Mediterranean Policy Program—Series on the Region and the Economic Crisis
Policy Brief
Prepared in Partnership with Paralleli (Turin) September 2011
Summary: While taking part in
activities to which it has been
invited within the context of EU
Mediterranean policy, Turkey
has remained distant to such a
scheme for cooperation. When
the Turkish government made
the critical decision to trans-
form the strategy of Turkish
economic development from
import-substitution orientation
to one of export-led growth,
Turkey initiated or expanded
relations with the non-Euro-
pean Mediterranean region.
Although initially these were
limited to economic exchanges,
as relations expanded, they
became more multi-dimen-
sional. Turkey developed an
interest in the region’s overall
political stability. Also, with
enhanced economic means,
it acquired a larger resource
base with which it could be
active in the region. Turkey’s
interest in the non-European
Mediterranean does not cover
all countries in the region
equally, with greater interest
falling onto Libya and countries
to its east. Tunisia, Algeria,
and Morocco tend to be
viewed more as only economic
partners. The interest in the
countries of the Eastern Medi-
terranean, on the other hand,
is more complex.
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Turkey and the Mediterranean:
Balancing Geopolitics and Geo-Economics
By Ilter Turan
Is There a Mediterranean Region?
In developing its neighborhood policy,
the European Union has identified the
Mediterranean as a region with which
close relations should be developed.
The Union for the Mediterranean,
however ineffective, constitutes both
evidence of EU interest in the region
and the instrument through which
this will be implemented. While taking
part in activities to which it has been
invited within the context of EU Medi-
terranean policy, Turkey has remained
distant to such a scheme for coopera-
tion.
Turkey’s ambivalence about treating
the southern rim of the Mediterranean
as a region and its reluctance to get
involved in EU planned activities for
the region derives from several factors.
First, as a candidate for membership,
Turkey is unsure as regards where it
fits. Taking part in the EU’s Mediterra-
nean activities, it fears, might lead it to
be identified too much as an outsider
rather than as a candidate country.
Second, when Turkey looks at the
countries that are referred to as
* İlter Turan is currently a professor of political science at Istanbul’s Bilgi University, where he also served as president
between 1998-2001. The views expressed in this brief are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the
views of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
the Mediterranean region, it sees a
number of different countries that do
not constitute in any sense an inte-
grated region. There are the former
French colonies of the Maghreb; there
is Egypt and Libya, each in a category
of its own; then there are the countries
of the Mashrik or Eastern Arabdom
such as Syria and Lebanon; and
finally there is Israel and Palestine. In
Turkish minds, the so-called Mediter-
ranean countries belong to a variety
of country groupings, some without
shores on the Mediterranean. Turkey
has different relations with each.
Third, and related to the second point,
in the Mediterranean region as defined
by the European Union, many Turks
see an imaginary entity and a project
designed to achieve EU prevalence
in a specific geography. Though the
evidence is not yet rich, Turks also
perceive a competitive relationship
between Spain, France, and Italy
as candidates to lead such a policy.
Finally, in the Turkish mind, the
Mediterranean corresponds to such
countries as Greece, Italy, and Spain
Mediterranean Policy Program—Series on the Region and the Economic Crisis
Policy Brief
and not the non-European Mediterranean region that the
EU has been trying put into political use.
Non-European Mediterranean:
Turkey’s Distant Neighbors
The Turkish Republic, from its beginnings, showed little
interest in the non-European Mediterranean. The new
nation state focused on nation building, consolidating the
republic and rebuilding the country after a long period of
wars. It showed little interest in reconstituting ties with
former subjects of the empire, who had not only cooper-
ated with the enemy, but had also fallen prey to European
colonialism at the end of the war.
The unraveling of this colonialism after the Second World
War did not change Turkey’s lack of interest in the region.
Feeling threatened by the Soviets, Turkey’s attention was
devoted to becoming an integral part of the Western Alli-
ance. The countries of the region, on the other hand, in
working to fight the vestiges of colonialism, often exhib-
ited sympathies to the Soviet bloc. Occasional attempts to
develop or improve relations with the West did not produce
long-lasting effects. For the same reasons, Turkey developed
close relations with Israel. Dubbed the Western democracies
in the region, the two countries engaged in close economic
and military cooperation.
Winds of Change
Although the end of the Cold War is often seen as the major
event that led to important changes in the external relations
of many countries, change in Turkey had started ten years
earlier, when the Turkish government made the critical
decision to transform the strategy of Turkish economic
development from import-substitution orientation to one
of export-led growth. The shift shortly came to be reflected
in foreign policy as Turkey began to search for new markets
and, in the process, develop new relationships. Factors of
economic prosperity came to weigh more importantly in
the conduct of foreign policy than the previously prevailing
security concerns. In the words of Kemal Kirişçi, Turkey
became a trading state. The end of the Cold War only
encouraged the continuation of this change.
