Hazard and Operability

Study
(HAZOP)
 INTRODUCTION

 Nama : Nasrullah, ST
 TTL : Jakarta, 17 Juni
 Education : Teknik Metalurgi , FTUI
 Alamat : Kompt Ditjen Moneter Kembangan , Jakarta Barat
 Experience :
– PT Interport Mandiri Utama ( Joint Operational ExxonMobile Lubricant with
Indika Energi Tbk ,Balikpapan( 2020))
– PT Margo Mulyo ( construction), Jakarta (2019)
– PT SMART Tbk (Refinery, agribusiness and food ,Jakarta( 2017-2019)
– PT Unelec Indonesia ( Manufacture Transformer,Joint ventute , GE, ALSTOM and
PLN ( 2015-2017))
– PT AKR Corporindo Tbk ( Oil and Energy ( 2005 -2015))
– PT Samudera Indonesia Tbk ( 2000 -2005)

2
 Tujuan

 Understood what is HAZOP

 Implementation HAZOP in your business if needed

 I suppose that I
should have done that
HAZOP Study!

4
 Introduction to HAZOP - Content

 What is a HAZOP Study?

 Origin of HAZOP study
 Objectives of a HAZOP Study
 When to Perform a HAZOP Study
 Benefits of HAZOP Study
 Overall HAZOP Methodology
 A Conceptual Example of HAZOP Study
 HAZOP Terminologies
 References

5
 The Rising Case for Change

 1984 – Bhopal, India – Toxic Material

Released
– 2,500 immediate
fatalities;
20,000+ total HAZARD:
– Many other offsite
injuries Highly Toxic
Methyl Isocyanate
 The Rising Case for Change

 1984 – Mexico City, Mexico –Explosion

– 300 fatalities
(mostly offsite)
– $20M damages HAZARD:
Flammable LPG
in tank
 The Rising Case for Change

1988 – Norco, LA – Explosion

– 7 onsite fatalities, 42 injured
– $400M+ damages

HAZARD:
Flammable
hydrocarbon vapors
 The Rising Case for Change

 1989 – Pasadena, TX – Explosion and Fire

– 23 fatalities, 130 injured; damage $800M+

HAZARD:
Flammable
ethylene/isobutane
vapors in a 10” line
 Enter … Process Safety Management

 Integral part of OSHA Occupational Safety and Health

Standards since 1992

 Known formally as: Process Safety Management of Highly

Hazardous Chemicals (29 CFR 1910.119)

 PSM applies to most industrial processes containing

10,000+ pounds of hazardous material
 What’s Covered by PSM?
 Process Safety Information
 Employee Involvement
 Process Hazard Analysis
 Operating Procedures
 Training
 Contractors
 Pre-Startup Safety Review
 Mechanical Integrity
 Hot Work
 Management of Change
 Incident Investigation
 Emergency Planning and
Response
 Compliance Audits
 Trade Secrets
 Process Hazard Analysis

Simply, PHA allows the employer to:

 Determine locations of potential safety problems

 Identify corrective measures to improve safety

 Preplan emergency actions to be taken if safety controls fail

 PHA Requirements

 Use one or more established methodologies

appropriate to the complexity of the process

 Performed by a team with expertise in engineering and

process operations

 Includes personnel with experience and knowledge

specific to the process being evaluated and the hazard
analysis methodology being used
 PHA Must Address …

 The hazards of the process

 Identification of previous incidents with likely potential for

catastrophic consequences

 Engineering and administrative controls applicable to the

hazards and their interrelationships
 PHA Must Address … (cont’d)

 Consequences of failure of engineering and administrative

controls, especially those affecting employees

 Facility siting; human factors

 The need to promptly resolve PHA findings and

recommendations
Hazard Analysis Methodologies

 What-If
 Checklist
 What-If/Checklist
 Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
 Fault Tree Analysis
 An appropriate equivalent methodology

16/49
 A scenario…

You and your family are on a road trip by using a car in the
middle of the night. You were replying a text message while
driving at 100 km/h and it was raining heavily. The car hits a
deep hole and one of your tire blows.

You hit the brake, but due to slippery road and your car tire
thread was thin, the car skidded and was thrown off the
road.

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 Points to ponder

What was the cause of the accident?

What was the consequence of the event?

What can we do to prevent all those things to happen in the first place?

What other possible accidents might happen on the road trip?

Can we be prepared before the accident occurs?

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 Can we make it more systematic?
Parameter Guideword Possible Consequences Action Safeguard
Causes
Car speed Too fast Rushing Skidded when - Slow down -ABS brake system
Too slow emergency brake - Speed up -Safety belt
- Air bag

Tire No thread Tire too old, often Car skidded - Check frequently
Less thread speeding and - Have spare tire
emergency break

Window Low Rain Cannot see the

visibility Very low road

Car light Dim -Stop car

No light -Go to nearest
garage
-Use emergency
signal
Road With holes Breaks the car tire - Put a signboard
Rocky -Street lights
Travel time Night No street light -Travel during
Foggy daylight
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 What is a HAZOP study?

