Moving Beyond Motion Metaphors For Changing Sound

Moving beyond Motion: Metaphors for Changing Sound
Author(s): Robert Adlington

Source: Journal of the Royal Musical Association , 2003, Vol. 128, No. 2 (2003), pp. 297-
318
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of the Royal Musical Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3557498
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3557498?seq=1&cid=pdf-
reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Taylor & Francis, Ltd. and Royal Musical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Journal of the Royal Musical Association
This content downloaded from

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Journal of the Royal Musical Association, 128 (2003) @ Royal Musical Association
Moving Beyond Motion: Metaphors for

Changing Sound
ROBERT ADLINGTON
THIS study forms part of a wider project to examine the

musical experience to cultural concepts of time. In partic
interested to explore the possibility that music - specifica
heard by listeners - gives access to experiences of change
odds with the ways in which we commonly understand time.
article I have pointed to the concern, voiced by various thi
last 200 years, that ideas of time act as a constraint upon s
Music, I argue both there and here, has the potential t
counterbalance to these prevailing ideas about the form o
This is a fact sometimes obscured by the words we use
music, which may seem to align it with favoured concep
rather than highlight its points of difference.
A prime example of this tendency of words to convi
musical form is fundamentally consistent with such concepts
our fondness for describing musical change in terms of m
is described in terms of motion in both theoretical an
contexts.2 Wallace Berry, for instance, asserts in his
textbook that 'in music, change is motion'.3 And Berr
seems to be supported by a music-lover (Gail) intervie
Music in Daily Life Project in Buffalo, New York, wh
moment in a Bach cantata as 'so going forward, y'kno
I am indebted to Arnie Cox, Eric Clarke and two anonymous readers for const
and encouragement in relation to earlier versions of this article. I am particularly
Cox for providing me with a copy of his thesis, 'The Metaphoric Logic of Mu
Space' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1999).
1 Robert Adlington, 'Musical Temporality: Perspectives from Adorno and De
sions, 6 (1997), 5-60. Such thinkers include Hegel and Marx, as well as Adorno
2 Recent studies of musical motion include Eric Clarke, 'Meaning and the S
Motion in Music', Musicae scientiae, 5 (2001), 213-34; Thomas Clifton, Music as H
Applied Phenomenology (New Haven, CT, 1983), esp. Chapters 4 and 5; Cox, 'The M
of Musical Motion and Space'; Naomi Cumming, 'Metaphors of Space and Moti
Analysis of Melody', Miscellanea musicologica, 17 (1990), 143-66; David Epstein
Music, the Brain, and Performance (New York, 1995); Christopher F. Hasty, 'Rhyt
Music: Preliminary Questions of Duration and Motion', Journal of Music Th
183-216; Judy Lochhead, 'The Metaphor of Musical Motion: Is There an Alternativ
Practice, 14/15 (1989-90), 83-103; Bruno R. Repp, 'Music as Motion: A Synopsi
Truslit's "Gestaltung und Bewegung in der Musik" (1938)', Psychology of Music
Patrick Shove and Bruno R. Repp, 'Musical Motion and Performance: Theoretic
Perspectives', The Practice of Performance: Studies in Musical Interpretation,
(Cambridge, 1995), 55-83; Neil Todd, 'Music and Motion: A Personal View', Pro
Fourth Rhythm Workshop: Rhythm Perception and Production, ed. Catherine Auxiett
and Claire Gerard (Bourges, 1992), 123-8.
3 Wallace Berry, Structural Functions in Music (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1976), 8.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
298 ROBERT ADLINGTON
pretty vague ... it's not

... forward ... positive
Judy Lochhead writes
virtually all sorts of wri
is explicitly concerned
musical encounters.6
In musicological writing, the idea that continuous, ongoing
movement is a necessary condition of music has become something of
an orthodoxy. This is partly in reaction to the preponderance, in
certain earlier analytical writings, of a rather static perspective of
musical form, one that seemed to neglect the fact that music changes.7
In particular, commentators see a basically unidirectional, forward
movement as characteristic of music; to listen to music, the argument
goes, is to be aware of a 'stream' of sound continually 'passing' the
listener. Contrasting impressions of motion may emerge from time to
time - for instance, ascending and descending movements; or rocking,
swinging and swaying - but a sense of onward, linear movement is
believed to remain ever-present, underpinning these other, more
momentary impressions.8 The 'path-like' quality of this kind of musical
motion is reflected in common descriptive expressions, such as 'this
music leads us to' or 'heads towards', 'the music unfolds' or 'drives
onwards', and references to musical 'journeys' or 'flow'.
That such an idea should seem natural and uncontroversial to lay-
person and theorist alike may partly be due to a shared belief that
music's motion is guaranteed by the flow of time. Adherence to a
Newtonian view of time, which stresses time's inexorable 'passage', can
result in an assumption that onward motion is an intrinsic phenom-
enological by-product of all temporal experience. In other words,
music moves by virtue of being temporal. This is the position taken in
David Epstein's account of musical motion.9 Epstein's discussion builds
on an assertion made in his first book, Beyond Orpheus, namely that
4 Susan D. Crafts, Daniel Cavicchi, Charles Keil et al., My Music (London, 1993), 96-7. Gail
learnt the oboe as a child, but it seems clear that her description is informal rather than theor-
etical.
5 Lochhead, 'The Metaphor of Musical Motion', 84.
6 A conspicuous example is Charles Keil and Steven Feld, Music Grooves: Essays and Dialogues
(Chicago, 1994).
7 The move beyond this static purview in the area of theory and analysis is symbolized by the
growth of Schenkerian studies over the last 30 years, a growth stimulated by the perception that
Schenkerian analysis is 'about directed tonal motion' (Nicholas Cook, A Guide to Musical Analysis,
London, 1987, 64). Elsewhere in musicology, renewed recognition of the importance of change
to the musical experience is reflected in the expansion of the field of performance studies (The
Practice of Performance, ed. Rink, can be taken as a representative volume; many of the contribu-
tors argue strongly for a recognition of music's 'dynamic' qualities) and studies of musical
narrative (see, for instance, Fred Everett Maus, 'Music as Narrative', Indiana Theory Review, 12
(1991), 1-42, and Anthony Newcomb, 'Narrative Archetypes and Mahler's Ninth Symphony',
Music and Text: Critical Inquiries, ed. Steven Paul Scher, Cambridge, 1992, 118-36).
s Throughout my discussion I will treat cyclical motion - which is often invoked in descrip-
tions of musical form - as a special case of this onward, linear movement, rather than as something
opposed to it. Cyclical motion shares with onward, linear movement a consistency and irre-
versibility of movement, and it is these qualities, fundamentally, in which I am interested.
9 Epstein, Shaping Time. Motion is only one of a large number of topics addressed in this
volume. For a fuller account and critique of the contents of Epstein's book see my review in Music
Analysis, 16 (1997), 155-71.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
MOVING BEYOND MOTION 299
'time is perceived as intrins