This new economic orientation guided Turkey to initiate
or expand relations with the non-European Mediterranean
region. Although initially these were limited to economic
2
Factors of economic prosperity
came to weigh more importantly in
the conduct of foreign policy than
the previously prevailing security
concerns.
exchanges, as relations expanded, they became more multi-
dimensional. In addition to viewing the countries of the
region as economic partners, Turkey developed an interest
in the region’s overall political stability. Also, with enhanced
economic means, it acquired a larger resource base with
which it could be active in the region. The basic driving
force behind expanded relations was enhanced economic
prosperity from the 1980s to 2007. With coming into power
of the socially conservative (read religious) Justice and
Development Party (known as AKP) for a second term in
2007, new political dimensions were added that aimed to
establish Turkey as a regional power capable of initiating
foreign policy actions on its own. Focusing on achieving
zero problems with neighbors (meaning attempting to
address them through peaceful means) and claiming that
all countries with which Turkey had historical ties (read
Islam and/or Ottoman Empire) came within the domain of
Turkish interest, the AKP government gave new momentum
to Turkish activism in its surrounding regions, motivated by
economic interest, cultural affinity, and enhanced security.
Relations with Individual Countries
Turkey’s interest in the non-European Mediterranean does
not cover all countries in the region equally, with greater
interest falling onto Libya and countries to its east. Tunisia,
Algeria, and Morocco tend to be viewed more as only
economic partners, an approach that also characterized the
Turkish-Libyan relationship until recently. The interest in
the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, on the other
hand, is more complex.
Libya and Egypt
Interestingly, the first country with which Turkey initiated
intensive economic relations was Libya. Turkish contractors
Mediterranean Policy Program—Series on the Region and the Economic Crisis
Policy Brief
entered the Libyan market during the late 1970s. During
the 1980s, Turkey had become an indispensable part of
the construction of harbors, pipelines, and a variety of
public and private facilities there. How much business they
secured and whether they were paid on time depended
on the general state of political relations between the two
countries, which in turn depended on Colonel Muammar
Gaddafi’s temporal and often whimsical judgments of
Turkey’s foreign policy, but Turkey was always present in
Libya. Economic relations improved and stabilized after
the Libyan leader assumed a more accommodating stance
toward Western countries and after Turkey became more
appreciative of Palestinian concerns.
When the anti-government demonstrations evolved into
violent clashes between pro- and anti-Gaddafi forces in
the spring of 2011, Turkey’s economic involvement was of
such a magnitude that it had to evacuate more than 20,000
workers, leaving behind an expensive machine park as
part of construction work estimated to be worth over $25
billion. In 2010, Turkey exported $1,935,307 and imported
$425,652 worth of goods, totaling a volume of $2,360,959
with Libya. The importance of the relationship to the
Turkish economy may help explain why Turkey was initially
reluctant to assume a clear stand against Gaddafi and why,
shortly afterwards, it decided to reverse its position and
support the Benghazi government when it judged that
Gaddafi would not be able to stay in power in view of the
international coalition that had been formed against him.
This policy shift has been vindicated as Gaddafi has lost his
battle while his friends in China and Russia now fear that
they will be deprived of economic opportunities that post-
Gaddafi Libyan reconstruction and development policies
will present to outside powers.
The importance of the relationship
to the Turkish economy may help
explain why Turkey was initially
reluctant to assume a clear stand
against Gaddafi.
3
Turkey became more interested
in assuming a regional role in
the politics of the Middle East,
the relationship became colored
by competitive as well as by
cooperative approaches.
Turkey’s relations with Egypt are more complex. Economic
relations are clearly important. The volume of trade between
the two countries, which was only US$517 million in 2000,
had risen to $3.26 billion in 2009. Furthermore, Turkish
investors saw Egypt as a promising land of economic expan-
sion, with abundant and inexpensive labor, an improving
business environment, and easy access to major markets
not only in Europe but also in Africa and South Asia. Some
Turkish textile firms had relocated there, while others were
making plans to do the same.
On the political front, as Turkey became more interested in
assuming a regional role in the politics of the Middle East,
the relationship became colored by competitive as well as
by cooperative approaches. The greater sympathy Turkey
has displayed toward the Palestinian causes — including the
organization of Gaza aid campaigns to be routed through
the Sinai and the failed Turkish efforts to mediate a modus
vivendi between Israel and Syria regarding Golan Heights —
constitute examples of Turkey’s attempts to increase its role
in regional politics at the expense of Egypt. The domestic
turmoil that Egypt has been undergoing since demonstra-
tions first started in Tahrir Square in the spring of this year
has in fact placed Turkey in a better position to exercise
regional leadership.
