G.R. No. 183053. June 16, 2010

2/23/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 621
or review proceeding. (Tomacruz-Lactao vs. Espejo, 434

SCRA 588 [2004])
The proper remedy to question an improvident
interlocutory order is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
not Rule 45—a petition for review under Rule 45 is the
proper mode of redress to question final judgments.
(Silverio, Jr. vs. Filipino Business Consultants, Inc., 466
SCRA 584 [2005])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 183053. June 16, 2010.*
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF

CRISTINA AGUINALDO-SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M.
SUNTAY III, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-
SUNTAY, respondent.
Succession; The order of preference set out in Section 6, Rule 78

of the Rules of Court in the appointment of an administrator of an
estate is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances of each case—jurisprudence has long held that the
selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial
court.—Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If
no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving
husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband
or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of
kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000177cf26beec868c2138003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/17
_______________
* SECOND DIV ISION.
143
VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010 143
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent

and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent and
willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select. However, the order of preference is not absolute for it
depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case.
Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator
lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the
attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the
least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of
their grandmother’s, Cristina’s, estate.
Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Relatives; Iron
Curtain Bar Rule; The Court is not unmindful of the critiques of
civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in the law concerning the bone of
contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code.—Counsel for
petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the
successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of
a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably
demonstrate the contrary—Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of
the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her
husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and
trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by
decedent’s husband, the original oppositor to respondent’s petition
for letters of administration. We are not unmindful of the critiques
of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in the law concerning the bone
of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning with
the eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes: In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate
family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an
illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of
the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it
reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but
with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998)
our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to
pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So
that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate
child from representing him in the intestate succession of the
grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so.

This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future
revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide
either that the illegitimate issue
144
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992
must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and
modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in
accord with an enlightened attitude vis-à-vis illegitimate children.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The peculiar circumstances of this
case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow
the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there
exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate
descendants of a deceased.—The factual antecedents of this case
accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first
descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her
legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband,
Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an
illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar
circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for
petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the
Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between
legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Honorato Y. Aquino for petitioner.
Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
Unlike Pope Alexander VI 1 who, faced with the impasse
between Spain and Portugal, deftly and literally divided the
exploration, or more appropriately, the riches of the New
World by issuing the Inter Caetera,2 we are confronted with
_______________
1 Formerly Cardinal Rodrigo Borgia, before ascending to the religious

title of Pope and assuming the name Alexander VI.
2 The Papal Bull which drew a longitudinal line (one hundred leagues
west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands) and bestowed all
145
VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010 145

the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family

imbroglio over the estate of a decedent.3
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949,4 reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-
95.5
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay
(Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and
Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by
her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren,
including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio
III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel
Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: herein
respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed
Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio I’s marriage to Isabel Cojuangco
was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two
_______________
non-Christian lands west thereof to Spain, and east of the line to

Portugal.
3 In The Family, a book with a factual core on the Borgia family of

15th Century Rome, Mario Puzo recounts that the ostensibly fair and just
papal ruling actually favored Spain and placed Portugal at a disadvantage
because papal intervention and arbitration of the matter was made at the
behest of King Ferdinand of Spain. More importantly, Pope Alexander VI
was originally a Catalan who, at the start of his career as a cleric in
Italy, conveniently changed his name from the Spanish “Borja” to the
Italian “Borgia” to gain acceptance and credibility as an authentic Roman
clergy.
4 Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate
Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Noel
G. Tijam, concurring; Rollo, pp. 20-32.
5 Penned by Judge Gregorio S. Sampaga; Rollo, pp. 35-60.
146

