Evidence Notes

I.
Nature, Scope and Function of Evidence
A. Proof of fact and of judicial truth
Rule 128, sec. 1 Evidence defined. — Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining
in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact.
Estrada v. Desierto and companion case, 353 SCRA 452 (2001)

—totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue. (Totality test)
Estrada v. Desierto and companion case, G.R. No. 146710-15,
Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration, April 3, 2001
Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd.v. CA, 342 SCRA 213 (2000)

—With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself
is the best evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best
evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.
People v. Base, 329 SCRA 158 (2000)

—“[a]n extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for
conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.”
— In this case the prosecution presented other evidence to prove the two elements of corpus
delicti, to wit: 1.] a certain result has been proven, i.e. a man has died; and 2.] some person is
criminally responsible.
People v. Vallejo, G.R.No.144656, May 9, 2002

—An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, provided sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused committed the crime.
—Requisites before circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction b e y o n d
reasonable doubt.
—Extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive
evidence showing that the declarant’s consent in executing the same has been vitiated, the confession
will be sustained.
Cf. - Lim v. CA, 270 SCRA 1(1997)

—DNA, being a relatively new science, it has not as yet been accorded official recognition by
our courts. Paternity will still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant
incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father.
People v. Campuhan, 329 SCRA 270 (2000)

—In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in
all respects complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter
disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or
even mischievous results.
People v. Castillo, 325 SCRA 613 (2000)

—If the means of proving a negative fact is equally within the control of each party, the burden
of proof is on the party averring said negative fact; If the nonexistence of some fact is a constituent
element of the crime, the onus is upon the State to prove this negative allegation of non-existence upon
the State to prove this negative allegation of non-existence.
—The first element·the existence of the firearm·was indubitably established by the
prosecution. Prosecution eyewitness Acaso saw appellant shoot the victim thrice with a .38 caliber
revolver. Appellant himself admitted that he did not turn over the gun to the security guards in the
building after the shooting. The same gun was recovered from the appellant and offered in evidence by
the prosecution. However, no proof was adduced by the prosecution to establish the second element of
the crime, i.e., that the appellant was not licensed to possess the firearm. This negative fact constitutes
an essential element of the crime as mere possession, by itself, is not an offense. The lack of a license
or permit should have been proved either by the testimony or certification of a representative of the
PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused was not a licensee of the subject firearm or that the
type of firearm involved can be lawfully possessed only by certain military personnel. Indeed, if the
means of proving a negative fact is equally within the control of each party, the burden of proof is on
the party averring said negative fact. As the Information alleged that the appellant possessed an
unlicensed gun, the prosecution is duty- bound to prove this allegation. It is the prosecution who has
the burden of establishing beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged, consistent
with the basic principle that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Thus, if the non-
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evidence/attygrandea/zlaspiñas
existence of some fact is a constituent element of the crime, the onus is upon the State to prove this
negative allegation of non-existence.
People v. Pascual, 331 SCRA 252 (2000)

—Paraffin Test; It is a well-settled rule that a negative paraffin test result is not a conclusive
proof that one has not fired a gun, because it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet bear no traces
of nitrates or gunpowder, as when the hands are bathed in perspiration or washed afterwards.
People v. Villanueva, 275 SCRA 489 (1997)

—Burden of Proof; Negative Facts; When a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff’s
case depends upon the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally
within the control of each party, then the burden of upon the party averring the negative.
People v. Malabago, 265 SCRA 198 (1996)

—In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused
and the deceased is the marriage certificate, and in the absence thereof, oral evidence of the fact of
marriage may be considered if such proof is not objected to.
People v. Pruna, G.R.No.138471, October 10, 2002

—The term „hearsay‰ as used in the law on evidence, signifies evidence which is not
founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited and which consequently
does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the confidence which the court may have
in him; its value, if any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third person not sworn as a
witness to that fact, and consequently not subject to cross-examination. If one therefore testifies to
facts which he learned from a third person not sworn as a witness to those facts, his testimony is
inadmissible as hearsay evidence. The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party
against whom the hearsay testimony is presented is deprived of the right or opportunity to cross-
examine the person to whom the statements are attributed. Moreover, the court is without opportunity
to test the credibility of hearsay statements by observing the demeanor of the person who made them.
B. Matters not requiring proof
1. Judicial Admissions
Rule 129, sec.4 Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission
was made.
Atillo III v. CA, 266 SCRA 596 (1997)

—As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a
judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof admits of two
exceptions:
1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and
2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to
contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission. „For instance, if a party
invokes an ‘admission’ by an adverse party, but cites the admission ‘out of context,’ then the
one making the admission may show that he made no ‘such’ admission, or that his admission
was taken out of context. This may be interpreted as to mean ‘not in the sense in which the
admission is made to appear.’ That is the reason for the modifier ‘such.’
2. Judicial Notice
Rule 129
Sec 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. —A court shall take judicial notice, without the
intrduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world
and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.
Sec 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. —A court may take judicial notice of matters which are
of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions.
Sec 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. —During the trial, the court, on its own initiative,
or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
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After the trial, and before judgment on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
People v. Cepeda, 324 SCRA 290 (2000)

— The Court has taken judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this country,
women by custom and tradition act with circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is observed so
that their reputation remains untainted.
People v. Cerbito, 324 SCRA 304 (2000)

— The value of jewelry is not a matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of
unquestionable demonstration and in the absence of receipts or any other competent evidence besides
the self-serving valuation made by the prosecution witness, the Court cannot award the reparation for a
watch taken.
Vinoya v. NLRC, 324 SCRA 469 (2000)

— Devaluation; The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that in 1993, the economic
situation in the country was not as adverse as the present, as shown by the devaluation of our peso.
Ditche v. CA, 327 SCRA 301(2000)

— The non- disclosure by witnesses to the police officers of the identity of the assailants
immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. The natural
reticence of most people to get involved in criminal prosecution against immediate neighbors, as in this
case, is of judicial notice.
BPI-Family Savings Bank v. CA, 330 SCRA 507(2000)

—As a rule, “courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding
the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge.” Be that as it
may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA
Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before this Court. Significantly, respondents do
not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the
contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take judicial notice thereof.
Salamera v. Sandiganbayan, 303 SCRA 217 (1999)

—One more point. Admittedly, there was no evidence submitted to the court of the value of
the gun to enable the court to fix the penalty to be imposed on the accused. Assuming that petitioner
malversed the gun, in malversation, the penalty for the offense is dependent on the value of the public
funds, money or property malversed. In this case, the Sandiganbayan did not base the penalty on the
minimum value of the gun in the absence of evidence of its true worth. It took judicial notice of its market
value and estimated its ‘reasonable value’ at P5,000.00. This is a grievous error. The Sandiganbayan could
not take judicial notice of the value of the gun. It must be duly proved in evidence as a fact. The court can
not take judicial notice of a disputed fact. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public
knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions. Otherwise, the court must receive evidence of disputed facts with notice to the
parties. This is an innovation introduced in the Revised Rules of Evidence the Supreme Court adopted on
July 1, 1989, which should not be unknown to the lower courts. The new rule of evidence governs this case,
since it was decided in 1995, six years after its effectivity.
People v. Tejero, 308 SCRA 660 (1999)

—The value of jewelry is not a matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable
demonstration and in the absence of receipts or any other competent evidence besides the self-serving
valuation made by the prosecution witnesses, the Court cannot award the reparation for the stolen jewelry.
PAL v. CA, 257 SCRA 33 (1996)

—Tipping, especially in a first-rate hotel, is an accepted practice, of which the Supreme Court
can take judicial notice.
Heirs of Canque v. CA, 275 SCRA 741 (1997)

—Every court must take cognizance of decisions the Supreme Court has rendered because
they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice and more importantly form part of the legal system;
Members of the bench have a responsibility to know and to apply the latest holdings of the Supreme Court.
Philsec Investment Corp. v. CA, 274 SCRA102 (1997)

—While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on
the ground of forum non conveniens, it should do so only after vital facts are established to
determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.·Nor is the trial court’s
refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under the principle of forum non conveniens.
First, a motion to dismiss is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, §1, which does not include
forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense. Second, while it is within
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the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do
so only after “vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances” require the
court’s desistance.
Mandarin Villa v. Ca, 257 SCRA 538 (1996)

—The Supreme Court takes judicial notice of the current practice among major
establishments to accept payment by means of credit cards in lieu of cash.
People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 (1995)

— An arraignment is null and void where the reading of the complaint or information to the
accused is not in the language or dialect known to him; Judicial notice is taken of the fact that
many Filipinos have limited understanding either of the Pilipino or English language.·The
arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed to follow section (1) (a) of
Rule 116 on arraignment. The reading of the complaint or information to the appellant in the
language or dialect known to him is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. It implements the constitutional right of an appellant „x x x to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. The new rule also responds to the reality that the
Philippines is a country divided by dialects and Pilipino as a national language is still in the
process of evolution. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that many Filipinos have limited
understanding either of the Pilipino or English language, our official languages for purposes of
communication and instruction. The importance of reading the complaint or information to the
appellant in the language or dialect known to him cannot thus be understated.
Metal Forming Corporation v. Office of the President, 247 SCRA (1995)

— Petitioner harps on the distinction between a tropical storm and a typhoon. Contrary to
petitionerÊs pretension, the phrase ‘against wind and storm pressure’ is not couched in specific terms
because as correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General·x x x in deciding whether or
not to buy the subject roof tiles being advertised by petitioner, it is reasonable to assume that buyers,
like private respondents, would consider (said) phrase x x x as referring to all kinds of weather
disturbances being experienced in our country during the rainy season, be it a mere tropical
depression, a storm or even a typhoon. In this regard, public respondent opined, which we sustain,
that·(Petitioner) cannot place undue reliance on the distinction between or among the terms ‘storm,’
‘typhoon’ or ‘cyclone’ because it itself had caused the misrepresentations to be couched in general
terms. Also, considering the weather situation in the country where storms and typhoons are not a rare
or unusual occurrence, these terms ought to, as they should only be, understood as comprehending and
referring practically to the same thing, at least insofar as the jural effects of misrepresentations
(petitioner’s) are concerned.
a. Mandatory judicial notice
Rule 129, Sec. 1

People v. Sevilleno, 305 SCRA 519 (1999)
— Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court requires courts to take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and geographical divisions of our country.·The court
below also erred in disregarding the testimony of Norma Baquia “for the reason that her testimony
failed to establish that the incident happened within the territorial jurisdiction of this court.” The
court did not consider her testimony purportedly because she only testified that her sister Virginia
went with the accused to Guindali-an without specifying as to what municipality or city it was part
of. Again, this is error. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court requires courts to take judicial
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and geographical divisions of our
country. There is only one Sitio Guindali-an, Brgy. Guadalupe, San Carlos City (Negros
Occidental).
b. Discretionary judicial notice
Rule 129, secs. 2-3

Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc. v. NLRC, 307 SCRA 131 (1999)
— This judicial notice, of course, rests on the assumption that the independent contractor is a
legitimate job contractor so that there can be no doubt as to the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between the contractor and the worker. In this situation, the only pertinent question that
may arise will no longer deal with whether there exists an employment bond but whether the
employee may be considered regular or casual as to deserve the application of Art. 280 of the Labor
Code.
3. Conclusive presumptions
Rule 131, sec. 2 Conclusive presumptions. —The following are instances of conclusive
presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately
led another to believe a particular things is true, and to act upon such, ge cannot, in any litigation
arising out od such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
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(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord att he time of the commencement
of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
4. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy, 341 SCRA 760 (2000)

— There is a case when expert testimony may be dispensed with, and that is under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. As held in Ramos v. Court of Appeals : Although generally, expert medical testimony is
relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated
from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the
need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such
matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common
knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only
physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been
treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements
and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by
any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable,
the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the
aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper
standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have
occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise
to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required
to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the
patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury
sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert
medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is
no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury
suffered by him.
C. Uniform procedure and applicability
Rule 128, sec. 2 Scope. — The rules of evidence shall the same in all courts and in all trials and
hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules.
II. Fundamental Concepts in Evidence
A. Admissibility
Rule 128, sec. 3 Admissibility of evidence. —Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and
is not excluded by the law or these rules.
Rule 3, sec. 2, Electronic Evidence Rule

SEC. 2. Admissibility. – An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules
on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner
prescribed by these Rules.
i.Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)

— Illegally seized documents are not admissible in evidence.·The Moncado ruling, that illegally
seized documents, papers and things are admissible in evidence, must be abandoned. The exclusion of
such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The non- exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. If there is competent evidence to establish
probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended,
then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the constitutional requirements If he
has no such evidence, then it is not possible for the judge to find that there is a probable cause, and,
hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation for the issuance
in that case is the necessity of fishing for evidence of the commission of a crime. Such a fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Cf. (1) Credibility

(2) Probative value/ weight
1. Conditional Admissibility — Evidence appears to be immaterial is

admitted by the court subject to the condition that its connection with another fact
subsequent to be proved will be established. Otherwise, such fact already received will
be stricken off the record at the initiative of the adverse party.
2. Multiple Admissibility — Evidence that is plainly relevant and competent for two or
more purposes will be received if it satisfies all the requirements prescribed by law in
order that it may be admissible for the purpose for which it is presented, even if it does
not satisfy the other requisites of admissibility for other purposes.
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ii. People v. Porras, 255 SCRA 514 (1996)
— The established rule of evidence is that inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution
witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of
their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimony.·At any rate, the alleged inconsistency
just discussed, which was shown to be otherwise, is neither substantial nor of such nature to cast a
serious doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The established rule of evidence is that
inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their
testimony. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, if only in minor details, reinforce rather
than weaken their credibility, for it is usual that witnesses to a stirring event should see differently
some details of a startling occurrence. Discrepancies on minor details, which do not destroy the
substance of the witnessÊ testimony show that the witness was not rehearsed.
iii. People v. Lapay, 298 SCRA 62 (1998)

— Findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
are entitled to great respect.·It is axiomatic that findings of the trial court with respect to the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal, absent any proof that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case.
We find no reason to depart from this rule.
—Delay in revealing the names of the malefactors does not, by itself, impair the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies.
—Courts should consider a piece of evidence only for the purpose for which it was
offered.·Courts should consider a piece of evidence only for the purpose for which it was
offered. In this case, appellant argues that the said document should have been admitted for the
sole purpose of proving that such counter-affidavit was executed. The counter-affidavit,
therefore, should not have been used for the purpose specified by the defense counsel during the
trial: to “disprove the testimony of Cornelio Valencia” or, as he subsequently declared in the
Appellant’s Brief, to corroborate the testimony of Defense Witness Santillan. For the court to
consider the substance of the counter-affidavit is to give probative value to the statements of an
affiant who could no longer be subjected to cross-examination, in violation of the hearsay rule.
B. Relevance
Rule 128, sec. 4; Cf. Materiality

Relevancy; collateral matters. —Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except
when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
C. Competency
Rule 128, sec. 3 Admissibility if evidence. —Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.
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D. Burden of Proof vs Burden of Evidence
BURDEN OF PROOF BURDEN OF EVIDENCE

Definition
It is the duty of a party to present evidence It is the duty of a party to provide evidence at
on the facts in issue necessary to establish his any stage of the trial until he has established
claim or defense by the amount of evidence a prima facie case, or the like duty of the
required by law (Sec. 1, Rule 131) adverse party to meet and overthrow that
prima facie case thus established. In both
civil and criminal cases, the burden of
evidence lies on the party who asserts an
affirmative allegation. (Regalado, Vol. II, p.
817, 2008 ed.)
Whether it shifts throughout the proceedings
Does not shift as it remains throughout the Shifts to the other party when one party has
entire case exactly where the pleadings produced sufficient evidence to be entitled to
originally placed it. a ruling in his favor
What determines it
Generally determined by the pleadings filed Generally determined by the developments at
by the party; and whoever asserts the the trial, or by the provisions of the
affirmative of the issue has the burden of substantive law or procedural rules which
proof. may relieve the party from presenting
evidence on the fact alleged.
Effect of a legal presumption
It does not shift the burden of proof. It creates a prima facie case and thereby
However, the one who has the burden of sustains the said burden of evidence on the
proof is relieved from the time being, from point which it covers, shifting it to the other
introducing evidence in support of his party. It relieves those favored thereby of the
averment because the presumption stands in burden of proving the fact presumed.
the place of evidence. (Francisco, p. 356,
1992 ed.)
Rule 128, sec. 1 Evidence defined. —Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining
in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact.
Rule 131, sec. 1 Burden of proof. —Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the
facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
Rule 133, secs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Sec 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. —In civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances
of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider
the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
Sec 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. —In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree
of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. —An extrajudicial confession
made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti (body of the crime).
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. —Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the interferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstance is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
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Sec 5. Substantial evidence. — In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may
be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Labor Code, Art. 277 (b) (now 292)

…The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the
employer.
RA 7080 —AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER sec
4 vis sec 2
Section 4. Rule of Evidence - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates
or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Seventy-five
million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by life
imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification from holding any public office. Any person who
participated with said public officer in the commission of plunder shall likewise be punished. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or investment thereof
forfeited in favor of the State.
RA 8493 — AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES

sec.7, par. 2 If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she
interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require
the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence.
Aklan Cooperative Inc. v. NLRC, 323 SCRA 258 (2000)

—Factual findings of administrative agencies are not infallible and will be set aside when they fail the
test of arbitrariness; Where the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission contradict those of the
labor arbiter, the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may look into the records of the case
and reexamine the questioned findings. Our query is limited to the determination of whether or not public
respondent NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
assailed resolutions.
People v. Rafales, 323 SCRA 13 (2000)

—Guiding principles in reviewing rape cases.·In the review of rape cases, we are always guided by the
following principles:
(1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility since it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it;
(2) by reason of the intrinsic nature of rape, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and
(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its merits and it cannot draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
—In rape cases, young girls usually conceal for sometime their ordeals due to the threats made by their
assailants.
People v. Pantorilla, 322 SCRA 337 (2000)

— The rule is well-settled that when an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of evidence to prove
his claim shifts to him. It is incumbent upon him to show the concurrent presence of all the elements of self-
defense, namely,
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element, whether in complete or incomplete self-defense. He

must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if
weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused admitted to the killing.
People v. Villar, 322 SCRA 393 (2000)

—The fundamental rule is that upon him who alleges rests the burden of proof.·We find no competent
evidence showing that the victim exhibited no unusual behavior during the one-year period that she was being
sexually abused by accused-appellant. The lack of concrete evidence of any unusual behavior on record does
not prove that there was in fact no such unusual behavior. If accused- appellant wanted the court to consider
such an allegation, it was incumbent upon him to prove the same with competent evidence. The fundamental
"8
rule is that upon him who alleges rests the burden of proof. He cannot simply rely on the lack of evidence
showing the contrary.
E. Proof vis Presumptions
(1) Conclusive presumptions

Rule 131, sec.2 Conclusive presumptions. —The following are instances of conclusive
presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately
led another to believe a particular things is true, and to act upon such, he cannot, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord att he time of the commencement
of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
(2) Disputable presumptions
Rule 131, sec.3 Disputable presumptions. —The following presumptions are satisfactory if
contradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime of wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a things delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later ones is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing takes in the doing of a recent wrongful act is
the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises
acts of ownership over, are owned by him;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of the money or
delivered the thing accordingly;
(l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elesewhere was acting the
lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon
by it; and in like manner that all matters within in an issue raised in a dispute submitted for
arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That an ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for the contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
(t) That an indorsement of a negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was
overdue and at the place where the instrument is dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter was duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of 10 years. If he disappeared after the age of 75 years, an absence of 5 years in order that his
succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate
among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft which is
missing who has not been heard of for 4 years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has
been missing for 4 years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose
existence has not been known for 4 years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for 4 consecutive years, the spouse present
may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead. In case of disappearance, where there is danger of death under the circumstances
hereinabove provided, an absence of only 2 years shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for a declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of re-appearance of the absent spouse.
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the
law or fact;
"9
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life;
(z) That persons acting as co-partners have entered into a contract of co-patnership;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and
who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry;
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each
other and who have acquired property through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit are equal;
(dd) That if the marriage terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within 300
days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to
the contrary:
1. A child born before 180 days after solemnization of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within
300 days after the termination of the former marriage;
2. A child born after 180 days following the celebration if the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within 300
days after the termination of the former marriage.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority,
was so printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting to contain reports of cases adjudged in
tribunals of the country where the book is published, contained correct reports of such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular
person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such
person or his successor in interest;
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when 2 persons perish in the same calamity, such as
wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities
resulting from the strength and age of sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of 15 years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of 60, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under 15 and the other above 60, the formed is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over 15 and under 60 and the sex be different, the male is deemed to
have survived; if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under 15 or over 60, and the other between those ages, the latter is
deemed to have survived.
(kk) That there is doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other,
as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the
same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time.
Rule 6, secs. 3, 4, Electronic Evidence Rule

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions relation to electronic signature. – Upon the authentication of
an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that:
(a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating or
approving the electronic document to which it is related or to indicate such person’s consent to the
transaction embodied therein; and
(c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verity the electronic signature operated without
error or fault.
SEC. 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. – Upon the authentication of a

digital signature, it shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the immediately preceding
section, that:
(a) The information contained in a certificate is correct;

(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate;
(c) The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the time it was
signed; and
(d) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein  
"10
People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 (1995)
—Presumption of Innocence; When life is at stake, the Court cannot lean on the rebuttable
presumption that the arraignment of the accused was regularly conducted.·One need not draw a picture
to show that the arraignment of the appellant is a nullity. It violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule
implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged
that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at
stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. We cannot assume. We must be sure.
Cleofas v. St. Peter Memorial Park, 324 SCRA 223 (2000)

—The custody to be shown for the purpose of making a document evidence without proof of
execution is not necessarily that of the person strictly entitled to the possession of the said document·it is
enough that if the person in whose custody the document is found is so connected with the document that
he may reasonably be supposed to be in possession of it without fraud.
—Absent any evidence that the thumbmark purporting to be that of the assignor in the
Assignment of Certificate of Sale is not really his, the presumption of law that the transfer transaction
evidenced thereby was fair and regular must stand, more so when the document was acknowledged
before a notary public and was, furthermore, the basis of several acts of public officers.·The fact that the
deed of assignment contain only a thumbmark of Antonio Cleofas is not indicative of the document’s
spuriousness. Petitioners failed to present evidence to prove that the thumbmark appearing in the deed of
assignment is not that of Antonio Cleofas. Petitioners merely relied on the fact that in the Sales
Certificate No. 923, Antonio Cleofas signed his name. Thus, we agree with the trial court’s observation
that: “x x x, absent any evidence that the thumbmark purporting to be Antonio Cleofas’ in the
Assignment of Certificate of Sale (Exh. ‘I’) is not really his, the presumption of law that the transfer
transaction evidenced thereby was fair and regular must stand, more so when the document was
acknowledged before a notary public and was, furthermore, the basis of several acts of public officers.”
(3) “Judge-made” presumptions
People v. Barita, 325 SCRA 22 (2000)

—We are not persuaded by the claim of accused-appellants that in order for them to be
convicted of selling 2,800 grams of marijuana, the whole specimen must be tested considering that
Republic Act 7659 imposes a penalty dependent on the amount or the quantity of drugs seized or taken.
This Court has ruled that a sample taken from one of the packages is logically presumed to be
representative of the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by accused-appellant.
People v. Naag, 322 SCRA 716 (2000)

Res gestae — a declaration that is uttered so closely to the occurrence of an event that it can
be used to prove that the event actually happened.
—The court noted that accused-appellant’s name was mentioned several times by Rosita
Fontelera as she was dying and that accused-appellant fled.
People v. Caballes, 274 SCRA 83 (1997)

—Indeed, no young woman of decent repute would publicly expose herself to the shame and
embarrassment of admitting having been sexually abused by two men successively within each other’s
full view if such were not the truth. No ulterior motive was offered by the appellant to explain why
Miguela would falsely charge him with the serious offense. Neither did appellant attempt to explain the
disparity between his testimony and that of his co-accused, a disparity which supported the victim’s
contentions. The only logical conclusion is that no other reason impelled the complaining witness to
come to court than to seek justice for the dastardly crime committed against her virtue. Even her sole
testimony which is credible suffices to make a conviction, for when a woman says that she has been
raped, she almost always says it all.
Ong v. CA, 272 SCRA 725 (1997)

—Indeed, the evidence for petitioner does not show that Manuel Ong was sterile and could
not have begotten private respondents or that even if he was so during the war that he could not have
been cured ten years later of that condition when Alfredo Ong, Jr. was conceived. On the other hand, as
this Court has ruled an adult male is presumed to have normal powers of virility and the burden of
evidence to prove the contrary rests upon him who claims otherwise. Petitioner has not overcome this
presumption.
People v. Abordo, 258 SCRA 571 (1996)

—It is not impossible to commit rape in a small room even if there are several other persons
in it. ·We have had cases showing that fear of discovery or the possible appearance of other people
does not necessarily deter the commission of rape. In People v. Opeña, 102 SCRA 755 (1981), we said
that it is not impossible to commit rape in a small room even if there are several other persons in it.
Lust does not respect either time or place.
People v. Cabillan, 267 SCRA 258 (1997)

— The Court rejects the argument of accused-appellant that the rape could not have been
committed without thereby courting the curiosity of neighbors who live nearby. Lust is no respecter of
"11
time and precinct; it can be committed in most unlikely places such as in a park, along a roadside,
within school premises, or even in an occupied room.
People v, San Juan, 270 SCRA 693 (1997)

— The mere fact that 26-year old Vivian had the mental development of a child 5 years and 10
months old does not lessen her credibility, since she has shown her ability to communicate her ordeal
clearly and consistently. Her steadfast account of the rape both on direct and cross examination are
replete with details that jibe on material points. Moreover, her testimony, taken together with her
father’s, paints a convincing picture of the whole sordid incident. Her positive identification of
Rodolfo San Juan as the one who raped her is credible because she knew and recognized Appellant San
Juan, her neighbor.
— Court is convinced that the reaction of Vicente and his son, Junior, when they witnessed the
rape of Vivian, is not contrary to human experience as to be unbelievable. We have repeatedly ruled
that “the workings of the human mind placed under a great deal of emotional and psychological stress
(such as during rape) are unpredictable, and different people react differently. There is no standard
form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, frightful or
traumatic experience·some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility.”
People v. Monfero, 308 SCRA 396 (1999)

— In rape cases, it is not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death·physical
resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter
submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s embrace because of fear for life and personal safety.
(4) Presumptions created special laws
• SC A.M. No. 00-04-07SC [“Child Witness Rule”], sec. 6
Section 6. Competency. Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. However, the court shall conduct a
competency examination of a child, motu proprio or on motion of a party, when it finds that substantial doubt
exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or
appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court.
(a) Proof of necessity. A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of necessity of competency
examination. The age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency examination.
(b) Burden of proof. To rebut the presumption of competence enjoyed by a child, the burden of proof lies on the
party challenging his competence.
(c) Persons allowed at competency examination. Only the following are allowed to attend a competency
examination:
(1) The judge and necessary court personnel; 
(2) The counsel for the parties; 
(3) The guardian ad litem; 
(4) One or more support persons for the child; and 
(5) The defendant, unless the court determines that competence can be fully evaluated in his absence.
(d) Conduct of examination. Examination of a child as to his competence shall be conducted only by the
judge. Counsel for the parties, however, can submit questions to the judge that he may, in his discretion, ask the
child.
(e) Developmentally appropriate questions. The questions asked at the competency examination shall be
appropriate to the age and developmental level of the child; shall not be related to the issues at trial; and shall
focus on the ability of the child to remember, communicate, distinguish between truth and falsehood, and
appreciate the duty to testify truthfully.
(f) Continuing duty to assess competence. The court has the duty of continuously assessing the competence of
the child throughout his testimony.
• RA 1379, sec. 2 — AN ACT DECLARING FORFEITURE IN FAVOR OF THE STATE ANY

PROPERTY FOUND TO HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY ANY PUBLIC
OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AND PROVIDING FOR THE PROCEEDINGS THEREFOR.
Section 2. Filing of petition. — Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during
his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor General, upon complaint by any taxpayer to the city or
provincial fiscal who shall conduct a previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in
criminal cases and shall certify to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable ground to believe
that there has been committed a violation of this Act and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, shall file, in the name and on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, in the Court of
First Instance of the city or province where said public officer or employee resides or holds
office, a petition for a writ commanding said officer or employee to show cause why the
property aforesaid, or any part thereof, should not be declared property of the State: Provided,
"12
That no such petition shall be filed within one year before any general election or within three
months before any special election.
The resignation, dismissal or separation of the officer or employee from his office or
employment in the Government or in the Government-owned or controlled corporation shall not
be a bar to the filing of the petition: Provided, however, That the right to file such petition shall
prescribe after four years from the date of the resignation, dismissal or separation or expiration
of the term of the officer or employee concerned, except as to those who have ceased to hold
office within ten years prior to the approval of this Act, in which case the proceedings shall
prescribe after four years from the approval hereof.
• PD 1866 (as amended by RA 8294), secs. 2, 4 —CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/

UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR
DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS,
SEC. 2. Presumption of Illegal Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. – The possession of

any machinery, tool or instrument used directly in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition,
by any person whose business or employment does not lawfully deal with the manufacture of
firearms or ammunition, shall be prima facie evidence that such article is intended to be used in
the unlawful/illegal manufacture of firearms or ammunition.
SEC. 4. Presumption of Unlawful Manufacture. – The possession of any machinery, tool or

instrument directly used in the manufacture of explosives, by any person whose business or
employment does not lawfully deal with the manufacture of explosives shall be prima facie
evidence that such article is intended to be used in the unlawful/illegal manufacture of
explosives.
May husband be convicted if firearm is found in the ceiling of a kitchen?
F. Functional Equivalence
Rule 3, Electronic Evidence Rule

ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
SECTION 1. Electronic documents as functional equivalent of paper-based documents. – Whenever a

rule of evidence refers to the term of writing, document, record, instrument, memorandum or any other
form of writing, such term shall be deemed to include an electronic document as defined in these
Rules.
SEC. 2. Admissibility. – An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules
on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner
SEC. 3. Privileged communication. – The confidential character of a privileged communications is not

solely on the ground that it is in the form of an electronic document.
G. Conflict between physical & testimonial evidence & between affidavit & testimony in open court
Jose v. CA, 322 SCRA 25 (2000)

—Where the physical evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution witnesses, physical evidence should prevail.·The trial court was justified in relying on the
photographs rather than on Rommel Abraham’s testimony which was obviously biased and
unsupported by any other evidence. Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth,
and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases such as murder or rape
where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions, relied
principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth.
People v. Laganto, 326 SCRA 693 (2000)

—In case of conflict between the contents of a sworn statement and testimony in open court,
the latter generally prevails since ex parte affidavits are often incomplete and inaccurate because by
their nature, they are ordinarily prepared by a person other than the affiant.·–Barlam’s testimony, in
our opinion, adequately established the liability of Lagunday, LAGARTO, and CORDERO for raping
and killing Angel Alquiza. She not only proved to be competent but also truthful in her narration of
what transpired on 2 August 1994. Her sworn statement might not entirely jibe with her oral testimony,
but we have ruled that in case of conflict between the contents of a sworn statement and testimony in
open court, the latter generally prevails since ex parte affidavits are often incomplete and inaccurate
because by their nature, they are ordinarily prepared by a person other than the affiant.
"13
Santos v. Sandiganbayan, 347 SCRA 374 (2000)
— It is settled that once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the
constitutional requirement on pre- interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the
declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. The defense attempted to
prove that Valentino and petitioner Estacio were subjected to threats and intimidation at the NBI to obtain their
confessions. Other than their bare assertions, Valentino and petitioner Estacio miserably failed to present any
convincing evidence to prove the NBI’s use of force or intimidation on their persons. Before signing their
statements, they never protested against any form of intimidation, much more, of maltreatment that they could
have relayed to relatives visiting them at the NBI.
III. Constitutional Exclusionary Rules
A. Violations of the rights against unreasonable searches & seizures &

privacy of communication & correspondence
Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 3 (2) vis sec. 2 and 3 (1)
Sec 3 (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
Republic Act No. 4200 —Anti-Wiretapping Law
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS
OF THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known
as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or
copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act
in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate
the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or
partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil,
criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the
acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following section or of
any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished
by imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of
the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.
Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer,
who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two
preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of
war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code,
and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national
"14
security: Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is
being committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of
rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit
sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of
sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the
prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such
evidence.
The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose communications,
conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of
telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its location;
(2) the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications,
conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented;
and (4) the period of the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order
which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the
court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.
All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the period
fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be accompanied
by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and
times covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit, and certifying
that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates
or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court. The envelope or package so
deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents revealed, except
upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be
heard to the person or persons whose conversation or communications have been recorded.
The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance within whose
territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed.
Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in
violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
B. Violations of the right to counsel and right against self-incrimination
Const. (1987), art III, sec. 12 (3) vis secs. 12 and 17
• 12(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
• Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
People v. Suarez, 267 SCRA 119 (1997)

—Extrajudicial Confessions; Hearsay Rule; Res Inter Alios Acta Rule; Doctrine of
Interlocking Confessions; Although an extrajudicial confession is admissible only against the confessant,
jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of
his co- accused.·It is important to note at the outset that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the judgment
of conviction imposed upon Suarez and Reyes for they have not filed any notice of appeal for themselves.
And while we are cognizant of the rule that the right to claim the inadmissibility of an extrajudicial
confession is personal in nature, in the sense that only the confessant whose rights during an investigation
were violated can raise an objection, we deem it necessary to discuss in this appeal the circumstances
surrounding the execution of ReyesÊ sworn statement in evaluating appellant LaraÊs own extra curia
declaration. Although an extrajudicial confession is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence
makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused.
"15
—The doctrine of interlocking confessions has been accepted and recognized as an exception
to the res inter alios acta rule and the hearsay rule; Where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence
to show the probability of participation by an accused co-conspirator, that confession is receivable as
evidence against him.·The lower court treated the confessions of the three accused as interlocking confessions
sufficient to corroborate and bolster the truth of each accused’s own incriminating statements. This doctrine
of interlocking confessions has been accepted and recognized in numerous decisions of this Court as an
exception to the res inter alios acta rule and the hearsay rule. ReyesÊ confession is thus admissible against
Lara to show the probable involvement of the latter in the perpetration of the crime. Where the confession is
used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by an accused co-conspirator, that
confession is receivable as evidence against him.
—Extrajudicial confessions independently made without collusion, almost identical with
each other in their essential details which could have been known only to the declarants, and corroborated by
other evidence against the person or persons implicated to show the probability of the latterÊs actual
participation in the commission of the crime are impressed with features of voluntariness in their execution
Zulueta v. CA, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)

—the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbandÊs infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any
purpose in any proceeding.”
People v. Salcedo, 273 SCRA 473 (1997)

—The failure of police investigators to inform the accused of his right to remain silent,
coupled with the denial of his right to a competent and independent counsel or the absence of effective legal
assistance when he waived his constitutional rights, render his confession inadmissible. ·Significantly, the
absence of counsel at the time of the investigation of the three above-named appellants was confirmed by the
police investigator himself. Under these circumstances, this Court is left with no choice but to exclude the
sworn statements of Laurio, Sual, Jr. and Banculo from the evidence against them.
— In further ensuring the right to counsel of the person being investigated, it is not enough
that the subject be informed of that right; he should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of the
same and should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one will be
provided him at his request. If he decides not to retain a counsel of his choice or avail himself of one to be
provided him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective,
must be made with the assistance of counsel.
People v. Aringue, 283 SCRA 291 (1997)

—A confession made by a suspect to a radio reporter is admissible against him.·While
detained at the Butuan City Jail, Cabal freely admitted his complicity to radio reporter, Vicente „Boy‰
Montederamos. * * * His confession to Montederamos, a private person, is admissible against him, not
having been extracted under custodial investigation.
C. Effects of uncounselled extrajudicial confessions to media
People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 (1997)

—When the accused talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement
officer, his uncounselled confession did not violate his constitutional rights.·The police detained appellant after
his initial confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor
and requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and appellant confessed that he alone committed the
crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. x x x Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that
appellant’s confession before the mayor is inadmissible.
People v. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1 (1999)

—A confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not shown that said reporter
was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that the
suspect confessed to the killing out of fear.· Accused-appellant contends that „it is . . . not altogether improbable
for the police investigators to ask the police reporter (Manuel) to try to elicit some incriminating information
from the accused.‰ This is pure conjecture. Although he testified that he had interviewed inmates before, there
is no evidence to show that Celso was a police beat reporter. Even assuming that he was, it has not been shown
that, in conducting the interview in question, his purpose was to elicit incriminating information from accused-
appellant. To the contrary, the media are known to take an opposite stance against the government by exposing
official wrongdoings. Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or that the
interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant confessed to the
killing out of fear. As already stated, the interview was conducted on October 23, 1996, 6 days after accused-
appellant had already confessed to the killing to the police.
But cf. People v. Morada, 307 SCRA 362 (1999)
"16
IV. Types and Sources of Evidence
A. Objects
1. General Rule
Rule 130, sec 1 Object as evidence. — Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of
the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or
viewed by the court.
Rule 128, sec. 4

Sec. 4 . Relevancy; collateral matters. — Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be
allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue. (4a)
People v. Vasquez, 280 SCRA 160 (1997)

—the study of forensic medicine tells us that the appearances of drowning are the
same whether the deceased fell in (i.e., accidental drowning), jumped in (i.e., suicidal drowning)
or was thrown into the water (homicidal drowning). So, the circumstances of the case will
decide the question as to the real cause of death when oneÊs body is fished out of a body of
water. Telltale external evidence decides whether injuries were inflicted before drowning or the
drowning was the cause of death.
People v. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167 (1996)

—Where entries in the police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the
uncontroverted testimony of a witness, the presentation of the police blotter as evidence is not
indispensable.·Next, appellant derided the nonpresentation by the prosecution of the police
blotter which could prove if appellant was indeed implicated right away by Batin to the crime.
We do not believe, however, that it was necessary for the prosecution to present as evidence a
copy of the aforementioned police blotter. Neither was its non-presentation in court fatal to the
prosecutionÊs case. Entries in the police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the
uncontroverted testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime
before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as evidence is not indispensable. Besides, if
appellant believed that he was not identified therein, then he should have secured a copy thereof
from the Silago Police Station and utilized the same as controverting evidence to impeach
BatinÊs credibility as witness. Having failed to do so, appellant cannot now pass the blame on
the prosecution for something which appellant himself should have done.
2. Types of object evidence
a. Instruments and articles
People v. Baniel, 275 SCRA 472 (1997)

—The nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim belie the
assertion of self- defense. The necropsy report of the examining physician stated that the
victim suffered stabbed, incised and hacked wounds on the vital parts of his body from the
neck to the chest, stomach, arms and back near the hipline. The gravity of these wounds is
indicative of a determined effort to kill and not just to defend. (narrow knife, victim died of
bleeding)
b. Documents and signatures
Rule 130, secs. 2, 3, 4
Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. —Document as evidence consist of writings or any material

containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written expressions
offered as proof of their contents.
Best Evidence Rule

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. —When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offerer;
"17
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
Sec. 4. Original of document. —

(a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in 2 or more copies executed at or about the same time, with
identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied
from another at or near the time fo transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded
as originals.
Rule 130, sec. 9

Parole Evidence Rule
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. —When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
A. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
B. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;
C. The validity of the written agreement; or
D. The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after
the execution of the written agreement.
The term “agreement” includes wills.
RA 8792 (Electronic Commerce Act), secs. 5

(c) "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or
stored by electronic, optical or similar means.
(e) "Electronic Signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound
in electronic form, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated
with the electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedures
employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention
of authenticating or approving an electronic data message or electronic document.
(f) "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information,
data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be prove and affirmed, which is receive, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
secs. 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, and 15
Electronic Evidence Rule, Rule 2, sec. 1 (h), (g), (j), (k), and (e)
(g) “Electronic data message” refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by
electronic, optical or similar means.
(h) “Electronic document” refers to information or the representation of information, data,

figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a
right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed,
which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It
includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means,
which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these
Rules, the term “electronic document” may be used interchangeably with electronic data message”.
(j) “Electronic signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristics and/or sound in
electronic form. Representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the
electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedure employed or adopted
by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating, signing or
approving an electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, an
electronic signature includes digital signatures.
(k) “Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text

messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.
"18
(e) “Digital Signature” refers to an electronic signature consisting of a transformation of an
electronic document or an electronic data message using an asymmetric or public cryptosystem such
that a person having the initial untransformed electronic document and the signer’s public key can
accurately determine:
(i) whether the transformation was created using the private key that
corresponds to the signer’s public key; and
(ii) whether the initial electronic document had been altered after the
transformation was made.
c. Persons
(1) Physical examination
US v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 (1912)
US v. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil.735 (1917)

—The main purpose of the constitutional provision against compelling a person in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral
examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in the
commission of a crime.  
—Forcing an accused to discharge morphine from his mouth is not compelling him
to be a witness against himself.
Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil.62 (1920)

—On a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of
the body of the accused is permissible.
(2) Examination of persons for identification or other relevant purposes

(3) Measuring and photographing body or parts thereof
(4) Psychological and mental examination
(5) Drug and alcohol testing
Skinner v. Rallway, Labor Executives Association, 103 L. Ed 2d 639 (1989)
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 103 L. Ed 2d 685 (1989)
Blustein v. Skinner, 908 F. 2d 451 (9th Cir., 1990)
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Department of Transportation, 932 F. 2d
1291 (9th Cir., 1991)
Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F. 2d 769 (7th Cir., 1991)
d. Photographs
Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58(1995)

—The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must
be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances
under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a
correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by
its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime.
—Even if the person who took the photographs was not presented to identify them,
the use of said photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation
in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof.
People V. Medrana, 110 SCRA 130 (1981)

—Failure of witness to recognize pictures of appellant in the newspapers cannot
be given importance where even the appellant himself could not be sure of them.
e. Experiments
US v. Tegrado, 36 Phil, 789 (1917)
f. Taped conversations
RA 4200, secs. 1, 3, and 4

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
"19
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions
thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of
offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable
for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of
the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes
of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the
high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the
Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage
and other offenses against national security: Provided, That such written order shall only be
issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of
the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is
being committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving
the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be
granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have
actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of,
or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily
available for obtaining such evidence.
The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose
communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard,
intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the
telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its location; (2) the identity of the
peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications,
conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense or offenses committed or
sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the authorization. The authorization shall be
effective for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from
the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court upon being
satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.
All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the
expiration of the period fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope
or sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted
such authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times covered by each
recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit, and certifying that
no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all
such duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court.
The envelope or package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or
used in evidence, or their contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not
be granted except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or
persons whose conversation or communications have been recorded.
The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance
within whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be
executed.
Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,

purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this
Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Child Witness Rule, sec. 29
Sec . 29. Admissibility of videotaped and audiotaped in-depth investigative or disclosure

interviews in child abuse cases.— The court may admit videotape and audiotape in-depth
investigative or disclosure interviews as evidence, under the following conditions:
(a) The child witness is unable to testify in court on grounds and under conditions
established under Section 28 (c)
(b) The interview of the child was conducted by duly trained members of a
multidisciplinary team or representatives of law enforcement or child protective services in
situations where child abuse is suspected so as to determine whether child abuse occurred.
(c) The party offering the videotape or audiotape must prove that:
(1) the videotape or audiotape discloses the identity of all individuals present and at
all times includes their images and voices;
"20
(2) the statement was not made in response to questioning calculated to lead the child
to make a particular statement or is clearly shown to be the statement of the child and
not the product of improper suggestion;
(3) the videotape and audiotape machine or device was capable of recording
testimony;
(4) the person operating the device was competent to operate it;
(5) the videotape or audiotape is authentic and correct; and
(6) it has been duly preserved.
The individual conducting the interview of the child shall be available at trial for examination by any
party. Before the videotape or audiotape is offered in evidence, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity to
view or listen to it and shall be furnished a copy of a written transcript of the proceedings.
The fact that an investigative interview is not videotaped or audiotaped as required by this Section shall
not by itself constitute a basis to exclude from evidence out-of-court statements or testimony of the child. It
may, however, be considered in determining the reliability of the statements of the child describing abuse.
g. Audio video, ephemeral electronic communication
Rule 11, secs.1 & 2, Electronic Evidence Rule

AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC. VIDEO AND EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE
SECTION 1. Audio, video and similar evidence. – Audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or
transactions shall be admissible provided is shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall be
identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person competent
to testify on the accuracy thereof.
SEC. 2. Ephemeral electronic communication. – Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or
unavailability of such witnesses, other competent evidence may be admitted.
A recording of the telephone conversation or ephemeral electronic communication shall be covered by the
immediately preceding section.
If the foregoing communications are recorded or embodied in an electronic document, then the provisions of
Rule 5 shall apply.
a. Testimony
Rule 130, sec. 36 Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded.
— A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Rule 130, sec. 20 Witnesses; their qualifications. — Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception
to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Rule 130 Sec 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. — The
following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
Sec 29(a) The child witness is unable to testify in court on grounds and under conditions
established under Section 28 (c).
Sec 28 (c) (c) The child witness shall be considered unavailable under the following
situations:
(1) Is deceased, suffers from physical infirmity, lack of memory, mental illness, or
will be exposed to severe psychological injury; or
(2) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to
procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means.
(d) When the child witness is unavailable, his hearsay testimony shall be admitted
only if corroborated by other admissible evidence.
"21
People V. Tuangco, 345 SCRA 429 (2000)
b. Nature of DNA Evidence
Rule 130, sec. 1 (object)

Object as evidence. — Objets as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court.
When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may exhibited to, examined or viewed by
the court.
Rule 130, sec. 2 (document)

Documentary evidence. — Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material
containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written expressions offered as
proof of their contents.
Rule 130, sec. 20 (testimony); cf. Rule 130, secs. 36, 49

succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception
to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Rule 130, sec. 36 Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded.
— A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Rule 130, sec 49. Opinion of expert witness. —The opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess,
may be received in evidence.
(DNA evidence)
Lejano, et al. v. People, G.R. 176389, 14 December 2010
PART TWO.
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
I. Rules of Admissibility
A. Generally
1. Relevance and competence
Rule 128, secs. 3, 4

Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. —Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is
not excluded by law or these rules.
Sec. 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. —Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be
improbability of the fact in issue.
Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 3 (2) vis sec. 2 and 3 (1)
Sec 3 (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
"22
Child Witness Rule, secs. 6, 8
Sec. 6. Competency.— Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. However, the court shall conduct a
competency examination of a child, motu proprio or on motion of a party, when it finds that substantial doubt
exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or
appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court.
(a) Proof of necessity.— A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of necessity of
competency examination. The age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency examination.
(b) Burden of proof.— To rebut the presumption of competence enjoyed by a child, the burden of proof
lies on the party challenging his competence.
(c) Persons allowed at competency examination.— Only the following are allowed to attend a
competency examination:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) The judge and necessary court personnel;
(2) The counsel for the parties;
(3) The guardian ad litem;
(4) One or more support persons for the child; and
(5) The defendant, unless the court determines that competence can be fully evaluated in his
absence.
(d) Conduct of examination.— Examination of a child as to his competence shall be conducted only by
the judge. Counsel for the parties, however, can submit questions to the judge that he may, in his discretion, ask
the child.
(e) Developmentally appropriate questions.— The questions asked at the competency examination shall
be appropriate to the age and developmental level of the child; shall not be related to the issues at trial; and shall
focus on the ability of the child to remember, communicate, distinguish between truth and falsehood, and
appreciate the duty to testify truthfully.
(f) Continuing duty to assess competence.— The court has the duty of continuously assessing the
competence of the child throughout his testimony.
Sec. 8. Examination of a child witness.— The examination of a child witness presented in a hearing or any
proceeding shall be done in open court. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a
different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such child witness may, however, move the
court to allow him to testify in the manner provided in this Rule.
Rule 3, sec. 2, Electronic Evidence Rule
SEC. 2. Admissibility. – An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the

rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner
2. Effects of waiver or failure to object
Security Bank & Trust Corp. v. Triumph Lumber & Cons. Corp., 301 SCRA 537 (1999)
—Best Evidence Rule; When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself; Exceptions.·The Court of Appeals also
erred in holding that forgery was duly established. First, Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court was
not complied with by private respondent. The Section explicitly provides that when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself. This is what is known as the “best evidence” rule. The exceptions are as follows:
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;
2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time, and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and
4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.
B. Specific Rules and Admissibility
1. Objects
Rule 130, sec. 1

Object as evidence. —Objects as evidence are those address to the senses of the court. When
object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.
"23
Rule 130, sec. 35
Unaccepted offer. —An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written
instrument or specific personal property is, if rejected without valid cause, equivalent to the actual
production and tender of the money, instrument, or property.
2. Documents
a. Best Evidence Rule
1. Conventional Documents

Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. —When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offerer;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
Sec. 4. Original of document. —

(a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in 2 or more copies executed at or about the same time, with
identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied
from another at or near the time fo transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded
as originals.
People v. Operaña, 343 SCRA 43 (2000)

— Where the original of the alleged suicide note could not be produced and only a mere
carbon copy was presented, the same could not be admitted in evidence.·As regards Juana Misola,
whose testimony will revolve around the alleged suicide note which was unsigned, the records
reveal that the original of said note could not be produced in open court. The alleged suicide note
presented was questioned in open court for being a mere carbon copy of the original, and could not
thus be admitted in evidence. Hence, there was no more need for Juana Misola’s testimony.
Fiscal of Pampanga v. Reyes and Guevarra, 55 Phil. 905 (1931)

—The rule of procedure which requires the production of the best evidence, is
applicable to the present case, and the copies of the weekly where the libelous article was
published, and its translation, certainly constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The
newspaper itself is the best evidence of an article published in it.
Mahilum v. CA, 17 SCRA 482 (1966)

—When duplicate copies of documents are admissible although they do not bear any
documentary stamp.·The documentary stamps required by Section 238 of the Internal Revenue
Code so that a public document may be admitted as evidence are supposed to be, and as a matter
of practice actually are, affixed to the original or first copy of the document and not to any of the
duplicates or carbon copies thereof. There being no evidence that such practice was not observed
in regard to the deed of sale involved in the present case, the presumptions that official duty has
been regularly performed, that private transactions have been fair and regular, and that the regular
course of business has been followed, must be applied (Sec. 69[q], Rule 123; now Sec. 5, Rule
131). The burden is upon those who seek to destroy these presumptions to do so by convincing
proof.
—When production of original is not required.·A signed carbon copy or duplicate of
a document executed at the same time as the original is what is known as duplicate original, and,
as such, may be introduced as evidence without accounting for the nonproduction of the original.
Republic v. CA, 258 SCRA 223 (1997)

—Machine copies of original documents are, at most, secondary evidence, which are
inadmissible if the offeror failed to prove any of the exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court and to establish the conditions for their admissibility.·The disagreement
between the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be definitely resolved because no reliable
copy of the original Plan II- 13961 was presented. Exhibits „6‰ and „6-A‰ are a machine copy
of the blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the
"24
Rules of Court. They are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible for failure of the
offeror to prove any of the exceptions provided therein and to establish the conditions for their
admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have no probative value.
PNB v. CA, 256 SCRA 44 (1996)

—Only the original document is the best evidence of the fact as to whether the
creditor authorized a third person to receive the check from the debtor, and in the absence of such
document, the debtor’s arguments regarding due payment must fail.·Considering that the contents
of the SPA are also in issue here, the best evidence rule applies. Hence, only the original document
(which has not been presented at all) is the best evidence of the fact as to whether or not private
respondent indeed authorized Sonia Gonzaga to receive the check from petitioner. In the absence
of such document, petitionerÊs arguments regarding due payment must fail.
2. Electronic documents and signatures
RA 9792, SECS. 10, 11, 12, 13 (also secs. 6, 7, 8, 9)
Rule 4, secs. 1, 2; Rules 5, 6, Electronic Evidence Rule

Rule 4: BEST EVIDENCE RULE (on Electronic Evidence Rule)
SECTION 1. Original of an electronic document. – An electronic document shall be

regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout
or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
SEC. 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. – When a document is in two or more

copies executed at or about the same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by
the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-
recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which is accurately
reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the
original.
RULE 5
AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
SECTION 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any
legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
SEC. 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the
same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by
the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document;
or  
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.  
SEC. 3. Proof of electronically notarized document. - A document electronically notarized in accordance with the
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court shall be considered as a public document and proved as a notarial
document under the Rules of Court.
RULE 6
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
SECTION 1. Electronic signature. – An electronic signature or a digital signature authenticate din the manner
prescribed hereunder is admissible in evidence as the functional equivalent of the signature of a person on a
written document.
SEC. 2. Authentication of electronic signatures. – An electronic signature may be authenticate in any of the
following manner:
(a) By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a digital signature and verity the
same;
(b) By any other means provided by law; or
(c) By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the genuineness of the electronic
signature.
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions relation to electronic signature. – Upon the authentication of an electronic
signature, it shall be presumed that:
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating or
approving the electronic document to which it is related or to indicate such person’s consent to the
transaction embodied therein; and  
(c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verity the electronic signature operated without
"25
error or fault.  
SEC. 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. – Upon the authentication of a digital signature,
it shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the immediately preceding section, that:
(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate;
(c) The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the time it was signed;
and
(d) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein  
3. Foreign Statute or Public Document
Corpuz v Sto. Tomas and Sol Gen, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
—The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alienÊs national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as
a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
Wild Valley Shipping Co., Ltd v. CA, supra
Cf. Parol Evidence Rule
Rule 130, sec. 9

Parol Evidence Rule
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it
is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in
issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
Ortanez v. CA, 266 SCRA 561 (1997)

—Under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the
terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon
and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof.·The parol evidence
herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private respondentsÊ oral testimony on the alleged
conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending
exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken
words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform
language.
Lustan v. CA, 266 SCRA 663 (1997)

—Even when a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property
may prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an issue the fact that the
document does not express the true intent of the parties, in which case parol evidence then
becomes competent and admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact given
merely as a security for the repayment of a loan.
—In this case, parol evidence then becomes competent and admissible to prove that
the instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the repayment of a loan. And
upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court will enforce the agreement or understanding
in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract.
CKH Industrial Development Corporation v. CA, 272 SCRA 333 (1997)

—Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that ‘when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon
and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement.’ The so-called ‘parol evidence rule’ forbids any
addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence
purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the parties’ written agreement, other or
different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. When
an agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be permitted to adduce evidence to
prove alleged practices which to all purposes would alter the terms of the written agreement.
Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned.
"26
—The rule is not without exceptions, however, as it is likewise provided that a party
to an action may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement
if he puts in issue in his pleadings:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their succes sors in interest
after the execution of the written agreement.
Willex Plastic Industries v. CA, 256 SCRA 478 (1997)

—It has been held that explanatory evidence may be received to show the
circumstances under which a document has been made and to what debt it relates. At all events,
Willex Plastic cannot now claim that its liability is limited to any amount which Interbank, as
creditor, might give directly to Inter-Resin Industrial as debtor because, by failing to object to
the parol evidence presented, Willex Plastic waived the protection of the parol evidence rule.
(becomes admissible without objection)
b. Secondary evidence Rule
Rule 130, secs. 5, 6, 7, 8;

Secondary Evidence
Sec. 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the original document has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution
or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on its part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control. —If the
document is int he custody or under the control of the adverse party, he must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its
existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in
the case of its loss.
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. —When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office,
its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof.
Sec. 8. Party who call for document not bound to offer it. — A party who calls for the
production of a document and inspects the same is not obliged to offer it as evidence.
Ong v. People, 342 SCRA 372 (2000);

—The documents submitted are mere photocopies of the originals. Thus, they are
secondary evidence and as such are not admissible unless there is ample proof of the loss of the
originals (Section 3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court. However, the loss of the originals have not
been proved by the prosecution, neither have they shown that the original is a public record in the
custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office, nor that the same is in the custody or
under the control of petitioners.
c. Presentation of part of transaction, writing or record
Rule 132, sec. 17 When part of transaction, writing, or record given in evidence, the
remainder admissible. —When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record
is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by
the other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary
to its understanding may also be given in evidence.
d. Official document in aid of judicial determination
People v. Lagarto, 326 SCRA 693 (2000)

—There is no rule that specifies who may identify a victim·it is enough that such
person knows the one being identified; An Autopsy Report is an official document the
authenticity of which is presumed. ·–Both LAGARTO and CORDERO claim that the
prosecution failed to prove the fact of death of Angel Alquiza because her death certificate
was not proffered in evidence. Instead, the prosecution presented the Autopsy Report (Exh.
C), which allegedly cannot be considered as proof of the fact of death of Angel „because there
was no proper and sufficient identification of the victim that was mentioned in said Autopsy
Report.‰ This issue, however, is answered in CORDEROÊs Brief itself: “The said Autopsy
Report states that the body of the supposed victim, Angel Alquiza, was identified by a certain
"27
Romezen Alquiza, a brother of the victim.” The records show that Romezen submitted to the
NBI a request for autopsy and the NBI issued a Certificate of Identification of Dead Body
which he also signed. These were essential for the autopsy which was eventually made by Dr.
Lagat. In any case, there is no rule that specifies who may identify a victim. It is enough that
such person knows the one being identified. Certainly, a brother of the victim can recognize
his own sister even with her manifest physical injuries. The prosecution cannot be faulted for
not presenting other witnesses to verify RomezenÊs identification, the choice of witnesses
being a matter of legal strategy and prerogative. Neither was CORDERO denied any
opportunity to cross-examine him regarding such fact because the Autopsy Report is an
official document the authenticity of which is presumed. Its validity, therefore, cannot be
collaterally attacked by putting Romezen on the witness stand.
3. Testimony
a. Qualifications and disqualifications of witnesses
Qualifications
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a

crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Rule 130, sec. 36

Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded.
— A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules.
Child Witness Rule, sec. 6 (Competency.)
People v. Chavez, 278 SCRA 230 (1997)

