ALBERT TISON and CLAUDIO L. JABON vs. SPS.

GREGORIO POMASIN and CONSORCIA PONCE POMASIN

Facts:

Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, 1 figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in
Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay last 12 August 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney
towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was
traversing the opposite lane going towards Naga City.

The opposing parties gave two different versions of the incident.

Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarni’s father, was on board the jitney and seated on the passenger’s
side. He testified that while the jitney was passing through a curve going downward, he saw a tractor-
trailer coming from the opposite direction and encroaching on the jitney’s lane. The jitney was hit by the
tractor-trailer and it was dragged further causing death and injuries to its passengers. 3

On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while he was driving the tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on
the opposite lane falling off the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag manner
and heading towards the direction of the truck. To avoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the
tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left
fender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise
damaged.

Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted.

Gregorio was injured and brought to the Albay Provincial Hospital in Legaspi City. His daughter, Andrea
Pomasin Pagunsan, sister Narcisa Pomasin Roncales and Abraham Dionisio Perol died on the spot. His
other daughter Laarni, the jitney driver, and granddaughter Annie Jane Pomasin Pagunsan expired at the
hospital. His wife, Consorcia Pomasin, another granddaughter Dianne Pomasin Pagunsan, Ricky Ponce,
Vicente Pomasin, Gina Sesista, Reynaldo Sesista, Antonio Sesista and Sonia Perol sustained injuries. 5 On
the other hand, Jabon and one of the passengers in the tractor-trailer were injured.

Albert Tison (Tison), the owner of the truck, extended financial assistance to respondents by giving them
₱1,000.00 each immediately after the accident and ₱200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin (Cynthia), one of
Gregorio’s daughters. Cynthia, in turn, executed an Affidavit of Desistance.

On 14 November 1994, respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo.

In their Answer, petitioners countered that it was Laarni’s negligence which proximately caused the
accident. They further claimed that Cynthia was authorized by Spouses Pomasin to enter into an
amicable settlement by executing an Affidavit of Desistance.

Issue:

WoN the driver of the tractor is negligent.

Held:

The issue of negligence is factual in nature. 12 And the rule, and the exceptions, is that factual findings of
the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive but may be reviewed when: (1) the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; (2) the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of
fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (5) the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case
and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) the Court of Appeals fails to notice
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; and (8) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or are mere conclusions
without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by
respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record. 13

This interplay of rules and exceptions is more pronounced in this case of quasi-delict in which, according
to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the
following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of
defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the
damage incurred by the plaintiff. 15 These requisites must be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.16 The claimants, respondents in this case, must, therefore, establish their claim or cause of
action by preponderance of evidence, evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that
which is offered in opposition to it.

The declaration of Jabon with respect to the road condition was straightforward and consistent. The
recollection of Gregorio veered from "curving and downward" to uphill. 24  On this point, Jabon and his
testimony is more credible.

The fact that the jitney easily fell into the road shoulder, an undebated fact, supports the trial court’s
conclusion that the jitney was indeed going downhill which, it may be repeated, was the original
testimony of Gregorio that the road was "curving and downward." 25 It is this conclusion, prodded by the
inconsistency of Gregorio’s testimony, that gives credence to the further testimony of Jabon that the
herein respondent’s jitney, "loaded with passengers with top-load" "was running in a zigzag manner." 26

Going downward, the jitney had the tendency to accelerate. The fall into the shoulder of the road can
result in the loss of control of the jitney, which explains why it was running in a zigzag manner before it
hit the tractor-trailer.

The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of
the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a
judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor
to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered
inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and
the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal
rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm
suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of other. 31
In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer driver’s restrictions
on his license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land
Transportation Office merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in his license.

NORMAN GAID vs. PEOPLE

Facts:

Petitioner Norman A. Gaid was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

At around 12:00 noon on 25 October 2001, petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-
lane road where the Laguindingan National High School is located toward the direction of Moog in
Misamis Oriental. His jeepney was filled to seating capacity. 5 At the time several students were coming
out of the school premises. 6 Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen
by eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store on the left side of the road. From where
he was at the left side of the road, Dayata raised his left hand to flag down petitioner's jeepney 7 which
was traveling on the right lane of the road. 8 However, neither did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis
Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at that point. 9

The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayata's feet was pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which, he
laid flat on the ground behind the jeepney. 10 Another prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who
was also situated on the left side of the street but directly in front of the school gate, heard "a strong
impact coming from the jeep sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in order to hurdle an
obstacle."11 Dayata was then seen lying on the ground 12 and caught in between the rear
tires.13 Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right
side.14

Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was run over, prompting him to jump off the jeepney to help the
victim. Petitioner stopped and saw Mellalos carrying the body of the victim. 15 Mellalos loaded the victim
on a motorcycle and brought him to the hospital. Dayata was first brought to the Laguindingan Health
Center, but it was closed. Mellalos then proceeded to the El Salvador Hospital. Upon advice of its
doctors, however, Dayata was brought to the Northern Mindanao Medical Center where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.16

Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio-cerebral injuries as the cause of death. 17 She
testified that the head injuries of Dayata could have been caused by having run over by the jeepney.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laguindingan 19 found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. The lower court held petitioner negligent in his driving considering that the
victim was dragged to a distance of 5.70 meters from the point of impact. He was also scored for "not
stopping his vehicle after noticing that the jeepney's left rear tire jolted causing the vehicle to tilt
towards the right."20 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) 21 affirmed in toto the decision of the
MCTC.

The Court of Appeals exonerated petitioner from the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide on the ground that he was not driving recklessly at the time of the accident. However, the
appellate court still found him to be negligent when he failed "to promptly stop his vehicle to check
what caused the sudden jotting of its rear tire."
Issue:

WoN the negligent act of the petitioner is simple.

Held:

No. During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent.

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act. 27

In the instant case, petitioner was driving slowly at the time of the accident.

It appears from the evidence Dayata came from the left side of the street. Petitioner, who was driving
the jeepney on the right lane, did not see the victim flag him down. He also failed to see him go near the
jeepney at the left side. Understandably, petitioner was focused on the road ahead. In Dayata's haste to
board the jeep which was then running, his feet somehow got pinned to the left rear tire, as narrated by
Bongolto. Actub only saw Dayata after he heard a strong impact coming from the jeep.

With the foregoing facts, petitioner cannot be held liable during the first stage.

In the instant case, petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the
vicinity of the school. He cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who came from behind on the
left side.

Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.34

The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender;
and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly
manifest.35

The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the
person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course actually pursued?

Assuming arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must be shown that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.

The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of impact proved to be the immediate cause of his
death, as indicated in the post-mortem findings. 43 His skull was crushed as a result of the accident. Had
petitioner immediately stopped the jeepney, it would still not have saved the life of the victim as the
injuries he suffered were fatal.

The evidence on record do not show that the jeepney dragged the victim after he was hit and run over
by the jeepney.

ST. LUKES COLLEGE OF MEDICINE V SPS. PEREZ (COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES)

Facts:

In February 2010, St. Luke's sent four (4) of its 4th year medical students to the clinic, namely: plaintiffs-
appellants Spouses Perez's daughter Jessa, plaintiffsappellants Spouses Quintos' daughter Cecille, Jerillie
Ann Murillo (Murillo) and Miguel Rafael Ramos (Ramos). They were tasked to complete a four-week
clerkship rotation at the clinic and like the previous batches, they were housed in the second floor of the
clinic. According to Ramos, he and his groupmates reported for duty at the Cabiao clinic and afterwards
went for a jog. Thereafter, they went grocery shopping. Ramos admitted that one of the beverages they
bought was an alcoholic beverage called The Bar, which consisted of either vodka or gin. He also
admitted that only he and Cecille drank the beverage. Ramos was awakened at around 3am when he
heard Murillo shouting that there was a fire. Ramos immediately towards it and saw a thick smoke
coming from the left portion of the living room where there was a glow. He also felt extreme heat,
prompting him to run to the bathroom to get a pail of water with which he tried to extinguish the fire.
The girls, who had followed him to the bathroom, stayed behind. When Ramos' attempt to put out the
fire proved to be futile, he went back to the bathroom and poured water on the girls in an attempt to
alleviate the extreme heat coming from the fire. According to Ramos, the smoke started to seep through
the bathroom door and the group had started shouting for help. After a considerable amount of time, he
heard somebody outside instructing him to get back from the window. When he did so, somebody broke
the window and started to dismantle the iron grills barring the same. By that time, Ramos had started
losing consciousness due to smoke inhalation and only remembered that he was being pulled out of the
building through the window. Unfortunately, the fire resulted in the deaths of the female medical
students, including the daughters of plaintiffs-appellants due to smoke inhalation resulting" to asphyxia.