declares that
Motion is the very stuff of time itself. To speak of time is virtually to speak
of motion, for motion is time's intrinsic correlate. We live, and conse-
quently move, within time and through time ... Motion is basically under-
stood by using time as its index ... The reverse of that correlation is equally
true: time is only experienced, and thus understood, through motion.
Motion is thus the quintessential property of time.11
Epstein's belief that 'the essence of temporal experience is movement'

has the consequence that, for him, motion is 'possibly the ultimate goal
of music'.12 Accordingly, one of the principal concerns of his book is
to elucidate the various impressions of motion that arise in music -
impressions that he believes are 'widely experienced and confirmed'.13
Is Epstein right to say that motion is the very stuff of time? Philoso-
phers have often pointed to some of the logical contradictions
surrounding this familiar idea. For instance, is it time that moves, or
we that move through time? (Experience can suggest either.) And how
can the motion of time be perceived without positing another 'time'
within which that motion occurs - thus prompting an endless
regress?14 Such complications notwithstanding, Epstein is not alone in
his view of time. A broadly Newtonian perspective, however discredited
it may be among specialists, remains widespread. This perspective -
comprising a 'common-sense' understanding, as it were - sees continu-
ous, steady, strongly directional flow as the essence of time. It is an
important part of my argument in this article that this common-sense
conception of time, regardless of the degree to which it may or may
not correspond with some 'actual' natural entity, is a real and powerful
presence in people's negotiations with their changing existence.15 It is
this social rather than natural time - in other words, the time that
impacts most directly on our understanding of ourselves - that is my
primary concern. So in this article I treat time as, essentially, a social
construction for dealing with change.16 As I have already suggested, I
view it frequently to have a constraining influence on our under-
standing of experience, and no small part of my argument is intended
to underline the possibility of experiences of change that point to the
limitations of this idea of time.
10 David Epstein, Beyond Orpheus: Studies in Musical Structure (Cambridge, MA, 1979), 55.
11 Epstein, Shaping Time, 8.
12 Ibid., 5, 26. For a similar view, see Barbara Barry, Musical Time: The Sense of Order (New York,
1990).
13 Epstein, Shaping Time, 487.
14 Stimulating contributions to these debates include Arthur N. Prior, 'Changes in Events and
Changes in Things' (1968), The Philosophy of Time, ed. Robin Le Poidevin and Murray
MacBeath(Oxford, 1993), 35-46; Keith Seddon, Time: A Philosophical Treatment (London, 1987);
G. J. Whitrow, Time in History (Oxford, 1988), Chapter 1.
15 I elaborate briefly on the mechanics of this influence in the third section of this article. I will
not enter directly into the question of the existence of a 'natural' time; I do not believe that my
larger argument, which is intended to throw into question common-sense time, is irreconcilable
with belief in such a thing.
16 It follows that I do not view change as being dependent on time.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
I want here to questio

forged explicitly by E
music. My motivation
(already mentioned)
ominous constraint on
the inadequacy of the
kinds of modern mus
'static'; and thirdly,
descriptions, in spite
my own musical exp
approach the issue t
metaphor. At one lev
that time should be vi
change, rather than
Metaphor theorists h
with its emphasis on d
argument will be dis
however, metaphor th
it proposes that this
conceptualization of c
able aspect of human
words, that we are con
fact that time as we c
we should see it that
fondness for describin
path-like motion.
In the first section o
claims of metaphor the
tion of some Debussy,
our conceptualizatio
metaphor theory's s
second section propose
ating some of the m
different account of
implied by metaphor t
alternative view of m
to conceptual metapho
music from that attributed to time.
Consider the following, loosely phenomenological description of the

first 20 bars of Debussy's Nuages (from the orchestral Nocturnes):
Clarinets and bassoons open the piece with a gentle twining figure (bars
1-4). Theft ' of the cor anglais (bar 5) sets up a tension that is released only
very gradually, with the bat bar 7. The music's tension is not fully expunged,
however, for the first string chord itself contains an implied dissonance (the
G, which wants to resolve to an F#), and tension is further increased by the

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
G# at bar 9. Complete releas

provide a fuller sound which i
three-part counterpoint. Thi
the one-bar crescendo, altho
lightens the texture. The m
harmonies (bars 15-20). Pizzi
dominant sevenths here. Th
chord, emphasized by a dram
a further increase of pressur
texture of bar 21 fails fully
At one level this descripti

fanciful interpretations or
identification of salient asp
in which they may be ex
though, the description is
literally move, become t
warmth or pressure. To at
hear it metaphorically.
In recent years the idea t
phorical has become well e
were once seen as the pres
widely recognized that eve
description is replete with
this view of metaphor in mu
of work in the field of me
Mark Johnson and Mark T
standing of metaphor as a
device, these theorists hav
cognition and experience
being subjective and indete
necessary and unavoidable.
It is the work of these thre
the music scholars who ha
17 See Nicholas Cook, Music, Imag

'Metaphor in Roger Scruton's Aesthe
Anthony Pople (Cambridge, 1994), 3
of Body-Derived Image Schemas in t
(1996), 217-43; Roger Scruton, The A
'Metaphor and Music Theory: Reflec
(1998), <http://smt.ucsb.edu/mto/i
sulates this view with his statement t
concepts of motion and space, from t
program notes' ('The Metaphoric Lo
18 Significant texts in this field incl
(Chicago, 1980); George Lakoff, Women,
Mind (Chicago, 1987); Mark Johnson,
ation, and Reason (Chicago, 1987); Geo
Guide to Poetic Metaphor (Chicago, 19
esis', Cognitive Linguistics, 1 (1990
Metaphor', Metaphor and Thought
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Ph
Western Thought (New York, 1999).

