
appealed to the Appeals Board of the HIGC, but this was dismissed for lack of merit.

Issue:
whether or not the LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by
Section 46 of the Corporation Code had the effect of automatically dissolving the
said corporation.

Ruling:
Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the
statute itself (optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum), Section 46 aforequoted
reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory, meaning for
the word "must" in the first sentence thereof. Note should be taken of the second
paragraph of the law which allows the filing of the by-laws even prior to
incorporation. This provision in the same section of the Code rules out mandatory
compliance with the requirement of filing the by-laws "within one (1) month after
receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission." It necessarily follows that failure to file the
by-laws within that period does not imply the "demise" of the corporation. By-laws
may be necessary for the "government" of the corporation but these are subordinate
to the articles of incorporation as well as to the Corporation Code and related
statutes.There are in fact cases where by-laws are unnecessary to corporate
existence or to the valid exercise of corporate powers, thus:
In the absence of charter or statutory provisions to the contrary, by-laws are not
necessary either to the existence of a corporation or to the valid exercise of the
powers conferred upon it, certainly in all cases where the charter sufficiently provides
for the government of the body; and even where the governing statute in express
terms confers upon the corporation the power to adopt by-laws, the failure to
exercise the power will be ascribed to mere nonaction which will not render void any
acts of the corporation which would otherwise be valid.  (Emphasis supplied.)
As correctly postulated by the petitioner, interpretation of this provision of law begins
with the determination of the meaning and import of the word "must" in this section
Ordinarily, the word "must" connotes an imperative act or operates to impose a duty
which may be enforced.  It is synonymous with "ought" which connotes compulsion
or mandatoriness.  However, the word "must" in a statute, like "shall," is not always
imperative. It may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. In this jurisdiction, the
tendency has been to interpret "shall" as the context or a reasonable construction of

245
the statute in which it is used demands or requires. This is equally true as regards
the word "must." Thus, if the languages of a statute considered as a whole and with
due regard to its nature and object reveals that the legislature intended to use the
words "shall" and "must" to be directory, they should be given that meaning.

G.R. No. 98382 May 17, 1993

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and EPIFANIO DE LA CRUZ, respondents.

Facts:
246
Two lots, located at Bunlo, Bocaue, Bulacan, the second a residential-commercial
building were mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank. The lots were under the
common names of (Epifanio dela Cruz), his brother (Delfin) and his sister (Maria).
The lots were mortgaged to guarantee the following promissory notes:

(1) a promissory note for Pl2,000.00, dated September 2, 1958, and payable within
69 days (date of maturity — Nov. l0, 1958);
(2) a promissory note for P4,000.00, dated September 22, 1958, and payable within
49 days (date of maturity — Nov. 10, 1958);
(3) a promissory note for P4,000.00, dated June 30, 1.9581 and payable within 120
days (date of maturity — Nov. 10, 1958) See also Annex C of the complaint itself).

This date of June 30, 1958 is disputed by the Epifanio who claims that the correct
date is June 30, 1961, which is the date actually mentioned in the promissory note.
The 3rd mentioned promissory note states that the maturity date is Nov. 10, 1958.
Now then, how could the loan have been contracted on June 30, 1961? It will be
observed that in the bank records, the third mentioned promissory note was really
executed on June 30, 1958
The Court is inclined to believe that the date "June 30, 1961" was a mere clerical
error and hat the true and correct date is June 1958.

Even assuming this, the fact still remains that the first two promissory notes had
been guaranteed by the mortgage of the two lots, and therefore, it
was legal and proper to foreclose on the lots for failure to pay said two promissory
notes. PNB presented under Act no 3135 a foreclosure petition of the mortgaged
lots. The lots were sold or auctioned off with PNB as the highest bidder.

The final Deed of Sale was registered in the Bulacan Registry of Property on March
19, 1963.
Inasmuch as the plaintiff did not volunteer to buy back from the PNB the two lots, the
PNB sold on June 4, 1970 the same to spouses Conrado de Vera and Marina de
Vera in a "Deed of Conditional Sale". Respondent brought a complaint for the
reconveyance of the lands, which the petitioner allegedly unlawfully foreclosed. The
petitioner defended that all were all valid.
CFI ruled the dissmisal of of the complaint.
Unsatisfied, respondent appeal that the lower court erred in holding that there was a
valid complaince in regard to the publication sec 3 of Act 3135Respondent court
reversed the judgement appealed from by declaring void, inter alia, the acution sale
247
of the foreclosed pieces of realty, the finald deed of sale, and the consolidation of
ownership.

Issue: WON The required publication of the Notices of Sale on the foreclosed
properties under sec 3 of Act 3135 was complied

Ruling: No, The first date falls on Friday while the second and third dates are on
Friday and Saturday, respectively. Sec 3 of Act 3135 requires the notice of auction
sale shalle be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”.
Evidently, petitioner bank failed to comply with this legal requiremnet.

The SC held that:

The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage
foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations
therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable (Jalandoni
vs. Ledesma, 64 Phil. l058. G.R. No. 42589, August 1937 and October 29, 1937). It
has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance
with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale
and that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render the notice
insufticient and vitiate the sale (59 C.J.S. 1314).

In view of the admission of defendant-appellee in its pleading showing that there was
no compliance of the notice prescribed in Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act 4118, with respect to the notice of sale of the foreclosed real properties in this
case, we have no choice but to declare the auction sale as absolutely void in view of
the fact that the highest bidder and purchaser in said auction sale was defendant-
appellee bank. Consequently, the Certificate of Sale, the Final Deed of Sale and
Affidavit of Consolidation are likewise of no legal efffect

Art 13 of the New Civil Code is completely silent as to the definition of “week”. It is
interpreted as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. Further clarifies
that where the word is used simply as a measure of duration of time and without
reference to the calendar, it means a period of seven consecutive days without
regard to the day of the week on which it begins (1 Tolentino, supra at p. 467 citing
Derby).
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and intervention are hereby dismissed and
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 17, 1991 is hereby affirmed in toto.

248
ANDRES BORROMEO, plaintiff, 
vs. 
FERMIN MARIANO, defendant.
G.R. No. 16808 | 1921-01-03

FACTS: 
249
Andres Borromeo was appointed, commissioned and took office as a Judge of the
Twenty-fourth (24th) Judicial District, effective July 1, 1914. 
However, on February, 25, 1920, he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first (21 st)
Judicial District, while Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth
(24th) Judicial District. After the appointments were made, Judge Borromeo
consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first (21st) Judicial District.
 
ISSUE: WHETHER Judge Borromeo may validly refuse to accept the Appointment
as Judge of the Twenty-first (21st) Judicial District

RULING: YES. 

The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires the court to give effect to the
general legislative intent if that can be discovered within the four corners of
the Act. When the object intended to be accomplished by the statute is once clearly
ascertained, general words may be restrained to it and those of narrower import may
be expanded to embrace it, to effectuate the intent. 

Along with this fundamental principle is another, equally well-established, that such
a construction is, if possible, to be adopted, as will give effect to all provisions
of the statute. (2 Lewis Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 662, et seq.; In re
Allen [1903], 2 Phil., 630; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 287.)

The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, although not
beginning with the usual introductory word, "provided," is nevertheless, in the nature
of a proviso, and should be construed as such. The office of a proviso is to limit the
application of the law. It is contrary to the nature of a proviso to enlarge the operation
of the law. It should not be construed so as to repeal or destroy the main provisions
of the statute.

Returning again to the principle of statutory construction that a proviso should not
be given a meaning which would tend to render abortive the main portions of
the law, it should further be recalled that judges of first instance are removable
only through a fixed procedure. 

The effect to be given to the word "appoint" is corroborated by the principles of the
law of public officers. Appointment and qualification to office are separate and
distinct things. Appointment is the sole act of those vested with the power to make it.
250
Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Persons may be chosen for office at
pleasure; there is no power in these Islands which can compel a man to accept the
office. (22 R. C. L., 423.) If, therefore, anyone could refuse appointment as a
judge of first instance to a particular district, when once appointment to this
district is accepted, he has exactly the same right to refuse an appointment to
another district.

For the reasons given, we are of opinion that the reasonable force of the language
used in the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code taken in connection
with the whole of the Judiciary Law, and the accepted canons of interpretation, and
the principles of the law of public officers, leave room for no other construction than
that a Judge of First Instance may be made a judge of another district only with
his consent.

It is our holding that the plaintiff Andres Borromeo is lawfully entitled to the
possession of the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-
Fourth Judicial District. It is our judgment that the defendant Fermin Mariano
shall be ousted from the office of Judge of the Twenty fourth Judicial District,
and the plaintiff placed in possession of the same. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the Attorney-General is denied. No costs shall be allowed.
Let this be entered as the order of the court. So ordered.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE N. MEDIADO

G.R. No. 169871
February 2, 2011

FACTS:

251
On March 20, 1997, Jimmy was having a conversation with Rodolfo Mediado at the
dancing hall located in Balatan, Camarines Sur. At that moment, his wife Lilia,
witnessed accused Jose emerge from behind Jimmy and hacked him twice on the
head with a bolo and continued hacking him although he had fallen to the
ground. Accused fled from the scene but was eventually caught by former-kagawad
Clorado and brought him to the PNP station. 

Lilia believed that Jose assaulted Jimmy for fear that he would report to the police
authorities that he attacked one Vicente Parañal during the town fiesta two days
earlier. Jose confessed killing Jimmy but claimed that he did so only to defend
himself and his father from Jimmy who hit them with a stone.  Accused then raised
the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

Both RTC and the CA rejected Jose’s claim of self-defense and defense of a relative
and found that treachery was employed by Jose when he attacked Jimmy from
behind. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: 

WON THE PROVISO OF SELF DEFENSE OR DEFENSE OF RELATIVES IS

PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR

RULING:

No, the proviso of self-defense or defense of relatives is not present in the

instant case. The RTC and the CA correctly rejected Jose’s claim of self-defense
and defense of a relative because he did not substantiate it with clear and convincing
proof. 

The requisites for the justifying circumstance of self-defense are as follows: (1)
unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. It should be noted that unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua
non for the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of a relative.

In the instant case, Jose did not support his claim that Jimmy had committed
aggression by punching Rodolfo and by throwing stones at him and his father.  In
fact, he and his father were not able to identify any weapon used by Jimmy aside
252
from the stone that he supposedly picked up from the ground. Plainly, he did not
establish with clear and convincing proof that Jimmy had assaulted him or his father
as to pose to either of them an imminent threat of great harm before he mounted his
own attack on Jimmy. Moreover, the nature, number and gravity of Jimmy’s
wounds spoke not of defense on the part of Jose but of a criminal intent to kill
Jimmy. They indicated beyond doubt the treacherous manner of the assault,
that is, that Jose thereby ensured that the killing would be without risk and
would deny Jimmy any opportunity to defend himself.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Apolonio 

G.R. No. 165483. September 12, 2006
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. NELLIE R. APOLONIO,
respondent. 
BRION, J.:

253
FACTS:
The respondent, Executive Officer of the NBDB National Book Development Board
approved the cash advance for the purchase of gift cheques, that was not authorized
by the NBDB’s governing board.

The Ombudsman found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty,
and ordered her removal. The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the
Ombudsman. 

The respondent cited section 13, article 11 of the constitution and the deliberations
of the constitutional commission, arguing that the Constitution only grants the
Ombudsman “RECOMMENDATORY POWERS” for the removal of a public official.
Furthermore, respondent claims the RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1999) which
grants the Ombudsman actual powers to directly impose the penalty of removal, is
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to directly impose the penalty of
removal from office against public officials.

RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative and rejected the respondent’s interpretation. What
is more, the Court cited the ruling in the case of Ledesma v. CA where the same
interpretation was first rejected on the basis of a “PROVISO” vis-a-vis constitutional
deliberations.

LEDESMA RULING:
The Court in the Ledesma case held that:

Section 15 of RA 6770 provides for the powers, functions and duties of the
Ombudsman. The Court draws attention to subparagraph 3:

Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions and duties:

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or
employee at fault or who neglect to perform an act or discharge a duty required by
law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
254
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21 of this Act: provided, that the refusal by any officer
without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at
fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law
shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer;

PROVISO:
The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the “ORDER” for the removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of an officer or employee similar
to the questioned issuances in the instant case.
                           
The refusal without just cause of any officer to comply with such an order of the
Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary
action is a strong indication that the Ombudsman’s “RECOMMENDATION” is not
merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.

CONGRESS MAY EMPOWER THE OMBUDSMAN WITH PROSECUTORIAL

FUNCTIONS

RA 6770 is proof that the legislature vested in the Ombudsman with prosecutorial
functions, and with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.

LEDESMA RULING IS CLEAR OF THE OMBUDSMAN’S RIGHT

The conclusion in the Ledesma case is clear, that the Ombudsman has been
statutorily granted the right to impose administrative penalties on erring public
officials.

THE WORD “RECOMMENDATORY” POWER 

The word “recommendatory” power in the text of Section 15 paragraph 3 of RA 6770
does not deprive the Congress of its plenary legislative power to vest the
Ombudsman powers beyond those stated.

TUNA PROCESSING, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 185582              

255
February 29, 2012

FACTS:

On January 14, 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka, referred to as the “licensor” and a co-
patentee of various patents and 5 Philippine tuna processors referred to as the
“sponsors”/”licensees”, which includes the respondent Kingford, entered into a MOA.
The MOA provides that the Licensor wishes to form an alliance with Sponsors to
enforce his 3 patents (US, Philippine & Indonesian), granting licenses, and collecting
royalties. Parties wish to be licensed under the patents in order to practice the
processes claimed in those patents, enforce the said patents and collect royalties in
conjunction with the Licensor. Tuna Processors, Inc. was established in California in
order to implement the objectives of the said agreement. It shall open and maintain
bank accounts in the US. It shall be owned by the Sponsors and Licensor with their
corresponding shares. 

Due to a series of events, the licensees withdrew from petitioner TPI and
correspondingly reneged on their obligations. Petitioner submitted the dispute for
arbitration (Breach of MOA by not paying past due assessments, failing to cooperate
with Claimant TPI in fulfilling objectives of the MOA and violation of “The Lanham
Act”) before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California,
US and won the case against respondent. 

To enforce the award, petitioner filed a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati. Respondent
Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss. After the court denied it for lack of merit,
respondent sought for inhibition of Judge Almeda and moved for the reconsideration
of the order denying the motion. Judge Almeda inhibited himself. The case was
again re-raffled to Branch 61 where Judge Ruiz granted the respondent's motion and
dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue
in the Philippines. Petitioner now seeks to nullify the order of the trial court
dismissing its Petition. 

ISSUE:

WON a foreign arbitral award can be enforced even if the corporation is not licensed
to do business in the Philippines. 

256
RULING:

YES. The foreign arbitral award can be enforced. 

Applying the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 in this case where the Act,
as its title - An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute
Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative
Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes - would suggest, is a law especially
enacted "to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the
freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes." It
specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an application
for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.

(Title forms part of a statute and may be used to construe it)

Also, SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award. - A party to a foreign arbitration
proceeding may oppose an application for recognition and enforcement of the
arbitral award in accordance with the procedural rules to be promulgated by the
Supreme Court only on those grounds enumerated under Article V of the New York
Convention. Any other ground raised shall be disregarded by the regional trial court.
Not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of the party
seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.

Also, Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution
provides that "any party to a foreign arbitration may petition the court to recognize
and enforce a foreign arbitral award.”

All considered, petitioner TPI, although a foreign corporation not licensed to do

business in the Philippines, is not, for that reason alone, precluded from filing the
Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award
before a Philippine court.

G.R. No. 194024               April 25, 2012

PHILIP L. GO, PACIFICO Q. LIM and ANDREW Q. LIM Petitioners,
vs.
DISTINCTION PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION,
INC. Respondent.

257
Facts:
Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim (petitioners) are registered
individual owners of condominium units in Phoenix Heights Condominium located at
H. Javier/Canley Road, Bo. Bagong Ilog, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
In August 2008, petitioners, as condominium unit-owners, filed a complaint before
the HLURB against DPDCI(Distinction Properties Development and Construction,
Inc.) for unsound business practices and violation of the MDDR. The case was
docketed as REM- 080508-13906. They alleged that DPDCI committed
misrepresentation in their circulated flyers and brochures as to the facilities or
amenities that would be available in the condominium and failed to perform its
obligation to comply with the MDDR.
In defense, DPDCI denied that it had breached its promises and representations to
the public concerning the facilities in the condominium. It alleged that the brochure
attached to the complaint was “a mere preparatory draft” and not the official one
actually distributed to the public, and that the said brochure contained a disclaimer
as to the binding effect of the supposed offers therein. Also, DPDCI questioned the
petitioners’ personality to sue as the action was a derivative suit. After due hearing,
the HLURB rendered its decision in favor of petitioners.
The CA ruled that the HLURB(Housing and land use regulatory board) had no
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioners as the controversy did not fall
within the scope of the administrative agency’s authority under P.D. No. 957. The
HLURB not only relied heavily on the brochures which, according to the CA, did not
set out an enforceable obligation on the part of DPDCI, but also erroneously cited
Section 13 of the MDDR to support its finding of contractual violation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioners.
 
RULING:
The petition fails.
In this case, the complaint filed by petitioners alleged causes of action that
apparently are not cognizable by the HLURB considering the nature of the action
and the reliefs sought. A perusal of the complaint discloses that petitioners are
actually seeking to nullify and invalidate the duly constituted acts of PHCC – the April
29, 2005 Agreement entered into by PHCC with DPDCI and its Board Resolution28
which authorized the acceptance of the proposed offsetting/settlement of DPDCI’s

258
indebtedness and approval of the conversion of certain units from saleable to
common areas. All these were approved by the HLURB.
Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers
depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or
empowering such agency. 
With respect to the HLURB, to determine if said agency has jurisdiction over
petitioners’ cause of action, an examination of the laws defining the HLURB’s
jurisdiction and authority becomes imperative. P.D. No. 957, specifically Section 3,
granted the National Housing Authority (NHA) the “exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
the real estate trade and business.”
Then came P.D. No. 1344 expanding the jurisdiction of the NHA (now HLURB), as
follows:
“SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957,
the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases of the following nature:
(a) Unsound real estate business practices; 
(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and
(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed
by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.”
 
This provision must be read in light of the law’s preamble, which explains the
reasons for enactment of the law or the contextual basis for its interpretation.
Statute derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is enacted, and to construe it
in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law.
P.D. No. 957, as amended, aims to protect innocent subdivision lot and
condominium unit buyers against fraudulent real estate practices.
The HLURB is given a wide latitude in characterizing or categorizing acts which may
constitute unsound business practice or breach of contractual obligations in the real
estate trade. 
This grant of expansive jurisdiction to the HLURB does not mean, however, that all
cases involving subdivision lots or condominium units automatically fall under its
jurisdiction.

259
PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA
G.R. No. 169004
September 15, 2010

260
FACTS:
On or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at
Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking
public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and
committing the offense, in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the
City Government of Toledo in the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND
PESOS (₱33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of his office,
for which he is duly bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law,
with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of ₱33,000.00, Philippine Currency,
despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid
amount.

Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss dated April 7, 2005 with the
Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued an Order dated April 12, 2005 directing
petitioner to submit its comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its
Resolution on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, without
prejudice to its filing before the proper court.Thus, the present petition.

ISSUE:  Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation
of The Auditing Code of the Philippines

RULING:

This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v.
Sandiganbayan and Amante is a case with uncanny similarities to the present one.
In fact, the respondent in the earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent
Plaza were both members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at
the time pertinent to this case. The only difference is that, respondent Amante failed
to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos (₱71,095.00)
while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand
Pesos (₱33,000.00).

In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The
261
Auditing Code of the Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v.
Sandiganbayan, et al. as a background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, thus:

x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then

President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the
highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on
the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times
accountable to the people.

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time

of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
offense. The exception contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A. 8249, where it
expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases
involving violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case
as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions
states:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: x
x x.

Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b)
where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in
relation to their office are involved where the said provision, contains no exception.
Therefore, what applies in the present case is the general rule that jurisdiction
of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The

262
present case having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249
shall govern. 

Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:

The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a), the following offenses are specifically
enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to
acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among
others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions.
Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are
provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic
service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent
and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that
other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent
provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
during the alleged commission of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

263
November 16, 1918

G.R. No. L-12767

264
In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG
JOHNSON, applicant-appellant,

Vs.

Hartigan & Welch for applicant and appellant.

Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others as appellees.
Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibañez de Johnson, personally and as
guardian, and for Simeona Ibañez, appellees.

FACTS:

Emil H. Johnson (Johnson - testator), a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of

the State of Illinois, United States, died in the city of Manila. Johnson left a will by
which he disposed of his estate (The will was written in an holographic instrument,
written in the testator's own handwriting)

Prior to his death Johnson was married to Rosalie Ackeson (Rosalie) they had a
daughter named EBBA INGEBORG JOHNSON (Ebba). Johnson later embarked for
the Philippine Islands as a soldier in the Army of the United States and continued to
live in the Philippine Island even after his military discharge. As a result Rosalie filed
for a decree of divorced from him in Cook County Illinois.

While Johnson was in the Philippines he had marital relations with Alejandra Ibañez,
by whom he had three children: Mercedes, Encarnacion and Victor. Johnson also
had two other children: Eleonor and Alberto to a certain Simeona Ibanez.

Johnson’s will were to be disposed as follow: 100 shares of the corporate stock in
the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company to be given to his brother Victor; to his father
and mother in Sweden, the sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum
of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibañez, the sum of P75 per month, if she remains
single; to Simeona Ibañez, spinster, P65 per month, if she remains single. The rest
of the property is left to the testator's five children — Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor,
Eleonor and Alberto.

The Court of First Instance of the city of Manila granted the probate of this will, on
the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois,
United States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the
laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section
265
636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Excerpt on the provision: “Will made here by
alien. — A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another
state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country
of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the
law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the
Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the
laws of these Islands.”)

Ebba, filed a petition to annul the decree of probate of will to put the estate to
intestate administration making her the sole legitimate heir of his father in
accordance to Philippine proceedings. Ebba’s petition were grounded on the
following: (1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a resident
of the State of Illinois at the time the will in question was executed; (2) The will is
invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois; (3)
The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to the petitioner; and
(4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order of probate can be set aside on the ground that the testator
was not a resident of the State of Illinois but a resident of Manila?

RULING:

No, section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure stated that a will made within the
Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is
executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or
subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or
country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall
have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.

As in the case, the court found that the testator (Johnson) was a citizen of State of
Illinois therefore the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined
by the law of Illinois to which he is a citizen. The court ruled that the legal and
testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall
be regulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where it may be

266
situated. Therefore, the probate of the will of the testator is valid and should not be
set aside.

DE VILLA VS CA
267
G.R. No. 87416

FACTS:

On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional
Trial Court with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.

That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw
and issue to ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a Depositors
Trust Company Check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987, payable to herein
complainant in the total amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00.

The accused knew that at the time of issue he had no sufficient funds in or credit
with drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment which
check when presented to the drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof was subsequently dishonored for the reason "INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor said accused failed to pay said ROBERTO
Z. LORAYEZ the amount of P50,000.00 of said check or to make arrangement for
full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a)

Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no
offense was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the
obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to
Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency).

Makati RTC Judge cited in its decision that the Bouncing Checks Law is applicable
to checks drawn against current accounts in foreign currency.
A petition for certiorari was filed wherein he contended:

That since the questioned check was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner
with a foreign bank, respondent court has no jurisdiction over the same or with
accounts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and that Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 could have not contemplated extending its coverage over dollar
accounts;

268
That assuming that the subject check was issued in connection with a private
transaction between petitioner and private respondent, the payment could not be
legally paid in dollars as it would violate Republic Act No. 529; and
That the obligation arising from the issuance of the questioned check is null and void
and is not enforceable with the Philippines either in a civil or criminal suit. Upon such
premises, petitioner concludes that the dishonor of the questioned check cannot be
said to have violated the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.

ISSUE:
WON THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE.

WON THE CHECK IN QUESTION, DRAWN AGAINST THE DOLLAR ACCOUNT

OF PETITIONER WITH A FOREIGN BANK, IS COVERED BY THE BOUNCING
CHECKS LAW (B.P. Blg. 22).

RULING:
Yes.  The trial court's jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be
questioned. Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering
justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. Jurisdiction in general, is either over
the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendant, or
over the issues framed in the pleadings.

Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide that:

Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some
of the essential ingredients thereof occured at some place within the jurisdiction of
the court, unless the particular place wherein it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense or is necessary for identifying the offense charged.

Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or any of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.

The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was
committed in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and
269
sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing
of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action.

Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines (154
SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the case of People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that
"the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the
check."

It will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. As
the trial court correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:

Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are
either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are
within the coverage of said law.

It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish courts should not distinguish.  Parenthetically, the rule is that where the
law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless
compelling reasons exist to justify it.

Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning
put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be
adopted.

The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the
lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.

270
Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of the Philippines
G.R. No. 196231-196232 September 4, 2012
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OFTHE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. :

FACTS:
FORMAL CHARGE AGAINST ROLANDO MENDOZA
In 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct against Manila Police District Senior
Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza, and four others. They were found guilty of
Grave Misconduct approved by the Ombudsman. They were dismissed from service.

HOSTAGE TAKER A FORMER POLICE OFFICER

In an attempt to secure his reinstatement in the police force and to restore the
benefits service, Former Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza hijacked a bus
and held hostage some of the passengers. However, he was shot dead by a sniper
at past 9 p.m. 

AFTERMATH: OMBUDSMAN FOUND TO BE NEGLIGENT

After the incident, the IIRC found that Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed
serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of
procedure by his prolonged inaction which precipitated the desperate resort of
Rolando Mendoza to hostage-taking. 

SERIOUS DISREGARD OF DUE PROCESS

In addition, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed
serious disregard of due process, manifest injustice, and oppression in failing to
provisionally suspend the further implementation of the judgment of dismissal
against Mendoza pending disposition of his unresolved motion for reconsideration. 

CONSOLIDATED PETITIONS
These petitions raise issues relating to the President’s exercise of the power to
remove from office herein petitioners who belong to the Office of the Ombudsman. 

DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN DISMISSED

271
The Office of the President finds Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales III guilty
of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust
and hereby meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from service.

G.R. No. 196231, is a Petition for Certiorari which assails on jurisdictional grounds
the Decision rendered by the Office of the President dismissing petitioner Emilio A.
Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.

RULING:
YES, the Congress intended the Office of the President and the Ombudsman to
exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor.

CONGRESS INTENDED THE OP TO EXERCISE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION

Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise
concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor, respectively. This sharing of authority goes into the wisdom of
the legislature, which prerogative falls beyond the pale of judicial inquiry.

CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATIONS 
The Congressional deliberations on this matter are quite insightful, viz.: 

Senator Angara explained that the phrase was added to highlight the fact that the
Deputy Tanodbayan may only be removed for cause and after due process. He
added that the President alone has the power to remove the Deputy Tanodbayan. 

Reacting thereto, Senator Guingona observed that this might impair the
independence of the Tanodbayan and suggested that the procedural removal of the
Deputy Tanodbayan...; and that he can be removed not by the President but by the
Ombudsman. 

272
However, the Chair expressed apprehension that the Ombudsman and the
Deputy Ombudsman may try to protect one another. The Chair suggested the
substitution of the phrase “after due process” with the words after due notice and
hearing with the President as the ultimate authority. 

Senator Guingona contended, however, that the Constitution provides for an

independent Office of the [T]anodbayan[,] and to allow the Executive to have
disciplinary powers over the Tanodbayan Deputies would be an encroachment on
the independence of the Tanodbayan. 

Replying thereto, Senator Angara stated that originally, he was not averse to the
proposal, however, considering the Chair’s observation that vesting such authority
upon the Tanodbayan itself could result in mutual protection, it is necessary
that an outside official should be vested with such authority to effect a check
and balance.

273
SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SAMELCO II), et. al., v. SELUDO,
JR.
G.R. No. 173840
April 25, 2012

FACTS:
As members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of the petitioner Samar II Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II), an electric cooperative providing electric service to
all members-consumers in all municipalities within the Second Congressional District
of the Province of Samar, individual petitioners passed Resolution No. 5 [Series] of
2005 on January 22, 2005.

The said resolution disallowed the private respondent to attend succeeding meetings
of the BOD effective February 2005 until the end of his term as director. The same
resolution also disqualified him for one (1) term to run as a candidate for director in
the upcoming district elections.

Convinced that his rights as a director of petitioner SAMELCO II had been curtailed
by the subject board resolution, private respondent filed an Urgent Petition for
Prohibition against petitioner SAMELCO II, impleading individual petitioners as
directors thereof, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Calbiga, Samar.

