Examiner preparation notes

May 2018

Theory of knowledge

21 pages
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These preparation notes are confidential and for the

exclusive use of examiners in this examination session.

They are the property of the International Baccalaureate

and must not be reproduced or distributed to any other
person without the authorization of the IB Global Centre,
Cardiff.
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Preamble
These notes outline what members of the examining team had in mind when they devised each of the
prescribed titles. They indicate approaches candidates might take in responding to the title chosen.
Examiners are kindly requested to keep the following points in mind:
1. While there may be good reasons for examiners to consult these notes during the actual marking
of essays, it is vital that they resist any temptation to treat the points they contain as if they
constituted a “checklist” of what is expected.
2. It is expected that examiners will carefully read these notes in advance of the marking session so
as to broaden and deepen their awareness of how responses to the prescribed titles might be
developed.
3. The approaches suggested in these notes are not the only ones possible, and may not even
comprise the best ones.
4. To a large extent they are couched in abstract terms because the intention is that they describe a
whole class of actual essays.
5. They describe ideal answers – there are many points included where the candidate would have to
work hard to make the arguments function, and most candidates are unlikely to be entirely
successful in this task.
6. The intention of the examiner preparation notes is, on the whole, not to describe flawed
approaches or ways in which candidates may fail to respond successfully.

In summary, what is written here is only a framework to help examiners in their assessment. Examiners
should be responsive to other valid approaches, but, in each case, examiners should consider whether
the candidate has presented an appropriate and cogent analysis of knowledge questions in
discussing the title.
Consider whether the candidate has:
a. understood the title
b. understood the knowledge questions that are explicit and implicit in it, and/or linked the title to
knowledge questions that arise naturally from it
c. developed and supported a comprehensive and cogent point of view about the topic and
appropriate knowledge questions.
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1. “The fields of study of academic disciplines can overlap, but adopting interdisciplinary approaches
to the production of knowledge leads only to confusion.” Discuss this claim.

Nature of the title

This title makes no specific demands about coverage of areas of knowledge or particular
disciplines – hence affording the candidate a free range of possibilities to explore with regard to
interdisciplinary relationships. Although examiners should be tolerant in their acceptance of the
meaning of “interdisciplinary”, candidates must articulate clearly how they are interpreting the word.
The existence of overlaps between academic disciplines with respect to what they study is
presented as a given, but candidates will need to try to contrast the “what” with the “how” in terms
of approaches. The claim in the title is provocative and designed to elicit challenge, and care must
be taken to situate responses within the quest for knowledge production. Candidates may
consider whether the confusion mentioned in the title refers to the general state of knowledge or of
the individual trying to make sense of it. High achieving candidates would be expected to identify
the source of confusion. This title arguably provides an opportunity for candidates to engage with
academic disciplines beyond the normal constraints imposed by standard areas of knowledge in
TOK, and would ideally draw on some of the experiences of those candidates who followed
interdisciplinary approaches in the IB Middle Years Programme.

Knowledge questions
Knowledge questions that a candidate might identify in the course of the development of a
response to the title include:
• Does an interdisciplinary approach to knowledge involve a merging of disciplines or merely a
synergy between them?
• Are there necessary aspects of approach to knowledge production that disciplines must share in
order for them to work successfully together? Are there aspects which automatically render
disciplines incompatible?
• For what reasons might confusion emerge from interdisciplinary work? Where might this
confusion be located?
• Do disciplines work together more as a result of deliberate collaboration or more as a contingent
result of unexpected consequences or unpredictable developments in knowledge?
• Why is an interdisciplinary approach to knowledge often considered to be a good thing?

Commentary on possible treatment

Successful responses to this title will need to clarify what might be meant by the term
“interdisciplinary”. Examiners should take a fairly liberal stance and accept interpretations ranging
from the bringing together of disciplines that nevertheless remain distinct to the merging of
disciplines such that their individual approaches cannot be entirely distinguished. Nonetheless, the
candidate’s intentions should be clear.

The field of study of a discipline encompasses everything which that discipline is competent to
explore. Candidates might explain the overlaps in terms of the map metaphor, with different
disciplines providing different maps of the same portions of territory. In order to make progress
with this title, candidates will need to maintain a distinction between the objects of interest to a
particular discipline and the approaches that the discipline adopts in order to investigate them.
These approaches are very likely to be interpreted as methods, but might also be discussed in
terms of the concepts that are employed by the discipline in order to engender understanding. In
thinking about this title, some candidates might identify the objection that fields of study are defined
by the approaches that are taken by different disciplines. While a sophisticated argument could be
built upon this foundation, there is a risk that it undermines the essence of the claim in the title and
hence might not provide the basis for a successful response to it. Nevertheless, it might profitably
be mentioned.
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Candidates should find it relatively straightforward to identify examples of overlaps in subject

matter across disciplines – for instance, biology and chemistry (metabolism), physics and
chemistry (matter), biology and psychology (the brain), and so on. It is likely that the overlapping
disciplines will have some general similarities in approach – physics and mathematics, or history
and literature – whereas disciplines that have few similarities are unlikely to be able to justify an
interdisciplinary approach – such as mathematics and ethics, perhaps. If candidates choose
disciplines from the same area of knowledge they need to ensure there are enough differences to
provide a fruitful analysis. It might also be noted that some questions and issues seem to belong
clearly in the field of just one discipline.

The case of mathematics needs to be approached carefully. The natural sciences employ the
methods of mathematics as part of their regular methodologies. At first glance this relationship
appears to be asymmetrical. Methods within the given scientific discipline adapt to incorporate
mathematical procedures but mathematics itself does not adapt to the requirements of the
discipline. This asymmetrical relationship should be accepted as interdisciplinary for the purposes
of this question nonetheless. At a higher level of analysis candidates might point out that specific
mathematical techniques are developed in conjunction with the requirements of specific disciplines.
For example the needs of physics have spawned new forms of mathematics such as tensor theory
and graded manifold theory. Economics has led to the development of stochastic modelling and
biology to dynamical systems theory and catastrophe theory. Recognition that mathematics does
adapt to the problems it faces in these interdisciplinary combinations should be rewarded.