 Systematic technique to IDENTIFY potential HAZard and

OPerating problems
 Involves a multi-disciplinary team methodically
“brainstorming” the plant design
 A qualitative technique based on “guide-words” to help
provoke thoughts about the way deviations from the intended
operating conditions can lead to hazardous situations or
operability problems

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 What is a HAZOP study?

 A HAZOP study is an examination procedure.

 Its purpose is to identify all possible deviation from the way in which a
design is expected to work and to identify all the hazards associated
with these deviations.
 When deviation arise that results in hazards, action are generated
that require design engineers to review and suggest solutions to
remove the hazard or to reduce its risk to an acceptable level.

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 Origin of HAZOP study

 HAZOP were initially 'invented' by ICI in the United Kingdom, but the
technique only started to be more widely used within the chemical process
industry after the Flixborough disaster in 1974.
 This chemical plant explosion killed twenty eight people and injured scores
of others, many of those being members of the public living nearby.
 Through the general exchange of ideas and personnel, the system was
then adopted by the petroleum industry, which has a similar potential for
major disasters.
 This was then followed by the food and water industries, where the hazard
potential is as great, but of a different nature, the concerns being more to
do with contamination rather than explosions or chemical releases.

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Potential Hazard AND Operability
Problems

Why the big AND ?

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 Potential Hazard AND Operability Problems

Because of the high profile of production plant accidents,

emphasis is too often placed upon the identification of
hazards to the neglect of potential operability problems.

Yet it is in the latter area that benefits of a HAZOP Study

are usually the greatest.

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 Example

 A study was commissioned for a new plant.

 Some two years previously, and for the first time, a similar study had
been carried out on different plant at the same site which was then
in the process of being designed.
 Before the latest review commenced, the Production Manager
expressed the hope that the same benefits would accrue as before,
stating that

“In his twenty years of experience, never had a new plant been
commissioned with so few problems, and no other plant had ever
achieved its production targets and break-even position in so short
a time".

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 Objectives of a HAZOP study
Safety Issues:
– To identify scenarios that would lead to the release of hazardous or
flammable material into the atmosphere, thus exposing workers to injury
– To check the safety of the design
– To improve the safety of an existing and or modified facility

Operability Issues:
– To decide whether and where to build
– To check operating and safety procedures
– To verify that safety instrumentation is working optimally
– To facilitate smooth, safe prompt start-up
– To minimize extensive last minute modifications
– To ensure trouble-free long-term operation

“Prevention is better than control”

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 Philosophy – Hazard vs Operability

 HAZOPs concentrate on identifying both hazards as well as

operability problems. While the HAZOP study is designed to
identify hazards through a systematic approach, more than
80% of study recommendations are operability problems
and are not, of themselves, hazards.

 Although hazard identification is the main focus, operability

problems should be identified to the extent that they have
the potential to lead to process hazards, result in an
environmental violation or have a negative impact on
profitability.

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 Definition of Hazard & Operability

 Hazard - any operation that could possibly cause a

catastrophic release of toxic, flammable or explosive chemicals
or any action that could result in injury to personnel.

 Operability - any operation inside the design envelope that

would cause a shutdown that could possibly lead to a violation
of environmental, health or safety regulations or negatively
impact profitability.

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 Benefits

 The circumstances when HAZOPs are likely to produce benefits

are:
– during the design or installation of any new plant or process, or major
modification to an existing one;
– when there are unique hazards such as environmental hazards and
quality or cost issues associated with the operation;
– following a major incident involving fire, explosion, toxic release etc; and
– to justify why a particular code of practice, guidance note or industry
code is not to be followed.

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 When should a HAZOP be held

 During various stages of plant design

– At the beginning of the project as a ‘safety and environmental specification’
– Towards the end of process definition, when the Process Flow sheets are available
as a Safety and Environmental Review
– When P&IDs are at ‘Approved for Design’ stage (Final design HAZOP)

 During construction site inspections ensure that recommendations

arising from the HAZOP or other safety and environmental reviews are
being implemented.

 A pre-commissioning study reviews plant procedures and perform a

conventional safety audit

 Once operational, an audit of plant and procedures at regular interval

ensures ongoing safety awareness

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 HAZOP study of existing plant

 Can be done at any time

 Mainly used to improve operating procedures or when modifying plant
 Sometimes used to identify possible improvements in plants where
accident or incident rate is abnormally high
 Can be used in conjunction with plant safety audits
 Needs exceptional care to fully define the scope and aims of the
study
 Despite detailed operation knowledge, much of the original design
intent is often unknown

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 Simple Example of a HAZOP Study
Diammonium Phosphate (DAP) Production

 Phosphoric acid and ammonia are mixed, and a non-hazardous

product, diammonium phosphate (DAP), results if the reaction of
ammonia is complete. If too little phosphoric acid is added, the reaction
is incomplete, and ammonia is produced. Too little ammonia available
to the reactor results in a safe but undesirable product.
Both chemicals will be used in large quantities and in
concentrated form. Due to the highly corrosive nature of both
chemicals, the project team was assigned to investigate the
hazards posed to staff from the reaction resulting from study
line 1 (phosphoric acid delivery line).