In their answer to the petition for prohibition, individual petitioners raised the
affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the
case. Individual petitioners assert that, since the matter involved an electric
cooperative, SAMELCO II, primary jurisdiction is vested on the National
Electrification Administration (NEA).

The RTC granted the petition and sustained the jurisdiction of the court over the
petition for prohibition and barred the petitioners and/or their representatives from
enforcing Resolution No. 5 [Series] of 2005. Thereafter, the CA affirms the RTC’s
decision. Hence, this case elevated before the Supreme Court.

274
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in affirming the RTC’s decision in which the latter
ruled that it has the primary jurisdiction over the question of the validity of the Board
Resolution issued by SAMELCO II?

RULING:
No. The Court held that the CA was not correct.

Section 10, Chapter II of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 5 of P.D. No. 1645,
provides:

Section 10. Enforcement Powers and Remedies. − In the exercise of its power of
supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other borrower, supervised or
controlled entities, the NEA is empowered to issue orders, rules and regulations and
motu proprio or upon petition of third parties, to conduct investigations, referenda
and other similar actions in all matters affecting said electric cooperatives and other
borrower, or supervised or controlled entities.

In addition, Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of P.D. No. 269, as amended by
Section 7 of P.D. No. 1645, states:

Section 24. Board of Directors. − (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall be

vested in its Board, subject to the supervision and control of NEA which shall have
the right to be represented and to participate in all Board meetings and deliberations
and to approve all policies and resolutions.

A comparison of the original provisions of Sections 10 and 24 of P.D. No. 269 and
the amendatory provisions under Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645 would readily
show that the intention of the framers of the amendatory law is to broaden the
powers of the NEA. A clear proof of such expanded powers is that, unlike P.D. No.
269, P.D. No. 1645 expressly provides for the authority of the NEA to exercise
supervision and control over electric cooperatives.

Certainly, the matter as to the validity of the resolution issued by the Board of
Directors of SAMELCO II, which practically removed respondent from his position as
a member of the Board of Directors and further disqualified him to run as such in the
ensuing election, is a matter which affects the said electric cooperative and, thus,

275
comes within the ambit of the powers of the NEA as expressed in Sections 5 and 7
of P.D. No. 1645.

In this regard, the Court agrees with petitioners' argument that to sustain the petition
for prohibition filed by respondent with the RTC would constitute an unnecessary
intrusion into the NEA's power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives. 

Therefore, the Court held that the NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision
and control, has primary jurisdiction to determine the issue of the validity of the
subject resolution.

276
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
G.R. No. 83892
February 22, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T.

David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both
petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration
of the unconstitutionality of EO No. 284 issued by President Corazon Aquino on July
25, 1987.

EO No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or
position in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 are
as follows:

Sec 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive

officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not
more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations and receive
the corresponding compensation thereof.

Sec 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank,
but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary
positions.

Sec 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either
be a secretary or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
277
The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds
exemptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution.
According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in the government are those provided in the constitution namely: 1. The
Vice President may be appointed as members of the cabinet under Section 3 par. 2
of Article VII. 2. The Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 of Article VIII

ISSUE:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes. In light of the construction given to Sec 13 of Article VII, EO No. 284 is
unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet Members,
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary
position to not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations, EO No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment
in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13 of Article 7 of the 1987
constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
constitution itself.

The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself:
Sec 3 Art. VII and Sec 8 Art VIII.

278
Ursua vs. CA
G.R. No. 112170 
April 10, 1996

Facts:
Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. A complaint initiated by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the
involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and
hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area.

Atty. Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman
requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty.
Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the
Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some
personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner
talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the
document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However,
Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he
would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint.

When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman he was instructed by the
security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name
petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the
Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter
of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan,
who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by
writing the name "Oscar Perez.

279
When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was
actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo. Loida reported the
matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly
charged. The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R.A. No. 6085. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
petitioner.
Petitioner now comes for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He
contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he
never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his alias. An alias, according to
him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is
also known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he
only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar
Perez himself. 

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner violates Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
No. 6085. 

Ruling: 
No, alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him
publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name
by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by
which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him
but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known
as aliases.  Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to
another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user
intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth
does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. 

It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman
as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer. He did so
while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in
which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is
not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or
was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The
use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction
where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he
280
had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still
be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the
Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records
hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper
circumstances.

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC               October 15, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.
FACTS:

Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya and about 70 other elderly women filed with the Court
a special civil action of certiorari against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Justice, and the Office of the Solicitor General. They
claimed that the Japanese army systematically raped them and a number of other
women, seizing them and holding them in houses or cells where soldiers repeatedly
ravished and abused them.
On April 28, 2010, the Court dismissed petitioners’ action. Justice Mariano C. del
Castillo wrote the decision who essentially gave two reasons for its decision: it
cannot grant the petition because, first, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative under the Constitution and the law to determine whether to espouse
petitioners’ claim against Japan; and, second, the Philippines is not under any
obligation in international law to espouse their claims.

On July 19, 2010, petitioners filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration which
counsel for petitioners, Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr., announced in his online blog
"detailing plagiarism committed by the court" under the second reason it gave for
dismissing the petition and that "these stolen passages were also twisted to support
the court’s erroneous conclusions that the Filipino comfort women of World War Two
have no further legal remedies." It accused Justice Del Castillo of "manifest
intellectual theft and outright plagiarism”. 

281
Justice Del Castillo then circulated a letter to his colleagues stating that when he
wrote the decision for the Court he had the intent to attribute all sources used in it. 
On August 26, 2010, the Committee heard the parties’ submissions in the summary
manner of administrative investigations.

Counsels for Justice Del Castillo requested the Committee to hear the Justice’s court
researcher to explain the research work that went into the making of the decision in
the Vinuya case. The researcher demonstrated how the attribution of the lifted
passages to the writings of Criddle-Descent and Ellis, found in the beginning drafts
of her report to Justice Del Castillo, were unintentionally deleted. She expressed
remorse at her "grievous mistake" and grief for having "caused an enormous amount
of suffering for Justice Del Castillo and his family."

On the other hand, counsel for petitioners insisted that lack of intent is not a defense
in plagiarism since all that is required is for a writer to acknowledge that certain
words or language in his work were taken from another’s work.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, Justice Del
Castillo plagiarized the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis.

RULINGS: NO.
To plagiarize, says Webster, is "to steal and pass off as one’s own" the ideas or
words of another. Stealing implies malicious taking. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
plagiarism as the "deliberate and knowing presentation of another person's original
ideas or creative expressions as one’s own." 

In this case, while it is true that Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign
authors materials that he lifted from their works and used in writing the decision for
the Court in the Vinuya case, but the evidence as found by its Ethics Committee
shows that the attribution to these authors appeared in the beginning drafts of the
decision. Unfortunately, as testified to by the court-employed researcher, she
accidentally deleted the same at the time she was cleaning up the final draft. The
Court believed her since, among other reasons, she had no motive for omitting the
attribution. Notably, although the ponencia of Justice Del Castillo accidentally
deleted the attribution to them, there remained in the final draft of the decision
attributions of the same passages to the earlier writings from which those authors
282
borrowed their ideas in the first place. In short, with the remaining attributions after
the erroneous clean-up, the passages as it finally appeared in the Vinuya decision
still showed on their face that the lifted ideas did not belong to Justice Del Castillo
but to others. He did not pass them off as his own.

Furthermore, there is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts,
including the Supreme Court, not to use original or unique language when reinstating
the laws involved in the cases they decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as these
are written. But laws include, under the doctrine of stare decisis, judicial
interpretations of such laws as are applied to specific situations. Under this doctrine,
Courts are "to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point." Once the Court
has "laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere
to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the
same; regardless of whether the parties or property are the same." 

And because judicial precedents are not always clearly delineated, they are quite
often entangled in apparent inconsistencies or even in contradictions, prompting
experts in the law to build up a large body of commentaries or annotations that often
become part of legal writings upon which lawyers and judges draw materials for their
theories or solutions in particular cases. And, because of the need to be precise and
correct, judges and practitioners alike usually lift passages from such precedents
and writings, at times omitting, without malicious intent, attributions to the originators.

If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past decisions
from the time of Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it is likely to
discover that it has not on occasion acknowledged the originators of passages and
views found in its decisions. These omissions are true for many of the decisions that
have been penned and are being penned daily by magistrates from the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts
nationwide and with them, the municipal trial courts and other first level courts. Never
in the judiciary’s more than 100 years of history has the lack of attribution been
regarded and demeaned as plagiarism.

283
PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its President,
GREGORY K. LOY, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation ("Pelizloy") owns Palm Grove Resort, which is
designed for recreation and which has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and
function halls. It is located at Asin, Angalisan, Municipality of Tuba, Province of
Benguet.

Provincial Board of the Province of Benguet approved Provincial Tax Ordinance No.
05-107, otherwise known as the Benguet Revenue Code of 2005 ("Tax Ordinance").
Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance levied a ten percent (10%) amusement
tax on gross receipts from admissions to "resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs and tourist spots."

It was Pelizloy's position that the Tax Ordinance's imposition of a 10% amusement
tax on gross receipts from admission fees for resorts, swimming pools, bath houses,
hot springs, and tourist spots is an ultra vires act on the part of the Province of
Benguet. Thus, it filed an appeal/petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction before
RTC Benguet.

Respondent argued that provinces can validly impose amusement taxes on resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots – these being
“amusement places.” RTC ruled in favor if the respondent.

284
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent can impose amusement taxes on admission fees to
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots for being
“amusement places” under the LGC.

RULING

No, they cannot impose amusement taxes.

Section 140 of the LGC provides:

SECTION 140. Amusement Tax - (a) The province may levy an amusement tax to
be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement at a rate of not more
than thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts from admission fees.

(b) In the case of theaters of cinemas, the tax shall first be deducted and withheld by
their proprietors, lessees, or operators and paid to the provincial treasurer before the
gross receipts are divided between said proprietors, lessees, or operators and the
distributors of the cinematographic films.

(c) The holding of operas, concerts, dramas, recitals, painting and art exhibitions,
flower shows, musical programs, literary and oratorical presentations, except pop,
rock, or similar concerts shall be exempt from the payment of the tax herein
imposed.

(d) The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may prescribe the time, manner, terms and
conditions for the payment of tax. In case of fraud or failure to pay the tax, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan may impose such surcharges, interests and penalties.

(e) The proceeds from the amusement tax shall be shared equally by the province
and the municipality where such amusement places are located. [Underscoring
supplied]

Evidently, Section 140 of the LGC carves a clear exception to the general rule in
Section 133 (i). Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of
amusement taxes on "the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas,
concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement."

However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are
not among those places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being
subject to amusement taxes. Thus, the determination of whether amusement taxes
may be levied on admissions to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs,
285
and tourist spots hinges on whether the phrase ‘other places of amusement’
encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots.

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter
follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be
restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned."17

The purpose and rationale of the principle was explained by the Court in National
Power Corporation v. Angas18 as follows:

The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular
and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the
general words as including all that is embraced in said class, although not
specifically named by the particular words. This is justified on the ground that if the
lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it
would have not made an enumeration of particular subjects but would have used
only general terms. [2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., pp. 395-400].19

In the present case, the Court need not embark on a laborious effort at statutory
construction. Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition of
‘amusement places’:

Section 131. Definition of Terms. - When used in this Title, the term:

xxx

(c) "Amusement Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other
places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or
viewing the show or performances [Underscoring supplied]

Indeed, theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia are bound by a
common typifying characteristic in that they are all venues primarily for the staging of
spectacles or the holding of public shows, exhibitions, performances, and other
events meant to be viewed by an audience. Accordingly, ‘other places of
amusement’ must be interpreted in light of the typifying characteristic of being
venues "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the
show or performances" or being venues primarily used to stage spectacles or hold

286
public shows, exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an
audience.

As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary,22 ‘show’ means "a spectacle or

display of something, typically an impressive one";23 while ‘performance’ means "an
act of staging or presenting a play, a concert, or other form of entertainment."24 As
such, the ordinary definitions of the words ‘show’ and ‘performance’ denote not only
visual engagement (i.e., the seeing or viewing of things) but also active doing (e.g.,
displaying, staging or presenting) such that actions are manifested to, and
(correspondingly) perceived by an audience.

Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs
and tourist spots cannot be considered venues primarily "where one seeks
admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances".
While it is true that they may be venues where people are visually engaged, they are
not primarily venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage or
present shows and/or performances.

Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots do not
belong to the same category or class as theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses,
and boxing stadia. It follows that they cannot be considered as among the ‘other
places of amusement’ contemplated by Section 140 of the LGC and which may
properly be subject to amusement taxes.

287
JOSE R. MORENO, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
Private Management Office (formerly, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST),
Respondent
G.R. No. 159373
November 16, 2006

FACTS:

Jose R. Moreno Jr. is the owner of the Ground Floor, the 7th Floor and the
Penthouse of the J. Moreno Building and the lot on which it stands. On the other
hand, Private Management Office (PMO) is the owner of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and
6th floors of the same building. PMO called for a conference discussing Moreno’s
right of first refusal over the floors of the building owned by the former. They
informed Moreno of the proposed purchase price of TWENTY-ONE MILLION
PESOS for the said floors.  

PMO informed Moreno thru Atty. Jose Feria, Jr., that the Board of Trustees (BOT) of
APT "is in agreement that Mr. Jose Moreno, Jr. has the right of first refusal" and
requested Moreno to deposit 10% of the "suggested indicative price" of ₱21.0 million
on or before February 26, 1993. Moreno then paid the ₱2.1 million and was given a
copy of the Official Receipt issued by defendant.

288
PMO wrote to Moreno that its Legal Department has questioned the basis for the
computation of the indicative price for the said floors and that the APT BOT has later
tentatively agreed on a settlement price of ₱42,274,702.17. This led to the complaint
of whether there was a perfected contract of sale over the said floors for the amount
of ₱21.0 million, and whether PMO is bound by the price of ₱21.0 million.

The RTC ruled in favor of Moreno. PMO filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. They elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, Moreno
filed for a motion to dismiss which was granted by the appellate court. This led to
PMO’s petition for review on certiorari to reverse the dismissal of the appeal which
led to the reversal of the resolution dismissing the appeal on the ground that the
appeal raises substantial issues justifying a review of the case on the merits.

On January 30, 2003, the appellate court found that there was no perfected contract
of sale over the subject floors and reversed the ruling of the trial court. Hence, this
current petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale between Moreno and
PMO.

RULING: No. The Court ruled that there was no perfected contract of sale between
Moreno and PMO. A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting
of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.13
Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing
and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the
acceptance absolute.

Contract formation undergoes three distinct stages – preparation or negotiation,

perfection or birth, and consummation. Negotiation begins from the time the
prospective contracting parties manifest their interest in the contract and ends at the
moment of agreement of the parties. The perfection or birth of the contract takes
place when the parties agree upon all the essential elements thereof. The last stage
is the consummation of the contract wherein the parties fulfill or perform the terms
agreed upon, culminating in its extinguishment. Once there is concurrence of the
offer and acceptance of the object and cause, the stage of negotiation is finished.

In this case, the surrounding circumstances clearly show that the parties are not past
the stage of negotiation. In a letter written by PMO to Moreno, it is clearly stated that
289
₱21.0 million is merely a "suggested indicative price" of the subject floors as it was
yet to be approved by the Board of Trustees. Before the Board could confirm the
suggested indicative price, the Committee on Privatization must first approve the
terms of the sale or disposition. The imposition of this suspensive condition finds
basis under Proclamation No. 5022 which vests in the Committee the power to
approve the sale of government assets. Hence, there was no perfected contract of
sale between Moreno and PMO.

Furthermore, Moreno relied on the Webster Comprehensive Dictionary’s definition of

the meaning of indicative which is "to indicate" is to point out, direct attention.
"Indicative" is merely the adjective of the verb to indicate. When the price of ₱21
million was indicated – then it becomes the "indicative" price – the correct price, no
ifs, no buts.

However, Moreno’s reliance of the meaning of indicative – in the phrase “suggested

indicative price” – in the Webster Comprehensive Dictionary is misplaced. Where the
transaction involves the sale of an asset under a privatization scheme which
attaches a peculiar meaning or signification to the term indicative, indicative price is
referred to as ball-park figure with the seller supplying the figure purely to define the
ball-park.

Since indicative price is referred to as a ballpark figure or a rough numerical estimate

or approximation of value, then the contract between Moreno and PMO was not
perfected. The Court finding no reason to reverse the ruling, affirmed the decision
rendered by the appellate court.

290
De Castro vs. JBC
G.R. No. 191002
March 17, 2010

FACTS:

The then Chief Justice Reynato Puno was subject to compulsory retirement by May
17, 2010, days after the coming May 10, 2010 elections. Petitioner compelled the
Judicial Bar Council to submit to the incumbent President the list of nominees for the
position of the next Chief Justice. Legal luminaries expressed conflicting opinions
regarding the issue. One side holds that the incumbent President cannot make
appointments within 2 months prior the coming presidential elections and until the
end of her term (Art. VII Sec. 15), while others hold that such prohibition only applies
to appointments to executive positions that may influence the election.

On January 18, 2010, the JBC passed a resolution unanimously agreeing to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. The JBC had already come up with
a list of nominations but has not yet decided on when to submit it to the President
due to the controversy.

291
In response to the Court’s order directing the JBC and OSG to comment on the
petition, the JBC has yet to take a position on when to submit the shortlist to the
President in light of Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that
vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the
occurrence thereof, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution concerning the ban on
Presidential appointments "two (2) months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term". 

The OSG submitted its comment stating that the JBC can submit the list of nominees
as it is a ministerial act of the JBC. The OSG further asserts that the incumbent
President may appoint the next Chief Justice because the prohibition under Article
VII Sec. 5 does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court.

Intervenors oppose the petition of De Castro because Section 15 of Article VII

prohibits the outgoing president from making any appointments from March 10, 2010
until June 30, 2010. They also cited In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional
Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively
(Valenzuela), where the Court held that Art. VII Sec 15 of the Constitution also
prohibited appointments by the President to the judicial positions during the period
therein fixed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the incumbent President has the power and authority to appoint
during the election ban the successor of Chief Justice Puno when he vacates the
position of Chief Justice on his retirement on May 17, 2010.

RULING:

Yes, the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice. 

The two constitutional provisions in conflict are Section 15 Article VII (Executive
Dept):

292
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not
make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.

and Section 4 (1) Article VIII (Judicial Dept):

Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice

and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in
division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

The Court agrees with the petitioner that Sec 15 Art. VII does not extend to
appointments in the Judiciary.

As mentioned above, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Dept. The presidential
power of appointments is dealt with in Sections 14,15, and 16. While Art. VIII is
dedicated to the Judicial Dept. which in Section 4(1) mandates the president to fill
the vacancy of Supreme Court Justices within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could have written the prohibition Sec 15 Art VII as equally
applicable to the appointment of Supreme Court members as provided in Article VIII.
Since such specification was not done by the framers, the prohibition of appointing
within 2 months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
incumbent president does not apply to appointments of Supreme Court members.

According to the journal of the Constitutional Commission, the original proposal was
to have an 11 member Supreme Court. Commissioner Eulogio Lerum wanted to
increase the number of Justices to fifteen. He also wished to ensure that that number
would not be reduced for any appreciable length of time (even only temporarily), and
to this end proposed that any vacancy "must be filled within two months from the
date that the vacancy occurs." He later agreed to suggestions to make the period
three, instead of two, months. As thus amended, the proposal was approved. The
Commission agreed on a fifteen-member Court. Thus, it was that the section fixing
the composition of the Supreme Court came to include a command to fill up any
vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence. Thereby, Sec 4(1) Art. VIII
imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member

293
of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure
by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution

The Court reverses the Valenzuela decision. The purpose of Sec 15 Art. VII was to
avoid vote-buying and “midnight appointments.” With this, there is no doubt that the
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments only in the
Executive Dept. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to the Judiciary
because the establishment of the JBC and the process of nomination and screening
ensures no midnight appointments in the Judiciary. The non-applicability was
confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado. He assured that "on the basis
of the (Constitutional) Commission's records, the election ban had no application to
appointments to the Court of Appeals.

Floresca v. Philex Mining Corp.

G.R. No. L-30642, [April 30, 1985]

FACTS:
On June 28, 1967, in Tuba, Benguet, employees of Philex Mining Corporation were
working on its copper mines underground operations when the mines collapsed,
resulting on a cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine; 5 were able to
escape, 22 were rescued within the next 7 days, and 21, including the relatives of
the petitioners, were left entombed in the tunnels, and though still alive, were not
rescued due to PHILEX’s decision to abandon rescue operations. 
Heirs of the deceased employees were then compensated under the Workmen’s
Compensation act as ruled by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a civil complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila
(CFI) against Philex upon knowing that the latter was negligent and failed to provide
294
adequate safety protection for its workers. Philex move to dismiss the complaint,
arguing that CFI has no jurisdiction over compensation cases. 
 Floresca, et al contend that CFI ha jurisdiction as their complaint is based on the
Civil Code provisions on damages arising out of negligence and not based on the
Workmen’s Compensation Act. 

ISSUE:
Won CFI have jurisdiction over the complaint? 

RULING:
The Court held YES. 

Generally, petitioners can only choose between claiming benefits or suing, not
both. Claiming the benefits under WCA would have naturally estopped them
from suing a civil case before the regular courts. Section 5 of WCA, providing
right of exclusive compensation, states that: 

The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a

personal injury entitling him to compensation. Shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer. Under the Civil Code and
other laws, because of said injury.

However, the Court decided to give the petitioners leeway given the
peculiarities of this instance, where the latter already claimed the benefits
under WCA before learning the true cause of the accident, that resulted to the
untimely demise of their loved ones, was the negligence of Philex. Only then
did they file a civil case. 

Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or

application of laws, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and
justice to prevail."

More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case
of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of
the safety and decent living of the laborer."

The court reasoned that had the petitioners learned of the cause much sooner,
petitioners would have filed for a civil suit instead. This then creates an exception
to Section 5 of WCA. Hence, court remanded the case to lower court for proper
judgment. (1) CFI now has jurisdiction because of the court’s making an exception
295
of the case. The Court heavily emphasize that strict application of the law, without
taking into consideration the peculiarity of the instance, ultimately defeats the
purpose of the law. 

BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, vs. 

CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.
G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen)
were wed in Cebu City when the respondent was already pregnant with their first
child. They have been married for more than 18 years and have a total of 6 children.
After being married for more than 18 years, Carmen filed a verified petition before
the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which,
however, only came to manifest thereafter. 

296
Carmen was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally
with his friends. But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly
and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning
drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically assault her
and force her to have sex with him. He refused to give financial support to their
family and would even get angry at Carmen whenever she asked for money for their
children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking
and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby. 

Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. The lower court rendered its
Decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the admissions made by
Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the
trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone
who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent
tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect existing even
before his marriage to Carmen.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA rendered a Decision reversing the
trial court’s ruling. Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied for
having been filed beyond the prescribed period. Undaunted, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari with this Court. The Court granted the petition and directed the
CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration. The CA decided to reconsider its
previous ruling. Reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision. A
motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied
by the CA. Thus, the petition is elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: 
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Benjamin and Carmen can be declared null
and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING:
No, the Court ruled that the marriage of Benjamin and Carmen cannot be declared
null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. 

297
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The
psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. 

CONSTITUTIONAL STARE DECISIS AND SATUTORY STARE DECISIS.  

Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while

statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important
for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional
litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional
litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is
not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not
inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within
the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once
decided."

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner

vs.
Bicolandia Drug Corporation (Formerly known as Elmas Drug Co.)
G.R. No. 148083
July 21, 2006

Facts:
In 1992, R.A. No. 7432, known as “An Act to Maximize the Contribution of Senior
Citizens to Nation Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and For other
purposes”, granted senior citizens several privileges, including the 20% discount
from private establishments, relative to the use of transportation services, hotels and
similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of
298
medicines anywhere in the country. The law also provides that these private
establishments may claim the discount given as tax credit.

In compliance with the law, the BIR issued R.R. No. 2-94, defining tax credit as a
“deduction from their gross income for income tax purposes and from their gross
sales for VAT or other percentage tax purposes”.
In 1995, respondent, a corporation engaged in pharmaceutical products, granted
20% sales discount to senior citizens and treated it as a deduction from its gross
income in compliance with RR No. 2-94. Respondent filed a claim for tax refund or
credit (P259,659) because its net losses for the year 1995 prevented it from
benefiting from the treatment of sales discounts as a deduction from gross sales.

Court of Tax Appeals granted the respondents claim for refund, reducing it to
P236,321.52. The Cour of Appeals modified the decision of CTA as “tax credit” is
different from “tax refund”. Respondent alleged that RR No. 2-94 is inconsistent with
Section 4 of RA No. 7432 which the latter defines discounts be claimed as tax credit.

Petitioner maintained that RR No. 2-94 is valid since the law tasked the DoF with the
issuance of the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the objectives of the
law.

Issue:
Whether or not the 20% sales discount granted to qualified senior citizens by
respondent may be claimed as “tax credit” under R.A. No. 7432?

Ruling:
Yes. The 20% sales discount granted to qualified senior citizens by respondent may
be claimed as “tax credit” under RA No. 7432.

In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to
implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. In this case, RR No. 2-94 is null
and void for failing to conform to the law it sought to implement. RR No. 2-94
defining “tax credit” as a “deduction from the gross income for income tax purposes
and from gross sales for VAT and other percentage tax purposes” is a whole lot
different from the definition of “tax credit” under RA No. 7432 (Tax credit as a
299
deduction from the total income tax liability). The lawmakers intended the grant of a
tax credit to complying private establishments like the respondent. It is well-settled
that a regulation should not conflict with the law it implements, for regulations are
always subordinate to law.

Thus, the 20% sales discount granted to qualified senior citizens by respondent may
be claimed as “tax credit” under RA No. 7432. Petition DENIED.

G.R. No. 174674 : October 20, 2010

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and NESTLE WATERS PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly

HIDDEN SPRINGS & PERRIER, INC.),Petitioners,v. UNIWIDE SALES, INC.,
UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC., NAIC RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CLUB, INC.,
FIRST PARAGON CORPORATION, and UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB,
INC., Respondents.

CARPIO, J.:
300
FACTS:
Respondents filed in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a petition for
declaration of suspension of payment, formation and appointment of rehabilitation
receiver, and approval of rehabilitation plan.

The newly appointed Interim Receivership Committee filed a rehabilitation plan in the
SEC. The plan was anchored on return to core business of retailing; debt reduction
via cash settlement and dacion en pago; loan restructuring; waiver of penalties and
charges; freezing of interest payments; and restructuring of credit of suppliers,
contractors, and private lenders.

The Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC an Amended Rehabilitation

Plan (ARP). The ARP took into account the planned entry of Casino Guichard
Perrachon, envisioned to infuse P3.57 billion in fresh capital. SEC approved the
ARP.

The Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC a Second Amendment to the
Rehabilitation Plan (SARP) in view of Casino Guichard Perrachon's withdrawal. SEC
approved the SARP.

Petitioners, as unsecured creditors of respondents, appealed to the SEC praying that

the Order approving the SARP be set aside and a new one be issued directing the
Interim Receivership Committee, in consultation with all the unsecured creditors, to
improve the terms and conditions of the SARP.

SEC denied petitioners' appeal for lack of merit. Court of Appeals denied for lack of
merit the petition for review filed by petitioners. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, which was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation
proceedings terminated?

RULING: Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

In light of supervening events that have emerged from the time the SEC approved
301
the SARP on 23 December 2002 and from the time the present petition was filed on
3 November 2006, any determination by this Court as to whether the SARP should
be revoked and the rehabilitation proceedings terminated, would be premature.

Undeniably, supervening events have substantially changed the factual backdrop of

this case. The Court thus defers to the competence and expertise of the SEC to
determine whether, given the supervening events in this case, the SARP is no longer
capable of implementation and whether the rehabilitation case should be terminated
as a consequence.

Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a
controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the
matter may well be within the latter's proper jurisdiction.

The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in

determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some
question arising in the proceeding before the court.

Petition for review is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 171763               June 5, 2009

MARIA LUISA PARK ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
SAMANTHA MARIE T. ALMENDRAS and PIA ANGELA T.
ALMENDRAS, Respondents.
FACTS:

On February 6, 2002, respondents Samantha Marie T. Almendras and Pia Angela T.

Almendras purchased from MRO Development Corporation a residential lot located
in Maria Luisa Estate Park, Banilad, Cebu City. After some time, respondents filed

302
with petitioner Maria Luisa Park Association, Incorporated (MLPAI) an application to
construct a residential house, which was approved in February 10, 2002. Thus,
respondents commenced the construction of their house.