Candidates are invited in this title to offer counterclaims to, as well as support for, the contention
that confusion arises from interdisciplinary enterprises, and challenges to the claim may put
forward ideas concerning complementarity and synergy between disciplines and the enlightenment
that ensues. It might be argued that successful partnerships need to involve disciplines that exhibit
similarities in methods or use of concepts. Less successful relationships might compromise and
dilute tried and tested protocols that have been polished through long practice, and fail to respect
long-standing and venerable traditions of historical development. Confusion might emerge in these
cases through trying to combine disparate conceptual systems or incompatible methodologies.
There is scope here for making use of the knowledge framework. On the other hand, widely
separated disciplines might produce shock enlightenment – possibly by throwing disciplinary
assumptions into stark relief and exposing limitations of traditional approaches to knowledge.
Novel and powerful new ways of thinking might emerge. In any case candidates might want to
consider why these disciplines are being brought together in the first place when, presumably, they
function effectively enough in isolation.

There are obvious similarities of methodological approach across the natural sciences which
facilitate the development of biochemistry and physical chemistry. It can be argued that some of
these similarities of scientific approach extend into the human sciences. In the arts, the
juxtaposition of music and lyrics, or film and music, might be regarded as successful
interdisciplinary projects on the basis of similar approaches. Historically, the development of
statistics as a coherent area of mathematics had a profound impact on knowledge when its
methods were combined with work in areas such as physics, biology, psychology and geography.
More recently, behavioral economics can be cited as a successful partnership between psychology
and economics, and evolutionary psychology between psychology and evolutionary biology. In the
former case, new insights from one discipline have compensated for perceived shortcomings in the
other; in the latter, the reach of one discipline has been extended through the influence of the
latter. Current excitement about the prospects for “big history” reflect possibilities for creating a
grand narrative from knowledge derived from a variety of disciplines with their various methods. In
a somewhat different scenario, it could be argued that bioinformatics became a successful
interdisciplinary enterprise only once its two constituent disciplines advanced to the stage where
their fields of study were seen to converge. Candidates might explore the possibility that
breakthroughs in knowledge arise more often as a result of unifications that were not anticipated
rather than deliberate interdisciplinary collaborations.
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On the negative side, attempts to merge incompatible disciplines can be documented as items of
support for the claim in the prescribed title. Attempts to explain human behaviour through the lens
of neoclassical economics are perhaps unlikely to receive support from the case studies and
qualitative body of work in anthropology. Psychoanalysis and neuroscience seem to offer
alternative approaches to the understanding of the mental life, despite recent efforts to establish
the all-embracing interdisciplinary subject of neuro-psychoanalysis. While scientists might accept
the reductionist idea that all natural phenomena are in principle manifestations of the behaviour of
basic entities of matter, explanations of what can be observed at the chemical, biological and
psychological levels require concepts that make sense at those levels; not those that belong in
physics. Accordingly, it could be argued that each discipline needs to draw on its own reserve of
concepts and hence its compatibility with other disciplines is limited.

Furthermore, it might be claimed that some disciplines have made unfortunate “choices”. Some
have suggested that history should concern itself with the particular rather than trying to emulate
the sciences in striving for the identification of something approaching universal laws. Efforts to
ground explanations for historical events solely in terms of physical or geographical circumstances
might be argued to have diminished the scope of history by limiting its remit. Some have
maintained that economics has lost its way in systematically pursuing a mathematical foundation
rather than accepting its status as a subject with an historical framework. More generally, it has
been claimed that the human sciences suffer from what has been called “physics envy”.

More ambitiously, candidates could claim that ethics itself is an interdisciplinary project as an
awkward amalgam of description of, and normative appeal to, human behaviour. Recent
encroachments of the human and natural sciences into the study of literature have spawned the
digital or Darwinian humanities and the concept of distant reading. Such developments have
triggered significant criticism.

There might be an argument that indigenous knowledge systems are often essentially non-
disciplinary as they do not make distinctions of this kind. If so, it could be concluded either that
there is no danger of confusion or that there is a major one depending on the way that the term
“interdisciplinary” has been defined.

At a stretch, it might be possible to regard individual religions as disciplines and to advance some
ideas about how attempts to combine them might have various positive or deleterious effects.
Many religious people situate the basis for moral decision-making exclusively within the religious
domain, but perhaps an argument that religion and ethics are independent disciplines could be
considered.
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2. “We know with confidence only when we know little; with knowledge doubt increases” (adapted
from JW von Goethe). Discuss this statement with reference to two areas of knowledge.

Nature of the title

Candidates should note that this title makes a specific request for two areas of knowledge, and that
there should be a roughly balanced treatment of them. The claim comes in two parts – firstly that
we know with confidence only when we know little, and secondly that as we know more, doubt
increases. Both of these parts will need to be tested and links between them examined. It is
conceivable that a candidate accepts one part but rejects the other – this option is open although
the candidate will have to explain carefully the basis for it. In any case, the relationship between
“confidence” and “doubt” assumes central importance. The quotation seems to suggest that both
of these conditions can arise as a consequence of quantity of knowledge possessed, so the
question of what counts as knowledge in each of these situations also needs attention. The
wording of the title leaves open the possibilities of exploring both knowledge production and
knowledge acquisition.