—Affidavits, being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and inaccurate. —
·The defense further attacks Agripina’s credibility on the ground that her affidavit before the police,
does not even mention the stabbing incident itself. This omission was, however, explained by Agripina
when she testified that she could not finish her statement because she had to attend to her crying child.
Affidavits, being taken ex-parte, are almost always incomplete and inaccurate. Appellant points out
that AgripinaÊs testimony is not credible because her claim that her house was elevated and therefore
higher than that of Navarez, was contradicted by prosecution witness Agapito Quimada. However, both
the testimony of Agripina and Agapito’s sketch show that the window of the victimÊs house faced the
front door of the Navarez residence. In other words, Agripina had an unobstructed view of the incident.
This is the material aspect of the prosecutionÊs case which the defense failed to disprove satisfactorily.
—When there is no evidence to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution
was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that such witness was not so moved and that his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.·The trial court did not err in finding that Agripina was a
credible witness whose testimony should be deemed as nothing but the truth. The appellant himself
admitted that there was no reason why she should testify against him. Well-settled is the rule that when
there is no evidence to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper
motive, the presumption is that such witness was not so moved and that his testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.
Molina v. People, 259 SCRA 138 (1996)

—Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony if credible. The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and a
subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide which
testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of
evidence. A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and
before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully
compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly
scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed.
—An affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented on the witness stand.·And in
situations, like the instant case, where testimony is recanted by an affidavit subsequently executed by
the recanting witness, we are properly guided by the well-settled rules that an affidavit is hearsay
unless the affiant is presented on the witness stand and that affidavits taken ex-parte are generally
considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.
"28
People v. Narciso, 262 SCRA 1 (1996)
—It is difficult to believe a testimony that inventory-taking in a store which employs
only six helpers with the owner acting as cashier, accountant and bookkeeper would take seven months
to finish.·Espisa also testified that from February to August 1988 they were doing inventory work in
Marlyn Trading, usually after store hours. This is difficult to believe, as the records show. Marlyn
Trading employed only six helpers with the owner acting as cashier, accountant and bookkeeper.
Certainly, the inventory-taking in a store this size would not take seven months to finish.
—A private certification is mere hearsay where the person who issued the same was
never presented as a witness.·The certification issued by Marlyn Canabe, owner of Marlyn Trading, as
to the fact that Narsico was in her employ and within the store premises at the time of the killing was
properly objected to by the prosecution as mere hearsay since she was never presented as a witness.
People v. Fernandez, 275 SCRA 49 (1997)

—A person’s statements on a matter, as related to the trial court by another, are mere
hearsay which even if not objected to nevertheless do not deserve credence.·The Court finds the appeal
unmeritorious, although obviously accused-appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in
considering PO3 San Pedro’s testimony regarding Santiago’s declarations implicating Fernandez is
correct. The implicatory statements of Santiago, it must be noted, were not given during the trial of
accused-appellant, who was thus deprived of the right of cross-examining and confronting his accuser.
Thus, Santiago’s statements on this matter, as related to the trial court by PO3 San Pedro, are mere
hearsay, which even if not objected to, as in this case, nevertheless do not deserve credence. However,
this is not sufficient to exonerate accused-appellant.
Waterous Drug Corporation v. NLRC, 280 SCRA 735 (1997)

People v. Porras, 255 SCRA 514 (1996)
Disqualifications
1. Mental incapacity
Rule 130, sec. 21 Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. — The
following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
2. Marriage
Rule 130, sec. 22
Section 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. — During their marriage, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed
by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants
3. Death or insanity of adverse party
Rule 130, sec. 23

Section 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. — Parties or
assignor of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person
of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
Cequeña v. Bolante, 330 SCRA 216 (2000)
4. Privileged communication
Rule 130, sec. 24

Sec. 24 Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
a. The husband or wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from
the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct
descendants or ascendants;
b. An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course
of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney’s secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his
"29
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such
capacity;
c. A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil
case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment
given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such
patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to
act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient;
d. A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the
confession, be examined as to any confession made to or any advice given by him
in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to
which the minister or priest belongs;
e. A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the
public interest would suffer by the disclosure.
Cf. Parental and Filial privilege
Rule 130, sec. 25

Sec. 25. Parental and filial privilege. —No person may be compelled to testify against
his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
Family Code, art. 215 — No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal c a s e , t o

testify against his parents and grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a
crime against the descendant or by one parent against the other.
5. Guardian ad litem in child abuse cases
Child Witness Rule, sec. 5 (e)

(e) The guardian ad litem shall not testify in any proceeding concerning any information,
statement, or opinion received from the child in the course of serving as a guardian ad
litem, unless the court finds it necessary to promote the best interests of the child.
See also: Rule 132, sec 3 (rights and obligations of witnesses)

Rights and obligations of a witness. —A witness must answer questions, although his
answer may tend to establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a witness:
1. To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting question, and from
harsh or insulting demeanor;
2. Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
3. Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
4. Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an
offense unless otherwise provided by law; or
5. Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it be
to the very fact at issue or to a fact in issue would be presumed. But a
witness must answer to the fact of his previous final conviction for an
offense.
__________ End of Midterms _________
b. Admissions and Confessions
1. Admissions
Generally admissible
Rule 130, sec. 26

Sec. 26. Admission of a party. —The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
Rule 130, secs. 30-31

Sec. 30. Admission by a conspirator. —The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against
the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Sec. 31. Admission by privies. —Where one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former.
"30
People v. Mendoza, 301 SCRA 66 (1999)
Cf. Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 12 (1), (2), (3)
Art. III, SECTION 12.

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Exceptions
a. Offer of compromise
Rule 130, sec. 27
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. —In civil cases, an offer of compromise
is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those

allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to a lesser

offense, is not admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses occasioned by an

injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury.
b. By third party [Res interalios acta (Part I)]
Rule 130, sec. 28

Sec. 28. Admission by third-party. —The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by
an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.
People v. Raquel, 265 SCRA 248 (1996)
c . By conspirator [Res inter alios acta (Part II)]

Rule 130, sec. 30
Sec. 30. Admission by a conspirator. —The act or declaration of a conspirator relating
to the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.
d. By- co-partner or agent

Rule 130, sec. 29
Sec. 29. Admission by a co-partner or agent. —The act or declaration of a partner or
agent of a the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership
or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule
applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly
interested with the party.
2. Confessions
Rule 130, sec. 33

Sec. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence
against him.
Rule 133, sec. 3

Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. —An
extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for
conviction, UNLESS corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
People v. Valla, 323 SCRA 74 (2000)

People v. Agustin, 240 SCRA 541(1995)
"31
People v. Arinque, 283 SCRA 291 (1997)
People v. Suarez, 267 SCRA 119 (1997)
People v. Salcedo, 273 SCRA 473(1997)
People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624(1995)
People v. Franco, 269 SCRA 211 91997);
Cf. Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 12 (1), (2), (3)

—supra
c. Previous Conduct as Evidence
Rule 130, sec. 34

Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. —Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one
time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another
time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system,
scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.

Sec . 30. Sexual abuse shield rule.—
(a) Inadmissible evidence.— The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal
proceeding involving alleged child sexual abuse:
(1) Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; and
(2) Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged victim.
(b) Exception.— Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim to

prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical
evidence shall be admissible.
A party intending to offer such evidence must:

(1) File a written motion at least fifteen (15) days before trial, specifically describing the
evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered, unless the court, for good cause,
requires a different time for filing or permits filing during trial; and
(2) Serve the motion on all parties and the guardian ad litem at least three (3) days before the
hearing of the motion.
Before admitting such evidence, the court must conduct a hearing in chambers and afford the
child, his guardian ad litem, the parties, and their counsel a right to attend and be heard. The
motion and the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal and protected by a
protective order set forth in Section 31(b). The child shall not be required to testify at the
hearing in chambers except with his consent.
Enriquez v. People, 331 SCRA 538 (2000)
d. Hearsay and its exceptions; independently relevant statements
1. General Rule
Rule 130, sec. 36

Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. —
A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules.
Feria v. CA, 325 SCRA 525 (2000)

Valenzuela v. Bellosillo, 322 SCRA 537 (2000)
People v. Silvestre, 307 SCRA 68 (1999)
People v. Panida, 310 SCRA 66 (1999)
People v. Silvano, 309 SCRA 362 (1999)
2. Exceptions to Hearsay — Mar 2, 2020
Dying declaration
Rule 130, sec.37

Sec. 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made under the
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is
"32
the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such
death.
People v. Ang-Nguho, 314 SCRA 480 (1999)

People v. Molina, 311 SCRA 517 (1999)
People v. Renato Bautista, 278 SCRA 613 (1997)
People v. Santiago Padao, 267 SCRA 64 (1997)
Ugaddan (Col. Ugaddan) v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 180 (1997)
People v. Eubra, 274 SCRA 180 (1997) — dying declaration not admissible in this case
People v. Francisco Santos, 270 SCRA 650 (1997)
Res gestae —things done
especially : the facts that form the environment of a litigated issue and are admissible
in evidence
Declaration against interest
Rule 130, sec. 38

Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration
was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true,
may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third
persons.
People v. Theodore Bernal, 274 SCRA 197 (1997)
Act or declaration against pedigree
Rule 130, sec. 39

Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. —The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him
by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration. The word “pedigree” includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
Tison v. CA, 276 SCRA 582 (1997)

People v. Silvano, 309 SCRA 362 (1999)
Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree

Rule 130, sec. 40
Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. —The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of
the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books
or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of
pedigree.
Common reputation
Rule 130, sec. 41
Sec. 41. Common reputation. — Common reputation existing previous controversy,
respecting facts of general interest more than 30 years old, or respecting marriage or moral
character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be
received as evidence of common reputation.
Part of the res gestae
Rule 130, sec.42

Sec. 42. Part of res gestae. —Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
theref, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying
an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae.
People v. Pirame, 327 SCRA 552 (2000)

People v. Naag, 322 SCRA 716 (2000)
People v. Valla,323 SCR 74 92000)
People v. Queriza, 279 SCRA 145 (1997)
People v. Garma, 271 SCRA 517 (1997)
People v. Francisco, 315 SCRA 114 (1999)
"33
Entries in the course of business
Rule 130, sec. 43
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. —Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a
position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Entries in official records
Rule 130, sec. 44

Sec. 44. Entries in official records —Entries in official records made in performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
People v. Mejia, 275 SCRA 127 (1997)
Commercial lists and the like

Rule 30, sec. 45
Sec. 45. Commercial lists and the like. —Evidence of statements of matters of interest to
person engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register. periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used
and relied upon by them therein.
Learned treatises
Rule 130, sec. 46
Sec. 46. Learned treatises. —A publisjed treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of
history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated
therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the
writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession
or calling as expert in the subject.
Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding
Rule 130, sec. 47

Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.— The testimony or deposition of
a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence
against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Special Exception in Child Abuse Cases
Child Witness Rule, sec. 28; Cf., Id., sec. 22
Sec . 28. Hearsay exception in child abuse cases.— A statement made by a child describing
any act or attempted act of child abuse, not otherwise admissible under the hearsay rule, may be
admitted in evidence in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding subject to the following rules:
(a) Before such hearsay statement may be admitted, its proponent shall make known to the
adverse party the intention to offer such statement and its particulars to provide him a fair
opportunity to object. If the child is available, the court shall, upon motion of the adverse party,
require the child to be present at the presentation of the hearsay statement for cross-examination
by the adverse party. When the child is unavailable, the fact of such circumstance must be
proved by the proponent.
(b) In ruling on the admissibility of such hearsay statement, the court shall consider the time,
content and circumstances thereof which provide sufficient indicia of reliability. It shall
consider the following factors:
(1) Whether there is a motive to lie;
(2) The general character of the declarant child;
(3) Whether more than one person heard the statement;
(4) Whether the statement was spontaneous;
(5) The timing of the statement and the relationship between the declarant child and
witness;
(6) Cross-examination could not show the lack of knowledge of the declarant child;
(7) The possibility of faulty recollection of the declarant child is remote; and
(8) The circumstances surrounding the statement are such that there is no reason to
suppose the declarant child misrepresented the involvement of the accused.
"34
(c) The child witness shall be considered unavailable under the following situations:
(1) Is deceased, suffers from physical infirmity, lack of memory, mental illness, or will
be exposed to severe psychological injury; or
(2) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to
procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means.
(d) When the child witness is unavailable, his hearsay testimony shall be admitted only if
corroborated by other admissible evidence.
Sec . 22. Corroboration.— Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child. His
testimony, if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or
judgment subject to the standard of proof required in criminal and non-criminal cases.
Business Records
i. Rule 8, sec. 1, Electronic Evidence Rule

Cf. Rule 8,sec.2,Id.
SECTION 1. Inapplicability of the hearsay rule. – A memorandum, report, record or data compilation
of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by electronic, optical or other similar means
at or near the time of or from transmission or supply of information by a person with knowledge
thereof, and kept in the regular course or conduct of a business activity, and such was the regular
practice ot make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation by electronic, optical or
similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witnesses,
is excepted from the rule or hearsay evidence.
SEC. 2. Overcoming the presumption. – The presumption provided for in Section 1 of this Rule may
be overcome by evidence of the untrustworthiness of the source of information or the method or
circumstances of the preparation, transmission or storage thereof.
e. Opinion
1. General Rule
Rule 130, sec. 48
Section 48. General rule. — The opinion of witness is not admissible, except as
indicated in the following sections.
Section 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring
special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to posses, may be
received in evidence.
Section 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. — The opinion of a witness for which proper
basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding —
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person.
Eduarte v. CA, 253 SCRA 391 (1996)

-petition granted, expert testimony was upheld
2. Exceptions
Expert Witnesses
Rule 130, sec. 49

Section 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring
special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to posses, may be
received in evidence.
Ordinary witnesses on identity, handwriting, mental sanity or

impressions of emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person
Rule 130, sec. 50
"35
Section 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. — The opinion of a witness for which proper
basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding —
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

People v. Madarang, 332 SCRA 99 (2000)

—guilty of parricide; appellant not insane
People v. Aliviano, 335 SCRA 371 (2000) —Rape; different doctor interpreted med cert
—the subject medical certificate cannot be given any probative value
Marsman Manning Agency v. NLRC, Cajeras, 313 SCRA 88 (1999)

— Medical report could not be considered corroborative and conclusive evidence; no
proof as to Dr. Hoed’s qualifications to diagnose medical illness
—presumption of regularity not applicable to Dr. Hoed
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works Inc. v. William Lines Inc.,

306 SCRA 762 (1999)
—Court is not mandated to admit expert witnesses’ testimonies
Borromeo v. Sun, 317 SCRA 176 (1999)

—Courts may place whatever weight is due on the testimony of an expert witness.
—Opinion of expert witness not admitted by court; deed of assignment is valid —not
forged.
f. Character
1. General Rule
Rule 130, sec. 51
Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions: —

(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the
moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character
which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it
tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.
(b)In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in civil case is admissible only when
pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case.
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Section 14,
Child Witness Rule, sec. 30 (Sexual Abuse Shield Rule)
People v. Adonis, 240 SCRA 773 (1995)

-The testimony of the Barangay Captain was given neither credence nor weight by the
trial court. While the accused may prove the bad moral character of the victim, the
proof must be of his general reputation in the community and not merely of isolated
and specific acts, Thus, the mere allegation that a complaint for theft had been filed
against the victim cannot establish his general reputations Besides, there was no
showing that Basas was ever convicted of that charge, assuming it had ever been filed.
2. Exceptions
Rule 130, sec. 51 a,b,c, vis Rule 132, sec 14
Sec. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. —
(a) In Criminal Cases:
1. The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the
moral trait involved in the offense charged.
2. Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character
which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
"36
3. The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it
tends to establish in any reasonable degree the improbability of the offense
charged.
(b) In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in a civil case is admissible only when
pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case.
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Sec. 14
Rule. 132. Sec. 14.

Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of witness. —Evidence of the good character of a
witness is not admissible until such character has been impeached.
4. Forensic DNA Evidence
Rule 128, secs. 3-4

Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. —Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law or these rules.
Sec. 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. —Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be
improbability of the fact in issue.
Rule 130, secs. 20, 36, 49

Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. —Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge, hearsay excluded. —A wintess
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are
derieved from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. —The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct.2786 (1993)
Tijing v. CA, G.R No.125901, March 8, 2001

• A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-
NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are
analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence
is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is
not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt
resolution of parentage and identity issues.
• “DNA” and “DNA Testing” Explained.—DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) refers to the chain of molecules found
in every cell of the body, except in red blood cells, which transmit hereditary characteristics among
individuals. DNA testing is synonymous to DNA typing, DNA fingerprinting, DNA profiling, genetic testing
or genetic fingerprinting.
Facts:
Angelita Diamante (ER of petitioner Bienvenida) stole the 4 month old son of petitioners.
Trial Court:
the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children, the alleged
birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed
strong facial similarity.
CA: evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor.
Reversed decision of Trial Court. Decided in favor of Angelita Diamante.
Issue: Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the son of
petitioners
"37
Ruling:
1. There is evidence that Angelina cannot give birth to a child because after her 2nd child was born, she was
ligated.
2. There is strong evidence that Tomas Lopez cannot have a son. His first marriage did not result to any
offspring. His brother testified that John Thomas was adopted.
3. Tomas Lopez filed the birth certificate of the child. Under the law, it should be the midwife. Also, in the said
birth certificate, Tomas and Angelina was married. The false entry put to doubt the other data in the said
certificate.
4. The trial court observed strong similarities between Bienvenida and the child.
5. Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida’s giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her
clinic.
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification
and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis.
The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother
and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of
DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid
of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to
resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and
identity issues.
People v. Vallejo, G.R. No.144656, May 9, 2002 (supra case)
People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004
Lejano v. PP, G.R. No. 176389 & PP v. Webb, G.R. No. 176864, 12/14/10
SC A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Judges &

Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre Trial & use of Deposition Discovery Measures, August
16, 2004) — (on file)
5. Out-of-Court Identification of Suspects
People v. Gamer, 326 SCRA 660 (2000)

People v. Navales, 337 SCRA 436 (2000)
People v. Faustino, 339 SCRA 718 (2000)
People v. Cabiles, 341 SCRA 721(2000)
PART THREE.
Presenting Evidence
The first witness was the Hatter. He came in with a teacup in one hand and a piece
of bread and butter in the other…” Take off your hat,” the King said to the Hatter. “It isn’t
mine,” said the Hatter. ‘Stolen!” the King exclaimed, turning to the jury who instantly
made a memorandum of the fact.
- From Lewis Caroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
Study Guide: At the end of Part Three, the student should: (a) know the order of trial for civil and criminal cases
as well as the different rules for presenting evidence in all its forms, (b) understand and appreciate the criteria or
standards used by the court in evaluating the admissibility and credibility of evidence. It would be useful to
recall the difference between evidence that is admissible and credible under Part One.
I. Order of trial
Rule 30, sec. 5, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure

SEC. 5. Order of trial.— Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for special
reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as
follows:(a) The plaintiff shall adduce evidence in support of his complaint;(b) The defendant shall then adduce
evidence in support of his defense, counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint;(c) The third-party
defendant, if any, shall adduce evidence of his defense, counterclaim, cross-claim and fourth-party complaint;
(d) The fourth-party, and so forth, if any, shall adduce evidence of the material facts pleaded by them;
(e) The parties against whom any counterclaim or cross-claim has been pleaded, shall adduce evidence in
support of their defense, in the order to be prescribed by the court;
"38
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good reasons and in
the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their original case; and
(g) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision, unless the court directs the
parties to argue or to submit their respective memoranda or any further pleadings.
If several defendants or third-party defendants, and so forth, having separate defenses appear by different
counsel, the court shall determine the relative order of presentation of their evidence.
Rule 119, sec. 11, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure

Section 11. Order of trial.— The trial shall proceed in the following order: (a) The prosecution shall
present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability. (b) The accused may present
evidence to prove his defense and damages, if any, arising from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the
case. (c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence
unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the
main issue. (d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda. (e) When the
accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense,
the order of trial may be modified.
II. Presentation of evidence
A. Testimonial
1. Procedure
Rule 132, secs., 1, 2, 15

Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court. —The examination of witnesses presented in a
trial or hearing shall be done in open court, under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally.
Sec. 2. Proceedings to be recorded. —The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing, including

the questions propounded to a witness and his answers thereto, the statements made by the judge
or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be recorded by
means of shorthand or stenotype or by other means of recording found suitable by the court.
Sec. 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. —On any trial or hearing, the judge may
exclude from the court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear
the testimony of other witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to
be prevented from conversing with one another until all shall have been examined.
Rule 132, secs. 34-36; Cf.

Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. —The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Sec. 35. When to make offer. —As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made
at the time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party’s testimonial
evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.
Sec. 36. Objection. —Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the
offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be
made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within 3 days after notice of the offer unless
a different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for objections must be specified.
People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 (1998)

• The testimony of a witness, although not formally offered in evidence, may still be admitted by the courts, if the other party
does not object to its presentation.·Appellant Cawaling also questions the trial courtÊs reliance on the testimonies of Dr.
Blandino Flores, Nelson Ilisan and Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano, Jr., for failure of the prosecution to offer them as evidence.
In People vs. Java, this Court ruled that the testimony of a witness, although not formally offered in evidence, may still be
admitted by the courts, if the other party does not object to its presentation. The Court explained: „Section 36 of [Rule 132]
requires that an objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefor
shall become reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the court below, an
objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.‰ In the present case, a cursory reading of the
stenographic notes reveals that the counsel for the appellants did not raise any objection when said witnesses testified on
the matters now being impugned. Moreover, they repeatedly cross-examined the witnesses, which shows that they had
waived their objections to the said testimonies of such witnesses.
• Presumption of Innocence; The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and is not sufficient to support a conviction.·We reject
appellantsÊ position that the equipoise rule should apply to this case. In People vs. Lagnas, the Court, through Mr. Justice
"39
Florenz D. Regalado, described this rule as follows: „Once again, albeit in effect a supportive and cumulative consideration
in view of the preceding disquisition, the equipoise rule finds application in this case, that is, if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and
the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and is not sufficient to
support a conviction.
• In this Decision, we also reiterate the following doctrines: (1) the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has
jurisdiction over informations for murder committed by public officers, including a town mayor; (2) the assessment of trial
courts on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies deserve great respect; (3) the equipoise rule cannot be invoked
where the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming; (4) alibi cannot be believed in the face of credible testimony
identifying the appellants; and (5) conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence.
• The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfil the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule provides that where the
evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional, presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the
accused.
Issue:
Third Issue: Credibility of Witnesses
Ruling:
In addition, family members who have witnessed the killing of their loved one usually strive to remember the
faces of the assailants. Thus, the relationship per se of witnesses with the victim does not necessarily mean that
the former are biased. On the contrary, it is precisely such relationship that would impel them to seek justice and
put the real culprit behind bars, rather than impute the offense to the innocent.
Appellant Cawaling also questions the trial court’s reliance on the testimonies of Dr. Blandino Flores, Nelson
Ilisan & Pros. Victoriano, Jr for failure of the prosecution to offer them as evidence. In People vs. Java, this
Court ruled that the testimony of a witness, although not formally offered in evidence, may still be admitted by
the courts, if the other party does not object to its presentation. The Court explained: “Section 36 of [Rule 132]
requires that an objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was
made in the court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.”
In the present case, a cursory reading of the stenographic notes reveals that the counsel for the appellants did not
raise any objection when said witnesses testified on the matters now being impugned. Moreover, they repeatedly
cross-examined the witnesses, which shows that they had waived their objections to the said testimonies of such
witnesses.
Rule 119, sec. 21 (Crim pro)

Sec. 21. Exclusion of the public. —The judge may, may motu propio, exclude the public from
the courtroom if the evidence to be produced during the trial is offensive to decency or public
morals. He may also, on motion of the accused, exclude the public from the trial except court
personnel and the counsel of the parties.
Rule 133, sec. 7; Cf. RA 8493, sec. 7 (2)

Sec. 7. Evidence on motion. —When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the
court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the
court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.
RA 8493, Sec. 7(2)

Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between
Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice,
judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a
plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial.
Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the court.
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she interposes
a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the
order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence.
2. Order of Presentation of Witnesses

Rule 132, sec. 4
Sec. 4. Order in the examination of an individual witness. —The order in which an
individual witness may be examined is as follows:
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross-examination by the opponent.
"40
a. Direct Examination
Rule 132, secs. 5, 10
Sec. 5. Direct examination. —Direct examination is the examination-in-chief of a witness
by the party presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue.
Sec. 10. Leading and misleading questions. —A question which suggests to the witness
the answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed,
except:
(a) On cross-examination;
(b) On preliminary matters;
(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a
witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a
deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association
which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness,
or contrary to that which he has previously stated. It is not allowed.
b. Cross examination
Rule 132, secs. 6, 10

Sec. 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. —Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters
stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and
freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the
reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
Sec. 10. Leading and misleading questions. —A question which suggests to the witness
the answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed,
except:
(a) On cross-examination;
(b) On preliminary matters;
(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a
witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a
deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association
which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness,
or contrary to that which he has previously stated. It is not allowed.
1. Generally
Rule 132, sec. 11
Section 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. — A witness may be
impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by
evidence that his general reputation for truth, honestly, or integrity is bad, or by
evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present,
testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown
by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been
convicted of an offense.
Rule 132, sec. 12, par. 1 vis sec. 10 (d) and (e)
Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. —Except with respect to witnesses
referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Sec 10, the party producing a witness is not
allowed to impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court

upon adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his
having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party,
may be impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called
by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be
impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must
only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief.
2. Prior inconsistent statements

Rule 132, sec. 13
"41
Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. —
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to
him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he
must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If
the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is
put to him concerning them.
People v. De Guzman, 288 SCRA 346 (1998)

• A witness cannot be impeached by evidence of contradictory or prior inconsistent
statements until the proper foundation or predicate has been duly laid by the party against
whom said witness was called.— The records disclose that at the trial, counsel for appellant
tried to utilize the testimony of complainant given in the preliminary investigation before
Judge Rodolfo A. Castro to impeach her through statements therein supposedly different from
what she gave in court. Alluding to her answer to Judge CastroÊs questions numbered 28 and
29, appellantÊs counsel asked complainant if she first reported the rape to one Dioneson
Bayno. Complainant duly corrected that statement and clarified that it was Mauricia and Hugo
Bayno whom she first told about the incident. However, complainant was never confronted
during the proceedings in the trial court with her answers allegedly given in the same
testimony at the preliminary investigation regarding appellantÊs resort to sleep-inducing
chemicals. In fact, no submarkings for such particular answers as exhibits were made in the
records of her testimony in the preliminary investigation, much less offered by the counsel of
appellant for that purpose during the trial of the case. It is universally accepted that a witness
cannot be impeached by evidence of contradictory or prior inconsistent statements until the
proper foundation or predicate has been duly laid by the party against whom said witness was
called.
• Although the whole record of the testimony of complainant at the preliminary
examination was offered in evidence by the defense and admitted by the trial court,
complainant cannot now be discredited through any of her extrajudicial statements which
were not brought to her attention during the trial. Thus, it has been held that granting arguendo
the alleged contradictions, previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the
credibility of a witness unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he was
then given an opportunity to explain them.
• It is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his
conflicting declarations that he should be deemed impeached.·Complainant is undoubtedly the
person best suited and mandated by the rule to explain the supposed differences in her
statements. Without such explanation before us, whether plausible or not, we are left with no
basis to evaluate and assess her credibility on the rationale that it is only when no reasonable
explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting declarations that he should be
deemed impeached. As things stand before us and the court a quo, therefore, complainantÊs
credibility remains unimpeached.
• Under the revision in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, those records of the
preliminary investigation do not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial
Court.
Crime of Rape
Issue:
Appellant adverts to the fact that complainant stated in her complaint and in her testimony given during the
preliminary investigation that he committed the crime of rape through the application of odorous chemicals over
her nose and mouth which caused her to sleep. This fact was not repeated by complainant in the trial court but
she merely claimed the crime was consummated by appellant through force and intimidation. Such
inconsistency, according to appellant, destroys Jovelyn’s credibility, thus warranting a reversal of the lower
court’s judgment of conviction.
Ruling:
It is universally accepted that a witness cannot be impeached by evidence of contradictory or prior inconsistent
statements until the proper foundation or predicate has been duly laid by the party against whom said witness
was called.
In Rule 132 of our own Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements.·Before a witness can be impeached by
evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must
be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked
whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be
shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
Although the whole record of the testimony of complainant at the preliminary examination was offered in
evidence by the defense and admitted by the trial court, complainant cannot now be discredited through any of
"42
her extrajudicial statements which were not brought to her attention during the trial. Thus, it has been held that
granting arguendo the alleged contradictions, previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the
credibility of a witness unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he was then given an
opportunity to explain them.
In People vs. Resabal, this Court explicitly ruled that the mere presentation of the prior declarations of a witness
without the same having been read to the witness while he was testifying in court is insufficient for the desired
impeachment of his testimony. As explained therein, the apparent contradiction between the declarations of the
witness before the former justice of the peace court and those before the then court of first instance was
insufficient to discredit him since he was not given ample opportunity, by reading to him his declarations before
the lower court, to explain the supposed discrepancy.
The rule which requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before introducing evidence of inconsistent
statements of a witness is founded upon common sense and is essential to protect the character of a witness. His
memory is refreshed by the necessary inquiries, which enables him to explain the statements referred to, and to
show that they were made under a mistake, or that there was no discrepancy between them and his testimony.
It would be unjust to complainant at this stage to be declared an incredible witness as a result of the unauthorized
procedure adopted by appellant.
Complainant is undoubtedly the person best suited and mandated by the rule to explain the supposed differences
in her statements. Without such explanation before us, whether plausible or not, we are left with no basis to
evaluate and assess her credibility on the rationale that it is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a
witness in reconciling his conflicting declarations that he should be deemed impeached. As things stand before
us and the court a quo, therefore, complainantÊs credibility remains unimpeached.
Again, it is undeniable that the proper basis was not laid for the impeachment of complainant through the
statements contained in her complaint. Coupled with the basic principle that courts shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered or whose purpose has not been specified, the complaint also cannot be taken
intoaccount for impeaching complainant. If appellant was really prepared to attack complainantÊs credibility
based on the statements in her complaint, he should necessarily have asked complainant about them during the
trial, offered the complaint as his evidence, and specified the purpose for its submission. Appellant utterly failed
in all of these mandatory evidential requirements.
Hence, no impeaching evidence having been properly brought before it for its consideration during trial, the
lower court was perfectly justified in disregarding the supposed inconsistent statements of complainant in her
complaint and her testimony during the preliminary investigation. Her testimony at the trial, therefore, stands
unassailed and entitled to full credit, together with the corroboration afforded thereto by the testimonies of the
other prosecution witnesses, in stark contrast to the effete and puerile defense offered by appellant. 
3. Hostile or adverse witness