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Production of DAP (continuous process)

Valve A

Phosphoric Acid

Study line 1
Phosphoric acid delivery line

Valve C
Valve B

Ammonia
Diammonium
Phosphate
(DAP)

Reactor

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HAZOP Study Report on line 1 of DAP

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 Preliminary HAZOP Example

Monomer Refer to reactor system shown.

Feed Cooling
Coils
The reaction is exothermic. A cooling system is
provided to remove the excess energy of
reaction. In the event of cooling function is lost,
Cooling Water the temperature of reactor would increase. This
to Sewer would lead to an increase in reaction rate
leading to additional energy release.

The result could be a runaway reaction with

Cooling pressures exceeding the bursting pressure of
Water In the reactor. The temperature within the reactor
is measured and is used to control the cooling
water flow rate by a valve.

TC Perform HAZOP Study

Thermocouple

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Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor - Example
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action
NO No cooling Temperature increase
in reactor

REVERSE Reverse Failure of water

cooling flow source resulting in
backward flow
MORE More cooling Instruct operators
flow on procedures

AS WELL AS Reactor Check

product in coils maintenance
procedures and
schedules
OTHER THAN Another Water source
material contaminated
besides cooling
water

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Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor – Answer
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action
NO No cooling Cooling water valve Temperature increase Install high
malfunction in reactor temperature alarm
(TAH)
REVERSE Reverse Failure of water Less cooling, Install check valve
cooling flow source resulting in possible runaway
backward flow reaction

MORE More cooling Control valve Too much cooling, Instruct operators
flow failure, operator reactor cool on procedures
fails to take action
on alarm
AS WELL AS Reactor More pressure in Off-spec product Check
product in coils reactor maintenance
procedures and
schedules

OTHER THAN Another Water source May be cooling If less cooling,

material contaminated inefffective and effect TAH will detect. If
besides on the reaction detected, isolate
cooling water water source.
Back up water
source?
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 HAZOP – The Critical Success Factor

 The HAZOP process is based on the principle that a team

approach to hazard analysis will identify more problems than
when individuals working separately combine results. The
HAZOP
 team is made up of individuals with varying backgrounds and
expertise.
 The expertise is brought together during HAZOP sessions and
through a collective brainstorming effort that stimulates
creativity and new ideas, a thorough review of the process under
consideration is made.

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 HAZOP Terminology - 1
Term Definition

Cause The reason(s) why the DEVIATION could occur. More CAUSES can
be identified for one DEVIATION.

Comments Any remarks to be given to the RECOMMENDATIONS or which, in

another way, showed up during the HAZOP sessions.

Consequence The results of the DEVIATION, in case it occurs. CONSEQUENCES

may both comprise process hazards and operability problems, like
plant shutdown. More CONSEQUENCES can follow from one
cause and, in turn, one CONSEQUENCE can have several CAUSES.

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 HAZOP Terminology - 2

Term Definition
Deviation A way in which the process conditions may depart from their INTENTION.

Intention / Design Description of how the process is expected to behave at the Study Line.
intent This is qualitatively described as an activity (e.g., feed, reaction,
sedimentation) and/or quantitatively in the process parameters, like
temperature, flow rate, pressure, composition, etc.

Keyword/ Guideword A short word to create the imagination of a DEVIATION of the INTENTION.
The mostly used set of Guidewords is: NO, MORE, LESS, AS WELL AS,
PART OF, OTHER THAN and REVERSE. The GUIDEWORDS are applied, in
turn, to all the PARAMETERS, in order to identify unexpected and yet
credible DEVIATIONS from the INTENTION.

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 HAZOP Terminology - 3

Term Definition
Parameter The relevant parameter for the condition(s) of the process, e.g.,
pressure, temperature, composition, etc.
Study Line/ Node A specific location in the process in which (the deviations of) the
process intention are evaluated. Examples might be: separators,
heat exchangers, scrubbers, pumps, compressors, and
interconnecting pipes with equipment
Recommendation Activities identified during a HAZOP study for follow-up. These may
comprise technical improvements in the design, modifications in
the status of drawings and process descriptions, procedural
measures to be developed or further in-depth studies to be
carried out.