children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay

Tañedo (Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion
Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was
reared ever since he was a mere baby, nine months old, by
the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged
natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural
child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses
Federico and Cristina.
As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I
and Isabel was annulled.6 Consequently, respondent and
her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their
mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from their
father and paternal grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed
a petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren:
respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Although the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City
granted the petition and allowed Federico one hour of
visitation monthly, initially reduced to thirty minutes, it
was altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by
respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the
unwanted visits of her grandparents.
Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse,
Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted their
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.7
On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor, containing
the following allegations:
“[A]t the time of [the decedent’s] death, [she] was a resident of the
Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent]
left an estate of real and personal properties, with a probable gross
_______________
6 Rollo, p. 43.
7 Id., at pp. 137-138.
147
VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010 147

value of P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of the

surviving heirs of the [decedent] are: (1) Federico C. Suntay, 89
years old, surviving spouse and a resident of x x x; (2) Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a
resident of x x x; (3) Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay, 39 years old,
legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; and (4) Emilio
Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate grandson and a resident
of x x x; and that as far as [respondent] knew, the decedent left no
debts or obligation at the time of her death.”8
Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his

grandchild, respondent Isabel, Federico filed his opposition
on December 21, 1995, alleging, among others, that:
“[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of

administering her estate and he should be the one appointed as its
administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties
left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the
administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had been
alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years;
that the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it
did not mention the other children of his son[,] namely: Emilio III
and Nenita S. Tañedo; that he is better situated to protect the
integrity of the estate of Cristina as even before the death of his
wife[,] he was already the one who managed their conjugal
properties; that the probable value of the estate as stated in the
petition was grossly overstated (sic); and that Isabel’s allegation
that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.”9
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle

the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation
dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio
III, as administrator of the decedent’s estate on his behalf,
in the event he would be adjudged as the one with a better
right to the letters of administration.
_______________
8 Id., at p. 35.
9 Id., at pp. 21-22.
148

Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio III’s Motion

for Leave to Intervene considering his interest in the
outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-
Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in his

grandfather’s opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his
stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to
administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
Additionally, Emilio III averred his own qualifications that:
“[he] is presently engaged in aquaculture and banking; he
was trained by the decedent to work in his early age by
involving him in the activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo
Foundation which was established in 1979 in memory of her
grandmother’s father; the significant work experiences
outside the family group are included in his curriculum
vitae; he was employed by the oppositor [Federico] after his
graduation in college with management degree at F.C.E.
Corporations and Hagonoy Rural Bank; x x x.”10
In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000,
Federico died.
After the testimonies of both parties’ witnesses were
heard and evidence on their respective allegations were
adduced, the trial court rendered a decision on November 9,
2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as
administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is

DENIED and the Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby
appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust
upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00, conditioned
as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and
complete inventory;
_______________
10 Id., at p. 58.
149
VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010 149

(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts,
legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and
at any other time when required by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of
Administration be issued in his favor.
SO ORDERED.”11
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA,

which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC,
revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III,
and appointed respondent as administratrix of the intestate
estate of the decedent, Cristina, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed

decision dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court to
Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner
Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby appointed administratrix of
the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of
administration be issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”12
The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been

denied, he appeals by certiorari to this Court, raising the
following issues:
A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF

THE ESTATE UNDER SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES
OF COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE
APPLIES; and
_______________
11 Id., at p. 60.
12 Id., at pp. 31-32.
150

B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN

PETITIONER WAS REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER
SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM BEING
APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DECEDENT’S
ESTATE.13
In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the

RTC ratiocinated, thus:
“Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both

testimonial and documentary, the court opines that it is to the best
interest of the estate of the decedent and all claimants thereto, that
the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be appointed administrator

of the estate in the above-entitled special proceedings.
Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court,
[respondent’s immediate] family and that of the decedent are
apparently estranged. The root cause of which, is not for this court
to ascertain nor is this the right time and the proper forum to dwell
upon. What matters most at this time is the welfare of the estate of
the decedent in the light of such unfortunate and bitter
estrangement.
The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would
go against the wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from
infancy in her home in Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it
would go against the wishes of the surviving spouse x x x who
nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as administrator.
As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter
is accorded preference as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule
78, Rules of Court. On the basis of such preference, he vigorously
opposed the appointment of the petitioner and instead nominated
[Emilio III], his grandchild and adopted child. Such nomination,
absent any valid and justifiable reason, should not be imperiously
set aside and insouciantly ignored, even after the oppositor
[Federico] has passed away, in order to give effect to the order of
preference mandated by law. Moreover, from the viewpoint of the
estate, the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s] intrinsically
meritorious. For the benefit of the estate and its claimants, creditors,
as well as heirs, the administrator should be one who is prepared,
_______________
13 Memorandum of petitioner; id., at p. 195.
151
VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010 151