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
as 'metaphor theory'. I
theorists have influenc
fields to an extent tha
made somewhat difficult.19 Nevertheless, the work of Lakoff and
Johnson in particular presents a crisply articulated view of the relation
of words to experience, which may readily be applied to the domain of
music - and which is, indeed, frequently cited in existing work on
musical metaphor. Although this work is now relatively widely known,
a concise synopsis of its basic contentions will prove useful for my
longer-term argument.
Rather than conceive of metaphor as a relatively insignificant aspect
of language, metaphor theory has been concerned to demonstrate the
extent to which it permeates ordinary speech and thought. Statements
such as 'it's hard to get that idea across to him', 'it's difficult to put my
ideas into words' and 'the idea is buried in terribly dense paragraphs',
for instance, are all dependent on metaphor (the metaphorical
components are italicized; all of them attribute an 'idea' with meta-
phorical properties drawn from the physical world).20 As Janna Saslaw
has pointed out, 'When we make statements like these, we have the
sense that we are being quite literal. ... Metaphorical expressions like
these are used unconsciously. When we use them, we don't usually
think about the structure of the concepts.'21 This characteristic of
everyday language has led metaphor theorists to conclude that
metaphor is not simply a feature of verbal descriptions, but is actually
fundamental to the way in which we experience the world. As George
Lakoff puts it, 'The locus of metaphor is not in language at all, but in
the way we conceptualize one mental domain in terms of another....
Metaphor is fundamentally conceptual, not linguistic in nature.'22
This contention revolves around the idea that understanding is
dependent on recurring patterns of experience, which are projected
from one domain of knowledge to another. Specifically, the point of
conceptual metaphors is to achieve a firmer grasp of relatively
unfamiliar or abstract phenomena by employing patterns of experi-
ence - often referred to as 'image schemas' - drawn from more
familiar, concrete domains. The principal source of these schemas is
our most immediate bodily experience: for instance, 'our bodily move-
ments through space, our manipulations of objects, and our percep-
tual interactions'.23 Thus, in the everyday metaphorical expressions
19 For instance, metaphor theory intersects in important ways with recent writings on the
evolution of the 'embodied mind'. See Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch,
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (Cambridge, MA, 1991), and Antonio
R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York, 1994). Mark
Johnson's recent work has incorporated insights on metaphor into the broader field of concep-
tual blending; see Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and
the Mind's Hidden Complexities (New York, 2002).
20 These examples, taken from Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, are cited in Saslaw,
'Forces, Containers, and Paths', 221.
21 Ibid.
22 Lakoff, 'The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor', 203, 244.
23 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 29.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
mentioned in the previ

communication of ideas a
container schemas. Lakoff
phorical' transfer to un
concepts. In Lakoff's w
through which we com
abstract reasoning.... Th
STATE, CHANGE, CAUSATIO
alized via metaphor.'24
commonly 'regarded as
ence',25 is ultimately org
argument and reasoning
and may involve propositi
us 'off course'.26 It is this
our descriptions of experi
repeated reference to wha
Let us return to my Debu
standing of metaphor, the
hardly surprising, nor
'accuracy'. Musical sound
perceptual faculties, can
'visually discrete body'.28
be driven to more concre
fullness, warmth or press
object of apprehension. T
'scientific' one's descriptio
less overtly phenomeno
might involve different im
virtue of references to su
texture and so on. As it i
sense than a 'technical' o
might construe the music
cation of what Arnie Cox has called 'the uneliminable role of
embodied cognition in music conceptualization and in the c
tion of musical meaning'.29
Having introduced the fundamental claims of metaphor th
us turn to the specific question of time. As we have seen,
theorists argue that cognitive metaphor and the embod
inform our understanding of very many basic concepts, incl
and change. Metaphor theory views cultural conceptions of
inherently and unavoidably metaphorical. Lakoff and John
24 Lakoff, 'The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor', 244, 222.

25 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, x.
26 Ibid., 53-4.
27 As in the title of their most recent book, and that of George Lakoff and Rafael
Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being (New
28 Lawrence Kramer, 'The Mysteries of Animation: History, Analysis and Musical
Music Analysis, 20 (2001), 153-78 (p. 162).
29 Cox, 'The Metaphoric Logic of Musical Motion and Space', 7.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
that 'we cannot observe