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 HAZOP Terminology - 4
Term Definition
Safeguard Facilities that help to reduce the occurrence frequency of the
DEVIATION or to mitigate its CONSEQUENCES. There are, in
principle, five types of SAFEGUARDS:
 Facilities that identify the DEVIATION. These comprise, among others,
alarm instrumentation and human operator detection.
 Facilities that compensate the DEVIATION, e.g., an automatic control
system that reduces the feed to a vessel in case of overfilling it
(increase of level). These usually are an integrated part of the process
control.
 Facilities that prevent the DEVIATION to occur. An example is an inert
blanket gas in storages of flammable substances.
 Facilities that prevent a further escalation of the DEVIATION, e.g., by
(total) trip of the activity. These facilities are often interlocked with
several units in the process, often controlled by logical computers.
 Facilities that relieve the process from the hazardous DEVIATION.
These comprise for instance: pressure safety valves (PSV) and vent
systems.

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 HAZOP Terminology - 4
Term Definition
Action – Where a credible cause results in a negative consequence, it must be
decided whether some action should be taken. It is at this stage that
consequences and associated safeguards are considered. If it is
deemed that the protective measures are adequate, then no action
need be taken, and words to that effect are recorded in the Action
column.
– Actions fall into two groups:
• Actions that remove the cause.
• Actions that mitigate or eliminate the consequences.
– Whereas the former is to be preferred, it is not always possible,
especially when dealing with equipment malfunction. However, always
investigate removing the cause first, and only where necessary mitigate
the consequences.

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 HAZOP Methodology - Content

 HAZOP Study Planning and Preparations

 HAZOP Study Team - Role and Responsibilities
 Meeting Arrangements
 Reporting and Follow-up
 HAZOP Guidewords;
 Possible Causes & Consequences
 Plant; Safeguards & Action Required
 Working Session 2: Chemical Plant

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HAZOP Planning and Execution
CLOSE OUT
Record/File
Completed
Actions
TRACK
ACTIONS
HAZOP
Review
Meeting
REPORT
Action List
HAZOP
Report
TEAM
System
Assessment
Team Activity
PLAN
Select Team
Examine System
Keywords

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 HAZOP study team

 Independent leader (e.g., not from plant studied)

– Preferred but complete independence not essential
 Project engineer
– Provide engineering input
 Operations representative
– Plant operation
 Discipline engineers
– Process
– Instrument/ electrical
– Mechanical/ maintenance
 HAZOP minute recorder
– One of the above

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 HAZOP STUDY - TEAM COMPOSITION
A Team Leader, an expert in the HAZOP Technique
Technical Members, for example

New Design Existing Plant

• Design or Project Engineer
• Process Engineer
• Commissioning Manager
• Instrument Design Engineer
• Chemist
Plant Superintendent
Process Supervisor (Foreman)
Maintenance Engineer
Instrument Engineer
Technical Engineer
 Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

HAZOP leader - The leader should be independent (i.e. has no

responsibility for the process and/or the performance of operations)
•Plan sessions and timetable
•Control discussion
•Limit discussion
•Encourage team to draw conclusion
•Ensure secretary has time for taking note
•Keep team in focus
•Encourage imagination of team members
•Motivate members
•Discourage recriminations
•Judge importance issues
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 Checklist for HAZOP Leader

 Always prepare study program in advance.

 Agree on the format or form to be used.
 Prepare follow up procedures.
 Brief members about HAZOP during first meeting.
 Stop the team trying to redesign the process.
 HAZOP is a team exercise. Do not let anybody (including the
leader himself to dominate).

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 Checklist for HAZOP Leader

 If conflict arises, handle with care.

 Avoid long discussions by recording areas which need to be resolved
outside meeting.
 Leader must be strong, yet diplomatic.
 Speak clearly. Make you point.
 Better have experience working as team member previously.
 Do not skip anything….some time small things may cause big
accident.

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Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

HAZOP Secretary

• Take adequate notes

• Record documentations
• Inform leader if more time required in taking notes
• If unclear, check wording before writing
• Produce interim lists of recommendations
• Produce draft report of study
• Check progress of chase action
• Produce final report

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Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

Process Engineer

• Provide a simple description

• Provide design intention for each process unit
• Provide information on process conditions and design conditions
• Provide a simple description
• Provide design intention for each process unit
• Provide information on process conditions and design conditions

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Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

Mechanical Design Engineer

• Provide specification details

• Provide vendor package details
• Provide equipment and piping layout information

Instrument Engineer

• Provide details of control philosophy

• Provide interlock and alarm details
• Provide info on shutdown, safety features

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 Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

Plant Engineer or Manager

• Provide information on compatibility with any existing adjacent plant
• Provide details of site utilities and services
• Provide (for study on existing plant) any update on maintenance access and
modifications

Shift Operating Engineer or Supervisor

• Provide guidance on control instrumentation integrity from an operating
experience view point
• Provide (for study on existing plant) information on plant stability at the
specified control parameters
• Provide information on experienced operability deviations of hazard potential

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Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

Chemist

• Provide details of process chemistry

• Provide details of process hazards (polymerisations, byproducts, corrosion etc)

Project Engineer

• Provide details of cost and time estimation and also budget constraints.
• Ensure rapid approval if required

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 Questioning Techniques

 Open questions
– Help person being asked to think – use words how, what and
why.
 Closed questions
– To focus on an issue or problem. Start with words who, when,
where.
– Required answer yes or no only.
 Question mix
– Mix between open and closed questions.