Current Turkish policy regarding Egypt aims to help a
peaceful transition to political competition. It is recog-
nized that a stable Egypt is needed to expand the economic
relationship. Furthermore, the Turkish business community
views Egypt as a base from which it can launch new opera-
tions into Africa and the Gulf, enhancing the country’s
economic importance for Turkey. In the domain of politics,
Mediterranean Policy Program—Series on the Region and the Economic Crisis

Policy Brief
Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, with his immense popu- Syria has moved from $729 million to $1.753 billion. Again
larity in the Egyptian street, has contributed to narrowing Turkish businessmen have begun to view Syria as a poten-
the options of Egypt’s current military rulers regarding how tial location for investment. Especially with the removal of
accommodating they may be toward Israel. Finally, the AKP visa requirements about a year ago, tourism trade has begun
government in Turkey probably anticipates that the winners to flourish with Syrians, especially for those living near the
in any multi-party elections in Egypt will be its ideological Turkish cities of Gaziantep and Antakya, who visit Turkey
kin, facilitating harmonious relations both in the economic for shopping and medical services.
and the political domain.
The improvement of relations between the two countries
The AKP government in Turkey enticed Syria to remove its territorial claims regarding
Hatay and re-evaluate its concerns that Turkish policies
would eventually leave Syria without water. Shortly before
probably anticipates that the the protest events in Syria started, Syrian President Basher
Assad and Erdoğan met in Syria for the groundbreaking
winners in any multi-party ceremonies of a joint dam on the Asi (Orontes) River. It
is within this atmosphere that Syrian willingness to allow
elections in Egypt will be its Turkey to conduct proximity talks between it and Israel
with regard to the status of Golan Heights becomes compre-
hensible. Turkey also discreetly encouraged Syria to with-
ideological kin, facilitating draw from Lebanon and later contributed to the United
Nations force in a noncombat capacity to help keep peace
harmonious relations both in at the Lebanese-Israeli frontier.

It also appeared that the Syrian government under Assad

the economic and the political viewed the growing Turkish relationship as a channel
through which Syria would become gradually integrated
domain. into the world system from which it had remained isolated,
branded as rogue state by the United States. When demon-
strations against the Assad regime started, Turkey hoped
Syria and Lebanon that it might be possible to persuade the Syrian leadership
Turkey’s relations with Syria underwent a major transfor- to liberalize. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu
mation in 1999. Until that year, Syria had been extending
support to the Kurdish terrorist organization PKK, offering
safe haven to its leader in Damascus and training grounds
It seems that Turkey has judged
for fighters in Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, which was then
under Syrian control. By pursuing such a policy, Syria that the chances of the Assad
hoped that it would force Turkey to reconsider its policy
of building a series of irrigation-power generation dams regime surviving are decreasing
along the Euphrates as well as keeping Syrian claims on the
Turkish province of Hatay alive. When Turkey threatened
military action in 1999, the Syrian government affected a
and that it is prudent both in
complete turnaround, kicked the PKK leader out, closed
down the training camps, and turned to developing friendly terms of long-term economic and
relations with Turkey. Since then, both economic and
political relations have blossomed. Turkey’s exports that political interest to adopt a strong
totaled only $184 million in 2000 have gone up to $1.425
billion in 2009 while the total volume of Turkish trade with stand.
4
Mediterranean Policy Program—Series on the Region and the Economic Crisis
Policy Brief
paid several visits to Damascus to persuade Assad that
listening to the opposition was the only way to go. Despite
indications that this was the way he would proceed, Assad
has failed to live up to his commitments, and relations
between the two countries have cooled down. It seems that
Turkey has judged, as in the case of Libya, that the chances
of the Assad regime surviving are decreasing and that it is
prudent both in terms of long-term economic and political
interest to adopt a strong stand, saying that the Syrian
regime must change.
Israel and Palestine
As indicated earlier, Turkey had close relations with Israel
since its founding. An important dimension of this was
defense cooperation, which included the refurbishing of
Turkish tanks by Israel as well as the sale of unmanned
aircraft to Turkey. Turkey offered the Israeli air force
training opportunities in Turkey since Israeli airspace was
too small for extensive training. Part of this comprehensive
relationship also included the support of Israeli lobbies in
the United States against activities in the U.S. Congress that
were unfriendly to Turkey such as the passing of Armenian
Genocide resolutions.
When Israel, quite unexpectedly,
dynamited what seemed to be
an almost-completed deal with
Syria, Turkey felt betrayed. From
that point on, relations have
deteriorated.
Economic relations between the two countries had been
growing during recent years. Their annual volume of trade
between is comparable to Turkey’s trade with Egypt and
Syria, reaching a volume of $2.063 billion in 2009, of which
$1.5328 billion is Turkish exports. In addition, Turkey is a
popular destination for Israeli tourists.