Upon ocular inspection of the house, MLPAI found out that respondents violated the
prohibition against multi-dwelling3 stated in MLPAI’s Deed of Restriction.
Consequently, on April 28, 2003, MLPAI sent a letter to the respondents, demanding
that they rectify the structure; otherwise, it will be constrained to forfeit respondents’
construction bond and impose stiffer penalties.

In a Letter4 dated April 29, 2003, respondents, as represented by their father Ruben

D. Almendras denied having violated MLPAI’s Deed of Restriction.

On May 5, 2003, MLPAI, in its reply, pointed out respondents’ specific violations of
the subdivision rules, to wit: (a) installation of a second water meter and tapping the
subdivision’s main water pipeline, and (b) construction of "two separate entrances
that are mutually exclusive of each other." It likewise reiterated its warning that
failure to comply with its demand will result in its exercise of more stringent
measures.

In view of these, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
7, a Complaint5 on June 2, 2003 for Injunction, Declaratory Relief, Annulment of
Provisions of Articles and By-Laws with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO)/Preliminary Injunction.

MLPAI moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
and failure to comply with the arbitration clause6 provided for in MLPAI’s by-laws.

In an Order7 dated July 31, 2003, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that it was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Respondents
moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied.

Aggrieved, the respondents questioned the dismissal of their complaint in a petition

for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
granted the petition in its Decision dated August 31, 2005, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED and the

assailed orders of the respondent trial court are declared NULL AND VOID, and SET
ASIDE. Respondent RTC is hereby ordered to take jurisdiction of Civil Case No.
CEB-29002.

303
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that it was the trial court and not
the HLURB that has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

Yes. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 535,12 the HIGC assumed the regulatory and
adjudicative functions of the SEC over homeowners’ associations. Section 2 of E.O.
No. 535 provides:

2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home Financing Act, the
Corporation, shall have among others, the following additional powers:

(a) . . . and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are
vested on the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to
homeowners associations, the provision of Act 1459, as amended by P.D.
902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding;

(b) To regulate and supervise the activities and operations of all houseowners
associations registered in accordance therewith;

Moreover, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot or

will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact.29

In the instant case, the HLURB has the expertise to resolve the basic technical issue
of whether the house built by the respondents violated the Deed of Restriction,
specifically the prohibition against multi-dwelling.

The terms of Article XII of the MLPAI by-laws clearly express the intention of the
parties to bring first to the arbitration process all disputes between them before a
party can file the appropriate action. The agreement to submit all disputes to
arbitration is a contract. As such, the arbitration agreement binds the parties thereto,
as well as their assigns and heirs.32 Respondents, being members of MLPAI, are
bound by its by-laws, and are expected to abide by it in good faith.33

In the instant case, both parties exchanged correspondence pertaining to the alleged
violation of the Deed of Restriction, they, however, made no earnest effort to resolve

304
their differences in accordance with the arbitration clause provided for in their by-
laws. Mere exchange of correspondence will not suffice much less satisfy the
requirement of arbitration. Arbitration being the mode of settlement between the
parties expressly provided for in their by-laws, the same should be respected. Unless
an arbitration agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of the courts
against the parties, the courts should look with favor upon such amicable
arrangements.34

Arbitration is one of the alternative methods of dispute resolution that is now rightfully
vaunted as "the wave of the future" in international relations, and is recognized
worldwide. To brush aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration in case of
disagreement between the parties would therefore be a step backward.

ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife MERRIDY JANE P.

DULAY, Petitioner,
vs.
ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC.,
Respondents
G.R. No. 172642 June 13, 2012

FACTS:

305
Nelson R. Dulay (Nelson, for brevity) was employed by General Charterers Inc.
(GCI), a subsidiary of co-petitioner Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime Inc. since 1986. He
initially worked as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun on a contractual basis.
From September 3, 1999 up to July 19, 2000, Nelson was detailed in petitioners’
vessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle.

25 days after the completion of his employment contract, Nelson died due to acute
renal failure secondary to septicemia. At the time of his death, Nelson was a bona
fide member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seaman’s Union of the
Philippines (AMOSUP), GCI’s collective bargaining agent. 

Nelson’s widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the
grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between
AMOSUP and GCI. However, on January 29, 2001, the grievance procedure was
"declared deadlocked" as petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by the
widow.

On March 5, 2001, Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC Sub-Regional
Arbitration Board in General Santos City against GCI for death and medical
benefits and damages.

On March 8, 2001, Joven Mar, Nelson’s brother, received ₱20,000.00 from

respondents pursuant to article 20(A)2 of the CBA and signed a "Certification"
acknowledging receipt of the amount and releasing AMOSUP from further liability. 

Merridy Jane contended that she is entitled to the aggregate sum of Ninety
Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00) pursuant to Article 20 (A)1 of the CBA x x x

Herein respondents, on the other hand, asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction
over the action on account of the absence of employer-employee relationship
between GCI and Nelson at the time of the latter’s death. Nelson also had no
claims against petitioners for sick leave allowance/medical benefit by reason of
the completion of his contract with GCI and that he is not entitled to death benefits
because petitioners are only liable for such "in case of death of the seafarer during
the term of his contract pursuant to the POEA contract" and the cause of his death is
not work-related. Petitioners admitted liability only with respect to article 20(A)2 [of
the CBA].

However, as petitioners stressed, the same was already discharged. 

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondent. It took cognizance of the case
by virtue of Article 217 (a), paragraph 6 of the Labor Code and the existence of a

306
reasonable causal connection between the employer-employee relationship and the
claim asserted. It ordered the petitioner to pay ₱4,621,300.00, the equivalent of
US$90,000.00 less ₱20,000.00, at the time of judgment x x x

Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA contending that
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the jurisdiction of the
NLRC over the case; in ruling that a different provision of the CBA covers the death
claim; in reversing the findings of the Labor Arbiter that the cause of death is not
work-related; and, in setting aside the release and quitclaim executed by the
attorney-in-fact and not considering the P20,000.00 already received by Merridy
Jane through her attorney-in-fact.

The CA ruled that while the suit filed by Merridy Jane is a money claim, the same
basically involves the interpretation and application of the provisions in the subject
CBA. As such, jurisdiction belongs to the voluntary arbitrator and not the labor
arbiter.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it in its Resolution of
April 18, 2006.

Petitioner contends that Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) 8042, otherwise known as
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, vests jurisdiction on the
appropriate branches of the NLRC to entertain disputes regarding the interpretation
of a collective bargaining agreement involving migrant or overseas Filipino workers.
Petitioner argues that the abovementioned Section amended Article 217 (c) of the
Labor Code which, in turn, confers jurisdiction upon voluntary arbitrators over
interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.

ISSUE:

WON whether or not the CA committed error in ruling that the Labor Arbiter has no
jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

No, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that the voluntary arbitrator has
jurisdiction over the instant case.

It is true that R.A. 8042 is a special law governing overseas Filipino workers.
However, a careful reading of this special law would readily show that there is no
specific provision thereunder which provides for jurisdiction over disputes or
unresolved grievances regarding the interpretation or implementation of a CBA. 
307
Section 10 of R.A. 8042, which is cited by petitioner, simply speaks, in general, of
"claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages." 

On the other hand, Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code are very specific in
stating that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the
interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements. 

Stated differently, the instant case involves a situation where the special statute
(R.A. 8042) refers to a subject in general, which the general statute (Labor
Code) treats in particular. 

In the present case, the basic issue raised by Merridy Jane in her complaint filed with
the NLRC is: which provision of the subject CBA applies insofar as death
benefits due to the heirs of Nelson are concerned. The Court agrees with the CA
in holding that this issue clearly involves the interpretation or implementation of the
said CBA. 

Thus, the specific or special provisions of the Labor Code govern.

RUFINO O. ESLAO, in his capacity as President of Pangasinan State

University, petitioner,

308
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 108310 
September 1, 1994
 
FACTS:

On 9 December 1988, PSU entered into a Memorandum of Agreement

("MOA") 1 with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR") for
the evaluation of eleven (11) government reforestation operations in
Pangasinan. 2 The evaluation project was part of the commitment of the Asian
Development Bank ("ADB") under the ADB/OECF Forestry Sector Program Loan to
the Republic of the Philippines and was one among identical project agreements
entered into by the DENR with sixteen (16) other state universities.

On 16 January 1989, per advice of the PSU Auditor-in-Charge with respect to the
payment of honoraria and per diems of PSU personnel engaged in the review and
evaluation project, PSU Vice President for Research and Extension and Assistant
Project Director Victorino P. Espero requested the Office of the President, PSU, to
have the University's Board of Regents ("BOR") confirm the appointments or
designations of involved PSU personnel including the rates of honoraria and per
diems corresponding to their specific roles and functions.

The BOR approved the MOA on 30 January 1989 5 and on 1 February 1989, PSU
issued Voucher No. 8902007 6 representing the amount of P70,375.00 for payment
of honoraria to PSU personnel engaged in the project. Later, however, the
approved honoraria rates were found to be somewhat higher than the rates provided
for in the guidelines of National Compensation Circular ("NCC") No. 53. Accordingly,
the amounts were adjusted downwards to conform to NCC No. 53. Adjustments
were made by deducting amounts from subsequent disbursements of honoraria. By
June 1989, NCC No. 53 was being complied with.

On 6 July 1989, Bonifacio Icu, COA resident auditor at PSU, alleging that there were
excess payments of honoraria, issued a "Notice of Disallowance" 8 disallowing
P64,925.00 from the amount of P70,375.00 stated in Voucher No. 8902007,
mentioned earlier. The resident auditor based his action on the premise that
Compensation Policy Guidelines ("CPG") No. 80-4, dated 7 August 1980, issued by
the Department of Budget and Management which provided for lower rates than
NCC No. 53 dated 21 June 1988, also issued by the Department of Budget and
309
Management, was the schedule for honoraria and per diems applicable to work done
under the MOA of 9 December 1988 between the PSU and the DENR.

ISSUE: 

WON evaluation project is in fact a “special project” and that there were
excess of payments of honoraria.

RULINGS:

The instant evaluation project being a Foreign-Assisted Project, the PSU personnels
involve in the project shall be paid according to the Budget Estimate schedule of the
MOA.
COA, under its constitutional mandate, is not authorized to substitute its own
judgement for any applicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or
propriety of which, however, it does not agree, at least not before such law or
regulation is set aside by the authorized agency of government – i.e., the courts – as
unconstitutional or illegal and void. The COA, like all other government agencies,
must respect the presumption of legality and constitutionality to which statutes and
administrative regulations are entitled until such statute or regulation is repealed or
amended, or until set aside in appropriate case by a competent court and ultimately
the Supreme Court.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

310
vs.
SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No: 187485
February 12, 2013

Facts:
Commissioner of Internal Revenue [CIR], empowered, act upon and approve claims
for refund or tax credit, with office at the Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BIR") National
Office Building, Diliman, Quezon City.

San Roque is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the Philippines with principal office at Barangay San Roque, San
Manuel, Pangasinan. As a seller of services, [San Roque] is duly registered with the
BIR with TIN/VAT No. 005-017-501. It is likewise registered with the Board of
Investments ("BOI") on a preferred pioneer status, to engage in the design,
construction, erection, assembly, as well as to own, commission, and operate
electric power-generating plants and related activities, for which it was issued
Certificate of Registration No. 97-356 on February 11, 1998.

On October 11, 1997, [San Roque] entered into a Power Purchase Agreement
("PPA") with the National Power Corporation ("NPC") to develop hydro-potential of
the Lower Agno River and generate additional power and energy for the Luzon
Power Grid, by building the San Roque Multi-Purpose Project located in San Manuel,
Pangasinan. The PPA provides, among others, that [San Roque] shall be
responsible for the design, construction, installation, completion, testing and
commissioning of the Power Station and shall operate and maintain the same,
subject to NPC instructions. During the cooperation period of twenty-five (25) years
commencing from the completion date of the Power Station, NPC will take and pay
for all electricity available from the Power Station.

On the construction and development of the San Roque Multi- Purpose Project
which comprises of the dam, spillway and power plant, [San Roque] allegedly
incurred, excess input VAT in the amount of ₱559,709,337.54 for taxable year 2001
which it declared in its Quarterly VAT Returns filed for the same year. [San Roque]
duly filed with the BIR separate claims for refund, in the total amount of
₱559,709,337.54, representing unutilized input taxes as declared in its VAT returns
for taxable year 2001.

311
However, on March 28, 2003, [San Roque] filed amended Quarterly VAT Returns for
the year 2001 since it increased its unutilized input VAT to the amount of
₱560,200,283.14. Consequently, [San Roque] filed with the BIR on even date,
separate amended claims for refund in the aggregate amount of ₱560,200,283.14.
[CIR’s] inaction on the subject claims led to the filing by [San Roque] of the Petition
for Review with the Court [of Tax Appeals] in Division on April 10, 2003.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judicial claims for tax refund or credit were filed within the
mandatory period prescribed by law?

RULING: No. San Roque failed to comply with the 120-day waiting period, the time
expressly given by law to the Commissioner to decide whether to grant or deny San
Roque's application for tax refund or credit. It is indisputable that compliance with the
120-day waiting period is mandatory and jurisdictional. The waiting period, originally
fixed at 60 days only, was part of the provisions of the first VAT law, Executive Order
No. 273, which took effect on 1 January 1988. The waiting period was extended to
120 days effective 1 January 1998 under RA 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997.
Thus, the waiting period has been in the statute books for more than fifteen (15)
years before San Roque filed its judicial claim.

312
HEIRS OF WILSON P. GAMBOA v FINANCE SECRETARYMARGARITO B.
TEVES supra
G.R. No. 176579
October 9, 2012

Facts:
On 28 November 1928, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3436 which
granted PLDT a franchise and the right to engage in telecommunications business.
In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American
company and a major PLDT stockholder, sold 26 percent of the outstanding common
shares of PLDT to PTIC. In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) was incorporated by
several persons.  Subsequently, PHI became the owner of 111,415 shares of stock
of PTIC. 

In 1986, the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The 111,415 PTIC shares,
which represent about 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, were
later declared by this Court to be owned by the Republic of the Philippines.  In 1999,
First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered, Hong Kong-based investment firm, acquired the
remaining 54 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. 

On 20 November 2006, the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine

Government announced that it would sell the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125
percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, through a public bidding. Parallax
won the bid. Initially, First Pacific refused and insisted to match the bid price of
Parallex, but eventually  First Pacific managed to  buy these 111, 415 shares.

With the sale, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7
percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in
PLDT to about 81.47 percent. This violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility
to not more than 40 percent.

On  February 28 2007, petitioner filed in the petition for prohibition, injunction and
declaration of nuliity if sale of the 111, 415 PTC shares. Petitioner claims that the
sale of 111, 415 PTIC shares would result in an increase in First Pacific’s common
shareholdings in PLDT from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, and this combined with a

313
Japanese company’s shareholdings in PLDT would result to a total foreign common
shareholdings in PLDT of 51.56 percent which is over the 40% constitutional limit. 
Issue:
Whether the sale of common shares to foreigners in excess of 40 percent of the
entire subscribed common capital stock violates the constitutional limit on foreign
ownership of a public utility

Ruling:
Court PARTLY GRANT the petition and rule that the term "capital" in Section 11,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in
the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and
not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares).
Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution
mandates the Filipinization of public utilities, to wit:

“Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization

for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the
Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in
character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such
franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject
to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good
so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by
the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body
of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its
capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or
association must be citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)”

Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as
opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term "capital" in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if
the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the
term "capital" shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in
the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in
the election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.

314
This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities.
As revealed in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, "capital" refers to
the voting stock or controlling interest of a corporation
It must be stressed, that foreigners hold a majority of the common shares of PLDT.
In fact, based on PLDT’s 2010 General Information Sheet (GIS), which is a
document required to be submitted annually to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, foreigners hold 120,046,690 common shares of PLDT whereas
Filipinos hold only 66,750,622 common shares. In other words, foreigners hold
64.27% of the total number of PLDT’s common shares, while Filipinos hold only
35.73%. Since holding a majority of the common shares equates to control, it is clear
that foreigners exercise control over PLDT. Such amount of control unmistakably
exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit on foreign ownership of public utilities
expressly mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.

The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock
must rest in the hands of Filipinos in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Full
beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60
percent of the voting rights, is constitutionally required for the State’s grant of
authority to operate a public utility. The undisputed fact that the PLDT preferred
shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, are non-voting and earn only 1/70 of the
dividends that PLDT common shares earn, grossly violates the constitutional
requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership of a
public utility.

In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60
percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command
in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that "[n]o franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except
to x x x corporations x x x organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty
per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens x x x

(1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares
exercises the sole right to vote in the election of directors, and thus exercise control
over PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDT’s common shares, constituting a
minority of the voting stock, and thus do not exercise control over PLDT; (3)
preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred
shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn; (5) preferred
63

315
shares have twice the par value of common shares; and (6) preferred shares
constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and common shares only
22.15%. This kind of ownership and control of a public utility is a mockery of the
Constitution.
Indisputably, construing the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
to include both voting and non-voting shares will result in the abject surrender of our
telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a clear abdication of the
State’s constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to Filipino citizens. Such an
interpretation certainly runs counter to the constitutional provision reserving certain
areas of investment to Filipino citizens, such as the exploitation of natural resources
as well as the ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising businesses.
The Court should never open to foreign control what the Constitution has expressly
reserved to Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of the Constitution and of the
national interest. The Court must perform its solemn duty to defend and uphold the
intent and letter of the Constitution to ensure, in the words of the Constitution, "a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."

316
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC) 
V. STOCKHOLDER OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK 
G.R. NO. 181556, DECEMBER 14, 2009

FACTS:

The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas filed on June 17, 1987 with the RTC of Makati for
the assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Saving and Loan Bank, Inc. alleging that
said bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business would involve
probable loss to depositors, creditors and the general public. RTC gave due course
to the petition. Petitioner PDIC was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner,
liquidator of Intercity Bank.

In the meantime RA no. 9302 was enacted which provides that “after the payment of
all liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the corporation shall pay any
surplus dividends at the legal rate of rate interest form date of takeover to date of
distribution to creditors and claimants of the closed bank in accordance with legal
priority before distribution to the shareholders of the closed bank.

Relying on R.A. no 9302 PDIC file a motion for approval of the final distribution of
Assets and termination of the Liquidation Proceedings. RTC Granted the prayer
except for the final project of distribution and for authority of PDIC to hold as trustee
the liquidating and surplus dividends allocated for creditors of intercity bank.

With regards to the issue of the retroactive application, the court a quo rule in
negative. It said that to do so would run counter to the prevailing jurisprudence and
unduly prejudice Intercity bank shareholder, the creditors having been paid their
principal claim in 2002 or before the passage of RA 9302 in 2004.

PDIC appeal to the CA  but respondent  move to dismiss  the appeal  arguing  that
the proper  recourse should be  to the Supreme  Court  through a petition  for

317
Review  on certiorari. CA dismissed the appeal, sustaining the main position of the
respondent. PDIC files the MR but then denied. Hence this present petition.

ISSUE:

WON Sec 12 of RA No. 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle

Intercity Bank Creditors to surplus dividend.

RULING:

The SC held that statute is prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they
being the formulation of the rules for the future not the past. Hence the legal maxim
lex de futuro, judex de praeterito (the law provide for the future, the judge for the
past), which is articulated in Art 4 of the Civil Code: Laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless contrary is provided. The reason for the rule is the tendency of
retroactive legislation to unjust and oppressive on account of its liabilities to unsettle
vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transaction.  Further, a perusal of RA
9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes its retroactive application.  In fact
its effectivity clause indicate a clear legislative intent to contrary. The petition is
denied.

318
G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008
People of the Philippines
vs Beth Temporada

Facts:
Accused Rosemarie Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan, Jojo Resco and
Beth Temporada are all employees of ATTC, a Travel and Tour Company, recruited
and promised overseas employment for a fee to Rogelio Legaspis Jr, as a technician
in Singapore, and other overseas workers. The accused were holding office in
Makati but eventually transferred to Manila. After paying placements fees, none of
the overseas recruits was able to leave or recover what they have paid, thus they
filed separate criminal complaints against accused in Manila.

The accused were then sentenced to life imprisonment for illegal recruitment and
estafa. Then the case was referred to the CA for intermediate review, CA affirmed
with modification on the penalty. The penalty was lowered for the lower court due to
insufficiency of evidence.

Issue: Whether the accused were guilty of 5 counts of estafa and illegal recruitment,
and be charged of the penalty of life imprisonment.

Ruling:
The Court affirms the modification of the CA, except for the penalty on the 5 counts
of estafa.

Although Temporada is saying that she is not a principal to the illegal recruitment and
estafa because she is a mere employee of ATTC and that she was just echoing the
319
requirement of her employer, the Court believes that Temporada actively and
consciously participated in illegal recruitment.

The Court agrees with the lower court that the accused were guilty of illegal
recruitment by a syndicate with the penalty of life imprisonment. The accused were
convicted separately also for 5 counts of estafa. 

G.R. No. 193960               January 7, 2013

KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA),
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-
QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY
(PAMPANGA); AND ABC, Respondents.

Facts: 
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of
Angeles City, Branch 59. Petitioner filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause with motion to quash the information. Petitioner averred that at the
time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in dating relationship
with private respondent; hence, RA. NO. 9262 was inapplicable.

In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had
ended prior to the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought
payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She
then inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her
which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the
latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information.

The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion. It did not consider material the fact that the
parties’ dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since
the parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical
injuries constituted an act of violence against women and their children as defined in
Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.
320
Issue: Whether or not the offender and the offended woman should be in a dating
relationship at the time of the infliction of the violence?

Ruling: No. The Court is not persuaded.

RA 9262 is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or
series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through
physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the
woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or
dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is
likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship.

Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on
statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the
courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women
with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. 

As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased
for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of
such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was
committed.

Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give
credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual
or dating relationship.

321
CARMELITA L. LLEDO, Complainant, 

vs. 

ATTY. CESAR V. LLEDO, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch
94, Quezon City, Respondent.

AM No. P-95-1167, February 9, 2010 612 SCRA 54

FACTS:

On April 3, 2006, Cesar L. Lledo, Jr., Cesar's son, wrote a letter to then Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban. He related that his father had been bedridden after suffering
a severe stroke and acute renal failure. He had been abandoned by his mistress and
had been under Cesar Jr.'s care since 2001. The latter appealed to the Court to
reconsider its December 21, 1998 decision, specifically the forfeiture of leave credits,
which money would be used to pay for his father's medical expenses. Cesar Jr.
asked the Court for retroactive application of the Court's ruling subsequent to his
father's dismissal, wherein the Court ruled that despite being dismissed from the
service, government employees are entitled to the monetary equivalent of their leave
credits since these were earned prior to dismissal.

Treating the letter as a motion for reconsideration, the Court, on May 3, 2006,
granted the same, specifically on the forfeiture of accrued leave credits.

Cesar Jr. wrote the Court again on November 27, 2006, expressing his gratitude for
the Court's consideration of his request for his father's leave credits. He again asked

322
for judicial clemency in connection with his father's claim for refund of the latter's
personal contributions to GSIS.

In its Comment, the GSIS Board said that Cesar is not entitled to the refund of his
personal contributions of the retirement premiums because "it is the policy of the
GSIS that an employee/member who had been dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits cannot recover the retirement premiums he has paid
unless the dismissal provides otherwise." The GSIS Board pointed out that the
Court's Decision did not provide that Cesar is entitled to a refund of his retirement
premiums.

ISSUE:

WON a government employee, like Cesar, dismissed from the service for cause, be
allowed to recover the personal contributions he paid to the GSIS?

RULING:

Yes, the Court ruled that it should be remembered that the GSIS laws are in the
nature of social legislation, to be liberally construed in favor of the government
employees. The money subject of the instant request consists of personal
contributions made by the employee, premiums paid in anticipation of benefits
expected upon retirement. The occurrence of a contingency, i.e. his dismissal form
the service prior to reaching retirement age, should not deprive him of the money
that belongs to him from the outset. To allow forfeiture of these personal
contributions in favor of the GSIS would condone undue enrichment.

The GSIS is directed to return to Atty. Cesar Lledo his own premiums and voluntary
deposits, if any, plus internet of three percentum per annum, and compounded
monthly.

323
CONSTANCIO D. PACANAN, JR., Petitioner, v. 

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FRANCISCO M. LANGI, SR., Respondents.

G.R. NO. 186224 

August 25, 2009

FACTS: 
Petitioner Pacanan, Jr. and private respondent Langi, Sr. were candidates for mayor
in the municipality of Motiong, Samar during the May 14, 2007 elections. After the
canvassing of votes, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Motiong, Samar
proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of 3,069
votes against private respondent's 3,066 votes.

Private respond filed with the RTC a Protest on May 25, 2007, contesting the results
of the elections in ten (10) of the forty-nine (49) precincts in Motiong, Samar, and
alleging acts of violence and intimidation and other election irregularities in the
appreciation of the votes by the MBC.

Petitioner filed his Verified Answer, asserting that private respondent's allegations of
threat and intimidation, fraud and other irregularities in the conduct of elections were
mere allegations unsupported by any documentary evidence. RTC rendered a
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decision on January 7, 2008 declaring private respondent as the winner in the May
14, 2007 mayoralty race for Motiong, Samar. 

On January 10, 2008, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal before the RTC of
Catbalogan, Samar. He also appealed the RTC decision. On March 17, 2008, the
Comelec First Division issued an Order dismissing the appeal for the protestee-
appellants failed to pay the correct appeal fee as prescribed by the Comelec Ruled
of Procedure withing the 5 day reglementary period. 

On March 28, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Comelec
En Banc denied in its previous resolution. They held that the Comelec did not
acquire jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-payment of the appeal fee on
time. Thus, the CFD correctly dismissed the appeal. Hence, the instant petition for
certiorari. 

Petitioner in this case invokes liberality in the application of the election law. He
asserts that the popular will of the people expressed in the election of public officers
should not be defeated by reason of technicalities. Petitioner argues that the true will
of the people of Motiong in the May 2007 elections should be determined by ordering
the Comelec to give due course to his appeal and to resolve the same on the merits. 

ISSUE:

WON the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal should be set aside, applying the mandated
liberal construction of election laws with regards to non-payment or the insufficient
payment of appeal fees. 

RULING:

Yes. The dismissal of petitioner’s appeal should be set aside. 

Section 3, Rule 22 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates that the notice of
appeal must be filed within 5 days after promulgation of the decision. 

Moreover, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the Comelec rules require the payment of
appeal fees in appealed election protest cases, the amended amount of which was
set at P3,200.00 in Comelec Minute Resolution No. 02-0130. 

The CFD should have been more cautious in dismissing petitioners appeal on the
mere technicality of non-payment of the additional P3,200.00 appeal fee given the

325
public interest involved in election cases. This is especially true in this case where
only one vote separates the contending parties. The Court stresses once more that
election law and rules are to be interpreted and applied in a liberal manner so as to
give effect, not to frustrate, the will of the electorate. 

Applying the mandated liberal construction of election laws, the Comelec should
have initially directed the petitioner to pay the correct appeal fee with the Comelec
Cash Division, and should not have dismissed outright petitioner’s appeal. This
would have been more in consonance with the intent of the said resolution which
sought to clarify the rules on compliance with the required appeal fees. 

Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal construction. This
liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of
the objectives of ensuring that holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections and for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Comelec. 

G.R. No. 138218             March 17, 2000

CLAUDIUS C. BARROSO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO S. AMPIG, JR., in his capacity as Acting Judge of
the RTC, Br. 24, 11th Judicial Region, Koronadal, South Cotabato, and DR.
EMERICO V. ESCOBILLO, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Claudius G. Barroso and private respondent Emerico V. Escobilio

were candidates for mayor of the municipality of Tampakan, Cotabato in May 11,
1998 elections. Private respondent and filed with the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) several cases against petitioner. He filed SPC 98-009, a pre-proclamation
protest under Section 234 of the Omnibus Election Code alleging massive vote-
buying, bribery, terrorism by petitioner and opening of ballot boxes outside the
precincts in at least thirteen (13) of the sixty-three (63) precincts in the municipality.

Private respondent also filed SPC 98-124, another pre-proclamation case under
Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code. In addition, he filed SPA 98-359 for
petitioner's disqualification alleging election offenses committed by the latter. He
likewise filed two (2) criminal complaints against petitioner with the Law Department
326
of the Comelec: Election Offense Case No. 161 for illegal possession of firearm and
violation of the gun ban, and Election Offense Case. No. 177 for massive vote-
buying.