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 Questioning Techniques

 Things to avoid
– Ambiguous or vague questions.
– Double barelled/multiple questions.
– Long complicated questions.
– Interrogation type of questions.
– A loaded questions – implied judgement.

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 Required information

 P & IDs
 Process flow diagrams
 Heat and Material Balances
 Layouts
 Logic Diagrams
 Equipment Data Sheets
 Material Hazard Data Sheets
 Hazardous area Layouts

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 Modes of operation to consider

 The following modes of plant operation should be considered for each

node:

– Normal operation
– Reduced throughput operation
– Routine start-up
– Routine shut-down
– Emergency shutdown
– Commissioning
– Special operating modes

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 HAZOP meeting
 Proposed agenda:

• Introduction & presentation of participation

• Overall presentation of the system/operation to be analyzed
• Description of the HAZOP approach
• Presentation of the first node or logical part of the operation
• Analyze the first node/ part using the guide-words and
parameters
• Continue presentation and analysis (steps 4 & 5)
• Coarse summary of findings

Focus should be on potential hazards as well as potential

operational problems.

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 Sequence for conducting a HAZOP Study
Flow diagram for the HAZOP analysis – The parameter-first approach

PHASE 1: DIVIDE SECTION Divide section into Study line

Specify the section or stage to be examined

PHASE 2: SELECT A LINE
PHASE 3: Describe & discuss the step/ operation; determine the design envelope.
ANALYSIS Develop & record the design intention

From the description and the design intention select a parameter

Combine this parameter with a guideword to develop a meaningful deviation

Seek a possible cause of the deviation and identify the consequences

Evaluate the safeguards and decide if they are adequate of if a change

or further study is needed.

Record
PHASE 4: RECORDING
PHASE 5: REEVALUATE Have all causes of this deviation been considered? NO

YES

Does any other guideword combine with this parameter to give a meaningful deviation? YES

NO

Are there further parameters to consider? YES

NO

Examination of the steps/ stage is complete

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 How to be a good HAZOP participant

 Be active! Everyone contribution is important

 Be to the point. Avoid endless discussion of details
 Be critical in a positive way – not negative, but constructive
 Be responsible. He who knows should let the other know

62
 HAZOP recording

 The findings are recorded during the meeting(s) using a HAZOP

work-sheet, either by filling in paper copies, or by using a
computer connected to a projector (recommended).

 The HAZOP worksheet may be different depending on the scope

of the study – generally the following entries (columns) are
included
• Ref. no.
• Guidewords
• Deviations
• Possible causes
• Consequences
• Safeguards
• Actions required (or, recommendations)
• Actions allocated to (follow up responsibility)

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 Process HAZOP worksheet
Hazards and Operability Review
Project Name: Date: Page of
Process :
Section: Ref. Drawing:

Item Study Process Deviations Possible Possible Action

node Parameter (guide words) causes consequences Required

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 Principles of HAZOP
Concept
•Systems work well when operating under design conditions.
•Problems arise when deviations from design conditions occur.

Basis
•a word model, a process flow sheet (PFD) or a piping and instrumentation
diagram (P&ID)

Method
•use guide words to question every part of process to discover what deviations from the
intention of design can occur and what are their causes and consequences may be.
 PRINCIPLES OF HAZOPS

GUIDE WORDS*
NONE
MORE OF
LESS OF
PART OF
MORE THAN
OTHER

CAUSE DEVIATION CONSEQUENCES

(from standard (trivial, important,
condition catastrophic)
or intention) -hazard
-operating difficulties
*COVERING EVERY PARAMETER RELEVANT TO THE SYSTEM
UNDER REVIEW:
i.e. Flow Rate. Flow Quantity, Pressure, Temperature, Viscosity, Components
STUDY NODES
The locations (on P&ID or procedures) at which the process parameters are investigated for
deviations. These nodes are points where the process parameters (P, T, F etc.) have an
identified design intent.
INTENTION
The intention defines how the plant is expected to operate in the absence of
deviations at the study nodes.
DEVIATIONS

These are departures from the intension which can be discovered by systematically
applying the guide words.