The NBI declared that the construction of the Cabiao Community Clinic building was in violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9514 (R.A. No. 9514) or the Revised Fire Code of the Philippines, that the
cause of the fire was due to faulty electrical wiring, and that St. Luke's negligence is criminal in nature.

Issue:

Whether or not St. Lukes is negligent.

Held:

Yes. The present case is one between a school and its students, with their relationship being based on
the enrollment contracts. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements
and observe its rules and regulations. In the case at bar, the Cabiao Community Clinic is to be considered
as part of the campus premises of St. Luke's. In the course description of the clerkship programx in
preventive and community medicine, it is stated that the Cabiao Community Clinic serves as the base
operation of the clerkship program In the performance of its contractual and inherent obligations, the
Court is mindful of the attendant difficulties on the part of institutions of learning, and the Court
recognizes that the latter cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. Thus, as also laid out in
the PSBA case, "the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation
to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the 'omission of that
degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of persons, time and place. The standard test in determining whether a person is
negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this:
could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to
the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes
a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to
exist Community Clinic because it was a requirement of petitioners. The students were complying with
an obligation under the enrollment contract — they were rendering medical services in a community
center as required by petitioners. It was thus incumbent upon petitioners to comply with their own
obligations under the enrollment contract - to ensure that the community center where they would
designate their students is safe and secure, among others. Petitioners failed to take the necessary
precautions to guard their students against foreseeable harm. As correctly found by the CA, petitioners
were remiss in inspecting the premises of the Cabiao Community Clinic and in ensuring that the
necessary permits were in order. These precautions could have minimized the risk to the safety of the
victims. Indeed, the CA had basis in making the following pronouncement:32 There is no record that any
inquiry on the condition of the premises was even made by defendants-appellees prior to the
implementation of the program. Petitioners additionally aver that the Clinic was built under the
direction, supervision, management and control of the Municipality of Cabiao,33 and that it ensured
that there was an agreement for the Municipality of Cabiao to provide 24-hour security to the Clinic. A
learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate matters of safety and
security to a third party as to do so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation of ensuring a
safe learning environment for its students. blind eye on petitioners' total reliance on the Municipality of
Cabiao in ensuring the safety and security of their students. The enrollment contract is between
petitioners and the victims, and petitioners cannot abdicate' on their contractual obligation to provide
their students a safe learning environment, nor can it pass or contract away such obligation to a third
party.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION vs. PURIFICACION VIZCARA

Facts:
On May 14, 2004, at about three o’clock in the morning, Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo) was driving a
passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops.

While crossing the railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train, then
being operated by respondent Japhet Estranas (Estranas), suddenly turned up and rammed the
passenger jeepney. The collision resulted to the instantaneous death of Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin,
and Samuel. On the other hand, Dominador and Joel, sustained serious physical injuries. 4

At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at the railroad crossing. Additionally,
the "Stop, Look and Listen" signage was poorly maintained. The "Stop" signage was already faded while
the "Listen" signage was partly blocked by another signboard. 5

On September 15, 2004, the survivors of the mishap, Joel and Dominador, together with the heirs of the
deceased victims, namely, Purificacion Vizcara, Marivic Vizcara, Cresencia Natividad and Hector Vizcara,
filed an action for damages against PNR, Estranas and Ben Saga, the alternate driver of the train, before
the RTC of Palayan City.

Issue:

WoN PNR is negligent in this case.

Held:

Yes. The petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.

In Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 17 negligence was defined as the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is
the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.18 To determine the existence of negligence, the time-honored test was: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in
effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.19

In the instant petition, this Court is called upon to determine whose negligence occasioned the ill-fated
incident. The records however reveal that this issue had been rigorously discussed by both the RTC and
the CA. To emphasize, the RTC ruled that it was the petitioners’ failure to install adequate safety devices
at the railroad crossing which proximately caused the collision. 
YLARDE VS. AQUINO CASE DIGEST

Facts:

Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan while Edgardo Aquino
was a teacher therein. The school had several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school
shop destroyed in World War II. Aquino decided to help clear the area. So after the classes, he gathered
18 of his male pupils, aged 10-11, and ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in making a
hole where the stone can be buried. The following day he called 4 of the 18 students, including Novelito
Ylarde to complete the excavation. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the
concrete block, Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Aquino left the children to level the loose
soil while he went to see another teacher for the key to the school workroom where he can get some
rope. Before leaving, he told the children “not to touch the stone”.  After he left, 3 of the children
playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining one jumped on top of the
concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned
to the wall which led to his death 3 days after.  The parents of Ylarde filed a suit for damages against
both Aquino and Soriano.

Issue:

Can Aquino and Soriano be held liable for damages?

Held:

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who
should be answerable for torts committed by their students while in a school of arts and trades, it is only
the head of the school who can be held liable. It was held in  Amadora vs. Court of Appeals that:

Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of
the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head
thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words,
teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo
singula sinquilis  'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and students' and 'heads of establishments
of arts and trades to the word "apprentices."

Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, we rule that private respondent Soriano, as principal,
cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and not a school of
arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano
did not give any instruction regarding the digging.

From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article
2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over
them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons.  
it is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he: (1) failed
to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to
make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2)
required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the
huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may
go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so
apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able
to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive
nuisance.

The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a
direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the
children to play around. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of the negligent
acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for
the unsafe situation created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils
concerned to real danger.

JARCO MARKETING CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope
and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively.
Private respondents Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.

In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department
Store, Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter
when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her. She then beheld her
daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping
counter/structure. ZHIENETH was crying and screaming for help. Although shocked, CRISELDA was quick
to ask the assistance of the people around in lifting the counter and retrieving ZHIENETH from the
floor. 3

ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on. The next day
ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter communicated with CRISELDA by writing on a magic slate. The
injuries she sustained took their toil on her young body. She died fourteen (14) days after the accident
or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed. She was six years old.

The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained. The provisional medical
certificate 5 issued by ZHIENETH's attending doctor described the extent of her injuries:

Diagnoses:

1. Shock, severe, sec. to intra-abdominal injuries due to blunt injury

2. Hemorrhage, massive, intraperitoneal sec. to laceration, (L) lobe liver

3. Rupture, stomach, anterior & posterior walls

4. Complete transection, 4th position, duodenum

5. Hematoma, extensive, retroperitoneal

6. Contusion, lungs, severe

After the burial of their daughter, private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement
of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses 6 which they had incurred.
Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages.

In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners denied any liability for the injuries and consequent death
of ZHIENETH. They claimed that CRISELDA was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her
daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances.
ZHIENETH too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its
eventual collapse on her. Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy wood with a
strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction.

Additionally, petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation maintained that it observed the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection, supervision and control of its employees.

Issue:

Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence. Who is/are negligent?

Held:

An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the

defendant. 15 It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any
human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens." 16

On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. 17 Negligence is "the failure to observe,
for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."

The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Plicart v.
Smith, 20 thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.

We quote the testimony of Gerardo Gonzales who was at the scene of the incident and accompanied
CRISELDA and ZHIENETH to the hospital:

Q: While at the Makati Medical Center, did you hear or notice anything while the child was being
treated?
A: At the emergency room we were all surrounding the child. And when the doctor asked the child
"what did you do," the child said "nothing, I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell on
me."