to posit a moving tim
domains of location
concept of time is th
the abstract notion of
path'. 31
It is clear that, from the perspective of metaphor theory, the notion
of change, slippery to grasp in any literal sense, invites an embodied
conceptualization. But why should change be understood in terms of
movement, rather than some other sort of bodily experience? Lakoff
and Johnson believe that underlying the motional conception of
changing events is the fundamental metaphor 'STATES ARE LOCATIONS'.
Expressions such as 'I'm in love', 'she's come out ofher depression', 'he's
on the edge of madness', and 'we're far from safety' reflect our under-
standing of the discrete states of an individual or a thing in terms of
locations - or what Lakoff and Johnson call 'bounded regions in
space'.32 It follows from this conceptualization that changes of state
'are conceptualized as movements from location to location'.33 For
Lakoff and Johnson, the metaphor 'CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS' governs
our understanding of the interrelation of events.34 We perceive
complex events to possess qualities of motion because it is a logical
consequence of our conceptualization of states as locations. It follows
that, for Lakoff and Johnson, the only way of understanding changing
experience is via motion or path metaphors. Thus, life, love and
careers are conceived as journeys,35 argument and reasoning are
understood in terms of 'motion along a path toward some destina-
tion',36 and purposes are conceived as physical goals.37 Complex events
in general, narrative and music included, are 'understood in terms of
a source-path-goal schema', which stipulates that such events 'have
initial states (the source), a sequence of intermediate stages (the path),
and a final state (the goal)'.38 As for time itself, Lakoff and Johnson
note that our attribution of motion takes two distinct forms, which they
describe as 'moving time' and 'the moving observer' respectively."3
30 Lakoff andJohnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 138. Compare Whitrow: 'Time certainly is a funda-
mental characteristic of human experience, but there is no evidence that we have a special sense
of time, as we have of sight, hearing, touch, taste, or smell. Our direct experience of time is always
of the present, and our idea of time comes from reflecting on this experience' (Time in History,
4-5).
32 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 180.
33 Ibid., 176.
34 Ibid., 183ff.
35 Lakoff, 'The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor', 224-5.
37 Ibid., 114.
38 Saslaw, 'Forces, Containers, and Paths', 220.
39 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 141, 145. These correspond to what Judy
Lochhead ('The Metaphor of Musical Motion', 103) describes as 'dynamic' and 'static' time
respectively. Lochhead's discussion of the idea of 'static' time rather neglects the fact that, in this
conception of time, the observer moves, even though time does not. I will not dwell on the contra-
diction that Lakoff andJohnson perceive between the two models, as both possess similar qualities
of motion, and it is these qualities, rather than the question of precisely what is moving, that are
my main interest.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
The first of these perspect

will come when ...' and 't
sayings such as 'he passed
Christmas'.40
Now, at this stage a caveat
important respects, met
congruent with the positio
Metaphor theory says that
emphasis on certain perce
onward motion, is in fact
social rather than a natural
Time understood thus is t
intangible (change) with ph
apparent parallel between m
complicated somewhat by a
metaphor theorists in a ra
time that acts as the basis
metaphor theorists' protes
us access to a truth about
such metaphors are a 'cons
what is true'41 - we are som
tion of time as a basis for th
be detected, for instance,
literal grounding for mot
incidental property of tim
larity is detectable inJanna
along a path is appropriate
because of the latter's arti
instances, the reader is ef
phorical constructions of
metaphorical constructions
of metaphor theorists' disc
claims, in the next section.
This difficulty aside, it ha
the convergence of meta
nature of time with my o
different. The fact that
grounds for claims about t
the fact that they are our
experience of change, but
For metaphor theory, a m
consequence of the inclin
while we distance ourselves
40 Lakoff, 'The Contemporary T

conceptualization of time, see Lakoff
41 Lakoff andJohnson, Philosophy in
42 Lakoff and Turner, More than Coo
43 Saslaw, 'Forces, Containers, and

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
with a view of experi

istics.
Arnie Cox, who deve
reinscribing the cons
dismantles, spells out
standing of music. Fo
describe the relation
space because, in the
offers an additional r
stand the relation of
and motional events
'phenomenology of ant
presence and memo
temporal events, but
have their most clear
associated, in the spa
The present is associa
has now arrived. An
departed. Cox explain
we experience, are
strongly motivated
"arrival", and "depart
"in" and "through tim
other experience inv
that 'the mapping of
domains of experien
tion',47 all such expe
of path-like motion. In
to the idea that such
II
Now let us return to my description of the opening of Debussy's Nuages.

As I stated previously, at one level this description provides good
evidence of the centrality of embodied cognition to the experience of
music. The description is full of imagery borrowed from the physical
and visual world, imagery that should not be literally imputed to the
music's sound but is rather the result of a metaphorical conceptualiz-
ation. At another level, though, the description is at one remove from
the accounts of experience given by metaphor theorists. This is
because a significant proportion of the music is described without
reference to the path-like motion that they would see as a corollary of
all temporal (or changing) experience. In fact the metaphor of relative
44 Cox, 'The Metaphoric Logic of Musical Motion and Space', 267. Cox's argument is elabor-
ated at length in Chapter 4 of his dissertation ('Temporal Motion and Musical Motion').
45 Ibid., 207.
46 Ibid., 214.
47 Ibid., 268.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
motion is used to describe t