•Process conditions
•activities
•substances
•time
•place
 GUIDE WORDS

Guide Words Meaning

No, None Negation of Intention
More Of Quantitative Increase
Less Of Quantitative Decrease
As Well As (More Than) Qualitative Increase
Part Of Qualitative Decrease
Reverse Logical Opposite of Intention
Other Than Complete Substitution
Deviations Generated by Each Guide Word

Guide word Deviations

NONE No forward flow when there should be, i.e. no flow.
More of any relevant physical property than there should
be, e.g. higher flow (rate or total quantity), higher
MORE OF temperature, higher pressure, higher viscosity, etc.
LESS OF Less of any relevant physical property than there should
be, e.g. lower flow (rate or total quantity), lower
temperature, lower pressure, etc.
PART OF Composition of system different from what it should be,
e.g. change in ratio of components, component missing,
ect.
MORE THAN More components present in the system than there
should be, e.g. extra phase present (vapour, solid),
impurities (air. Water, acids, corrosion products), etc.
OTHER THAN What else can happen apart from normal operation, e.g.
start-up, shutdown, uprating, low rate running,
alternative operation mode, failure of plant services,
maintenance, catalyst change, etc.

REVERSE: reverse flow

 Guidewords/ Keywords
The basic HAZOP guide-words are:
Guide-word Meaning
No (not, none) None of the design intent is achieved No flow when production is expected
More (more of, higher) Quantitative increase in a parameter
Less (less of, lower) Quantitative decrease in a
parameter
As well as (more than) An additional activity occurs
Part of Only some of the design intention is
achieved
Reverse Logical opposite of the design
intention occurs
Other than (Other) Complete substitution – another
activity takes place
Example
Higher temperature than desired
Lower pressure than normal
Other valves closed at the same time
(logic fault or human error)
Only part of the system is shut down
Back-flow when the system shuts
down
Liquids in the gas piping
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 Additional guidewords

Guide-word Meaning
Early/ late The timing is different from the intention

Before/ after The step (or part of it) is effected out of sequence

Faster/ slower The step is done/not done with the right timing

Where else Applicable for flows, transfer, sources and destinations

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 Process parameter

 Process parameter may generally be classified into the

following groups:
– Physical parameters related to input medium properties
– Physical parameters related to input medium conditions
– Physical parameters related to system dynamics
– Non-physical parameters related to batch type process
– Parameters related to system operations
These parameters are not necessarily used in conjunction with guide-words
• Instrumentation
• Relief
• Startup/ shutdown
• Maintenance
• Safety/ contingency
• Sampling

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 Examples of process parameter

Flow Composition pH
Pressure Addition Sequence
Temperature Separation Signal
Mixing Time Start/stop
Stirring Phase Operate
Transfer Speed Maintain
Level Particle size Service
Viscosity Measure Communication
Reaction Control Absorb

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 Examples of process parameter -2

Isolate Corrode Drain

Vent Erode Purge
Inspect Separate (settle, Maintain
filter, centrifuge

Start-up Reduce (grind, Shut-down

crush, etc)

74
 Guidewords + Parameter

Some examples of combinations of guide-words and parameters:

 NO FLOW
– Wrong flow path – blockage – incorrect slip plate – incorrectly fitted return valve –
burst pipe – large leak – equipment failure – incorrect pressure differential –
isolation in error
 MORE FLOW
– Increase pumping capacity – increased suction pressure – reduced delivery head –
greater fluid density – exchanger tube leaks – cross connection of systems – control
faults
 MORE TEMPERATURE
– Ambient conditions – failed exchanger tubes – fire situation – cooling water failure –
defective control – internal fires

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 Causes of Deviations – 3 Types

 Human error - which are acts of omission or commission by an operator, designer,

constructor or other person creating a hazard that could possibly result in a release
of hazardous or flammable material.
 Equipment failure - in which a mechanical, structural or operating failure results in
the release of hazardous or flammable material.
 External Events - in which items outside the unit being reviewed affect the
operation of the unit to the extent that the release of hazardous or flammable
material is possible. External events include upsets on adjacent units affecting the
safe operation of the unit (or node) being studied, loss of utilities, and exposure
from weather and seismic activity.

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 Consequences & Safeguards

 All consequences of any credible causes of a release that are

identified by the group must be determined in order to:
– help to determine a risk ranking in HAZOPs where multiple hazards are uncovered by
the group so that priority can be established in addressing the hazard.
– help make the determination as to whether a particular deviation results in an
operability problem or hazard.
 If the team concludes from the consequences that a particular
cause of a deviation results in an operability problem only, then the
discussion should end and the team should move on to the next
cause, deviation or node.
 If the team determines that the cause will result in the release of
hazardous or flammable material, then safeguards should be
identified.

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 Consequences & Safeguards

 Safeguards should be included whenever the team determines

that a combination of cause and consequence presents a credible
process hazard.

 What constitutes a safeguard can be summarized based on the

following general criteria:
• Those systems, engineered designs and written procedures that are designed
to prevent a catastrophic release of hazardous or flammable material.
• Those systems that are designed to detect and give early warning following
the initiating cause of a release of hazardous or flammable material.
• Those systems or written procedures that mitigate the consequences of a
release of hazardous or flammable material.