Rule 132, sec. 12, pars. 2, 3
Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. —Except with respect to witnesses
referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Sec 10, the party producing a witness is not
allowed to impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court

upon adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his
having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party,
may be impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called
by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be
impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must
only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief.
c. Re-direct/ re-cross examination

Sec. 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. —After the cross-examination of the
witness has been concluded, he may be re-examined by the party calling him, to explain or
supplement his answers given during the cross-examination. On re-direct examination, questions
on matters not dealt with during the cross-examination, may be allowed by the court in its
discretion.
Sec. 8. Re-cross-examination. —Upon the conclusion of the re-direct examination, the adverse
party may re-cross-examine the witness on matters stated in his re-direct examination, and also
on such other matters as may be allowed by the court in its discretion.
3. Recall of witnesses
"43
Rule 132, sec.9
Sec. 9. Recalling witness. —After the examination of a witness by both sides has been
concluded, the witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant or
withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require.
Cf. Rule 30, sec. 5: Rule 119, sec.11 (on rebuttal witnesses)
Rule 30, Sec. 5 (Civil Pro)
Sec. 5. Order of trial. —Subject to the provisions of Sec. 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for
special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial
order and shall proceed as follows:
(a) The plaintiff shall adduce evidence in support of his complaint;
(b) The defendant shall then adduce evidence in support of his defense, counterclaim,
cross-claim and third-party complaint;
(c) The third-party defendant, if any, shall adduce evidence of his defense,
counterclaim, cross-claim and fourth party complaint;
(d) The fourth party, and so forth, if any, shall adduce evidence of the material facts
pleaded by them;
(e) The parties against whom any counterclaim or cross-claim has been pleaded, shall
adduce evidence in support of their defense, in the order to be prescribed by the
court;
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court,
for good reasons and in furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon
their original case; and
(g) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision,
unless the court directs the parties to argue or to submit their respective memoranda
or any further pleadings.
If several defendants or third-party defendants, and so forth, having separate defenses appear by
different counsel, the court shall determined the relative order of presentation of their evidence.
Rule 119, Sec.11 (Criminal pro)

Sec. 11. Order of Trial. —The trial shall proceed in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case,
the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, if any, arising
from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal
evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present
additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admissio of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision unless the court directs the to argue orally or to submit written memoranda.
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.
4. Special Procedure on Presentation of Child Witnesses
a. Generally
See Child Witness Rule, secs. 1, 2, 3, 4
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule.— Unless otherwise provided, this Rule shall govern the
examination of child witnesses who are victims of crime, accused of a crime, and witnesses to crime. It
shall apply in all criminal proceedings and non-criminal proceedings involving child witnesses.
Sec. 2. Objectives.— The objectives of this Rule are to create and maintain an environment that will
allow children to give reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma to children, encourage children
to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate the ascertainment of truth.c
Sec. 3. Construction of the Rule.— This Rule shall be liberally construed to uphold the best interests of
the child and to promote maximum accommodation of child witnesses without prejudice to the
constitutional rights of the accused.
Sec. 4. Definitions.—
(a) A “child witness” is any person who at the time of giving testimony is below the age of
eighteen (18) years. In child abuse cases, a child includes one over eighteen (18) years but is
found by the court as unable to fully take care of himself or protect himself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
(b) “Child abuse” means physical, psychological or sexual abuse and criminal neglect as
defined in Republic Act No. 7610 and other related laws.
(c) “Facilitator” means a person appointed by the court to pose questions to a child.
(d) “Record regarding a child” or “record” means any photograph, videotape, audiotape, film,
handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic recording, computer data or printout, or other
memorialization, including any court document, pleading, or any copy or reproduction of any of
the foregoing, that contains the name, description, address, school or any other personal
"44
identifying information about a child or his family and that is produced or maintained by a
public agency, private agency or individual.
(e) A “guardian ad litem” is a person appointed by the court where the case is pending for a
child who is a victim of, accused of, or a witness to a crime to protect the best interests of the
said child.
(f) A “support person” is a person chosen by the child to accompany him to testify at or attend a
judicial proceeding or deposition to provide emotional support for him
(g) “Best interests of the child” means the totality of the circumstances and conditions as are
most congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of security of the child and most
encouraging to his physical, psychological, and emotional development. It also means the least
detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the child.
(h) “Developmental level” refers to the specific growth phase in which most individuals are
expected to behave and function in relation to the advancement of their physical, socio-
emotional, cognitive, and moral abilities.
(i) “In-depth investigative interview” or “disclosure interview” is an inquiry or proceeding
conducted by duly trained members of a multi-disciplinary team or representatives of law
enforcement or child protective services for the purpose of determining whether child abuse has
been committed.
b. Appointment of guardian ad litem

Sec. 5. Guardian ad litem.—
(a) The court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a victim of, accused of, or a
witness to a crime to promote the best interests of the child. In making the appointment, the
court shall consider the background of the guardian ad litem and his familiarity with the judicial
process, social service programs, and child development, giving preference to the parents of the
child, if qualified. The guardian ad litem may be a member of the Philippine Bar. A person who
is a witness in any proceeding involving the child cannot be appointed as a guardian ad litem.
(b) The guardian ad litem:
(1) shall attend all interviews, depositions, hearings, and trial proceedings in which a
child participates;
.
(2) shall make recommendations to the court concerning the welfare of the child;
(3) shall have access to all reports, evaluations, and records necessary to effectively
advocate for the child, except privileged communications;
(4) shall marshal and coordinate the delivery of resources and special services to the
child;
(5) shall explain, in language understandable to the child, all legal proceedings,
including police investigations, in which the child is involved;
(6) shall assist the child and his family in coping with the emotional effects of crime and
subsequent criminal or non-criminal proceedings in which the child is involved;
(7) may remain with the child while the child waits to testify;
(8) may interview witnesses; and
(9) may request additional examinations by medical or mental health professionals if

there is a compelling need therefor.
(c) The guardian ad litem shall be notified of all proceedings but shall not participate in the trial.
However, he may file motions pursuant to Sections 9, 10, 25, 26, 27 and 31(c). If the guardian
ad litem is a lawyer, he may object during trial that questions asked of the child are not
appropriate to his developmental level.
(d) The guardian ad litem may communicate concerns regarding the child to the court through an
officer of the court designated for that purpose.
(e) The guardian ad litem shall not testify in any proceeding concerning any information,
statement, or opinion received from the child in the course of serving as a guardian ad litem,
unless the court finds it necessary to promote the best interests of the child.
(f) The guardian ad litem shall be presumed to have acted in good faith in compliance with his
duties described in Sub-section (b).
"45
c. Presumption of competency; Determination of competency; Competency examination
Sec. 6. Competency.— Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. However, the court
shall conduct a competency examination of a child, motu proprio or on motion of a party, when
it finds that substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember,
communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court.
(a) Proof of necessity.— A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of
necessity of competency examination. The age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a
competency examination.
(b) Burden of proof.— To rebut the presumption of competence enjoyed by a child, the burden
of proof lies on the party challenging his competence.
(c) Persons allowed at competency examination.— Only the following are allowed to attend a
competency examination:
(1) The judge and necessary court personnel;
(2) The counsel for the parties;
(4) One or more support persons for the child; and
(5) The defendant, unless the court determines that competence can be fully evaluated in
his absence.
(d) Conduct of examination.— Examination of a child as to his competence shall be conducted
only by the judge. Counsel for the parties, however, can submit questions to the judge that he
may, in his discretion, ask the child.
(e) Developmentally appropriate questions.— The questions asked at the competency
examination shall be appropriate to the age and developmental level of the child; shall not be
related to the issues at trial; and shall focus on the ability of the child to remember,
communicate, distinguish between truth and falsehood, and appreciate the duty to testify
truthfully.
(f) Continuing duty to assess competence.— The court has the duty of continuously assessing
the competence of the child throughout his testimony.
d. Manner of examination
Child Witness Rule, secs. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17
Sec. 7. Oath or affirmation.— Before testifying, a child shall take an oath or affirmation to tell
the truth.
Sec. 8. Examination of a child witness.— The examination of a child witness presented in a

hearing or any proceeding shall be done in open court. Unless the witness is incapacitated to
speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be
given orally.
The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such child witness may,
however, move the court to allow him to testify in the manner provided in this Rule.
Sec. 9. Interpreter for child.—

(a) When a child does not understand the English or Filipino language or is unable to
communicate in said languages due to his developmental level, fear, shyness, disability, or other
similar reason, an interpreter whom the child can understand and who understands the child may
be appointed by the court, motu proprio or upon motion, to interpret for the child.
(b) If a witness or member of the family of the child is the only person who can serve as an
interpreter for the child, he shall not be disqualified and may serve as the interpreter of the child.
The interpreter, however, who is also a witness, shall testify ahead of the child.
(c) An interpreter shall take an oath or affirmation to make a true and accurate interpretation.
Sec. 10. Facilitator to pose questions to child.—

(a) The court may, motu proprio or upon motion, appoint a facilitator if it determines that the
child is unable to understand or respond to questions asked. The facilitator may be a child
psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker, guidance counselor, teacher, religious leader, parent, or
relative.
(b) If the court appoints a facilitator, the respective counsels for the parties shall pose questions
to the child only through the facilitator. The questions shall either be in the words used by
counsel or, if the child is not likely to understand the same, in words that are comprehensible to
the child and which convey the meaning intended by counsel.
(c) The facilitator shall take an oath or affirmation to pose questions to the child according to the
meaning intended by counsel.
Sec. 11. Support persons.—

(a) A child testifying at a judicial proceeding or making a deposition shall have the right to be
accompanied by one or two persons of his own choosing to provide him emotional support.
(1) Both support persons shall remain within the view of the child during his testimony.
"46
(2) One of the support persons may accompany the child to the witness stand, provided
the support person does not completely obscure the child from the view of the opposing
party, judge, or hearing officer.
(3) The court may allow the support person to hold the hand of the child or take other
appropriate steps to provide emotional support to the child in the course of the
proceedings.
(4) The court shall instruct the support persons not to prompt, sway, or influence the
child during his testimony.
(b) If the support person chosen by the child is also a witness, the court may disapprove the
choice if it is sufficiently established that the attendance of the support person during the
testimony of the child would pose a substantial risk of influencing or affecting the content of the
testimony of the child.
(c) If the support person who is also a witness is allowed by the court, his testimony shall be
presented ahead of the testimony of the child.
Sec . 12. Waiting area for child witnesses.— The courts are encouraged to provide a waiting
area for children that is separate from waiting areas used by other persons. The waiting area for
children should be furnished so as to make a child comfortable.
Sec. 13. Courtroom environment.— To create a more comfortable environment for the child,
the court may, in its discretion, direct and supervise the location, movement and deportment of
all persons in the courtroom including the parties, their counsel, child, witnesses, support
persons, guardian ad litem, facilitator, and court personnel. The child may be allowed to testify
from a place other than the witness chair. The witness chair or other place from which the child
testifies may be turned to facilitate his testimony but the opposing party and his counsel must
have a frontal or profile view of the child during the testimony of the child. The witness chair or
other place from which the child testifies may also be rearranged to allow the child to see the
opposing party and his counsel, if he chooses to look at them, without turning his body or
leaving the witness stand. The judge need not wear his judicial robe.
Nothing in this section or any other provision of law, except official in-court identification
provisions, shall be construed to require a child to look at the accused.
Accommodations for the child under this section need not be supported by a finding of trauma to
the child.
Sec. 14. Testimony during appropriate hours.— The court may order that the testimony of the
child should be taken during a time of day when the child is well-rested.
Sec. 15. Recess during testimony.—

The child may be allowed reasonable periods of relief while undergoing direct, cross, re-direct,
and re-cross examinations as often as necessary depending on his developmental level.
Sec . 16. Testimonial aids.— The court shall permit a child to use dolls, anatomically-correct
dolls, puppets, drawings, mannequins, or any other appropriate demonstrative device to assist
him in his testimony.
Sec . 17. Emotional security item.— While testifying, a child shall be allowed to have an item
of his own choosing such as a blanket, toy, or doll.
e. Duty and Powers of Judge in relation to testimony of child witness

Child Witness Rule, secs. 5, 10, 12, 13, 18, 23, 24
Sec . 18. Approaching the witness.— The court may prohibit a counsel from approaching a
child if it appears that the child is fearful of or intimidated by the counsel.
Sec. 23. Excluding the public.— When a child testifies, the court may order the exclusion from
the courtroom of all persons, including members of the press, who do not have a direct interest
in the case. Such an order may be made to protect the right to privacy of the child or if the court
determines on the record that requiring the child to testify in open court would cause
psychological harm to him, hinder the ascertainment of truth, or result in his inability to
effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity. In making its order, the court
shall consider the developmental level of the child, the nature of the crime, the nature of his
testimony regarding the crime, his relationship to the accused and to persons attending the trial,
his desires, and the interests of his parents or legal guardian. The court may, motu proprio,
exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced during trial is of such
character as to be offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, on motion of the
accused, exclude the public from trial, except court personnel and the counsel of the parties.
Sec . 24. Persons prohibited from entering and leaving courtroom.— The court may order
that persons attending the trial shall not enter or leave the courtroom during the testimony of the
child.
"47
f. Mode of examination and questioning
Child Witness Rule, sec. 8, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27
Sec . 18. Approaching the witness.— The court may prohibit a counsel from approaching a
child if it appears that the child is fearful of or intimidated by the counsel.
Sec. 19. Mode of questioning.— The court shall exercise control over the questioning of
children so as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth; (2) ensure that questions are stated
in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child; (3) protect children from
harassment or undue embarrassment; and (4) avoid waste of time.
The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.
Sec. 20. Leading questions.— The court may allow leading questions in all stages of
examination of a child if the same will further the interests of justice.
Sec . 21. Objections to questions.— Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so

as not to mislead, confuse, frighten, or intimidate the child.
Sec. 25. Live-link television testimony in criminal cases where the child is a victim or a
witness.—
(a) The prosecutor, counsel or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order that the testimony of
the child be taken in a room outside the courtroom and be televised to the courtroom by live-link
television.
Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this section, he shall consult the
prosecutor or counsel and shall defer to the judgment of the prosecutor or counsel regarding the
necessity of applying for an order. In case the guardian ad litem is convinced that the decision
of the prosecutor or counsel not to apply will cause the child serious emotional trauma, he
himself may apply for the order.
The person seeking such an order shall apply at least five (5) days before the trial date, unless
the court finds on the record that the need for such an order was not reasonably foreseeable.
(b) The court may motu proprio hear and determine, with notice to the parties, the need for
taking the testimony of the child through live-link television.
(c) The judge may question the child in chambers, or in some comfortable place other than the
courtroom, in the presence of the support person, guardian ad litem, prosecutor, and counsel for
the parties. The questions of the judge shall not be related to the issues at trial but to the feelings
of the child about testifying in the courtroom.
(d) The judge may exclude any person, including the accused, whose presence or conduct causes
fear to the child.
(e) The court shall issue an order granting or denying the use of live-link television and stating
the reasons therefor. It shall consider the following factors:
(1) The age and level of development of the child;
(2) His physical and mental health, including any mental or physical disability;
(3) Any physical, emotional, or psychological injury experienced by him;
(4) The nature of the alleged abuse;
(5) Any threats against the child;
(6) His relationship with the accused or adverse party;
(7) His reaction to any prior encounters with the accused in court or elsewhere;
(8) His reaction prior to trial when the topic of testifying was discussed with him by
parents or professionals;
(9) Specific symptoms of stress exhibited by the child in the days prior to testifying;
(10) Testimony of expert or lay witnesses;
(11) The custodial situation of the child and the attitude of the members of his family
regarding the events about which he will testify; and
(12) Other relevant factors, such as court atmosphere and formalities of court procedure.
(f) The court may order that the testimony of the child be taken by live-link television if there is
a substantial likelihood that the child would suffer trauma from testifying in the presence of the
accused, his counsel or the prosecutor as the case may be. The trauma must be of a kind which
would impair the completeness or truthfulness of the testimony of the child.
(g) If the court orders the taking of testimony by live-link television:
(1) The child shall testify in a room separate from the courtroom in the presence of the
guardian ad litem; one or both of his support persons; the facilitator and interpreter, if
any; a court officer appointed by the court; persons necessary to operate the closed-
circuit television equipment; and other persons whose presence are determined by the
court to be necessary to the welfare and well-being of the child;
(2) The judge, prosecutor, accused, and counsel for the parties shall be in the
courtroom. The testimony of the child shall be transmitted by live-link television into
the courtroom for viewing and hearing by the judge, prosecutor, counsel for the parties,
accused, victim, and the public unless excluded.
(3) If it is necessary for the child to identify the accused at trial, the court may allow the
child to enter the courtroom for the limited purpose of identifying the accused, or the
"48
court may allow the child to identify the accused by observing the image of the latter on
a television monitor.
(4) The court may set other conditions and limitations on the taking of the testimony that
it finds just and appropriate, taking into consideration the best interests of the child.
(h) The testimony of the child shall be preserved on videotape, digital disc, or other similar
devices which shall be made part of the court record and shall be subject to a protective order as
provided in Section 31(b).
Sec . 26. Screens, one-way mirrors, and other devices to shield child from accused.—
(a) The prosecutor or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order that the chair of the child or
that a screen or other device be placed in the courtroom in such a manner that the child cannot
see the accused while testifying. Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this
Section, he shall consult with the prosecutor or counsel subject to the second and third
paragraphs of Section 25(a) of this Rule. The court shall issue an order stating the reasons and
describing the approved courtroom arrangement.
(b) If the court grants an application to shield the child from the accused while testifying in the
courtroom, the courtroom shall be arranged to enable the accused to view the child.
Sec . 27. Videotaped deposition.—

(a) The prosecutor, counsel, or guardian ad litem may apply for an order that a deposition be
taken of the testimony of the child and that it be recorded and preserved on videotape. Before
the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this Section, he shall consult with the prosecutor
or counsel subject to the second and third paragraphs of Section 25(a).
(b) If the court finds that the child will not be able to testify in open court at trial, it shall issue an
order that the deposition of the child be taken and preserved by videotape.
(c) The judge shall preside at the videotaped deposition of a child. Objections to deposition
testimony or evidence, or parts thereof, and the grounds for the objection shall be stated and
shall be ruled upon at the time of the taking of the deposition. The other persons who may be
permitted to be present at the proceeding are:
(1) The prosecutor;
(2) The defense counsel;
(4) The accused, subject to sub-section (e);
(5) Other persons whose presence is determined by the court to be necessary to the
welfare and well-being of the child;
(6) One or both of his support persons, the facilitator and interpreter, if any;
(7) The court stenographer; and
(8) Persons necessary to operate the videotape equipment.
(d) The rights of the accused during trial, especially the right to counsel and to confront and
cross-examine the child, shall not be violated during the deposition.
(e) If the order of the court is based on evidence that the child is unable to testify in the physical
presence of the accused, the court may direct the latter to be excluded from the room in which
the deposition is conducted. In case of exclusion of the accused, the court shall order that the
testimony of the child be taken by live-link television in accordance with Section 25 of this
Rule. If the accused is excluded from the deposition, it is not necessary that the child be able to
view an image of the accused.
(f) The videotaped deposition shall be preserved and stenographically recorded. The videotape
and the stenographic notes shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court where the case is
pending for safekeeping and shall be made a part of the record.
(g) The court may set other conditions on the taking of the deposition that it finds just and
appropriate, taking into consideration the best interests of the child, the constitutional rights of
the accused, and other relevant factors.
(h) The videotaped deposition and stenographic notes shall be subject to a protective order as
provided in Section 31(b).
(i) If, at the time of trial, the court finds that the child is unable to testify for a reason stated in
Section 25(f) of this Rule, or is unavailable for any reason described in Section 4(c), Rule 23 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may admit into evidence the videotaped deposition
of the child in lieu of his testimony at the trial. The court shall issue an order stating the reasons
therefor.
(j) After the original videotaping but before or during trial, any party may file any motion for
additional videotaping on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The court may order an
additional videotaped deposition to receive the newly discovered evidence.
5. Taking of Electronic Testimony

Rule 10, secs. 1, 2, 3, Electronic Evidence Rule
RULE 10
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
SECTION 1. Electronic testimony. – After summarily hearing the parties pursuant to Rule 9 of these Rules, the
court may authorize the presentation of testimonial evidence by electronic means. Before so authorizing, the
court shall determine the necessity for such presentation and prescribe terms and conditions as may be necessary
under the circumstance, including the protection of the rights of the parties and witnesses concerned.
"49
SEC. 2. Transcript of electronic testimony. – When examination of a witness is done electronically, the entire
proceedings, including the questions and answers, shall be transcribed by a stenographer, stenotypes or other
recorder authorized for the purpose, who shall certify as correct the transcript done by him. The transcript should
reflect the fact that the proceedings, either in whole or in part, had been electronically recorded.
SEC. 3. Storage of electronic evidence. – The electronic evidence and recording thereof as well as the
stenographic notes shall form part of the record of the case. Such transcript and recording shall be deemed prima
facie evidence of such proceedings.
6. Rights and obligations of a witness

Rule 132, secs. 3, 16
Sec. 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. —A witness must answer questions, although his
answer may tend to establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a witness:
(1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from
harsh or insulting demeanor;
(2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
(3) Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense
unless otherwise provided by law; or
(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it be to
the very fact at issue or to a fact from which the fact in issue would be
presumed. But a witness must answer to the fact of his previous final conviction
for an offense.
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. —A witness may be allowed to refresh his
memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at
the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact
was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in
such case the writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party,
who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read It in evidence So, also,
a witness may testify from such a writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the
particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction
when made; but such evidence must be received with cation.
7. Remedies during examination
a. Objections
Rule 132, secs. 36-38
Section 36. Objection. — Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately
after the offer is made. Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a
witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. An offer of
evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the unless a different
period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (36a)
Section 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. — When it becomes reasonably
apparent in the course of the examination of a witness that the question being propounded are of the
same class as those to which objection has been made, whether such objection was sustained or
overruled, it shall not be necessary to repeat the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse party to
record his continuing objection to such class of questions. (37a)
Section 38. Ruling. — The ruling of the court must be given immediately after the objection
is made, unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented;
but the ruling shall always be made during the trial and at such time as will give the party against
whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated. However, if the
objection is based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of them
must specify the ground or grounds relied upon. (38a)

Sec . 21. Objections to questions.— Objections to questions should be couched in a
manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten, or intimidate the child.
People v. Versoza, 294 SCRA 466 (1998)

• Factors to be considered in adopting the totality of circumstances test in resolving the admissibility of out-of-court
identification of suspects.·InPeople v. Teehankee, the Court enumerated the factors that should be considered in adopting
the totality of circumstances test in resolving the admissibility of out-of-court identification of suspects: x x x
• (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
• (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time;
• (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
• (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
• (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and
• (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
• It is axiomatic that an objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the grounds
shall become apparent.·It bears stressing that appellant Avendaño raised the issue of his being charged and convicted
"50
allegedly under a wrong name for the first time on appeal. When eyewitness Dojenas identified him in court, no objections
were made by the defense as to Avendaño’s first and middle names and none were registered in the transcript of
stenographic notes. Neither do the records bear out any effort on AvendañoÊs part to raise the issue that the person being
charged with the crime is named Jerry Avendaño y Mendoza and not Cherry Abendaño y Pagatpat. Having failed to make
an objection as to his exact name in the course of the trial, it was too late for appellant Avendaño to raise the matter on
appeal. It is axiomatic that an objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the
grounds shall become apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the court below, an
objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.
Roberry resulting to Homicide
On appeal, Verzosa and Avendaño anchor their prayer for acquittal on the alleged unreliability of the positive
identification made by the lone eyewitness who testified at the trial·Arthur Dojenas. They claim that when
Arthur Dojenas pointed to them as the perpetrators, there were other detainees inside the detention cell and it was
possible that one of those other detainess could have been the real culprit. They assert that Dojenas did not point
to them right away during the confrontation at the police station. Neither was Dojenas’ testimony corroborated
by any other witness.
Specifically, appellant Avendaño attempts to discredit his identification as one of the perpetrators of the crime by
claiming that his name is Cherry and that his middle name is Pagatpat while the information and the dispositive
portion of the assailed decision speak of a certain “Jerry Avendano”.
In attempting to destroy his identification by Dojenas, appellant Avendaño insists that said witness was not aware
of his true and real name as he was mentioned in the sinumpaang salaysay, charged in the information and
convicted by the trial court as “Jerry Avendaño y Mendoza” and not as “Cherry Abendaño y Pagatpat,” his real
name. In sum, it is appellant AvendañoÊs view that the identities of malefactors can only be established if the
witness knows their names.
Ruling:
It is, therefore, enough that an eyewitness positively identify the culprits in a crime by means of their faces or
physical features.
It bears stressing that appellant Avendaño raised the issue of his being charged and convicted allegedly under a
wrong name for the first time on appeal. When eyewitness Dojenas identified him in court, no objections were
made by the defense as to Avendaño’s first and middle names and none were registered in the transcript of
stenographic notes. Neither do the records bear out any effort on Avendaño’s part to raise the issue that the
person being charged with the crime is named Jerry Avendaño y Mendoza and not Cherry Abendaño y Pagatpat.
Having failed to make an objection as to his exact name in the course of the trial, it was too late for appellant
Avendaño to raise the matter on appeal. It is axiomatic that an objection in the course of the oral examination of
a witness should be made as soon as the grounds shall become apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility
of evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.
b. Striking-off answer
Rule 132, sec. 39
Sec 39. Striking out answer. —Should a witness answer the question before the adverse
party had the opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same, and such objection is found to be
meritorious, the court shall sustain the objection and order the answer given to be stricken off the
record.
B. Documentary
1. Authentication and proof
a. Documents
1.Public
Rule 132, sec.19, pars. 1, 2
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. —For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required
by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
Rule 132, secs. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30
"51
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. —Documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the
fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. —The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country,
the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul-general, consul,
vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. —Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. —Any public record, an official copy of
which is admissible in evidence, must not be removed from the office in which it is kept, except
upon order of a court where the inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of
a pending case.
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. —An authorized public record of a
private document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the
legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.
Sec. 30. Proof of notarial documents. —Every instrument duly acknowledged or

proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or
document involved.
Agasen v. CA, 325 SCRA 504 (2000)