Based on the tesminonies by Gonzales, without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor
were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any
concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners
miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family.

Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children
below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. 

Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the
counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and
sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse.

DR. LI VS. SPS. SOLIMAN G.R. NO. 165279, JUNE 7, 2011

Facts:

Respondents’ 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy of the mass located in her
lower extremity at the St. Luke’s Medical Center (SLMC). Results showed that she was suffering from
osteosarcoma, osteoblastic type, a high-grade (highly malignant) cancer of the bone. Following this
diagnosis, Angelica’s right leg was amputated and her doctor suggested that she undergo chemotherapy
to eliminate any remaining cancer cells. She was then referred to herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical
oncologist.

On August 18, 1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC, and died on September 1, 1993, just eleven days
after the administration of the first cycle of the chemotherapy regimen. The post-mortem examination
of the PNP Crime Laboratory indicated the cause of death as “Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple
organ hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation.” SLMC issued its own Certificate of
Death showing the cause of death as Osteosarcoma, Status Post AKA.

Respondents sued the petitioner (among others) and SLMC for damages, alleging negligence by their
careless administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the essential precautions in
detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and failure to fully inform them of the
possible side effects of its administration.

Petitioner denied having been negligent in administering the chemotherapy drugs to Angelica and
asserted that she had fully explained to respondents how the chemotherapy will affect not only the
cancer cells but also the patient’s normal body parts, including the lowering of white and red blood cells
and platelets. She claimed that Angelica died of sepsis which is a complication of the cancer itself.

Issue:
Can the petitioner be held liable for failure to fully disclose serious side effects to the parents of the
child patient who died while undergoing chemotherapy?

Held:

No. From a purely ethical norm, the doctrine of informed consent evolved into a general principle of law
that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in
the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might
be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own
welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or
none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against
the probable benefits.

There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice/ medical negligence action
based upon the doctrine of informed consent: “(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2)
he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the
failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and
(4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment.” The gravamen in an informed consent case
requires the plaintiff to “point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which
would have altered her decision to undergo it.

Examining the evidence on record, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent
in the chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelica’s parents. Respondents could
not have been unaware in the course of initial treatment and amputation of Angelica’s lower extremity,
that her immune system was already weak on account of the malignant tumor in her knee. When
petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy which includes
lowered counts of white and red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart
damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor that the
respondents understood very well that the severity of these side effects will not be the same for all
patients undergoing the procedure. In other words, by the nature of the disease itself, each patient’s
reaction to the chemical agents even with pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely
determined by the physician. That death can possibly result from complications of the treatment or the
underlying cancer itself, immediately or sometime after the administration of chemotherapy drugs, is a
risk that cannot be ruled out, as with most other major medical procedures, but such conclusion can be
reasonably drawn from the general side effects of chemotherapy already disclosed.

DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ V. CA AND LYDIA UMALI

Facts:

Lydia Umali was examined by Dr. Cruz (Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital) who found a myoma
[benign tumor] in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation [removal of uterus] on 23
Mar 1991. On March 22, Rowena Umali accompanied her mother to the hospital and spent the night
there, for the operation was to be conducted on the following day. Rowena noticed that the clinic was
untidy, so she tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. On the day of the
operation, Rowena asked Dr. Cruz if the operation could be postponed. Because of this, Dr. Cruz called
Lydia in her office. Consequently, Lydia informed Rowena that the operation must go on as scheduled.

While Lydia’s relatives were waiting, Dr. Ercillo (anesthesiologist) told them to buy tagamet ampules,
and Rowena’s sister went out to buy some. An hour later, Dr. Ercillo asked them to buy blood for Lydia,
so they did. A few hours later, the operation was finished. However, Dr. Cruz asked again the family to
buy additional blood, but there was no more type A blood available in the blood bank. A person arrived
to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena noticed that her mother was gasping for
breath–apparently, the oxygen supply had run out, so the family went out to buy oxygen. Later in the
evening, she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped. She was then transferred to another
hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. However, this transfer was
without the consent of the relatives, who only found out about it when an ambulance came to take
Lydia to the other hospital.

In the new hospital (San Pablo District Hospital), she was re-operated upon by Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo
because blood was oozing out from her incision. They summoned Dr. Angeles, Ob-Gyne head of the new
hospital, but when he arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead (BP: 0/0). Dr. Angeles told
Drs. Cruz and Ercillo that there was nothing he could do. Lydia died while Dr. Cruz was closing her
abdominal wall. Immediate cause of death is shock; disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) as
antecedent cause.

Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo were charged with reckless imprudence and negligence resulting in homicide of
Lydia Umali. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) found Dr. Ercillo not guilty for insufficiency of
evidence against her, but held Dr. Cruz responsible for Umali’s death. RTC and CA affirmed MTCC.

Issue:

WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against Dr. Cruz for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.

Held:

No. The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the
doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage
results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for
which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.
For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate
cause of the injury complained of .’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.’" 35 (Emphasis supplied.)

Burden of establishing medical negligence on plaintiff.

Plaintiff has the burden to establish this, and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be
proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon, as well as a causal connection of such breach and the
resulting death of patient. Negligence cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of
the injury complained of (Chan Lugay v. St. Luke’s Hospital, Inc.). In this case, no cogent proof exists that
the circumstances caused Lydia’s death, so the 4th element of reckless imprudence is missing.

The testimonies of the doctors presented by the prosecution establish hemorrhage / hemorrhagic shock
as the cause of death, which may be caused by several different factors. Autopsy did not reveal any
untied cut blood vessel, nor was there a tie of a cut blood vessel that became loose. The findings of the
doctors do not preclude the probability that a clotting defect (DIC) caused the hemorrhage and
consequently, Lydia’s death.

The Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies that substantiate Dr. Cruz’ allegation
that the cause of Lydia’s death was DIC, which cannot be attributed to Dr. Cruz’ fault or negligence. This
probability was unrebutted during trial.

BORROMEO vs. FAMILY CARE HOSPITAL

Facts:

The petitioner, Carlos Borromeo, was the husband of the late Lilian V. Borromeo (Lilian). Lilian was a
patient of the respondent Family Care Hospital, Inc. (Family Care) under the care of respondent Dr.
Ramon Inso (Dr. Inso).

On July 13, 1999, the petitioner brought his wife to the Family Care Hospital because she had been
complaining of acute pain at the lower stomach area and fever for two days. She was admitted at the
hospital and placed under the care of Dr. Inso.

Meanwhile, Lilian’s condition did not improve. She suffered from spiking fever and her abdominal pain
worsened. The increasing tenderness of her stomach, which was previously confined to her lower right
side, had also extended to her lower left side. Lilian abruptly developed an acute surgical abdomen.

On July 15, 1999, Dr. Inso decided to conduct an exploratory laparotomy on Lilian because of the
findings on her abdomen and his fear that she might have a ruptured appendix. Exploratory laparotomy
is a surgical procedure involving a large incision on the abdominal wall that would enable Dr. Inso to
examine the abdominal cavity and identify the cause of Lilian’s symptoms. After explaining the situation,
Dr. Inso obtained the patient’s consent to the laparotomy.

At around 3:45 P.M., Lilian was brought to the operating room where Dr. Inso conducted the surgery.
During the operation, Dr. Inso confirmed that Lilian was suffering from acute appendicitis. He proceeded
to remove her appendix which was already infected and congested with pus.

The operation was successful. Lilian’s appearance and vital signs improved. At around 7:30 P.M., Lilian
was brought back to her private room from the recovery room.

