Indian Political Science Association

Dr. B. R. AMBEDKAR AND MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION: A Case Study of Indian

Federalism
Author(s): K. H. CHELUVA RAJU
Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 2 (April - June 1991), pp. 153-
164
Published by: Indian Political Science Association
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 Or. B. R. AMBEDKAR AND MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION
 Case Study of Indian Federalism

K. H. CHELUVA RAJU

Perhaps, the greatest achievement of India after the attain-

ment of independence was framing of the Constitution within a
period of three years from December 1946 and November 1949.
Framing of the Constitution was a stupendous and a challenging
task considering the size, diversity and complex problems of India.
The credit for the above achievement must go to the national
leaders and their enlightened leadership during that critical
period.
The constituent Assembly was really fortunate to have many
distinguished statesmen, freedom-fighters, intellectuals and pat-
riots coming from several spheres of national life and represen-
ting India's most of the regions, interests, social groups and
political parties.1 One such distinguished statesman and intellec-
tual who was called upon to play great role in the making of the
India's Constitution was Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar, who was per-
suaded by the leaders of the Indian National Congress at the
suggestion of Mahatma Gandhi to accept the Chairmanship of the
Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly. The Consti-
tuent Assembly and its majority party - the Indian National Con-
gress could not have done honour to Dr. Ambedkar than assigning
this historic role. Dr. Ambedkar not only accepted the responsi-
bility of the Chairmanship of the Drafting Committee, but also
raised to the expectations of the Constituent Assembly and the
people of India.
Dr. Ambedkar was eminently qualified to occupy this position
by virtue of his academic distinction as a constitutional expert,
The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 2, April - June, 1991

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 154 THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

his intimate knowledge of the working of the Government of India

Act, 1935 and his rich experience in the political developments of
India. In several ways, Dr. Ambedkar participated in the crucial
constitutional developments since 1927, as a delegate to the Round
Table Conferences, as a member of the Viceroy's Executive
Council, as the first Law Minister of independent India under
the Prime Ministership of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.

The proceeding and deliberations of the Constituent Assembly

shows Dr. Ambedkar's constructive role in framing, piloting and
defending the provisions of the Draft Constitution against many
criticisms. At the same time, his manner and methodology were
forceful and logical in clarifying issues as well as resolving many
controversies. Dr. Ambedkar has left his mark on the Constitu-
tion of India. Rightly, Dr. Ambedkar deserves the title to be
called as the chief architect of India's Constitution.

An attempt is made in this paper to analyse Dr. B. R.

Ambedkar's role and contribution to the shaping of the Indian
federation as an instrument of national integration.

Genesis of Federal Idea

The development of federal idea has chequered history in

India.. It has been a product of devolution of powers to the
British Provinces to ensure 'provincial autonomy' under the
Constitutional Reforms of 1919 and the Government of India
Act of 1935. Ultimately, it culminated as a part of the Cabinet
Mission Plan and later as a part of the present Constitution.

Earlier to the attainment of independence, two problems of

the Indian politics - the Hindu-Muslim communal question and
the problem of the Princely States - had contributed to the
emergence of a consensus to have a federal polity for India. The
solution was to establish a federal system with minimal powers to
the Centre having only three subjects - Defence, External Affairs
and Communications and leaving maximum autonomy to the
constituent units including residuary powers. This offer was made
by the famous 'Objectives Resolution' moved by Pandit Jawahar-
lal Nehru and approved by the Constituent Assembly on 13th
December 1946 under the terms of the Cabinet Mission Plan.*
The objective was to influence the Muslim League and the Prin-
cely State to Join the 'Union of India* under the federal scheme»

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 DR« B. R. AMBEDKAR AND MARINO OF THE CONSTITUTION 155

However, partition of India as per decision of the Mountbatten

Plan of 3rd June 1947 had catalytic effect on the structure of the
Indian federation. The Constituent Assembly led by the Congress
Party reversed earlier approach and decided in favour of 'federa-
tion* with 'Strong Centre5, as recommended by the Union Powers
Committee and accepted by the Drafting Committee as the csoun-
dest framework of our Constitution'.3

The demand for partition of India by the Muslim League

had profund impact on the members of the Drafting Committee
particularly Dr. Ambedkar. As a result, Dr. Ambedkar during
the debate in the Constituent Assembly on the above issue sup-
ported even wider powers to the Centre in the interest of the
unity of the country by stating:

So far as I am personally concerned, I would like to

have strong Centre, stronger than the Centre we had earlier
created under the Government of India Act, 1938.4

Union of India

The Constitution of India, which came into effect on 26th

January 1950, declares that:

ludia, that is Bharath, shall be a Union of States.5

One of the controversies that confronted the Constituent Assem-

bly was regarding designating India either a 'federation* or a
'Union'. Dr. B. N. Rao, Constitutional Advisor, in his Draft
Constitution suggested the term federation for historical reasons.
However, the Drafting Committee rejected it and instead used
the word 'Union', in which Dr. Ambedkar played significant part.