Knowledge questions
Knowledge questions that a candidate might identify in the course of the development of a
response to the title include:
• What is the connection between confidence and knowledge?
• What are grounds for doubt about an individual knowledge claim? What are the conditions
under which we might expect doubt to increase with knowledge?
• What kinds of knowledge are likely to foster doubt, and what kinds might tend to lead to
confidence? Why?
• What are the grounds for thinking that confidence and doubt are inversely related? Might there
be a direct relationship?
• To what extent is the possible positive correlation of doubt with knowledge due to increased
knowledge of the fragility of our methods for producing knowledge?

Commentary on possible treatment

The claim in this title is somewhat paradoxical – how can it be that with knowledge there is more
doubt? One might expect that doubt is inversely related to the amount of knowledge, and this
expectation might be profitably registered by candidates.

There are a number of pertinent distinctions which might be made at an early stage. As noted,
candidates could focus here on the processes of knowledge production or look more closely at the
acquisition of knowledge and the effects produced by it. Hence, the “we” in the title might be
interpreted as acquisition (all of us individually in similar fashion knowing with confidence when we
know little and becoming doubtful as we learn); or as (collective) production (we as a group
knowing with confidence when we know little but becoming doubtful as we engage further with the
enterprise of research). Related to this, there might be a need for balance between, for instance, a
consideration of the Dunning-Kruger effect in individuals with a broader interpretation in which “we”
refers to a whole group of knowers in a particular area of knowledge. Some clarity would also be
useful early on with regard to the nature of doubt – the uncertainty associated with it might be
psychological (“I'm/we’re not sure any more”); or epistemic (taking the form of the accumulation of
anomalies or counter-instances). Doubt can be about the whole state of knowledge in a field or
about an individual knowledge claim.

Essential for an effective analysis of the title will be a consideration of the kinds of knowledge that
are under scrutiny for their effects on confidence and doubt. If more knowledge means more data,
this is likely to render knowledge as a whole “messier”, whereas by contrast knowledge in the form
of a better theoretical overview of what is already known is more likely to make sense of the “mess”
and reduce “epistemic entropy”. It is easy to see that the effects of these two kinds of knowledge
will be markedly dissimilar, with the former likely to support the title claim and the latter
undermining it. Additionally, candidates might like to consider the nature of procedural knowledge
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– in most cases, accumulating experience and practice with regard to skills and habits is likely to
decrease doubt – thus contradicting the title.

While the values attached to confidence and doubt are not explicit in the title, it will be hard to
construct a convincing account without reference to some possibilities here. Attitudes to
confidence and doubt are fundamental here. The most obvious interpretation is likely to be that
doubt is bad and confidence is good. In this view, the title claim becomes something close to an
expression of “(having just) a little knowledge is a dangerous thing”. But being knowledgeable can
undermine confidence for taking action and lead to paralysis. Confidence can lead on to progress
in a field of knowledge. On the other hand, theoretical knowledge can undermine deeply-held
intuitions in the field of ethics; over-intellectualizing what we “know” to be true and eroding our
confidence.

Alternatively, perhaps doubt is good and confidence is bad. Doubt keeps knowers and academic
practitioners honest in their work; indeed, some disciplines have effectively institutionalized doubt
into their working practices for this reason. Guarding against over-confidence is necessary not just
as a defense against dishonesty but also because of the vast array of unconscious biases that
have been identified in human cognition. On the other hand, some people, through incapacity or
indolence, never achieve more knowledge and, by this means, remain confident! As current
politics seems to indicate, this can be a dangerous state of affairs. All of this might have
implications for education.

A third possibility is that both doubt and confidence are good. Doubting might be a sign of
confidence – of knowing how to approach the acquisition or production of knowledge; an indication
that a person understands the provisional nature of much knowledge.

Illustration of many of the above arguments needs to be made with reference to selected areas of
knowledge. Examples supporting the title claim might be found in the history of discovery in
practically any field where an initial consensus is disrupted by new evidence – continental drift, the
ether hypothesis, the Michelson-Morley experiment, quantum electrodynamics and so on.
Candidates may bring in the work of Thomas Kuhn on paradigms and the accumulation of
anomalies, leading to doubt and resolution – a new discovery disrupts previously stable normal
science and doubt in the old paradigm increases with the new evidence. Care must be taken with
this kind of material – not only in the understanding of the paradigm concept but also in how the
throwing out of the old order constitutes doubt. This seems to constitute a certainty that the old
regime was wrong. False confidence is illustrated in the assumptions of the late 19th century that
the work of physics was almost complete; whereas the value of confidence can be exemplified by
the way an overarching theory such as evolution by natural selection confers confidence in
explanations of specific phenomena and in approaching new challenges.

The human sciences and history might be open to similar lines of analysis, with new evidence
casting doubt on existing received wisdom, and new theory providing renewed confidence. It is
interesting to speculate whether the same pattern can be discerned with respect to artistic
knowledge. It is possible that the emergence of a new genre or form of expression cements
confidence in existing forms rather than casting doubt. For example, can one feel more confident
interpreting Bach post Stravinsky? The moderns tell us a lot about the nature of sound that can
now be applied to our understanding of the Baroque.

The nature of mathematics might seem to offer only counterexamples to the title claim, with
production of knowledge building upon secure foundations, but learning more about alternative
axiomatic systems might lead to doubt, as might an increasing awareness of different methods for
making progress. As implied above, it has been claimed that humans grow up with a kind of innate
“folk” ethics that develops independently of any formal study of the subject. Possibly it could be
argued that a sound knowledge of formal ethical theories can lead to doubt rather than clarity as to
what is right or what ought to be done.
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Learning about foreign cultures (through the human sciences, and possibly about indigenous
knowledge systems) presents the difficulty of the outsider, in which a modicum of knowledge
seems to bring enlightenment but then further investigation exposes the limitations of what was
previously accepted.