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 HAZOP Study Reporting
 The report must be placed with the HSE Assessment and Control of Work and will largely consist of the
record sheet(s), however, the following information should be included:

– An outline of the terms of reference and scope of the study.

– A very brief description of the process which was studied
– The procedures and protocol employed. The Keyword combinations applied should be listed,
together with the explanatory meanings given to the team at the start of the study. Also the fact
that Action Sheets have been produced and responses will be recorded should be explained. A
brief description of the Action File (described in the following section) should be included.
– General comments. If, for example, the team were assured that high point vents and low point
drains would be universally provided, mention that statement and its source. If certain details of
vendor packages were not available, explain and list the items which were not reviewed.
– Results. This usually states the number of recommended actions.
– Appendices:
• Master copies of the drawings studied.
• Copies of technical data used.
• Cause and Effect charts (i.e. matrices showing the executive action of safety related
instruments and trips).
• Any calculations produced.
• Relevant correspondence between departments, from contractor to vendor, or client to
contractor.
– HAZOP study record sheets

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 HAZOP Study Action Follow-up

 An addendum to the HAZOP report, to be issued

when the actions have been completed
 Deviations from the original intent should be noted
 Major changes may require a follow-up HAZOP study

80
HAZOP Exercise

81
Case Study – Shell & Tube Heat Exchanger

 Using relevant guide works, perform HAZOP study on shell & tube heat exchanger

Process
fluid

Cooling water

82
 HAZOP on Heat Exchanger – Answer 1

Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

Less Less flow of Pipe blockage Temperature of High Temperature
cooling water process fluid remains Alarm
constant
More More cooling Failure of Temperature of Low Temperature
flow cooling water process fluid Alarm
valve decrease
More of More pressure Failure of Bursting of tube Install high
on tube side process fluid pressure alarm
valve
Contamination Contamination Leakage of tube Contamination of Proper
of process and cooling process fluid maintainance
fluid line water goes in and operator
alert
Corrosion Corrosion of Hardness of Less cooling and Proper
tube cooling water crack of tube maintainence

83
 HAZOP on Heat Exchanger – Answer 2
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NONE No cooling water flow Failure of inlet cooling Process fluid temperature is Install Temperature
water valve to open not lowered accordingly indicator before and
after the process fluid
line
Install TAH

MORE More cooling water Failure of inlet cooling Output of Process fluid Install Temperature
flow water valve to close temperature too low indicator before and
after process fluid line
Install TAL

LESS Less cooling water Pipe leakage Process fluid temperature too Installation of flow meter
low

REVERSE Reverse process fluid Failure of process fluid Product off set Install check valve
flow inlet valve (whether it is crucial
have to check?)

CONTAMINATION Process fluid Contamination in cooling Outlet temperature too low Proper maintenance and
contamination water operator alert

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 B
A B

FB  F A C

The flowsheet shows that raw material streams A and B are transferred by
pump to a reactor, where they react to form product C. Assume that the
flow rate of B should not exceed that of A. Otherwise, an explosion may
occur. Let’s consider the flow of A in line 1:

NONE No flow of A
MORE Flow of A greater than design flow
LESS Flow of A less than design flow
AS WELL AS Transfer of some component additional to A
PART OF Failure to transfer a component of A
REVERSE Flow of A in a direction opposite to design direction
OTHER THAN Transfer of some material other than A
Beginning

1 Select a vessel

2 Explain the general intention of the vessel and its lines

3 Select a line

4 Explain the intention of the line

5 Apply the first guide words

6 Develop a meaningful deviation

7 Examine possible causes

8 Examine consequences

9 Detect hazards

10 Make suitable record

11 Repeat 6-10 for all meaningful deviations derived from first guide words
12 Repeat 5-11 for all the guide words
13 Mark line as having been examined
14 Repeat 3-13 for each line
15 Select an auxiliary system (e.g. Heating system)
16 Explain the intention of the auxiliary system
17 Repeat 5-12 for auxiliary system
18 Mark auxiliary as having been examined
19 Repeat 15-18 for all auxiliaries
20 Explain intention of the vessel
21 Repeat 5-12
22 Mark vessel as completed
23 Repeat 1-22 for all vessels on flow sheet
24 Mark flow sheet as completed
Figure 8.9 Hazard and operability studies : detailed sequence of examination
25 Repeat 1-24 for all flow sheets (Chemical Industry Safety and Health Council, 1977 Item 6)
End
 HAZOP DISPLAY

Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Action Required

No No Flow Pump Fail System Over- Shutdown
Heated System
Line Blockage
Operator
Stops Pump
More More Excessive Over-Cooled Product
Flow Pump Speed Product Unacceptable;
(Control System) (Incomplete Dump
Reaction)
EXAMPLE