• Notarized documents are considered public documents which enjoy the presumption of validity as to authenticity and due
execution. —It is not denied that the two subject documents are notarized documents and, as such, are considered public
documents which enjoy the presumption of validity as to authenticity and due execution. One of the documents, the Deed
of Absolute Sale, was identified by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maximo Quero, the administering officer who had notarized
it. The legal presumption of validity of petitionersÊ duly notarized public documents has not been overcome by
preponderant evidence by private respondent, upon whom the burden of proof rests, having alleged the contrary.
• Where the plaintiff fails to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of documents attached and
alleged as part of the counterclaim, he is deemed to have admitted the same. —The subject documents were also attached
by petitioners to their Answer where they were alleged as part of the counterclaim. As such, private respondent should have
specifically denied under oath their genuineness and due execution. After all, a counterclaim is considered a complaint,
only this time, it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the
same rules as if it were an independent action. Having failed to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the said documents, private respondent is deemed to have admitted the same.
Facts:
Petitioners claimed that they became the owners of the portion of the subject land which belonged to private respondent as
her share therein, by virtue of: (1) the sale in their favor of 1,785 square meters thereof by Leonora Calonge, sister of
Fortunata Calonge-Agasen, and (2) the sale in their favor by private respondent.
Issues:
1. THE DECISION (ANNEX A) ERRED IN DECLARING THE DEED OF PARTITION WITH SALE (EXH. 1) AND THE
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (EXH. 2) NOT AUTHENTIC AND VALID;
2. THE DECISION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE THEIR CLAIM OF
OWNERSHIP AND IN GIVING MORE CREDENCE TO PLAINTIFFS TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND TAX
DECLARATION NO. 21460 (EXH. B) AND CERTIFICATION OF TAX PAYMENTS (EXH. C
As correctly stated by the lower court, the crucial question in the instant controversy is whether or not the two (2) documents,
relied upon by petitioners as basis for their claim of ownership, are valid.
Held:
Yes. They are valid.
it is not denied that the two subject documents are notarized documents and, as such, are considered public documents which
enjoy the presumption of validity as to authenticity and due execution. One of the documents, the Deed of Absolute Sale, was
identified by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maximo Quero, the administering officer who had notarized it. The legal
"52
presumption of validity of petitionersÊ duly notarized public has not been overcome by preponderant evidence by private
respondent, upon whom the burden of proof rests, having alleged the contrary.
The subject documents were also attached by petitioners to their Answer where they were alleged as part of the counterclaim.
As such, private respondent should have specifically denied under oath their genuineness and due execution. After all, a
counterclaim is considered a complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the
same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action. Having failed to specifically deny under
oath the genuineness and due execution of the said documents, private respondent is deemed to have admitted the same.
And while private respondent denied having signed any document selling the subject parcels of land, the trial court found her
signature on the subject documents to be genuine, after a comparison thereof with her own documentary evidence on record.
Indeed, it has been held that where a comparison is permissible, it may be made by the court, with or without the aid of
expert witnesses.
The following circumstances all indicate the genuineness and due execution of the subject documents:
(1) The subject documents were duly notarized public documents;
(2) The documents enjoy the legal presumption of validity;
(3) Their genuineness and due execution were not specifically denied under oath by private respondent;
(4) Private respondent’s signature thereon were found genuine by the lower court upon a comparison of her signature thereon
with that in her own documentary evidence;
(5) The actual identification and positive testimony of petitioner; and
(6) The testimony of the lawyer who had notarized one of the subject documents. Private respondent’s bare denial of the
same cannot, by any measure, overcome the above-mentioned evidence and legal presumptions in petitioners’ favor.
But Cf. Cequeña v. Bolante, 330 SCRA 216 (2000)

Circumstances under which a document can be considered ancient. —An ancient
document is one that is:
(1) more than 30 years old,
(2) found in the proper custody, and
(3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It must on its
face appear to be genuine.
An affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains
a notarial jurat; By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership. —Not all notarized
documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not
automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. Furthermore,
the affidavit in question does not state how the ownership of the subject land was transferred
from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of
acquiring ownership.
Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the
property for which such taxes have been paid.
Facts:
Dispute between a parcel of land. Tax declarations were previously under Sinfroso
Mendoza (father of respondent, Bolante). Later on, tax declarations were under the name of
Margarito Mendoza, brother of Sinfroso and father of petitioner, Cequena.
Bolante was occupying the property in question.
Trial court: Ruled in favor of petitioners, Cequena.
CA: Reversed trial court’s decision because the genuine and due execution of the
affidavit allegedly signed by the respondent ( respondent in petition to CA —Cequena) and her
mother had not been sufficiently established. The notary public or anyone else who had
witnessed the execution of the affidavit was not presented. No expert testimony or competent
witness ever attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures.
CA further ruled that the affidavit was insufficient to overcome the denial of
respondent and her mother. The former testified that the latter, never having attended school,
could neither read nor write. Respondent also said that she had never been called “Leonor,”
which was how she was referred to in the affidavit.
Moreover, the appellate court held that the probative value of petitioner’s tax receipts
and declarations paled in comparison with respondentÊs proof of ownership of the disputed
parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 indeed
gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Who was the lawful owner and possessor of the land subject of the case
"53
[I]n not considering the affidavit as an exception to the general rule that an affidavit is
classified as hearsay evidence, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand; 
Held:
Petition has no merit.
SC quoted CA’s decision:

While it is true that the affidavit was signed and subscribed before a notary public,
the general rule is that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence, unless affiants
are placed on the witness stand (PeopleÊs Bank and Trust Company vs. Leonidas,
207 SCRA 164). Affidavits are not considered the best evidence, if affiants are
available as witnesses (Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 587). The due
execution of the affidavit was not sufficiently established. The notary public or
others who saw that the document was signed or at least [could] confirm its recitals
[were] not presented. There was no expert testimony or competent witness who
attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures. Worse, [respondent] denied
the genuineness of her signature and that of her mother x x x. [Respondent] testified
that her mother was an illiterate and as far as she knew her mother could not write
because she had not attended school. Her testimony was corroborated by Ma. Sales
Bolante Basa, who said the respondent’s mother was illiterate.
Before a private document offered as authentic can be received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved first. And before a document is admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule under the Dead Man’s Statute, the offeror must show:
(a) that the declarant is dead, insane or unable to testify;
(b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the declarant;
(c) that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the same was contrary
to his interest; and
(d) that circumstances render improbable the existence of any motive to falsify.
In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive and who
testified that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest is not
admissible if the declarant is available to testify as a witness. Such declarant should be
confronted with the statement against interest as a prior inconsistent statement.
Also, the affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document. An ancient document is

one that is:
(1) more than 30 years old,
(2) found in the proper custody, and
(3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It must on its
face appear to be genuine.
It must on its face appear to be genuine. The petitioners herein failed, however, to
explain how the purported signature of Eduarda Apiado could have been affixed to the subject
affidavit if, according to the witness, she was an illiterate woman who never had any formal
schooling. This circumstance casts suspicion on its authenticity.
Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an
affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial
jurat.
Furthermore, the affidavit in question does not state how the ownership of the subject
land was transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is
not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they
constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes has
been paid. In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for
tax purposes does not prove ownership.
Additional note: Ownership — tax declarations/receipts coupled with actual possession

(Art 538, Civil Code)
2. Private
Rule 132, sec. 19, pars. 1-3
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. —For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
"54
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required
by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
Rule 132, secs. 20, 27

Sec. 20. Proof of private document. —Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuiness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. —An authorized public record of a
private document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the
legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.
Cf. Rule 132, sec. 21 (when not necessary)

Sec. 21. When evidence by authenticity of private document not necessary. —
Where a private document is more than 30 years old, is produced from a custody in
which it would naturally be found genuine, and in unblemished by any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need be given.
3. Electronic
RA 8792, secs. 5 (f), 7, 10, 11, 14, 15
Sec. 5(f) "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact
may be prove and affirmed, which is receive, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved
or produced electronically.
Section 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents - Electronic documents shall have the
legal effect, validity or enforceability as any other document or legal writing, and -
(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met by an electronic
document if the said electronic document maintains its integrity and reliability and can be
authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent reference, in that -
i. The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition
of any endorsement and any authorized change, or any change which arises in the
normal course of communication, storage and display; and
ii. The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for which it was
generated and in the light of all relevant circumstances.
(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or
whether the law simply provides consequences for the document not being presented or retained
in its original from.
(c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retained in its original form, that
requirement is met by an electronic document if -
i. There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the document from the time
when it was first generated in its final form; and
ii. That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be
presented: Provided, That no provision of this Act shall apply to vary any and all
requirements of existing laws on formalities required in the execution of documents for
their validity.
For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the functional equivalent of a written
document under existing laws.
This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to admissibility of electronic data massages
or electronic documents, except the rules relating to authentication and best evidence.
Section 10. Original Documents. -

(1) Where the law requires information to be presented or retained in its original form, that
requirement is met by an electronic data message or electronic document if;
(a) the integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated in its final
form, as an electronic data message or electronic document is shown by evidence
aliunde or otherwise; and
(b) where it is required that information be resented, that the information is capable of
being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or
whether the law simply provides consequences for the information not being presented or
retained in its original form.
"55
(3) For the purpose of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):
(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has remained
complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement and any change
which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and display ; and
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of purposed for
which the information was generated and in the light of all the relevant circumstances.
Section 11. Authentication of Electronic Data Messages and Electronic Documents. - Until the
Supreme Court by appropriate rules shall have so provided, electronic documents, electronic
data messages and electronic signatures, shall be authenticated by demonstrating, substantiating
and validating a claimed identity of a user, device, or another entity is an information or
communication system, among other ways, as follows;
(a) The electronic signature shall be authenticated by proof than a letter , character,
number or other symbol in electronic form representing the persons named in and
attached to or logically associated with an electronic data message, electronic document,
or that the appropriate methodology or security procedures, when applicable, were
employed or adopted by such person, with the intention of authenticating or approving
in an electronic data message or electronic document;
(b) The electronic data message or electronic document shall be authenticated by proof
that an appropriate security procedure, when applicable was adopted and employed for
the purpose of verifying the originator of an electronic data message and/or electronic
document, or detecting error or alteration in the communication, content or storage of an
electronic document or electronic data message from a specific point, which, using
algorithm or codes, identifying words or numbers, encryptions, answers back or
acknowledgement procedures, or similar security devices.
The supreme court may adopt such other authentication procedures, including the use of
electronic notarization systems as necessary and advisable, as well as the certificate of
authentication on printed or hard copies of the electronic document or electronic data messages
by electronic notaries, service providers and other duly recognized or appointed certification
authorities.
The person seeking to introduce an electronic data message or electronic document in any legal
proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity by evidence capable of supporting a
finding that the electronic data message or electronic document is what the person claims it be.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the integrity of the information and communication
system in which an electronic data message or electronic document is recorded or stored may be
established in any legal proceeding -
a.) By evidence that at all material times the information and communication system or
other similar device was operating in a manner that did not affect the integrity of the
electronic data message and/or electronic document, and there are no other reasonable
grounds to doubt the integrity of the information and communication system,
b.) By showing that the electronic data message and/or electronic document was
recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings who is adverse in interest to the party
using it; or
c.) By showing that the electronic data message and/or electronic document was
recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a
party to the proceedings and who did not act under the control of the party using the
record.
Section 14. Proof by Affidavit. - The matters referred to in Section 12, on admissibility and
Section 9, on the presumption of integrity, may be presumed to have been established by an
affidavit given to the best of the deponent's knowledge subject to the rights of parties in interest
as defined in the following section.
Section 15. Cross - Examination.

(1) A deponent of an affidavit referred to in Section 14 that has been introduced in evidence may
be cross-examined as of right by a party to the proceedings who is adverse in interest to the
party who has introduced the affidavit or has caused the affidavit to be introduced.
(2) Any party to the proceedings has the right to cross-examine a person referred to in section
11, paragraph 4, sub paragraph c.
Rules 5, 6, Electronic Evidence Rule
RULE 5
AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
SECTION 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any
legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
"56
SEC. 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme
Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or  
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.  
SEC. 3. Proof of electronically notarized document. - A document electronically notarized in accordance with
the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court shall be considered as a public document and proved as a notarial
document under the Rules of Court.
RULE 6
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
SECTION 1. Electronic signature. – An electronic signature or a digital signature authenticate din the manner
prescribed hereunder is admissible in evidence as the functional equivalent of the signature of a person on a
written document.
SEC. 2. Authentication of electronic signatures. – An electronic signature may be authenticate in any of the
following manner:
(a) By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a digital signature and verity the same;
(b) By any other means provided by law; or  
(c) By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the genuineness of the electronic signature.  
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions relation to electronic signature. – Upon the authentication of an electronic
signature, it shall be presumed that:
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating or approving the
electronic document to which it is related or to indicate such person’s consent to the transaction embodied
therein; and  
(c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verity the electronic signature operated without error or
fault.  
SEC. 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. – Upon the authentication of a digital signature,
it shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the immediately preceding section, that:
(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate;  
(c) The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the time it was signed; and  
(d) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein.
c. Handwriting
Rule 132, sec. 22

Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. —The handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting may also be
given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writing admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge.
Rule 130, sec.50 (b)

Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witness. —The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is
given, may be received in evidence regarding —
(a) The identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
Security Bank and Trust Company v. Triumph Lumber & Construction

Corporation, 301 SCRA 537 (1999)
• The initial step in the investigation of a disputed handwriting is the introduction of the genuine
handwriting of the party sought to be charged with the disputed writing, which is to serve as a
standard of comparison. —Then, too, the proper procedure in the investigation of a disputed
handwriting was not observed. The initial step in such investigation is the introduction of the
genuine handwriting of the party sought to be charged with the disputed writing, which is to
serve as a standard of comparison. The standard or the exemplar must therefore be proved to be
genuine.
• Ways of Establishing Genuineness of a Standard Writing. —In BA Finance v. Court of Appeals,
we had the occasion to rule that the genuineness of a standard writing may be established by
any of the following:
"57
• (1) by the admission of the person sought to be charged with the disputed writing made
at or for the purposes of the trial, or by his testimony;
• (2) by witnesses who saw the standards written or to whom or in whose hearing the
person sought to be charged acknowledged the writing thereof;
• (3) by evidence showing that the reputed writer of the standard has acquiesced in or
recognized the same, or that it has been adopted and acted upon by him in his business
transactions or other concerns.
• A purported expert witness is not a credible document examiner where although she had
testified more or less three hundred times as an expert, her findings were sustained by the
courts in more or less ten cases only.·Our review of the testimony of private respondentÊs
expert witness, Crispina V. Tabo, fails to convince us that she was a credible document
examiner, despite petitionerÊs admission that she was. She was candid enough to admit to the
court that although she had testified more or less three hundred times as an expert, her findings
were sustained by the courts in more or less ten cases only.
• Knowledge of the genuine signature could be obtained either by
• (a) seeing the person write some other documents or signatures (ex visu scriptionis);
• (b) seeing documents otherwise known to him to have been written by the person in
question (ex scriptis olim visis); or
• (c) examining, in or out of court, for the express purpose of obtaining such knowledge,
the documents said to have been written by the person in question (ex comparatione
scriptorum).
• Given the fact that Mrs. Tabo’s testimony cannot inspire a conclusion that she was an expert, it
was error to rely on her representation. It is settled that the relative weight of the opinions of
experts by and large depends on the value of assistance and guidance they furnish the court in
the determination of the issue involved.
People v. Pagpaguitan, 315 SCRA 226 (1999)

When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied upon the other to be the
writing of a particular person, any other writing of that person may be admitted in evidence for the
purpose of comparison with the writing in dispute; The court may, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, order a party to write or sign his signature as a basis for comparison. —When a writing
in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied upon the other to be the writing of a particular person,
any other writing of that person may be admitted in evidence for the purpose of comparison with the
writing in dispute. It is also recognized that a comparison of writing is a rational method of
investigation; similarities and dissimilarities thus disclosed have probative value in the search for
truth. Thus, it has been held that, where a comparison is permissible, it may be made by the court,
with or without the aid of expert witnesses. The court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion,
order a party to write or sign his signature as a basis for comparison. For, the handwriting of a person
is characteristic of the person himself. Once admitted, the genuineness of other offered writings
alleged to be the work of the same writer becomes a question for the trier of fact who may, but need
not, be assisted in this task by experts.
Facts:
Pagpaguitan and Salazar raped the victim, Evelyn. The defense of Pagpaguitan is that
Evelyn and himself are sweethearts (Sweetheart theory).
Pagpaguitan faults the judge for arrogating unto himself the task of determining the
genuineness of the handwriting at the back of the picture of the accused and the complainant
together (Exhibit 1) and the alleged letter of complainant to him (Exhibit 2) submitted by the defense
to prove that he and the victim were sweethearts. The victim denies having written either the letter or
the dedication at the back of the picture.
Issue:
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ARROGATING UNTO ITSELF THE SPECIAL TASK OF

DETERMINING THE GENUINESS OF THE HANDWRITING OF THE COMPLAINANT
WHICH RESULT IT HEAVILY RELIED UPON IN ITS VERDICT AGAINST THE ACCUSED
whether or not it is permissible or proper for the trial judge to receive and examine a
specimen writing, written at his order by a party who alleged that she was not the writer of other
documents submitted in evidence?
Held:
During trial, the judge ordered the complainant to write under his dictation (Exhibit X). It is
of record that the handwriting at the back of the picture and in the letter were very different.
Findings of the trial court: …In a letter comparison, the court found that the alphabets g, k ,
p and y in both exhibits 2 and X have different writing characteristics which led the court to believe
that Exhibit 2 was not written by the complainant.
"58
Pagpaguitan argues that the task of comparing the handwriting on the documents in
question was one for experts and not the judge. On this point, SC finds the judge’s comparison
proper and permissible.
When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied upon the other to be the
writing of a particular person, any other writing of that person may be admitted in evidence for the
purpose of comparison with the writing in dispute. It is also recognized that a comparison of writing
is a rational method of investigation; similarities and dissimilarities thus disclosed have probative
value in the search for truth. Thus, it has been held that, where a comparison is permissible, it may
be made by the court, with or without the aid of expert witnesses. The court may, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, order a party to write or sign his signature as a basis for comparison. For, the
handwriting of a person is characteristic of the person himself. Once admitted, the genuineness of
other offered writings alleged to be the work of the same writer becomes a question for the trier of
fact who may, but need not, be assisted in this task by experts.
People v. Agresor, 320 SCRA 302 (1999)

• The test of genuineness ought to be the resemblance, not the formation of letters in some other
specimens but to the general character of writing, which is impressed on it as the involuntary and
unconscious result of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is, therefore, itself permanent.
The identification of handwriting should not rest, therefore, on the apparent similarity or dissimilarity
of one feature but should be based on the examination of all the basic characteristics of the handwriting
under study. Our own examination of the love letters reveals that they are devoid of any unusual pen
pauses, pen lifts, tremors and retouchings that characterize forgeries. Indeed, the writing appears to
flow naturally, not conscious, hesitant or studied. The writers of both sets of writing write with a
consistent heavy pressure. There are no pronounced variations in the formation of the letters.
• Opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the courts, the expert’s function being
to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion; Nevertheless the
handwriting expert may afford assistance in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape
notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.
Facts:
According to complainant: Accused Agresor forced her to go away and took advantage of
her 3 times.
Defense: Sweetheart theory

Erwin also claimed that Ritchie used to send letters through his friend Cherry Anne Alcaraz
and his aunt, Imelda Balaan. In a letter she sent through Cherry Anne on the first week of February
1994, Ritchie wrote that she was being forced to abort the baby she was carrying and that she wanted
to go away. The lovers thus agreed to meet in one of the stores in the supermarket and leave together.
After talking in the store, Erwin got his clothes from the house of one of his barkada. He also
instructed Marciano Viernes, a tricycle driver, to fetch Ritchie from the store at around 10:00 that
same morning. He and complainant then rode to Barangay 24, Alsem, Vintar in the tricycle.
Confronted with the letters offered as evidence by the defense, Ritchie denied having
written them. She said that that was not how she wrote and that “the letters were different” from her
handwriting.
Issue:
Whether or not
Held:
SC reversed appellant’s (Agresor) innocence.
The undated letters given by complainant to appellant establish that they were indeed lovers
We fail to see any difference between the two sets of writings that can be described as
material. The size and proportions of letters do not have much significance in the identification of
handwriting for the simple reason that they can be appreciably changed according to the
circumstances. And while there are portions in the love letters written in an erect manner, the
handwriting in these letters, in general, like the handwriting in the notebook is slanted to the left.
Differences noted by the trial court may be due to variations that invariably occur since the
hand does not move in a mechanical manner and cannot always produce characters alike. The mood
and the relative importance of the document may also unconsciously affect the handwriting.
Notes - written while given a limited time to take down notes
Love letter - made in a relaxed and in a more leisurely manner.
"59
The test of genuineness ought to be the resemblance, not the formation of letters in same
other specimens but to the general character of writing, which is impressed on it as the involuntary
and unconscious result of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is, therefore, itself
permanent. The identification of handwriting should not rest, therefore, on the apparent similarity or
dissimilarity of one feature but should be based on the examination of all the basic characteristics of
the handwriting under study.
Our own examination of the love letters reveals that they are devoid of any unusual pen
pauses, pen lifts, tremors and retouchings that characterize forgeries. Indeed, the writing appears to
flow naturally, not conscious, hesitant or studied. The writers of both sets of writing write with a
consistent heavy pressure. There are no pronounced variations in the formation of the letter.
It is also significant to add that appellant produced in evidence not only one or two letters to
prove his relationship with complainant, but a total of eight letters and notes. The handwriting in all
these letters bears a striking similarity to the specimens. The sheer number of the love letters weighs
against any suspicions of forgery since it would greatly increase the risk of discovery.
Accused requested for handwriting to be submitted to the NBI to ascertain its authenticity
but the trial court denied the motion, ruling that “The Court itself can determine whether or not that
handwriting is the handwriting of the private complainant.”
The trial court should not have simply brushed aside this motion since the accusedÊs
defense rests on the theory that he and the victim were sweethearts and the letters were offered
precisely to prove such defense. Accordingly, he is entitled to present evidence that the handwriting
thereon was genuine, especially in the light of the denial of the alleged victim that the handwriting
was hers.
Opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the courts, the expert’s
function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion;
Nevertheless the handwriting expert may afford assistance in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which
would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.
As there was dispute regarding the genuiness of the handwriting, it would have been
prudent if the trial court allowed the presentation of a handwriting expert by the defense.
See RA 8972, secs. 5 (e), 8, 9, 14

Sec. 5(e) "Electronic Signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound
in electronic form, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with
the electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedures employed or
adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating or
approving an electronic data message or electronic document.
Section 8. Legal Recognition of Electronic Signatures. - An electronic signature on the

electronic document shall be equivalent to the signature of a person on a written document if
that signature is proved by showing that a prescribed procedure, not alterable by the parties
interested in the electronic document, existed under which -
(a) A method is used to identify the party sought to be bound and to indicate said party's
access to the electronic document necessary for his consent or approval through the
electronic signature;
(b) Said method is reliable and appropriate for the purpose for which the electronic
document was generated or communicated, in the light of all circumstances, including
any relevant agreement;
(c) It is necessary for the party sought to be bound, in or order to proceed further with
the transaction, to have executed or provided the electronic signature; and
(d) The other party is authorized and enabled to verify the electronic signature and to
make the decision to proceed with the transaction authenticated by the same.
Section 9. Presumption Relating to Electronic Signatures - In any proceedings involving an

electronic signature, it shall be presumed that -
(a) The electronic signature is the signature of the person to whom it correlates; and
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of signing or
approving the electronic document unless the person relying on the electronically signed
electronic document knows or has noticed of defects in or unreliability of the signature
or reliance on the electronic signature is not reasonable under the circumstances.
Section 14. Proof by Affidavit. - The matters referred to in Section 12, on admissibility and
Section 9, on the presumption of integrity, may be presumed to have been established by an
"60
affidavit given to the best of the deponent's knowledge subject to the rights of parties in interest
as defined in the following section.
2. Alterations
Rule 132, sec. 31
Sec. 31. Alterations in document, how to explain. —The party producing a document
as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part
material to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. He may show that the
alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the
parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration did not
change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall not
be admissible in evidence.
3. Documents in unofficial language

Rule 132, sec. 33
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. —Documents written in an
unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into
English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to
have such translation prepare before trial.
4. Effect of Seal
Rule 132, sec 32
Sec. 32. Seal. — There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed private
documents insofar as their admissibility as evidence is concerned.
III. Offer and appreciation of evidence
A. Offer of evidence; effects of offer or lack of offer
Rule 132, secs. 34, 35

Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. —The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Sec. 35. When to make offer. —As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at
the time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party’s
testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.
Dela Torre v. CA, 294 SCRA 196 (1998)

• If a party fails to invoke the rule which requires that the offer of the testimony of witnesses be made at
the beginning of the testimony of said witnesses or to object to such testimony at the close of the
presentation of the evidence, he is deemed to have waived his objection based on this ground. —
Petitioner contends that the trial court admitted in evidence the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
when the fact is that before they testified, their testimonies were not formally offered as required by
Rule 132, S35 of the Rules of Court. x x x Petitioner raised this point, however, only in the Court of
Appeals. He thus waived his objection by his failure to raise it at the close of the presentation of the
prosecution evidence in the trial court. As already noted, the trial in this case took place from December
28, 1989 to February 1, 1990. That was after the adoption of the new rule which required that the offer
be made at the beginning of the testimony of a witness. Petitioner should have invoked this rule and
objected to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, if not before each of their testimonies, then at
least at the time their testimonies were formally offered at the close of the presentation of the
prosecution evidence. Not having done so, he must be deemed to have waived his objection based on
this ground. Consequently, the trial court committed no error in considering the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses in its decision despite the fact that such testimonies had not been offered before
they were given.
• The reason for Rule 132, §1 of the Rules of Court is two-fold: to afford the judge the opportunity of
observing the demeanor of the witness and to allow the adverse party a chance of cross-examining
him.·Rule 132, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that „the examination of witnesses presented in a trial
or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness
shall be given orally. The reason for this rule is two-fold: to afford the judge the opportunity of
observing the demeanor of the witness and to allow the adverse party a chance of cross-examining him.
• Although hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse party’s
counsel, it is nonetheless without probative value. The explanation for this is given in People v. Valero,
thus: The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like
hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the
striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may
make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
"61
Issue:
W/O the trial court erred when it admitted in evidence the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, when the
same were not formally offered
Held:
NO.
Under Rule 132, Sec 36, it is required that an objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness should
be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for the first
time on appeal will not be considered.
Petitioner raised this point only in the Court of Appeals. He thus waived his objection by his failure to raise it at
the close of the presentation of the prosecution evidence in the trial court.
Petitioner should have invoked this rule and objected to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, if not
before each of their testimonies, then at least at the time their testimonies were formally offered at the close of
the presentation of the prosecution evidence. Not having done so, petitioner be deemed to have waived his
objection based on this ground.
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value. In this case, documents material to the guilt
of the accused were admitted without the prosecution presenting in court those who executed them. These
documents contain statements of facts and, therefore, those who made them should have been presented in court
so that they could be cross-examined by the defense. Otherwise, whatever matter they contain is hearsay and,
consequently, without probative value.
Alonte v. Savellano Jr., 287 SCRA 245 (1998)
Facts:
The charge is principally based on the following affidavit dated October 31, 1996 of Ms. Juvie-Lyn
Punongbayan, a 16-year old minor. The complainant alleged that she was raped by Mayor Alonte, assisted by
Concepcion by bringing her to the house of the mayor.
Punongbayan executed an Affidavit of Desistance for the reason that she wants a “new life”
The court cannot close its eyes to the possibility of bribery.
Issue:
W/N respondent judge, Savellano Jr., committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when, in total disregard of the Revised Rules on Evidence and existing doctrinal
jurisprudence, he rendered a decision in the case a quo on the basis of the 2 affidavits (Punongbayan’s and
Balbin’s) which were neither marked nor offered into evidence by the prosecution, nor without giving the
petition opportunity to cross-examine the affiants thereof, again in violation of the petitioners right to due
process.
Affidavit of Balbin —Bribery to drop the rape case against Mayor Alonte
—submitted to Secretary of Justice for the motion for the early resolution of the case
Held:
Separate opinion:
Any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be
offered by him, otherwise it is excluded and rejected. —The admission of private complainant’s affidavit of
October 21, 1996 was made solely in response to respondent judge’s own questioning. It was this affidavit
which respondent judge used to convict the petitioners. This affidavit, however, was not marked nor was it
formally offered before the court. The Revised Rules on Evidence clearly and expressly provide that “[t]he
court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.” Evidence not formally offered in court
will not be taken into consideration by the court in disposing of the issues of the case. Any evidence which a
party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by him, otherwise it is
excluded and rejected.
A retracted statement or testimony must be subject to scrupulous examination. The previous

statement or testimony and the subsequent one must be carefully compared and the circumstances under
which each was given and the reasons and motives for the change carefully scrutinized. The veracity of each
statement or testimony must be tested by the credibility of the witness which is left for the judge to decid
"62
Oct 21, 1996 affidavit by Complainant — “Reply-Affidavit”, the complaint was
based on this affidavit
Notes:
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that
the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is
given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates by now elementary and deeply imbedded in
our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable.
B. Objections to offer of evidence; ruling
Rule 132, secs. 36, 38

Sec. 36. Objection. —Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer
is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be
made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within 3 days after notice of the offer
unless a different period is allowed bu the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Sec. 38. Ruling. —The ruling of the court must be given immediately after the objection is made,
unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented; but the
ruling shall always be made during the trial and at such time as will give the party against whom it is
made an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated. However, if the
objection is based on 2 or more grounds, a ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of them
must specify the ground or grounds relied upon.
Cf. Rule 132, sec. 37

Sec. 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. —When it becomes reasonably apparent in the
course of the examination of a witness that the questions being propounded are of the same class as
those to which objection has been made, whether such objection was sustained or overrules, it being
sufficient for the adverse party to record his continuing objection to such class of questions.
C. Remedies from exclusion of evidence