There is potential in the area of religion here. Religious adherents might claim that increasing
familiarity with scripture or like-minded religious communities (ie more knowledge) leads to greater
confidence, while others might point to how their own gathering of life experiences has led to doubt
itself, and possibly a renunciation of religion as a whole. More broadly, challenges to our belief
systems have been shown to produce a “backfire effect” in which we “double down” on what we
previously accepted. This leads us to important and urgent questions as to how to present
knowledge in ways that maximize the chances of recipients considering it with due care and
attention.
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3. “Without the assumption of the existence of uniformities there can be no knowledge.” Discuss this
claim with reference to two areas of knowledge.

Nature of the title

Candidates should note that this title makes a specific request for two areas of knowledge, and that
there should be a roughly balanced treatment of them. There is a need to consider alternative
relationships between uniformities and knowledge – as to whether the former are natural features
of the latter or whether the assumption of them might be a necessary step in the production of
knowledge. In other words, whether it is the absence of uniformities or the absence of starting
assumptions about them that leads to the situation in which there is “no knowledge”. In any case,
the analysis will revolve around the connections between these three key terms in the title.

Knowledge questions
Knowledge questions that a candidate might identify in the course of the development of a
response to the title include:
• What is the connection between the assumptions of the existence of uniformities of nature and
the methods we use to produce knowledge?
• Is there any way in which the validity of the assumption of the existence of uniformities can be
established? Given that there is no knowledge without it, does the assumption of the existence
of uniformities actually matter at all?
• If the assumption of the existence of uniformities is necessary for knowledge and turns out to be
false could we know it?
• What is the effect on the validity and reliability of knowledge if its production requires the
acceptance of an unverified or unverifiable assumption?
• Does the assumption of the uniformity of nature pre-empt our scientific exploration of it? Is the
assumption of the existence of uniformities of nature a question of faith?

Commentary on possible treatment

As alluded to above, there are at least two interpretations of the title that might lead to a successful
response to this title. One interpretation is that the structure of knowledge must include
uniformities (in order for it to count as knowledge). We assume almost by definition that these
uniformities exist and our job as inquisitive knowers is to find them. Hence the discovery of
uniformities is key to the production of knowledge. So no uniformities means no knowledge;
uniformities are part of the structure of knowledge.

A somewhat different interpretation is that the knower needs to assume the existence of
uniformities as a starting point for the construction of knowledge, even if in the end those
uniformities that have been posited turn out not to exist (or not so strongly or obviously as
previously assumed). The assumptions are part of the process of constructing knowledge even
though they might be abandoned or diluted at some point in the process. They are a necessary
step in the “bootstrapping” of knowledge. In this perspective, if we set out without uniformities in
mind we cannot get to knowledge; invoking uniformities is part of the process for producing
knowledge. Completely effective essays will treat this second interpretation.

Candidates may note that assumptions in general act to “clean up” knowledge but at the price of
driving a wedge between the knowledge and reality. This price might be quite different in the
context of each of the interpretations above.

Candidates also need to be clear about the kinds of uniformities that are under consideration – the
word is plural in the title and so invites the candidate to think about this. There are at least two
ways in which the idea of uniformity can be fleshed out: immutable laws of nature – If X happens
then Y happens and the more general idea that uniformity is a pattern observed in, say, behaviour
or experimental results. Both these notions of uniformity are legitimate objects of investigation in
response to this title. So for example, there are uniformities in the objects that we study –
electrons, atoms, humans, etc – and this affects the ways in which we can approach our
investigation of them. Secondly, there may be uniformities in the relations between objects –
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causal regularities, laws of nature, persistence of patterns and correlations. Again, such
uniformities permit certain methodologies. Thirdly, there can be uniformities in the methodologies
themselves – this allows knowledge to be shared as there can be common standards for
replicability and so on. Moreover, uniformities in methods allows inductive processes to take place
as well as longitudinal studies. Last but not least, there are uniformities in the capacities of
knowers – constancy of perception, language, cognitive apparatus and so on.

Candidates need to embed such points of analysis in a consideration of carefully chosen areas of
knowledge. A discussion of the methods in the natural sciences might uncover not a single
scientific method but rather a cluster that exhibits some family resemblances. The use of a
hypothetico-deductive model is predicated upon the existence of laws of nature. Similarly,
inductive methods seem to require correlations or regularities in nature. Any talk of causation
points to nature as being constituted by causal regularities. Examples could be drawn from
virtually all branches of science. Moving on from law-like generalizations, candidates might
consider taxonomic schemes as presupposing a basic set of regularities in the objects or
phenomena to be classified. Such regularities might be real and phylogenetic or merely
instrumental in getting the process of classification off the ground – hence illustrating the two
interpretations of the title discussed above. More expansively, the assumption that the universe is
comprehensible is predicated upon the existence of universal uniformities.

The human sciences also constitute a fertile area since there seems to be a tension between their
supposition of the free will of the agent on the one hand and the existence of some sort of valid
statistical (law-like) generalization on the other. The relevant uniformity here might be human
nature. A discussion of what this might entail would have to be linked explicitly back to the
question – ie that the assumption of human nature amounts to a claim about a set of uniformities or
regularities regarding human traits and dispositions. Rational expectations is a classic example
from economics. Reactions to irregularities illustrate the rival interpretations of the title, as in the
first view they are impediments to knowledge whereas in the second they may be regarded merely
as an indication of the developing maturity of the knowledge in the discipline.

Perhaps a similar analysis works with history but here there is room for particularist lines of
argument. Those who view history as being a construction based on the idiosyncrasies of
individual human beings might reject the human nature argument and thereby preclude the
possibility of history repeating itself or offering predictive insights. The assumption of uniformities
here might yield disappointing results. On the other hand, comparative methods rely on
uniformities across situations and time periods. Perhaps there are historians who ascribe to the
second view that the assumption of uniformities is more of a heuristic tool than a recognition of
reality.