On July 27, 1998, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial court, Branch 24,
Koronadal, South Cotabato a petition contesting petitioner's election. The election
contest was docketed as E.C. Case No. 15-24. Private respondent certified in his
petition that SPA 98-359 and Election Offense Cases Nos. 161 and 177 were then
pending.

Petitioner raised several affirmative defense in his answer, particularly, private

respondent's failure to disclose to the court the pendency of the two (2) pre-
proclamation controversies — SPC 98-009 and SPC 98-124. Petitioner thereafter
filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on his affirmative defenses and sought the
dismissal of the petition for non-compliance with Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. The
motion was granted and the parties were required to submit their respective
memoranda.

Issue: Whether or not the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal
construction.

Ruling: Yes. The strict application of non-forum shopping rule in the case at bar
would not work to the best interest of the parties and the electorate. An election
contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public interest. The purpose
of an election protest ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of
canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction of the
canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. An
election contest therefore involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary
interests of rival candidates but paramount to their claims is the deep public concern
involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the real choice of the
electorate. And the court has the corresponding duty to ascertain by all means within
its command who is the real candidate elected by the people. 

The certification against forum shopping is required under Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, viz:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
327
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c)
if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or
is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient
implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections and for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
Comelec.

VIOLAGO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 194143
October 4, 2011

FACTS:
Herein petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the mayoralty race
during the May 10, 2010 elections in the City of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Private
respondent was proclaimed the winner.

On May 21, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition with the COMELEC questioning the
proclamation of private respondent on the following grounds: (1) massive vote-
buying; (2) intimidation and harassment; (3) election fraud; (4) non-appreciation by
the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines of valid votes cast during the said
election; and, (5) irregularities due to non-observance of the guidelines set by the
COMELEC.

Thereafter, the COMELEC 2nd Division issued an Order setting the preliminary
conference on August 12, 2010 and directing the parties to file their Preliminary
Conference Briefs at least one (1) day before the scheduled conference. Private

328
respondent filed her Brief on the day before the schedule. Petitioner, on the other
hand, filed his Brief on the day of the scheduled preliminary conference.

Petitioner, likewise, filed an Urgent Motion to Reset Preliminary Conference on the

ground that he did not receive any notice and only came to know of it when he
inquired with the COMELEC a day before the scheduled conference. 

The COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed petitioner’s protest. Petitioner then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc contending that it was only
on August 16, 2010 that he received a copy of the Order of the COMELEC which set
the preliminary conference on August 12, 2010.

COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration on the ground

that petitioner failed to file a verified motion in violation of Section 3, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in

denying petitioner's MR.

RULING: Yes. With respect to the COMELEC en banc’s denial of petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration, it is true that Section 3, Rule 20 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure on Disputes in an Automated Election System, as well as Section 3, Rule
19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, clearly require that a motion for
reconsideration should be verified. However, the settled rule is that the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction.

In Quintos v. Commission on Elections, this Court held that "the alleged lack of
verification of private respondent’s Manifestation and Motion for Partial
Reconsideration is merely a technicality that should not defeat the will of the
electorate. The COMELEC may liberally construe or even suspend its rules of
procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all
matters pending before the COMELEC."

Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal construction. This
liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of
the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections and for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and

329
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Comelec. Thus, we
have declared:

It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized by
all courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated
by mere technical objections. An election contest, unlike an ordinary action, is
imbued with public interest since it involves not only the adjudication of the private
interests of rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty
which beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge
the prerogatives of the office within their gift. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to
keep in office for an uncertain period one who’s right to it is under suspicion. It is
imperative that his claim be immediately cleared not only for the benefit of the winner
but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside
technicalities of procedure which protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action.

G.R. No. 195649               April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.

Facts: Respondent Arnado (Arnado) is a natural born Filipino citizen. Arnado was
subsequently naturalizaed as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his
Filipino citizenship. Arnado  then applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and
took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008 and an
Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his
favor. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to

disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.  Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a
330
resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto
a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." As well as Arnado’s use of his American
Passport. Arnado was the declared the Mayor of Kauswagan Lanao Del Norte

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of

Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion
for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. 

Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, he
claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his
proclamation makes him the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number
of lawful votes, thus should be proclaimed as the winner.

Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Arnado be disqualified to run for the Mayoralty
position?
Whether or not Petitioner, Maquiling is legitimate candidate to be declared as Mayor
in lieu of Arnado’s disqualification?

Ruling:

Yes, the court held that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado
of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it
took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using
his US passport. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s
nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to
run for an elective position

Yes, Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been
counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes. Wherefore the courts declared that CASAN MACODE MAQUILING
331
having garnered the second highest votes is the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.

G.R. No. 177711 : September 5, 2012

SUICO INDUSTRIAL CORP., and SPOUSES ESMERALDO and ELIZABETH

SUICO, Petitioners, v. HON. MARILYN LAGURA-YAP, Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28; PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT
CORP. OF THE PHILIS. (PDCP now First E-Bank); and ANTONIO
AGRODEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

REYES, J.:

FACTS: In 1993, respondent Private Development Corporation of the Philippines

(PDCP Bank), later renamed as First E-Bank and now Prime Media Holdings, Inc.,
foreclosed the mortgage constituted on two real estate properties in Mandaue City
then owned by petitioners and mortgagor-spouses Esmeraldo and Elizabeth Suico,
following petitioner Suico Industrial Corporations failure to pay the balance of two
secured loans it obtained from the bank in 1987 and 1991. PDCP Bank emerged as

332
the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the properties, as evidenced by a
Certificate of Sale dated February 29, 1993 issued by the Sheriff of Mandaue City.

The mortgagors failure to redeem the foreclosed properties within the period allowed
by law resulted in the consolidation of ownership in favor of PDCP Bank and the
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 34987 and 34988 in the banks name.
The enforcement of a writ of possession obtained by PDCP Bank from the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Mandaue City, Branch

28, was however enjoined by an injunctive writ obtained by the petitioners on

January 17, 1995 from the RTC, Mandaue City, Branch 56, where they filed on
December 9, 1994 an action for specific performance, injunction and damages to
prevent PDCP Bank from selling and taking possession of the foreclosed properties.
Petitioners alleged in said action for specific performance that they had an
agreement with PDCP Bank to intentionally default in their payments so that the
mortgaged properties could be foreclosed and purchased during public auction by
the bank. After consolidation of title in the banks name, PDCP Bank, allegedly, was
to allow the petitioners to purchase the properties for P 5,000,000.00 through a
recommended buyer. Petitioners then claimed that PDCP Bank increased the
properties selling price, thereby preventing their recommended buyers from
purchasing them.

ISSUE: Whether or not a review of the records of the case shows that the Order
dismissing the Complaint was received by plaintiffs through counsel

RULING: This Court finds the petition dismissible.

Given the antecedents that led to the filing of this petition, and the fact that the
timeliness of an appeal from the RTCs dismissal of the action for specific
performance is a crucial issue that will determine whether or not the other issues
resolved by the RTC can still be validly questioned at this time, we find it proper to
first resolve the question on the RTCs ruling that the petitioners notice of appeal was
filed out of time.

A party is given a "fresh period" of

fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
courts resolution on a motion for

333
reconsideration within which to file
a notice of appeal.

Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court prescribes the period to appeal from
judgments or final orders of RTCs, as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sec. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal
is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. x x x.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.

In Neypes v. Court of Appeals decided by this Court on September 14, 2005, we

ruled that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules of Court and to
afford litigants a fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Said "fresh period rule" also aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform. It eradicates the confusion as to when the fifteen (15)-day appeal
period should be counted from receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of notice
of final order appealed from.

Thus, in similar cases decided by this Court after Neypes, the fresh period rule was
applied, thereby allowing appellants who had filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration the full fifteen (15)-day period from receipt of the resolution resolving
the motion within which to file a notice of appeal. Among these cases is Sumiran v.
Damaso, wherein we reiterated our ruling in Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes and
De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat to explain that the rule can be applied to actions
pending upon its effectivity:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals that
by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new
procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would

334
standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion
as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. x x x

Tomas vs. Santos 

G.R. No. 190448. July 26, 2010
FEDERICO D. TOMAS, petitioner, vs. ANN G. SANTOS, respondent. 
NACHURA, J.: 

FACTS:
COMPLAINT AGAINST PETITIONERS
(Santos) filed a complaint for reconveyance of title, declaration of nullity of
assignment and deed of sale, breach of contract, and damages against petitioners
(Tomas) and others. 

335
The subject of the complaint was a real property located in Del Nacia Ville, Sauyo
Road, Novaliches, Quezon City. At the time of the filing of the complaint, the property
was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 81965 in the name of Tomas. 

DISMISSED COUNTERCLAIM, LACKS CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM

SHOPPING
Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared Tomas in default and dismissed his
counterclaim on the ground that his answer lacked a certification of non-forum
shopping, proof of service, and an explanation why personal service was not
resorted to in furnishing a copy of his answer to Santos. 

DISMISSED DUE TO TECHNICAL GROUNDS

After several of Tomas’s motions for reconsideration is denied by the RTC, he filed
his appeal with the Court of Appeals which he denominated “Petition for Review”
which was dismissed due to technical grounds.

Hence, this petition anchored both on procedural and substantial grounds, i.e.
assailing the outright dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Appeals, as well as the
judgment of the RTC on the merits of the case.

There was no allegation whatsoever of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC, but rather merely a recitation of what
Tomas perceived as a reversible error committed by the RTC based on the issues
raised and the discussions made in his appeal.

ISSUE
Whether or not technicality and procedural imperfection should serve as bases of
decisions in the case of Tomas.

RULING
No. Courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax
compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character.

The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be simply disregarded as
they ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. 

336
However, it is equally true that courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and they
have the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most
mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put
an end to litigation and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard. 

This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after
giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and
procedural imperfection should, thus, not serve as bases of decisions. In that way,
the ends of justice would be served.

WHEREFORE¸ the assailed Resolutions dated July 29, 2009 and November 26,
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 109646 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The appeal of Federico D. Tomas before the Court of Appeals is
REINSTATED. No costs.

BPI v. Dando
G.R. No. 177456
September 4, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

FACTS:
On or about 12 August 1994, Dando availed of a loan in the amount of ₱750,000.00
from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), under a Privilege Cheque Credit
Line Agreement.

337
Dando defaulted in the payment of the principal amount of the loan, as well as the
interest and penalties thereon. Despite repeated demands, Dando refused and/or
failed to pay his just and valid obligation.

In 2000, BPI and FEBTC merged, with the former as the surviving entity, thus,
absorbing the rights and obligations of the latter. On 13 March 2003, BPI filed before
the RTC a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against Dando.

After Dando filed with the RTC his Answer with Counterclaim, BPI filed its Motion to
Set Case for Pre-Trial. When the parties appeared before the RTC on 18 August
2003 for the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference, Dando orally moved for the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 03-281, citing Sections 5 and 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.

On calling this case for the pre-trial conference, counsel for both parties appeared
and even [respondent] Domingo R. Dando appeared. The attention of the Court was
called by the counsel for the [respondent Dando] that the counsel for the [petitioner
BPI] only filed her Pre-Trial Brief today at 9:00 o’clock in the morning instead of at
least three days before the pre-trial conference, as required by the Rules. This
prompted the counsel for the [respondent Dando] to ask for the dismissal of the case
for violation of Rule 18 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

In this case, the BPI stated in its motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing
its action that the delay in the filing of the pre-trial brief was solely due to the heavy
load of paper work of its counsel, not to mention the daily hearings the latter had to
attend.
Initially, the RTC, through Acting Presiding Judge Pimentel favored Dando and
dismissed the civil case. However, later on, the RTC, now presided by Judge
Untalan reversed its previous ruling and finds merit in BPI’s motion. Thereafter, the
CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration of BPI for lack of merit. Thus, this case
appeared before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA is correct when it strictly applied the Rules of Procedure?

RULING:
No. The Court held that the CA is not correct when it strictly applied the Rules of
Procedure.

338
In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, the Court restated the reasons that may provide
justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules, such as: (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact
that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Herein, BPI instituted a Civil Case before the RTC to recover the amount it had lent
to Dando, plus interest and penalties thereon, clearly, a matter of property. The
substantive right of BPI to recover a due and demandable obligation cannot be
denied or diminished by a rule of procedure, more so, since Dando admits that he
did avail himself of the credit line extended by FEBTC, the predecessor-in-interest of
BPI, and disputes only the amount of his outstanding liability to BPI. To dismiss Civil
Case with prejudice and, thus, bar BPI from recovering the amount it had lent to
Dando would be to unjustly enrich Dando at the expense of BPI.

The counsel of BPI invokes "heavy pressures of work" to explain his failure to file the
Pre-Trial Brief with the RTC and to serve a copy thereof to Dando at least three days
prior to the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference. True, in Olave v. Mistas, we did not find
"heavy pressures of work" as sufficient justification for the failure of therein
respondents’ counsel to timely move for pre-trial. However, unlike the respondents in
Olave, the failure of BPI to file its Pre-Trial Brief with the RTC and provide Dando
with a copy thereof within the prescribed period under Section 1, Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court, was the first and, so far, only procedural lapse committed by the
bank in the Civil Case. BPI did not manifest an evident pattern or scheme to delay
the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe a mandatory requirement of
the Rules. In fact, BPI, for the most part, exhibited diligence and reasonable dispatch
in prosecuting its claim against Dando by immediately moving to set Civil Case for
Pre-Trial Conference after its receipt of Dando’s Answer to the Complaint; and in
instantaneously filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 October 2003 Order of
the RTC dismissing Civil Case.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The CA’s

decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

339
SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and
DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA, Petitioners,
vs.
MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204528
February 19, 2013
 
Facts:
340
Respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The Amparo was directed against
petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and
Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation (DE
LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease and desist from
framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges
of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush
incident."

Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons
and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also set the case for hearing on 1
March 2012. The hearing was held allegedly for determining whether a temporary
protection order may be issued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al.
manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases.

Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s]ince no writ has been issued, return is not the
required pleading but answer". The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply
suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary
Procedure applied and thus required an Answer. Judge Pampilo proceeded to
conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March 2012. Even without a Return nor an
Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5)
working days after that hearing. Since the period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed
by then, the judge also decided that the memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be
filed in lieu of their Answer.

The RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The

RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection,
production and inspection orders. The production and inspection orders were in
relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of the
attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. It is not clear from the
records how these pieces of evidence may be related to the alleged threat to the life,
liberty or security of the respondent Gatdula. The RTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012 filed by De Lima, et al.

ISSUE:

341
Whether or not the “Decision” dated March 20, 2012 could be a judgement or final
order that is appealable via Rule 45 enunciated under Section 19 of the Rule of Writ
of Amparo.

RULING:

No. The “Decision” dated 20 March 2012 is an interlocutory order since it pertained
to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not the
judgement under Section 18. The “decision” being interlocutory order is suggested
by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given
together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection
orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition
but before final judgement is rendered. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45
may not yet be the proper remedy at this time since such remedy can only be availed
for the final order such as a judgement under Section 18 of the Rule on Amparo.

G.R. No. 163653               July 19, 2011

342
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs.
FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

Facts:
On various dates during the years 1996 and 1997, in the meantime, FDC also
extended advances in favor of its affiliates, namely, FAI, FLI, Davao Sugar Central
Corporation (DSCC) and Filinvest Capital, Inc. (FCI). Duly evidenced by instructional
letters as well as cash and journal vouchers, said cash advances amounted to
₱2,557,213,942.60 in 1996 and ₱3,360,889,677.48 in 1997.

On 3 January 2000, FDC received from the BIR a Formal Notice of Demand to pay
deficiency income and documentary stamp taxes, plus interests and compromise
penalties. The foregoing deficiency taxes were assessed on the taxable gain
supposedly realized by FDC from the Deed of Exchange it executed with FAI and
FLI, on the dilution resulting from the Shareholders’ Agreement FDC executed with
RHPL as well as the "arm’s-length" interest rate and documentary stamp taxes
imposable on the advances FDC extended to its affiliates.

On 26 January 2000 or within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days from notice
of the assessment, both FDC and FAI filed their respective requests for
reconsideration/protest, on the ground that the deficiency income and documentary
stamp taxes assessed by the BIR were bereft of factual and legal basis.

CTA went on to render the Decision dated 10 September 2002 which, with the
exception of the deficiency income tax on the interest income FDC supposedly
realized from the advances it extended in favor of its affiliates, cancelled the rest of
deficiency income and documentary stamp taxes assessed against FDC and FAI for
the years 1996 and 1997.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, FDC filed on 5 November 2002 the petition
for review docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. No. 72992, pursuant to Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Calling attention to the fact that the cash advances it
extended to its affiliates were interest-free in the absence of the express stipulation
on interest required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, FDC questioned the
imposition of an arm's-length interest rate thereon on the ground, among others, that
the CIR's authority under Section 43 of the NIRC: (a) does not include the power to
impute imaginary interest on said transactions; (b) is directed only against controlled
343
taxpayers and not against mother or holding corporations; and, (c) can only be
invoked in cases of understatement of taxable net income or evident tax evasion.
Upholding FDC's position, the CA's then Special Fifth Division granted the petition.
The CIR's petitions for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not can the CIR impute theoretical interest on the advances made by
Filinvest to its affiliates.

Ruling:

NO. Despite the seemingly broad power of the CIR to distribute, apportion and
allocate gross income under (now) Section 50 of the Tax Code, the same does not
include the power to impute theoretical interests even with regard to controlled
taxpayers’ transactions. This is true even if the CIR is able to prove that interest
expense (on its own loans) was in fact claimed by the lending entity. The term in the
definition of gross income that even those income “from whatever source derived” is
covered still requires that there must be actual or at least probable receipt or
realization of the item of gross income sought to be apportioned, distributed, or
allocated. 

Pursuant to Article 1956 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, no interest shall be due
unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. Considering that taxes, being
burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute expressly and
clearly declares, the rule is likewise settled that tax statutes must be construed
strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Accordingly, the
general rule of requiring adherence to the letter in construing statutes applies with
peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions of a taxing act are not to be
extended by implication. While it is true that taxes are the lifeblood of the
government, it has been held that their assessment and collection should be in
accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government
itself.

344
G.R. No. 120082 September 11, 1996
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. HON. FERDINAND
J. MARCOS

FACTS:

Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by virtue
of Republic Act No. 6958, mandated to "principally undertake the economical,
efficient and effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan
International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City.
Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption
from payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its Charter.

On October 11, 1994, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the

Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels
of land belonging to the petitioner located in Cebu City, in the total amount of
P2,229,078.79.

Petitioner objected claiming in its favor Section 14 of RA 6958 which exempt it from
payment of realty taxes. It was also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the
government performing governmental functions, citing section 133 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which puts limitations on the taxing powers of local
government units. 
Respondent City then argued that the MCIAA is a government-controlled corporation
whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and
234 of the Local Governmental Code that took effect on January 1, 1992.
The trial court dismissed the petition and ruled that with the repealing clause in RA
7160, it is safe to infer and state that the tax exemption provided for in Section 14 of
RA 6958 had been expressly repealed by the provisions of the New Local
Government Code of 1991. So that petitioner in this case has to pay the assessed
realty tax of its properties effective after January 1, 1992 until the present. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not MCIAA can still avail the tax exemption granted to it by Section 14 of
RA 6958 in view of the provisions of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government
Code

RULING:

345
NO. The MCIAA cannot avail tax exemption. 
Tax statutes must be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor
of the taxpayer. But since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the
lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes
granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers
and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of exemption from tax payment
must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be
mistaken. Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefrom is the
exception. 
Under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment of
realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions,
agencies, and instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and
exemption therefrom the exception, the exemption may thus be withdrawn at the
pleasure of the taxing authority. The only exception to this rule is where the
exemption was granted to private parties based on material consideration of a
mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus covered by the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution.

Section 234 of LGC provides for the exemptions from payment of real property
taxes and withdraws previous exemptions therefrom granted to natural and juridical
persons, including government owned and controlled corporations, except as
provided therein. Likewise, Section 193 of the LGC provides that tax exemptions or
incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical,
including government-owned, or controlled corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, non stock and non profit hospitals and
educational constitutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.

Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity
of the LGC, exemptions from real property taxes granted to natural or juridical
persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except as provided
in the said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned
corporation, it necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in
Section 14 of its charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn. In short, the petitioner
can no longer invoke the general rule in Section 133 that the taxing powers of the
local government units cannot extend to the levy of:

(o) taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies, or
instrumentalities, and local government units.

346
G.R. No. L-69344             April 26, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SPOUSES ANTONIO and CLARA
PASTOR, respondents.
 
FACTS:
Republic of the Philippines, through the BIR, filed in the Court of First Instance, to
collect from the spouses Antonio Pastor and Clara Reyes-Pastor deficiency income
taxes for the years 1955 to 1959 with surcharge and monthly interest, and costs. The
Pastors filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, but the motion was denied. They
filed an answer admitting there was an assessment against them for income tax
deficiency but denying liability therefor. They contended that they had availed of the
tax amnesty under P.D.’s Nos. 23, 213 and 370 and had paid the corresponding
amnesty taxes amounting of their reported untaxed income under P.D. 23, and a
final payment on October 26, 1973 under P.D. 370 evidenced by the Government’s
Official Receipt. The trial court held that the respondents had settled their income tax
deficiency for the years 1955 to 1959, not under P.D. 23 or P.D. 370, but under P.D.
213.

The Government appealed to the Intermediate Appellant Court, alleging that the
private respondents were not qualified to avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213 for
the benefits of that decree are available only to persons who had no pending
assessment for unpaid taxes, as provided in Revenue Regulations Nos. 8-72 and 7-
73. Since the Pastors did in fact have a pending assessment against them, they
were precluded from availing of the amnesty granted in P.D.’s Nos. 23 and 213. The
Government further argued that “tax exemptions should be interpreted strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer. The Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals)
rendered a decision dismissing the Government’s appeal and holding that the
payment of deficiency income taxes by the Pastors under PD. No. 213, and the
acceptance thereof by the Government, operated to divest the latter of its right to
further recover deficiency income taxes from the private respondents pursuant to the
existing deficiency tax assessment against them
 
ISSUES:

347
Whether or not the tax amnesty payments made by the private respondents bar an
action for recovery of deficient income taxes under P.D.’s Nos. 23, 213 and 370.

RULING:
YES. It would bar an action to recover deficient income taxes.
 [T]he Government is estopped from collecting the difference between the deficiency
tax assessment and the amount already paid by them as amnesty tax. The finding of
the appellate court that the deficiency income taxes were paid by the Pastors, and
accepted by the Government, under P.D. 213, granting amnesty to persons who are
required by law to file income tax returns but who failed to do so, is entitled to the
highest respect and may not be disturbed except under exceptional circumstances
The rule is that in case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the
Government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer strictisimi juris for taxes, being
burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute (in this case
P.D. 213) expressly and clearly declares.

348
LINCOLN PHILIPPINE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. (now JARDINE-CMG
LIFE INSURANCE CO. INC.), petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 118043
July 23, 1998

FACTS:

Lincoln Philippine Life Insurance Company, Inc. (Lincoln), now Jardine-CMG Life
Insurance Company, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the life insurance
business. In 1984, it issued 50,000 shares of stock as stock dividends, with a par
value of P100 or a total of P5 million. Lincoln paid documentary stamp taxes on each
certificate on the basis of its par value. 

 
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue took the view that the book value of the
shares should be used as basis for determining the amount of the documentary
stamp tax. This led to the Internal Revenue Commissioner to issue a deficiency
documentary stamp tax assessment in excess of the par value of the stock
dividends. However, the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) rendered its decision
holding that the amount of the documentary stamp tax should be based on the
par value stated on each certificate of stock. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue was ordered to desist from collecting said deficiency documentary stamp
taxes for the same are considered withdrawn.

In turn, Commissioner of Internal Revenue appealed to the Court of Appeals which

held that in assessing the tax in question, the basis should be the actual value
represented by the subject shares on the assumption that stock dividends,
being a distinct class of shares, are not subject to the qualification in the law as

349
to the type of certificate of stock used (with or without par value). The CA ordered
Lincoln to pay the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the deficiency of documentary
stamp tax on the stock dividends it issued. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not stock dividends involving shares with par value are subject to
documentary stamp tax based on the actual value represented by each share.
 
RULING: The Court ruled that yes, the stock dividends involving shares with par
value are subject to documentary tax based on the actual value represented by each
share.

It is a settled rule that, in case of doubt, tax laws must be construed strictly
against the State and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. This is because taxes,
as burdens which must be endured by the taxpayer, should not be presumed to go
beyond what the law expressly and clearly declares. That such strict construction
is necessary in this case is evidenced by the change in the subject provision as
presently worded, which now expressly levies the said tax on shares of stock as
against the privilege of issuing certificates of stock as formerly provided:

Sec. 175. Stamp Tax on Original Issue of Shares of Stock. — On every original

issue, whether on organization, reorganization or for any lawful purpose, of shares of
stock by any association, company or corporation, there shall be collected a
documentary stamp tax of Two pesos (P2.00) on each Two hundred pesos (P200),
or fractional part thereof, of the par value, of such shares of stock: Provided, That in
the case of the original issue of shares of stock without par value the amount of the
documentary stamp tax herein prescribed shall be based upon the actual
consideration for the issuance of such shares of stock: Provided, further, That in the
case of stock dividends, on the actual value represented by each share.

In this case, it is clearly stated in Sec. 175 that in the case of stock dividend, the
amount to be collected for a documentary stamp shall be based on the actual value
represented by each share. Lincoln who paid documentary stamp taxes on each
certificate on the basis of its par value is correct. The CIR cannot oblige Lincoln to
pay the deficiency documentary stamp tax assessments for their basis of
computation of such was incorrect. It was clearly provided by Section 175 of the Tax
Code that the computation must be based on the actual value presented by each

350
share. Thus, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as the
deficiency tax assessment on stock dividends is concerned and the decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals was reinstated.

Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation, Petitioner, Vs.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent
G.R. No. 159471
January 26, 2011
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner is a zero-rated Value Added Tax (VAT) person for being an exportr of
copper concentrates. On January, 20, 1994, it filed its VAT return for the fourth
quarter of 1993 showing a total input tax of P863,556,963.74 and an excess VAT
credit of P842,336,291.60. 

On January 25, 1996, it applied for a tax refund or a tax credit certificate for the latter
amount with CIR (respondent). On the same date, petitioner filed the same claim for
refund with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), claiming that the two-year prescriptive
period provided for under Section 230 of the Tax Code for claiming a refund was
about to expire. 

The CTA denied the petitioner’s claim for refund due to failure to comply with the
required documents. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the CTA.

The Petitioner argued that the CA erred in upholding the court of tax appeals' finding
in its decision dated 24 August 1998 that petitioner, in not submitting its export
documents, failed to present adequate proof that its input taxes are directly
attributable to its export sales.

Petitioner is basically asking the Court to review the factual findings of the CTA and
the CA. Petitioner insists that it had presented the necessary documents or copies
thereof with the CTA that would prove that it is entitled to a tax refund.

351
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was able to show adequate evidence that it is entitled
to a tax refund.

RULING: 
No. The Court noted that when claiming a tax refund/ credit, the VAT registered
taxpayer must be able to establish that it does not have refundable or creditable
input VAT and the same has not been applied against its output VAT liabilities -
information which are supposed to be reflected in the taxpayer's VAT returns. Thus,
the application must be included with copies of the taxpayer’s VAT returns for the
taxable quarters concerned. 

In this case, the petitioners failed to submit a copy of their 1994 first quarter VAT
return, which is necessary for purposes determining whether or not the claimed input
taxes were applied to any of its output tax liability in the first quarter or in the
succeeding quarters of 1994.

“The formal offer of evidence of the petitioner failed to include photocopy of its export
documents, as required. There is no way therefore, in determining the kind of goods
and actual amount of export sales it allegedly made during the quarter involved. This
finding is very crucial when we try to relate it with the requirement of the
aforementioned regulations that the input tax being claimed for refund or tax credit
must be shown to be entirely attributable to the zero-rated transaction, in this case,
export sales of goods. Without the export documents, the purchase invoice/receipts
submitted by the petitioner as proof of its input taxes cannot be verified as being
directly attributable to the goods so exported.”