Rule 132, sec. 40
Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. —If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded
by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence
excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of
the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.
D. Weight and sufficiency of evidence
Rule 133, secs.1-5

Sec 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. —In civil cases, the party having the burden
of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all
the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial.
The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily
with the greater number.
Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. —In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof as, excluding a possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.
Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground fr conviction. —An extrajudicial

confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti.
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. —Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
"63
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Sec. 5. Susbtantial evidence. —In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact
may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Rule 7, Electronic Evidence Rule

RULE 7
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
SECTION 1. Factors for assessing evidentiary weight. - In assessing the evidentiary weight of an electronic
document, the following factors may be considered:
(a) The reliability of the manner or method in which it was generated, stored or communicated, including
but not limited to input and output procedures, controls, tests and checks for accuracy and reliability of the
electronic data message or document, in the light of all the circumstances as well as any relevant
agreement;
(b) The reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified;  
(c) The integrity of the information and communication system in which it is recorded or stored, including
but not limited to the hardware and computer programs or software used as well as programming errors;  
(d) The familiarity of the witness or the person who made the entry with the communication and information
system;  
(e) The nature and quality of the information which went into the communication and information system
upon which the electronic data message or electronic document was based; or  
(f) Other factors which the court may consider as affecting the accuracy or integrity of the electronic
document or electronic data message.  
SEC. 2. Integrity of an information and communication system. – In any dispute involving the integrity of the
information and communication system in which an electronic document or electronic data message is recorded
or stored, the court may consider, among others, the following factors:
(a) Whether the information and communication system or other similar device was operated in a manner
that did not affect the integrity of the electronic document, and there are no other reasonable grounds to
doubt the integrity of the information and communication system;
(b) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings with interest
adverse to that of the party using it; or  
(c) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by
a person who is not a party tot he proceedings and who did not act under the control of the party using it.
E. Appreciation of evidence
People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 (1998)

It is doctrinal that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for
the trial court has an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and, thus, to
determine whether he or she is telling the truth.—Appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence
to the testimony of dela Cruz and in disregarding his own testimony. We disagree. It is doctrinal that the trial
court’s evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for the trial court has an
untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and, thus, to determine whether he or she
is telling the truth. Such assessment is generally binding on this Court, except when the same has been reached
arbitrarily or when the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which could have affected the result of the case. We have examined the records of this case
and the arguments raised by appellant, but we find no reason to apply these exceptions.
Facts:
Murder of Danilo de Claro.
Prosecution Witness, Ricardo dela Cruz testified that Obello held the 2 arms of victim, de Claro, while a certain
Antonio Go came from appellant’s back and fatally stabbed the victim in the abdomen.
The Trial Court’s Ruling : In convicting appellant, the trial court relied on the testimony of Eyewitness Ricardo
dela Cruz which was corroborated by the medical findings showing the nature and the location of the wounds
inflicted on the victim. The trial court also disbelieved appellantÊs contention that he was carrying his six-month
old child at that time and that he merely tried to pacify the victim and Antonio Go. The trial court held that said
claim was “against ordinary instincts and promptings of human nature.
The trial court also appreciated conspiracy between appellant and Antonio Go. The trial court ruled that “the
killing of Danilo de Claro was committed in such a way that he was not in a position to defend himself[,] for
when he was being stabbed by Antonio Go, his hands were held by Rolly Obello, which was the reason why all
the wounds were in front of the body. Moreover, Danilo de Claro was unarmed.” Without expressly stating so,
the trial court in effect held that the killing was qualified by treachery.
Issue:
In the main, appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
"64
Held: The appeal is not meritorious.
Credibility of Witnesses:
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of dela Cruz and in disregarding
his own testimony. We disagree. It is doctrinal that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is
accorded the highest respect, for the trial court has an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor
of a witness and, thus, to determine whether he or she is telling the truth. Such assessment is generally binding
on this Court, except when the same has been reached arbitrarily or when the trial court has overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have affected the
result of the case. We have examined the records of this case and the arguments raised by appellant, but we find
no reason to apply these exceptions.
Between a positive and categorical testimony on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally
prevails. Indeed, the testimony of a single witness, when positive and credible, is sufficient to support a
conviction even of murder. Testimonies are to be weighed, not numbered; hence, a finding of guilt may be based
on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness when the trial court finds such testimony positive and
credible.
Appellant cited 2 inconsistencies in the statement of the prosecution witness —re: the date of filing of affidavit
of the witness and the number of people who brought the victim to the hospital.
In any event, the alleged inconsistencies refer to minor details and not to the basic elements of the crime. They
do not cast doubt on the identification of appellant as the assailant. Hence, they cannot impair the credibility of
witness Dela Cruz. Such minor inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and candor, for they erase any
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
But Cf. People v. Clopino, 290 SCRA 581 (1998)*** CIPRIANO?

The defense maintains that there is an inconsistency between the sworn statement given by Melody to the PC on
the one hand, and her testimony in court on the other. (No penetration -sworn statement vs. 1 inch of the penis
was able to penetrate victim’s vagina - Melody’s testimony in trial court).
Moreover, under Rule 132, §13 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, in order to impeach a witness by evidence of
prior inconsistent statement, the statement must be related to him and the circumstances of its execution stated.
Then he must be asked whether he made such inconsistent statement. In this case, no attempt was made to
impeach Melody’s testimony in court. She was not shown the complaint of February 18, 1992 and the sworn
statement of the same date nor was she asked to explain any discrepancy.
2nd issue: Accused-appellant contends that Judge Barrsaga had no basis for saying that the testimony of Melody
was given in a straightforward manner and, therefore, was credible. He points out that because Judge Barsaga
did not try the case, another one, Judge Eduardo Israel Tanguanco, having done so, the former did not observe
the witness’ demeanor so as to be able to say that her testimony was straightforward.
Held:
It may be that a judge who tried the case and had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses has an
advantage over another who did not have such an opportunity. But such lack of opportunity does not necessarily
prevent him from determining from the transcript of stenographic notes whether a witness was forthright and
frank. How often has this Court itself found the testimony of witnesses to have been given in a straightforward
manner on the basis solely of the records of the case.
Indeed, there is no claim in this case that at any time in her testimony Melody Quintal hedged or even hesitated
or otherwise indicated that she was withholding anything from the court. As held in People v. Tuvilla: “While the
trial judge who presided over the trial of the case would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of
the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot
render a valid and just decision. The full record was available to him. It is evident from the knowledgeable and
analytical decision he has written that he thoroughly examined the testimonial and documentary evidence before
him and carefully assessed the credibility of the witnesses with the seasoned perceptiveness he has developed as
a trial judge.”
1. Testimonial
a. Credibility of witnesses; effects of bias or relationship or other circumstances like minority
disability/illness; appreciation by trial court
People v. Valla, 323 SCRA 74(2000) —Rape with Homicide

The declaration of appellant acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in
evidence against him under Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Note that
his extrajudicial confession is corroborated by the corpus delicti as required by Section 3 of
Rule 133. The Rules do not require that all the elements of the crime must be clearly
established by evidence independent of the confession. Corpus delicti only means that there
should be some concrete evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from
the confession. In this case, the fact of the crime was sufficiently proven through the
"65
testimonies by witnesses such as Myra Pines, who heard the cries of the victim, and the
other members of the search party who found the body of the victim, and witnessed the
confession of the appellant, as well as documentary evidence presented during trial such as
the medico-legal certificate (Exhibit „D‰·) attesting that the victim had been raped and
killed.
The crucial issue centers on the assessment of credibility of the witnesses. In this case, the
trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We
find no reason to disturb this finding. As consistently held by the Court, the trial judge’s
evaluation of the testimony of a witness is generally accorded not only the highest respect,
but also finality, unless some weighty circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood but
which could change the result. Having had the direct opportunity to observe the witness on
the stand, the trial judge was in a vantage position to assess his demeanor, and determine if
he was telling the truth or not.
***(On Extrajudicial confession) Corpus delicti only means that there should be some
concrete evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession.
Facts:
Dyesebel de la Cruz was found dead and raped. Accused is the victim’s cousin.
A search party was out to look for Dyesebel and when her body was found the accused
asked for forgiveness in front of the members of the search party and offered his daughter in
exchange for the life he took directly to Gonzalo de la Cruz, father of Dyesebel.
Accused denied the extrajudicial confession in court.
Issue:
In sum, the crucial issue centers on the assessment of credibility of the witnesses.
Held:
In this case, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. We find no reason to disturb this finding. As consistently held by the Court, the
trial judge’s evaluation of the testimony of a witness is generally accorded not only the
highest respect, but also finality, unless some weighty circumstance has been ignored or
misunderstood but which could change the result. Having had the direct opportunity to
observe the witness on the stand, the trial judge was in a vantage position to assess his
demeanor, and determine if he was telling the truth or not.
The prosecution witnesses, particularly the barangay officials, had no motive to falsely
testify against appellant, who is their townmate, nor did they have any reason to impute
such a heinous crime against appellant if it were not true. AppellantÊs claim that he was
implicated in the crime “because he did not immediately accomplish the cutting of the grass
in the ricefield” — is too preposterous to even merit consideration.
More importantly, the declaration of appellant acknowledging his guilt of the offense may
be given in evidence against him under Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Note that his extrajudicial confession is corroborated by the corpus delicti as
required by Section 3 of Rule 133. The Rules do not require that all the elements of the
crime must be clearly established by evidence independent of the confession. Corpus delicti
only means that there should be some concrete evidence tending to show the commission of
the crime apart from the confession. In this case, the fact of the crime was sufficiently
proven through the testimonies by witnesses such as Myra Pines, who heard the cries of the
victim, and the other members of the search party who found the body of the victim, and
witnessed the confession of the appellant, as well as documentary evidence presented
during trial such as the medico-legal certificate (Exhibit „D‰·) attesting that the victim
had been raped and killed.
[Civil indemnity - 100,000]
People v. Atienza, 326 SCRA 802 (2000)

An accused charged with rape through one mode of commission may still be convicted of
the crime if the evidence shows another mode of commission, provided that the accused did not
object to such evidence.· —Even though private complainant’s subnormal mental capacity was not
alleged in the Information, hence, conviction under par. (2), Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code
would normally be violative of accused-appellant’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, it cannot be denied however that he did not object to the
presentation of Dr. Chona Belmonte who was precisely called by the prosecution as its first witness
to testify on private complainant’s subnormal mental capacity, that is, although the latter was already
thirteen (13) years old at the time of the incident, her mental capacity was equivalent only to that of
an eight (8)-year old child. While defense counsel did object to Dr. Belmonte’s Psychiatric
Evaluation Report during the prosecution’s formal offer of documentary evidence, he did so only on
"66
the ground that private complainant did not appear to him to be feeble-minded during cross-
examination. Thus, instead of objecting outright to the aforementioned prosecution evidence on the
ground that private complainant’s alleged subnormal mental capacity was not properly alleged in the
Information, the defense in fact waived this procedural infirmity by presenting evidence of its own to
prove the contrary, that is, that private complainant was normal as shown by her Elementary School
Permanent Record or DECS. Form No. 137- A formally offered as Exh. 1 for the defense.
In rape it is not necessary that there be marks of physical violence on the victim’s body
because the exertion of irresistible force by the accused is not an element of the offense, more so
when the force required to overwhelm a child especially one who is of subnormal mental capacity is
obviously and understandably of a lesser degree than that needed to overwhelm a normal adult.·–
Private complainant’s testimony was corroborated by Dr. Diosdado Fuentebella who affirmed on the
witness stand the presence of spermatozoa in her vaginal secretion, consistent with the claim of
recent sexual contact. Although no sign of external physical injury was noted on her body the same
did not negate her claim of rape. We have held that it was not necessary that there be marks of
physical violence on the victim’s body because the exertion of irresistible force by the accused is not
an element of the offense, more so when the force required to overwhelm a child, especially one who
is of subnormal mental capacity like herein private complainant, is obviously and understandably of
a lesser degree than that needed to overwhelm a normal adult. Considering that accused-appellant
was at the time of the incident a thirty-five (35)-year old normal male while private complainant was
a puny thirteen (13)-year old with a mental capacity of an eight (8)-year old, it is not really difficult
to understand how accused-appellant succeeded in his criminal design with minimal force·–but force
nonetheless·–such that no manifestation of physical injury was noted on private complainant.
Issue:
Accused-appellant contends in his appeal that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of
rape as defined in par (2), Art 335 of the RPC, providing for a mode of commission different from
that charged in the information, i.e, while the Information charged him with rape committed through
force and intimidation as defined in par (1), Art 335, he was nevertheless eventually convicted of
rape under par.(2) thereof, i.e, rape of a woman who was deprived of reason, including those with the
mental capacity, of a child below 12 years old.
Held:
SC finds NO merit in accused-appellant’s contention.
The trial court did not find him guilty solely of rape committed under par 2 Art 335 of the
RPC. On the contrary, a plain reading of the appealed Decision readily shows that he had carnal
knowledhe of the 13 yr old complainant through force and intimidation as properly charged in the
information
[T]he Court believes that the accused Rolando Atienza sexually assaulted the offended
party, Maria Theresa Obias with the use of force. It is true that neither the offended party nor the
Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Diosdado Fuentebella, testified that there was physical force sustained
by the former. But, force or violence required in rape is relative x x x x Being relative, the force
needed to overpower the resistance of the offended party is that which is necessary to consummate
the offense. Besides, in the instant case, it is hard to believe that a 13-year old girl, with a mental
age of an eight (8) years of age would voluntarily submit sexually to a man more than twice her age
if no force was exerted. Moreover, if the mental age of a woman above twelve (12) years of age is
that of a child below twelve (12) years of age voluntarily submits herself to the bestial desire of the
accused, or even if the circumstances of force or intimidation do not exist, or of the victim being
deprived of reason or otherwise rendered unconscious, are absent, the accused would still be liable
for rape (People v. Bulaybulay, 248 SCRA 601).
Even though private complainant’s subnormal mental capacity was not alleged in the
Information, hence, conviction under par. (2), Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code would normally
be violative of accused-appellant’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, it cannot be denied however that he did not object to the presentation of Dr.
Chona Belmonte who was precisely called by the prosecution as its first witness to testify on private
complainant’s subnormal mental capacity, that is, although the latter was already thirteen (13) years
old at the time of the incident, her mental capacity was equivalent only to that of an eight (8)-year
old child. While defense counsel did object to Dr. Belmonte’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report during
the prosecution’s formal offer of documentary evidence, he did so only on the ground that private
complainant did not appear to him to be feeble-minded during cross-examination. Thus, instead of
objecting outright to the aforementioned prosecution evidence on the ground that private
complainant’s alleged subnormal mental capacity was not properly alleged in the Information, the
defense in fact waived this procedural infirmity by presenting evidence of its own to prove the
contrary, that is, that private complainant was normal as shown by her Elementary School Permanent
Record or DECS. Form No. 137- A formally offered as Exh. 1 for the defense.
In Pailano, this Court impliedly recognized that an accused charged with rape through one
mode of commission may still be convicted of the crime if the evidence shows another mode of
commission provided that the accused did not object to such evidence.
"67
Finally, even assuming arguendo that accused-appellant’s conviction under par 2 of Art 335
of RPC should be set aside, he is nevertheless still liable for rape comitted through force and
intimidation since his guilt thereof, as properly charged in the Information, has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. (The thirteen (13)-year old private complainant tearfully recounted on the witness
stand how accused-appellant forcibly dragged her to her motherÊs bed upon learning that she was
alone, undressed her, sexually abused her despite her resistance·–Habo ko! Habo ko! “I don’t
want!”)
People v. Juan, 326 SCRA 786 (2000)

Taking Rowena’s version in its totality, we find ourselves unable to concur with the
credibility accorded to it by the trial court. For evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in
conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind. Whatever is repugnant
to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance.
It is notable that the contradictions and vacillations we observed in Rowena’s testimonies

referred to the initial and final stages of her story. Was she awakened by a kiss on the lips by
accused-appellant, or was she awakened when he entered her mosquito net? Did she purposely wake
her parents up or were they simply awakened when she returned home? Her anamnesis wavered on
these aspects apparently in her obvious desire to twist the events to suit her purpose.
The other portions of Rowena’s testimony were simply unreliable. Her statements that
accused-appellant shoved a knife at her neck inside her bedroom without explaining how he was
able to enter their house at that late hour when everybody was already asleep; that her father was
awakened when she cried; that she and accused-appellant were able to leave the house unnoticed;
that accused- appellant held the front of her neck or throat with one hand and poked a knife at her
nape with the other hand while walking towards the open field; that she was raped with the knife still
pointed at her neck; and, that she was able to leave accused-appellant by promising that she would
return with her jewelry, all appear to have been scripted by her or for her. The knife pointed at her
neck was mentioned to show the use of violence or intimidation but the plot was too simplistic that it
overlooked vital angles. Rowena adhered to the claim that accused- appellant held a knife at her
neck from beginning to end, that is, from the time she was awakened inside her bedroom and while
walking towards the open field forty (40) meters away from her house until the consummation of the
rape. When a witness fabricates a story, he usually adopts a simple account because a complex one
might lead to entanglement which may be difficult to disentangle. Along the same line, the
experience of the courts and the general observations of humanity teach us that the natural
limitations of our inventive faculties are such that if a witness delivers in court a false narrative
containing numerous details, he is almost certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements
which can be readily refuted, or to expose in hi demeanor the falsity of his mes-sage.
And while the accused-appellant might have failed to introduce proofs of his “sweetheart
theory” such as love letters, gifts and the like, other than the testimony of his sister which we find to
be biased per se, we find these no longer pertinent. The unwitting disclosure of Rowena herself that
she was ordered by accused appellant to return with her jewelry and clothes was already an adequate
indication that the 2 intended to run away. 
People v. Dela Cruz, 313 SCRA 189 (1999)

The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether or not such is in
conformity with human knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind. —If the one who
boxed Felix was a person other than Marbel, Felix could have remonstrated then and there against
the attacked by Arthur on Marbel. Consequently, we find it difficult to sustain the testimony of
Romeo and Jerry that when they heard the shouts Marbel was still sitting on the bench. We seriously
doubt this particular narration of Romeo and Jerry. The test to determine the value of the testimony
of a witness is whether or not such is in conformity with human knowledge and consistent with the
experience of mankind. Aside from subjecting the testimony of a witness under the most careful
scrutiny, of equal importance is getting the complete picture of the events the witness is narrating.
What is more in accord with the ordinary course of events was that Marbel boxed Felix on the road
then returned to the house of Diego, perhaps unaware that Arthur was there. But Arthur must have
learned that it was Marbel who boxed his father Felix, so that in immediate vindication of a wrong
done to his father, Arthur stabbed Marbel.
The rule that the factual findings and assessment of credibility of a witness generally binds
the court cannot be strictly applied in this case. Significant facts and circumstances were overlooked
and disregarded by the trial court which when properly considered affected the result of the case.
There were strong and cogent reasons that justified departure from the trial courtÊs finding. At any
rate, only that aspect of the testimonies of Romeo and Jerry is not sustainable. Even where a witness
has been found to have deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not required that the
whole of his testimony be rejected. The testimony of a witness may be believed in part and
"68
disbelieved in part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and
improbabilities of the case.
Facts:
Arthur De la Cruz stabbed victim, Marbel Baptista, 11 times claiming it to be self defense.
The trial court accorded full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
especially that of Arthur’s uncle Diego Pelonio, regarding the manner of the attack on Marbel by
Arthur and the place of its commission. On the other hand, it found ArthurÊs claim of self-defense to
have been contrived since he failed to raise it when he surrendered to the authorities. Besides, he
also failed to establish the elements of selfdefense.
Accused appellant also insists that the testimony of Diego Pelonio should be completely
disregarded having failed to submit himself to cross-examination, while Romeo Bitamor should be
considered a biased witness being a friend and compadre of the victim. He attacks the credibility of
Jerry Paclibare as he gave contradictory narrations in court and in his affidavit regarding the identity
of the person who shouted for help. (Diego, Romeo and Jerry witnessed the event.
We find it unnatural for Arthur to have been suddenly infuriated upon his return to the
house of Diego with Marbel as the target of his furor, to the exclusion of the other guests of Diego. It
should be recalled that during the drinking session, Arthur was watching television. When he heard
the shouts of a woman, he proceeded to the direction where the sound came from. His parents Felix
and Carlita must have then disclosed to him the identity of Marbel as the one who boxed Felix, that is
why he directed his stab blows solely at Marbel upon his return to the house of Diego. We draw this
inference from a consideration of the other portions of the testimony of Romeo manifesting that
indeed it was Marbel who physically assaulted Felix on the road. Otherwise, it would be very
unnatural for Arthur to stab Marbel for no reason at all. It may be recalled that Arthur was in the
house of Diego helping the latter prepare the food for his guests.
Jurisprudence recognizes that victims of criminal violence have a penchant for seeing the
faces and features of their attackers and remembering them. In the present case, Marbel was known
to Felix, both being residents of Batan, Aklan. Felix must have acquiesced to the infliction by his son
Arthur of the injuries Marbel sustained as may be gathered from the testimony of prosecution
witness, Romeo.
The rule that the factual findings and assessment of credibility of a witness generally binds
the court cannot be strictly applied in this case. Significant facts and circumstances were overlooked
and disregarded by the trial court which when properly considered affected the result of the case.
There were strong and cogent reasons that justified departure from the trial court’s. finding. At any
rate, only that aspect of the testimonies of Romeo and Jerry is not sustainable. Even where a witness
has been found to have deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not required that the
whole of his testimony be rejected. The testimony of a witness may be believed in part and
disbelieved in part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and
improbabilities of the case.
The Supreme Court then appreciated the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave
offense under Art 13, par 5 of the RPC. The circumstance that Felix, Arthur’s father, was boxed by
Marbel was serious enough to perturb Arthur’s mind and diminish the voluntariness of his action.
Arthur’s (accused-appellant) version of the incident was scripted way below the level of
satisfaction. It has imperfections as to some significant segments so much so that it failed to pass the
test of credibility.
The circumstance that Romeo was the victim’s friend and compadre does not automatically
impair his credibility nor render his testimony less worthy of credence since no improper motive has
been ascribed to him for testifying against accused-appellant. On the other hand, whether the woman
who was shouting was unidentified, as declared by Jerry in court, or the voice of the woman was that
of accused- appellantÊs mother, as stated in JerryÊs affidavit, refers to a trivial matter which cannot
in any manner serve to discredit him. Besides, whenever there is an inconsistency between the
affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight because the
affidavit is almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.
SC held that accused-appellant Arthur Dela Cruz is guilty of homicide, not murder.
People v. Banela, 301 SCRA 84 (1999)

A trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses carry great weight and respect and
will be sustained by the appellate courts unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed
decision or affect the result of the case. —It is doctrinally settled that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of
"69
its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under grilling examination. A trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses carry great
weight and respect and will be sustained by the appellate courts unless the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter
the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. In the instant case, we see no cogent reason to
depart from this established rule as accused- appellant has failed to present any substantial evidence
which would merit a reversal of the findings of the court below.
When there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to
testify falsely against an accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence.—It is an oft-repeated rule that when there is no showing of any improper motive on the
part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against an accused or to falsely implicate him in the
commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. In the case at bar, accused-appellant was not able to
show any improper ulterior motive on the part of complainant to falsely incriminate him in such a
serious offense. Indeed, her only motive can well be to bring before the bar of justice the person who
had abused her.
Facts:
When a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. And so long as her testimony meets the test of
credibility and unless the same is controverted by competent physical and testimonial evidence, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
Issue:
The arguments advanced in the appeal mainly revolve on the issue of credibility.
It is contended that Marilou could not have possibly made any positive identification of her
assailants since she was sexually abused in an unlighted place. Accused-appellant further claims that
in her direct examination, Marilou positively identified accused-appellant as the person who raped
her, whereas in her “Salaysay” executed immediately after the incident, she failed to name him.
Held:
It is doctrinally settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe
the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.
A trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses carry great weight and respect and will be
sustained by the appellate courts unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect
the result of the case. In the instant case, we see no cogent reason to depart from this established rule
as accused- appellant has failed to present any substantial evidence which would merit a reversal of
the findings of the court below.
It is an oft-repeated rule that when there is no showing of any improper motive on the part
of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against an accused or to falsely implicate him in the
commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. In the case at bar, accused-appellant was not able to
show any improper ulterior motive on the part of complainant to falsely incriminate him in such a
serious offense. Indeed, her only motive can well be to bring before the bar of justice the person who
had abused her.
Moreover, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, oftentimes the only evidence
that can be offered to prove the guilt of the perpetrator is the testimony of the offended woman
herself. Thus, her testimony, standing alone can be made the basis of conviction if such testimony
meets the test of credibility
We have consistently held that when a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that the rape has been committed, and that if her testimony meets
the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. This is true in the instant
case where the trial court found that there is clear, convincing, and competent physical and
testimonial evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against accused-
appellant.
Side notes: For alibi to prosper the accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed but he must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission
"70
People v. Calayca, 301 SCRA 192 (1999) From Qualified rape to Simple rape
Errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected of a witness especially
when she is recounting details of an experience so humiliating and so painful as rape.—We have
ruled in numerous cases that an errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected of
a witness especially when she is recounting details of an experience so humiliating and so painful as
rape. Minor errors in the testimony of a rape victim tend to buttress, rather than weaken, her
credibility since that would indicate that her testimony was not contrived.
This supposed ill-motive of private complainant was not duly established by the defense.
Hence, there was nothing for the prosecution to rebut. The elementary principle in the rules of
evidence is that an affirmative allegation made by a party must be duly proved to merit acceptance
by the court.
Right to be Informed; Qualified Rape; An accused can only be convicted of simple rape and
not qualified rape, even if proved, if the Information alleged was only the relationship of the offender
as the parent of the victim and failed to state the minority of the latter. —A reading of the
Information for rape filed against appellant in the present case reveals that he is merely charged with
the crime of simple rape which warrants the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua. This is
so because the fact of the minority of the victim, is not stated in the Information. What was alleged
therein was only the relationship of the offender as the parent of the victim. Again, as we have
emphasized in People v. Ramos, the elements of minority of the victim and her relationship to the
offender must concur. As such, the charge of rape in the Information is not in its qualified form so as
to fall under the special qualifying circumstances stated in Section 11 of R.A. 7659. Thus, the
penalty of death prescribed in R.A. 7659 should not have been imposed against appellant.
“The victim’s brief but candid and straightforward narration of how she was raped by the
appellant bears earmarks of a credible witness.”
Accused appellant made an attempt to impute ill-motive on the part of private complainant,
Neddy, to falsely charge him with rape. He claims that this is because he slapped Neddy and her
sister when he discovered that they took his savings of 5000 pesos. —The SC did not agree and cited
the ruling of the trial court: “xxx Although, this allegation was not rebutted as the trial prosecutor did
not present again Neddy as a rebuttal witness, to the mind of the court, the fact of slapping is not
enough reason on the part of private offended party to file such heinous case as rape against her own
father. If it were true that Neddy Calayca got his money without his permission, she would not be
slighted if slapped knowing that she got it and she deserved such punishment. This is in accord with
human experience.”
We believe that a teenage unmarried lass would not ordinarily file a rape charge against
anybody, much less her own father, if it were not true. For, it is unnatural for a young and innocent
girl to concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter subject
herself to a public trial id she has not, in fact, been a victim of rape and deeply motivated by a
sincere desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. The alleged slapping by the appellant of
private complainant over money in the amount of merely 5000 is too frail a reason for a teenage
daughter to falsely charge her own father with the heinous crime of rape that is punishable by death.
It is significant to note that, as likewise emphasized by the trial court, appellant did not
deny the imputation of private complainant that he raped her. His silence on the evidence of rape
against him is a mute but eloquent admission of the crime charged.
People v. Padilla, 301 SCRA 265 (1999)