The Drafting Committee used the term 'Union', in place of

federation, for certain reasons: (1) the Indian 'Union' is not the
result of an agreement by the sovereign States, since the British
Provinces and the Princely States were not sovereign States before
independence; (2) Hence, the States as constituent units have
no right to secede from the 'Union' which is permanent and
'indestructible'. The Constitution gives the power to the Union
Parliament the power to change the name, boundary and terri-
tory of the States, and even the power to abolish and to create
new States. The 'Union of India' has been established by the

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156 THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

people of India through representatives assembled at the Consti-

tuent Assembly, and the States are the created by the Constitu-
tion as constituent units.

Defending the above nature and status of the Union of India,

Dr. Ambedkar stated in the Constituent Assembly:

Though India was to be a federation, the federation was

not the result of an agreement by the States to join a federa-
tion and that federation not being the result of an agree-
ment no State has the right to secede from it.

The federation is a Union, because it is indestructible»

Though the country and the people may be divided into
different States for convenience of administration, the country
is one integrated whole, its people a single people, living
under a single impérium derived from a single source.

The Americans had to wage a civil war to establish that

the States have no right of secession and that their federation
was indestructible.

The drafting Committee thought it was better to make

it clear at the out set rather than leave it to speculation or
to disputes.6

Federal Structure

Though the term federal is not used in the Constitution, the

Union of India has all the federal attributes similar to other
federations.

(1) It is Union of States with 25 States as its Constituent

Units;

(2) There is dual polity consisting of the Union Govern-

ment at the national level and the State Governments at the
regional level;

(3) There is the written Constitution which is the funda-

mental law of the land and which divides the powers between the
Union and the States; and which has also a separate procedure
for amending the federal provisions of the Constitution;

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 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR AND MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 157

(4) There is Division of legislative, administrative and

financial powers between the Union and the States under the
three lists - Union List, State List and Concurrent List of the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.

(5) There is the Supreme Court as the highest court and

guardian of the Constitution and has the original jurisdiction to
settle disputes between the Union and the States.

The architects of the Constitution have taken care to pro-

vide a federal system suited to the genus and circumstances of
the people for whom it is designed.

However, the critics inside and outside the Constituent

Assembly have commented that the Indian Constitution is neither
federal nor unitary.7

During the discussion in the Constituent Assembly on the

above subject, Dr. Ambedker defended the federal character of
the Constitution by observing that:

It establishes a dual polity with the Union at the Cen-

tre and the States at the periphery, each endowed with
sovereign powers to be exercised in the field assigned to them
respectively by the Constitution. The Union is not a League
of States, united in a loose relationship, nor are the States
the agencies of the Union deriving power from it.

Both the Union and the States are created by the Con-
stitution; both derive their respective authority from the
Constitution. The one is not sub-ordinate to the other in
its own field; and the authority of one is co-ordinate with
that of the other.8

Strong Centre

As already stated, the Constituent Assembly took a decision

that India should be a federation with a strong Centre. It is so
structured as to establish the supremacy of the Union, while
assuring the autonomy of the States limited to certain subjects.9
The scheme of dirtribution of legislative power under the Seventh
Schedule has been done in such a way as to confer more powers
on the Centre than the States. Also the residuary powers are

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158 THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

vested with the Centre, not the States. In the administrative

field, the power to appoint the Governor, the exercise of the
State's executive power in conformity with the executive power
of the Union, the power to issue directions to the States under
certain circumstances, have made the Union more powerful than
the States. Even in the financial field, the Union is given more
resources and power than the States,

The architects of the Indian Constitution were convinced

that "a strong Centre within the federal framework is a neces-
sity" to protect the security of the new nation, to check the fissi-
parous and divisive forces, to ensure uniformity and stability of
administration, to facilitate faster socio-economic change through
the instrument of planning, and to enable to play greater role in
international affairs.