352
ACCENTURE, INC., petitioner, 
vs. 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
 G.R. No. 190102, July 11, 2012

FACTS: 
Accenture Inc. (Accenture) s a corporation engaged in the business of providing
management consulting, business strategies development, and selling and/or
licensing of software that is registered with the BIR as a VAT taxpayer in accordance
with Section 236 of the National Internal Revenue Code. 
The monthly and quarterly VAT returns of Accenture show that, notwithstanding its
application of the input VAT credits earned from its zero-rated transactions against
its output VAT liabilities, it still had excess or unutilized input VAT credits in the
amount of P37,038,269.18. Thus, Accenture filed with the Department of
Finance(DoF) an administrative claim for the refund or the issuance of a Tax Credit
Certificate (TCC). When the DoF did not act on the claim, Accenture filed a Petition
for Review with CTA praying for the issuance of a TCC in its favor. 

The CIR ruled that Accenture’s sales of goods and services to its clients are not
zero-rated transactions and that it failed to prove that it is entitled to a refund due to
lack of documentation. The CIR emphasized that to qualify for the zero-rating under
the 1997 Tax Code, it should be proven that the recipient of the services was doing
business outside of the Philippines. Since Accenture failed to prove that their foreign
clients who rendered the former services were conducting business outside
Philippines, it is not entitled to refund. 

The CTA affirmed the CIR’s decision. 

ISSUE: 

353
Whether or not Accenture is entitled to tax refund.

RULING:

The Court held NO.

The fact that the clients are foreign does not automatically mean that they were
conducting business outside the Philippines. Section 22 of the Tax Code provides: x
x x (H) The term “resident foreign corporation” applies to a foreign corporation
engaged in trade or business within the Philippines; (I) The term “nonresident foreign
corporation” applies to a foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business within
the Philippines”.

Consequently, to come within the purview of Section 108 (B) (2), it is not enough that
the recipient of the service be proven to be a foreign corporation; rather, it must be
specifically proven to be a nonresident foreign corporation.

There is no specific criterion as to what constitutes "doing" or "engaging in" or

"transacting" business. here is no specific criterion as to what constitutes "doing" or
"engaging in" or "transacting" business. 

A taxpayer claiming a tax credit or refund has the burden of proof to establish the
factual basis of that claim. Tax refunds, like tax exemptions, are construed strictly
against the taxpayer. 54

Accenture failed to discharge this burden. It alleged and presented evidence to

prove only that its clients were foreign entities. However, as found by both the CTA
Division and the CTA En Banc, no evidence was presented by Accenture to prove
the fact that the foreign clients to whom petitioner rendered its services were clients
doing business outside the Philippines.

As ruled by the CTA En Banc, the Official Receipts, Intercompany Payment

Requests, Billing Statements, Memo Invoices-Receivable, Memo Invoices-Payable,
and Bank Statements presented by Accenture merely substantiated the existence of
sales, receipt of foreign currency payments, and inward remittance of the proceeds
of such sales duly accounted for in accordance with BSP rules, all of these were
devoid of any evidence that the clients were doing business outside of the
Philippines. 55

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The 22 September

2009 Decision and the 23 October 2009 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En
Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 477, dismissing the Petition for the refund of the excess or
unutilized input VAT credits of Accenture, Inc., are AFFIRMED.
354
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
S.C. JOHNSON AND SON, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 127105 June 25, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

FACTS

JOHNSON AND SON, INC a domestic corporation, entered into a license agreement
with SC Johnson and Son, United States of America (USA), a non-resident foreign
corporation based in the U.S.A. pursuant to which the [respondent] was granted the
right to use the trademark, patents and technology owned by the latter including the
right to manufacture, package and distribute the products covered by the Agreement
and secure assistance in management, marketing and production from SC Johnson
and Son, U. S. A.

The said License Agreement was duly registered with the Technology Transfer
Board of the Bureau of Patents, Trade Marks and Technology Transfer under
Certificate of Registration No. 8064 . For the use of the trademark or technology, SC
JOHNSON AND SON, INC was obliged to pay SC Johnson and Son, USA royalties
based on a percentage of net sales and subjected the same to 25% withholding tax
on royalty payments which respondent paid for the period covering July 1992 to May
1993. 

On October 29, 1993, SC JOHNSON AND SON, USA filed with the International Tax
Affairs Division (ITAD) of the BIR a claim for refund of overpaid withholding tax on

355
royalties arguing that, since the agreement was approved by the Technology
Transfer Board, the preferential tax rate of 10% should apply to the respondent.
Respondent submits that royalties paid to SC Johnson and Son, USA is only subject
to 10% withholding tax pursuant to the most-favored nation clause of the RP-US Tax
Treaty in relation to the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty. The Internal Tax Affairs
Division of the BIR ruled against SC Johnson and Son, Inc. and an appeal was filed
by the former to the Court of tax appeals. The CTA ruled against CIR and ordered
that a tax credit be issued in favor of SC Johnson and Son, Inc. Unpleased with the
decision, the CIR filed an appeal to the CA which subsequently affirmed in toto the
decision of the CTA. Hence, an appeal on certiorari was filed to the SC.

ISSUE:
WON SC JOHNSON AND SON,USA IS ENTITLED TO THE MOST FAVORED
NATION TAX RATE OF 10% ON ROYALTIES AS PROVIDED IN THE RP-US TAX
TREATY IN RELATION TO THE RP-WEST GERMANY TAX TREATY.

RULING:
NO, The concessional tax rate of 10 percent provided for in the RP-Germany Tax
Treaty could not apply to taxes imposed upon royalties in the RP-US Tax Treaty
since the two taxes imposed under the two tax treaties are not paid under similar
circumstances, they are not containing similar provisions on tax crediting.

The United States is the state of residence since the taxpayer, S. C. Johnson and
Son, U. S. A., is based there. Under the RP-US Tax Treaty, the state of residence
and the state of source are both permitted to tax the royalties, with a restraint on the
tax that may be collected by the state of source. Furthermore, the method employed
to give relief from double taxation is the allowance of a tax credit to citizens or
residents of the United States against the United States tax, but such amount shall
not exceed the limitations provided by United States law for the taxable year. The
Philippines may impose one of three rates- 25 percent of the gross amount of the
royalties; 15 percent when the royalties are paid by a corporation registered with the
Philippine Board of Investments and engaged in preferred areas of activities; or the
lowest rate of Philippine tax that may be imposed on royalties of the same kind paid
under similar circumstances to a resident of a third state.

356
Given the purpose underlying tax treaties and the rationale for the most favored
nation clause, the Tax Treaty should apply only if the taxes imposed upon royalties
in the RP-US Tax Treaty and in the RP-Germany Tax Treaty are paid under similar
circumstances. This would mean that private respondent must prove that the RP-US
Tax Treaty grants similar tax reliefs to residents of the United States in respect of the
taxes imposable upon royalties earned from sources within the Philippines as those
allowed to their German counterparts under the RPGermany Tax Treaty. The RP-US
and the RP-West Germany Tax Treaties do not contain similar provisions on tax
crediting. Article 24 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, supra, expressly allows crediting
against German income and corporation tax of 20% of the gross amount of royalties
paid under the law of the Philippines. On the other hand, Article 23 of the RP-US Tax
Treaty, which is the counterpart provision with respect to relief for double taxation,
does not provide for similar crediting of 20% of the gross amount of royalties paid.

At the same time, the intention behind the adoption of the provision on relief from
double taxation in the two tax treaties in question should be considered in light of the
purpose behind the most favored nation clause.

TAX REFUNDS ARE IN THE NATURE OF TAX EXEMPTIONS, AND AS SUCH

THEY ARE REGARDED AS IN DEROGATION OF SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY AND
TO BE CONSTRUED STRICTISSIMI JURIS AGAINST THE PERSON OR ENTITY
CLAIMING THE EXEMPTION.

It bears stress that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such they are
regarded as in derogation of sovereign authority and to be construed strictissimi juris
against the person or entity claiming the exemption. The burden of proof is upon him
who claims the exemption in his favor and he must be able to justify his claim by the
clearest grant of organic or statute law. Private respondent is claiming for a refund of
the alleged overpayment of tax on royalties; however, there is nothing on record to
support a claim that the tax on royalties under the RP-US Tax Treaty is paid under
similar circumstances as the tax on royalties under the RP-West Germany Tax
Treaty. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 309
SCRA 87, G.R. No. 127105 June 25, 1999

357
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines
G.R. No. 163835 
July 7, 2010
Brion, J.

Facts:
Eastern filed with the CIR a written application for refund or credit of unapplied input
taxes it paid on the imported equipment purchased during 1995 and 1996 amounting
to P22,013,134.00. To toll the running of the two-year prescriptive period under the
same provision, Eastern filed an appeal with the CTA. The CTA found that Eastern
has a valid claim for the refund/credit of the unapplied input taxes, declaring it
entitled to a tax refund of P16,229,100.00.

The CIR filed a motion for reconsideration of the CTA’s decision. Subsequently, it
filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. The CTA denied the CIR’s motion
for reconsideration. The CIR then elevated the case to the CA, who affirmed the CTA
ruling and likewise denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
present petition.

The CIR posits that, applying Section 104(A) of the Tax Code on apportionment of
tax credits, Eastern is entitled to a tax refund of only a portion of the amount claimed.
Since the VAT returns clearly reflected income from exempt sales, the CIR asserts
that this constitutes as an admission on Eastern’s part that it engaged in transactions

358
not subject to VAT. Hence, the proportionate allocation of the tax credit to VAT and
non-VAT transactions provided in Section 104(A) of the Tax Code should apply.

Eastern objects to the arguments raised in the petition, alleging that these have not
been raised in the Answer filed by the CIR before the CTA and was only raised. In
fact, the CIR only raised the applicability of Section 104(A) of the Tax Code in his
supplemental motion for reconsideration of the CTA’s ruling. Eastern claims that for
the CIR to raise such an issue now would constitute a violation of its right to due
process; following settled rules of procedure and fair play, the CIR should not be
allowed at the appeal level to change his theory of the case.

Eastern further argues that there is no evidence on record that would evidently show
that respondent is also engaged in other transactions that are not subject to VAT.

Issue:
Whether or not the rule in Section 104(A) of the Tax Code on the apportionment of
tax credits can be applied in appreciating Eastern’s claim for tax refund, considering
that the matter was raised by the CIR only when he sought reconsideration of the
CTA ruling

Ruling:
Yes. The question of the applicability of Section 104(A) of the Tax Code was already
raised but the tax court did not rule on it. This failure should not be taken against the
CIR. The mere declaration of exempt sales in the VAT returns, whether based on
Section 103 of the Tax Code or some other special law, should have prompted for
the application of Section 104 (A) of the Tax Code to Eastern’s claim.

The general rule is that appeals can only raise questions of law or fact that (a) were
raised in the court below, and (b) are within the issues framed by the parties therein.
An issue which was neither averred in the pleadings nor raised during trial in the
court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

The rule against raising new issues on appeal is not without exceptions; it is a
procedural rule that the Court may relax when compelling reasons so warrant or
when justice requires it. What constitutes good and sufficient cause that would merit
suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the courts (CIR v. Mirant Pagbilao

359
Corporation, G.R. No. 159593). Another exception is when the question involves
matters of public importance.

“Taxes are the lifeblood of the government.” For this reason, the right of taxation
cannot easily be surrendered; statutes granting tax exemptions are considered as a
derogation of the sovereign authority and are strictly construed against the person or
entity claiming the exemption. Claims for tax refunds, when based on statutes
granting tax exemption or tax refund, partake of the nature of an exemption; thus, the
rule of strict interpretation against the taxpayer-claimant similarly applies.

The taxpayer is charged with the heavy burden of proving that he has complied with
and satisfied all the statutory and administrative requirements to be entitled to the tax
refund. This burden cannot be offset by the non-observance of procedural
technicalities by the government’s tax agents when the non-observance of the
remedial measure addressing it does not in any manner prejudice the taxpayer’s due
process rights.

CIR VS. PROCTER AND GAMBLE PHILIPPINES

G.R NO: 66838

2 DECEMBER 1991

FACTS:

Procter and Gamble Philippines declared dividends payable to its parent company
and sole stockholder, P&G USA. Such dividends amounted to Php 24.1M. P&G Phil
paid a 35% dividend withholding tax to the BIR which amounted to Php 8.3M It
subsequently filed a claim with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for a refund or
tax credit, claiming that pursuant to Section 24(b)(1) of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 369, the applicable rate of
withholding tax on the dividends remitted was only 15%.

ISSUE:

Whether or not P&G Philippines is entitled to the refund or tax credit.

RULING:

YES. P&G Philippines is entitled.

Sec 24 (b) (1) of the NIRC states that an ordinary 35% tax rate will be applied to
dividend remittances to non-resident corporate stockholders of a Philippine
corporation. This rate goes down to 15% ONLY IF  he country of domicile of the
360
foreign stockholder corporation “shall allow” such foreign corporation a tax credit for
“taxes deemed paid in the Philippines,” applicable against the tax payable to the
domiciliary country by the foreign stockholder corporation. However, such tax credit
for “taxes deemed paid in the Philippines” MUST, as a minimum, reach an amount
equivalent to 20 percentage points which represents the difference between the
regular 35% dividend tax rate and the reduced 15% tax rate. Thus, the test is if USA
“shall allow” P&G USA a tax credit for ”taxes deemed paid in the Philippines”
applicable against the US taxes of P&G USA, and such tax credit must reach at least
20 percentage points. Requirements were met.

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES v. KERRY LAO ONG (DIGEST)

18 June 2012
GR No. 175430

Facts: The respondent, Kerry Lao Ong, filed for a petition for naturalization in 1996.
Ong was born in Cebu City to Chinese parents. He was raised and educated in the
Philippines, having studied in the Sacred Heart School for Boys in Cebu, and the
Ateneo de Manila University. In 1981, he married Grezilda Yap, also a Chinese
citizen, and fathered four children, which upon filing of petition were all of school age,
and were enrolled in exclusive schools in Cebu.

In his petition, he alleged that he is a “businessman/business manager,” and has

been since 1989. However, when he testified, he alleged that he has been a
businessman since after he graduated from college in 1978. He made no mention of
the nature of his “business.” He also alleged that he earns an average annual
income of P150,000.00, and presented four tax returns as “proof” of said income
(amounting to P60,000.00, P118,000.00, P118,000.00 and P128,000.00).

In 2001, the trial court granted his petition, and was admitted as a citizen of the
Republic of the Philippines.

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In 2003, The Republic, through the Solicitor General appealed the decision to the
CA, which was then denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ong has proved that he has some lucrative trade, profession or
lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, Paragraph 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law.

RULING:

The Court held that Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.  The burden of
proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of law.

Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of “some known lucrative trade, profession,

or lawful occupation” means “not only that the person having the employment gets
enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment
gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the
object of charity or a public charge. It has been held that in determining the existence
of a lucrative income, the courts should consider only the applicant’s income;
his or her spouse’s income should not be included in the assessment.

The applicant provided no documentary evidence, like business permits, registration,

official receipts, or other business records to demonstrate his proprietorship or
participation in a business. Instead, Ong relied on his general assertions to prove his
possession of “some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation.” Bare,
general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of an
applicant for naturalization.

362
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the
qualification of a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth
paragraph, of the Revised Naturalization Law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines

is GRANTED. The Petition for Naturalization of Kerry Lao Ong is DENIED for failure
to comply with Section 2, fourth paragraph, of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, and MA.

MARGARITA M. GALON, Petitioners,
vs.
PHIL PHARMA WEALTH, INC., Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
G.R. No. 182358, February 20, 2013

FACTS: On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C which
provided for a list and category of sanctions to be imposed on accredited
government suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of adverse findings
regarding their products (e.g. substandard, fake, or misbranded) or violations
committed by them during their accreditation.

DOH, through former Undersecretary Ma. Margarita M. Galon, issued Memorandum

No. 209 series of 2000, inviting representatives of 24 accredited drug companies,
including herein respondent Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting.

363
Undersecretary Galon handed them copies of a document entitled "Report on
Violative Products" issued by the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), which detailed
violations or adverse findings relative to these accredited drug companies’ products.
Specifically, the BFAD found that PPI’s products which were being sold to the public
were unfit for human consumption.

During the meeting, the 24 drug companies were directed to submit within 10 days,
or until November 6, 2000, their respective explanations on the adverse findings
covering their respective products contained in the Report on Violative Products.

Instead of submitting its written explanation within the 10-day period as required, PPI
belatedly sent a letter dated November 13, 2000 addressed to Undersecretary
Galon, informing her that PPI has referred the Report on Violative Products to its
lawyers with instructions to prepare the corresponding reply. Undersecretary Galon
found PPI’s letter "untenable" PPI’s, therein informed PPI that, effective immediately,
its accreditation has been suspended for two years pursuant to AO 10 and
Memorandum No. 171-C.

PPI filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a Complaint seeking to declare
null and void certain DOH administrative issuances, with prayer for damages and
injunction against the DOH, former Secretary Romualdez and DOH Undersecretary
Galon, docketed as Civil Case No. 68200.

The trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 68200, declaring the case to be one
instituted against the State, in which case the principle of state immunity from suit is
applicable. PPI moved for reconsideration, but the trial court remained steadfast. PPI
appealed to the CA.
The CA reversed the trial court ruling and ordered the remand of the case for the
conduct of further proceedings. The CA concluded that it was premature for the trial
court to have dismissed the Complaint.

ISSUE: 

WON Civil Case No. 68200 be dismissed for being a suit against the state?

RULING:

The petition is granted. 

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As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly
or impliedly, then it may be the subject of a suit There is express consent when a
law, either special or general, so provides. On the other hand, there is implied
consent when the state "enters into a contract or it itself commences
litigation." However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it
does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State "will be
deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a
contract in its proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves
its sovereign or governmental capacity [,] x x x no such waiver may be implied."
"Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For,
waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.”

The DOH can validly invoke state immunity.

The DOH, being an "unincorporated agency of the government" can validly invoke

the defense of immunity from suit because it has not consented, either expressly or
impliedly, to be sued. Significantly, the DOH is an unincorporated agency which
performs functions of governmental character.

The mantle of non-suability extends to complaints filed against public officials

for acts done in the performance of their official functions.

As regards the other petitioners, to wit, Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, and
Undersecretary Galon, it must be stressed that the doctrine of state immunity
extends its protective mantle also to complaints filed against state officials for acts
done in the discharge and performance of their duties." The suability of a
government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his
official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of
official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the
government." Otherwise stated, "public officials can be held personally accountable
for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they
have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.”

Thus, Civil Case No. 68200 is dismissed.

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Salvacion vs. Central Bank

G.R. No: 94723

August 21, 1997

FACTS:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and
lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment.
Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7,
1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day
on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989.

On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen,
Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The

366
policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368,
2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account —
China Banking Corp., 4.) VALID ID; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door
Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.

On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed

against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and
Criminal Cases for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with
preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the day there
was a scheduled hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped from jail.

The Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking

Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China
Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of
garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando de
Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying that the garnishment did
not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a
garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed
the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of
Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits
or defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body, whatsoever.
This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in
a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any
exception or whether said section has been repealed or amended since said
section has rendered nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claim
sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary
attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?

RULING: NO. Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the
favorable judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully
367
deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA
No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still
denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive.

The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to
release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy
the judgment. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to
anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as
the case before us.

Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution, hence void; because its provision that "Foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order
or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever

has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg
Bartelli Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in
violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution;

has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in violation
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution;
has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y
Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely
converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency
deposit account with an authorized bank.

368
HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, Presiding Judge, Branch XXVIII, Regional
Trial Court, Mandaue City, Mandaue City Mayor ALFREDO M. OUANO,
Mandaue City Vice-Mayor PATERNO CAÑETE and Mandaue City Sangguniang
Panlungsod Member RAFAEL MAYOL, respondents.

G.R. No. 108072 December 12, 1995

Facts:

369
On 22 July 1992, Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O.
Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas filed criminal and
administrative complaints against respondents (mayor, vice mayor, sangguniang
panglungsod and all other public officials of Mandaue City) for having violated R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, Articles 170 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A.
No. 6713. 

Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials, acting in

conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by
increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00
without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City.

Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials, on
05 August 1992, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the
administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative
sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension,
had now been vested with the Office of the President.

In his memorandum, Mayor Ouano reiterated that, under Sections 61 and 63 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, the Office of the President, not the Office of the
Ombudsman, could lawfully take cognizance of administrative complaints against
any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city or an independent
component city and to impose disciplinary sanctions, including preventive
suspensions, and that there was nothing in the provision of the Constitution giving to
the Office of the Ombudsman superior powers than those of the President over
elective officials of local governments.

Respondent officials were formally placed under preventive suspension by the

Deputy Ombudsman pursuant to an Order. On 25 September 1992, a petition for
prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order, was filed by respondent officials with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City. Acting favorably on the pleas of petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued,
on even date, a restraining order directed at petitioner, enjoining him ". . . from
enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order of preventive suspension issued
in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015."

370
RTC ruled that Since the investigatory power of the Ombudsman is so general,
broad and vague and gives wider discretion to disciplining authority to impose
administrative sanctions against a responsible public official or employee while that
of Section 60 of the New Local Government Code provides for more well defined and
specific grounds upon which a local elective official can be subjected to
administrative disciplinary action, that it Could be considered that the latter law could
be an exception to the authority and administrative power of the Ombudsman to
conduct an investigation against local elective officials and as such, the jurisdiction
now to conduct administrative investigation against local elective officials is already
lodged before the offices concerned under Section 61 of Republic Act No. 7160.

Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman under Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6770, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, has been divested of his authority to conduct
administrative investigations over local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent
enactment of R.A.

Ruling:
The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13 (1,)
Article XI, of the 1987 Constitution,
The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government… 

Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus contends that
the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive
suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it. 

The Solicitor-General has viewed the Local Government Code of 1991 as having
conferred, but not on an exclusive basis, on the Office of the President (and the
various Sanggunians) disciplinary authority over local elective officials. He posits the
stand that the Code did not withdraw the power of the Ombudsman theretofore
vested under R.A. 6770 conformably with a constitutional mandate

Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has
repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman
Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let
alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other .
371
Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that
courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be
absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must
be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence.The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to
have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting
statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all
efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the
subject.

Likewise noteworthy is Section 27 of the law which prescribes a direct recourse to

this Court on matters involving orders arising from administrative disciplinary cases
originating from the Office of the Ombudsman; thus:

Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — . . .In all administrative disciplinary
cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days
from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis supplied)

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS ) et al. vs.

HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila

G.R. No. 156052             March 7, 2007

Facts: Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila

reclassified the area from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil
companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation.

372
However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed
that “the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and
practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were required to remove 28 tanks
starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of safety buffer
and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor
and the DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously operate within the limited
area resulting from joint operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang
Panlungosod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.

Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce

Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil
companies.

Issue:

Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.

Ruling:

Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
because the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city
mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.”
One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the
duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the
Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial
duty to do so.

In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty
on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional.

373
Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr.,

G.R. No. 168332

19 June 2009

Facts:

Koruga is a minority stockholder of Banco Filipino

374
On August 20, 2003, she filed a complaint before the Makati RTC

Koruga's complaint alleged:

1 Violation of Sections 31 to 34 of the Corporation Code ("Code") which prohibit self-

dealing and conflicts of interest of directors and officers

10.2 Right of a stockholder to inspect the records of a corporation (including financial

statements) under Sections 74 and 75 of the Code

10.3 Receivership and Creation of a Management Committee

On September 12, 2003, Arcenas, et al. filed their Answer raising, among others, the
trial court's lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. They also filed a
Manifestation and Motion seeking the dismissal of the case

In an Order dated October 18, 2004, the trial court denied the Manifestation and
Motion

On February 9, 2005, the CA issued a 60-day TRO enjoining Judge Marella from
conducting further proceedings in the case.

On February 22, 2005, the RTC issued a Notice of Pre-trial[9] setting the case for
pre-trial on June 2 and 9, 2005. Arcenas, et al. filed a Manifestation and Motion[10]
before the CA, reiterating their application for a writ of... preliminary injunction. Thus,
on April 18, 2005, the CA issued the assailed Resolution, which reads in part:

(C)onsidering that the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on

February 9, 2005 expired on April 10, 2005, it is necessary that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued in order not to render ineffectual whatever final resolution this
Court may render... in this case, after the petitioners shall have posted a bond

Dissatisfied, Koruga filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Koruga alleged that the CA effectively gave due course to Arcenas, et al.'s
petition when it issued a writ of preliminary injunction without factual or legal basis

Meanwhile, on March 13, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution granting the prayer
for a TRO and enjoining the Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 138, from
proceeding with the hearing of the case upon the filing by Arcenas, et al. of a
P50,000.00 bond.

G.R. No. 169053

375
In their Petition, Arcenas, et al. asked the Court to set aside the Decision[14] dated
July 20, 2005 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 88422, which denied their petition,
having found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Makati RTC. The CA
said that... the RTC Orders were interlocutory in nature and, thus, may be assailed
by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:

Whether or not which body has jurisdiction over the Koruga Complaint, the RTC or
the BSP?

Ruling:

We hold that it is the BSP that has jurisdiction over the case.

the acts complained of pertain to the conduct of Banco Filipino's banking business.

The law vests in the BSP the supervision over operations and activities of banks.

Specifically, the BSP's supervisory and regulatory powers include:... conduct of

examination to determine compliance with laws and regulations if the circumstances
so warrant as determined by the Monetary Board;

Overseeing to ascertain that laws and Regulations are complied with;

Regular investigation which shall not be oftener than once a year from the last date
of examination to determine whether an institution is conducting its business on a
safe or sound basis

Inquiring into the solvency and liquidity of the institution

Correlatively, the General Banking Law of 2000 specifically deals with loans
contracted by bank directors or officers, thus:

SECTION 36. Restriction on Bank Exposure to Directors, Officers, Stockholders and

Their Related Interests.

The Monetary Board may regulate the amount of loans, credit accommodations and
guarantees that may be extended, directly or indirectly, by a bank to its directors,
officers, stockholders and their related interests, as well as investments of such bank
in enterprises owned or... controlled by said directors, officers, stockholders and their
related interests.

376
Furthermore, the authority to determine whether a bank is conducting business in an
unsafe or unsound manner is also vested in the Monetary Board.

Finally, the New Central Bank Act grants the Monetary Board the power to impose
administrative sanctions on the erring bank:

Section 37.

the Monetary Board may, at its discretion, impose upon... any bank or quasi-bank,
their directors and/or officers... or any commission of irregularities, and/or conducting
business in an unsafe or unsound manner as may be determined by the Monetary
Board

Koruga's invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code is misplaced. In an

earlier case with similar antecedents, we ruled that:

The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to all types of

corporations, while the New Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks and other
financial institutions, including the dissolution and liquidation thereof. As between a
general and special... law, the latter shall prevail - generalia specialibus non
derogant.

Consequently, it is not the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate

Controversies,[32] or Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on Receivership, that
would apply to this case. Instead, Sections 29 and 30 of the New Central Bank Act
should be... followed

, viz.:

Section 30.

the Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior... hearing forbid the
institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the banking institution.

actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this
Act shall be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court
except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess
of... jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

the appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested exclusively with the
Monetary Board.

377
On the strength of these provisions, it is the Monetary Board that exercises exclusive
jurisdiction over proceedings for receivership of banks.

From the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that the RTC has no jurisdiction to
hear and decide a suit that seeks to place Banco Filipino under receivership.

the court's jurisdiction could only have been invoked after the Monetary Board had
taken action on the matter and only on the ground that the action taken was in
excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or
excess of... jurisdiction.

378
Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al. -
GR No. 171101

FACTS:
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to
DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the
resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the
subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court
noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court
cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must,
by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original
6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to
remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the
said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or
practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest,
in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their
thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court
decision.

ISSUE:
(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover
the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac
Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by
HLI’s SDP?

(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation
payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?

379
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA
6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP
coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs
should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties,
whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?

(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the
qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be
reconsidered?

RULING:
[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents
PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-
beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option
the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision
that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI,
and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this
case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only
to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the
President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior
to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and
consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact
doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority
stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5,
2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed
to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution
scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they
want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
380
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover,
the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the
modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011
decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but
found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that
may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda
Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by
HLI’s SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the
SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then
the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.
Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian
reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands
originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were
supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision
appears too restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other
portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these
may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per
FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in
adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual
qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the
agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that
matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of
agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall
determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare
portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and
have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-
hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the
coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the
381
unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of
the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]

4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November
21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the
FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda
Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage
through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on
November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued
under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that
the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is,
January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to
receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position
involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the
instant case.  The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land
valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the
landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special
agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with
finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA
6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be
allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed
after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or
certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs
have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year
prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the
issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under
CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to
sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform
would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be
transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an
382
option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given
an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will
never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of
shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital
stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously
vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the
hands of the FWBs.  Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share
of the common shares and other voting shares.  Applying the formula to the HLI
stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101
shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share).
The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall
short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

383
TUNA PROCESSING INC VS PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC
G.R. NO. 185582
February 29, 2012

FACTS:
On January 14, 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka and five (5) Philippine tuna processors,
namely, Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna
Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and respondent Kingford entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement. The parties likewise executed a Supplemental
Memorandum of Agreement dated  January 15, 2003 and an Agreement to Amend
Memorandum of Agreement dated July 14, 2003.