An alkene/alkane fraction containing small amounts of suspended

water is continuously pumped from a bulk intermediate storage
tank via a half-mile pipeline into a buffer/settling tank where the
residual water is settled out prior to passing via a feed/product
heat exchanger and preheater to the reaction, is run off manually
from the settling tank at intervals. Residence time in the reaction
section must be held within closely defined limits to ensure
a d e q u a t e c o n v e r s i o n o f t h e
alkene and to avoid excessive formation of polymer.
 Results of hazard and operability study of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank

Guide word Deviation Possible causes Consequences Action required

NONE No flow (1)No hydrocarbon available
at intermediate storage.
(2)J1 pump fails (motor
fault, loss of drive,
impeller corroded away
etc.)
(3)Line blockage, isolation
valve closed in error, or
LCV fails shut.
(4)Line fracture
Loss of feed to reaction section
and reduced output.
Polymer formed in heat exchanger
under no flow conditions.
As for (1)
As for (1)
J1 pump overheats.
As for (1)
Hydrocarbon discharged into
area adjacent to public highway.
(a)Ensure good
communications with
intermediate storage
operator
(b)Install low level alarm
on settling tank LIC.
Covered by (b)
Covered by (b)
(c)Install kickback on J1
pump.
(d)Check design of J1
pump strainers.
Covered by (b)
(e)Institute regular
patrolling & inspection
of transfer line.

(1)
 Results of hazard and operability study of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank

Guide word Deviation Possible causes Consequences Action required

MORE OF More flow (5)LCV fails open or LCV
bypass open in error.
More pressure (6)Isolation valve closed in
error or LCV closes, with
J1 pump running.
(7)Thermal expansion in an
isolated valved section due
to fire or strong sunlight.
More (8)High intermediate storage
temperature temperature.
Settling tank overfills.
Incomplete separation of water
phase in tank, leading to
problems on reaction section.
Transfer line subjected to full
pump delivery or surge pressure.
Line fracture or flange leak.
Higher pressure in transfer line
and settling tank.
(f)Install high level alarm
on LIC and check
sizing of relief opposite
liquid overfilling.
(g)Institute locking off
procedure for LCV
bypass when not in use.
(h)Extend J2 pump suction
line to 12’’ above tank
base.
(j)Covered by (c) except
when kickback blocked
or isolated. Check line.
FQ and flange ratings
and reduce stroking
speed of LCV if
necessary. Install a PG
upstream of LCV and
an independent PG on
settling tank.
(k)Install thermal expansion
relief on valved section
(relief discharge route to
be decided later in study).
(l)Check whether there is
adequate warning of
high temperature at
intermediate storage. If
not, install.

(2)
 Results of hazard and operability atudy of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling
tank

Guide word Deviation Possible causes Consequences Action required

LESS OF Less flow (9)Leaking flange of valved Material loss adjacent to public Covered by (e) and the
stub not blanked and highway. checks in (j).
leaking.
Less (10)Winter conditions. Water sump and drain line (m)Lag water sump down
temperature freeze up. to drain valve and steam
trace drain valve and
drain line downstream.
PART OF High water (11)High water level in Water sump fills up more quickly. (n)Arrange for more frequent
concentration intermediate storage Increased chance of water phase draining off of water from
in stream. tank. passing to reaction section. intermediate storage tank.
Install high interface level
alarm on sump.
High concen- (12)Disturbance on distillation Higher system pressure. (p)Check that design of
tration of lower columns upstream of settling tank and associated
alkanes or intermediate storage. pipework, including relief
alkenes in stream. valve sizing, will cope with
sudden ingress of more
volatile hydrocarbons.
MORE Organic acids (13)As for (12) Increased rate of corrosion of (q)Check suitability of
THAN present tank base, sump and drain line. materials of construction.
OTHER Maintenance (14)Equipment failure, flange Line cannot be completely (r)Install low-point drain and
leak, etc. drained or purged. N2 purge point down-
Stream of LCV. Also
N2 vent on settling tank.

(3)
 Some References

 Frank P. Lees (1980). “Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. Hazard

Identification, Assessment and Control.” Volume 1. Butterworth & Co (Publishers)
Ltd.
 Frank P. Lees (1980). “Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. Hazard
Identification, Assessment and Control.” Volume 2. Butterworth & Co (Publishers)
Ltd.
 Frank Crawley, Malcolm Preston & Brian Tyler (2000). “HAZOP: Guide to best
practice. Guidelines to best practice for the process and chemical industries”.
Institution of Chemical Engineers, UK.
 Risk Management Group (1992). “Hazard & Operability Studies. Basic 2-day
Training Course Notes.” ICI Australia Engineering Pty Ltd.
 Marvin Rausand (2004). “HAZOP. Hazard and Operability Study.” Department of
Production and Quality Engineering, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.

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