On the face of it, mathematics does not seem to require any sort of assumptions about the nature
of the world. However, once it starts being applied, a whole host of assumptions might be said to
operate. Why, for example, might we expect the universe to operate according to deterministic
principles which can be expressed in relatively simple mathematical terms? The discipline exhibits
subservience to the operations of logic, and hence uniformity of the rational capacities of
mathematicians is critical, and this leads us back to the last of the categories of uniformities set out
above.

The arts might offer a contrast in that they deal with particular instances rather than universals or
generalizations. Nonetheless, artistic endeavor might make assumptions about the capacities of
human beings for aesthetic appreciation as well as basic assumptions about the uniformities of
human experience. If we all had disparate artistic sensibilities, organized public art could not get
off the ground. An interesting discussion could be had about the role of social forces in producing
convergent tastes, conventions in composition and sets of artistic values.
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Ethics as an area seems to make universalizing assumptions which could be thought of as being a
type of uniformity. However, there are particularist versions that suggest that this conclusion is not
necessary or inevitable.

In religious knowledge systems, qualities often ascribed to deities such as omniscience and
omnipotence imply universal applications to the world and hence a certain species of uniformity. It
might be possible to argue that indigenous knowledge systems concern themselves with particular
types of uniformity in connection to traditions and continuity over time. However, as always,
candidates need to take great care not to descend into cliché and unsupported speculation in this
area.
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4. “Suspension of disbelief” is an essential feature of theatre. Is it essential in other areas of

knowledge? Develop your answer with reference to two areas of knowledge.

Nature of the title

Candidates should note that this title makes a specific request for two areas of knowledge, and that
there should be a roughly balanced treatment of them. As specified in the clarifying notes released
on IBIS, these two areas of knowledge must both be different from the arts. However, it will be
hard for candidates to achieve at the highest level without first offering some clarification of what
“suspension of disbelief” might mean in theatre (and possibly in other art forms). It is likely that
successful candidates will do this, but it will not count as one of the two required areas. The claim
in the title is a strong one in insisting that the suspension is essential; however, candidates are
expected to provide a nuanced appraisal in each area rather than offering a single counterexample
in order to invalidate the claim. It is worth noting that there are some particular challenges to
navigate with this title – not least the “double negative” of disbelief being suspended that will need
careful handling by the candidate and appraisal by the examiner. Crucial to a successful response
is the notion that the suspension of disbelief is an essential feature of knowledge production in the
chosen areas. Candidates will need to unpack their own reading of “essential” and then both
illustrate this with examples and show how these examples are somehow typical.

Knowledge questions
Knowledge questions that a candidate might identify in the course of the development of a
response to the title include:
• What are the possible scenarios in which a knower might suspend disbelief?
• When might suspension of disbelief constitute a fruitful strategy in the quest for knowledge?
When might it hinder knowledge acquisition?
• Is the suspension of disbelief always a conscious and active choice?
• How can we know when to suspend disbelief and when to cease doing so?
• How can we tell when others are suspending disbelief or simply believing?

Commentary on possible treatment

Candidates are likely to interpret “suspension of disbelief” as involving the deliberate entertaining
of possibilities that may not be the case in reality, as in “I know this is not true but I want to explore
hypotheticals and learn something from them”. This involves engagement with fictions as in: “I put
aside my knowledge that that actor on stage is not really Hamlet in order to understand the
existential dilemma facing the character”; “I put aside my reservations about the assumption of
rational behaviour in economics in order to construct a generalizable model of human action”; “I put
aside my understanding of the involvement of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in
WWI in order to examine other causal factors for its outbreak”.

An alternative take on the phrase might be as follows. When a phenomenon appears to be highly
counterintuitive, knowers may want to disbelieve it but suspend their disbelief long enough to
investigate. In times past, it would have been easy to disbelieve the principle of heliocentrism, but
there were those who conquered their instinctive rejection of it in order to reach an understanding
of the truth.

There is perhaps a third possibility – there may be situations in which one is won over by alluring
claims despite a nagging sense that one ought to know better. This kind of suspension might
account for some people being taken in by repeated insistence that, for instance, Barack Obama
was born in Kenya. Insofar as this last interpretation of “suspension of disbelief” can sustain a
convincing response to the title, it should be accepted, but it would seem to be hard to show that it
leads to a disposition that is “essential” in areas of knowledge.

The first interpretation (and the one most obviously prompted by the wording of the title) involves
an active deliberate choice – accepting something for the time being in the interests of gaining
some epistemic benefit from doing so. The second is similar in this respect – but this time as a
means of resisting the urge to dismiss something that may indeed have value. The third
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interpretation seems to lead into the murky territory of gullibility, intransigence and conspiracies,
and might in many circumstances be regarded as a failure of cognition.

The first two interpretations imply that the state of suspending disbelief is temporary. That it is
instrumental in achieving some specific goal regarding the production of knowledge and can then
be discarded. The third suggests a more permanent state – that suspension of disbelief might be
thought of as belief in something despite there being compelling evidence against it. A general
appraisal of the first interpretation might contrast the value of asking high-order counterfactual
questions with the merits of a more prosaic incremental approach to knowledge in which we simply
accumulate beliefs as we go along, sticking doggedly to what seems to be true.

As mentioned above, candidates may start by explaining “suspension of disbelief” in theatre and
extend that explanation to other art forms. Poetry requires it. Novels use it. Film effectively
engages our willingness to suspend disbelief as we believe in the pictures we see. A bad film will
make us aware of our incredulity. Candidates will need to explain what it means to say that it is an
“essential feature” in these art forms – for the audience to become emotionally involved in a play,
they must respond as if the characters are real and as if the events are really happening at that
moment, even though they know that that is not the case. Otherwise there would not be empathy
with the characters, nor would we agonize over situations that didn’t actually happen. That is what
makes “suspension of disbelief” essential in the theatre. Without it we wouldn’t be able to
construct knowledge, nor acquire it at a personal level or as shared knowledge.