Due to a series of events, the five Philippine tuna processors and respondent
Kingford withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly backed out on their
obligations. Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International
Center for Dispute Resolution in California, United States and won the case against
respondent.

To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition,
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. In the
RTC of Makati City, respondent Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss. After the court
denied the motion for lack of merit, respondent sought for the inhibition of Judge
Alameda and moved for the reconsideration of the order denying the motion. Judge
Alameda inhibited himself, to which the case was re-raffled to Judge Ruiz, who
granted respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the petition on the
ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.

Petitioner TPI now seeks to nullify, in this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45, the order of the trial court dismissing its Petition for Confirmation,
Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award.

ISSUE:
WON a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines have the
legal capacity to sue under the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 2004.
384
RULING:
Yes, a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines have
the legal capacity to sue under the provisions of the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply
in this case as the Act, as its title - An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative
Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for
Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes - would suggest, is a law
especially enacted to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes
or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes.
It specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an
application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. The Corporation
Code is the general law providing for the formation, organization, and regulation of
private corporations. As between a general and special law, the latter shall
prevail - generalia specialibus non derogant.

385
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent

G.R. No. 169202              

March 5, 2010

FACTS:

The petitioner, Maria Virginia V. Remo, is a Filipino citizen married to Francisco R.

Rallonza. Her passport had entries of the following: “Maria Virginia” as her given
name; “Remo” as her middle name; and “Rallonza” as her surname. Before the
expiry of the validity of her passport, applied for renewal of her passport with the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in the USA. Upon application, petitioner
requested to revert her surname to her maiden name while her marriage is still
subsisting. It was denied by the DFA stating that, “Use of maiden name is allowed in
passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous
application.” 

Petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President. She contended that since
her marriage to her husband is still subsisting, Section 5(d) of RA No. 8239
(instances when a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name) does
not apply in her case. She further contended that this prohibition, conflicts with and,
thus, operates as an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code.

The Office of the President ruled that, Section 5(d) of RA No. 8239 or the Philippine
Passport Act of 1996 “offers no leeway for any other interpretation than that only in
case of divorce, annulment, or declaration (of nullity) of marriage may a married
woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes.” It held that, when there is
a conflict between a general and special law, the latter will control the former
regardless of the respective dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is the general
law, RA No. 8239 shall be upheld. 

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for review and affirmed the ruling of the
office of the President. Hence, the present petition.

386
ISSUE:

WON the petitioner can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement
passport. 

RULING:

No. The petitioner cannot revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement
passport. Both provisions in Article 370 of the Civil Code and in RA No. 8239 does
not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her
assport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases
enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA No. 8239 which are: death of husband, divorce,
annulment, or nullity of marriage. Since the petitioner’s case does not fall in any of
the mentioned circumstances, she may not resume her maiden name in the
replacement passport. A married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name
must be based only on the severance of the marriage. 

Assuming RA No. 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA No. 8239
specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of the
Civil Ccode which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in
statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law, thus: “It is a
familiar rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary repugnancy
between a general and a special law or provision, the latter will control the former
without regard to the respective dates of passage.” 

387
G.R. No. 172642               June 13, 2012
ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife MERRIDY JANE P.
DULAY, Petitioner,
vs.
ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS,
INC., Respondents.

Facts: Nelson Dulay was employed by General Charterers Inc, a subsidiary of co-
petitioner Aboitiz Jebsen Inc. since 1986. He initially worked as an ordinary seaman
and later as bosun on a contractual basis. From September 3, 1999 up to July 19,
2000, Nelson was detained in petitioner’s vessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle. After the
completion of his employment contact, Nelson died due to acute renal failure. At this
time of his death, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers,
GCI’s collective bargaining agent. Nelson’s widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed
for death benefits through the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining
Agent. However, the grievance procedure was “declared deadlocked” as petitioners
refused to grant the benefits sought by the widow. Merridy Jane filed a complaint
with the NLRC against GCI for death and medical benefits and damages.

Respondent on the other hand refused to award the same on the ground that there is
no employer-employee relation between GC and Nelson at the time of his death. The
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, ordering respondents to pay the money.

Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling: Yes. The voluntary Arbitrator must take cognizance of this case. The specific
or special provisions of the Labor Code govern. Articles 217 par. C and 261 of the
Labor Code in stating that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases from the
interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements. Section 29 of
the prevailing Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino

388
on Board Ocean Going Vessels, promulgated by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), provides as follows:

Section 29. Dispute Settlement Procedures – In cases of claims and disputes arising
from this employment, the parties covered by a collective bargaining agreement shall
submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) shall exercise original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary action on cases, which are
administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations of recruitment laws,
rules and regulations involving employers, principals, contracting partners and
Filipino seafarers.
It is clear from the above that the interpretation of the DOLE, in consultation with
their counterparts in the respective committees of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, as well as the DFA and the POEA is that with respect to disputes
involving claims of Filipino seafarers wherein the parties are covered by a collective
bargaining agreement, the dispute or claim should be submitted to the jurisdiction of
a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.

389
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation vs. Stockholders of Intercity Savings
and Loan Bank, supra.

Facts:

The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, filed
on June 17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity
Bank)... alleging that, inter alia, said bank was already insolvent and its continuance
in business would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and the general
public.[1]

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave it due
course.[2] Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) was eventually
substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank.[3]

In the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 (RA 9302)[4] was enacted, Section 12 of
which provides:

SECTION 12. Before any distribution of the assets of the closed bank in accordance
with the preferences established by law, the Corporation shall periodically charge
against said assets reasonable receivership expenses and subject to approval by the
proper court,... reasonable liquidation expenses, it has incurred as part of the cost of
receivership/liquidation proceedings and collect payment therefor from available
assets.

PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets
and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings

The reimbursement of the liquidation fees and expenses

P3,795,096.05;

The provision of P700,000.00 for future expenses in the implementation of this

distribution and the winding-up of the liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank,
Inc.
390
The write-off of assets in the total amount of P8,270,789.99,... The write-off of
liabilities in the total amount of P1,562,185.35,... The Final Project of Distribution of
Intercity Savings and Loan Bank... to hold as trustee the liquidating and surplus
dividends allocated in the project of distribution for creditors who shall have a period
of three (3) years from date of last notice within which to claim payment therefor.

Authorizing the disposal of all the pertinent bank records in accordance with
applicable laws, rules and regulations

By Order of July 5, 2006,[6] Branch 134 of the Makati RTC granted the motion
except the above-quoted paragraphs 5 and 6 of its prayer,

Issues:

whether Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle

Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends,

Ruling:

it otherwise holding that to so resolve would run counter to... prevailing jurisprudence
and unduly prejudice Intercity Bank shareholders, the creditors having been paid
their principal claim in 2002 or before the passage of RA 9302 in 2004.

PDIC appealed to the Court of Appeals[7] before which respondent Stockholders of

Intercity Bank (the Stockholders) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing principally
that the proper recourse should be to this Court through a petition for review on
certiorari... since the question involved was purely one of law.[8]

By Resolution of October 17, 2007,[9] the appellate court dismissed the appeal,
sustaining in the main the position of the Stockholders. Its Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 24, 2008,[10]
PDIC... filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

391
SPOUSES MARIAN B. LINTAG and ANGELO T. ARRASTIA, represented herein
by Attorney-in-Fact REMEDIOS BERENGUER LINTAG, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL
POWERCORPORATION, Respondent.

G.R. NO. 158609 : July 27, 2007

Facts: Petitioners-spouses Marian Berenguer-Lintag and Angelo T. Arrastia

(petitioners) are the registered owners of a property with an area of 80,001 square
meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-24855 and located at
Barangay Bibincahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

On December 4, 1996, respondent National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a

Complaint4 for Eminent Domain against petitioners in order to acquire an easement
of a right of way over a portion of the said property, consisting of 8,050 square
meters (subject property) with an initial assessed value at P2,468.09. NPC averred
that such acquisition was necessary and urgent for the construction and
maintenance of NPC's 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project.

On January 17, 1997, after the deposit of the initial assessed value of the subject
property amounting to P2,468.09 with the Philippine National Bank, the RTC, upon
an ex-parte motion of NPC, ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession on the
subject property5 consonant with Presidential Decree (PD) No. 42.6

On January 24, 1997, the Writ of Possession7 was issued in favor of NPC.8

On May 25, 2000, the RTC issued an Order9 appointing three (3) new
Commissioners to appraise the value of the subject property. They were directed to
take their oath within five (5) days from receipt of said Order, to notify the parties and
their respective counsels as to the date of the conduct of ocular inspection of the
subject property, and to submit a report within fifteen (15) days from the completion
of the ocular inspection.

392
On June 15, 2000, two commissioners filed a motion praying that the RTC use the
previous Commissioners' Report as basis in determining the amount of just
compensation.10

On July 11, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion11 asking the Court to order the NPC to
pay them or their Attorney-in-Fact Remedios Berenguer Lintag (Remedios Lintag)
the amount of P49,665.63, as the tentative value of the damaged improvements.

On August 28, 2000, the RTC directed Field Personnel Wenifredo A. Halcon, Jr. and
Augusto V. Ramos, Jr. to confirm that the damage to the improvements in the
subject property amounted to P49,665.63.12 NPC paid the said amount.

On September 13, 2000, pre-trial was held and a pre-trial Order13 was issued. The
case was set for trial on the merits on November 15, 2000.

However, on November 7, 2000, Republic Act (RA) No. 8974 entitled "An Act To
Facilitate The Acquisition Of Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location For National
Government Infrastructure Projects And For Other Purposes" was approved.

On February 14, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion14 asking the RTC to direct the NPC
to comply with RA No. 8974. In the said motion, petitioners asseverated that
pursuant to Sec. 4 of RA No. 8974, they are entitled to 100% of the value of the
subject property based on the current relevant zonal valuation made by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR), which at the time was pegged at P700.00 per square
meter. Thus, petitioners prayed that NPC be directed to pay P5,635,000.00 for the
subject property.

Issue: Whether or not the direct NPC comply with RA No. 8974

Ruling:

The petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioners' first ground must fail.

In the case of Republic v. Gingoyon,22 this Court held that RA No. 8974 is a

substantive law, to wit:

It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a

substantive matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the

393
standard, which it did through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically,
this prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just compensation in
expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure projects, as well as
the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of
possession.

This ruling was reiterated in this Court's Resolution23 of February 1, 2006, which
further states that:

[I]f the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural, and so the converse
certainly holds that if the rule or provision creates a right, it should be properly
appreciated as substantive in nature. Indubitably, a matter is substantive when it
involves the creation of rights to be enjoyed by the owner of property to be
expropriated. The right of the owner to receive just compensation prior to acquisition
of possession by the State of the property is a proprietary right, appropriately
classified as a substantive matter and, thus, within the sole province of the
legislature to legislate on.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

It is possible for a substantive matter to be nonetheless embodied in a rule of

procedure, and to a certain extent, Rule 67 does contain matters of substance. Yet
the absorption of the substantive point into a procedural rule does not prevent the
substantive right from being superseded or amended by statute, for the creation of
property rights is a matter for the legislature to enact on, and not for the courts to
decide upon. Indeed, if the position of the Government is sustained, it could very well
lead to the absurd situation wherein the judicial branch of government may shield
laws with the veneer of irrepealability simply by absorbing the provisions of law into
the rules of procedure. When the 1987 Constitution restored to the judicial branch of
government the sole prerogative to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, it should be understood that such rules necessarily pertain to points
of procedure, and not points of substantive law.

It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and

regulations, operate prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is
manifest by express terms or by necessary implication24 because the retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested.25 This is
based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not
backward).

394
In the application of RA No. 8974, the Court finds no justification to depart from this
rule. First, RA No. 8974 is a substantive law. Second, there is nothing in RA No.
8974 which expressly provides that it should have retroactive effect. Third, neither is
retroactivity necessarily implied from RA No. 8974 or in any of its provisions.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, the silence of RA No. 8974 and its Implementing
Rules on the matter cannot give rise to the inference that it can be applied
retroactively. In the two (2) cases26 wherein this Court applied the provisions of RA
No. 8974, the complaints were filed at the time the law was already in full force and
effect. Thus, these cases cannot serve as binding precedent to the case at bench.

As to petitioners' second ground, the parties may be guided by the following

principles.

Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to

exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context
of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action,
"of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint x x x.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the

determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners x x x.27

It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have
been completed. The process is not complete until payment of just
compensation.28 Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this case does
not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of
ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the final just
compensation.29

We observe that petitioners are not questioning the authority of the NPC to exercise
the power of eminent domain nor the propriety of its exercise. While the
constitutional restraint of public use has been overcome, the imperative just
compensation is still wanting. Thus, petitioners now appeal for the prompt payment

395
of just compensation. Indeed, just compensation is not only the correct determination
of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property
within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just."30

This Court understands the plight of petitioners. It has been ten (10) years since they
were divested of possession of their property, but they still have to be paid just
compensation. It may be noted that the expropriation case still pends at the RTC,
and it is in that case where a determination of the amount of just compensation shall
be made. Inasmuch as this determination necessarily involves factual matters, and
considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, at this point, we can only direct the
RTC to try the case expeditiously, so that the amount of just compensation for the
subject property can be fixed and promptly paid, as justice and equity dictate.

For this purpose, the RTC must bear in mind that it is the value of the land at the
time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint, whichever came first,
not the value of the land at the time of the rendition of judgment which should be
considered.31 In this case, where the institution of

an expropriation action preceded the taking of the subject property, just

compensation is based on the value of the land at the time of the filing of the
complaint. This is provided by the Rules of Court, the assumption of possession by
the expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on its deposit with the National or
Provincial Treasurer of the amount equivalent to the value of the property as
provisionally ascertained by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.32

Finally, this Court takes cognizance of petitioners' manifestation that the NPC, as
found by the RTC, failed to pay the initial deposit of P32,930.00 as required in PD
42.33 The RTC had already fixed this amount on the basis of its initial factual findings.
The assailed CA Decision adopted the RTC's factual findings. NPC's Comment filed
with this Court and even its Petition for Certiorari before the CA did not address,
much less contest, this fact. Because this factual finding was not disputed by the
NPC in its pleadings before the CA and before this Court, it is, therefore, deemed
admitted.34 However, inasmuch as petitioners made no mention of this amount in
their prayer before this Court, the same shall simply be considered by the RTC and
included in the determination of the final just compensation.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, guided by the foregoing principles, is hereby directed to
396
proceed with the hearing of the expropriation case, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-
6295, and to resolve the issue of just compensation with utmost dispatch. No costs.

Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens

G.R No: 206844-45
July 23, 2013

FACTS:  On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an

agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, containing the list of nominees to share
power in their sharing power agreement.   The COMELEC issued a Omnibus
Resolution in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) stating that the list
of nominees submitted to them shall be permanent. This is in lieu of the empty seat
in Congress after the 2010 elections following the resignation of Rep. Kho. Two
SENIOR CITIZENS were allocated seats in the House of Representatives, the first
being Rep. Arquiza, and Rep. Kho as the second.   Rep. Arquiza, honoring Rep.
Kho’s resignation, stated that their fourth nominee shall take the latter’s seat
considering that the third nominee, Datol, has previously been expelled from the
party.    COMELEC claims that they shall stay true to the list presented by SENIOR
CITIZENS, regardless of Datol’s (being the third nominee) expulsion. Also that the
resignation of Rep. Kho shall not be recognized because it will change the order of
nominees.   

ISSUE:  Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of

COMELEC for issuing Resolution without due process.

RULING: Yes. There is grave abuse on the part of COMELEC for violating due
process. Instead, the COMELEC issued the May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in
SPP No. 12157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) without conducting any further
proceedings.   The Court ruled that the Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of
the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-
191 (PLM) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as Coalition of Associations of
397
Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. is concerned, and that the Commission on
Elections En Banc is ORDERED to PROCLAIM the Coalition of Associations of
Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. as one of the winning party-list organizations
during the May 13, 2013 elections with the number of seats it may be entitled to
based on the total number of votes it garnered during the said elections.   

G.R. No. 149417             June 4, 2004

GLORIA SANTOS DUEÑAS, petitioner,

vs.
SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, respondent.

FACTS: Sometime in 1997, the members of the SSHA submitted to the petitioner a
resolution asking her to provide within the subdivision an open space for recreational
and other community activities, in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957, as
amended by P.D. No. 1216.7 Petitioner, however, rejected the request, thus,
prompting the members of SSHA to seek redress from the NHA.

On April 25, 1997, the NHA General Manager forwarded the SSHA resolution to
Romulo Q. Fabul, Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer of the HLURB in
Quezon City.

In a letter dated May 29, 1997, the Regional Director of the Expanded NCR Field
Office, HLURB, opined that the open space requirement of P.D. No. 957, as
amended by P.D. No. 1216, was not applicable to Santos Subdivision.

SSHA then filed a petition/motion for reconsideration,10 docketed as HLURB Case

No. REM-070297-9821, which averred among others that: (1) P.D. No. 957 should
apply retroactively to Santos Subdivision, notwithstanding that the subdivision plans
were approved in 1966 and (2) Gloria Santos Dueñas should be bound by the verbal
promise made by her late father during his lifetime that an open space would be
provided for in Phase III of Santos Subdivision, the lots of which were at that time
already for sale.

398
Petitioner denied any knowledge of the allegations of SSHA. She stressed that she
was not a party to the alleged transactions, and had neither participation nor
involvement in the development of Santos Subdivision and the sale of the
subdivision’s lots. As affirmative defenses, she raised the following: (a) It was her
late father, Cecilio J. Santos, who owned and developed the subdivision, and she
was neither its owner nor developer; (b) that this suit was filed by an unauthorized
entity against a non-existent person, as SSHA and Santos Subdivision are not
juridical entities, authorized by law to institute or defend against actions; (c) that P.D.
No. 957 cannot be given retroactive effect to make it applicable to Santos
Subdivision as the law does not expressly provide for its retroactive applicability; and
(d) that the present petition is barred by laches.

ISSUE: Whether or not the applicability of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of

administrative remedies

RULING: The petitioner contends that the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 51601 was
premature as SSHA failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. Petitioner submits
that since Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure does not mention
the HLURB, the respondent should have appealed the decision of the HLURB Board
in HLURB Case No. REM-A-980227-0032 to the Office of the President prior to
seeking judicial relief. In other words, it is the decision of the Office of the President,
and not that of the HLURB Board, which the Court of Appeals may review.

We find petitioner’s contentions bereft of merit. The principle of non-exhaustion of

administrative remedies is, under the factual circumstances of this case,
inapplicable. While this Court has held that before a party is allowed to seek
intervention of the courts, it is a pre condition that he avail himself of all
administrative processes afforded him, nonetheless, said rule is not without
exceptions. The doctrine is a relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity
and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of each case.

In the instant case, the questions posed are purely legal, namely: (1) whether the
respondent had any right to demand an open space and the petitioner had any legal
obligation to provide said open space within Santos Subdivision under P.D. No. 957,
as amended by P.D. No. 1216, and (2) whether the action had already prescribed
under Article 1145 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that
SSHA had sought relief from the Office of the President, but the latter forwarded the
case to the HLURB. In view of the foregoing, we find that in this particular case,

399
there was no need for SSHA to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking
judicial relief.

FLORENCIO EUGENIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON

GR No. 109404

Jan 22, 1996

Facts:

On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on installment basis from petitioner
and his co-owner/ developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in
Quezon City.

Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and
2620 filed by the Delta Village Homeowners' Association, Inc., the National Housing
Authority rendered a resolution on January 17, 1979 inter alia ordering petitioner to
cease and desist from making... further sales of lots in said village or in any project
owned by him.

While NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending, private respondent filed
with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a complaint (Case No. 80-589)
against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and

Adelina Relevo alleging that, in view of the above NHA resolution, he suspended
payment of his amortizations, but that petitioner resold one of the two lots to the said
spouses Relevo, in whose favor title to the said property was registered. Private

400
respondent further alleged... that he suspended his payments because of petitioner's
failure to develop the village. Private respondent prayed for the annulment of the
sale to the Relevo spouses and for reconveyance of the lot to him.

On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of
petitioner to cancel the contract with private respondent and dismissed private
respondent's complaint.

On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and, applying
P.D. 957, ordered petitioner to complete the subdivision development and to
reinstate private respondent's purchase contract over one lot, and... to immediately
refund to the complainant-appellant (herein private respondent) all payments made
thereon, plus interests computed... at legal rates from date of receipt hereof until fully
paid.

The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the HSRC
and denied the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and for
having been filed out of time. Petitioner has now filed this Petition for review before
the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for
the non-payment of amortizations by a buyer on installment under land purchase
agreements entered into prior to the enactment of P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree"?

Ruling:

The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation,
circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced.

as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it follows that

Section 23 thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent when he
desisted from making further payment to petitioner due to petitioner's failure to
develop the subdivision... project according to the approved plans and within the
time limit for complying with the same. (Such incomplete development of the
subdivision and non-performance of specific contractual and statutory obligations on
the part of the subdivision-owner had been established in the... findings of the
HLURB which in turn were confirmed by the respondent Executive Secretary in his
assailed Decision.) Furthermore, respondent Executive Secretary also gave due
weight to the following matters: although private respondent started to default on

401
amortization payments... beginning May 1975, so that by the end of July 1975 he
had already incurred three consecutive arrearages in payments, nevertheless, the
petitioner, who had the cancellation option available to him under the contract, did
not exercise or utilize the same in timely fashion but... delayed until May 1979 when
he finally made up his mind to cancel the contracts. But by that time the land
purchase agreements had already been overtaken by the provisions of P.D. 957,
promulgated on July 12, 1976. (In any event, as pointed out by respondent HLURB
and seconded... by the Solicitor General, the defaults in amortization payments
incurred by private respondent had been effectively condoned by the petitioner, by
reason of the latter's tolerance of the defaults for a long period of time.)

WHEREFORE, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion, the petition is

DENIED due course and is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

G.R. No. 119745 June 20, 1997

POWER COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT

OF APPEALS, SPOUSES REYNALDO and ANGELITA R. QUIAMBAO and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Power Commercial & Industrial Development Corporation, an

industrial asbestos manufacturer, needed a bigger office space and warehouse for
its products. For this purpose, on January 31, 1979, it entered into a contract of sale
with the spouses Reynaldo and Angelita R. Quiambao, herein private respondents.
The contract involved a 612-sq. m. parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. S-6686 located at the corner of Bagtican and St. Paul Streets, San Antonio
Village, Makati City. The parties agreed that petitioner would pay private
respondents P108,000.00 as down payment, and the balance of P295,000.00 upon
the execution of the deed of transfer of the title over the property. Further, petitioner
assumed, as part of the purchase price, the existing mortgage on the land. In full
satisfaction thereof, he paid P79,145.77 to Respondent Philippine National Bank
("PNB" for brevity).

On June 1, 1979, respondent spouses mortgaged again said land to PNB to

guarantee a loan of P145,000.00, P80,000.00 of which was paid to respondent
spouses. Petitioner agreed to assume payment of the loan.

402
On March 17, 1982, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 45217 against respondent
spouses for rescission and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 159. Then, in its reply to PNB's letter of February 19, 1982, petitioner
demanded the return of the payments it made on the ground that its assumption of
mortgage was never approved. On May 31, 1983, 8 while this case was pending, the
mortgage was foreclosed. The property was subsequently bought by PNB during the
public auction. Thus, an amended complaint was filed impleading PNB as party
defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a substantial breach of the contract between the
parties warranting rescission

RULING: The alleged "failure" of respondent spouses to eject the lessees from the
lot in question and to deliver actual and physical possession thereof cannot be
considered a substantial breach of a condition for two reasons: first, such "failure"
was not stipulated as a condition - whether resolutory or suspensive - in the contract;
and second, its effects and consequences were not specified either. 13

The provision adverted to by petitioner does not impose a condition or an obligation

to eject the lessees from the lot. The deed of sale provides in part: 14

We hereby also warrant that we are the lawful and absolute owners of the above
described property, free from any lien and/or encumbrance, and we hereby agree
and warrant to defend its title and peaceful possession thereof in favor of the said
Power Commercial and Industrial Development Corporation, its successors and
assigns, against any claims whatsoever of any and all third persons; subject,
however, to the provisions hereunder provided to wit:

By his own admission, Anthony Powers, General Manager of petitioner-corporation,

did not ask the corporation's lawyers to stipulate in the contract that Respondent
Reynaldo was guaranteeing the ejectment of the occupants, because there was
already a proviso in said deed of sale that the sellers were guaranteeing the peaceful
possession by the buyer of the land in question. 15 Any obscurity in a contract, if the
above-quoted provision can be so described, must be construed against the party
who caused it. 16 Petitioner itself caused the obscurity because it omitted this alleged
condition when its lawyer drafted said contract.

If the parties intended to impose on respondent spouses the obligation to eject the
tenants from the lot sold, it should have included in the contract a provision similar to

403
that referred to in Romero vs. Court of Appeals, 17 where the ejectment of the
occupants of the lot sold by private respondent was the operative act which set into
motion the period of petitioner's compliance with his own obligation, i.e., to pay the
balance of the purchase price. Failure to remove the squatters within the stipulated
period gave the other party the right to either refuse to proceed with the agreement
or to waive that condition of ejectment in consonance with Article 1545 of the Civil
Code. In the case cited, the contract specifically stipulated that the ejectment was a
condition to be fulfilled; otherwise, the obligation to pay the balance would not arise.
This is not so in the case at bar.

Absent a stipulation therefor, we cannot say that the parties intended to make its
nonfulfillment a ground for rescission. If they did intend this, their contract should
have expressly stipulated so. In Ang vs. C.A., 18 rescission was sought on the ground
that the petitioners had failed to fulfill their obligation "to remove and clear" the lot
sold, the performance of which would have given rise to the payment of the
consideration by private respondent. Rescission was not allowed, however, because
the breach was not substantial and fundamental to the fulfillment by the petitioners of
the obligation to sell.

As stated, the provision adverted to in the contract pertains to the usual warranty
against eviction, and not to a condition that was not met.

The terms of the contract are so clear as to leave no room for any other
interpretation. 19

Furthermore, petitioner was well aware of the presence of the tenants at the time it
entered into the sales transaction. As testified to by Reynaldo, 20 petitioner's counsel
during the sales negotiation even undertook the job of ejecting the squatters. In fact,
petitioner actually filed suit to eject the occupants. Finally, petitioner in its letter to
PNB of December 23, 1980 admitted that it was the "buyer(s) and new owner(s) of
this lot."

404
ORLANDO L. SALVADOR v. PLACIDO L. MAPA
GR No. 135080,
Nov 28, 2007

Facts:

On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No.
13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans,...
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for investigation, including the
loan transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle
Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).

After examining and studying the documents relative to the loan transactions, the
Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined
under Memorandum Order No. 61 because the stockholders and officers of PEMI
were known cronies of then President

Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and PEMI was

undercapitalized at the time the loan was granted.

405
Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee,
and representing the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a sworn complaint for violation of
Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act

No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the respondents... the
Ombudsman handed down the assailed Resolution,[6] dismissing the complaint. The
Ombudsman conceded that there was ground to proceed with the conduct of
preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, it dismissed... the complaint holding that the
offenses charged had already prescribed,... It bears mention that the acts
complained of were committed before the issuance of BP 195 on March 2, 1982.
Hence, the prescriptive period in the instant case is ten (10) years as provided in the
(sic) Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.

Equally important to stress is that the subject financial transactions between 1978
and 1981 transpired at the time when there was yet no Presidential Order or
Directive naming, classifying or categorizing them as Behest or Non-Behest Loans.

the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on October 8,

1992 under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61,
dated November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of
reference in determining... behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be
considered the bases of charging respondents for alleged offenses committed, they
become ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution.

The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it on
July 27, 1998.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME DEFINED BY SEC. 3(e) AND (g) OF R.A. 3019
HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED AT THE TIME THE PETITIONER FILED ITS
COMPLAINT.

WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13 AND MEMORANDUM

ORDER NO. 61 ARE EX-POST FACTO LAW[S]

Ruling:

The issue of prescription has long been settled by this Court in Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[13] thus:

406
[I]t is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the
violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made
because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the
"beneficiaries of the... loans." Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the
prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968
were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and
not from the day of such commission.

Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the date of the discovery of the
offenses, and since discovery could not have been made earlier than October 8,
1992, the date when the Committee was created, the criminal offenses allegedly
committed by the respondents had not... yet prescribed when the complaint was filed
on October 4, 1996.

The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must

be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable
implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the
Constitution is clear beyond... reasonable doubt. The presumption is always in favor
of constitutionality.

In any event, we hold that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No.
61 are not ex post facto laws.

An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an action done
before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and
punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was
when committed; or (c) which... changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which
alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order... to convict the
defendant.[22] This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which
assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which... deprives a
person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation
of amnesty

The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the
retrospectivity of penal laws.

407
The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not come within the
shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on

Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not mete out
penalty for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely
provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws,
Administrative Order No. 13 and

Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is,
therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and
memorandum orders are ex post facto.

G.R. No. 175781               March 20, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCA TALARO,* GREGORIO TALARO,** NORBERTO (JUN) ADVIENTO,
RENATO RAMOS, RODOLFO DUZON,*** RAYMUNDO ZAMORA** and LOLITO
AQUINO, Accused.
NORBERTO (JUN) ADVIENTO, RENATO RAMOS and LOLITO
AQUINO, Accused-Appellants.

FACTS: Around 6 o'clock in the morning of April 26, 1994, tricycle driver Rodolfo
Duzon was at the parking area in the poblacion of Urdaneta waiting for passengers,
when accused-appellant Renato Ramos approached him. Accused-appellant Ramos
offered to pay Rodolfo Duzon ₱200.00 for the latter to drive Ramos' motorcycle to
Laoac, Pangasinan to take some onions and turnips there. Duzon agreed, so after

408
bringing his own tricycle home to his house in Bactad, Urdaneta, he then drove
Ramos' motorcycle to the poblacion of Urdaneta. At the poblacion, Ramos bought a
basket where he placed the onions and turnips. Ramos then told Duzon to drive the
motorcycle to Laoac, but they first passed by Garcia Street in Urdaneta. At a house
along Garcia Street, Ramos alighted and talked to someone whom Rodolfo Duzon
later came to know as accused-appellant Lolito Aquino. Ramos then told Duzon that
after coming from Laoac, Duzon should leave the motorcycle at that house on Garcia
Street with Lolito Aquino. Ramos and Duzon then proceeded to Laoac, stopping at a
gas station where they fueled up. Ramos alighted from the motorcycle at the gas
station and, taking along the basket of onions and turnips, walked towards Guardian
Angel Hospital (the clinic owned by the Alipios). Five minutes after Ramos alighted,
Duzon heard three gunshots coming from the west, and moments later, he saw
Ramos, who was coming toward him, being chased by another man. When Ramos
got to the motorcycle, he ordered Duzon to immediately drive away, and poked a gun
at Duzon's back. Ramos then instructed Duzon as to the route they should take until
they reached Urdaneta where Ramos alighted, leaving Duzon with instructions to
bring the motorcycle to Garcia Street, leave it with Lolito Aquino, then meet him
(Ramos) again at the poblacion where he (Duzon) will be paid ₱200.00 for his
services. Duzon did as he was told, but when he met with Ramos at
the poblacion and asked for the ₱200.00, Ramos got mad and shouted invectives at
him. A few days later, he again ran into Ramos who warned him to keep his silence,
threatening to kill him (Duzon) too if he tells anyone about the killing. Accused-
appellant Norberto (Jun) Adviento also threatened him not to reveal to anyone
whatever he knows about the crime. That was why Duzon decided to keep quiet.
Later, however, he revealed the matter to his brother, Victoriano Duzon, who
accompanied him to the Criminal Investigation Services (CIS) Office in Urdaneta so
he could give his statement. He executed affidavits, assisted by a lawyer from the
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), attesting to what he knew about the crime, in his
desire to be a state witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed is murder

RULING: Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his

confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one
of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of
the original design. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

409
In this case, the existence of a conspiracy has been established by the testimony of
Raymundo Zamora, positively identifying all three accused-appellants as the ones he
saw and heard transacting with Francisca Talaro on April 24, 1994 to kill Atty. Melvin
Alipio for the price of P60,000.00, and pointing to Lolito Aquino as the one who
demanded and received part of the payment after Atty. Alipio had been killed. The
credibility of Raymundo Zamora's testimony is further bolstered by Lolito Aquino's
admission23 that he and Renato Ramos even conducted surveillance on the victim a
day before Renato Ramos carried out the shooting, and that the motorcycle used as
a getaway vehicle belonged to him. Rodolfo Duzon also pointed to Renato Ramos as
the gunman; he also pointed to Renato Ramos and Norberto (Jun) Adviento as the
ones who threatened to kill him if he talks to anyone about the shooting. All the
proven circumstances point to the conclusion that accused-appellants acted in
concert to assure the success of the execution of the crime; hence, the existence of
a conspiracy is firmly established.

Lolito Aquino's admission, and accused-appellants' positive identification of

Raymundo Zamora and Rodolfo Duzon cannot be belied by accused-appellants'
mere denial. It is established jurisprudence that denial and alibi cannot prevail over
the witness' positive identification of the accused-appellants.24 Moreover, accused-
appellants could not give any plausible reason why Raymundo Zamora would testify
falsely against them. In People v. Molina,25 the Court expounded, thus:

In light of the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses

and since no ill motive on their part or on that of their families was shown that
could have made either of them institute the case against the appellant and
falsely implicate him in a serious crime he did not commit, appellant's defense
of alibi must necessarily fail. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the defense of alibi,
being inherently weak, cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime. x x x26 (Emphasis supplied)

Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino claimed he merely admitted his participation in the

crime out of fear of the police authorities who allegedly manhandled him, however,
the trial court did not find his story convincing. The trial court's evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is conclusive on this Court as it is the
trial court which had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of
witnesses.27 The Court again explained the rationale for this principle in Molina,28 to
wit:

410
As oft repeated by this Court, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent
to so conclude, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and
deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they gave their testimonies. The
trial judge therefore can better determine if such witnesses were telling the truth,
being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Further, factual findings of
the trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses' credibility are entitled to
great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirms
the said findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court
overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the
outcome of the case.29

The Court cannot find anything on record to justify deviation from said rule.

Accused-appellant Renato Ramos insisted that he was not properly identified in

open court, and considering that there are so many persons named "Renato
Ramos," then there can be some confusion regarding his identity. There is no truth to
this claim. Ramos was properly identified in open court by Raymundo Zamora, as
one of the men he saw and heard transacting with Francisca Talaro for the killing of
Atty. Alipio.30 Hence, there can be no doubt as to which Renato Ramos is being
convicted for the murder of Atty. Alipio.

Another strong indication of Lolito Aquino's and Renato Ramos' guilt is the fact that
they escaped from detention while the case was pending with the trial court. Renato
Ramos escaped from prison on December 20, 1994,31 while Lolito Aquino escaped
on May 5, 1996.32 It has been repeatedly held that flight betrays a desire to evade
responsibility and is, therefore, a strong indication of guilt.33 Thus, this Court finds no
reason to overturn their conviction.

Nevertheless, this Court must modify the penalty imposed on accused-appellants

Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Lolito Aquino, and Renato Ramos. In People v.
Tinsay,34 the Court explained that:

On June 30, 2006, Republic Act No. 9346 (R.A. 9346), entitled An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, took effect. Pertinent provisions
thereof provide as follows:

Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly,

Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177),

411
otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby
repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659)
otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws, executive orders and
decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.

Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

xxxx

SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or

whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall
not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.

It has also been held in People vs. Quiachon that R.A. No. 9346 has retroactive
effect, to wit:

The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the
principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws
which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is
embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar
as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.1âwphi1

However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346
provides that "persons convicted of offenses pushed with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall
not be eligible for parole."

Hence, in accordance with the foregoing, appellant should only be sentenced

to suffer reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.35

412
The awards for damages also need to be modified. In People v. Alberto Anticamara
y Cabillo, et al.,36 the Court held that in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence on
heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the award of moral damages should be
increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00, while the award for exemplary damages,
in view of the presence of aggravating circumstances, should be ₱30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 15, 2005 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00071 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
penalty of death imposed on accused-appellants is REDUCED to reclusion
perpetua without possibility of parole in accordance with R.A. No. 9346;
and INCREASING the award of moral damages from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00, and
the award of exemplary damages from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00. The rest of the
award of the Court of Appeals is hereby maintained.

G.R. No. 154213 : August 23, 2012

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. AND AGEMAR MANNING

AGENCY, INC., Petitioners, v. ESTANISLAO SURIO, FREDDIE PALGUIRAN,
GRACIANO MORALES, HENRY CASTILLO, ARISTOTLE ARREOLA,
ALEXANDER YGOT, ANRIQUE BATTUNG, GREGORIO ALDOVINO, NARCISO
FRIAS, VICTOR FLORES, SAMUEL MARCIAL, CARLITO PALGUIRAN, DUQUE
VINLUAN, JESUS MENDEGORIN, NEIL FLORES, ROMEO MANGALIAG, JOE
GARFIN and SALESTINO SUSA, Respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

413
FACTS:
Respondents Estanislao Surio, et al. were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a
vessel owned by petitioner Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. (Eastern).

On December 23, 1993, Eastern filed against Surio, et al. a complaint for disciplinary
action based on breach of discipline and for the reimbursement of the wage
increases in the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA.

During the pendency of the administrative complaint in the POEA, R.A. No. 8042
(Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15, 1995.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 vested original and exclusive jurisdiction over all money
claims arising out of employer-employee relationships involving overseas Filipino
workers in the Labor Arbiters. The jurisdiction over such claims was previously
exercised by the POEA under the POEA Rules and Regulations of 1991 (1991
POEA Rules).

The POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary action. Eastern elevated the
matter to the NLRC. The NLRC also dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Likewise, the CA also denied the Eastern’s petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction to review on appeal cases decided
by the POEA on matters pertaining to disciplinary actions?

RULING: The petition for review lacks merit.

Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10, transferred the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide money claims involving overseas Filipino
workers from the POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did not remove from the POEA
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all disciplinary action cases
and other special cases administrative in character involving such workers.

When Republic Act No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in
respect of cases decided by the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested in the
Secretary of Labor in accordance with his power of supervision and control under
Section 38(1), Chapter 7, Title II, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987.

In conclusion, we hold that petitioners should have appealed the adverse decision of
414
the POEA to the Secretary of Labor instead of to the NLRC.

Court of Appeals’ decision AFFIRMED.

JUANITA NARZOLES v. NLRC

GR No. 141959
Sep 29, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner-employees appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission

because of the adverse decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing their complaint for
illegal dismissal. The NLRC modified the decision and ordered respondents to
reinstate petitioners “but without backwages.” Petitioners received the NLRC
decision on July 23 1998 and filed a motion for reconsideration on August 3, 1998.
On September 1, 1998, Section 4, Rule 65 as amended by Circular No. 39-98
provides that if the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due
415
time after notice of said judgment, order, or resolution the period herein fixed shall be
interrupted. And if the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition
within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any
event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition
shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
fifteen (15) days. On October 19, 1998, petitioners received a copy of the NLRC
Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration. Petitioners then filed a petition
for certiorari on December 17, 1998. The court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals. Acting on the petition, the CA denied the same for late filing, applying
Section 4, Rule 65 amended by Circular No. 39-98 in computing the period for the
filing of the petition for certiorari. It shows that the petitioner’s last day to file their
petition for certiorari is December 8, 1998. The petition was filed before the
Honorable Supreme Court. Consequently, this court hereby resolves to dismiss the
petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioners filed the present petition
for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment apply to cases where the motion for
reconsideration was filed before the amendment although the petition was filed after
the amendment took effect.

RULING: The Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated
tremendous confusion resulting in the dismissal of numerous cases for late filing.
This may have been because, historically, even before the 1997 revision to the Rules
of Civil Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the
motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Were it not for the
amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, the cases so dismissed would
have been resolved on the merits. Hence, the Court deemed it wise to revert to the
old rule allowing a party a fresh 60-day period from notice of the denial of the motion
for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. The Court resolved, in A.M. No. 00-
2-03-SC, to further amend Section 4, Rule 65. The Resolution further amending
Section 4, Rule 65 can be described as curative in nature, and the principles
governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are enacted to cure
defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void
for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. They are intended to supply
defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable
persons to carry into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed
of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity
416
in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute
was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been
invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. Curative
statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive. The filing of the petition for
certiorari in this Court, therefore, is deemed to be timely, the same having been
made within the 60-day period provided under the curative Resolution. The Court
resolved to give due course to, and grant, the petition. The case is hereby remanded
to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings

MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, IN HER CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR OF

MARIKINA CITY, JOSEPHINE C. EVANGELISTA, IN HER CAPACITY AS CHIEF,
PERMIT DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CITY ENGINEER, ALFONSO ESPIRITU IN
HIS CAPACITY AS ENGINEER OF MARIKINA CITY.- PETITIONERS
VS
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE AND ST. SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMY-
MARIKINA, INC.- RESPONDENT, GR. No. 161107, MARCH 12, 2013
Mendoza, J.:

417
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which
seeks to set aside the CA ruling.

St. Scholastica College and St. Scholastica Academy are educational institutions
organized under Philippine Law with a principal address at Malate, Manila, and
Marikina.

St. Scholastica is the owner of 4 parcels of land with an area of 56, 306.80 square
meters located in Marikina Heights with TCT No. 91537. Inside was the residence of
the Sisters of the Benedictine, the order of formation of the house of Novices and the
retirement for the elderly sisters.

The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built around 30 years
ago.

On September 30, 1994, Sangguniang Panlungsod of City of Marikina enacted

Ordinance No. 192, entitled regulating the Construction of fences and walls in the
City of Marikina.

On April 2, 2000, City government of Marikina sent a letter to the Respondents,

ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it
80% see-thru and at the same time, to move it by 6 meters to provide parking space
for vehicles to park.

On April 26, 2000, Respondents requested an extension of time to comply with the
order, however, Mayor Fernando insisted on the enforcement of the Ordinance.

Respondent then filed a Petition for Prohibition with an application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before RTC
Marikina.

Respondents argued that the petitioners were acting in excess of jurisdiction in

enforcing Ordinance No. 192 Series of 1994, asserting that such contravenes
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and would result in great losses.

However, Petitioners contend that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police
power.
418
On June 30, 2000, RTC issued a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION enjoining
Petitioners from implementing the demolition of the fence at St. Scholastica Marikina.

On December 1, 2003, CA dismissed the Petitioner's appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN DECLARING THAT CITY ORDINANCE 192
SERIES OF 1994 IS NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER.

WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN RULING THAT AFOREMENTIONED

ORDINANCE IS AN EXERCISE OF THE CITY OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN.

WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CITY VIOLATED THE

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE IN IMPLEMENTING ORDINANCE 192 SERIES OF 1994.

WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED

ORDINANCE CANNOT BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION.

RULING:
The ultimate question is whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance 192 Series of
1994 are a valid exercise of police power by the City of Marikina.

Police Power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and
general welfare of the people.

The test of a valid ordinance must not only be within the corporate powers of the
LGU to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, but it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) Must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; 2) Must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) Must not be partial
or discriminatory; 4) Must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) Must be general and
consistent with public policy; 6) Must not be unreasonable;

Ordinance 192 must be struck down for not being reasonably necessary to
accomplish the City's purpose, more importantly, it is oppressive of private rights,
arbitrary intrusion, and a violation of due process clause.
419
The court is of the view that the implementation of the setback requirement would be
tantamount to taking of Respondents private property for public use without just
compensation in contravention to the Constitution.

As to the beautification purpose of the assailed ordinance, the state may not under
the guise of police power, infringe on private rights solely for the sake of the
aesthetic appearance of the community.

Ordinance No. 217 amended Section 7 of Ordinance No. 192 Series of 1994 by
including educational institutions which were intentionally omitted, and giving said
educational institutions 5 years from the passage of such ordinance 192 and not
Ordinance 217 to conform its provisions.

Petitioners argued that the amendment could be retroactively applied because the
assailed Ordinance is a curative statute which is retroactive in nature, however,
Petitioners failed to point out any irregular or invalid provisions.

As such the assailed ordinance cannot qualify as curative and retroactive in nature.

The Petitioners were acting in excess of their jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance 192
against the Respondents.

The Writ of Prohibition is hereby issued commanding Mayor Fernando et al to

permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Section 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance
192 Series of 1994 on St. Scholastica's property in Marikina.

Maxey vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No: 45870
11 MAY 1984

FACTS: Relevant Provision of Law: Art. 144 of the Civil Code1 Melbourne Maxey
and Regina Morales started living together in 1903 but were only married in a
420
“military fashion.” However, they had a church wedding in 1919. The properties in
dispute were acquired in 1911 and 1912. In 1919, Regina died. Melbourne remarried
and in 1953, his second wife Julia (using a power of attorney) sold the properties to
private respondents spouses Macayra. Julia is of the belief that said properties were
exclusive to Melbourne. Petitioners are children of Melbourne and Regina. They
seek the annulment of the above sale and recovery of possession. They allege that
such properties were conjugal properties of their parents’ marriage as they were
bought with their joint effort and capital. The trial court ruled for the petitioners, while
the CA found otherwise.

ISSUES: (1) W/N Melbourne and Regina were married in 1903 in military fashion
RULING: Act No. 3613 recognizing military marriages was only enacted in 1929. The
military wedding did not make a valid marriage. They were only legally married in
1919. (2) W/N the properties in question were conjugal or exclusive to Melbourne

RULING: They were conjugal property. The CA disputed the application of Art. 144 of
the Civil Code because it could not be applied retroactively in prejudice of vested
rights. But even if Art. 144 did apply, the CA is of the view that the property could not
have been acquired by the spouses’ joint efforts because this pertains to monetary
contributions and Regina was a mere housewife. SC rules otherwise. It applies Art.
144 retroactively because no vested rights of Melbourne were impaired because
there exists a concurrent right of Regina or her heirs to a share of the properties in
question. The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne and the
estate of his late wife Regina when they were sold. Art. 144 recognizes that it would
be unjust to require a woman who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship except
for the requirement of a valid marriage to abandon her home and children, neglect
her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in business
before the rules on co-ownership would apply. It does not matter that she made no
monetary contribution, for the "real contribution" to the acquisition of property must
include not only the earnings of a woman but also her contribution to the family's
material and spiritual goods through caring for the children, administering the
household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her husband from household
tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a housewife. But given that
the properties were owned in common by the spouses, Julia’s sale over Melbourne’s
share is valid. Petitioners should return one-half of the purchase price of the land to
private respondents while the latter should pay some form of rentals for their use of
one-half of the properties.

421
LUCIANO VALENCIA and FRANCISCO OCAMPO, Petitioners, v. HON. JOSE T.
SURTIDA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, and RUFINA
SUBASTIL, Respondents.

FACTS: In the complaint filed therein, on or about February 14, 1959, Rufina
Subastil, the main respondent herein, alleged that she is the owner and possessor of
422
a riceland situated in Sampaloc, Gainza, Camarines Sur, and more particularly
described in said pleading; that, at the inception of the agricultural season, sometime
in July, 1950, defendants therein, namely, Luciano Valencia and Francisco Ocampo,
husband and wife, who are petitioners herein, entered into a verbal contract with her
whereby they agreed to cultivate the southern portion of said lot and pay her five (5)
cavanes of clean palay, by way of rental for each agricultural year; and that, after
complying with this obligation during the year 1950-1951, petitioners thereafter failed
and refused to do so, as well as to vacate the land, despite repeated demands, for
which reason Rufina Subastil prayed that petitioners be sentenced to vacate the land
and deliver the same to her, as well as to pay her the equivalent of the unsatisfied
rentals and those which may accrue until possession shall have been given to her, in
addition to P500 as moral, actual and consequential damages, P200 as attorney’s
fees and the costs.

Not having filed a responsive pleading, petitioners were declared in default on

August 24, 1959. Respondent Judge then received the evidence for Rufina Subastil,
and later on, rendered judgment, on or about October 27, 1959, finding that
petitioners were, since 1950, tenants of Rufina Subastil under a 70-30 sharing basis,
representing five (5) cavanes of palay a year for her, which were paid by petitioners
during the agricultural year 1950-1951, but not subsequently thereto, and sentencing
petitioners to vacate the land and to pay P400.00, as well as the costs, to Rufina
Subastil.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action

RULING: This motion for reconsideration was denied, and, soon thereafter,
respondent Judge issued an order directing the execution of said decision,
whereupon petitioners instituted this action for certiorari upon the ground that the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur had no jurisdiction over said case No. 4457,
it appearing on the face of the complaint therein that its purpose was to eject the
petitioners as tenants of an agricultural land and respondent Judge having, in his
aforementioned decision, ordered the ejectment of petitioners herein as such tenants
of an agricultural land, which is within the exclusive competence of the Court of
Agrarian Relations.

In their answer, respondents herein alleged, inter alia, that there could have been no
tenancy relationship between petitioners herein and Rufina Subastil because
423
petitioners asserted in their motion for reconsideration that the land in question
belongs to them; that, assuming that said relationship had existed, non-compliance
with the conditions thereof terminated said relationship; and that, in any event,
Republic Act No. 1199, which took effect on August 30, 1954, is inapplicable to the
parties in said Case No. 4457, their relationship as landlord and tenants having
begun prior thereto.

Respondents’ pretense is clearly untenable for Civil Case No. 4457 was begun on or
about February 14, 1959, when Republic Act No. 1199 was already in force. The
application of this statute to said case would, therefore, be prospective in nature,
aside from the fact that it is already settled that laws enacted in the exercise of the
police power, to which said Act belongs, may constitutionally affect tenancy relations
created before the enactment or effectivity thereof (Viuda de Ongsiako v. Gamboa,
47 Off. Gaz., 5613).

Again, respondent Judge having found that petitioners are tenants of an agricultural
land, it is clear that their ejectment is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur (Bakit v. Asperin, L-15700, April 26, 1931), for pursuant to
section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"All cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landholder or by a third

party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship
of landholder and tenant, as well as the violation of any of the provisions of this Act,
shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or
hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance of tenancy relations and
disputes."cralaw virtua1aw library

and Republic Act No. 1267, creating the Court of Agrarian Relations, provides, in
Section 7 thereof, as amended by Republic Act No. 1409,
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions, matters, controversies or
disputes involving all those relationships established by law which determine the
varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of
the parties works the land: Provided, however, That cases pending in the Court of
Industrial Relations upon approval of this Act which are within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Agrarian Relations, shall be transferred to, and the proceedings therein
424
continued in, the latter court."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, the decision complained of is hereby annulled, with costs against

respondent Rufina Subastil. It is so ordered.

RODOLFO GUEVARRA AND JOEY GUEVARRA, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
425
G.R. No. 170462
February 05, 2014

FACTS: Rodolfo and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated
homicide and homicide under two Informations which read:

In Criminal Case No. Br. 20–1560 for Frustrated

Homicide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province
of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with intent to
kill and without any just motive, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times with a sharp pointed bolo
one Erwin Ordoñez, who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab wounds
on the different parts of his body, which injuries would ordinarily cause the death of
the said Erwin Ordoñez, thus, performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is, by the timely and
able medical assistance rendered to the said Erwin Ordoñez, which prevented his
death.RoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20–1561 for Homicide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province
of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with intent to
kill and without any just motive, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times with. sharp pointed bolo
one David Ordoñez, who as. result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab wounds
on the different parts of his body which directly caused his
death.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Although the informations stated that the crimes were committed on January 8,
2000, the true date of their commission is November 8, 2000, as confirmed by the
CA through the records.6 The parties failed to raise any objection to the
discrepancy.7cralawred

On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to both charges.8 The cases were
jointly tried with the conformity of the prosecution and the defense. At the pre–trial,
426
the petitioners interposed self–defense, which prompted the RTC to conduct reverse
trial of the case.9 During the trial, the parties presented different versions of the
events that transpired on November 8, 2000.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF–DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ELEMENTS OF SELF–DEFENSE.

RULING: We deny the present petition as we find no reversible error in the CA

decision of October 24, 2005. 

At the outset, we emphasize that the Court’s review of the present case is via
petition for review under Rule 45, which generally bars any question pertaining to the
factual issues raised. The well–settled rule is that questions of fact are not
reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions,
among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court’s judgment or
the appellate court’s misapprehension of the adduced facts.24

The petitioners fail to convince us that we should review the findings of fact in this
case. Factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great
weight and respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when
supported by the evidence on record.25 We find that both the RTC and the CA fully
considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, and they
have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that the
petitioners are guilty of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide.

In the absence of any showing that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain
facts and circumstances that could substantially affect the outcome of the present
case, we uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of
these crimes fully established during the trial.

The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when: (1) an “accused intended to kill
his victim, as manifested by his use of deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim
sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code is present.”26

427
On the other hand, the crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is killed;
(2) the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) the
accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) the killing was not
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or
infanticide.27

The petitioners’ intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of
wounds sustained by their victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, among other things, of the means used by the malefactors; the
conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of
the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim.28 The CA aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered
and which eventually caused his death, and the thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds
Erwin sustained, confirmed the prosecution’s theory that the petitioners purposely
and vigorously attacked David and Erwin.29 In fact, the petitioners admitted at the
pre–trial that “the wounds inflicted on the victim Erwin Ordoñez would have caused
his death were it not for immediate medical attendance.”30

By invoking self–defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the

acts for which they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would
have exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the
petitioners to show that the killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin,
respectively, were attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression
on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the persons resorting to self–defense.31

Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of
unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least.
threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon. person.32 The element of unlawful
aggression must be proven first in order for self–defense to be successfully pleaded.
There can be no self–defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim
had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self–
defense.33

As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and
428
David were just passing by the petitioners’ compound on the night of November 8,
2000 when David was suddenly attacked by Joey while Erwin was attacked by
Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside, not inside, the petitioners’
compound, as evidenced by the way the petitioners’ gate was destroyed. The
manner by which the wooden gate post was broken coincided with Erwin’s testimony
that his brother David, who was then clinging onto the gate, was dragged into the
petitioners’ compound. These circumstances, coupled with the nature and number of
wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners did not act in self–
defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in fact, the real
aggressors.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent (DIGEST)

429
G.R. No. 122156
February 3, 1997

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel
(MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation

(MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42
more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution
of the contracts, the MPHC matched the bid price  in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a
manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of
the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and
submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision
and requires implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are
self-executing.

430
RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

431
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board
GR Nos. 157870, 158633, 161658
November 3, 2008

Facts:
Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165, a.k.a. the
Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002. Section 36 requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, particularly those who are charged with
offenses punishable by a penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day of imprisonment.
On December 23, 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution 6486, which provides the
rules on the mandatory drugs testing of candidates for public office. It requires the
COMELEC offices and employees concerned to submit two separate lists of
candidates: one for those who complied with the mandatory drug testing and the
other of those who failed to comply.
It was Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. who opposed such resolution, contending that it was
unconstitutional as it imposes an additional qualification for senators.

Issue:
1. Do Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution 6468 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator?
2. Is RA 9165 unconstitutional?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Section 36, validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution provides.
The COMELEC resolution effectively enlarges that qualification requirements for
senator, enumerated under Section 3, Article VI of the Constitution.
2. The provision of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing for students (Section
36[b]) are constitutional as long as they are random and suspicionless. This is
because schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students, and schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for
admission that are fair and non-discriminatory.
The provision requiring mandatory drug testing for officers and employees of public
and private offices (Section 36[d])  are also justifiable. The privacy expectation in a
regulated office environment is reduced. A degree of impingement upon such privacy
432
has been upheld. To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal
drug use is substantial enough to override the individual’s privacy interest under the
premises.
On the other hand, the Court finds no justification in the mandatory drug testing of
those prosecuted for crimes punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years and 1
day (Section 36[f]). The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
randomness and suspicionless. In this case, it cannot be said that the drug testing is
random. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165.
In sum, Section 36(c) and (d) are constitutional, but 36(f) is not.