Mental Retardates; A mental retardate is not, by reason of such handicap alone,
disqualified from testifying in court. —A mental retardate is not, by reason of such handicap alone,
disqualified from testifying in court. He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to
relate what he or she knows. If the testimony of a mental retardate is coherent, the same is
admissible in court. Thus, we have in several cases upheld the conviction of the accused based
mainly on statements given in court by the victim who was a mental retardate.
Sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape,
which does not require proof that the accused used force or intimidation in having carnal knowledge
of the victim for conviction. —During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence tending to show
that Maria Aurora is a mental retardate. Significantly, accused- appellant also admitted this point
during his direct examination. It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental
retardate constitutes statutory rape, which does not require proof that the accused used force or
intimidation in having carnal knowledge of the victim for conviction. However, this fact was not
alleged in the information in this case and, therefore, cannot be the basis for conviction. At any rate,
there is adequate evidence to show that the accused-appellant used force and intimidation in
committing the crime of rape in this case.
Issue:
"71
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT THE TESTIMONY OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
LATTER IS INCOMPETENT TO TESTIFY DUE TO HER MENTAL HANDICAP.
Held:
Accused-appellant’s contention is WITHOUT MERIT.
The basic test of a witness’ qualification is of course whether he can percieve and, perceiving, can make
known of his perception to others. Negatively put, Rule 130 Sec 21 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is
such that they are incapable of intelligently making know their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving
the facts respecting which they are examined and relating them truthfully.
Hence, a mental retardate is not, by reason of such handicap alone, disqualified from testifying in court.
He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If the testimony of a
mental retardate is coherent, the same is admissible in court. Thus, we have in several cases upheld the
conviction of the accused based mainly on statements given in court by the victim who was a mental retardate.
Trial courts, which have the opportunity to observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tone of voice of
a witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her testimony will be given credence. In
the instant case, the trial court accorded weight to the testimony of Maria Aurora. Indeed, the complainant’s
truthfulness is evident in her testimony.
Notes:
During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence tending to show that Maria Aurora is a mental retardate.
Significantly, accused appellant also admitted this point during his direct examination. It is settled that sexual
intercourse with a woman who as mental retardate constitutes statutory rape, which does not require proof that
the accused used force and intimidation in having carnal knowledge of the victim for conviction. However, this
fact was not alleged in the information in this case and, therefore, cannot be the basis for conviction. At any rate,
there is adequate evidence to show that the accused-appellant used force and intimidation in comitting the crime
of rape in this case.
The fact that the rape victim is a mental retardate does not per se preclude the trial court from admitting her
testimony in evidence nor from according it full faith and respect. (People vs. Balisnomo, 265 SCRA 98 [1996])
Modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness. (People vs.
Espanola, 271 SCRA 689 [1997])
It is not easy to ascertain the identity of the rapist when the victim is deprived of reason. (People vs. Romua, 272
SCRA 818 [1997])
People v. Antonio, 303 SCRA 414 (1999)

Mere relationship of a witness to a party, without more, cannot impair the witness’
credibility. --Nor did the trial court err in giving credence to the testimonies of Rosalinda Reyes and
Feliciana Napao. That the victim was a boarder of Napao’s son, Rodrigo Reyes, and the owner of the
land being tilled by the latter are not sufficient reasons not to believe this witness. Time and again
we have said that mere relationship of a witness to a party, without more, cannot impair the witness’
credibility.
No reason or motive has been shown for us to doubt the truthfulness of Rosalinda Reyes
and Feliciana Napao. They positively identified accused-appellants, together with T/Sgt. Bala, as the
perpetrators of the crime. Like Zacarias Hernandez, they pointed to accused-appellants as the
persons who attacked Edgardo Hernandez and they were positive they were the assailants because
they know them, they being their neighbors.
The Supreme Court generally accords the highest respect to the evaluation of the
testimonies of eyewitnesses by the trial court. —Nor was there anything shown that would have
impaired the power of observation of these witnesses. That there were bushes and trees near the
electric post did not necessarily mean that the place was dark. There is no proof that because of
these, identification of the protagonists was impossible. In the absence of evidence to this effect, the
factual findings and conclusions of the trial court must be given great weight. In a number of cases,
this Court generally accords the highest respect to the evaluation of the testimonies of eyewitnesses
by the trial court.
The trial court held:

If there is nothing in the record to show that the prosecution witnesses were moved by any
improper motive to accuse falsely the appellants of so grave a crime as murder, then the findings of
the trial court as to the credibility must be respected.
"72
Absent any indication of a sinister scheme to prevaricate, the affirmative statements uttered
by the People’s witnesses showing accused-appellant’s culpability must be respected inasmuch as
positive declarations subordinate disclaimers emanating from the defense.
People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999) Rape with Homicide —Automatic Review
We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation and experience·whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside
of judicial cognizance.—Appellant’s defense that two other persons brought to him the dead body of
the victim and forced him to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the words of Vice-Chancellor
Van Fleet of New Jersey, “Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but must be credible in itself·such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human
testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance.”
If the accused did not commit the crime and was only forced to disposed/dumpted the body
of the victim in the septic tank, he could have apprise Col. Maganto, a high ranking police officer or
the lady reporter who interviewed him. His failure and omission to reveal the same is unnatural. An
innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime as a matter of
preservation and self-defense and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A person’s silence
therefore, particularly when it is persistent will justify an inference that he is not innocent.
People v. Alquizalas, 305 SCRA 367 (1999)
• There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident

especially if the assailant is physically near. —We find appellantÊs attempt to impugn the
credibility of the prosecution evidence not convincing at all. Private complainantÊs attitude after
the sexual assault is understandable. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted
by a shocking incident especially if the assailant is physically near. Some may shout, some may
faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may even welcome intrusion. On her
part, private complainant was only waiting for the proper time to reveal her harrowing ordeal as
soon as possible and that is the reason why she just took the same ride with the appellant to Barili,
Cebu. In fact upon her arrival home, she immediately reported the incident to her grandmother in
the presence of the wife of appellant.
• The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape
charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience. —There is no reason to doubt
private complainantÊs story. The records reveal that private complainant could not help but cry
during her direct examination. The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the
credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience. Besides,
evidence to be believed must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness but must be
credible in itself as when it conforms to common experience and observation mankind can prove
as probable under the circumstances.
The parties are cousins and there is nothing to show that private complainant was actuated
by ill motive to testify against appellant.
In previous cases, we have taken judicial notice of the fact that it is highly inconceivable for
a young barrio lass, inexperienced with the ways of the world, to fabricate a charge of defloration,
undergo a medical examination of her private parts, subject herself to public trial and tarnish her
family’s honor and reputation, unless she was motivated by a potent desire to seek justice for the
wrong committed against her.
Certainly, if private complainant had consented to have sexual intercourse with appellant
her natural reaction would have been to conceal it or keep silent as this would bring disgrace to her
honor and reputation as well as to her family. Hence, claim of accused is far from credible.
People v. Bea, Jr., 306 SCRA 653 (1999)
• The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape
charge with the verity born out of human nature.·In the instant case, the trial court found Jocelyn’s
testimony to be clear, convincing and straightforward. It must be noted that in several stages of the
trial where Jocelyn took the witness stand, the trial court observed that she became hysterical,
causing the court, upon agreement of both counsel, to defer the proceedings to a later date. Thus,
in People v. Gecomo, it was correctly observed that “the crying of the victim during her testimony
is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature.”
• It is not uncommon for a young girl at the tender age of 16 years to be intimidated into
silence and conceal for some time the violation of her honor, even by the mildest threat against her
life.·The contention that JocelynÊs failure to report the sexual assault until after five (5) months is
fatal to the crime imputed is likewise unfounded. In a similar rape case involving a 16-year old
victim, the Court held that it is not uncommon for a young girl at the tender age of 16 years to be
intimidated into silence and conceal for some time the violation of her honor, even by the mildest
"73
threat against her life. Contrary to appellantÊs assertion, there is nothing in the record which
indicates her testimony to be improbable or incredible.
• A public accusation by a Filipina, whose virtue has heretofore been unblemished, that she
has been raped, carries a lot of credence.·When asked why despite his poverty, he was the one
singled out for the rape charge, appellant could only refute the same by imputing JocelynÊs
pregnancy to her alleged boyfriend and that he was merely used to becloud the shame brought
upon her honor. Needless to say, no young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that she was
ravished and her honor tainted unless such were true, for it would be instinctive for her to protect
her honor. A public accusation by a Filipina, whose virtue has heretofore been unblemished, that
she has been raped, carries a lot of credence.
As held in People v. Miranda, failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make
voluntary complainant’s submission to the criminal acts of the accused.
People v. Gonzales, 311 SCRA 547 (1999)

• It is well-settled that any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of
relating truthfully facts for which he is examined; Requirements of a childÊs competence as a
witness.—The fact that prosecution witness Mary Iris Hortezano was merely seven (7) years old at
the time of the incident and eight (8) years old at the time she testified does not disqualify her from
being a witness nor does this circumstance render her testimony incredible. It is well-settled that
any child regardless of age, can be a known his perception to others and that he is capable of
relating truthfully facts for which he is examined. The requirements of a childÊs competence as a
witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of
communication. Even a mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness. And,
there is no minimum age for witnesses, even a child can be a witness so long as he can perceive
and relate his perceptions. Besides, the testimony of children of sound mind is likely to be more
correct and truthful than that of older persons.
• Moreover, minor lapses are to be expected when a person is recounting details of a
traumatic experience too painful to recall. A witness is not expected to remember an occurrence
with perfect recollection of minor and minute details. Furthermore, it has been held that minor
inconsistencies do not discredit but rather strengthen the testimony of a witness as they erase any
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. Thus, the testimony of witness Mary Iris that there was a lamp
and the reference to a „parol‰ and a kerosene lamp by the prosecution, are mere minor
inconsistencies which do not destroy the fact that the place of the incident was lighted; enough for
witness Mary Iris to identify accused-appellant whom she has known because they were
neighbors. And it has been held that the illumination from a kerosene lamp is sufficient to permit
the identification of a malefactor.
• The testimony of PO3 Arche would merely be corroborative. There is an eyewitness in
the person of the victimsÊ sister Mary Iris. The doctrine of long standing is that the testimony of a
single eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to support a conviction, even in a charge
for murder. Even an uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if credible, is enough to warrant
conviction.
People v. Alba, 305 SCRA 811 (1999)

• The exact date of commission of rape is not an element of the crime.·With respect to the date of
the rape, she said it was in February of 1994. She was not asked when exactly it was
committed. If the defense wanted to test her credibility, it should have pointedly asked her for
the exact date. It is noteworthy that the information in Criminal Case No. 94- 5517 alleged that
the second time Janette was raped by her father was on February 7, 1994. At any rate, proof of
the exact date the rape was committed is not required so much so that the offended partyÊs
failure to recall the exact date is fatal. As this Court has held in several cases, the exact date of
commission of rape is not an element of the crime.
• It is not unusual for any woman to try to keep her dishonor a secret and to suffer alone in her
misfortune rather than subject herself to public scrutiny and even ridicule or pity.·It is quite
possible that the offended party wanted to conceal her dishonor and simply suffer in silence, but
that she finally decided to complain after her father again violated her. It is not unusual for any
woman to try to keep her dishonor a secret and to suffer alone in her misfortune rather than
subject herself to public scrutiny and even ridicule or pity.
• There is no law requiring that a witnessÊ competence be first established before he can testify.
— Accused-appellant contends that the victimÊs competence as a witness should have been
first established considering that she was a minor at the time she testified. There is, however, no
law requiring that a witnessÊ competence be first established before he can testify.
• The fact that the offended party is a minor does not mean that she is incapable of perceiving
and of making her perception known.·The burden of showing that a witness is incompetent to
testify is on accused-appellant. The fact that the offended party is a minor does not mean that
she is incapable of perceiving and of making her perception known. In the case at bar, the
offended party was questioned by accused- appellant’s counsel concerning her competence, and
her answers show that she was competent to testify.
• Children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within
their view than older persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of
"74
older persons.·Indeed, as this Court observed in one case, children of sound mind are likely to
be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older persons, and their
testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of older persons. Other than the allegation
of minority, the defense failed to adduce other grounds for the disqualification of the victim as a
witness.
b. Conflicting testimonies as badge of truth and/or falsehood
People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 (1998)

• It is doctrinal that the trial courtÊs evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the
highest respect, for the trial court has an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the
demeanor of a witness and, thus, to determine whether he or she is telling the truth.—Appellant
contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of dela Cruz and in
disregarding his own testimony. We disagree. It is doctrinal that the trial courtÊs evaluation of
the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for the trial court has an
untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and, thus, to determine
whether he or she is telling the truth. Such assessment is generally binding on this Court, except
when the same has been reached arbitrarily or when the trial court has overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could
have affected the result of the case. We have examined the records of this case and the
arguments raised by appellant, but we find no reason to apply these exceptions.
• Between a positive and categorical testimony on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the
former generally prevails. ·Between a positive and categorical testimony on one hand, and a
bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails. Indeed, the testimony of a single
witness, when positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction even of murder.
Testimonies are to be weighed, not numbered; hence, a finding of guilt may be based on the
uncorroborated testimony of a single witness when the trial court finds such testimony positive
and credible.
• Minor inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and candor, for they erase any suspicion of a
rehearsed testimony.·In any event, the alleged inconsistencies refer to minor details and not to
the basic elements of the crime. They do not cast doubt on the identification of appellant as the
assailant. Hence, they cannot impair the credibility of Witness dela Cruz. Such minor
inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and candor, for they erase any suspicion of a
rehearsed testimony.
Issue: In the main, appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
SC:
Appellant also alleges inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses on the

following matters: (1) the date when dela Cruz executed his affidavit and (2) the identities of the
persons who brought the victim to the hospital.
While Ricardo testified that he executed an affidavit on September 1, 1991 at the police station,
said affidavit was in fact dated September 15, 1991 as affirmed by the investigating officer, Pat.
Sotero Basilio, who investigated him on that day
In his affidavit dated September 15, 1991, Nestor Cruz averred that he did so, but he failed to
mention that he had companion(s). Ricardo dela Cruz testified, however, that Danilo de Claro,
Jr., the victim’s brother, accompanied him in bringing the victim to the hospital. Witness
Lourdes Faigane testified also that the victim’s brother brought the victim to the hospital, but she
did not mention Ricardo dela Cruz.
Appellant’s contentions do not persuade The alleged discrepancies in Dela Cruz’ testimony may
be attributed to his inability to recall correctly the date of his interview with the police and of the
execution of his sworn statement. It is entirely possible that the police talked to Ricardo on Sept
1, 1991 but that he executed his sworn statement on Sept 15, 1991. This slight error is not
unlikely considering that Witness Dela Cruz is unlettered, as admitted by appellant.
The testimony of Faigane did not purport to be a complete enumeration of the persons who
brought her brother to the hospital. Hence, while she averred that the victim’s brother brought
the victim to the hospital, this does not necessarily mean that he alone did so.
In any event, the alleged inconsistencies refer to minor details and not to the basic elements of
the crime. They do not cast doubt on the identification of appellant as the assailant. Hence, they
cannot impair the credibility of Witness dela Cruz. Such minor inconsistencies even guarantee
truthfulness and candor, for they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
"75
People v. Badon, 308 SCRA 175 (1999)
• The decision of a judge who did not try the case is not by that reason alone erroneous. —
The circumstance alone that the judge who wrote the decision had not heard the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses would not taint his decision. In the case at bar, the full record was available
to Judge Alfonso P. Briones and a perusal of his decision readily shows that it was duly based on
the evidence presented during the trial, including the stenographic notes. It is evident that he
thoroughly examined the testimonial and documentary evidence before him and carefully assessed
the credibility of the witnesses with the perceptiveness he has developed as a trial judge. While the
judge who presided over the entire trial of the case would be in a better position to ascertain the
truth or falsity of the testimony of all the witnesses, it does not follow that a judge who only took
over from a colleague who had earlier presided over the trial cannot render a valid and just
decision. The decision of a judge who did not try the case is not by that reason alone erroneous.
• The bare denial and weak alibi of accused-appellants are insufficient to overcome the
positive identification by prosecution witnesses. —Based on the record and evidence at hand, the
Court finds that the guilt of accused- appellants has been established beyond reasonable doubt in
consequence of the fact that they have been positively identified by prosecution witnesses
Demetrio Macayan and Crispin Encontad. The bare denial and weak alibi of accused-appellants
are insufficient to overcome the positive identification by prosecution witnesses.
• To expect identical features in the testimony of witnesses cannot but generate the
suspicion that the material circumstances testified to by them were integral parts of a well thought
out and prefabricated story. ·Accused-appellants endeavored to discredit the testimony of
Demetrio and Crispin based on the lack of absolute harmony in their testimony. However, this
Court cannot and does not expect absolute uniformity in every detail, because witnesses react
differently to what they see and hear depending upon their situation and state of mind. It is of
common experience that the perception of individuals may vary depending on their location and
the extent of their peripheral vision. To expect identical features in the testimony of witnesses
cannot but generate the suspicion that the material circumstances testified to by them were integral
parts of a well thought out and prefabricated story.
• Verily, inconsistencies in minor details do not impair the credibility of witnesses where
there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants.
—Under the circumstances, however, this Court fully recognizes the difficulty of remembering
what another would not otherwise forget. It is not common experience for a person to witness the
perpetration of a crime, and the startling experience usually perverts his normal pattern of reaction.
Crispin may not have been able to completely tell the tale but what is significant is that Demetrio
was able to fill in the details. He positively identified Arnold Arellano as one of the three assailants
of Edwin Gomez. Verily, inconsistencies in minor details do not impair the credibility of witnesses
where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the
assailants.
• Delay in revealing the names of the perpetrators of the crime does not necessarily render
a witness less credible witness if such delay is sufficiently explained.·Anent DemetrioÊs testimony,
accused-appellants assert that this cannot be relied upon because he testified seven years after the
occurrence of the incident. But delay in revealing the names of the perpetrators of the crime does
not necessarily render a witness a less credible witness if such delay is sufficiently explained
(People vs. Alcantara, 254 SCRA 384 [1996]). Likewise, failure to volunteer what one knows to
law enforcement officials does not necessarily impair a witnessÊ credibility.
• Where alibi is established only by the accused and a relative, such defense deserves scant
consideration, especially so in the face of affirmative testimony of credible prosecution
witnesses.·Accused-appellants insist that they have sufficiently established their defense of alibi as
they were far from the crime scene, which is around one hundred meters away from their house,
and this fact was corroborated by their witness, who happens to be their father, Restituto Arellano.
Where alibi is established only by the accused and a relative, such defense deserves scant
consideration, especially so in the face of affirmative testimony of credible prosecution witnesses
(People vs. Corpus, 240 SCRA 203 [1995]). Many times has this Court held that the defense of
alibi can prosper only if it is shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the
scene of the crime or within its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission (People vs. De
Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 [1995]). This, accused-appellants failed to prove. Needless to say, it was not
physically impossible for accused- appellants to be at the crime scene when they were only one
hundred meters away therefrom. This distance could be covered by 1-minute leisurely walk or a
dash of less than 30 seconds. Withal, the defense of alibi by accused-appellants is worthless in the
face of positive identification.
People v. Mangahas, 311 SCRA 384 (1999)

• The matter of assigning value to the declaration of witnesses is best done by trial
courts which, unlike appellate courts, can assess such testimony in the light of the
demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial stage. Accused-appellantÊs plea
of self-defense once again brings the Court to the crucial question of credibility of
witnesses and the weight that should be given to testimonial evidence. On this issue, the
Court has almost invariably ruled that the matter of assigning value to the declaration of
witnesses is best done by trial courts which, unlike appellate courts, can assess such
testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial
stage and thus, unless cogent reasons are shown, the findings of the trial court are accorded
great respect and credit.
"76
• When a witness makes two statements, both being sworn to as a witness in one
case, these statements incur the gravest contradiction, then the court cannot accept either
the first or the second statements as proof·he himself by his own act of giving false
testimony impeaches his own testimony and the court is compelled to exclude it from all
consideration. —Verily, these two defenses are incompatible with each other. As such, they
do not at all provide shield to the accused to ward off the crime imputed against him. When
a witness makes two statements, both being sworn to as a witness in one case, these
statements incur the gravest contradiction, then the court cannot accept either the first or
the second statements as proof. He himself by his own act of giving false testimony
impeaches his own testimony and the court is compelled to exclude it from all
consideration.
• The act of the accused in „correcting‰ his testimony to address certain points
raised against him by the judge raises further doubts on the truthfulness of his
allegations.·The discrepancies in his two testimonies are too glaring to overlook. In the
trial proper of the case, accused-appellant testified that he fired his gun at the victim only
once, that the victim Rufino Gestala poked the gun at accused-appellant and squeezed the
trigger only once, and that Renato Panoso got the gun from the back of his waist and
offered it to him for sale. However, during his testimony in his motion for reconsideration,
he contradicted himself by testifying that he fired at the victim twice; that the victim poked
his gun at him and squeezed the trigger continuously when it did not fire; and that when
Renato Panoso approached him to offer him the gun, he (Panoso) was already holding the
gun. Verily, accused-appellant „corrected‰ his testimony to address certain points raised
against him by the judge in his December 2, 1994 Decision. In doing so, however,
accusedappellant raised further doubts on the truthfulness of his allegations.
c. Positive versus negative testimony
People v. Uy, 327 SCRA 335 (2000) - Drugs

• Although there are instances when the law enforcers resort to the practice of planting
evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians, still the defense of frame-up in
drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the
law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official duties.—We,
of course, are aware that in some instances law enforcers resort to the practice of planting
evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians. But the defense of frame-up in
drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the
law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official duties.
Moreover, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed by the court with
disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy
in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
• An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially when it
comes from the mouth of a credible witness.—As against the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses that they caught RAMON in a buy-bust operation, supported by
other evidence such as the packets of shabu sold by and seized from him, RAMONÊs
negative testimony must necessarily fail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a
negative testimony, especially when it comes from the mouth of credible witness.
• An NBI Forensic Chemist is a public officer, and his report carries the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his function and duty.—As to the reports of Forensic
Chemist Bravo, it must be stressed that as an NBI Forensic Chemist, Bravo is a public
officer, and his report carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
function and duty. Besides, by virtue of Section 44, Rule 130, entries in official records
made in the performance of office duty, as in the case of the reports of Bravo, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. We are also aware that “the test conducted for
the presence of shabu (infrared test) is a relatively simple test which can be performed by
an average or regular chemistry graduate” and where „”here is no evidence. . . to show
that the positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (‘shabu’) are
erroneous . . . coupled with the undisputed presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed, said results” may “adequately establish” that the specimens
submitted were indeed shabu.
People v. Calayca. 301 SCRA 192 (1999) — Rape

• Errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected of a witness especially when she is
recounting details of an experience so humiliating and so painful as rape. — We have ruled in numerous cases
that an errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected of a witness especially when she is
recounting details of an experience so humiliating and so painful as rape. Minor errors in the testimony of a
rape victim tend to buttress, rather than weaken, her credibility since that would indicate that her testimony
was not contrived.
• To a young and naïve girl, there is not much difference between a bolo and a knife since both weapons are
sharp and deadly·what is important to consider is that the weapon was effectively used by the malefactor to
intimidate the victim into submission to his dastardly act.·The inaccuracy in private complainantÊs description
of the weapon used is insignificant and understandable. To a young and naïve girl, there is not much difference
between a bolo and a knife since both weapons are sharp and deadly. What is important to consider is that the
"77
weapon was effectively used by appellant to intimidate private complainant into submission to his dastardly
act.
• This supposed ill-motive of private complainant was not duly established by the defense. Hence, there was
nothing for the prosecution to rebut. The elementary principle in the rules of evidence is that an affirmative
allegation made by a party must be duly proved to merit acceptance by the court.
• A teenage unmarried lass would not ordinarily file a rape charge against anybody, much less her own father, if
it were not true.—We believe that a teenage unmarried lass would not ordinarily file a rape charge against
anybody, much less her own father, if it were not true. For, it is unnatural for a young and innocent girl to
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter subject herself to a
public trial if she has not, in fact, been a victim of rape and deeply motivated by a sincere desire to have the
culprit apprehended and punished. The alleged slapping by appellant of private complainant over money in the
amount of merely P5,000.00 is too frail a reason for a teenage daughter to falsely charge her own father with
the heinous crime of rape that is punishable by death.
• Admissions; An accusedÊs silence on the evidence of rape against him is a mute but eloquent admission of the
crime charged.·It is significant to note that, as likewise emphasized by the trial court, appellant did not deny
the imputation of private complainant that he raped her on January 29, 1994 at his house in Solo, Balingasag,
Misamis Oriental. His silence on the evidence of rape against him is a mute but eloquent admission of the
crime charged.
People v. Tolentino, 308 SCRA 485 (1999) — Attempted Rape

• Where there is paucity of evidence that the slightest penetration ever took place, the accused can only be liable
for attempted rape. —The prosecution did not ask her the appropriate questions to get some more important
details that would demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt that TOLENTINO's penis reached the labia of the
pudendum or the lips of RACHELLEÊs vagina. It should have, for instance, asked whether TOLENTINOÊs
penis was firm and erect or whether RACHELLEÊs legs were spread apart to bring us to the logical conclusion
that, indeed, TOLENTINOÊs penis was not flabby and had the capacity to directly hit the labia of the
pudendum or the lips of RACHELLEÊs vagina. There is paucity of evidence that the slightest penetration ever
took place. Consequently, TOLENTINO can only be liable for attempted rape.
• Positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony; Alibi cannot prevail over, and is worthless in the face
of, the positive identification by a credible witness that the accused committed the crime.·Besides, against
RACHELLE’s positive testimony, TOLENTINO had nothing to offer but denial and alibi. Settled is the rule
that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony. Equally settled is that alibi is a weak defense, for it
is easy to concoct and fabricate. It cannot prevail over, and is worthless in the face of, the positive
identification by a credible witness that the accused committed the crime. RACHELLE positively identified
TOLENTINO as her rapist.
Naval v. Panday, 301 SCRA 290 (1999)

• Testimony is affirmative or positive if it consists of statements as to what the witness
heard or saw, and it is negative if the witness states that he did not hear or did not see the
phenomenon in question; The positive testimony of a single witness is entitled to more weight and
credence than the testimony of several witnesses who testified in the negative or to collateral
matters. —Testimony is affirmative or positive if it consists of statements as to what the witness
heard or seen. It is negative if the witness states that he did not hear or did not see the phenomenon
in question. The Court has held in at least two (2) cases that the testimony of a credible witness
that he saw or heard a particular thing at a particular time and place is more reliable than that of a
witness who with the same opportunities, testified that he did not hear or see the same thing at the
same time and place. Moreover, the positive testimony of a single witness is entitled to more
weight and credence than the testimony of several witnesses who testified in the negative or to
collateral matters.
• The testimony of a witness that he does not remember or has no knowledge of a particular
matter has little or no weight as against the direct testimony of a witness who does remember the
matter or against the positive evidence that an event occurred which is not contradicted by a
witnessÊ testimony that he does not remember whether it occurred or not. —No weight and credit
can be given to the testimonies of Bolalin and Pasibe for while they claim that they were in the
immediate vicinity of the compound of the Bodega Tigaon on the day, time and place of the
incident while there was an ongoing boxing practice, their failure to see and observe the alleged
incident can be attributed to want of particular attention considering their preoccupation with the
boxing practice. Moreover, the testimony of a witness that he does not remember or has no
knowledge of a particular matter has little or no weight as against the direct testimony of a witness
who does remember the matter or against the positive evidence that an event occurred which is not
contradicted by a witnessÊ testimony that he does not remember whether it occurred or not.
• Verily, criminals are convicted, not on the number of witnesses against them, but on the
credibility of the testimony of even one witness who is able to convince the court of the guilt of the
accused beyond a shadow of doubt.·The Court ruled: „[T]hat the prosecution had only one
eyewitness hardly affects its cause. There is no law which requires that the testimony of a single
witness needs corroboration except where the law expressly mandates such corroboration.‰
Verily, criminals are convicted, not on the number of witnesses against them, but on the credibility
of the testimony of even one witness who is able to convince the court of the guilt of the accused
beyond a shadow of doubt. To rephrase what had been said earlier, the Investigating Justice found
the testimony of Cecil Buenafe more convincing than those of respondent JudgeÊs witnesses. So
does this Court.
"78
• Evidence; The quantum of proof required to establish respondent JudgeÊs misconduct in
an administrative complaint is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence.·It
needs be stressed in this regard that in the instant proceeding, respondent judge is being
administratively held to account for serious misconduct or malfeasance in office. The quantum of
proof required to establish respondent JudgeÊs misconduct in the administrative complaint is not
proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence. It need not be overemphasized that the
factual landscape, measured within such an evidentiary matrix, is strewn with overwhelming proof
of respondent JudgeÊs perfidy thus prompting the Court in the challenged Decision to concur with
the Investigating Justice in holding that complainants were able to muster the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove their charges against him.
• Witnesses; In any prosecution involving an unchaste act perpetrated by a man against a
woman where the willingness of the woman is material such as rape and acts of lasciviousness, the
womanÊs character as to her chastity is admissible to show whether or not she consented to
manÊs act.—In any prosecution involving an unchaste act perpetrated by a man against a woman
where the willingness of the woman is material such as rape and acts of lasciviousness, the
womanÊs character as to her chastity is admissible to show whether or not she consented to manÊs
act. Hence, in a prosecution for rape, or for enticement to prostitution, or in an action or
prosecution for indecent assault, the likes of acts of lasciviousness, the womanÊs character as to
chastity is admissible, but not in a prosecution for rape under the age of consent, because in a trial
for sex offenses where the womanÊs consent is immaterial and not in issue, it follows that the
womanÊs unchastity would likewise be immaterial, like a charge for rape of a woman under
twelve (12) years of age.
• The presumption is that witnesses are not actuated by any improper motive absent any
proof to the contrary.·The presumption is that witnesses are not actuated by any improper motive
absent any proof to the contrary and that their testimonies must accordingly be met with
considerable, if not conclusive, favor under the rules of evidence because it is not expected that
said witnesses would prevaricate and cause the damnation of one who brought them no harm or
injury.
d. Eyewitness testimony
People v. Antonio, 303 SCRA 414 (1999)