academically and by experience, for the demands and

responsibilities of the position. While [respondent], a practicing
physician, is not unqualified, it is clear to the court that when it
comes to management of real estate and the processing and
payment of debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with an established
track record as a manager has a decided edge and therefore, is in a
position to better handle the preservation of the estate.”14
In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio III’s

status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred
from representing his deceased father in the estate of the
latter’s legitimate mother, the decedent. On the whole, the
CA pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely nominated
by Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the latter’s

appointment as administrator of the decedent’s estate,
cannot be appointed as the administrator of the decedent’s
estate for the following reasons:15
1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a
suspensive condition, i.e., Federico’s appointment as
administrator of the estate, he being the surviving spouse of
Cristina, the decedent. The death of Federico before his
appointment as administrator of Cristina’s estate rendered
his nomination of Emilio III inoperative;
2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and
illegitimate offspring (Emilio III) of decedent’s son, Emilio I,
respondent is preferred, being the “next of kin” referred to
by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and entitled to
share in the distribution of Cristina’s estate as an heir;
3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article
99216 of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from
inheriting ab
_______________
14 Rollo, pp. 59-60.

15 Id., at pp. 25-31.
16 Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor
shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
152

intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his

father or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from
inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be preferred over
respondent in the administration of the estate of their
grandmother, the decedent; and
4. Contrary to the RTC’s finding, respondent is as much
competent as Emilio III to administer and manage the
subject estate for she possesses none of the disqualifications
specified in Section 1,17 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between
Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as
administrator of the decedent’s estate.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling
excluding Emilio III in the administration of the decedent’s
undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses over several

undisputed facts and circumstances:
1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate
succession is to give preference to the wishes and presumed
will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will;
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to
as the iron curtain bar rule,18 is quite the opposite scenario
in
_______________
17 Sec. 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or

administrators.—No person is competent to serve as executor or
administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the
trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding
or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral
turpitude.
18 Called as such because the law does not recognize the natural tie of
blood and is based on the presumed intervening antagonism and
incompatibility between the legitimate and illegitimate family of a
deceased. See Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-66574,
June 17, 1987, 150 SCRA 645.
153
VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010 153

the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship

between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III,
on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of
legitimate relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent,
Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both
acknowledged him as their grandchild;
4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in
the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their
conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their
marriage;
5. Cristina’s properties forming part of her estate are
still commingled with that of her husband, Federico,
because her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit
terminated upon her death, remains undetermined and
unliquidated; and
6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico,

entitled to share in the distribution of the latter’s estate as a
direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply
representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred
in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the
decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s
interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this
Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that
the CA even declared that “under the law, [Federico], being
the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession
over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent,
aside from his share in the conjugal partnership.”
Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained
legal reasoning—Emilio III’s nomination was subject to a
suspensive condition and rendered inoperative by reason of
Federico’s death—wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator of an
estate:
154

“SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.

—If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person
as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
may be granted to such other person as the court may select.”
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it

depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each
case.19 Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.20
In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this

case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both
respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother’s,
Cristina’s, estate.
In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,21 we upheld the
appointment by the trial court of a co-administration
between the decedent’s son and the decedent’s brother, who
was likewise a creditor of the decedent’s estate. In the same
vein, we
_______________
19 See Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167979, March 16, 2006, 484
SCRA 699; Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, August 7, 1992,
212 SCRA 413; Capistrano v. Nadurata, 46 Phil. 726 (1922).
20 See Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra; Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,
supra; Capistrano v. Nadurata, supra.
21 Supra note 19.
155
VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010 155

declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana

Rustia Vda. de Damian22 that:
“[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal

consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed.
The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-
administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand
that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management
of the estates, a situation which obtains here.”
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the

succession other putative heirs, including another
illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita
Tañedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the
two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio
II. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative
heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina
and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we
are impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint
administration of the subject estate.
One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously
argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional
bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a
decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts
indubitably demonstrate the contrary—Emilio III, an

illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated
by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared
from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and
eventually legally adopted by decedent’s husband, the
original oppositor to respondent’s petition for letters of
administration.
We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a
conflict and a lacuna in the law concerning the bone of
contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning
with the eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
_______________
22 G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 334, 360. (Citations
omitted.)
156

“In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation

was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that
Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently
adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the
Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in
subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the
hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art.
992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from
representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the
illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference
being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the
Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the
illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in
which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain
said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution
would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-à-vis
illegitimate children.”23
Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate

succession:
“The law [of intestacy] is founded… on the presumed will of the

deceased… Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally,
spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the descendants, then the
ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always preferring those
closer in degree to those of remoter degrees, on the assumption that
the deceased would have done so had he manifested his last will…
Lastly, in default of anyone called to succession or bound to the
decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is in accordance with his
presumed will that his property be given to charitable or
educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of
humanity.”24
_______________
23 Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quarter (1976), Vol. 4, No. 1,
pp. 40-41; cited in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66574,
February 21, 1990, 182 SCRA 427, 434; and Diaz v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra note 18, at p. 651.
24 Cited in Balane, Jottings and Jurisprudence (1998), p. 368.
157
VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010 157

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately

reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first
descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish
between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren.
Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally
raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate
grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar
circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by
counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in
Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and
antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate
descendants of a deceased.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint
impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of
heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the
parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering
that the question on who will administer the properties of
the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata25 on the same
issue remains good law:
“[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature,

although the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed
the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the
proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the

estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.”
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart

from the foregoing admonition:
“Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made.—

x x x. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless
the
_______________
25 Supra note at 19, at p. 728.
158

distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the

court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration
over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each
of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is
likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the
heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to
the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all
other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is
further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
**
Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad and Perez, JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—A party may not be allowed to defeat the

purpose of an essentially valid petition for the settlement of
the estate of a decedent by raising matters that are
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. (Vda. de
Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 135 [2001])
The second sentence of Section 1, Rule 74, which provides
for execution of affidavits of adjudication is an exception to
the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property,
it
_______________
** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza per

Special Order No. 842 dated June 3, 2010.
© Copyright 2021 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

G.R. No. 183053. June 16, 2010

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.R. No. 183053. June 16, 2010

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

2/23/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 621

or review proceeding. (Tomacruz-Lactao vs. Espejo, 434

G.R. No. 183053. June 16, 2010.*

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF

Succession; The order of preference set out in Section 6, Rule 78

* SECOND DIV ISION.

VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010 143

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent

grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so.

144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

1 Formerly Cardinal Rodrigo Borgia, before ascending to the religious

VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010 145

the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family

non-Christian lands west thereof to Spain, and east of the line to

3 In The Family, a book with a factual core on the Borgia family of

146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay

VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010 147

value of P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of the

Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his

“[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of

Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle

148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio III’s Motion

Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in his

“WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is

VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010 149

Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA,

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed

The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been

A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF

150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN

In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the

“Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both

the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be appointed administrator

13 Memorandum of petitioner; id., at p. 195.

VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010 151

academically and by experience, for the demands and

In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio III’s

by Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the latter’s

14 Rollo, pp. 59-60.

152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his

undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses over several

17 Sec. 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or

VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010 153

the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship

6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico,

154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.

However, the order of preference is not absolute for it

In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this

VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010 155

declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana

“[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal

Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the

indubitably demonstrate the contrary—Emilio III, an

156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation