Pabusta, Mheryza

3A

Pre-Trial

G.R. NO. 145276

ROLANDO AGULTO, MAXIMA AGULTO and CECILLE TENORIO VS. WILLIAM Z. TECSON

Facts:

Respondent William Z. Tecson filed an action for damages against petitioners Rolando Agulto,
Maxima Agulto, Cecille Tenoria and a certain Maribel Mallari in the RTC of Quezon City.

The petitioners and Mallari filed an answer claiming that the respondent had no cause of action
against them, alleging malicious prosecution. They then prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint.

RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time.
Respondent filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. On The RTC
ordered the revival of the complaint and required the parties to appear during the pre-trial
conference scheduled on January 21, 1999. The pre-trial was, however, reset to April 29, 1999.

During the scheduled pre-trial, the petitioner Rolando Agulto and his counsel were informed by
an employee of the RTC that the presiding judge was on leave. The counsel for petitioners
suggested that the pre-trial be reset. The RTC employee advised petitioner's counsel that the
suggested setting was not yet official as it would depend on the calendar of the court and the
counsel of respondent.

The pre-trial proceeded on June 17, 1999. For failure of petitioners to appear at the pre-trial and
to submit their pre-trial brief, the RTC issued an order allowing the respondent to present his
evidence ex parte.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. They claimed that they were not notified of the
pre-trial held on June 17, 1999. Before the motion could be heard, however, the court rendered
its decision in favor of respondent. Petitioners were ordered to pay respondent moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the aggregate amount of P170,000.

After receiving a copy of the decision, petitioners filed motions to cite respondent's counsel in
contempt of court and to set the decision aside. RTC denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and the motions to cite counsel in contempt of court and to set its decision
aside.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. They claimed that the RTC gravely abused
its discretion when it issued the September 24, 1999 order. They also asserted that the RTC
violated their constitutional right to due process when it decided the case not on the merits but
on mere technicalities.

The CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the proper remedy was appeal by writ of error. The
CA also held that the petitioners failed to show that their absence during the scheduled pre-trial
was for a valid cause.

Issues:

Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the respondent to present
his evidence ex- parte after the questioned pre- trial.Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it allowed the respondent to present his evidence ex- parte after the questioned
pre- trial.

Held:

Under the present Section 3, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the notice of pre-trial
should be served on counsel. The counsel served with notice is charged with the duty of
notifying the party he represents. It is only when a party has no counsel that the notice of pre-
trial is required to be served personally on him. Thus, the present rule simplifies the procedure
in the sense that notice of pre-trial is served on counsel, and service is made on a party only if
he has no counsel.6 It does not, however, dispense with notice of pre-trial.

Here, no notice of pre-trial was served on counsel of petitioners in connection with the pre-trial
held on June 17, 1999. Hence, the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it issued
its June 17, 1999 order allowing respondent to present his evidence ex parte. Considering that
the RTC gravely abused its discretion, petitioners availed of the proper remedy when they filed
a petition for certiorari with the CA

Trial

G.R. No. 220826

HUN HYUNG PARK VS. EUNG WON CHOI

Facts:

Eung Won Choi (Choi) was charged for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known
as the Bouncing Checks Law, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati for issuing a
postdated check in the amount of P1,875,000. The same was dishonored for having been
drawn against insufficient funds. Choi filed a demurer to evidence after the prosecution rested
its case. The Makati Metropolitan Trial Court granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case.

Hun Hyung Park (Park) appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati, contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect.
RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove respondent‘s criminal
liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. Upon a motion for reconsideration,
however, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC for
further proceedings, so that the defendant may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case.

Issue:

WON Choi was deprived of due process?

Held:

Choi was not deprived of due process, either: (i) in the MeTC Order dated March 7, 2011, as
affirmed by the RTC-Branch 142, declaring Choi to have waived his right to present evidence
after he moved for a sixth postponement; or (ii) in the RTC-Branch 142 Order dated March 28,
2012 denying his Motion for Reconsideration two days before the lapse of the ten (10) days
period given to him by the RTC to file his Reply to the Opposition (to the Motion for
Reconsideration).

Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC-Branch 142, was correct in
ruling that Choi had waived his right to present evidence.
Claiming that substantive justice must be the determinative end of courts, Choi argues that any
grant of postponement must take into consideration the reason for the postponement and the
merits of the case of the movant. To that extent, the Court agrees, and so holds, that Choi had
been provided with more than ample opportunity to present his case.

To begin with, the grant or denial of a motion — or, in this case, motions — for postponement is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which should always be predicated on the
consideration that the ends of justice and fairness are served by the grant or denial of the
motion. As the Court enunciated in Sibay v. Bermudez:

x x x After all, postponements and continuances are part and parcel of our procedural system of
dispensing justice. When no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not
manifest with the corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it
is sound judicial discretion to allow the same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully
ventilated. Thus, in considering motions for postponements, two things must be borne in mind:
(1) the reason for the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the movant. Unless grave
abuse of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by mandamus or
appeal. Because it is a matter of privilege, not a right, a movant for postponement should
not assume beforehand that his motion will be granted.

Modes of Discovery

A.C No. 9923

ATTY. RAYMUND P. PALAD VS. ATTY. LORNA PATAJO-KAPUNAN

Facts:

Petitioner Atty. Raymund Palad initiated the present petition to cite Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan
for indirect contempt in view of the latter's statement on air pertaining to the former's suspension
from the practice of law, thus, violating the confidentiality rule under Section 18, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors issued a Resolution
recommending his suspension from the practice of law. He moved for reconsideration. As
Hayden Kho's counsel, Atty. Patajo-Kapunan manifested that she would no longer comment on
the motion for reconsideration.

He received a text message from a friend, informing him that "Pilipino Star Ngayon" carried a
news article on his supposed one-year suspension from the practice of law. He immediately
wrote then Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno requesting an investigation of the persons
who prematurely released the information.

He received more calls from his friends, informing him that Atty. Patajo-Kapunan was on a
phone patch live interview on DZMM Teleradyo with Noli de Castro. There, she volunteered
information that he had indeed been suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. He
was able to secure and transcribe an audio recording of the interview.

Atty. Patajo-Kapunan violated Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court ordaining that disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are confidential. Further, at the time of her interview, there was yet
no Supreme Court decision confirming his suspension from the practice of law. By reason of
Atty. Patajo-Kapunan's premature and inaccurate disclosure, she should be penalized with
indirect contempt of court.
Issue:

Should Atty. Patajo-Kapunan be held liable for indirect contempt of court for violating Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court?

Held:

No. The power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly is
an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the
dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the administration of justice
from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court
orders. This contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and
sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. It should not be availed
of unless necessary in the interest of justice.