In this understanding of suspension, there is a need to “unsuspend” when the exercise is over –
the suspension needs to be temporary in order to return to the real world. Permanent suspension
of disbelief can morph into delusional adherence to a pet theory, and lack of awareness that the
original suspension was an epistemic device for exploration of the issue. This way lies ideology
and rigid doctrine. On the other hand, with the second interpretation, perpetual suspension of
disbelief in the actual state of the world might a good thing if it takes the form of a skeptical attitude
to what appears only on the surface to be the case.

Candidates need to explore their own unpacking of the key phrase in the title in the context of
selected areas of knowledge. Historians argue about the value of counterfactuals in their area –
some scholars welcome them as a means of making comparisons in a discipline in which
experiments are not possible, while others dismiss them as flights of fancy with little inherent value.
Hence the first perspective on the key phrase finds no general consensus in this field. However, a
positive application of the second perspective would support historians in their efforts to remain
open to new interpretations of events.

In the sciences, there are many examples of suspension of disbelief in action. There are useful
fictions in which models and theories are deliberately simplified in the interests of furthering
comprehension, making predictions and finding applications. And then there are many
counterintuitive findings in science that require mental fortitude in order to accept (ie stave off
disbelief). Both kinds of demand are made in connection with quantum science, where orbitals and
hybridization involve simplification, and where the acceptance of quantum phenomena is
necessary despite the fact that they seem impossible in the world with which we are familiar. With
regard to scientific method, the hypothetico-deductive model seems to elevate the suspension of
disbelief in the creation of hypotheses and then champions an attitude of disbelief in how we treat
them.

An aspect of religious experience is the management of doubt. There is perhaps a role here for a
consideration of various ways of knowing – particularly faith, emotion, imagination and intuition.
Perhaps a believer’s faith is dependent on the extent to which they are willing to suspend disbelief.
But, if so, this is not about “entertaining” religion; it is at most about suppressing disbelief and thus
here we seem to have an instance of the third notion of suspended disbelief as described above.
With regard to the existence of deities, the issue would seem to be whether adherents are
suspending disbelief or simply believing.
 – 15 –

In the human sciences, we find relevant scenarios in economics. For instance, we suspend our
disbelief when accepting the model of perfect competition to understand the world of markets.
There is the danger here of economists introducing assumptions (under the guise of suspensions
of disbelief) that they know do not actually hold in the world, but then the disbelief starts to fade
and the assumptions recede into the broader set of ideological settings that have become
accepted.

Anthropomorphism is a feature of many indigenous communities, and an exploration regarding

how essential it is and why, might be fruitful. Arguments can be made regarding the extent to
which their worldview is influenced or even depends on this “suspension of disbelief”, and the
meaning derived from it. Andean indigenous peoples, for example, attribute to mountains the
power of male spirits that fertilize the female land – this is their explanation of how nature works –
one that provides meaning. Again, it needs to be asked whether members of these communities
are really suspending disbelief or just believing what they happen to believe.

Once again, this title seems to exhibit connections to current affairs. Candidates might also
explore the conditions under which we are not prepared to suspend disbelief and why that may
be so.
 – 16 –

5. “The quality of knowledge produced by an academic discipline is directly proportional to the

duration of historical development of that discipline.” Explore this claim with reference to two
disciplines.

Nature of the title

Candidates should note that this title makes a specific request for two disciplines. The two
disciplines could even come from the same area of knowledge, but candidates would have to take
care to ensure that sufficient contrast was available in such a comparison in order to sustain a
worthwhile analysis. It is important to note that the title is asking about the production of
knowledge, not its acquisition. The success of a response to this title will depend to no small
extent on a convincing unpacking of the idea of “quality” of knowledge – there is a lot of leeway in
this concept and several pitfalls loom, such as a conflation with quantity. The best analyses will
need to provide not just evidence for and/or against the claim in the title but also some plausible
reasons for whatever conclusions are drawn. The title claims explicitly that the degree of
progression in quality is proportional to the age of the discipline. Candidates must focus on this
rather than the temptation to deal exclusively with the question of whether there is any progress
at all.

The notion of proportionality is ambiguous and examiners should try to accommodate alternative
interpretations. Some candidates might take a strict mathematical view that there is a linear
relation between duration and quality. Counterexamples to this position would be claims that
quality changes in a non-linear fashion: exponential increase say. A broader view might be that
the change in quality has an upwards linear trend but that there were some dips in development.
In any case, examiners should not insist on a discussion about the origins of disciplines although
such discussion may well be illuminating.

Knowledge questions
Knowledge questions that a candidate might identify in the course of the development of a
response to the title include:
• What features of knowledge can contribute to its quality? Are these features similar across
disciplines?
• What kinds of developments in knowledge might contribute to its quality? Might some
developments detract from it? What if the criteria for quality have themselves shifted over time?
• Is the historical development of knowledge in a discipline sufficiently regular in order for its
duration to function as an accurate measure of quality?
• To what extent is it possible to identify the origins of disciplines as benchmarks for their
duration?
• Do the differences between objects of study in different disciplines fatally compromise any
attempt at comparison of quality across them? Are there other particularities of disciplines that
invalidate comparison of quality?

Commentary on possible treatment

As noted above, there is an urgent need to unpack what might be meant by “quality of knowledge”.
Candidates might consider some of the following – that “quality” is related to success in explaining
phenomena in the discipline’s field of study, to the identification of real-world applications and
improving quality of life, to the degree of internal coherence and consistency in the discipline, or
perhaps to the degree of comprehensibility or communicability of the knowledge itself. One
obvious problem is that it is difficult to maintain one measure for quality over time, and it is possible
that some of the measures that seem to resonate with us today might not make any sense to those
working in the same disciplines long ago.