At around 1:30 A.M. on July 16, 1999, roughly six hours after Lilian was brought back to her room, Dr.
Inso was informed that her blood pressure was low. After assessing her condition, he ordered the
infusion of more intravenous (IV) fluids which somehow raised her blood pressure.
Despite the late hour, Dr. Inso remained in the hospital to monitor Lilian’s condition. Subsequently, a
nurse informed him that Lilian was becoming restless. Dr. Inso immediately went to Lilian and saw that
she was quite pale. He immediately requested a blood transfusion.

Dr. Inso observed that Lilian was developing petechiae  in various parts of her body. Petechiae  are small
bruises caused by bleeding under the skin whose presence indicates a blood-coagulation problem – a
defect in the ability of blood to clot.

At around 3:30 A.M., Dr. Inso personally called the Perpetual Help Medical Center to arrange Lilian’s
transfer, but the latter had no available bed in its ICU. Dr. Inso then personally coordinated with the
Muntinlupa Medical Center (MMC)  which had an available bed.

At around 4:00 A.M., Lilian was taken to the MMC by ambulance accompanied by the resident doctor on
duty and a nurse. Dr. Inso followed closely behind in his own vehicle.

Upon reaching the MMC, a medical team was on hand to resuscitate Lilian. A nasogastric tube ( NGT)
was inserted and IV fluids were immediately administered to her. Dr. Inso asked for a plasma expander.
Unfortunately, at around 10:00 A.M., Lilian passed away despite efforts to resuscitate her.

At the request of the petitioner, Lilian’s body was autopsied at the Philippine National
Police (PNP)  Camp Crame Crime Laboratory. Dr. Emmanuel Reyes (Dr. Reyes), the medico-legal assigned
to the laboratory, conducted the autopsy.

Dr. Reyes concluded that the cause of Lilian’s death was hemorrhage due to bleeding petechial blood
vessels: internal bleeding. He further concluded that the internal bleeding was caused by the 0.5 x 0.5
cm opening in the repair site. He opined that the bleeding could have been avoided if the site was
repaired with double suturing instead of the single continuous suture repair that he found.

However, Dr. Reyes admitted that he had very little experience in the field of pathology and his only
experience was an on-the-job training at the V. Luna Hospital where he was only on observer status. He
further admitted that he had no experience in appendicitis or appendectomy and that Lilian’s case was
his first autopsy involving a death from appendectomy.

Based on the autopsy, the petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Family Care and against Dr.
Inso for medical negligence.

Dr. Ramos is a practicing pathologist with over 20 years of experience. He is an associate professor at
the Department of Surgery of the Fatima Medical Center, the Manila Central University, and the
Perpetual Help Medical Center. He is a Fellow of the Philippine College of Surgeons, a Diplomate of the
Philippine Board of Surgery, and a Fellow of the Philippine Society of General Surgeons.

Issue:

WoN Dr. Inso is medically negligent.

Held:

Whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. This is a basic legal principle that equally applies to
civil and criminal cases. In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff has the duty of proving its
elements, namely: (1) a duty  of the defendant to his patient; (2) the defendant’s breach  of this duty;
(3) injury  to the patient; and (4) proximate causation  between the breach and the injury suffered.17 In
civil cases, the plaintiff must prove these elements by a preponderance of evidence.

A medical professional has the duty to observe the standard of care  and exercise the degree of skill,
knowledge, and training ordinarily expected of other similarly trained medical professionals acting
under the same circumstances.18 A breach of the accepted standard of care constitutes negligence or
malpractice and renders the defendant liable for the resulting injury to his patient. 19

The standard is based on the norm observed by other reasonably competent members of the
profession practicing the same field of medicine.20 Because medical malpractice cases are often highly
technical, expert testimony is usually essential to establish: (1) the standard of care that the defendant
was bound to observe under the circumstances; (2) that the defendant’s conduct fell below the
acceptable standard; and (3) that the defendant’s failure to observe the industry standard caused injury
to his patient.21

The expert witness must be a similarly trained and experienced physician. Thus, a pulmonologist is not
qualified to testify as to the standard of care required of an anesthesiologist 22 and an autopsy expert is
not qualified to testify as a specialist in infectious diseases

Dr. Reyes is not an expert witness who could prove Dr. Inso’s alleged negligence. His testimony could
not have established the standard of care that Dr. Inso was expected to observe nor assessed Dr. Inso’s
failure to observe this standard. His testimony cannot be relied upon to determine if Dr. Inso committed
errors during the operation, the severity of these errors, their impact on Lilian’s probability of survival,
and the existence of other diseases/conditions that might or might not have caused or contributed to
Lilian’s death.

The testimony of Dr. Avila also has no probative value in determining whether Dr. Inso was at fault. Dr.
Avila testified in his capacity as an expert in medical jurisprudence, not as an expert in medicine,
surgery, or pathology. His testimony fails to shed any light on the actual cause of Lilian’s death.

On the other hand, the respondents presented testimonies from Dr. Inso himself and from two expert
witnesses in pathology and surgery.

The petitioner cannot invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur  to shift the burden of evidence onto the
respondent. Res ipsa loquitur,  literally, "the thing speaks for itself;" is a rule of evidence that presumes
negligence from the very nature of the accident itself using common human knowledge  or experience.

The application of this rule requires: (1) that the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) that the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution from the injured person. 38 The concurrence of
these elements creates a presumption of negligence that, if unrebutted, overcomes the plaintiff’s
burden of proof.

This doctrine is used in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.

The rule is not applicable in cases such as the present one where the defendant’s alleged failure to
observe due care is not immediately apparent to a layman.
GSIS vs. PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION

Facts:

On 2 April 1996, at around 6:45 p.m., the Twin Otter aircraft of Philippine Airways Corporation (PAC)
arrived at the Manila International Airport 5 from El Nido, Palawan.6 In command of the aircraft was Ely B.
Bungabong.7 With Bungabong in the cockpit was Michael F. Galvez as co-pilot. 8

Upon touchdown, the Twin Otter taxied along the runway and proceeded to the Soriano Hangar to
disembark its passengers.9 After the last passenger disembarked, PAC’s pilots started the engine of the
Twin Otter in order to proceed to the PAC Hangar located at the other end of the airport. 10 At around
7:18 p.m., Galvez contacted ground control to ask for clearance to taxi to taxiway delta. 11 Rogelio Lim,
ground traffic controller on duty at the Air Transportation Office (ATO), issued the clearance on
condition that he be contacted again upon reaching taxiway delta intersection. 12

PAC’s pilots then proceeded to taxi to taxiway delta at about 7:19 and 19 seconds. 13 Upon reaching the
intersection of taxiway delta, Galvez repeated the request to taxi to taxiway delta, which request was
granted.14 Upon reaching fox 1, Galvez requested clearance to make a right turn to fox 1 and to cross
runway 13 in order to proceed to fox 1 bravo. 15 ATO granted the request.16 At this point, the Twin Otter
was still 350 meters away from runway 13. 17 Upon reaching runway 13, PAC’s pilots did not make a full
stop at the holding point to request clearance right before crossing runway 13. 18 Without such
clearance, PAC’s pilots proceeded to cross runway 13.

Meanwhile, the Philippine Airlines’ (PAL) Boeing 737, manned by pilots Rogelio Casiño and Ruel Isaac,
was preparing for take-off along runway 13. The PAL pilots requested clearance to push and start 19 on
runway 13. Ernesto Linog, Jr., air traffic controller on duty at the ATO issued the
clearance.20 Subsequently, at 7:20 and 18 seconds, Linog, Jr. gave PAL’s Boeing 737 clearance to take
off.21 Pilots Casiño and Isaac then proceeded with the take-off procedure. 22 While already on take-off
roll, Casiño caught a glimpse of the Twin Otter on the left side of the Boeing 737 about to cross runway
13.23

While the Twin Otter was halfway through runway 13, Galvez noticed the Boeing 737 and told
Bungabong that an airplane was approaching them from the right side. 24 Bungabong then said, "Diyos ko
po" and gave full power to the Twin Otter. 25 The PAL pilots attempted to abort the take-off by reversing
the thrust of the aircraft.26 However, the Boeing 737 still collided with the Twin Otter. 27

On 7 May 1996, PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez filed in the Regional Trial Court (Branch 112) of Pasay City
a complaint35 for sum of money and damages against PAL, Casiño, Isaac, ATO, Lim, Linog, Jr., and ATO’s
traffic control supervisor, Danilo Alzola. The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), as insurer of
the Boeing 737 that figured in the collision, intervened.