point (the 'descending' strin
motional metaphors (involvi
phors that involve motion o
(such as tension and weight
Two straightforward explanat
themselves. The first is, simpl
is to say, as a concise descri
experience of listening to th
motional aspect foremost am
music does, in fact, possess
theorists and musicologists
would aver; my description
second explanation for my
path-like motion is slightly
description assumes an im
unavoidable corollary of the
therein. Thus, a sense of continual, forward motion is assumed to
accompany the 'twining' of the opening, or the setting-up and gradual
release of tension by the cor anglais, or the fluctuations in fullness in
the strings in bars 7-13. This second explanation would be consistent
with Lakoff and Johnson's assertion that all change is grasped as
motion: motion is implicit, as it were, in the very identification of
change.
To my mind, though, neither of these explanations gets to the nub
of why my description does not make more of a feature of path-like
motion. My description of the Debussy certainly is far from 'complete',
but I do not hold this to be the real reason why motion is relatively
neglected within it. It does strive, after all, to record the principal meta-
phorical imagery in my hearing of the music, and path-like motion
appears not to figure highly. The second of the two explanations for
this 'omission' is also mistaken, I believe, and I will explain why
presently. First, I want to state my view of the relation of motion to my
description, which is quite different from either of those given above.
There may be moments in the opening of Nuages that suggest path-like
motion more strongly than my description suggests. But my descrip-
tion is true to experience, I believe, to the extent that it conveys the
impression of the involvement of not one, but a host of different
'embodied' metaphors by means of which I grasp the changing music.
Motion is one of these, but, in contradiction to many writers attempt-
ing to describe musical temporality, I hold it to have no special prece-
dence over the others. My description envisages musical experience as
an inherently metaphorical matter, but it proposes that changing
musical sound may be conceptualized via a wide range of physical
source domains - a variety of different sorts of 'bodily interactions', to
use Mark Johnson's phrase.48 There are moments where motion is
48 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xx.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
particularly appropr
strings in bar 14 mig
other source domain
motional one. The cha
to motivate a concept
than it does one of fl
a 'weight' schema com
'fullness' schema that
turn eventually supe
14. The experience o
words, is not domina
path-like motion -
motion and others gr
creating a sort of kal
Of course, non-moti
existing descriptions
ing' or 'softening'; as
become more 'weight
disc recording of Tch
moments of the pie
void', undergo 'viol
'collapse' and 'darken
experiencing) musica
logical writings some
izations of music are
ongoing motion, rat
ations.50 For instance
musicological texts as m
cally seen as implicat
potentially wholly au
might be said of Lako
ence. In the course of
motional domains t
conceptualizing cha
('growing anger is in
heat'), emptiness and
cality ('happier is u
hunger'; 'acquiring
('overcoming proble
49 Jonathan Swain, booklet

('Path6tique'), Russian Nation
50 A rare exception to this
Thoughts: The Contribution o
describes a variety of non-m
Chopin Pr61ude, including var
51 See, for instance, Epstein,
as phenomena of the physica
however, that the motion inv
an elastic fabric, is epipheno
the core of physical sensatio
movements is in any case at
music.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
('greater understanding is
change is evolution').52 Yet
temporal events per se, t
squarely to path-like motion
One of the reasons for thi
that change of any sort i
argument runs somethin
conceptualized as 'increas
schema), the increasing hea
movement from one moment of heat to the next moment of even
greater heat. Similarly, this argument would state that the grow
'pressure' of each of the crescendos in bars 17-20 of Nuages is acc
panied by a sense of motion from moment to moment as the pres
increases. In other words, as stated before, under this argum
motion is implicit in the very notion of change.
But why should this be so? After all, the conceptualization of ch
as motion is purely metaphorical - as Lakoff and Johnson themse
strongly assert. It is an effective metaphor, frequently used in respon
to the need to find a physical correlate to the relatively abstract noti
of 'change'. But if an alternative physical correlate suggests itself
particular type of changing experience - increasing pressure,
instance - the requirements of cognitive metaphor are already f
satisfied: an abstract notion is grasped using an appropriate metap
To insist that this experience of increasing heat is additionally acc
panied by a sense of motion is to impose a second-level meta
where one is not needed. We all have a ready knowledge of the fe
of increasing pressure; it is an immediate, physical experience th
requires no additional metaphorical overlay. One may choose
identify the successive moments of increasing heat with sp
movement, but it is hardly a requirement to do so in order to grasp t
nature of the experience. And of course, as the arguments of meta
theory clearly imply, there is no 'truth' about temporal experience th
requires to be identified as motion, for motion is merely a conve
metaphor for the experience of change.53
Something of what I am trying to argue here may be crystalliz
I return to bar 14 of Nuages. I stated earlier that this was the
52 I have adapted metaphors discussed by Lakoff and Johnson in the following places: L
and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 14, 51, 143; Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things,
396, 406, 409; Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 207, 545, 560-1.
53 The idea that motion is a literal property of changing existence tends to be reinfor
our vocabulary: our favoured words for identifying different moments in a changing event -
included - are often locational and linear. Thus we talk about one moment 'following' ano
say that something happened 'in between' other things; refer to parts of temporal even
'passages'; and so on. Metaphor theorists take such words as indication of our inherentl
tional and motional experience of change. But, as the present argument is intended to su
this descriptive bias reflects a long-lived cultural reluctance to countenance change reflectiv
a non-motional way (say, in terms of varying weight or heat, rather than in terms of varying sp
locations) as much as it reflects any actual property of changing experience. (Reasons f
prominence of motional metaphors in descriptions of music, specifically, are offered in the
section.) Non-motional metaphors have to fight for prominence, as it were, alongside the ha
motional ones. It is at this point that I have to depart somewhat from the assumption under
ing metaphor theory, namely that descriptions invariably give a sound indication of mo
experience.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
(a) (b)
Figure 1. Two
Nuages.
moment that my description identified with path-like motion. In

contrast to the sort of motion regularly imputed to music by musicol-
ogists and theorists, however, my description identified 'downward'
rather than 'onward' movement. Of course, it is possible to have both
downward and onward movement. The musical notation in this bar,
for instance, combines a left-to-right 'onward' motion with a gradual
descent. The resulting diagonal line might be the metaphorical image
conjured up in this bar for the listener wedded to the idea of music's
ongoing motion (see Figure 1(a)). My description, though, envisages
a different sort of downward motion: a strictly vertical descent (see
Figure 1(b)). The fact that the music continues to change is captured
by the progressive nature of this vertical descent; no further
'movement' is necessary to conceptualize the music's changing char-
acter. The additional lateral or horizontal element in Figure 1(a) is, I
would argue, the product of a second-level metaphorical conceptualiz-
ation (in terms of 'onward' movement as well as descent) - an
additional conceptualizing move that goes beyond what is strictly
needed in order to grasp the music.54
So, to summarize: my Debussy description stands for a view of music
in which motional conceptualizations are a possible part of, rather
than necessarily underlie, a metaphorical listening experience.
Onward motion is not ever-present, nor is it a condition of music's
temporal existence. Instead, identifications of movement intermingle
with other metaphorical schemas. Motion comes to the fore at some
moments, but in others it is not so apt and an alternative metaphorical
image is preferred - on which occasions the music no longer 'passes'.
To hear musical change in terms of a variety of physical metaphors is
to dethrone onward motion as an assumed corollary of musical form.
III
This account of musical experience may seem difficult to square with