433
SABIO VS. GORDON
G.R. NO: 174340
17 OCT 2006

FACTS: A Senate Resolution was introduced by Senator Miriam Santiago "directing

an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and Philcomsat Holdings due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors” Then PCGG Chairman Camilo
Sabio was invited by the Senate to be one of its resource persons. Chairman Sabio
declined, invoking Section 4 (b) of EO No. 1 which provides that "No member or staff
of the [PCGG] shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance" Notwithstanding the Subpoena Ad Testificandum issued by Senator
Gordon to Chairman Sabio and other PCGG Comissioners, they refused to appear
before the Senate and pointed out that the anomalous transactions referred to in the
Senate Resolution are subject of pending cases before the regular courts, the
Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court for which reason they may not be able to
testify thereon under the principle of sub judice. Section 4 (b) of EO No. 1 is
challenged on the ground that it tramples upon the Senate's power to conduct
legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING: Section 4 (b) of EO No. 1 is unconstitutional. Power of Legislative Inquiry

1. The power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate. The power of inquiry -
with process to enforce it - is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. Hence, there need not be | Page 2 of 3 any express provision in the
Constitution granting such powers to the legislative since it is already impliedly
included in the function of legislation. 2. Notably, Article VI, Section 21 grants the
power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also
to any of their respective committees. 3. Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with
Article VI, Section 21 as it exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress'
power of inquiry. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or
possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate
or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class. 4. Section 4(b), being in the nature of
an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It places the
PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other

434
administrative bodies. 5. Corollarily, Sec. 4(b) also runs counter to the following
constitutional provisions: Art. II, Sec. 28 (policy of full public disclosure), Art. III, Sec.
7 (right of the people to information on matters of public concern). Right to Privacy 6.
One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." This means
that the power of inquiry must be "subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution
on government action." (i.e. Bill of Rights) 7. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right to
privacy. In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must
determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and,
if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government
intrusion. 8. The legislative inquiry focuses on acts committed in the discharge of
duties as officers and directors of the said corporations. Consequently, the directors
of POTC, Philcomsat have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters
involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest. Certainly,
such matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to
information.

435
MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO: 157013
10 JULY 2003

FACTS:
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act) provides that all
citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least
eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president,
vicepresident,

Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 disqualifies from voting an immigrant or permanent
resident who is recognized as such in the host country, UNLESS he/she executes,
upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring
that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under the said law.
-Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act empowers the
COMELEC to order the proclamation of the winning candidates (president,
vicepresident, senators and party-list representatives).

Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the “Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee” with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC.

Arguments of Macalintal: (1) Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates

Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a
resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes
to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. He cites the ruling
of the Supreme Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, wherein it was held that a
“green card” holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his
domicile and residence in the Philippines; (2) Section 18.5 is unconstitutional, as it
affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president
and vice-president; (3) Sections 19 and 25 creating the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee are unconstitutional intrudes into the independence of the
COMELEC. Should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the

436
Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any interested party,
including the legislators.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Section 1, Article V of the
1987 Constitution;

(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional insofar as it
involves the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president
and vice-president;

(3) Whether or not the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
violates Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of
constitutional commissions.

RULING:
(1)
No. Contrary to Macalintal’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution,
Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in
compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that
Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the
“qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country.

The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas
absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who
executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines.

He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this
country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country
does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile
of origin, the Philippines.

Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has
not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit
required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.

x x x x Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be

at the same time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under our election
437
laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an
absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is
considered synonymous with domicile. x x x x For political purposes the concepts of
residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these
concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally
emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile. x x x x

To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad

because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have
relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the
presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.

(2)
Yes. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to
Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of
president and vice-president. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to
usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to
encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-
president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.” x x x x The
canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president
and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

NOTE: Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 was declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL with
respect only to the power given to the Comelec to canvass the votes and proclaim
the winning candidates for President and Vice-President, which is lodged with
Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. However, its
consitutionality was UPHELD insofar as the authority given to the COMELEC to
proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives.

(3)
Yes. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR
for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of
its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. The second sentence of the first paragraph of
Section 19 stating that, “the Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted
to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
438
approval,” and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating
that, “it shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Commission,” whereby Congress, in both
provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution,
should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both
provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.

439
G.R. No. 202242  July 17, 2012
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and
REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.

FACTS:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of
Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the
President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the
judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the
moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the
Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of
having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as
two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the
House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2)
of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as
representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally
envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the
National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive
with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional
440
Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the
Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral
legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding
adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of
Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of
representation, defeating the principle of balance.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of
Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing
balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most
likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably
presidential appointees

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object
of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have
the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

ISSUE:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two
(2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution.

RULING:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to
perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is
unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words
of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it
can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the
use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal
and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members
of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only
one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)

441
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in
no uncertain terms, so provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in
which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each
word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since
a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the
foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used
in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No
particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC

Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the
Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look
into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable
from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote
may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or
among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.

With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from
the Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of
the records of Constitutional Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of
JBC representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are
still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two
houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by
the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be
taken to mean the entire legislative department.

The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the
three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the
442
selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have
more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak,
whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle
of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.”

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one
whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the
JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of
the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which
all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of
the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what
may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the
call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the
government and the people who run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the

JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play
under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the

Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of
Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section
8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.

443
FRANCISCO JR VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. NO: 160261
10 SEPTEMBER 2003

FACTS:
On 2 June 2003, Former Pres. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against C.J.
Davide, Jr., among others.* The House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the
complaint on 22 Oct 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The Committee Report
to that effect has not been sent to the House in plenary. The following day and just
nearly five months since the filing of the first complaint, a second impeachment
complaint** was filed by respondents house representatives. Thus arose the instant
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against the respondents House of
Representatives, et. al., (the House) most of which contend that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 3(5), Art. XI of
the Const. which provides: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year.” The House argues: the
one year bar could not have been violated as the first impeachment complaint has
not been initiated. Sec. 3(1) of the same is clear in that it is the House, as a
collective body, which has “the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.”
“Initiate” could not possibly mean “to file” because filing can, as Sec. 3 of the same
provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for
impeachment by any member of the House; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the
House.*** Since the House, as a collective body, has yet to act on the first
impeachment complaint, the first complaint could not have been “initiated”.

ISSUE:
Is the second impeachment complaint barred under Section 3(5) of Art. XI of the
Const.?

RULING:
Yes. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly revealed that the
framers intended “initiation” to start with the filing of the complaint.**** The vote of
one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the
444
impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified
complaint. [Thus, under the one year bar on initiating impeachment proceedings,] no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice
for action [within one year from filing of the first verified impeachment complaint]. To
the argument that only the House as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings
because Sec. 3(1) of Art. XI of the Const. says “The House x x x shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment,” this is a misreading and is
contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating “impeachment
cases” with “impeachment proceeding.

On the ground of culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes.

On the ground of the alleged results of the legislative inquiry conducted on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by C.J. Davide, Jr. of the Judiciary
Development Fund.

Const., Art. XI, Sec. 3: x x x x x x x x x (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may
be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof x x x (3) A vote of at least one-
third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. x x x x x x x x x x x x

The well-settled principles of constitutional construction: First, verba legis, that is,

wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. Second, where there is
ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted
in accordance with the intent of its framers. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and
the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. It
may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. Finally, ut magis valeat quam
pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat

445
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
(Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, et al., G.R. No. 160261 [2003])

Following the principle of reddendo singula singulis, the term “cases” must be
distinguished from the term “proceedings.” An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Under Sec.3(3), Art. XI, the House,
by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that
sense that the House has “exclusive power” to initiate all cases of impeachment. On
the other hand, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding
and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. (Ibid.)

There was a preliminary issue on whether the power of judicial review extends to
those arising from impeachment proceedings. The Court ruled in the affirmative. Our
Constitution, though vesting in the House of Reps the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power:
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official (Art. XI, Secs. 3 (2), (3), (4) and (5)).
Where there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies, our courts are dutybound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits pursuant to its
expanded certiorari jurisdiction under Art. VIII, Sec. 1: the power to correct any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. (Id.)
N.B. There are two types of political questions: (1) justiciable and (2) non-justiciable.
The determination of one from the other lies in the answer to the question of whether
there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies.

446
G.R. No. 166471: March 22, 2011

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner,v. LA TRINIDAD WATER

DISTRICT, Respondent.

CARPIO,J.:

FACTS:
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, organized to provide
domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. La Trinidad
Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Section 47 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic,
industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.

TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a
certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks
system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPCs application, arguing that its
franchise is exclusive as provided under PD 198. A CPC is however granted. LTWD
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by NWRB. LTWD then
appealed to the RTC where it court set aside the NWRB decision. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition may be granted

RULING: Yes. RTC Decision Set Aside.

Political Law- No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens,nor shall such franchise,
certificate or authorizationbe exclusive in characteror for a longer period than fifty
years.

447
Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are
clear franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that,"nor shall
such franchise x x x be exclusive in character."There is no exception.

When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of
the Court is to apply the law the way it is worded. What cannot be legally done
directly cannot be done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does
not need explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.

Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that
are exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and the Court cannot
legally do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the
Court cannot create indirectly.

In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President

Marcos) created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the
BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in
character.

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always
prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must
conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all
laws that do not conform to it.

Petition Granted. Section 47 of PD 198 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

448
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec
G.R NO: 147589 and 147613
26 JUNE 2001

FACTS:

Akbayan and Ang Bagong Bayani filed their MOTIONS before Comelec to have
some party-list groups DELETED FROM THE OFFICIAL LIST OF PARTIES. (for the
2001 elections) They contend that there are SOME POLITICAL PARTIES (PMP,
LAKAS-NUCD, NPC, LDP, AKSYON DEMOCRATICO, PDP-LABAN,
NATIONALISTA) included in the party-list system. They argue that the party-list
system is for the marginalized and underrepresented.

ISSUE:

Whether COMELEC was correct in including some of these political parties in the
Party-List Election.

RULING:

SC: THEY ARE QUALIFIED. These political parties cannot be disqualified from the
party-list election merely on the ground that they are political parties. The
Constitution provides that the members of the House may be elected through a party
list system of REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES
OR ORGANIZATIONS.

Under the Party List Law RA 7941, a PARTY is defined as either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties. A political party is also defined as a group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles, and policies for the general
conduct of government, and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as

449
candidates for public office. Thus, political parties, even the major ones, may
participate in the party-list elections.

While RA 7941 mentions the labor, peasants, fisher folk, urban poor, ICCs, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, OFWs and professionals as marginalized
and underrepresented, the ENUMERATION IS NOT EXCLUSIVE.

Looking into the Policy behind RA 7941, it is not enough for a candidate to claim
representation among these enumerated groups because representation is easy to
claim and feign. The party list group (even political parties) must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented.

Again, the POLICY OF THE LAW: To enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors who lack well defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to legislation.

SC: CASE REMANDED TO COMELEC TO DETERMINE QUALIFICATIONS OF

THESE POLITICAL PARTIES.

GUIDELINES:

1. Party must truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors

2. Major political parties allowed but they must still represent the marginalized

3. Religious sector may not be represented but a religious leader may be a nominee

4. Must not be disqualified under Sec 6 RA 7941

5. Must be independent from the government (not adjunct, not funded, not assisted)

6. Nominees must themselves be qualified (age, residence, citizenship)

7. Nominees must belong to the marginalized/underrep

8. Nominee must be able to contribute to appropriate legislation

450
J.M TUASON & CO., INC. V. LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION
G.R. NO: 21064
18 FEBRUARY 1970

FACTS: R.A. 2616 authorized expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City
owned by petitioner and 2 others. Lands were to be divided to lots to be sold. They
prayed that it be declared unconstitutional because violative of equal protection
clause since statute applies only to Tatalon estate.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A PERSON SHALL BE DENIED EQUAL

PROTECTION

RULING: No person shall be denied equal protection. A judicial being is included

within its terms. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the
equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed was
prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least discrimination that finds no
support in reason. Petitioner failed to prove denial of equal protection. Occupants
believe in gf that veterans subdivision is the real owner. Only when the place vastly
improved with building of roads, infrastructure did petitioner claimed for the first time
that they are the owners.

451
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SUPRA

FACTS:

The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order No.
284 issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino.

The petitioners alleged that Section 1, 2 and 3 of EO 284 contravenes the provision
of Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

The assailed provisions of EO 284 are as follows:

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other

appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.

Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they
must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in
rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his
primary position.

Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should
either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, meanwhile, states that:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or

452
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of
the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION: EO 284 adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII

other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those
provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President (may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII: “The Vice-President may
be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no
confirmation.”) and the secretary of justice (as an ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII: “A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of
the private sector.”)

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is unconstitutional

RULING: Yes. EO 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The court said, by allowing Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant

secretaries to hold at least two positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment
which is a direct contravention of the express mandate of Article VII, Section 13 of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits them from doing so, unless otherwise provided
in the 1987 Constitution itself.

The explained that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must

be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
constitution itself which are Section 3 of Article VII (for VP) and Section 8 of Article
VIII (for Secretary of Justice).

453
Thus, the PETITION is GRANTED.

NITIFAN V. CIR
G.R. NO: 78780
23 JULY 1987

FACTS: 
The Chief Justice directed the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the
Supreme Court to discontinue the withholding of taxes from the salaries of the
Justices of the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members of
the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc.

Judges Nitafan, Polo and Savellano from RTC Manila filed a petition to prohibit
and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial
Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from
their salaries. They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of
their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary
envisioned in and by said Constitution."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the members of the Judiciary exempt from income taxes?

RULING:
No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income
tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not
clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission regarding the constitutional provision in question until it
was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers
was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of
that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional

454
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by
the framers.

Hence, the doctrine in Perfecto v. Meer and Endencia vs. David (declared
the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and
considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in
office) do not apply anymore. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of
the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning
and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they
have adopted.

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens
should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should
share the burden of general income taxation equitably. (Nitafan vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987)

455
G.R. No. L-51042 September 30, 1982

DIONISIO MALACORA, and LUCIA, MARABULAS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELO LIBARNES and RODRIGO
LIBARNES, respondents.

FACTS: Appeal by certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which
modified the judgment of the trial court, the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch I,
Butuan City. the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, questioned orders of June 27,1978 and August 1, 1978, as wen as

the writ of execution of October 7, 1974, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale and Sheriff's
Final Deed of Sale are hereby annuled and set aside, with costs against the private
respondents." 1

From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the following facts as set forth therein are
undisputed:

On April 14, 1971, the respondent court rendered a decision in CAR Case No. 6,
entitled "Dionisio Malacora and Lucia Marabulas vs. Rodrigo Libarnes and Consuelo
Libarnes", the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the

herein defendants RODRIGO LIBARNES and CONSUELO LIBARNES to pay the
herein plaintiffs DIONISIO MALACORA and LUCIA MARABULAS the total amount of
TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY FIVE (P2,595.00) PESOS for
onehalf of all the coconut trees and of TEN (P10.00) PESOS for one-half of the

456
banana plants said plaintiffs planted on the defendants' land and after payment of
said amounts their tenancy relation will be considered as terminated and the said
plaintiffs will be allowed to surrender and leave their tenanted holding.

Both parties in this case are hereby ordered to pay fifty-fifty the court fees, the
plaintiffs to pay their one-half share upon receipt of the payments for one-half of the
improvements as herein above ordered.

Defendants, petitioners herein, appealed to this Court (CA-G.R. No. 00658-R) which
modified the judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the modification
that the petitioners are ordered to pay P8.00 per coconut trees for one- half of all the
coconut trees which the private respondents had planted on the land in question,
without pronouncement as to costs.

After Our decision became final and the case had been returned to the respondent
court, plaintiffs, private respondents herein, filed a motion for execution. Acting on
the motion, the respondent court, on September 20, 1974, entered an order of
execution; and on October 4, 1974, the Clerk of Court issued a writ of execution
which commanded petitioners 'to pay plaintiffs Dionisio Malacora and Lucia
Marabulas the total amount of P2,184.00 for the 273 coconut trees planted by the
plaintiffs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the writ of execution?

RULING: No. From the plain language of the provision, the Constitution could not
have intended anything but full and immediate compliance therewith. The manifest
purpose of the provision is to avoid delay in the disposition of cases, which always is
a cause of injustice, under the familiar aphorism that "justice delayed is justice
denied." It would, at the same time, ease up the clogged dockets of the courts, which
had long presented a problem that defies solution, despite the striving of this Court in
constant quest of one.

To begin with, it is, to me, not correct to say that it is impossible to comply with the
provision of Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. There is nothing hard to just
follow its simple mandate of considering an appealed decision affirmed if no decision
is rendered before the lapse of time limit set therefor. What may be impossible is for
the Supreme Court, for example, to decide a case on the merit within the eighteen

457
(18) months given to it from its submission for decision, because so many other
appealed cases had already accumulated and will increasingly do so, as long as We
do not apply the clear mandate of the Constitution. It is precisely with full cognizance
of this fact-the impossibility of avoiding delays in disposing of appealed cases on the
merits-that prompted the adoption of this special remedy by no less than the
Constitution because similar time limitations as provided by mere statutes, without
an alternative prescription of what would be the effect of failure to meet the deadline,
had been held merely directory. To hold the Constitutional provision as also merely
directory would render it nugatory, because the unmistakable and clear intent of the
framers would be put to naught. The automatic affirmance of the appealed provision
in case of failure to decide or resolve within the time limit is precisely the alternative
prescription, believed to' better serve the cause of justice than waiting, no n-latter
how long, for a decision on the merit.

This may be illustrated with a case in which a money award is made in favor of the
plaintiff. By applying the Constitution, the appealed decision is deemed affirmed if no
decision is rendered within the applicable maximum period allowed. Without the
constitutional provision, it may take many years more from the lapse of that period
before decision is actually rendered on the merits. If statistics showing that 95%
more or less, of the appealed cases to this Court are affirmed is accurate, the
appealled decision would, in all probability, be affirmed, if decision on the merits is
rendered. The injustice caused by the delay becomes instantly patent when it is
considered that if the award is paid earlier, the money would have a greater
purchasing value than when it is paid years later. This is due to inflation which had
long since gripped the whole world so tightly and unrelentingly as the Constitutional
Convention was obviously aware of, for which it saw the need of inserting the unique
and novel provision in the new Constitution, as a much needed extraordinary
remedy.

458
Gamboa v. Teves etal.,

GR No. 176579,

October 9, 2012

FACTS: The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of
shares involving almost 12 million shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific. Thus, First Pacific’s common
shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby
increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%.
The petitioner contends that it violates the Constitutional provision on filipinazation of
public utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%.
Then, in 2011, the court ruled the case in favor of the petitioner, hence this new
case, resolving the motion for reconsideration for the 2011 decision filed by the
respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the term

‘capital’ in its 2011 decision?

RULING: The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing its State policy
of developing an economy ‘effectively controlled’ by Filipinos. Asserting the ideals
that our Constitution’s Preamble want to achieve, that is – to conserve and
develop our patrimony , hence, the State should fortify a Filipino-controlled
economy. In the 2011 decision, the Court finds no wrong in the construction of the
term ‘capital’ which refers to the ‘shares with voting rights, as well as with full
459
beneficial ownership’ (Art. 12, sec. 10) which implies that the right to vote in the
election of directors, coupled with benefits, is tantamount to an effective
control. Therefore, the Court’s interpretation of the term ‘capital’ was not erroneous.
Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

TANADA VS. ANGARA

GR No. 118295  
May 2, 1997

FACTS:

The Philippines joined World Trade Organization as a founding member with the
goal of improving Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports. The President also saw in the
WTO the opening of new opportunities for the services sector, the reduction of costs
and uncertainty associated with exporting and the attraction of more investments into
the country. On April 15, 1994, respondent Navarro, then DTI Secretary, signed in
Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Negotiations. On December 14, 1994, the Senate concurred in the
ratification of the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the
WTO which includes various agreements and associated legal instruments. On
December 16, 1994,the President signed the Instrument of Ratification.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the WTO Agreement violated the mandated economic nationalism by the
Constitution

460
2. Whether the provisions of the WTO Agreement restricts and impairs Philippine
sovereignty, specifically the legislative power vested in the Congress

3. Whether the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes but not
in the other documents referred to in the Final Act is defective and insufficient and
thus constitutes abuse of discretion

RULING:

1. No. The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut
out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The constitutional policy of a self-
reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of
foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion
nor mendicancy in the international community.

2. No. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-
encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and
limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a
member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a
hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international
law, which are considered to be automatically part of our laws. A treaty engagement
is not a mere moral obligation on the parties. By their inherent nature, treaties really
limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. The Philippines has effectively
agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and
police power. The underlying consideration in this partial sovereignty is the reciprocal
commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and
immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity
characterizes the same commitments under WTO-GATT. The point is that a portion
of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the
rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part  of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity
with all nations.

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3. No. The petitioners submit that concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is
flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act. The Court held that a final
act is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic
conference and not the treaty itself. On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself
expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included as its integral parts. It
should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as
shown by the member’s deliberation.

Oposa vs Factoran
GR No. 101083
July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing
their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents
against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be
rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to:

Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.”
They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens
patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders
to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
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The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

RULING: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well
as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature”
which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present
as well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes
at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.

463
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 177131
7 June 2011

FACTS:

This case arose when the COA issued Resolution No. 99-011on August 19, 1999
(“the COA Resolution”), with the subject “Defining the Commissions policy with
respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines.” In its whereas clauses, the
COA Resolution stated that the BSP was created as a public corporation under
Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 460 and
Republic Act No. 7278; that inBoy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor
Relations Commission, the Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under
its charter, was a “government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article
IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution”; and that “the BSP is appropriately regarded as a
government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code.”

The COA Resolution also cited its constitutional mandate under Section 2(1), Article
IX (D).Finally, the COA Resolution reads: NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of
the foregoing premises, the COMMISSION PROPER HAS RESOLVED, AS IT

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DOES HEREBY RESOLVE to conduct an annual financial audit of the Boy Scouts of
the Philippines in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and
express an opinion on whether the financial statements which include the Balance
Sheet, the Income Statement and the Statement of Cash Flows present fairly its
financial position and results of operations. x x x x BE IT RESOLVED
FURTHERMORE, that for purposes of audit supervision,the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines shall be classified among the government corporations belonging to the
Educational, Social, Scientific, Civic and Research Sector under the Corporate Audit
Office I, to be audited, similar to the subsidiary corporations, by employing the team
audit approach.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Boy Scout of the Philippines is a government owned and controlled
corporation subject for COA’s audit jurisdiction.

RULING:

YES. After looking at the legislative history of its amended charter and carefully
studying the applicable laws and the arguments of both parties, we find that the BSP
is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA’s audit jurisdiction.

The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111, approved on October 31, 1936),
entitled “An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be Known as the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines, and to Define its Powers and Purposes” created the BSP as a “public
corporation” to serve the following public interest or purpose:

Sec. 3. The purpose of this corporation shall be to promote through organization and
cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys to do useful things for themselves
and others, to train them in scoutcraft, and to inculcate in them patriotism, civic
consciousness and responsibility, courage, self-reliance, discipline and kindred
virtues, and moral values, using the method which are in common use by boy
scouts.

The BSP as a Public Corporation under Par. 2, Art. 2 of the Civil Code

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There are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code and
the BSP, as presently constituted under Republic Act No. 7278, falls under the
second classification. Article 44 reads:

Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose

created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted
according to law;

(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to

which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member. (Emphases supplied.)

The BSP, which is a corporation created for a public interest or purpose, is subject to
the law creating it under Article 45 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article
are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.

Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a
government instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to
the exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the
provisions of the BSP Charter.

466
G.R. No. 143855: September 21, 2010

REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR., PROSPERO

AMATONG, ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, RAUL M. GONZALES, PROSPERO
PICHAY, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI AND FRANKLIN BAUTISTA, Petitioners, v.
HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (EXECUTIVE SECRETARY), HON. MAR ROXAS
(SECRETARY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY), HON. FELIPE MEDALLA
(SECRETARY OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY),
GOV. RAFAEL BUENAVENTURA (BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) AND
HON. LILIA BAUTISTA (CHAIRMAN, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION), Respondents.

ABAD, J.:

FACTS:
On March 7, 2000, President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.)
8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly

467
repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in
the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories.

R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship
and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the
same rights as Filipino citizens.

On October 11, 2000, petitioners, all members of the House of Representatives, filed
the present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following
grounds:

The law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which
enjoins the State to place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to
achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and full
employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade
policies.
The implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which
taken together with alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in the
loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.

Foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari
store vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring about more unemployment.

The World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage
of R.A. 8762 on the government as a condition for the release of certain loans.

There is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or
combinations in restraint of trade.

Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry

Secretary Mar Roxas, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
Secretary Felipe Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael Buenaventura,
and Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:

Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact that
they are taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public
funds.

468
The petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.

Petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. 8762.

Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing
provisions that are judicially demandable.

The Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign
investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of
investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest
so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or
not to make such reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws
allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the
Constitution to Filipino citizens.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762

Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional

RULING:
Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of
justice and make such a challenge. More particularly, standing refers to his personal
and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of
the passage of that law.

Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as
taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve the question they raise since
the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs when the public
interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

As the Court explained in Tanada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the 1987
Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing.
Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the
courts.
469
Furthermore, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly
of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or
interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given
preference in all areas of development.

More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the
discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the
recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus,
Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the
economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain
industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress
has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments
instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed
such policy.

Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A.
8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there
is no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court is
not convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien
control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and
strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on
foreign participation in that business. Thus -

First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories above-
enumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated
in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage in
retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to
engage in certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores through the use of
mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-door
selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing activities.

470
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN
AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND
GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
G.R. No. 91649             
May 14, 1991

FACTS: The PH Amusement and Gaming Corp. was created by PD 1067-A and
granted a franchise under PD 1067-B. Subsequently, under PD 1869, the
Government enabled it to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by
existing franchise or permitted by law, under declared policy. But the petitioners think
otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR
Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and
order, and because of the following issues:

ISSUE:
(1) WON it waived the Manila City gov't's right to impose taxes and license fees,

471
which is recognized by law.

(2) WON it has intruded into the LGUs' right to impose local taxes and license fees,
and thus contrary to the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the Constitution.

(3) WON it violates the equal protection clause as it allows some gambling acts but
also prohibits other gaming acts.

(4) WON it violates the Cory  gov't's policy of being away from monopolistic and
crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization.

RULING:
(1) No. The fact that PAGCOR, under its charter, is exempt from paying tax of any
kind is not violative of the principle of local autonomy. LGUs' have no inherent right to
impose taxes. LGUs' power to tax must always yield to a legislative act which is
superior having been passed by the state itself which has the inherent power to tax.
The charter of LGUs is subject to control by Congress as they are mere creatures of
Congress. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over LGUs. And if Congress
can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power.

(2) No. LGUs' right to impose license fees on "gambling", has long been revoked. As
early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of
"franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested
exclusively on the National Government. Furthermore, LGUs' have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the gov't such as PAGCOR which exercises governmental
functions of regulating gambling activities.

(3) No.  The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all
persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. The
Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the same.

(4) No. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what
the law is and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy
issues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the
472
people themselves as the repository of all state power. On the issue of monopoly, the
same is not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide
whether public interest demands that monopolies be "regulated" or prohibited. Again,
this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide. The judiciary can only
intervene when there are violations of the statutes passed by Congress regulating or
prohibiting monopolies.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

G.R. No. 115455
October 30, 1995

FACTS:
PPI contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while
maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. CREBA
asserts that R.A. No. 7716 impairs the obligations of contracts, and violates the rule
that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall “evolve a
progressive system of taxation”.
CUP argues that legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption
to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives.
To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional
policy.

473
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7716 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
No. In withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax
burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. The VAT is not a
license tax. It is imposed purely for revenue purposes.
Equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property
of the same class be taxed at the same rate. It is enough that the statute or
ordinance applies equally to all persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar
situation.

Gamboa v. Teves etal.,

GR No. 176579,
October 9, 2012

FACTS: The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of
shares involving almost 12 million shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific. Thus, First Pacific’s common
shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby
increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%.
The petitioner contends that it violates the Constitutional provision on filipinazation of
public utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%.
Then, in 2011, the court ruled the case in favor of the petitioner, hence this new
case, resolving the motion for reconsideration for the 2011 decision filed by the
respondents.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the term
‘capital’ in its 2011 decision?

RULING: The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing its State policy
of developing an economy ‘effectively controlled’ by Filipinos. Asserting the ideals
that our Constitution’s Preamble want to achieve, that is – to conserve and
develop our patrimony , hence, the State should fortify a Filipino-controlled
economy. In the 2011 decision, the Court finds no wrong in the construction of the
term ‘capital’ which refers to the ‘shares with voting rights, as well as with full
beneficial ownership’ (Art. 12, sec. 10) which implies that the right to vote in the
election of directors, coupled with benefits, is tantamount to an effective
control. Therefore, the Court’s interpretation of the term ‘capital’ was not erroneous.
Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

475