Issue:

What is the degree of negligence committed by the pilots?

Held:
In this case, however, the Boeing 737 and the Twin Otter were not both taxiing at the time of the
collision. Only the Twin Otter was taxiing. The Boeing 737 was already on take-off roll. The Rules of the
Air provide:

2.2.4.6 Taking Off. An aircraft taxiing on the maneuvering area of an aerodrome shall give way to
aircraft taking off or about to take off.

For disregarding PAL’s right of way, PAC’s pilots were grossly negligent. Gross negligence is one that is
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a
duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.47

We find it hard to believe that PAC’s pilots did not see the Boeing 737 when they looked to the left and
to the right before approaching the runway. It was a clear summer evening in April and the Boeing 737,
only 200 meters away, had its inboard lights, outboard lights, taxi lights, and logo lights on before and
during the actual take-off roll. 48 The only plausible explanation why PAC’s pilots did not see the Boeing
737 was that they did not really look to the left and to the right before crossing the active runway.

Records show that PAC’s pilots, while still 350 meters away, prematurely requested clearance to cross
the active runway.49 ATO points out that PAC’s pilots should have made a full stop at the holding point to
ask for updated clearance right before crossing the active runway. 50 Had PAC’s pilots done so, ATO
would by then be in a position to determine if there was an aircraft on a take-off roll at the runway. The
collision would not have happened.

BAO vs. BACHELOR EXPRESS

Facts:

In the early afternoon of November 6, 1993, respondent Wenifredo Salvaña (Salvaña) was driving the
bus owned by respondent Bachelor Express, Inc./Ceres Liner, Inc.

Along the national highway at Magdum, Tagum City bound for Davao City. At about 1:20 in the
afternoon, he overtook a Lawin PUJ jeepney while negotiating a blind curve in a descending road at Km.
60, causing him to intrude into the opposite lane and bump the 10-wheeler Hino dump truck of
petitioner Cresencio Baño (Baño) running uphill from the opposite direction. The collision resulted in
damage to both vehicles, the subsequent death of the truck driver, Amancio Asumbrado (Asumbrado),
and serious physical injuries to bus driver Salvaña.

On March 11, 1994, Baño and the heirs of Asumbrado (collectively called "petitioners") filed a
complaint4 for quasi-delict, damages and attorney's fees against respondents, accusing Salvaña of
negligently driving Bus 4042 causing it to collide with the dump truck.

Respondents denied liability, claiming that prior to the collision, Bus 4042 was running out of control
because of a problem in the steering wheel system which could not have been avoided despite their
maintenance efforts. Instead, they claimed that Asumbrado had the last clear chance to avoid the
collision had he not driven the dump truck at a very fast speed.

RTC – Reckless negligence

CA – Not gross negligence

Issue:

What is the degree of negligence committed by Salvana.

Held:

Gross. In the case of Government Service Insurance System v. Pacific Airways Corporation,7 the Court has
defined gross negligence as "one that is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected."

In the present case, records show that when bus driver Salvaña overtook the jeepney in front of him, he
was rounding a blind curve along a descending road. Considering the road condition, and that there was
only one lane on each side of the center line for the movement of traffic in opposite directions, it

would have been more prudent for him to confine his bus to its proper place. Having thus encroached
on the opposite lane in the process of overtaking the jeepney, without ascertaining that it was clear of
oncoming traffic that resulted in the collision with the approaching dump truck driven by deceased
Asumbrado, Salvaña was grossly negligent in driving his bus. He was remiss in his duty to determine that
the road was clear and not to proceed if he could not do so in safety. 8

SPOUSES CARBONELL vs. METROPOLITAN BANK

Facts:

The petitioners initiated against the respondent Civil Case No. 65725, an action for damages, alleging
that they had experienced emotional shock, mental anguish, public ridicule, humiliation, insults and
embarrassment during their trip to Thailand because of the respondent's release to them of five US$
100 bills that later on turned out to be counterfeit. They claimed that they had travelled to Bangkok,
Thailand after withdrawing US$ l ,000.00 in US$ 100 notes from their dollar account at the respondent's
Pateros branch; that while in Bangkok, they had exchanged five US$ 100 bills into Baht, but only four of
the US$ 100 bills had been accepted by the foreign exchange dealer because the fifth one was "no
good;" that unconvinced by the reason for the rejection, they had asked a companion to exchange the
same bill at Norkthon Bank in Bangkok; that the bank teller thereat had then informed them and their
companion that the dollar bill was fake; that the teller had then confiscated the US$ 100 bill and had
threatened to report them to the police if they insisted in getting the fake dollar bill back; and that they
had to settle for a Foreign Exchange Note receipt. 3

The petitioners claimed that later on, they had bought jewelry from a shop owner by using four of the
remaining US$100 bills as payment; that on the next day, however, they had been confronted by the
shop owner at the hotel lobby because their four US$ 100 bills had turned out to be counterfeit; that
the shop owner had shouted at them: "You Filipinos, you are all cheaters!;" and that the incident had
occurred within the hearing distance of fellow travelers and several foreigners.
The petitioners continued that upon their return to the Philippines, they had confronted the manager of
the respondent's Pateros branch on the fake dollar bills, but the latter had insisted that the dollar bills
she had released to them were genuine inasmuch as the bills had come from the head office; that in
order to put the issue to rest, the counsel of the petitioners had submitted the subject US$ 100 bills to
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) for examination; that the BSP had certified that the four US$100
bills were near perfect genuine notes; 4 and that their counsel had explained by letter their unfortunate
experience caused by the respondent's release of the fake US dollar bills to them, and had demanded
moral damages of ₱10 Million and exemplary damages. 5

Issue:

What is the degree of negligence committed by the bank?

Held:

None. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one's duties; it is a negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty
to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exe1iing any effort to avoid them. 15

In order for gross negligence to exist as to warrant holding the respondent liable therefor, the
petitioners must establish that the latter did not exert any effort at all to avoid unpleasant
consequences, or that it wilfully and intentionally disregarded the proper protocols or procedure in the
handling of US dollar notes and in selecting and supervising its employees.

The CA and the RTC both found that the respondent had exercised the diligence required by law in
observing the standard operating procedure, in taking the necessary precautions for handling the US
dollar bills in question, and in selecting and supervising its employees. 16 Such factual findings by the trial
court are entitled to great weight and respect especially after being affirmed by the appellate court, and
could be overturned only upon a showing of a very good reason to warrant deviating from them.

In this connection, it is significant that the BSP certified that the falsity of the US dollar notes in question,
which were "near perfect genuine notes," could be detected only with extreme difficulty even with the
exercise of due diligence. Ms. Nanette Malabrigo, BSP's Senior Currency Analyst, testified that the
subject dollar notes were "highly deceptive" inasmuch as the paper used for them were similar to that
used in the printing of the genuine notes. She observed that the security fibers and the printing were
perfect except for some microscopic defects, and that all lines were clear, sharp and well defined. 17

STANDARD INSURANCE CO. vs. CUARESMA

Facts:

two vehicles, one driven by Jefferson Cham and insured with petitioner Standard Insurance Co., Inc., and
the other owned by respondent Arnold Cuaresma and driven by respondent Jerry B. Cuaresma, figured
in an accident at North Avenue, Quezon City. 3 Consequently, the damage on the vehicle driven by Cham
was repaired, the cost of which was borne by petitioner. Cham then executed a  Release of Claim in favor
of petitioner.

Based on said document, petitioner, in its letter 5 dated April 15, 2004 addressed to respondents,
demanded the payment of the sum spent on repairing the vehicle driven by Cham.