well-worn intuitions about music's motional qualities. This is partly
because there are a number of factors encouraging us to prioritize
motion over other physical or embodied metaphors. Arnie Cox notes
54 My preferred conceptualization here is, of course, consistent with the metaphorical associ-
ation of scalic voice-leading with vertical motion encouraged by many centuries of text-setting
and, more recently, cartoon soundtracks.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
how motional metaphors t

actual, literal sense of sound
the notated page, and the
musical sound'.55 In other
in itself possess qualities of
sorts of actual motion inv
might subconsciously assoc
selves.56 The moving mech
needle through a groove, th
a disc - also need to be considered in this connection.
Additionally, though, we need to return to an idea mooted at the star
of this article: namely, the way in which time itself is sometimes h
to guarantee music's motion. That is to say, we might wonder abo
the ability of cultural ideas of time to persuade us that motion is t
best way of grasping a changing experience, even when that experie
gives evidence to the contrary. This is most likely to happen when
are reflecting upon that experience, rather than actually having it:
concepts of time tend to work against a reflective acceptance of altern
tive ways of making sense of change. Hoyt Alverson has pointed to
way in which the clock, that pervasive symbol of time, has conditio
our notions about the form of existence:
With the establishment of clocks as the embodiment of time, it was not long
before the experienced essence of clocks (uniform motion) became
metonymically the experienced essence of time itself. Time became
medium in uniform motion. ... The clock became not simply the measure
of time but its canonic exemplification.57
A listener's adherence to the idea that music has an inherently

motional form thus does not necessarily indicate that his or her
musical experience gives irrefutable evidence to this end. Rather, it
may simply reflect the listener's confidence that, first, clocks embod
time and, secondly, time dictates the form of all existence.
This is not to deny that some music motivates impressions of onwar
motion by virtue of its own structural properties. The relationships
between chords and keys in tonal music spring to mind as an
example. It is difficult to conceptualize these without reference t
path metaphors; as Saslaw observes, 'try to imagine talking abou
progressions or modulations without speaking of going and
55 Cox, 'The Metaphoric Logic of Musical Motion and Space', 193.

56 For more on the influence of performers' movements on listeners' perceptions of musical
motion, see Shove and Repp, 'Musical Motion and Performance', and Andrew Mead, 'Physio-
logical Metaphors and Musical Understanding', Journal ofMusic Theory, 43 (1999), 1-19. For more
on the impact of notation on our understanding of musical form see Trevor Wishart, 'Musical
Writing, Musical Speaking', Whose Music? A Sociology of Musical Languages, ed.John Shepherd et al.
(London, 1977), 125-51.
57 Hoyt Alverson, Semantics and Experience: Universal Metaphors of Time in English, Mandarin, Hindi
and Sesotho (Baltimore, 1994), 102. Alverson finds evidence for spatial conceptualizations of
change in all of the diverse cultures he examines, and some of these conceptualizations take the
form of path-like motion. (Others take intriguingly different forms.) On the basis of this evidence,
it is clear that the urge to construct a time with phenomenal properties to 'explain' change is not
limited to Western culture. Alverson's data deserve fuller study by metaphor theorists.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
returning'.58 In seekin
certain metaphors - b
make reference to what Lakoff and Turner have called 'the invariance
hypothesis'.59 This states that metaphorical mappings, far from bein
arbitrary, are constrained by the 'schematic structure' of the phenom
enon for which a metaphor is sought. If a metaphor is to seem apt an
to avoid dissonance with the thing it describes, the skeletal image-
schema of that thing must not be violated by the metaphor.60 Path-like
motion is appropriate as a metaphor for tonal relations because it is
consistent with the basic structure of those relations. This structure
comprises an ordered sequence of essentially discrete musical 'objec
(harmonies) that may readily be perceived as distinct features of t
passing surroundings - marking out, as it were, the ongoing journey
Additionally, tonal relations permit a measure of accurate anticipati
of future events; these events can then be conceptualized as 'lyi
ahead', as 'approaching' (or being approached), and as 'arriving'
being arrived at). Susan McClary has commented on the appropriat
ness of tonality's evocation of 'progress' and 'quests after goals' to t
ideologies of the culture in which it first flourished.61 She poin
particularly to the fondness of composers for delaying decisi
moments of 'arrival' - namely, structural cadences - as a way of dram
tizing the journey on which the listener has embarked.
The failure of parts of the post-tonal repertory to motivate
comparable impressions of motion has been a frequent source of cri
cism.62 There are, of course, identifiable structural reasons why th
music fails to support metaphors of paths and goals. For instan
expectations in post-tonal music tend to lack specificity; identifiabl
locatable goals are replaced by more indeterminate, generalized pos
bilities of continuation. The musical past is often similarly fluid a
unenduring, as opposed to the ordered sequence that we like t
believe is inscribed into memory by tonal harmony.63 The relative
58 Saslaw, 'Forces, Containers, and Paths', 229. At least, path metaphors predominate
descriptions of the heard effect of music in which these relations occur. When tonal relations
conceptualized more abstractly, metaphors of hierarchy are often preferred; see Lawrence
Zbikowski, 'Conceptual Models and Cross-Domain Mapping: New Perspectives on Theorie
Music and Hierarchy', Journal of Music Theory, 41 (1997), 193-225.
59 For a summary of this notion see Turner, 'Aspects of the Invariance Hypothesis'.
60 Ibid., 251.
61 Susan McClary, Conventional Wisdom: The Content of Musical Form (Berkeley, 2000); see esp.
pp. 66-8.
62 See, for instance, George Rochberg, 'The Structure of Time in Music: Traditional and
Contemporary Ramifications and Consequences', The Aesthetics of Survival: A Composer's View of
Twentieth-Century Music (Ann Arbor, 1984), 137-47; Barry, Musical Time.
63 Music theorists and music psychologists have, in fact, often argued that even in tonal music
memory and expectation take a variety of forms - from the precise and detailed to the most
generalized and selective. See, for instance, Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music
(Chicago, 1956); Jamshed J. Barucha, 'Neural Nets, Temporal Composites, and Tonality', The
Psychology of Music, ed. Diana Deutsch (2nd edn, San Diego, 1999), 413-41; Jerrold Levinson,
Music in the Moment (Ithaca, NY, 1997); Irene Deliege and Marc Melen, 'Cue Abstraction in the
Representation of Musical Form', Perception and Cognition of Music, ed. Irene Deliege and John
Sloboda (Hove, 1997), 387-412. Arnie Cox's proposal, discussed earlier in this paper, that the
metaphorical conceptualization of music in terms of path-like motion is grounded by the
phenomenology of expectation and memory shared by both realms of experience, presumes an
unwarrantedly restricted view of these faculties.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
absence in some post-tona