Candidates will also have to consider why the quality of knowledge in a discipline might have
increased. Perhaps there has been more time for refinement and review of pre-existing
knowledge, maybe there are more people working in the field finding out more things, possibly
there has been more opportunity to root out error, or there has been time for the knowledge to be
tested against a wider range of circumstances. The degree of assent to the claim is likely to
 – 17 –

depend upon the nature of the objects of study in the various disciplines, and this arguably creates
another confounding circumstance in the quest to make valid comparisons across them. In these
circumstances, it will be easy to fall back on some measure of the amount of knowledge rather
than its quality, and that should be resisted. Quality of knowledge may not always increase in a
linear fashion and this might prompt further reflection on whether a comparison made across two
disciplines is actually fair, given that some crucial breakthrough might be made in one of them
tomorrow that would unilaterally and substantially alter the comparison.

Candidates are likely to suggest that the quality of knowledge is dependent on things other than
just simple duration. These may include the priorities attached to different kinds of knowledge now
or in the past, the contributions of eminent individuals whose impact was largely contingent, the
emergence of a dominant theory or paradigm that proved particularly fruitful, or of a single method
that can be applied to a wide range of circumstances, or even as a result of pure serendipity.
Nevertheless, some of these influences can be factored into an analysis based on duration as
many of them become more likely the more time is available for them to occur. This might make it
harder to sustain strong counterclaims that exclude duration as a prominent factor.

As implied above, perhaps a relativistic argument based on irreconcilable differences between

objects of study in different disciplines might be most successful in this regard. In any case,
candidates will need to be careful that they do not wholly dismiss the main thrust of the title and
then write an essay which answers a different question.

Not only is “quality” a problematic term in this title, but the candidate also needs to cope with the
definitions and the historical integrity of disciplines. In many cases it is hard to pinpoint the origins
of certain disciplines, and their relationships often seem to resemble a complicated dance through
time. Furthermore, disciplines have changed names – natural history to biology, political economy
to economics, and so on.

All these definitional and operational difficulties notwithstanding, the candidate will need to select
two disciplines and hang the analysis upon them. In mathematics, ancient scholarship still carries
great value. This is because of the method by which knowledge is produced in which something
established remains so (by proof), so mathematicians can only add to the corpus over time. These
kinds of additions might count as increased quality if they are about filling in gaps and enhancing
the overall cohesion of the field of knowledge. Increased quality of knowledge in this area might
take the form of a larger arsenal of techniques and procedures at the disposal of mathematicians.
By contrast, many scientific claims from ancient times have been shown to be mistaken. Again,
this is due to the methodology involved, which here leaves knowledge provisional and open to
revision. In this sense, it could be argued that the sciences have increased their quality of
knowledge over time to a greater extent than has been the case in mathematics. But the title asks
for treatment of individual disciplines so it is crucial for candidates to drill down into a particular one
and proceed from there.

Most human sciences have shorter histories than natural sciences, so responses to the claim in
the title might rest on whether these disciplines can be shown to be less mature and/or more riven
by disagreement. As an exception as a group 3 IB subject, philosophy might offer candidates
opportunities for a different conclusion, but a case would need to be made that this discipline
counts as a human science.

Ethics, perhaps partially insulated from developments elsewhere, seems to rival mathematics as
an ancient discipline, but the question of how much progress has been made is controversial.
Technology continually throws up new issues for ethicists, but arguably these are mainly new
formulations of old questions and do not contribute to the quality of knowledge.

Change in the arts is beyond doubt, but candidates might struggle to present these changes as
instances of increasing quality. It is difficult to agree with the claim here unless some way of
arguing that art builds upon itself can be mounted.
 – 18 –

History is another example of an ancient discipline, but it can be claimed that it has become truly
empirical only since the 19th century, so, depending on the time period under consideration, we
might be faced with the dilemma of different criteria for quality over time. Those of a non-religious
stance may want to argue that religion is a prime example of stagnating knowledge divorced from
progress in other areas, but counterarguments may revolve around the capacity of religions to
absorb quality by adapting influences from numerous cultural origins. Examiners should accept
individual religions as instances of disciplines. Candidates who want to address indigenous
knowledge systems would do well to select an example with which they are familiar and consider
the difficulties with identifying disciplines and the origins of whatever knowledge is under
consideration.

Counterclaims to the title claim may deal with emerging disciplines such as robotics, data analytics
or quantum biology. Candidates might note that such enterprises tend to be interdisciplinary in
origin.
 – 19 –

6. “Robust knowledge requires both consensus and disagreement.” Discuss this claim with reference
to two areas of knowledge.

Nature of the title

Candidates should note that this title makes a specific request for two areas of knowledge, and that
there should be a roughly balanced treatment of them. The underlying dynamic of this title is that
both consensus and disagreement are essential for knowledge to attain robust status. Candidates
might deliberate on whether these two are processes that lead to the production of robust
knowledge or merely descriptive features of that kind of knowledge. An important task for the
candidate, then, is to keep the concept of robustness distinguishable from each of the other key
terms so that a meaningful conclusion can be reached. It might be difficult to produce a strong
argument against the claim in the title – if this is the case, then the key task for the candidate is to
elucidate the roles of consensus and disagreement in the matrix of knowledge production and
indicate how these roles might vary according to circumstances.