Meanwhile, on August 10, 2004, an Information 6 was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Quezon City charging Cham of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
docketed as Criminal Case No. 020256. During the pendency thereof, on March 17, 2008, petitioner,
claiming that respondents collided with Cham's vehicle in a reckless and imprudent manner, filed a
Complaint7 for Sum of Money with the MeTC of Manila against respondents.

Respondents, however, were declared in default on December 12, 2008 for failure to file their
responsive pleading to petitioner's Complaint despite several opportunities granted by the MeTC of
Manila.8 As a result, petitioner was allowed to present its evidence exparte.

MeTC ruled in favor of petitioner.

However, RTC found petitioner failing to sufficiently prove that the proximate cause of the damage
incurred by Cham's vehicle was respondents' fault or negligence. CA Affirmed.

Issue:

WoN the testimonies of Cham and Obello, and the traffic accident report is sufficient proof of
negligence.

Held:

No. In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defense offered by his opponent. This principle equally holds true, even if the
defendant had not been given the opportunity to present evidence because of a default order.

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and
is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence." It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 19 The reason for this is that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Mere allegations, therefore, cannot be
deemed as evidence.

While petitioner may have proven the fact of its payment of the expenses for the repair of Cham's
vehicle through the testimony of its Assistant Vice-President and other supporting receipts and
documents, it fell short in proving that the damage caused on said vehicle was due to the fault of the
respondents.

Moreover, for the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible as prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated, the following requisites must be present:
 x x x (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information.22

Regrettably, in this case, petitioner failed to prove the third requisite cited above. As correctly noted by
the courts below, while the Traffic Accident Investigation Report was exhibited as evidence, the
investigating officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to testify that he had sufficient
knowledge of the facts therein stated, and that he acquired them personally or through official
information.23 Neither was there any explanation as to why such officer was not presented. We cannot
simply assume, in the absence of proof, that the account of the incident stated in the report was based
on the personal knowledge of the investigating officer who prepared it.

JOSEFA vs. MANILA ELECTRIC CO.

Facts:

At around 1 :45 p.m. on April 21, 1991, a dump truck, a jeepney and a car figured in a vehicular accident
along Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. 4 As a result of the accident, a 45-foot wooden electricity post, three 75
KVA transformers, and other electrical line attachments were damaged. 5 Upon investigation, respondent
Manila Electric Company (Meralco) discovered that it was the truck with plate number PAK-874 and
registered in Josefa’s name that hit the electricity post.

Meralco demanded from Josefa reimbursement for the replacement cost of the electricity post and its
attachments, but Josefa refused to pay. 7 Thus, on September 28, 1993, Meralco sued Josefa and Pablo
Manoco, the truck driver, for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.

Juan Fernandez, Meralco’s senior legal investigator, testified that he arrived at the scene of the accident
at around 2:30 p.m. on that fateful day and saw Meralco employees installing a new electricity post. He
interviewed the people in the vicinity who told him that it was the truck that rammed the electricity
post.

Elmer Albio identified himself as the driver of the jeepney that was involved in the accident. He testified
thata truck suddenly hit the rear of his jeepney while he was driving along OrtigasAvenue, Pasig City; he
thus lost control of the jeepney and hit a Nissan car on the other lane of the road. Thereafter, the truck
hit the electricity post.

SPO2 Manuel Valiente testified that he immediately went to the scene of the accident after a concerned
citizen went to the police station and informed him about the accident. 17 However, he could no longer
recall the truck’s exact position with reference to the electricity post at the time of his arrival at the
scene of the accident.

SPO2 Galang stated that one of his functions as a traffic accident investigator was to record vehicular
accidents in the police blotter book. He identified and authenticated a certified true copy of the police
blotter dated January 7, 1994 (Exhibit "B") but admitted that he neither saw nor investigated the
accident.

Vitaliano Espiritu, Meralco’s foreman,testified that he replaced the damaged electricity post,
transformers, and other electrical line attachments after receiving an emergency radio call from a
Meralco personnel.

Carlos Zapanta, Meralco’s supervising accountant, affirmed that Meralco incurred actual damages
totaling ₱384,846.00. To support his finding, he identified and authenticated two pieces of evidence.

Josefa filed a demurrer to Evidence25 , but was denied by the RTC.

RTC dismissed the complaint. CA reversed.

Issue:

WoN the evidence presented by MERALCO is sufficient to prove the negligence of the petitioner.

Held:

Yes. Nonetheless, Meralco has sufficiently established the direct causal link between the truck and the
electricity post through Abio’s testimony. Abio categorically stated during trial that he saw the truck hit
the electricity post. We find his first-hand account of the incident during the directexamination frank
and straightforward. More importantly, Josefa failed to impeach the veracity of Abio’s testimony during
the cross-examination. Abio even reiterated that it was Josefa’s truck that rammed the electricity
post.40 We thus give full faith and credence to his positive, unrebutted, and categorical declaration on
the witness stand, made under solemn oath, that it was the truck that caused damage to Meralco’s
property.

Even without Abio’s testimony, it does not escape this Court’s attention that Josefa judicially admittedin
his motions and pleading that his truck hit the electricity post. In a motion to dismiss dated March 17,
1997, Josefa stated:

"1. This action was commenced by plaintiff to recover from defendant the sum of ₱384,846.00 as actual
damages resulting from the vehicular mishap which occurred on April 21, 1991 along Ortigas Avenue,
Rosario, Pasig City, Metro Manila, whereby defendant’s dump truck with plate No. PAK 874 hit and
bumped plaintiff’s 45-foot wooden pole;41 " (emphasis and underline ours)

Josefa further declared in his motion for reconsideration dated February 22, 2008:

[T]he manner who and why the accident occurred was not explained. In the absence of any description
on such important aspect, fault or negligence cannot be properly imputed to Pablo Manojo Bautista
simply because the truck he was then driving bumped to electric post. The causal connection between
the fault or negligence and the damage must be shown.

Contrary to the CA’s opinion, the finding that it was the truck that hit the electricity post would not
immediately result in Josefa’s liability. It is a basic rule that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent act
or omission that creates the vinculum jurisin extra-contractual obligations. 46 In turn, the employee’s
negligence established to bethe proximate cause of the damage would give rise to the disputable
presumption that the employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of the erring employee. 47

Nonetheless, in some cases where negligence is difficult to prove, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
permits an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant or some other person who is charged
with negligence where the thing or transaction speaks for itself. 48 This doctrine postulates that, as a
matter of common knowledge and experience and in the absence of some explanation by the defendant
who is charged with negligence, the very nature of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence
on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury. In other words, res ipsa
loquitur is grounded on the superior logic of ordinary human experience that negligence may be
deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. 49

The procedural effect of res ipsa loquiturin quasi-delict cases is that the defendant’s negligence is
presumed.1awp++i1 In other words, the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant to prove that he did
not act with negligence.50 This doctrine thus effectively furnishes a bridge by which the complainant,
without knowledge of the cause of the injury, reaches over to the defendant, who knows or should
know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by him to prevent the injury. 51 For this doctrine to
apply, the complainant must show that: (1) the accident is of such character as to warrant an inference
that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person
charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

The present case satisfiesall the elements of res ipsa loquitur. It is very unusual and extraordinary for the
truck to hit an electricity post, an immovable and stationary object, unless Bautista, who had the
exclusive management and control of the truck, acted with fault or negligence.

BJDC CONSTRUCTION vs. NENA E. LANUZO

Facts:

Nena E. Lanuzo (Nena) filed a complaint for damages1 against BJDC Construction (company), a single
proprietorship engaged in the construction business under its Manager/Proprietor Janet S. de la Cruz.
The company was the contractor of the re-blocking project to repair the damaged portion of one lane of
the national highway at San Agustin, Pili, Camarines Sur from September 1997to November 1997.