• The Supreme Court generally accords the highest respect to the evaluation of the
testimonies of eyewitnesses by the trial court. —Nor was there anything shown that would
have impaired the power of observation of these witnesses. That there were bushes and
trees near the electric post did not necessarily mean that the place was dark. There is no
proof that because of these, identification of the protagonists was impossible. In the
absence of evidence to this effect, the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court
must be given great weight. In a number of cases, this Court generally accords the highest
respect to the evaluation of the testimonies of eyewitnesses by the trial court.
People v. Bihison, 308 SCRA 510 (1999)

• The assignment of values to the testimony of witnesses is virtually left to the trial court
which is considered to be in the best position to discharge that function.—The core issue raised by
appellants in their appeal is indeed factual and involves nothing more really than the credibility of
the witnesses. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the assignment of values to the testimony of
witnesses is virtually left to the trial court which is considered to be in the best position to
discharge that function. Its findings on that issue almost invariably are given the highest degree of
respect and, absent strong cogent reasons to the contrary, are not disturbed on appeal. Appellants
have not been able to successfully show sufficient justification to warrant a reversal at this time
and in this instance of that long standing rule.
• Eyewitnesses to a horrifying event cannot be expected, nor be faulted if they are unable,
to be completely accurate in picturing to the court all that has transpired and every detail of what
they have seen or heard.·Eyewitnesses to a horrifying event cannot be expected, nor be faulted if
they are unable, to be completely accurate in picturing to the court all that has transpired and every
detail of what they have seen or heard. Various reasons, mostly explainable, can account for this
reality; the Court has long acknowledged the verity that different human minds react distinctly and
diversely when confronted with a sudden and shocking event, and that a witness may sometimes
ignore certain details which at the time might have appeared to him to be insignificant but which to
another person, under the same circumstances, would seem noteworthy.
• The probative value of testimonial evidence, particularly that which relates to the identity
of the culprits, will not be diminished as long as the mass of testimony jibes on material points.—
The probative value of testimonial evidence, particularly that which relates to the identity of the
culprits, will not be diminished as long as the mass of testimony jibes on material points. Neither
the slight variation in the statements of witnesses nor a want of perfect recollection down to
minute details dilute their credibility or reduce the veracity of their declaration. Indeed,
inadequacies on minor matters can even enhance the worth of testimony and indicate that the
responses are honest and unrehearsed.
e. Judicial admissions
People v. Sarabia, 317 SCRA 684 (1999)
"79
• When evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is without any
evidentiary weight being patently hearsay. —The appellant begged of this Court to give a
second look to the lower courtÊs finding of probative value in the testimony of Pfc. Jose
Laboyo which he claimed was nothing but hearsay evidence. This Court is aware that
„hearsay evidence carries no probative value‰ (Waterous Drug Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 280 SCRA 735). „When evidence is based on what was
supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight being patently
hearsay.‰
• “A judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof
except (1) when it is made through palpable mistake and (2) when it is shown that no
admission was in fact made.” “In spite of the presence of judicial admission in a party’s
pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented.”
f. Unbelievable testimony
People v. Andales, 312 SCRA 738 (1999)

• That the accused got hold of the victim and moved him from side to side in an effort to
dodge the bullets fired at him is likewise preposterous and not worthy of belief– it is a
narration that could have only been lifted from pocketbooks and quite akin to what could
only be seen in movies.–Jellie also claims that when Rubencio Malobago attacked him he
was able to overpower Rodolfo and used him as shield against RubencioÊs shots. We find
these reasons lame considering that Rodolfo is much bigger in height and built than Jellie.
That he got hold of Rodolfo and moved him from side to side in an effort to dodge the
bullets fired at him is likewise preposterous and not worthy of belief. His narration could
have only been lifted from pocketbooks and quite akin to what could only be seen in
movies. As aptly noted by the Court of Appeals, they were quite theatrical in execution.
For evidence to be believed it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
but must also be credible in itself, i.e., it must conform to ordinary human experience and
the normal course of human conduct. JellieÊs version does not meet this test.
People v. Perucho, 305 SCRA 770 (1999)

• Credibility of Witnesses; The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is a matter that
peculiarly falls within the authority of the trial court, as it had the opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand.—As a general rule, the evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses is a matter that peculiarly falls within the authority of the trial
court, as it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand. For
this reason, appellate courts accord its factual findings and assessments of witnesses with
great weight and even finality, barring arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance.
• Evidence must not only proceed from a credible witness, but also be credible in itself.—In
the present case, however, this Court sees flimsy support for the findings and conclusion
of the trial court. The oft-stated truism is that evidence must not only proceed from a
credible witness, but also be credible in itself. Thus, this Court has held: „We have no test
of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and
experience.‰ After careful examination of the records, we find that the testimonies of the
two prosecution witnesses do not pass this test.
• The wanton disregard by the policemen of their own safety and that of the victims is
incompatible with common experience. —True, such recklessness on the part of the
policemen may signify mere incompetence. But it is unbelievable that they, or any other
law enforcers for that matter, are capable of such gross ineptitude. Their wanton disregard
of their own safety and that of the victims is incompatible with common experience.
Otherwise stated, their story is too improbable to be accorded credence.
• When the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is wanting and questionable, the
defenses of denial and alibi assume significance.—Well-entrenched is the doctrine that a
finding of guilt must rest on the prosecutionÊs own evidence, not on the weakness or
even absence of evidence for the defense. Herein appellant interposes denial and alibi,
which have been widely held to be inherently weak and unavailing. However, when the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses is wanting and questionable, the said defenses
assume significance. So is it in this case.
• It is precisely when the prosecutionÊs case is weak that the defense of alibi assumes
importance and becomes crucial in negating criminal liability.—When an accused
invokes alibi and denial, which are deemed the “weakest” of all defenses, “the courts
should not at once have a mental prejudice against him. For, taken in the light of all the
evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit him.” Thus, the Court has recognized
that “[i]t is precisely when the prosecution’s case is weak, as in this instance, that the
defense of alibi assumes importance and becomes crucial in negating criminal liability.”
People v. Vidal, 308 SCRA 1 (1999)

• Geraldine’s overall demeanor, the serious gaps in her testimony, the uncertainties in
identifying the accused during the testimony, her fickleness in answering the questions hardly give
the kind of credence to her supposed “positive-testimony.”—We cannot understand why the trial
"80
court failed to entertain serious misgivings about the patently inconsistent and contradictory
testimony of the complainant. True, Geraldine appeared clear and straightforward on direct
examination, where questions and answers could be prepared and rehearsed beforehand. But she
was a different witness when the court and the defense counsels took over the questioning. Her
testimony was obviously not as clear and straightforward, as the trial court would want us to
believe. GeraldineÊs overall demeanor, the serious gaps in her testimony, the uncertainties in
identifying the accused during the testimony, her fickleness in answering the questions hardly give
the kind of credence to her supposed „positive-testimony‰ which would warrant a conviction
based on the quantum of evidence required by our penal laws.
• Exacting standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt acquires more relevance in rape
because such charges are fairly easy to make but difficult to establish, and harder still to defend by
the accused party, who may be innocent.— In crimes against chastity, the testimony of the
offended party should not be received with precipitate credulity. The exacting standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt acquires more relevance in rape because such charges are fairly easy to
make but difficult to establish, and harder still to defend by the accused party, who may be
innocent. While it is true that accused-appellantsÊ defense of alibi is weak, the same being easy to
fabricate, such defense assumed importance and became crucial in negating their criminal liability,
especially because the prosecutionÊs evidence is “frail and effete” and thus failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the persons who committed the crime.
• It is a hornbook precept that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defenseÊs evidence.—Alibi
should be considered in the light of all the evidence on record for it can tilt the scales of justice in
favor of the accused. Stated differently, „when an accused puts up the defense of alibi, the courts
should not at once have a mental prejudice against him. For, taken in the light of all the evidence
on record, it may be sufficient to acquit him.‰ It is a hornbook precept that the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense's evidence.
People v. Bayron, 313 SCRA 727(1999)

• Court finds the claim of accused-appellant to be highly incredible and contrary to
ordinary human behavior. —It is true the Court has sustained the defense of consensual sex in a
number of rape cases. But, in those cases, evidence was presented, consisting of letters and the
testimonies of witnesses, to corroborate the claim of the accused that the alleged rape was actually
a sexual intercourse between consenting adults. Here, not only is there no evidence of this nature
presented but, on the contrary, the evidence shows that the parties did not know each other before
the alleged tryst on January 16, 1994. If accused- appellantÊs claim were to be believed, within
minutes of their meeting, he and complainant simply engaged in a sexual intercourse with not even
nary a word said between them. We find this claim to be highly incredible and contrary to ordinary
human behavior. No woman, much less a married one with three children, would just lie with a
complete stranger.
• The conduct of a woman immediately following the alleged assault is of utmost
importance as it tends to establish the truth or falsity of her claim. —Complainant’s conduct
immediately after accused-appellant had left belie the latter’s claim that they had engaged in
voluntary sexual intercourse. She ran outside the stall, still fastening her pants, to ask help from the
people gathering on the street. She immediately reported the matter to the Langihan police and
afterwards submitted to a physical examination at the Butuan City General Hospital at 9:00 that
morning. The examining physician found not only spermatozoa in complainantÊs vaginal canal
but also a cut in the small finger of her left hand and hematoma on the right side of her neck,
confirming complainantÊs allegation that accused-appellant had forced her to have sexual
intercourse with him. These circumstances are consistent with the conduct of one who has just
undergone a harrowing experience. As this Court has pointed out, the conduct of a woman
immediately following the alleged assault is of utmost importance as it tends to establish the truth
or falsity of her claim. If complainant had not been forced and intimidated into submitting to the
lustful designs of accused-appellant, her natural reaction, as a married woman, would have been to
conceal her illicit activity instead of denouncing it immediately as rape, for otherwise, her conduct
would constitute adultery.
g. Failure to object; effect on probative value
Restaurante Las Conchas v. Llego, 314 SCRA 24(1999)

• While lack of objection to a hearsay testimony or evidence results in the admittance
thereof as evidence, said evidence cannot be given any credence and probative values
unless it is shown that it falls within the exceptions to the hearsay rule.—Well-settled is
the rule that while lack of objection to a hearsay testimony or evidence results in the
admittance thereof as evidence, said evidence cannot be given any credence and probative
values unless it is shown that it falls within the exceptions to the hearsay rule. In the
present case, petitioners failed miserably to show that the financial statements and income
tax returns are exceptions to the hearsay rule, thus, their contents have no probative value
whatsoever.
Gonzales v. NLRC, 313 SCRA 169 (1999)
"81
• Hearsay; The failure of a school to refute the contention of the teacher that the joint
affidavits executed by the students and parents were “pre-prepared” raises serious doubts as to the
probative value of this evidence; Hearsay evidence, in the strict sense, has no probative value
whether objected to or not. —The failure of ATENEO to refute the contention of petitioner that the
joint affidavits executed by the students and parents were “pre-prepared” raises serious doubts as
to the probative value of this evidence. As correctly pointed out by the Executive Labor Arbiter,
“there is more reason to disregard it especially where the same was challenged and has remained
unexplained.” Hearsay evidence, in the strict sense, has no probative value whether objected to or
not.
• Administrative Law; Evidence; Substantial Evidence Rule; In Ang Tibay vs. CIR, the
Supreme Court set the measure of evidence to be presented in an administrative investigation when
it said that substantial evidence is more than mere scintilla·it means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. —In the instant case,
ATENEO failed to prove by substantial evidence that petitioner had inflicted corporal punishment
on her students. In Ang Tibay v. CIR, the Court set the measure of evidence to be presented in an
administrative investigation when it said, „substantial evidence is more than mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.‰ The evidence of private respondent did not measure up to this standard. It relied
solely on the witnessesÊ affidavits with questionable veracity. Moreover, the affidavit of
recantation executed by some students and their parents all the more weakened the case of private
respondent. Failure in this regard negates the very existence of the ground for dismissal.
2. Documentary
a. Probative value of documents otherwise inadmissible but admitted for lack of objection
Security Bank & Trust Corporation v. Triumph Lumber & Construction

Corporation, 301 SCRA 537 (1999), supra
Heirs of Teodoro Dela Cruz v. CA, 298 SCRA 172 (1998)

• Best Evidence Rule; It is imperative that all the originals of a deed must be accounted for
before secondary evidence can be presented. —To begin with, Atty. Sevillano Tabangay, the notary
public who notarized the deed of sale, testified that the document has about five (5) copies. Hence,
it is imperative that all the originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be
presented. These petitioners failed to do. Moreover, records show that none of these five copies
was even presented during the trial. PetitionersÊ explanation that these copies were lost or could
not be found in the National Archives was not even supported by any certification from the said
office. It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be presented, all duplicates
and/or counterparts must be accounted for, and no excuse for the nonproduction of the original
document itself can be regarded as established until all its parts are unavailable.
• Secondary evidence, when not objected to when presented, becomes primary evidence. —
Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when Exhibit „A‰ was presented private respondents
failed, not only to object, but even to cross-examine the notary public, Atty. Tabangay, regarding
its execution. Fortwith, upon private respondentsÊ failure to object to Exhibit „A‰ when it was
presented, the same becomes primary evidence. To be sure, even if Exhibit „A‰ is admitted in
evidence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that its probative value must still meet the various
tests by which its reliability is to be determined. Its tendency to convince and persuade must be
considered for admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
b. Medico-legal reports
People v. Lasola, 318 SCRA 241 (1999)

• A medico-legal report is not indispensable when evidence other than the same point to the
inescapable guilt of the accused. —Neither is there need to delve at length into the issue
that the medico-legal report is „inconclusive proof of the commission of the offense,
much less the guilt of the accused.‰ A medico-legal report is not indispensable when
evidence other than the same point to the inescapable guilt of the accused. It is merely
corroborative evidence, the absence of which would not prevent the prosecution from
establishing the fact of rape, which in this case, was proved not just by the lone testimony
of the victim but also by another witness in the person of her mother.
People v. Quisay, 320 SCRA 450(1999)

• While it may be true that the medical certificate or testimonies of the physicians who
examined the victim may not alone suffice to prove that the victim was raped, such evidence may
be offered to corroborate the testimony of other prosecution witnesses to prove the fact of rape.—
While it may be true that the medical certificate or testimonies of the physicians who have
examined the victim may not alone suffice to prove that the victim was raped, such evidence may
be offered to corroborate the testimony of other prosecution witnesses to prove the fact of rape.
The sexual assault in this case was proven not merely by the medical testimony of the
prosecution’s expert witnesses but on other convincing pieces of evidence.
"82
c. Death Certificates
People v. Abdul, 310 SCRA 246 (1999)
• The absence of a death or burial certificate does not negate the fact of the killing since
corpus delicti can be proved by testimonial evidence; Meaning of Corpus Delicti; Elements of. —
We reject accused-appellant’s claim that the prosecution failed to prove the fact of death of the
victims for the reason that no death certificate or testimony of an imam or Muslim priest was
presented in court to prove the fact of death of Annih and Abraham. The absence of a death or
burial certificate does not negate the fact of the killing since corpus delicti can be proved by
testimonial evidence. Corpus Delicti is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been
committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains of a house burned down. In
a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime has been committed and is made up of
two elements: a.) that a certain result has been proved; and b.) that some person is criminally
responsible for the act.
d. Police Blotters
People v. Manegdeg, 316 SCRA 689 (1999)

• Police Blotters; Entries in a police blotter are not conclusive proof of the truth of such
entries and should not be given undue significance or probative value for they are usually
incomplete and inaccurate. —Moreover, this Court has consistently held that entries in a police
blotter are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries and should not be given undue
significance or probative value for they are usually incomplete and inaccurate.
People v. Silva, 321 SCRA 647 (1999)

• Entries in a police blotter are merely prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein but
they are not conclusive. —This Court has ruled that official records, as a police blotter, should not
be given undue significance or probative value for they are usually incomplete and inaccurate,
sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries. Entries in a
police blotter are merely prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein but they are not
conclusive.
e. Affidavits/writings
People v. Sanchez, 301 SCRA 21 (1999)

• Affidavits; Sworn statements/affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open
court declarations because the former are often executed when an affiantÊs mental
faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the
incident which has transpired.—To further fortify this observation, we advert to that all-
too familiar rule that discrepancies between sworn statements and testimonies made at the
witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witnesses. Sworn statements/affidavits are
generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations because the former are
often executed when an affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a
fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Testimonies given
during trials are much more exact and elaborate. Thus, testimonial evidence carries more
weight than sworn statements/affidavits.
Grepalife Employees Union v. Grepalife, 303 SCRA 113 (1999)

• Affidavits; Pleadings and Practice; While it is true that affidavits may be regarded as
infirm evidence before the regular courts unless the affiants are presented on the stand, such
affidavits by themselves are acceptable in proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. —Petitioner de la
Rosa assails the inherent weakness of the sworn statements of these security guards. But while it is
true that affidavits may be regarded as infirm evidence before the regular courts unless the affiants
are presented on the stand, such affidavits by themselves are acceptable in proceedings before the
Labor Arbiter. Under Sec. 7, Rule V, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, these
proceedings, save for the constitutional requirements of due process, are not to be strictly governed
by the technicalities of law and procedural rules. Section 3, par. 2, of the same Rule, provides that
verified position papers are to be accompanied by all supporting documents including the
affidavits of the partiesÊ respective witnesses in lieu of direct testimony. It is therefore a clear
mandate that the Labor Arbiter may employ all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the
controversy before him.
People v. Mercado, 304 SCRA 504 (1999)

• Affidavits; Between an affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter prevails
because affidavits taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in
open court. —The defense argues that the affidavits of Antonio Peralta and Nelson Tamares show
that accused-appellant had no part in the illegal recruitment of workers. This is not true. They are
merely incomplete, due no doubt to the fact that they were given ex parte. Moreover, as can be
seen from the testimonies of these complainants quoted earlier, accused- appellant was clearly one
of those who recruited them without license. Between an affidavit and the testimony given in open
court, the latter prevails because affidavits taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to
the testimony given in open court.
"83
3. Object
a. Injuries
People v. Villaluna, 303 SCRA 518 (1999)

• Absence of external signs or physical injuries on the victim does not negate the
commission of rape, specially in a situation where complainant filed the rape case a year
after the incident, when the injuries have healed. —The delay in reporting the incident
made any physical findings of the rape inconclusive. The medico-legal expert who
examined complainant a year after the rape incident could only conclude that the
complainant was impregnated and had delivered a baby but could not say definitely
whether she was a victim of a sexual intercourse by force. In any case, absence of
external signs or physical injuries on the victim does not negate the commission of rape,
specially in this situation where complainant filed the rape case a year after the incident,
when the injuries have healed.
People v. Borreros, 306 SCRA 680 (1999)

• The presence of several gunshot wounds on the body of the deceased is physical evidence
that strongly militates against a stance of self-defense. —Neither did the trial court err in rejecting
appellantÊs theory of self-defense considering the nature and number of gunshot wounds of the
victims. The deceased Danilo Almario suffered four (4) gunshot wounds on the left side of his
back below the scapula, on the right forearm, on the left thigh and on the lower left femur, all fired
by the assailant from behind. The deceased, Federico Medina, suffered two (2) gunshot wounds,
one on the head and another on the left forearm. Verily, the nature, location and number of the
wounds sustained by the victims make appellantÊs theory of self-defense implausible. As held in
People vs. Guarin, the presence of several gunshot wounds on the body of the deceased is physical
evidence that strongly militates against appellantÊs stance. If appellant shot the victims just to
defend himself, it defies reason why he had to inflict several wounds on them. Irrefutably, the
multiple and serious injuries sustained by the victims evinced a determined effort on the part of
appellant to kill them.
People v. Acala, 307 SCRA 330 (1999)

• Healed lacerations do not negate rape·in fact, lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are
the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.—As the victim was no longer a virgin when she
was raped on January 19, 1996, no new injury on her hymen could be expected. The fact that the
lacerations were already healed points to the conclusion that the victim was repeatedly raped
before January 19, 1996, consistent with the accusation against accused- appellant. In People v.
Espinoza,it was held that healed lacerations do not negate rape. In fact, lacerations, whether healed
or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.
b. Hair
People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383 (1999)
• Hair samples may be admitted in evidence against the accused, for what is proscribed is
the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from
the accused under duress. —It bears emphasis, however, that under the above-quoted
provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the
accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and
morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against
him. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly
taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may
be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial
compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under
duress.
c. Physical Condition
Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)
— BODILY EXHIBITION.·On a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an
ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
— Upon petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the trial court ordered the
defendant, a woman charged with the crime of adultery, to submit her body to the
examination of one or two competent doctors to determine whether she was pregnant or
not. Held: That while this order of the trial court is phrased in absolute terms, it should,
nevertheless, be understood as subject to the limitations herein mentioned, and thus as not
in violation of that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of the Philippine
Code of Criminal Procedure which find their origin in the Constitution of the United States
and practically all State Constitutions, and in the common law rules of evidence, relating to
self-incrimination.
"84
d. Drug Sample
People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 338 SCRA 420 (2000)
• If the prosecution proves that the sample is positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride,
it can be presumed that the entire substance seized is shabu.—Thus, if the prosecution proves that
the sample is positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, it can be presumed that the entire
substance seized is shabu. The burden of evidence shifts to the accused who must prove otherwise.
Appellants in this case have not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption.
e. Forensic DNA evidence
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)
Tijing v. CA, G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001

• DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) Test; Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available; Being a novel
scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge, but
eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence; Courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress.—A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods
unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the
facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem
repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on
the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said
result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing,
in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and
identity issues.
• “DNA” and „DNA Testing,‰ Explained.—DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) refers to the
chain of molecules found in every cell of the body, except in red blood cells, which
transmit hereditary characteristics among individuals. DNA testing is synonymous to
DNA typing, DNA fingerprinting, DNA profiling, genetic testing or genetic
fingerprinting.
People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, May 9, 2002

— Except for identical twins, each personÊs DNA profile is distinct and unique. —DNA is
an organic substance found in a personÊs cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for
identical twins, each personÊs DNA profile is distinct and unique. When a crime is committed,
material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victimÊs body for the suspectÊs DNA.
This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken
from the suspect and the victim.
People v. Yatar, G.r. No. 150224, may 19, 2004

— DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms, and a
personÊs DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a personÊs lifetime·the
DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft
of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. —Significantly, subsequent
testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from the vagina of the
victim was identical semen to be that of appellantÊs gene type. DNA is a molecule that encodes the
genetic information in all living organisms. A personÊs DNA is the same in each cell and it does not
change throughout a personÊs lifetime; the DNA in a personÊs blood is the same as the DNA found
in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal
and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two
individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.
—DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means
to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence
has been left. —DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective
means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological
evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source
of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate
account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the
acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case. DNA
evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion
in the same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault would leave
"85
biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the
victimÊs body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture
could also be transferred to the victimÊs body during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence is helpful
in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected
from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the
suspect at the scene of the crime.
— In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors·how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests; Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science
and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse
these relatively uncharted waters though we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence
that has developed in other jurisdictions. ·The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI),
which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification
method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA
sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has
become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR
method. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests. In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly
qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based
on Dr. de UngriaÊs testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are
identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant
showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO
10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victimÊs vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match
exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open
court during the course of the trial. Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in
science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we
traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive
jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the
U.S. has proven instructive.
— Evidence; Evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non- existence.—In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable.
Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at
trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel
procedure. Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by
the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles
of human genetics and molecular biology.
— Self-Incrimination; The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal
process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt·it does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.·In an attempt
to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as well
as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against
self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution. This contention is untenable.
The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right
against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
— Ex Post Facto Laws; No ex-post facto law is involved in DNA testing since the science of
DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the
Rules of Court·whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling
requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented. ·Appellant further
argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional on the
ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law. This argument is
specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves the
admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas
an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual
determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
— The legal relevancy of evidence denotes „something more than a minimum of probative
value,‰ suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a „plus value‰·evidence without
„plus value‰ may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict.—Generally, courts
should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere conjectures or
suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes „something more than a minimum of
probative value,‰ suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a „plus value.‰ This
"86
may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable
of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without „plus value‰ may be
logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance
the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the
court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is
that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and
judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable
doubt. This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else,
committed the offense charged. In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that
the present case passes the test of moral certainty.
4. Facts
a.
Age
People V. Pruna, G.R. No.138471, October 10, 2002
— No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded from testifying
--the intelligence, not the age, of a young child is the test of the competency as a witness.·Section 21
of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence enumerates the persons who are disqualified to be witnesses.
Among those disqualified are „[c]hildren whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable
of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and relating them truthfully.‰ No
precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded from testifying. The
intelligence, not the age, of a young child is the test of the competency as a witness. It is settled that
a child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive and, in perceiving, can make
known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully the facts for which he is
examined.
— In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must consider his capacity
(a) at the time the fact to be testified to occurred such that he could receive correct impressions
thereof, (b) to comprehend the obligation of an oath, and (c) to relate those facts truly to the court at
the time he is offered as a witness; The question of competency of a child-witness rests primarily in
the sound discretion of the trial court. —In determining the competency of a child witness, the court
must consider his capacity (a) at the time the fact to be testified to occurred such that he could
receive correct impressions thereof; (b) to comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate
those facts truly to the court at the time he is offered as a witness. The examination should show that
the child has some understanding of the punishment which may result from false swearing. The
requisite appreciation of consequences is disclosed where the child states that he knows that it is
wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be punished if he does so, or that he uses language which is
equivalent to saying that he would be sent to hell for false swearing. A child can be disqualified only
if it can be shown that his mental maturity renders him incapable of perceiving facts respecting
which he is being examined and of relating them truthfully. The question of competency of a child-
witness rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. This is so because the trial judge
sees the proposed witness and observes his manner of testifying, his apparent possession or lack of
intelligence, as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. Since many of the witnessÊ
manners cannot be photographed into the record, the finding of the trial judge will not be disturbed
or reversed unless from what is preserved it is clear that such finding was erroneous.
b. Resignation from office

Estrada v. Desierto & companion case, supra; also G.R.No.146710-15, Resolution on
Motion for Reconsideration, April 3, 2001
"87

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I.

Nature, Scope and Function of Evidence

A. Proof of fact and of judicial truth

Estrada v. Desierto and companion case, 353 SCRA 452 (2001)

Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd.v. CA, 342 SCRA 213 (2000)

People v. Base, 329 SCRA 158 (2000)

People v. Vallejo, G.R.No.144656, May 9, 2002

Cf. - Lim v. CA, 270 SCRA 1(1997)

People v. Campuhan, 329 SCRA 270 (2000)

People v. Castillo, 325 SCRA 613 (2000)

People v. Pascual, 331 SCRA 252 (2000)

People v. Villanueva, 275 SCRA 489 (1997)

People v. Malabago, 265 SCRA 198 (1996)

People v. Pruna, G.R.No.138471, October 10, 2002

B. Matters not requiring proof

Atillo III v. CA, 266 SCRA 596 (1997)

People v. Cepeda, 324 SCRA 290 (2000)

People v. Cerbito, 324 SCRA 304 (2000)

Vinoya v. NLRC, 324 SCRA 469 (2000)

Ditche v. CA, 327 SCRA 301(2000)

BPI-Family Savings Bank v. CA, 330 SCRA 507(2000)

Salamera v. Sandiganbayan, 303 SCRA 217 (1999)

People v. Tejero, 308 SCRA 660 (1999)

PAL v. CA, 257 SCRA 33 (1996)

Heirs of Canque v. CA, 275 SCRA 741 (1997)

Philsec Investment Corp. v. CA, 274 SCRA102 (1997)

Mandarin Villa v. Ca, 257 SCRA 538 (1996)

People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 (1995)

Metal Forming Corporation v. Office of the President, 247 SCRA (1995)

a. Mandatory judicial notice

Rule 129, Sec. 1

b. Discretionary judicial notice

Rule 129, secs. 2-3

4. Res Ipsa Loquitur

Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy, 341 SCRA 760 (2000)

C. Uniform procedure and applicability

II. Fundamental Concepts in Evidence

Rule 3, sec. 2, Electronic Evidence Rule

i.Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)

Cf. (1) Credibility

1. Conditional Admissibility — Evidence appears to be immaterial is

iii. People v. Lapay, 298 SCRA 62 (1998)

Rule 128, sec. 4; Cf. Materiality

BURDEN OF PROOF BURDEN OF EVIDENCE

Rule 133, secs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Labor Code, Art. 277 (b) (now 292)

RA 8493 — AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES

Aklan Cooperative Inc. v. NLRC, 323 SCRA 258 (2000)

People v. Rafales, 323 SCRA 13 (2000)

People v. Pantorilla, 322 SCRA 337 (2000)

Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element, whether in complete or incomplete self-defense. He

People v. Villar, 322 SCRA 393 (2000)

E. Proof vis Presumptions

(1) Conclusive presumptions

(2) Disputable presumptions

Rule 6, secs. 3, 4, Electronic Evidence Rule

(a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;

SEC. 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. – Upon the authentication of a

(a) The information contained in a certificate is correct;

Cleofas v. St. Peter Memorial Park, 324 SCRA 223 (2000)

(3) “Judge-made” presumptions

People v. Barita, 325 SCRA 22 (2000)

People v. Naag, 322 SCRA 716 (2000)