The critical event that turned the tide in Turkish-Israeli rela-
tions was Israel’s having reached the almost-final step in the
5
initiation of proximity talks with Syria, and then suddenly
attacking Gaza. Turkey had appreciated that stability in the
Middle East was not possible without an Arab-Israeli recon-
ciliation, and that Arabs seemed to need external assis-
tance in achieving such a state of affairs. When Israel, quite
unexpectedly, dynamited what seemed to be an almost-
completed deal, Turkey felt betrayed. From that point on,
relations have deteriorated.
The attack by the Israeli navy on a ship in the interna-
tional aid flotilla on the high seas, killing eight Turkish
and one American national of Turkish origin, has marked
yet another turning point in constantly worsening rela-
tions. Israel’s refusal to apologize and pay indemnity for the
deceased, and Turkey’s failure to secure such an outcome by
using international instruments, has led Turkey to initiate a
number of unilateral measures against Israel. Accordingly,
Turkey will now work to have Palestine recognized as an
Although it was common
knowledge that these
authoritarian regimes suppressed
oppositions, it was assumed that
they would continue to rule in the
foreseeable future.
independent state, will insure security in the international
waters of Eastern Mediterranean, and will fully suspend
military cooperation with Israel, among other measures.
What is remarkable is that both countries have taken care to
clarify that ordinary trade is not included in what otherwise
is an unfriendly state of affairs.
Readjusting Regional Policies
Turkey’s policies with the non-European countries of the
Mediterranean, particularly those in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, were based on cooperating with the existing regimes.
Although it was common knowledge that these authori-
Mediterranean Policy Program—Series on the Region and the Economic Crisis
Policy Brief
tarian regimes suppressed oppositions whose strength was
unknown, it was assumed that they would continue to rule
in the foreseeable future. The coming of riots and regime
change, initially in Tunisia and then in Egypt, took everyone
by surprise, Turkey being no exception.
In the face of the new political realities, Turkey, not unlike
its European allies, has had to establish a delicate balance
between its short- and long-term economic and its polit-
ical-cum-security interests in dealing with its Southern
Mediterranean neighbors. As long as the older leadership
structures were in place, Turkey worked with the existing
leaders. When they were challenged by popular uprisings,
after some hesitation, Turkey judged that change was inevi-
table and moved political considerations ahead of short-
term economic ones, giving support to those demanding
democratization. In this way, it envisioned developing good
relations with the new regimes and expanding its role both
as an economic and political actor in the new order that will
emerge in the region.
In this context, the worsening ties with Israel presents a
dilemma for Turkey. Israel’s Arab neighbors are concerned
that both Turkey’s actions and appeals to their mass public
narrows down their ability to have amicable relations with
Israel. Israel’s Western allies, notably the United States, find
it highly problematic that its two allies in the region are at
loggerheads. A change of government in Israel to one that is
willing to offer an apology to Turkey may well open the way
to improvement. Otherwise, economic factors alone will not
suffice to affect change.
The Turkish trading state is constrained in its foreign policy
in the Eastern Mediterranean by political and security
considerations. Sometimes, such considerations guide
policy in the hope of enhancing economic gains in the long
run; at other times, however, political considerations exhibit
an autonomy of their own. Turkey is continuing to meet the
challenge of balancing geopolitics and geo-economics in
the region, so far with some success. Interestingly, Turkey’s
regional political and security role has led to commentary
within the European Union that Turkey’s cooperation is
indispensable for the success of EU’s Mediterranean poli-
cies and therefore Turkey’s membership negotiations should
quickly lead to a successful conclusion.
About the Partners
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-par-
tisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to
promoting better understanding and cooperation between North Amer-
ica and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by sup-
porting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere,
by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communi-
ties, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by
providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the
transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initia-
tives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from
Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF
maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to
its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe:
Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF
also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.
www.gmfus.org
Paralleli’s mandate is to contribute to the creation of a Euro-Mediter-
ranean area of freedom and of economic and social development. The
institute acts at the local, national, and international level with the aim
of meeting the needs of the North-West region of Italy concerning its
relations with the other sides of the Mediterranean Sea. The activities of
the Institute fall within the process of Euro-Mediterranean partnership
initiated by the European Union with the 1995 Barcelona Process and
currently undergoing a major relaunch through the “Union for the
Mediterranean,” since July 2008. Paralleli intends to contribute to the
reinforcement of political relations, economic cooperation, cultural
exchange, and human flows between the European and the South-East
Mediterranean countries. Its main objective is to promote dialogue at
cultural, social, and political level between the societies of the Mediter-
ranean countries, with the aim of encouraging and improving economic
relations between them, with a particular focus on the dimension of
sustainability and co-development. For this reason, the institute has
decided: to involve civil society in the development of Euro-Mediterranean
relations; to create and to support networking in the Mediterranean area;
and to increase the value of research in order to suggest truly effective
policies to local, national, and international actors.
www.paralleli.org