Nena alleged that she was the surviving spouse of the late Balbino Los Baños Lanuzo (Balbino) who
figured in the accident that transpired at the site of the re-blocking work at about 6:30 p.m. on October
30, 1997; that Balbino’s Honda motorcycle sideswiped the road barricade placed by the company in the
right lane portion of the road, causing him to lose control of his motorcycle and to crash on the newly
cemented road, resulting in his instant death; and that the company’s failure to place illuminated
warning signs on the site of the project, especially during night time, was the proximate cause of the
death of Balbino.

In its answer,2 the company denied Nena’s allegations of negligence, insisting that it had installed
warning signs and lights along the highway and on the barricades of the project; that at the time of the
incident, the lights were working and switched on; that its project was duly inspected by the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the Office of the Mayor of Pili, and the Pili
Municipal Police Station; and that it was found to have satisfactorily taken measures to ensure the
safety of motorists.

The company insisted that the death of Balbino was an accident brought about by his own negligence,
as confirmed by the police investigation report that stated, among others, that Balbino was not wearing
any helmet at that time, and the accident occurred while Balbino was overtaking another motorcycle;
and that the police report also stated that the road sign/barricade installed on the road had a light.

RTC in favor of petitioner. CA reversed.

The CA ruled that the following elements for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were
present, namely: (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not
have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.

The CA regarded as self-serving the testimony of Eduardo Zamora, an employee of the company who
testified that there was an electric bulb placed on top of the barricade on the area of the accident. It
held that Zamora’s statement was negated by the statements of Ernesto Alto and Asuncion Sandia to
the effect that they had passed by the area immediately before the accident and had seen the road to
be dark and lit only by a gas lamp. It noted that SPO1 Corporal, the police investigator, had noticed the
presence of lighted electric bulbs in the area, but the same had been installed on the other side of the
street opposite the barricade.

The CA ruled that the placing of road signs and streamers alone did not prove that the electric bulbs
were in fact switched on at the time of the accident as to sufficiently light up the newly re-blocked
portion of the highway.

Issue:

WoN petitioner’s negligence was proven in this case.

Held:

NO. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. 10 It is basic that whoever
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a mere allegation is not evidence. 11 Generally, the
party who denies has no burden to prove. 12 In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would
be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. 13 The burden of proof is on the plaintiff if the
defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court,
but it may rest on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises
affirmative defense or defenses, which if proved, will exculpate him from liability. 14
By preponderance of evidence, according to Raymundo v. Lunaria: 15

x x x is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. It refers
to the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." It
is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.

In addition, according to United Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 16 the plaintiff must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s.

Negligence, the Court said in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 17 is "the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do,18 or as Judge Cooley defines it, ‘(t)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.’"

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

During the trial, the Lanuzo heirs attempted to prove inadequacy of illumination instead of the total
omission of illumination. Their first witness was Cesar Palmero, who recalled that lights had been
actually installed in the site of the project. The next witness was Ernesto Alto, who stated that he had
seen three light bulbs installed in the site, placed at intervals along the stretch of the road covered by
the project. Alto further stated that he had passed the site on board his tricycle on October 30, 1997
prior to the accident, and had seen only a gas lamp, not light bulbs, on his approach. Another witness of
the plaintiffs, Asuncion Sandia, claimed that she had also passed the site on board a bus on the night just
prior to the accident, and had seen the site to be dark, with only one lane open to traffic, with no light at
all. Obviously, the witnesses of the plaintiffs were not consistent on their recollections of the significant
detail of the illumination of the site.

In contrast, the company credibly refuted the allegation of inadequate illumination. Zamora, its flagman
in the project, rendered an eyewitness account of the accident by stating that the site had been
illuminated by light bulbs and gas lamps, and that Balbino had been in the process of overtaking another
motorcycle rider at a fast speed when he hit the barricade placed on the newly cemented road. On his
part, SPO1 Corporal, the police investigator who arrived at the scene of the accident on October 30,
1997, recalled that there were light bulbs on the other side of the barricade on the lane coming from
Naga City; and that the light bulb on the lane where the accident had occurred was broken because it
had been hit by the victim’s motorcycle. Witnesses Gerry Alejo and Engr. Victorino del Socorro
remembered that light bulbs and gas lamps had been installed in the area of the project.

Additionally, the company submitted the application for lighting permit covering the project site (Annex
7) to prove the fact of installation of the electric light bulbs in the project site.

In our view, the RTC properly gave more weight to the testimonies of Zamora and SPO1 Corporal than to
those of the witnesses for the Lanuzo heirs.1âwphi1 There was justification for doing so, because the
greater probability pertained to the former. Moreover, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of
the witnesses and of their testimonies is preferred to that of the appellate court’s because of the trial
court’s unique first-hand opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor as such.

There is no question that Zamora and SPO1 Corporal were thoroughly cross-examined by the counsel for
the Lanuzo heirs. Their recollections remained unchallenged by superior contrary evidence from the
Lanuzo heirs.

Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitour not applicable.

Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence cannot be fairly ascribed to the
company considering that it has shown its installation of the necessary warning signs and lights in the
project site. In that context, the fatal accident was not caused by any instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the company. In contrast, Balbino had the exclusive control of how he operated and
managed his motorcycle. The records disclose that he himself did not take the necessary precautions.

DEL CARMEN vs. BACOY

Facts:

Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide was filed against Allan before the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23. In a Decision dated March 13, 1997, said court declared
Allan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. 4

During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilia’s father, Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of
the six minor children5 of the Monsaluds, filed Civil Case No. 96-20219, 6 an independent civil action for
damages based on culpa aquiliana.

At dawn on New Year’s Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud (Emilia), along with her spouse Leonardo
Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their way home from a Christmas party
they attended in Poblacion, Sominot, Zamboanga Del Sur. Upon reaching Purok Paglaom in Sominot,
they were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep bearing plate number UV-PEK-600 that was being driven by
Allan Maglasang (Allan). The jeep was registered in the name of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar
Jr.) and used as a public utility vehicle plying the Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to Sominot, Zamboanga del
Sur and vice versa route.

For his part, Oscar Jr. claimed to be a victim himself. He alleged that Allan and his friends 9 stole his jeep
while it was parked beside his driver’s rented house to take it for a joyride. Both he and a vehicle
mechanic testified that the subject jeep can easily be started by mere pushing sans the ignition key. The
vehicle’s engine shall then run but without any headlights on. 10 And implying that this was the manner
by which the vehicle was illegally taken, Oscar Jr. submitted as part of his documentary evidence the
statements11 of Jemar Alarcon (Jemar) and Benjamin Andujar (Benjamin). The two, who were with Allan
in the jeep at the time of the accident, declared before the investigating officer that during said time,
the vehicle’s headlights were off. Because of this allegation, Oscar Jr. even filed before the same trial
court a carnapping case against Allan and his companions docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-10380. 12 The
case was, however, dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Oscar Jr. clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it was the latter’s brother, Rodrigo
Maglasang (Rodrigo), who was employed as the driver. 14 In any event, Allan’s employment as conductor
was already severed before the mishap occurred on January 1, 1993 since he served as such conductor
only from the first week of December until December 14, 1992. 15 In support of this, Oscar Jr. presented
as witnesses Faustino Sismundo (Faustino) and Cresencio "Junior" Baobao (Cresencio). Faustino, a
resident of Molave, testified that when he boarded the jeep heading to Sominot on December 31, 1992,
it was Cresencio who was the conductor. He also believed that Crecencio started to work as such at
around December 15 or 16, 1992.16 Cresencio, for his part, testified that he worked as Oscar Jr.’s
conductor from December 15, 1992 to January 1, 1993 and that Rodrigo was his driver.

Geronimo, on the other hand, averred that Allan was still Oscar Jr.’s employee subsequent to December
14, 1992. To prove this, he presented as witnesses Saturnino Jumawan (Saturnino) and Jose Navarro
(Jose). Saturnino testified that he would pay his fare to Allan every time he would board the jeep in
going to Molave and that the last time he rode the subject vehicle was on December 23, 1992. He also
claimed that immediately before January 1, 1993, Rodrigo and Allan used to park the jeep at the yard of
his house.20 Jose likewise attested that Allan was still the jeep conductor during the said period as he had
ridden the jeep many times in mid-December of 1992.

RTC exculpated the spouses del Carmen from civil liability for insufficiency of evidence. However, their
son Oscar Jr. was held civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity. The RTC anchored its ruling primarily on the
principle of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that a presumption of negligence on the part of a defendant may be
inferred if the thing that caused an injury is shown to be under his management and that in the ordinary
course of things, the accident would not have happened had there been an exercise of care.

Via MR. Oscar was also absolved. CA Set aside RTC’s decision.

Issue:

WoN the negligence of the Oscar was proved in this case.

Held:

Yes. Notably, the carnapping case filed against Allan and his group was already dismissed by the RTC for
insufficiency of evidence. But even in this civil case and as correctly concluded by the CA, the evidentiary
standard of preponderance of evidence required was likewise not met to support Oscar Jr.’s claim that
his jeep was unlawfully taken.

Two of Allan’s co-accused in the carnapping case, Jemar and Benjamin, declared before the police that
when Allan invited them to ride with him, he was already driving the jeep

There were six accused in the carnapping case. If Jemar and Benjamin were fetched by Allan who was
driving the jeep, this would mean that only three men pushed the jeep contrary to Rodrigo’s testimony
in Criminal Case No. 93-10380 that it has to be pushed by at least five people so that it could start
without the ignition key.
Assuming arguendo that Allan stole the jeep by having the same pushed by a group, the ignition key
should then be with Rodrigo as he was entrusted with the jeep’s possession. Thus, at the time Rodrigo
faced his employer hours after the incident, it is reasonable to expect that the driver should have also
returned the key to the operator together with the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration.
Notably, Rodrigo did not do so and instead, the key was allegedly handed over to the police for reasons
unexplained and not available from the records. Interestingly, Oscar Jr. never presented Rodrigo as his
witness. Neither was he able to attest on cross-examination that Allan really stole the jeep by pushing or
that the key was handed over to him by Rodrigo.

While Oscar Jr. highlights that the headlights were not on to support his claim that his jeep was stolen,
this circumstance by itself will not prove that it really was stolen. The reason why the headlights were
not on at the time of the accident was not sufficiently established during the trial. Besides, the fact that
the headlights were not on cannot be exclusively attributed to the lack of ignition key in starting the jeep
as there may be other possibilities such as electrical problems, broken headlights, or that they were
simply turned off.

Hence, sans the testimony of witnesses and other relevant evidence to support the defense of
unauthorized taking, we cannot subscribe to Oscar Jr.’s claim that his jeep was stolen. The evidence on
record brings forth more questions than clear-cut answers.

The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as follows:

1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;

2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and

3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.44

The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just walking along the road would
suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in charge of the said
vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct
him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeep’s use, including who or who may not drive it. As
he is aware that the jeep may run without the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it safely
and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no
showing that the death of the victims was due to any voluntary action or contribution on their part.

The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a presumption of negligence against
Oscar Jr. which he could have overcome by evidence that he exercised due care and diligence in
preventing strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed to do so.

Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use 48 or that the subject vehicle was stolen49 which are valid
defenses available to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from
his jeep’s use.

MACALINAO vs. ONG

Facts:

Complaint for damages.

Macalinao and Ong were employed as utility man and driver, respectively, at the Genetron International
Marketing (Genetron), a single proprietorship owned and operated by Sebastian. On 25 April 1992,
Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and two truck helpers to deliver a heavy piece of machinerya
reactor/motor for mixing chemicals, to Sebastian's manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan. While in the
process of complying with the order, the vehicle driven by Ong, Genetron's Isuzu Elf truck with plate no.
PMP-106 hit and bumped the front portion of a private jeepney with plate no. DAF-922 along
Caypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan at around 11:20 in the morning.

Macalinao's body was paralyzed and immobilized from the neck down as a result of the accident and per
doctor's advice, his foot was amputated. He also suffered from bed sores and infection. His immedicable
condition, coupled with the doctor's recommendation, led his family to bring him home where he died
on 7 November 1992. [6]

Before he died, Macalinao was able to file an action for damages against both Ong and Sebastian before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81. [7] After his death, Macalinao was substituted
by his parents in the action. [8] A criminal case for reckless' imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries [9] had also been instituted earlier against Ong but for reasons which do not appear in the
records of this case, trial thereon did not ensue.

RTC held that based on the evidence, Ong drove the Isuzu truck in a reckless and imprudent manner
thereby causing the same to hit the private jeepney. It observed that while respondents claimed that
Ong was driving cautiously and prudently at the time of the mishap, no evidence was presented to
substantiate the claim. [11] It declared Ong negligent and at the same time, it held that Sebastian failed
to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Ong.

On appeal, the appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court. It held that the evidence
presented by petitioners was woefully scant to support a verdict of negligence against Ong. And since
respondents' liability hinged squarely on proof of Ong's negligence, neither of them could be held liable
for damages to petitioners. 

Issue:

WoN the negligence of Ong was sufficiently proven in this case.

Held:

Yes. Contrary to the above conclusion of the appellate court, the evidence on record coupled with the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur sufficiently establishes Ong's negligence.

The photographs of the accident which the appellate court cavalierly brushed aside as insignificant
deserve substantial cogitation. Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth which
ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. 
In this case, while there is a dearth of testimonial evidence to enlighten us about what actually
happened, photographs [21] depicting the relative positions of the vehicles immediately after the
accident took place do exist.

Exhibits 'L and 'L-4 among the photographs, however, reveal that in the aftermath of the collision, the
Isuzu truck usurped the opposite lane to such an extent that only its right rear wheel remained in the
left lane, a few inches from the demarcation line.

While ending up at the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile collisions, the
position of the two vehicles gives rise to the conclusion that it was the Isuzu truck which hit the private
jeepney rather than the other way around.

Another piece of evidence which supports a finding of negligence against Ong is the police report of the
incident denoted as Entry No. 04-229 of the Sta. Maria Police Station. The report states that the Isuzu
truck was the one which hit the left front portion of the private jeepney. 

While true in most instances, it must still be remembered that although police blotters are of little
probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence
to refute the facts stated therein.

Res ipsa loquitur recognizes that parties may establish prima facie  negligence without direct proof, thus,
it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. [37] It permits the plaintiff to present
along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create
an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving
that there was no negligence on his part. 

The doctrine can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief
evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but
inaccessible to the injured person.

In this case, Macalinao could no longer testify as to the cause of the accident since he is dead.
Petitioners, while substituting their son as plaintiff, have no actual knowledge about the event since they
were not present at the crucial moment. The driver of the private jeepney who could have shed light on
the circumstances is likewise dead. The only ones left with knowledge about the cause of the mishap are
the two truck helpers who survived, both employees of Sebastian, and Ong, who is not only Sebastian's
previous employee but his co-respondent in this case as well. In the circumstances, evidence as to the
true cause of the accident is, for all intents and purposes, accessible to respondents but not to
petitioners. The witnesses left are unlikely to divulge to petitioners what they knew about the cause of
the accident if the same militates against the interest of their employer. This justifies the invocation of
the doctrine.

Under local jurisprudence, the following are the requisites for the application of  res ipsa loquitur: 

(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence;

(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and

(3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. [42] 
We are convinced that all the above requisites are present in the case at bar.

No two motor vehicles traversing opposite lanes will collide as a matter of course unless someone is
negligent, thus, the first requisite for the application of the doctrine is present.

There exists a fourth requisite under American jurisprudence, that is, that the defendant fails to offer
any explanation tending to show that the injury was caused by his or her want of due care.  [44] In this
case, while respondents claimed that Ong drove cautiously and prudently during the time in question,
no evidence was proffered to substantiate the same.

All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur  are present, thus a reasonable
presumption or inference of Ong's negligence arises.