Knowledge questions
Knowledge questions that a candidate might identify in the course of the development of a
response to the title include:
• What might be the features of knowledge that contribute to its robustness? How can we know
when we have robust knowledge?
• Under what circumstances might broad consensus with regard to an item of knowledge render it
robust? Under what circumstances might consensus undermine it?
• Is robust knowledge the kind of knowledge that resists disagreement (and can be seen to do so)
or is disagreement part of the process by which knowledge becomes robust?
• Should consensus and disagreement operate simultaneously or in some kind of sequence in
order to generate robust knowledge?
• Whose consensus and disagreement should count in the processes of the production of robust
knowledge?

Commentary on possible treatment

Candidates addressing this title will need to make some decisions as to the character of robust
knowledge. As indicated above, the description of this type of knowledge must not simply echo the
meaning of either of the other two terms in the title – while consensus sounds like a good start for
robustness, it cannot be sufficient. Robust knowledge might mean knowledge that is solid, healthy,
durable, comprehensible, defensible, coherent, open to scrutiny, or resistant to challenge. At the
same time, the range of these possibilities highlight the danger that the interpretation of robustness
may vary across areas of knowledge.

It seems obvious that consensus is essential if there is to be shared knowledge of any kind. But
candidates need to consider who has the qualifications to be part of any consensus that matters.
Consensus may arise not from common conclusions that arise from dispassionate consideration of
evidence but less helpfully from ideological positions or from self-centred calculations among
individuals with common interests.

There may be knowledge that is robust to the extent of being settled – in such cases disagreement
may be unnecessary or even unhelpful. It may even be advisable to shut down pointless
discussion about it when it involves the participation of outsiders lacking in relevant credentials
(eg climate change, Holocaust denial, evolutionary origins) and who may have little stake in the
disinterested accumulation of knowledge. Disagreement can narrow to trivial details or the absurd.
Sometimes there is a need to avoid engagement with adversaries in order to prevent legitimization
of corrupted views. Disreputable disagreement stems from ignorance or from those with an
agenda in mind. Often such disagreement is focused on the practitioners rather than on the
knowledge itself.
 – 20 –

Candidates are likely to note that excessive consensus can easily lead to stultifying unanimity of
views and weakening of overall conclusions through convergence and compromise. Similarly,
consensus does not automatically imply truth. Filter bubbles and echo chambers populate
communal space these days, and consensus is often associated with unhelpful aspects of
committee dynamics.

A satisfactory response to the title will almost certainly emphasize the importance of balance.
What is needed is an equilibrium point between too much consensus and creeping complacency
(stagnation) and too much disagreement and no common foundation for work or progress. There
may be agreement as to the importance of language to consensus and disagreement: robust
knowledge must be couched in unambiguous terms in order to avoid disagreement about
trivialities.

Candidates will need to situate these sorts of considerations within the context of the areas of
knowledge that they choose for this essay. The balance between consensus and disagreement
will depend upon these choices – perhaps a wider consensus can be found in natural sciences and
mathematics. Furthermore, a standard answer to the title will likely place the sciences and arts at
opposite ends of a continuum (perhaps with the goals of reaching universal truth and provoking
controversy respectively).

In the arts, there may be some consensus on conventions, but disagreement on the message to be
taken from the art itself. Stagnation would occur without disagreement, and hence there is
continual tension between consensus and disagreement. Perhaps today that tension is stronger
than ever and many audiences or spectators lack confidence in what art tells us and how it does it,
making it harder to identify robust knowledge in this area.

In mathematics, there is likely to be greater disagreement about methods of approaching problems

rather than about the knowledge itself. While one cannot disagree with an established proof, there
may be disagreements at the level of methodology or notation.

The sciences can be considered as an institutionalized space for controlled disagreement, and
hence there are deeply embedded norms that guard against lazy consensus. Nevertheless,
consensus is essential in this area, not least because of our reliance on applications – we need it
or else lives may be at risk in the manufacture of medicines, aviation, bridges and so on.
Candidates may mention that in the natural sciences we need knowledge which is reproducible,
replicable and generalizable but that does not mean that it is static at any point in time. For the
production of knowledge, we need consolidation for which we need disagreement.

Candidates may argue that the objects of study in the human sciences make it inevitable that
disagreement will play a prominent role in knowledge production. Living with more disagreement,
human scientists find themselves prey to the dangers of politicization and the injection of ideology
into debate.

Progress and patterns in history would seem to support the title statement easily. But as with other
areas of knowledge, what is meant by robust knowledge needs exploring. In this context it might
be characterized as knowledge for which there is evidence and exhibits coherence with what has
already been established. It may be that the individualized nature of the historian’s work produces
disagreement more between particular historians rather than between groups. Ethics is an area
fraught by disagreement due to its very nature and strongly dependent on culture for its knowledge
claims. The challenge for the ethicist may be to try to see past these specifics in order to reach
conclusions that demonstrate robustness when applied to humanity as a whole. In religious
knowledge systems, candidates can explore the role of consensus as expressed through common
practice and ritual. Disagreements can be regarded as heresy, but then they are also responsible
for divergence in doctrine and origin of denominations, not to mention longstanding debate within
religions. In indigenous knowledge systems, consensus can be strong as a binding factor for
culture.
 – 21 –

In order to draw a response together in a coherent manner, candidates may consider the various
ways in which consensus and disagreement interact. For example, a sequential paradigm model
might be invoked in which consensus is followed by disagreement and then by a new consensus.
In contrast, there is a parallel cumulative model according to which there is consensus with
continual disagreement at fringes leading to consolidated consensus as time goes on. Examples
will need to be provided in order to illustrate these alternatives.

Finally, it may be worth scrutinizing the objects of disagreement and consensus – it is possible to
have consensus about the “big knowledge picture” and disagreement about the details. This would
produce a very different scenario to one in which the disagreements were much more deep-seated
and concerned with fundamental aspects of knowledge in the field. So the analysis might in the
end revolve around the best locations for consensus and disagreement in the quest for progress.