However, the distribution of functional responsibilities and

powers has led the critics in the Constituent Assembly to say
that India is federal in structure, but unitary in spirit, and the
emphasis of the Constitution is more on the paramountcy of the
Union than the autonomy of the States.10 Refuting the above
criticism of a few members in the Constituent Assembly, Dr.
Ambedkar assorted that a strong Centre should not make India
less federal:

It may be that the Constitution assignes to the Centre

a larger field for the operation of its legislative and execu-
tive authority than it is to be found in any other federal
Constitution. It may be that the residuary powers given to
the Centre and not to the States. But these do not form the
essence of federalism.11

Special features

Indian federation differs from other federation in many

ways, but what makes it more different is its special features:

(1) Single Constitution for both the Union and the States.
The States have no separate Constitutions of their own except
the State of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 of the
Constitution.

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 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR AND MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 159

(2) Single citizenship of the Union and the States have no

separate citizenship of their own.

(3) Existence of Common Civil Services - All-India

Services such as I.A.S. and I.P.S. - common to the Union and
the States.

(4) Common Comptroller and Auditor-General appointed

by the President of India.

(5) Common Election Commission appointed by the Pre-

sident of India.

(6) Single integrated judiciary under which the Judges of

the Supreme Court and the High Courts are appointed by the
President of India.

The special features were criticised in the Constituent

Assembly as 'Unitary features' and world have the tendency to
make India more unitary than federal.12 Defending these common
institutions and instruments in order to prevent the evils of dual
polity and to promote unity of the nation, Dr. Ambedkar stated
in the Constituent Assembly:

The Constitution has sought to forge means and methods

by which India will have a federation and at the same time
will have uniformity in all the basic matters which are
essential to maintain the unity of the country.13

Emergency Powers

No part of the Constitution generated so much of controversy

in the Constituent Assembly as that of the 'Emergency Provisions'.
In addtion to the normal powers, the Union Government is vested
with a few emergency powers to be exercised by the President of
India under certain extra-ordinary circumstances. The Union
Government, under the Constitution, has the duty of protecting
the States from external aggression or internal disturbances and
also to ensure that the government of every State is carried on in
accordance with the provisions.14

In order to discharge these obligations, the Constitution

envisages three types of Emergencies: (i) when the security of

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160 THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

India or any part is threatened by external aggression or internal

disturbance; (ii) when the financial credibility or stability is
threatened; (iii) when the government of a State cannot be carried
on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, and
during which time the President's Rule is imposed in that State.15
These 'Emergency Provisions' have been incorporated in the
Constitution to enable the Indian federation to function as
unitary in times of emergency.

However, critics in the Constituent Assembly described these

'Emergency Provisions' as anti-democratic, anti-federal and
autocratic in character and opened to misuse by political parties.16
Taking the experience of other federal systems particularly that
of the United States, Dr. Ambedkar defended the emergency
powers by stating:
All federal systems including the American are placed
in a tight mould of federation. No matter what the circum-
stances, it cannot change its form and shape. It can never
become unitary.
On the otherhand, the Draft Constitution can be both
unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of
time and circumstances. In normal times it is framed to
work as federal system. But in times of war, it is so designed
as to make it work as though it was a unitary system. Such
a power of converting itself into a unitary state, no federa-
tion possesses.17

Pointing out the possibility of misuse of these powers,

Dr. Ambedkar observed:

I do not altogether deny that there is possibility of the

Articles being abused or employed for political purposes.
But that objection applies to every part of the Constitution
which gives power to Centre to override the Provinces. The
proper thing we ought to expect is that such Articles will
never be called into operation and that they would remain
a dead letter.18

Centralising Tendency
One of the significant developments in modern federalism is
the trend toward centralisation. India cannot be an exception.

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 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR AND MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 161

India is a federation with strong centralising tendency from the

beginning and it was further strengthened by certain political
developments since 1967.

The Single-party rule of the Indian National Congress at

the national and the State levels, the dominant role of the two
Prime Ministers - Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Smt. Indira
Gandhi, the increased role of the extra-constitutional bodies -
Planning Commission and the National Development Council in
the Planning process, frequent use of the Article 356 to impose
President's Rule in several States, use of the office of the Gover-
nor more as an agent of the Centre, and lastly excessive depend-
ence of the States on the Union for plan as well as non-plan
financial assistance accelerated the process of centralisation of
powers in the hands of the Union to the disadvantage of the
constitutional position and powers of the States.