(as opposed to ongoing sta
mapping of distinct locati
of these features of post
whether other metaphors
means of conceptualizing t
which structural features in music lend themselves to non-motional
metaphors, then the post-tonal repertory would seem to be a g
place to turn, for it is arguably here that such metaphors are crucia
the music's changing character.
Let me describe a particular moment from Ligeti's Atmosphe
(letters [D]-[G] in the score).65 Initially, the music rests momentar
on a still, middle-register near-unison. Gradually, though, element
the texture begin to rise from this relaxed position, ascending ev
higher. Cellos and violas remain at the original register, but eventu
disappear from view as attention focuses on the intense straining
violins, trumpets and high woodwind. As these instruments, too, gradu
ally drop out, the music's sustained protraction seems increasin
vulnerable. Eventually the tension is too great, and the music sudde
retracts, tutta laforza, to an earthy bass register.
It will be noted, first of all, that motional metaphors are promin
in this description. However, in contradistinction to the forward, g
orientated motion of tonal syntax, my description of the Ligeti rec
only vertical movements - rather as I described the movement in b
14 of Nuages in purely vertical terms. The fact that not all the orc
tra initially joins this upward motion informs the wider metaphor
frame that organizes my experience of this extract. For there is a stro
sense here of upward motion in relation to an entity that rem
unmoving. I am inclined to associate the music's change with
experience of raising an arm. From a relaxed resting point, my a
gradually moves above the rest of my (unmoving) body. And t
embodied understanding of the music remains relevant as the sta
parts of the orchestra are phased out of the texture. At this point
my description suggests, motion is no longer uppermost in my exp
ence - in spite of the fact that the instruments are, from a notatio
perspective, continuing their registral ascent. Instead, a new metap
comes into play; namely, the accumulating tension of an upwa
stretch (the description refers to 'intense straining', 'sustained prot
tion', 'great tension' and 'sudden retraction').66 What motivates th
shift from a metaphor of motion to a metaphor of strain or tensi
Various factors are significant. The disappearance of the mid
register has an impact. The 'upward' progress of the clotted violin
64 Fred Lerdahl, for instance, points to the way in which this characteristic of many conte
porary musical works 'inhibits the inference of structure'; see 'Cognitive Constraints on Com
sitional Systems', Contemporary Music Review, 6/2 (1992) ('New Tonality'), 97-121 (p. 104).
65 This extract begins just under three minutes into the recording by the Berlin Philharmo
Orchestra, conducted by Jonathan Nott, of Ligeti's Atmosphbres (Teldec 8573 88261 2); see sou
clip 1, taken from this recording, at <www.jrma.oupjournals.org>.
66 This occurs at letter [F] in the score. 'Stretching' features as a prominent metaphor in G
'Musical Images as Musical Thoughts'; see esp. p. 34.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
wind lines is more pro

than it is in isolation;
'outstretched' elemen
sustaining a stretch, w
than the position of t
awareness. The acute
string lines, embolden
tion caused by the lite
sify the association wit
musical texture corre
sustained stretch; con
at the end of the extr
aspects of the structu
motional metaphor at
whole from the onwa
corollary of musical c
Elliott Carter's musi
than the extract from
possible to identify p
Carter's music. The op
from Three Occasions
feathery, tremulous
airborne. A more cumbersome brass fanfare serves notice, however, of
what is to follow, namely four successive, clearly marked brass entries
on sustained chords, largely divested of the figuration that character-
izes the very opening. The weighty impact of each entry is com-
pounded by their accumulation on top of each other. Much of this
substantial load is soon lifted, although a stopped horn chord sounds
as a kind of reeling aftershock; the music does not fully get off the
ground again until the fluttering figuration resumes on the celesta.
As with the Ligeti, the verticality schema is perceptible in this
description. However, the more prominent metaphor is that of weight;
motional attributions are largely secondary and supportive. To associ-
ate heaviness with loud music in low registers, and lightness with
quieter music in higher registers, as my description basically does, may
seem simplistic to the point of naivety. There are, nevertheless, strong
reasons for making these connections: the pervasive verticality schema
associates bass frequencies with lowness and thus, by extension, with
relative heaviness;69 and the actual impact of loud bass sounds on the
human body is in certain respects akin to a weighty physical force.
67 Of course, the title of Ligeti's work suggests a rather different governing metaphor for this
music. Additionally, the composer's programme note for the work refers evocatively to images of
entanglement (the relevant passage is quoted in Gydrgy Ligeti in Conversation, with Peter Virnai,
Josef HIusler et al., London, 1983, 25). These alternative metaphorical frames seem to me more
apt for other parts of Ligeti's score.
68 See sound clip 2, taken from the recording by the London Sinfonietta, conducted by Oliver
Knussen, of Carter's A Celebration of Some 100 X 150 Notes from Three Occasions for Orchestra (Virgin
Classics 791 503-2), at <www.jrma.oupjournals.org>.
69 On the verticality schema see Zbikowski, 'Metaphor and Music Theory'.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
There are, additionally, o