However, as a reaction to the growing trend toward cen-

tralisation of powers at the Centre, demand for 'State autonomy*
has emerged. Since 1967, Indian federalism has been subjected
to two strains and stresses - particularly increased trend toward
centralisation of power on the one hand and demand for State
autonomy on the other. It has become a political movement
with the involvement of political parties. The Indian National
Congress is defending the existing centralisation of power.
Whereas the opposition parties, particularly the regional parties
like the D.M.K, of Tamilnadu, Telugu Desam of Andhra, Gana
Parishad of Assam and Akali Dal of Punjab have been fighting
for State autonomy, though there is no agreement as to its nature
and content. These factors ultimately led to the appoint of the
Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations and its report of
1987 is now under consideration.19 The situation has been
further aggravated by the liberation and secessionist movements
in Punjab, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir. These political forces
and movements have come to challenge the future of the Con-
stitution, which is the foundation of the Union of India.

In this context, it is worthwhile to remember the words and

warning against 'over-centralisation of powers' uttered by
Dr. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly:

However, much you may deny powers to the Centre, it

is difficult to prevent the Centre from becoming strong.
P-2

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162 THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Conditions in the modern world are such that centralisation

of powers is inevitable. The same conditions are sure to
operate on the government of India and nothing that one
can do will help to prevent it from becoming.

On the otherhand, we must resist the tendency to make

it stronger. It cannot chew more than it can digest. Its
strength must be commensurate with its weight. It would
be a folly to make it strong that it so may fall by its own
weight.20

Flexible and Cooperative Federalism

One of the important trends in modern federalism is the rise

of cooperative federalism. The spirit of competition is giving
place to co-operation between the national and regional Govern-
ments in tackling modern problems. Hence, the architects of
the Indian Constitution realised that the division of functional
responsibilities and powers between the Union and the States on
an exclusive basis would be impossible. The Union and the
States have been viewed not as rivals or competitors, but as
partners in solving nation's problems. Noting the experience of
the other federal systems during war and crisis, they have intro-
duced the concept of 'co-operative federalism' and making the
Indian federalism more flexible.

The Constitution provides wide scope for co-operation between

the Union and the States in legislative, administrative and finan-
cial fields under the Concurrent List and other parts of the Cons-
titution. Economic and Social Planning under the Concurrent
List has become the basis for undertaking national development
through the five-year plans for foster socio-economic change.21
Further, as a part of co-operative federalism, the Constitution pro-
vides for an Inter-State Council to promote inter-governmental
co-operation in matters of common interest; to make recommen-
dations for better co-ordination of policy and co-ordination; and
to provide a forum at the highest level to resolve many Union«»
State as well as inter-state differences and conflicts,22

Defending the flexible nature of the Constitution and the

merits of Indian federalism, Dr. Ambedkar maintained in the
Constituent Assembly:

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 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR AND MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 163

One can therefore safely say that the Indian federation will
not suffer from the faults of rigidity and legalism. Its distin-
guishing feature is that it is a flexible federations.23

Conclusion

This brief survey shows that the contribution of Dr. B. R.

Ambedkar, as the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, to the
shaping of the Indian federalism as an instrument of national
integration has been substantial. It also reveals his role and
remarkable qualities as a statesman, democrat, nationalist, fede-
ralist and above all as a patriot committed to the well-being of
India and her people.

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar's contribution to the theory and prac-

tice of the Indian Federalism is worth remembering at a time
when the nation is at cross-roads and when the integrity of India
is challenged by certain divisive forces and secessionist move-
ments in different parts of India,

NOTES

1. B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India's Constitution Indian

Institute of Public Administration, Delhi, 1966, Vol. I. Granville
Austin, The Indian Constitution , Cornerstone of a Nation , Oxford Uni
versity Press, Bombay, 1966, Chapter I.

2. K. R. Bombawall, The Foundations of Indian Federalism ,

Publishing House, Bombay, 1967, Chapter 6,

3. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IV, p. 729.

4. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IV, p. 741.
5. Constitution of India, Article I.

6. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, p. 43.

7. K. T. Shaw, Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VIII,
P. 196.

8. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, P 33.

9. Constitution of India, Part XI and Seventh Schedule.

10. K. Santhanam, Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol.

VIII, p. 196.

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164 THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

11. Gonstitutent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, p. 33.

12. K. Santhanam, Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol.
VIII, P. 198.
13. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, P. 33.
14. Constitution of India, Article 355.
15. Constitution of India, Article 352 and 356.
16. H. V. Kamath, Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol.
VIII, P. 196.
17. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, p. 34.
18. Constitutent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, p. 177.
19. Government of India, Report of the Commission on
Centre-State Relations, 1988.
20. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, p. 42.
21. Government of India, The First Five Year Plan, 1952.
22. Constitution of India, Article 263.
23. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VIII, p. 256.

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