metaphors. Each separate
and involves unchanging,
stone is immediately felt
holds it. Each entry also o
helps to keep the entri
supports a mapping from
cally spatially localized rat
Could the Carter extrac
What reasons are there
heaviness over, say, meta
orchestral work Stele open
and fluidity, and it may h
qualities between these tw
ture in the Kurtig is simp
sustained note (G) playe
octaves. This edifice init
immediately subject to a d
of the chord are blurred
in exaggerated vibrato an
notes, the music 'weeps aw
dissolve. Three clarinets c
rest of the orchestra has
opened the work becomes
The opening chord is cru
crisp articulation (achiev
deniable impression of so
diminuendo mean there is
considerations of weight
octaves, being spread acro
localized force conveyed b
ously 'forceful', brass en
gesture, it is difficult not
as breaches of the music'
and wind flutter whimsic
music's original state for
degenerated; dissolution i
This is not to legislate ag
cence and dissipation; t
between metaphors of soli
esis implies that some met
are not freely interchangea
70 See sound clip 3, taken from the

by Claudio Abbado, of KurtLg's Ste
nals.org>. @ 2002 Deutsche Gramm
under various laws. These materials
cation, further distribution or publ
part, is strictly prohibited.
71 Paul Griffiths, booklet note to t

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
or of shifting colours
- are specified by qu
association of 'high' re
darkness is a compone
qualities are importan
opposed to, say, relati
works against a conce
thus makes metaphors
less appropriate. The
evocations of light a
descriptions of music
found in much recent
orchestral piece Du cris
porary composition.73
start, playing either su
dynamic levels. The
form the extremes of
by allowing different p
gain prominence. Saar
to allow the play of li
The simultaneous pre
lines the appropriaten
can readily incorporate
how one could interpr
To place the foregoin
my larger argument
understood in terms
onward motion does
conceptualization that
the implication of t
Conceived in the way
said to be passing, or u
anything, driving onw
and retracting, fluctu
ing and brightening.
that loom prominent
moments: hearing m
(earlier I referred to
of metaphors), and b
when we describe ton
inevitably involve som
of any description of
to see how different sorts of music could motivate non-motional
72 One assumes there is a straightforward association at work here between the lightnes
('high') sky or sun and the darkness of the ('low') earth.
73 See sound clip 4, taken from the recording by the Los Angeles Philharmonic Orc
conducted by Esa-Pekka Salonen, of Saariaho's Du cristal (Ondine ODE 804-2), at
<www.jrma.oupjournals.org>.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
conceptualizations of changi
experiences could reflect th
able to distance ourselves
temporal existence that typi
experience.
Let me give a summary of my claims in this article. I have pointed to

the importance of metaphors in the description and experience of
music, and shown how this accords with recent metaphor theory,
which argues for the centrality of physical metaphors in all experience.
However, I have also suggested that music's changing sound does not
require to be experienced in terms of ongoing, path-like motion - a
suggestion that is counter to the claims of many writers on musical
temporality, and those of metaphor theorists themselves. I have argued
instead that music frequently prompts a 'kaleidoscope' of meta-
phorical imagery, within which ongoing motion is only one of many
candidate conceptualizations. The idea that ongoing motion has some
sort of priority as a way of conceptualizing musical change, in relation
to other metaphorical frames such as heat, weight, light, tension or
transformation, is, I have suggested, a product of numerous extrane-
ous factors which may intervene when we come to reflect upon musical
experience. One of the most important of these factors is our idea of
time itself, which is typically understood to involve ongoing motion,
and which is sometimes accorded an existential actuality even by those
metaphor theorists who point to its thoroughly metaphorical status.
In the final section of this article I pointed to a number of specific
examples of music that foreground non-motional metaphors. These
were all drawn from avant-garde concert music of the second half of
the twentieth century - in part because of my desire to indicate how
our appreciation of music may be constrained if undue importance is
attached to the metaphor of ongoing motion. My view of the place of
motion in musical experience is perhaps more obviously borne out by
non-tonal music of this sort, given the conduciveness of tonal syntax to
conceptualization in terms of directed motion. However, the phenom-
enological variety of musical experience which my account attempts to
underline is also evident in more traditional repertory: this is
suggested by the Debussy extract discussed in this article, and indeed
by the programme note to the Tchaikovsky 'Pathetique' from which I
quoted. In this connection it should be emphasized that it is not my
concern to rule the conceptualization of music in terms of ongoing
motion as inappropriate per se, but rather to see that conceptualiz-
ation treated as part of a wider repertory of physicalized responses.
One of the consequences of doing so would be to remind ourselves
that, contrary to the impression given by cultural concepts of time,
change possesses no intrinsic properties that give it a special affinity
with onward motion over any of the other physical metaphors by means
of which we might grasp it. Another way of expressing this would be as
follows: music, partly by virtue of its susceptibility to metaphorical
conceptualization, implicitly points to the limitations of our customary

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC
dealings with change.

time work to obscure t
suggest that musical ex
to aspects of our encou
from time's onward motion.
ABSTRACT
This article argues that music offers experiences of change that are at
with our common understanding of time. Specifically, I question the
spread belief that onward motion is a condition of musical temporali
approach this issue through metaphor theory, which tends to argue f
necessity of metaphorical experiences of time and music in terms of m
I argue that music's changing sound evokes a variety of bodily metap
motion is not ever-present, but intermingles with metaphors of heat,
weight, tension and so on. Works by Ligeti, Carter, KurtAg and Saaria
discussed as case studies.

186.176.232.105 on Mon, 08 Feb 2021 02:16:45 UTC

Moving Beyond Motion Metaphors For Changing Sound

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Moving Beyond Motion Metaphors For Changing Sound

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Moving beyond Motion: Metaphors for Changing Sound

Author(s): Robert Adlington

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3557498

This content downloaded from